The architecture of macroprudential policy: delegation and coordination
Bean, C.
(2022).
The architecture of macroprudential policy: delegation and coordination.
In
Holzmann, R. & Restoy, F.
(Eds.),
Central Banks and Supervisory Architecture in Europe: Lessons from Crises in the 21st Century
(pp. 96 - 107).
Edward Elgar.
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781802208894.00015
(2022).
The architecture of macroprudential policy: delegation and coordination.
In
Holzmann, R. & Restoy, F.
(Eds.),
Central Banks and Supervisory Architecture in Europe: Lessons from Crises in the 21st Century
(pp. 96 - 107).
Edward Elgar.
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781802208894.00015
There are technical and political economy reasons for the delegation of macroprudential policy but the absence of a measurable objective hinders accountability while some borrower-focussed policies may raise questions of political legitimacy. Macroprudential and monetary policies theoretically do not need to reside in the same agency but in practice it may be helpful. Finally, the financial market turbulence in spring 2020 highlighted that stresses may arise beyond the regulatory perimeter, emphasising the need for vigilance.