The Principal Principle and the contingent a priori

Bradley, R.ORCID logo (2024). The Principal Principle and the contingent a priori. Economics and Philosophy, 40(2), 472 - 477. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267124000014
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In Chapter 6 of Objects of Credence, Anna Mahtani argues that the opacity of credence raises difficulties for the Principal Principle and proposes a revised principle relating credence and chance that avoids it. In this comment on her book, I both defend Mahtani’s proposed principle against a charge of triviality and argue that the opacity of belief does not threaten the role of chance in guiding credence.

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