Why would passive funds invest in corporate governance?

Friedman, Henry; and Mahieux, Lucas (2021) Why would passive funds invest in corporate governance? [['eprint_typename_blog_post' not defined]]
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Ownership by passively managed funds has increased over the last 20 years. They are called passive because they hold stock in proportion to the company’s weight on a published index, such as the FTSE100 or the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Being tied to indexes means they cannot modify the weight of a specific company in their portfolio. Henry Friedman and Lucas Mahieux explore passive funds’ incentives to monitor the firms they invest in and present a nuanced view of the role that these funds play in firms’ corporate governance.

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