US Supreme Court decision making in Intellectual Property rights (1954-2022)

Unah, I. & Peng, S. Z. T. (2024). US Supreme Court decision making in Intellectual Property rights (1954-2022). In Fix, M. & Montgomery, M. (Eds.), Research Handbook On Judicial Politics (pp. 14 - 34). Edward Elgar. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781035309320.00010
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We analyze U.S. Supreme Court decision making in the complex area of intellectual property (IP) to determine whether the Court is strengthening, keeping neutral, or weakening the rights of intellectual property owners. We argue that the Court’s strategic currency is to weaken IP protections to counteract the value stretching and monopolistic tendencies of IP holders. Relying on original data covering four judicial Eras from the Warren Court to the Roberts Court (1954-2022), the analysis strongly supports our theoretical argument, especially as it pertains to patents, showing that the Supreme Court is weakening the rights of patent holders in the IP ecosystem. We further find that there is no IP exceptionalism in the Supreme Court when it comes to ideological influences but that these ideological effects are highly codependent upon other institutional factors. Interestingly, liberal Justices are significantly more likely than conservative Justices to disfavor expanding protections for intellectual property owners.

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