Biafra and the politics of naming genocide

Although the Nigeria-Biafra war of 1966-1970 may not be included in the canon of cases most often studied by genocide scholars, it is an early example of the power of the term “genocide” to shape responses to purported genocide. This chapter begins by summarizing the Nigeria-Biafra war. It then focuses on the contentions surrounding the discourse used to describe the conflict, and in particular the use of the term “genocide” by Biafrans and their supporters, and the extraordinary lengths to which the British government in particular - a staunch ally of the post-colonial Nigerian government - went to deny that “genocide” was ongoing. The case of Biafra is one of the first conflicts that demonstrated the power of the social norm against genocide: governments (principally the British) came under pressure from civil society to take action to try to stop or prevent “genocide”; but if that action was considered undesirable, they sought to avoid the use of the term “genocide,” with the British going so far as to organize an observer force tasked with showing that it was not a case of genocide. The winning side in the war - the Nigerian government backed by the British - shaped the discourse about what was happening; not only was it not a case of genocide, but it was also a case in which the term genocide was used erroneously, for “public relations” purposes. The legacy of this winning discourse then helped ensure that the case has often been excluded from emblematic cases of genocide.