Bank capital regulation with random audits
Bhattacharya, S., Plank, M., Strobl, G. & Zechner, J.
(2000).
Bank capital regulation with random audits.
(Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 354).
Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
We consider a model of optimal bank closure rules (cum capital replenishment by banks), with Poisson-distributed audits of the bank's asset value by the regulator, with the goal of eliminating (ameliorating) the incentives of levered bank shareholders/managers to take excessive risks in their choice of underlying assets. The roles of (tax or other) subsidies on deposit interest payments by the bank, and of the auditing frequency are examined.
| Item Type | Working paper |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2000 The Author(s) |
| Departments | LSE > Research Centres > Financial Markets Group |
| Date Deposited | 29 Jun 2023 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/119103 |