Ist das rechtliche postulat ein postulat der reinen praktischen vernunft

While German speaking Kant scholars tend to focus on interpreting the ‘postulate of practical reason with regard to Right' as a permissive law ( lex permissiva ), their English speaking counterparts emphasise its status as a postulate of pure practical reason. The present article seeks to establish a connection between the postulate's two functions. The paper distinguishes between a.) a justificatory function and b.) a referring function of the postulate of Right. In its first function as a lex permissiva the postulate justifies the right to external possession of each person. In its second function as a postulate of pure practical reason it refers agents to the ‘final end' or ‘final purpose' of the Doctrine of Right as a whole, namely to the idea of cosmopolitan Right as an idea of pure practical reason. The referring function of the postulate of Right follows as a corollary from its justificatory function: b.) is thus conceptually dependent upon a.). This interpretation establishes a systematic connection between Kant's account of Private Right on the one hand and his view of cosmopolitan Right on the other hand: the final end of securing the right of each lies in establishing ‘thoroughgoing' relations of Right among all.