Why term limits may mean leaders are less likely to strike legislative deals.
Cockerham, Alexandra G.
(2022)
Why term limits may mean leaders are less likely to strike legislative deals.
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For many, term limits are a way of checking the power of government executives. In new research, Alexandra G. Cockerham challenges these assumptions. Analyzing bargaining between the legislature and executive across states with and without gubernatorial term limits, she finds that such limits mean that governors are more likely to take unilateral action. By contrast, executives who are not term-limited are likely to be more experienced in bargaining and have a greater incentive to maintain a good relationship with the legislature.
| Item Type | ['eprint_typename_blog_post' not defined] |
|---|---|
| Departments | LSE |
| Date Deposited | 18 Mar 2022 00:14 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/114242 |
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