The possibility of generalized social choice functions and Nash’s independence of irrelevant alternatives

Salles, Maurice The possibility of generalized social choice functions and Nash’s independence of irrelevant alternatives Social Choice and Welfare, 60 (1-2). 299 – 311. ISSN 0176-1714

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Social choice functions are generalized to handle Nash’s independence of irrelevant alternatives. Possibility and impossibility results are established.

Item Type	Article
Keywords	AAM requested
Departments	CPNSS
DOI	10.1007/s00355-022-01437-z
Date Deposited	25 Nov 2022 10:33
URI	https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/117419

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Salles, Maurice

http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85141640302&partnerID=8YFLogxK (Scopus publication)
https://www.springer.com/journal/355 (Official URL)

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