JEL classification

Journal of Economic Literature Classification (10696) D - Microeconomics (2307) D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty (632) D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information (217)
Number of items at this level: 217.
Accounting
  • Frantz, Pascal, Instefjord, Norvald (2007). Implications of strategic disclosure of favourable news for capital markets-based research. Social Science Research Network.
  • Frantz, Pascal, Instefjord, Norvald, Walker, Martin (2007). Executive compensation contracts: a model of disclosure choice. Social Science Research Network. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.986729
  • Martin, Melissa, Timmermans, Oscar (2025). Disclosure costs of relative performance evaluation. Management Science, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06200 picture_as_pdf
  • Nezlobin, Alexander, Reichelstein, Stefan, Wang, Yanruo (2015). Managerial performance evaluation for capacity investments. Review of Accounting Studies, 20(1), 283 - 318. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-014-9303-x
  • Raghunandan, Aneesh, Ruchti, Thomas (2024). The impact of information frictions within regulators: evidence from workplace safety violations. Journal of Accounting Research, 62(3), 1067-1120. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12541 picture_as_pdf
    • Centre for Economic Performance
  • Canziani, P. (1997). Imperfect information. (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP0357). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Ferreira, Daniel, Ornelas, Emanuel, Turner, John L. (2007). Unbundling ownership and control. (ECGI Finance Working Paper 172/2007). European Corporate Governance Institute.
  • Fuchs, William, Garicano, Luis, Rayo, Luis (2015). Optimal contracting and the organization of knowledge. Review of Economic Studies, 82(2), 632 - 658. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdu043
  • Graetz, Georg (2023). Imperfect signals. (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP1919). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance. picture_as_pdf
  • Hansen, Stephen, McMahon, Michael (2011). How experts decide: identifying preferences versus signals from policy decisions. (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP1063). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance. picture_as_pdf
  • Ireland, Norman, Naylor, Robin A., Smith, Jeremy, Telhaj, Shqiponja (2009). Educational returns, ability composition and cohort effects: theory and evidence for cohorts of early-career UK graduates. (CEP Discussion Paper 939). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Matouschek, Niko, Ramezzana, Paolo, Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric (2008). Labor market reforms, job instability, and the flexibility of the employment relationship. (CEPDP 865). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Ornelas, Emanuel, Turner, John L. (2007). Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control. Games and Economic Behavior, 60(1), 187-199. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.004
  • Petropoulou, Dimitra (2008). Competing for contacts: network competition, trade intermediation and fragmented duopoly. (CEPDP 854). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Petropoulou, Dimitra (2008). Information costs, networks and intermediation in international trade. (CEPDP 848). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
    • Centre for Macroeconomics
  • Barrdear, John (2014). Peering into the mist: social learning over an opaque observation network. (CFM discussion paper series CFM-DP2014-9). Centre For Macroeconomics.
  • Barrdear, John (2015). Towards a new Keynesian theory of the price level. (CFM discussion paper series CFM-DP2015-09). Centre For Macroeconomics.
    • Economics
  • Ashraf, Nava, Bandiera, Oriana, Jack, Kelsy (2012). No margin, no mission?: a field experiment on incentives for pro-social tasks. (Discussion paper 8834). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Ashraf, Nava, Bandiera, Oriana, Davenport, Edward, Lee, Scott (2020). Losing prosociality in the quest for talent? Sorting, selection, and productivity in the delivery of public services. American Economic Review, 110(5), 1355 - 1394. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180326 picture_as_pdf
  • Ashraf, Nava, Bandiera, Oriana, Jack, B. Kelsey (2014). No margin, no mission? A field experiment on incentives for public service delivery. Journal of Public Economics, 120, 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.06.014
  • Bandiera, Oriana (2007). Contract duration and investment incentives: evidence from land tenancy agreements. Journal of the European Economic Association, 5(5), 953-986. https://doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2007.5.5.953
  • Bandiera, Oriana (2002). Land distribution, incentives and the choice of production techniques in Nicaragua. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Bandiera, Oriana (2002). Land distribution, incentives and the choice of production techniques in Nicaragua. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Bandiera, Oriana (2000). On the structure of tenancy contracts: theory and evidence from 19th century rural Sicily. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Bandiera, Oriana (2001). On the structure of tenancy contracts: theory and evidence from 19th century rural sicily. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Bandiera, Oriana, Levy, Gilat (2004). Robin Hood's compromise: land reforms, inequality, redistribution and moral hazard. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Bardsley, Peter, Meager, Rachael (2018). Competing lending platforms, endogenous reputation, and fragility in microcredit markets. European Economic Review, 112, 107-126. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.12.003
  • Bergemann, Dirk, Pesendorfer, Martin (2007). Information structures in optimal auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 137(1), 580-609. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001
  • Bergemann, Dirk, Pesendorfer, Martin (2001). Information structures in optimal auctions. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Berry, Jim, Fischer, Gregory, Guiteras, Raymond (2010-11-06 - 2010-11-07) Incentive compatibility in the field: a test of the Becker-De Groot-Marschak mechanism [Paper]. The Northeast Universities Development Consortium (NEUDC) conference, Cambridge, United States, USA.
