JEL classification

Journal of Economic Literature Classification (10696) N - Economic History (877) N4 - Government, War, Law, and Regulation (127) N43 - Europe: Pre-1913 (28)
Number of items at this level: 28.
B
  • Boerner, Lars (2016). Medieval market making brokerage regulations in Central Western Europe, ca. 1250-1700. (Economic History Working Papers 242/2016). London School of Economics and Political Science.
    • C
  • Chilosi, David (2013). Risky institutions: political regimes and the cost of public borrowing in early modern Italy. (Economic History working papers 177/13). Department of Economic History, London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Chilosi, David, Volckart, Oliver (2009). Money, states and empire: financial integration cycles and institutional change in Central Europe, 1400-1520. (Economic History Working Papers 132/09). Department of Economic History, London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Chilosi, David, Volckart, Oliver (2011). Money, states, and empire: financial integration and institutional change in Central Europe, 1400–1520. Journal of Economic History, 71(03), 762-791. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050711001914
  • Chilosi, David (2014). Risky institutions: political regimes and the cost of public borrowing in early modern Italy. Journal of Economic History, 74(03), 887-915. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050714000631
  • Claridge, Jordan, Gibbs, Spike (2020). Waifs and strays: property rights in late medieval England. (Economic History Working Papers 313). London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Claridge, Jordan, Gibbs, Spike (2022). Waifs and strays: property rights in late medieval England. Journal of British Studies, 61(1), 50 - 82. https://doi.org/10.1017/jbr.2021.125 picture_as_pdf
  • Prak, Maarten, Crowston, Clare, De Munck, Bert, Kissane, Christopher, Minns, Chris, Schalk, Ruben, Wallis, Patrick (2018). Access to the trade: monopoly and mobility in European craft guilds, 17th and 18th centuries. (Economic History working papers 282/2018). London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Schalk, Ruben, Wallis, Patrick, Crowston, Clare, Lemercier, Claire (2016). Failure or flexibility? exits from apprenticeship training in pre-modern Europe. (Economic History Working Papers 252/2016). London School of Economics and Political Science, Economic History Department.
    • D
  • Dal Bo, Ernesto, Hutkova, Karolina, Leucht, Lukas, Yuchtman, Noam Meir (2023). Dissecting the sinews of power: international trade and the rise of Britain's fiscal-military state, 1689-1823. (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP1931). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance. picture_as_pdf
  • Dal Bó, Ernesto, Hutkova, Karolina, Leucht, Lukas, Yuchtman, Noam (2025). Dissecting the sinews of power: international trade and the rise of Britain’s fiscal-military state, 1689-1823. Journal of Economic History, 85(2), 336 - 369. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050725000117 picture_as_pdf
    • G
  • Gao, Xinchuchu (2025). The EU's twin transitions towards sustainability and digital leadership a coherent or fragmented policy field? Regional Studies, 59(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2024.2360053 picture_as_pdf
  • Thomadakis, Stavros, Gounopoulos, Dimitrios, Nounis, Christos, Riginos, Michalis (2014). Financial innovation and growth listings and IPOs from 1880 to World War II in the Athens Stock Exchange. (GreeSE papers 86). London School of Economics and Political Science.
    • K
  • Knight, Richard (2014). The political economy of Byzantium: transaction costs and the decentralisation of the Byzantine Empire in the twelfth century. (The Economic History working paper series 187). London School of Economics and Political Science.
    • M
  • Ma, Debin, Rubin, Jared (2017). The paradox of power: understanding fiscal capacity in Imperial China and absolutist regimes. (Economic History working papers 261/2017). Department of Economic History, London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Ma, Debin, Rubin, Jared (2019). The paradox of power principal-agent problems and administrative capacity in Imperial China (and other absolutist regimes). Journal of Comparative Economics, 47(2), 277-294. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2019.03.002 description
    • N
  • Naidu, Suresh, Yuchtman, Noam (2013). Coercive contract enforcement: law and the labor market in nineteenth century industrial Britain. American Economic Review, 103(1), 107-144. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.1.107 picture_as_pdf
    • O
  • O'Brien, Patrick K., Palma, Nuno (2023). Not an ordinary bank but a great engine of state: the Bank of England and the British economy, 1694–1844. Economic History Review, 76(1), 305 - 329. https://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.13191 picture_as_pdf
    • R
  • Wang, Han, Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés (2021). Local institutions and pandemics: city autonomy and the Black Death. Applied Geography, 136, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2021.102582 picture_as_pdf
    • S
  • Schaff, Felix (2020). When ‘the state made war’, what happened to economic inequality? Evidence from preindustrial Germany (c.1400-1800). (Economic History Working Papers 311). London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
    • V
  • Volckart, Oliver (2017). Bimetallism and its discontents: cooperation and coordination failure in the empire’s monetary politics, 1549-59. (Economic History working papers 271/2017). London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Volckart, Oliver (2023). How well-integrated was the sixteenth-century Holy Roman Empire? (Economic History Working Papers). Department of Economic History, London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Volckart, Oliver (2015). Power politics and princely debts: why Germany’s common currency failed, 1549-1556. (Economic History working paper series 223/2015). London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Volckart, Oliver (2017). Premodern debasement: a messy affair. (Economic History working papers 270/2017). London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Volckart, Oliver (2009). Regeln, Willkür und der gute Ruf: Geldpolitik und Finanzmarkteffizienz in Deutschland, 14. bis 16. Jahrhundert. Jahrbuch fur Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 2009(2), 101-130.
  • Volckart, Oliver (2021). Voting like your betters: the bandwagon effect in the diet of the Holy Roman Empire. (Economic History Working Papers 329). Department of Economic History, London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Volckart, Oliver (2023). Voting like your betters: the bandwagon effect in the diet of the Holy Roman Empire. German History, 41(1), 1 - 20. https://doi.org/10.1093/gerhis/ghac073 picture_as_pdf
    • W
  • Wallis, Patrick (2018). Guilds and mutual protection in England. (Economic History working papers 287). London School of Economics and Political Science, Economic History. picture_as_pdf