CEO compensation: evidence from the field
Edmans, A., Gosling, T. & Jenter, D.
(2023).
CEO compensation: evidence from the field.
Journal of Financial Economics,
150(3).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2023.103718
We survey directors and investors on the objectives, constraints, and determinants of CEO pay. We find that directors face constraints beyond participation and incentives, and that pay matters not to finance consumption but to address CEOs’ fairness concerns. 67% of directors would sacrifice shareholder value to avoid controversy, leading to lower levels and one-size-fits-all structures. Shareholders are the main source of constraints, suggesting directors and investors disagree on how to maximize value. Intrinsic motivation and reputation are seen as stronger motivators than incentive pay. Even with strong portfolio incentives, flow pay responds to performance to fairly recognize the CEO's contribution.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2023 The Author(s) |
| Departments | LSE > Academic Departments > Finance |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.jfineco.2023.103718 |
| Date Deposited | 26 Oct 2023 |
| Acceptance Date | 17 Sep 2023 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/120546 |
Explore Further
- G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- G38 - Government Policy and Regulation
- M12 - Personnel Management
- M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs, seniority issues)
- https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85174350347 (Scopus publication)
- https://www.lse.ac.uk/finance/people/faculty/Jenter (Author)
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4168-9329