  • Besley, Timothy, Pande, Rohini (1998). Read my lips : the political economy of information transmission. (Theoretical Economics; TE/1998/355 TE/98/355). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Bryan, Gharad, Karlan, Dean, Zinman, Jonathan (2012). You can pick your friends, but you need to watch them: loan screening and enforcement in a referrals field experiment. (BREAD working paper 321). Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development.
  • Bryan, Gharad, Karlan, Dean, Zinman, Jonathan (2015). Referrals: peer screening and enforcement in a consumer credit field experiment. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(3), 174-204. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130234
  • Brzustowski, Thomas, Georgiadis Harris, Alkis, Szentes, Balázs (2023). Smart contracts and the Coase conjecture. American Economic Review, 113(5), 1334 - 1359. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20220357 picture_as_pdf
  • Campbell, Arthur, Ederer, Florian, Spinnewijn, Johannes (2011-06-30) Time to decide: information search and revelation in groups [Other]. STICERD Economic Theory Seminars, London, United Kingdom, GBR.
  • Campbell, Arthur, Ederer, Florian, Spinnewijn, Johannes (2014). Delay and deadlines: freeriding and information revelation in partnerships. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(2), 163-204. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.2.163
  • Caselli, Francesco, Cunningham, Tom, Morelli, Massimo, Moreno de Barreda, Inés (2012). Signalling, incumbency advantage, and optimal reelection rules. (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP1122). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance. picture_as_pdf
  • Chassang, Sylvain, Padró i Miquel, Gerard (2008). Mutual fear and civil war. Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development, Harvard University.
  • Chassang, Sylvain, Padró i Miquel, Gerard, Snowberg, Erik (2012). Selective trials: a principal-agent approach to randomized control experiments. American Economic Review, 102(4), 1279-1309. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.4.1279
  • Chassang, Sylvain, Padró i Miquel, Gerard, Snowberg, Erik (2010). Selective trials: a principal-agent approach to randomized controlled trials. (NBER working papers 16343). NBER.
  • Cornelli, Francesca, Felli, Leonardo (2010). How to sell a (bankrupt) company? Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Dang, Canh Thien, Owens, Trudy (2020). Does transparency come at the cost of charitable services? Evidence from investigating British charities. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 172, 314 - 343. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.02.020 picture_as_pdf
  • Dasgupta, Amil, Prat, Andrea (2003). Trading volume with career concerns. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Eeckhout, Jan, Kircher, Philipp (2010). Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory, 145(4), 1354-1385. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.005
  • Eső, Péter, Szentes, Balázs (2017). Dynamic contracting: an irrelevance theorem. Theoretical Economics, 12(1), 109-139. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2127
  • Eyster, Erik, Rabin, Matthew (2010). Naïve herding in rich-information settings. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(4), 221-243. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.4.221
  • Eyster, Erik, Rabin, Matthew, Vayanos, Dimitri (2017). Financial markets where traders neglect the informational content of prices. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 770). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Faure-Grimaud, Antoine (1996). Soft budget constraint and stock price information. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 251). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Fischer, Gregory, Berry, James, Guiteras, Raymond (2012). Eliciting and utilizing willingness to pay: evidence from field trials in Northern Ghana. London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Fuchs, William, Garicano, Luis, Rayo, Luis (2015). Optimal contracting and the organization of knowledge. Review of Economic Studies, 82(2), 632 - 658. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdu043
  • Garrett, Daniel, Georgiadis, George, Smolin, Alex, Szentes, Balázs (2023). Optimal technology design. Journal of Economic Theory, 209, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105621 picture_as_pdf
  • Ghatak, Maitreesh (2000). Contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk. Journal of Development Economics, 63(2), 303-326. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00116-4
  • Ghatak, Maitreesh, Karaivanov, Alexander (2011). Contractual structure and endogenous matching partnerships. (Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers EOPP 024). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Ghatak, Maitreesh, Morelli, Massimo, Sjostrom, Tomas (2002). Credit rationing, wealth inequality and allocation of talent. (TE 441). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Gottardi, Piero, Rahi, Rohit (2001). Efficiency properties of rational expectations equilibria with asymmetric information. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 381). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Hansen, Stephen, McMahon, Michael (2011). How experts decide: identifying preferences versus signals from policy decisions. (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP1063). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance. picture_as_pdf
