The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
Chaigneau, Pierre; Edmans, Alex; and Gottlieb, Daniel
(2019)
The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
Games and Economic Behavior, 113.
743 - 755.
ISSN 0899-8256
Holmström (1979) provides a condition for a signal to have positive value assuming the validity of the first-order approach. This paper extends Holmström's analysis to settings where the first-order approach may not hold. We provide a new condition for a signal to have positive value that takes non-local incentive constraints into account and holds generically. Our condition is the weakest condition possible in the absence of restrictions on the utility function.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Contract theory,principal-agent model,informativeness principle |
| Departments | Management |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.geb.2018.08.006 |
| Date Deposited | 26 Oct 2019 11:48 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/102226 |
-
picture_as_pdf -
subject - Accepted Version
Download this file
Share this file
Downloads
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0555-6185