Imperfect memory and choice under risk

Gottlieb, D.ORCID logo (2014). Imperfect memory and choice under risk. Games and Economic Behavior, 85, 127 - 158. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.013
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This paper presents a model of choice based on imperfect memory and self-deception. I assume that people have preferences over their own attributes (e.g., skill, knowledge, or competence) and can manipulate their memories. The model provides a prior-dependent theory of regret aversion and allows for prior-dependent information attitudes. It implies that behavior will converge to the one predicted by expected utility theory after a choice has been faced a sufficiently large number of times.

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