Epistemic perspectives on democratic participation, freedom and empowerment

Abstract

The thesis aims to tackle two fundamental questions about epistemic aspects of democratic theory. First, which epistemic goals should democratic decision-making have and can they be pursued in a way that allows for decision-making that is both inclusive and competent? Second, how can these epistemic goals be pursued in a democracy in a manner that respects and promotes voters’ epistemic autonomy? In the first two chapters, I discuss the types of truth democracies can track and explain for which of these types more inclusive forms of decision-making will outperform less inclusive ones. In chapter one, I compare direct and representative voting on this basis, and in chapter two, deliberative mini-publics and their alternatives. Chapters three and four aim to tackle the question of which changes to voters’ informational environments can improve their epistemic autonomy and empower them. In chapter three, I coin the term “freedom of information choice”, understood as the ability to form evaluative judgments autonomously, and explain which sets of information options allow for it. In chapter four, I provide an interpretation of the epistemic empowerment of voters and explain which types of interventions will promote it. Together, these chapters provide a framework for the type of interventions in voters’ epistemic environments that could improve both inclusivity and epistemic autonomy while maintaining quality decision-making.