A combinatorial auction with multiple winners for universal service

Kelly, F. & Steinberg, R.ORCID logo (2000). A combinatorial auction with multiple winners for universal service. Management Science, 46(4), 586-596. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.4.586.12054
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We describe a discrete-time auction procedure called PAUSE (Progressive Adaptive User Selection Environment) for use in assigning COLR (Carrier of Last Resort) responsibility for universal service. The auction incorporates synergies by permitting all combinatorial bids, is transparent to the bidders, allows for multiple winners, and minimizes the possibility of bidder collusion. The procedure is computationally tractable for the auctioneer and thus very efficient to run. The inherent computational complexity of combinatorial bidding cannot be eliminated. However, in this auction the computational burden of evaluating synergies rests with the bidders claiming those synergies, while the auctioneer simply checks that a bid is valid.

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