Why would passive funds invest in corporate governance?
Friedman, Henry; and Mahieux, Lucas
(2021)
Why would passive funds invest in corporate governance?
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Ownership by passively managed funds has increased over the last 20 years. They are called passive because they hold stock in proportion to the company’s weight on a published index, such as the FTSE100 or the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Being tied to indexes means they cannot modify the weight of a specific company in their portfolio. Henry Friedman and Lucas Mahieux explore passive funds’ incentives to monitor the firms they invest in and present a nuanced view of the role that these funds play in firms’ corporate governance.
| Item Type | ['eprint_typename_blog_post' not defined] |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2021 The Authors |
| Departments | LSE |
| Date Deposited | 15 Mar 2021 14:33 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/108691 |
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