Respect for persons and the moral force of socially constructed norms
When and why do socially constructed norms—including the laws of the land, norms of etiquette, and informal customs—generate moral obligations? I argue that the answer lies in the duty to respect others, specifically to give them what I call “agency respect.” This is the kind of respect that people are owed in light of how they exercise their agency. My central thesis is this: To the extent that (i) existing norms are underpinned by people’s commitments as agents and (ii) they do not conflict with morality, they place moral demands on us on agency-respect grounds. This view of the moral force of socially constructed norms, I suggest, is superior to views that deny the moral force of such norms, and it elegantly explains certain instances of wrongdoing that would otherwise remain unaccounted for.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. |
| Departments | LSE > Academic Departments > Government |
| DOI | 10.1111/nous.12319 |
| Date Deposited | 09 Oct 2019 |
| Acceptance Date | 12 Jul 2019 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/102012 |
Explore Further
- http://www.lse.ac.uk/government/people/academic-staff/laura-valentini (Author)
- https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85076340085 (Scopus publication)