The incoherence of institutional reform:decentralization as a structural solution to immediate political needs

Institutional reforms are structural changes in the rules and norms of authority, with long-term, unpredictable effects on government, politics and society. But leaders undertake them to solve unrelated, discrete, short-term political problems. Understanding the latter is key to understanding the characteristics of real reforms, and hence their fate. We introduce the concept of instrumental incoherence, and use it to construct a theory of decentralization where reform is motivated by orthogonal objectives. We show that reformers’ incentives map onto the specifics of reform design via their side effects, not their main effects, which in turn lead to the medium and long-term consequences eventually realized. We characterize downwardly-accountable decentralization, which ties the hands of the center to empower local voters, vs. upwardly-accountable decentralization, which ties the hands of local government to empower the center. We use these ideas to explain highly divergent outcomes in two extreme cases: Bolivia and Pakistan, using detailed, original evidence. Our analysis likely extends to a broader class of reforms where the incentives of agents pursuing a change, and the effects of that change, are highly asymmetric in time and dimension. It also implies a serial reform dynamic corrosive to institutions and to voters’ faith in politics.