Fast algorithms for rank-1 bimatrix games
The rank of a bimatrix game is the matrix rank of the sum of the two payoff matrices. This paper comprehensively analyzes games of rank one, and shows the following: (1) For a game of rank r, the set of its Nash equilibria is the intersection of a generically one-dimensional set of equilibria of parameterized games of rank r − 1 with a hyperplane. (2) One equilibrium of a rank-1 game can be found in polynomial time. (3) All equilibria of a rank-1 game can be found by following a piecewise linear path. In contrast, such a path-following method finds only one equilibrium of a bimatrix game. (4) The number of equilibria of a rank-1 game may be exponential. (5) There is a homeomorphism between the space of bimatrix games and their equilibrium correspondence that preserves rank. It is a variation of the homeomorphism used for the concept of strategic stability of an equilibrium component.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2020 INFORMS |
| Departments | LSE > Academic Departments > Mathematics |
| DOI | 10.1287/opre.2020.1981 |
| Date Deposited | 02 Jan 2020 |
| Acceptance Date | 21 Nov 2019 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/102978 |
Explore Further
- http://www.lse.ac.uk/Mathematics/people/Bernhard-Von-Stengel (Author)
- https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85104112912 (Scopus publication)
- https://pubsonline.informs.org/journal/opre (Official URL)