  • Hart, Oliver, Moore, John (1998). Cooperatives vs. outside ownership. (TE 346). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Hendren, Nathaniel, Landais, Camille, Spinnewijn, Johannes (2021). Choice in insurance markets: a Pigouvian approach to social insurance design. Annual Review of Economics, 13, 457 - 486. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-090820-111716 picture_as_pdf
  • Huang, Haizhou, Marin, Dalia, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2003). Financial crisis, economic recovery and banking development in former Soviet Union economies. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Ilzetzki, Ethan, Thysen, Heidi (2024). Fiscal rules and market discipline. IMF Economic Review, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41308-024-00265-8 picture_as_pdf
  • Jofre-Bonet, Mireia, Pesendorfer, Martin (2001). Estimation of a dynamic auction game. National Bureau of Economic Research.
  • Lach, Saul, Neeman, Zvika, Schankerman, Mark (2021). Government financing of R&D: a mechanism design approach. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 13(3), 238 - 272. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190053 picture_as_pdf
  • Landais, Camille (2015). Assessing the welfare effects of unemployment benefits using the regression kink design. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 7(4), 243-278. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20130248
  • Landais, Camille, Nekoei, Arash, Nilsson, Peter, Seim, David, Spinnewijn, Johannes (2021). Risk-based selection in unemployment insurance: evidence and Implications. American Economic Review, 111(4), 1315 - 1355. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180820 picture_as_pdf
  • Levy, Gilat (2003). Careerist judges. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Levy, Gilat (2003). Careerist judges. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Levy, Gilat (2000). Strategic consultation in the presence of career concerns. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Levy, Gilat, Razin, Ronny (2003). It takes two: an explanation of the democratic peace. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Levy, Gilat (2004). Anti-herding and strategic consultation. European Economic Review, 48(3), 503-525. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(03)00019-9
  • Levy, Gilat (2005). Careerist judges. RAND Journal of Economics, 36(2), 275-297.
  • Levy, Gilat, Moreno de Barreda, Inés, Razin, Ronny (2022). Persuasion with correlation neglect: a full manipulation result. American Economic Review: Insights, 4(1), 123 - 138. https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210007 picture_as_pdf
  • Levy, Matthew, Szentes, Balázs (2016). An alternative to signaling: directed search and substitution. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(4), 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150116
  • Madarász, Kristóf, Prat, Andrea (2010). Screening with an approximate type space. (Discussion Paper 7900). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Marin, Jose M., Rahi, Rohit (1999). Speculative securities. Economic Theory, 14(3), 653-668. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050346
  • Mariotti, Thomas, Meier, Martin, Piccione, Michele (2005). Hierarchies of beliefs for compact possibility models. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 41(3), 303-324. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.11.009
  • Onuchic, Paula (2025). Advisors with hidden motives. Games and Economic Behavior, 153, 431 - 450. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.009 picture_as_pdf
  • Padró i Miquel, Gerard, Yared, Pierre (2010). Political economy of indirect control. (NBER working papers 15748). NBER.
  • Palomino, Frédéric, Prat, Andrea (1999). Risk taking and optimal contracts for money managers. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Pesendorfer, Martin (1998). Pollution claim settlements under correlated information. Journal of Economic Theory, 79(1), 72-105. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2374
  • Peski, Marcin, Szentes, Balázs (2013). Spontaneous discrimination. American Economic Review, 103(6), 2412-2436. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.6.2412
  • Petropoulou, Dimitra (2008). Competing for contacts: network competition, trade intermediation and fragmented duopoly. (CEPDP 854). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Petropoulou, Dimitra (2008). Information costs, networks and intermediation in international trade. (CEPDP 848). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Prat, Andrea (1999). Campaign advertising and voter welfare. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Prat, Andrea (1997). Campaign advertising and voter welfare. Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University.
