Cognitive primitives of collective intentions:linguistic evidence of our mental ontology

Theories of collective intentions must distinguish genuinely collective intentions from coincidentally harmonized ones. Two apparently equally apt ways of doing so are the ‘neo‐reductionism’ of Bacharach (2006) and Gold and Sugden (2007a) and the ‘non‐reductionism’ of Searle (1990, 1995). Here, we present findings from theoretical linguistics that show that we is not a cognitive primitive, but is composed of notions of I and grouphood. The ramifications of this finding on the structure both of grammatical and lexical systems suggests that an understanding of collective intentionality does not require a primitive we‐intention, but the notion of grouphood implicit in team reasoning, coupled with the individual concept I. This, we argue, supports neo‐reductionism but poses difficulties for non‐reductionism.