Kant’s republican account of citizenship

Kant's political philosophy has experienced a recent revival, largely due to influential interpretations that frame his concept of right as a republican account of “non-domination.” One of the major challenges in reconstructing Kant's concept of law within neo-republican terms is his notion of citizenship. While neo-republicans have made substantial efforts to distance themselves from the traditional view that restricted voting rights to mainstream white men, Kant's distinction between “active” and “passive” citizens still echoes this conventional line of thought. Without dismissing the prevalence of the sexist and classist prejudices inherent in Kant's active/passive dichotomy, this paper argues that Kant introduces this distinction with the republican aim of securing a state governed by non-arbitrary laws. I contend that this aim explains Kant's concern with the civic character of citizens and their ability to contest structures of domination—a line of argument that aligns him more closely with contemporary neo-republicanism.