Informal governance in hybrid federalism as a tool of containment, not transformation: the case of Nepal

Imrie-Kuzu, D. & Mathema, K. (2026). Informal governance in hybrid federalism as a tool of containment, not transformation: the case of Nepal. Regional and Federal Studies, https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2026.2613261
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Nepal’s 2015 federalization promised greater autonomy for marginalized groups, particularly the Madheshis. Yet rather than dispersing power, federalism has entrenched central dominance. This article investigates how this outcome emerged, drawing on interviews with hard-to-reach communities and critical analysis of Nepalese media. It reveals that informal coalition politics and judicial activism function not as constraints on central authority but as tools to sustain it. Crucially, Madheshi leaders invoke judicial authority to deflect accountability for blocked reforms while retaining access to federal power. The article introduces a novel argument: hybrid federalism should not be seen as a temporary or transitional phase, but as a durable political strategy that offers symbolic inclusion while obstructing substantive change. It challenges prevailing theories of institutional hybridity by showing how elites intentionally preserve hybrid arrangements to manage contestation without transformation. Nepal's case thus sheds new light on how institutional hybridity is deployed in the Global South.

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