  • Prat, Andrea (2002). Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies. Journal of Economic Theory, 103(1), 162-189. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2793
  • Prat, Andrea (1998). Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies. Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University.
  • Prat, Andrea (2002). The wrong kind of transparency. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Prat, Andrea (2005). The wrong kind of transparency. American Economic Review, 95(3), 862-877. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054201297
  • Prat, Andrea (2003). The wrong kind of transparency. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Rahi, Rohit (1995). Optimal incomplete markets with asymmetric information. Journal of Economic Theory, 65(1), 171-197. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1006
  • Rahi, Rohit (1995). Partially revealing rational expectations equilibria with nominal assets. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 24(2), 137-146. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)00679-5
  • Spinnewijn, Johannes (2012). Heterogeneity, demand for insurance and adverse selection. (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP1142). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance. picture_as_pdf
  • Spinnewijn, Johannes (2017). Heterogeneity, demand for insurance and adverse selection. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 9(1), 308-343. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20140254
  • Weizsacker, Georg (2008). Do we follow others when we should? A simple test of rational expectations. ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution, University College London.
  • Yared, Pierre, Padró i Miquel, Gerard (2012). The political economy of indirect control. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(2), 947-1015. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjs012
  • Zhang, Shengxing (2018). Liquidity misallocation in an over-the-counter market. Journal of Economic Theory, 174, 16-56. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.11.008
    • European Institute
  • Costa-i-Font, Joan, Mossialos, Elias (2006). The public as a limit to technology transfer: the influence of knowledge and beliefs in attitudes towards biotechnology in the UK. Journal of Technology Transfer, 31(6), 629-645. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-006-0019-3
  • Kleine, Mareike (2024). Negotiating with your mouth full: intergovernmental negotiations between transparency and confidentiality. Review of International Organizations, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09572-1 picture_as_pdf
    • Finance
  • Anderson, Ronald W., Bustamante, Maria Cecilia, Guibaud, Stéphane (2012). Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover. London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Anderson, Ronald W., Bustamante, Maria Cecilia, Guibaud, Stéphane (2012). Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 711). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Anderson, Ronald W., Bustamante, Maria Cecilia, Guibaud, Stéphane, Zervos, Mihail (2018). Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover. Journal of Finance, 73(1), 419 - 464. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12583
  • Axelson, Ulf, Makarov, Igor (2016). Informational black holes in financial markets. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 754). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Axelson, Ulf, Makarov, Igor (2026). Sequential credit markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 176, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104216 picture_as_pdf
  • Babus, Ana, Kondor, Peter (2018). Trading and information diffusion in over-the-counter markets. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 777). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Babus, Ana, Kondor, Peter (2018). Trading and information diffusion in OTC markets. Econometrica, 86(5), 1727-1769. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA12043
  • Burkart, Mike, Lee, Samuel (2012). Smart buyers. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 696). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Bustamante, Maria Cecilia (2012). The dynamics of going public. Review of Finance, 16(2), 577-618. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfr001
  • Camanho-Da-Costa-Neto, Nelson, Deb, Pragyan, Liu, Zijun (2010). Credit rating and competition. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 653). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Chabakauri, Georgy, Yuan, Kathy, Zachariadis, Konstantinos (2014). Multi-asset noisy rational expectations equilibrium with contingent claims. (Working papers). Social Science Research Network (SSRN).
