The Principal Principle and the contingent a priori
Bradley, R.
(2024).
The Principal Principle and the contingent a priori.
Economics and Philosophy,
40(2), 472 - 477.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267124000014
In Chapter 6 of Objects of Credence, Anna Mahtani argues that the opacity of credence raises difficulties for the Principal Principle and proposes a revised principle relating credence and chance that avoids it. In this comment on her book, I both defend Mahtani’s proposed principle against a charge of triviality and argue that the opacity of belief does not threaten the role of chance in guiding credence.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2024 The Author |
| Departments | LSE > Academic Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| DOI | 10.1017/S0266267124000014 |
| Date Deposited | 14 Dec 2023 |
| Acceptance Date | 03 Dec 2023 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/121056 |
Explore Further
- https://www.lse.ac.uk/cpnss/people/richard-bradley (Author)
- https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/economics-and-philosophy (Publisher)
- https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85189428538 (Scopus publication)
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2184-7844
