CEO compensation:evidence from the field

Edmans, Alex; Gosling, Tom; and Jenter, DirkORCID logo CEO compensation:evidence from the field Journal of Financial Economics, 150 (3): 103718. ISSN 0304-405X
Copy

We survey directors and investors on the objectives, constraints, and determinants of CEO pay. We find that directors face constraints beyond participation and incentives, and that pay matters not to finance consumption but to address CEOs’ fairness concerns. 67% of directors would sacrifice shareholder value to avoid controversy, leading to lower levels and one-size-fits-all structures. Shareholders are the main source of constraints, suggesting directors and investors disagree on how to maximize value. Intrinsic motivation and reputation are seen as stronger motivators than incentive pay. Even with strong portfolio incentives, flow pay responds to performance to fairly recognize the CEO's contribution.

picture_as_pdf

picture_as_pdf
subject
Published Version
Available under Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0

Download

Atom BibTeX OpenURL ContextObject in Span OpenURL ContextObject Dublin Core MPEG-21 DIDL Data Cite XML EndNote HTML Citation METS MODS RIOXX2 XML Reference Manager Refer ASCII Citation
Export

Downloads