Iraq's popular mobilisation forces: the possibilities for Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration

This paper examines the divergence in the applicability of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process to Iraq as compared to the more traditional experiences of Nepal, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan. Iraq’s experience is defined by the heterogeneous identity of the Hashd (Hashd al-Shaabi, or Popular Mobilisation Forces) combatants, in terms of their different allegiances (to both state and non-state players) and their legitimatisation by both the religious and political establishments. In contrast, the conflicting parties in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan have more homogenous identities and these better resemble classic internecine civil wars. Iraq can only go through a stripped-down version of the DDR process because the majority of the Hashd are not willing to be disarmed, either because they believe the war is not over, or because they have transmuted into Iraq’s defence and security apparatus and, in some instances, have entered the political arena. Iraq can only manage partial demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration of its native Hashd combatants because of the lack of political will and leadership, the absence of state and civil society mechanisms and because elements of the Hashd believe themselves already part of the state’s institutions.