Inference on incomplete information games with multi-dimensional actions

Inference on incomplete information games with multi-dimensional actions Economics Letters, 215: 110440. ISSN 0165-1765

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By extending de Paula and Tang (2012) and Aradillas-López and Gandhi (2016), we derive testable restrictions for uniqueness of equilibrium in games with multi-dimensional actions. We discuss two models of payoff functions which imply certain covariance restrictions for players’ actions. These restrictions can be used to construct an identified set of strategic parameters under multiple equilibria.

Item Type	Article
Keywords	multiple equilibria,partial identification,moment inequalities
Departments	Economics
DOI	10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110440
Date Deposited	14 Mar 2022 10:03
URI	https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/114341

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https://www.lse.ac.uk/economics/people/faculty/taisuke-otsu (Author)
https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/economics-le... (Official URL)

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