The warrior-politicians: Henry L. Stimson, the War Department, and the politics of American grand strategy during World War II

This thesis examines how the War Department operated as a bureaucratic, political, and policy actor within the politics of wartime Washington during World War II, focusing on the role of Henry Stimson as secretary of war. This project is centered around a puzzle: why did the Army – and the military more broadly – gain unprecedented levels of influence over U.S. national policy under a president renowned for centralizing authority and decision-making in his own hands? This thesis concludes that the War Department emerged as pivotal policymaking nexus within the U.S. government because its senior civilian officials transformed it into a political actor which actively worked to influence the bureaucratic and foreign policy decision-making process. This thesis studies formal U.S. decision-making by incorporating bureaucratic politics and rivalries alongside other forms of domestic political wrangling to explain how the Army both shaped American grand strategy and grew into a key actor within the wartime political establishment. War Department leaders streamlined their own bureaucracy and improved civil-military relations with the Army to craft a coherent political and policy agenda. They cultivated relationships with key executive branch officials and legislators to build coalitions to support its policy initiatives. And they inserted the Army into political conversations and decision-making processes it previously was not involved in to entire its interests were met. The result was that the Army gained important leverage over its bureaucratic rivals – namely the Navy and the State Departments – which helped it drive the political and policy conversations within the executive branch and in Washington. This meant national policy and strategy were substantially influenced by Army thinking, debated on Army terms, and often shifted as Army officials and planners adjusted their strategic outlook. By examining how the War Department labored to mold U.S. national security decision-making during World War II, this thesis expands our understanding of how different agencies compete to influence the U.S. foreign policy process and achieve their preferred policy outcomes