The war on terror and the victory trap

Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump have all used the language of “victory” and “defeat” in the War on Terror despite its ambiguous outcomes. This paper develops the concept of a “victory trap” to explain this phenomenon and its political consequences. On the one hand, the electoral consequences of “losing” wars lead presidents to make claims about “winning” and eventual “victory.” On the other hand, strategic realities and public reluctance to bear the costs of total victory result in policymakers facing criticism for being unable to produce results proportionate to their rhetoric. As such, whilst scholarship is clear on the effects of both “losing” and “winning” wars, this paper provides the first exploration of how these dual dynamics play out in practice. In arguing that policymakers are oftentimes politically “trapped,” this paper suggests the limits of a range of scholarship on effective (foreign) policy-related messaging that points toward ambiguity or accuracy.