An equilibrium search-matching model of discrimination
Rosen, A.
(1992).
An equilibrium search-matching model of discrimination.
(CEPDP 97).
London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
A model in which firms have incomplete information about workers at the hiring stage is shown to entail discrimination as the unique stable equilibrium outcome, even if no agents have a taste for discrimination. Discriminated groups (e.g., blacks, women) earn lower wages, endure longer unemployment spells, and must satisfy stricter requirements in order to obtain work.
| Item Type | Working paper |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 1992 A.Rosen |
| Departments | LSE > Research Centres > Centre for Economic Performance |
| Date Deposited | 20 Aug 2008 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/21024 |