Team reasoning: solving the puzzle of coordination
In many everyday activities, individuals have a common interest in coordinating their actions. Orthodox game theory cannot explain such intuitively obvious forms of coordination as the selection of an outcome that is best for all in a common-interest game. Theories of team reasoning provide a convincing solution by proposing that people are sometimes motivated to maximize the collective payoff of a group and that they adopt a distinctive mode of reasoning from preferences to decisions. This also offers a compelling explanation of cooperation in social dilemmas. A review of team reasoning and related theories suggests how team reasoning could be incorporated into psychological theories of group identification and social value orientation theory to provide a deeper understanding of these phenomena.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2017 The Authors |
| Keywords | common knowledge, cooperation, coordination, game theory, group identification, social dilemma, social value orientation, team reasoning |
| Departments | LSE |
| DOI | 10.3758/s13423-017-1399-0 |
| Date Deposited | 19 Mar 2021 12:24 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/109252 |
Explore Further
- http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85032801523&partnerID=8YFLogxK (Scopus publication)
- https://www.springer.com/journal/13423 (Official URL)