  • Chabakauri, Georgy, Yuan, Kathy, Zachariadis, Konstantinos (2021). Multi-asset noisy rational expectations equilibrium with contingent claims. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 745). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Chabakauri, Georgy, Yuan, Kathy, Zachariadis, Kostas (2022). Multi-asset noisy rational expectations equilibrium with contingent claims. Review of Economic Studies, 89(5), 2445 - 2490. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab081 picture_as_pdf
  • Chau, Minh, Vayanos, Dimitri (2008). Strong-form efficiency with monopolistic insiders. Review of Financial Studies, 21(5), 2275-2306. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhl029
  • Costa, Cristiano M., Ferreira, Daniel, Moreira, Humberto (2005). Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision. Economics Letters, 86(3), 379-385. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.001
  • Danilova, Albina, Julliard, Christian (2015). Information asymmetries, volatility, liquidity and the Tobin Tax. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 748). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Dasgupta, Amil, Steiner, Jakub, Stewart, Colin (2012). Dynamic coordination with individual learning. Games and Economic Behavior, 74(1), 83-101. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.005
  • DeFusco, Anthony A., Tang, Huan, Yannelis, Constantine (2022). Measuring the welfare cost of asymmetric information in consumer credit markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 146(3), 821 - 840. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.09.001 picture_as_pdf
  • Dow, James, Rahi, Rohit (1998). Informed trading, investment, and welfare. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 292). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • D’Andrea, Angelo, Pelosi, Marco, Sette, Enrico (2025). When broadband comes to banks: credit supply, market structure, and information acquisition. Journal of the European Economic Association, https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaf041
  • Eyster, Erik, Rabin, Matthew, Vayanos, Dimitri (2017). Financial markets where traders neglect the informational content of prices. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 770). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Farboodi, Maryam, Kondor, Peter (2021). Cleansing by tight credit: rational cycles and endogenous lending standards. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 843). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Farboodi, Maryam, Kondor, Peter (2023). Cleansing by tight credit: rational cycles and endogenous lending standards. Journal of Financial Economics, 150(1), 46 - 67. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2023.07.003 picture_as_pdf
  • Ferreira, Daniel, Nikolowa, Radoslawa (2023). Talent discovery and poaching under asymmetric information. Economic Journal, 133(649), 201 - 234. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueac048 picture_as_pdf
  • Fisman, Raymond, Paravisini, Daniel, Vig, Vikrant (2016). Cultural proximity and loan outcomes. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 759). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Fisman, Raymond, Paravisini, Daniel, Vig, Vikrant (2017). Cultural proximity and loan outcomes. American Economic Review, 107(2), 457 - 492. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20120942
  • Goldstein, Itay, Ozdenoren, Emre, Yuan, Kathy (2010). Trading frenzies and their impact on real investment. (CEPR Discussion Paper DP7652). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Goldstein, Itay, Ozdenoren, Emre, Yuan, Kathy (2011). Trading frenzies and their impact on real investment. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 670). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Hertzberg, Andrew, Liberman, Andres, Paravisini, Daniel (2018). Screening on loan terms: evidence from maturity choice in consumer credit. Review of Financial Studies, 31(9), 3532 - 3567. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy024
  • Hertzberg, Andrew, Liberti, Jose Maria, Paravisini, Daniel (2011). Public information and coordination: evidence from a credit registry expansion. Journal of Finance, 66(2), 379-412. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01637.x
  • Lou, Youcheng, Rahi, Rohit (2021). Information, market power and welfare. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 842). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Lou, Youcheng, Rahi, Rohit (2023). Information, market power and welfare. Journal of Economic Theory, 214, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105756 picture_as_pdf
  • Marín, José, Rahi, Rohit (1997). Speculative securities. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 268). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Paravisini, Daniel (2008). Local bank financial constraints and firm access to external finance. Journal of Finance, 63(5), 2161-2193. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01393.x
  • Rahi, Rohit (2019). Information acquisition with heterogeneous valuations. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 787). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Rahi, Rohit, Zigrand, Jean-Pierre (2018). Information acquisition, price informativeness and welfare. (Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers 77). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Rahi, Rohit (2021). Information acquisition with heterogeneous valuations. Journal of Economic Theory, 191, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105155 picture_as_pdf
  • Rahi, Rohit, Zigrand, Jean-Pierre (2018). Information acquisition, price informativeness, and welfare. Journal of Economic Theory, 177, 558-593. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.007
  • Satterthwaite, Mark, Williams, Steven R., Zachariadis, Konstantinos (2012). Price discovery.
  • Vayanos, Dimitri, Wang, Jiang (2012). Liquidity and asset returns under asymmetric information and imperfect competition. Review of Financial Studies, 25(5), 1339-1365. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhr128
  • Vayanos, Dimitri, Wang, Jiang (2012). Liquidity and asset returns under asymmetric information and imperfect competition. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 708). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Vayanos, Dimitri, Wang, Jiang (2012). Market liquidity - theory and empirical evidence. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 709). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Vayanos, Dimitri, Woolley, Paul (2013). An institutional theory of momentum and reversal. Review of Financial Studies, 26(5), 1087-1145. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hht014
  • Zachariadis, Konstantinos (2012). A baseline model of price formation in a sequential market.
