Heterogeneous electoral constituencies against legislative gridlock

Legislative gridlocks, driven by social partisan sorting, pose a significant threat to contemporary democracies. In this paper, I argue that this problem can be addressed by replacing geographic electoral constituencies, which group voters by area of residence, with heterogeneous electoral constituencies, which are based on random assignment and thus reflect the diversity of the entire electorate. I show that geographic electoral constituencies are likely to crystallise cleavages that reinforce geographic divisions, whereas heterogeneous electoral constituencies are likely to dilute deep social divisions. I argue that heterogeneous constituencies have this effect not because they suppress intergroup difference, as is commonly held, but rather because they encourage political parties to express cross-cutting social identities. The politicisation of cross-cutting social cleavages prevents social partisan sorting and moderates political conflict. Heterogeneous electoral constituencies should therefore be considered as part of an expressive institutional response to the democratic threat of legislative gridlock.