Does the case of the Chilean nitrate boom support activist or deterministic interpretations of the ‘resource curse’?

Literature attesting to the existence of a resource ‘curse’ implied that economic prospects for resource abundant nations were poor and out of their hands. Not only had resource abundance created difficult-tomanage structural conditions, but it had also corrupted institutions and, in turn, condemned nations to further negative management of resources in the future. A critical branch of literature rose in opposition, suggesting that the outcomes of resource abundant nations had not been predetermined by their resources, but had been contingent on active institutional management. Correct management could not only have mitigated the immediate structural and institutional impacts of the socalled ‘curse,’ but it could also have prevented the degradation of these virtuous institutional behaviours themselves. This comment will add to the debate by demonstrating which theory applies better to the case of Chile during its nitrate era: which stated ‘curse’ effects struck Chile, and how culpable was institutional management in this process? I find that whilst there are definite ‘curse’ symptoms, institutional management played a larger role than ‘determinists’ would predict, supporting the ‘activist’ strand of argument. This is not to downplay, however, the pressures that resource abundance exerted, even in countries that had a claim to institutional exceptionality.