Political fragmentation and government stability: evidence from local governments in Spain
Carozzi, F.
, Cipullo, D. & Repetto, L.
(2022).
Political fragmentation and government stability: evidence from local governments in Spain.
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
14(2), 23 - 50.
https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200128
, Cipullo, D. & Repetto, L.
(2022).
Political fragmentation and government stability: evidence from local governments in Spain.
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
14(2), 23 - 50.
https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200128
This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that each additional party with representation in the local parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 5 percentage points. The entry of an additional party affects stability by reducing the probability of a single-party majority and increasing the instability of governments when such a majority is not available. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability.
Explore Further
- C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H70 - General
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Carozzi, F., Cipullo, D. & Repetto, L.
(2022).
Data and Code for: Political Fragmentation and Government Stability. Evidence from Local Governments in Spain.
[Dataset]. OpenICPSR.
https://doi.org/10.3886/e125341