There is a 'good' reason for EU banks to hold their own country's sovereign debt

Saka, Orkun (2020) There is a 'good' reason for EU banks to hold their own country's sovereign debt [['eprint_typename_blog_post' not defined]]

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Is it possible to attribute the banks' home bias in sovereign exposure to something beyond their externally-imposed (such as moral suasion) or internally-distorted (such as risk-shifting) incentives? Despite the so-called doom loop between the two, could the relationship of banks with their domestic governments have an underexplored silver lining?

Item Type	['eprint_typename_blog_post' not defined]
Departments	Systemic Risk Centre
Date Deposited	28 Feb 2020 11:45
URI	https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/103620

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Saka, Orkun

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