The moral ambiguity of the AI consciousness debate

In this paper, I review the recent debate on the prospect of AI consciousness and assess its ethical relevance. Intuitively, when a being is conscious, this is sufficient to ground its non-derivative moral status. However, the semantic content of consciousness is ambiguous, particularly when attributed to non-biotic entities. Standard ethical accounts concerning the moral status of sentient beings presuppose affective or valenced consciousness. Yet, recent speculations about artificial consciousness have largely been driven by considerations of cognitive architecture, often neglecting the affective aspect of subjective experience. Crucially, no persuasive narrative currently exists about how valenced states may emerge in artificial systems. This significantly reduces the ethical relevance of current AI consciousness claims. As ethicists, we are well-advised to treat such claims with care, demanding precision and rigor when consciousness is attributed to artificial systems. This involves developing logically coherent claims about the emergence of artificial valence.