The securitised ‘others’ of Russian nationalism in Ukraine and Russia

In trying to analyse and understand Russian nationalism, most scholars focus on what Russian nationalism is as an ideology. But to understand Russia’s war in Ukraine we also need to understand what Russian nationalism does. This article explores how Russian nationalism has increasingly securitized and repressed three groups: Muslim minorities living in Russia as internal ‘others’, Ukrainian citizens as external ‘others’, and Crimean Tatars, as ‘others’ in between. Overall, I argue that we need to understand the breadth and depth of the repression against these ‘others’ of Russian nationalism, which now extends to Russia’s desire to legitimize its genocide in Ukraine. This argument is also important in terms of policy: as Russia’s war against Ukraine continues, there is a real risk that some western actors will listen to or repeat Putin’s narrative that Russia is the victim and allow Putin to set the terms of ending war in Ukraine through the idea that Russia is the victim and not the aggressor.