    • Financial Markets Group
  • Baeriswyl, Romain, Cornand, Camille (2006). Monetary policy and its informative value. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 569). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Bar-Isaac, Heski, Cuñat, Alejandro (2005). Long-term debt and hidden borrowing. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 542). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Bena, Jan (2006). Choice of corporate risk management tools under moral hazard. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 566). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Bhattacharya, Sudipto, Nyborg, Kjell (2011). Bank bailout menus. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 676). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Blanes i Vidal, Jordi (2003). Credibility and cheap talk of securities analysts: theory and evidence. (Discussion paper 472). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Brandts, Silke, Laux, Christian (2005). ART versus reinsurance: the disciplining effect of information insensitivity. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 545). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Brunnermeier, Markus (1998). Buy on rumours - sell on news: a manipulative trading strategy. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 309). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Carletti, Elena (2001). The structure of bank relationships, endogenous monitoring and loan rates. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 388). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Carletti, Elena, Cerasi, Vittoria, Daltung, Sonja (2004). Multiple-bank lending: diversification and free-riding in monitoring. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 490). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Cerasi, Vittoria, Daltung, Sonja (2002). Diversification and delegation in firms. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 403). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Chabakauri, Georgy, Yuan, Kathy, Zachariadis, Konstantinos (2014). Multi-asset noisy rational expectations equilibrium with contingent claims. (Working papers). Social Science Research Network (SSRN).
  • Cornand, Camille, Heinemann, Frank (2006). Speculative attacks with multiple sources of public information. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 570). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Cornelli, Francesca, Felli, Leonardo (2010). How to sell a (bankrupt) company? Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Corsetti, Giancarlo, Dasgupta, Amil, Morris, Stephen, Shin, Hyun Song (2001). Does one Soros make a difference? A theory of currency crises with large and small traders. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 372). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Dasgupta, Amil, Steiner, Jakub, Stewart, Colin (2007). Efficient dynamic coordination with individual learning. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 600). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Martimort, David (2000). A theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. Annals of Economics and Finance, 1(2), 231-263.
  • Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, Peyrache, Eloic, Quesada, Lucia (2007). The ownership of ratings. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 590). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Gondat-Larralde, Celine, James, Kevin R. (2004). Block-booking and IPO share allocation: the importance of being ignorant. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 480). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Goodhart, C. A. E., Tsomocos, Dimitrios P., Wang, Xuan (2020). Support for Small Businesses amid Covid-19. (CEPR Discussion Paper 15055). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Gottardi, Piero, Rahi, Rohit (2001). Efficiency properties of rational expectations equilibria with asymmetric information. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 381). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Hart, Oliver, Moore, John (1998). Cooperatives vs. outside ownership. (TE 346). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Heider, Florian (2001). Signalling with debt and equity: a unifying approach and its implications for the pecking order hypothesis and competitive credit rationing. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 387). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • James, Kevin R. (2004). IPO underpricing during the boom: a block-booking explanation. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 481). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Jobst, Andreas A. (2002). Loan securitisation: default term structure and asset pricing based on loss prioritisation. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 422). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Kondor, Peter (2004). The more we know, the less we agree: public announcements and higher-order expectations. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 532). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Marchesi, Silvia, Sabani, Laura (2005). IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 535). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Mariano, Beatriz (2008). Do reputational concerns lead to reliable ratings? (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 613). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Marin, Jose M., Rahi, Rohit (1999). Speculative securities. Economic Theory, 14(3), 653-668. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050346
  • Nier, Erlend (1999). Equity finance, adverse selection and product market competition. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 333). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Nier, Erlend (1997). Optimal managerial remuneration and firm-level diversification. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 269). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Pagratis, Spyros (2004). Co-ordination failure and the role of banks in the resolution of financial distress. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 420). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Prat, Andrea (2004). The wrong kind of transparency. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 498). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Rahi, Rohit (1995). Optimal incomplete markets with asymmetric information. Journal of Economic Theory, 65(1), 171-197. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1006
  • Rahi, Rohit (1995). Partially revealing rational expectations equilibria with nominal assets. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 24(2), 137-146. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)00679-5
  • Satterthwaite, Mark, Williams, Steven R., Zachariadis, Konstantinos (2012). Price discovery.
  • Sette, Enrico (2007). Competition and opportunistic advice of financial analysts: theory and evidence. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 592). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Vitale, Paolo (2001). Foreign exchange intervention and macroeconomic stability. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 317). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Zachariadis, Konstantinos (2012). A baseline model of price formation in a sequential market.
    • Geography and Environment
  • Contu, Davide, Mourato, Susana, Kaya, Ozgur (2020). Individual preferences towards nuclear energy: the transient residency effect. Applied Economics, 52(30), 3219 - 3237. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2019.1707766 picture_as_pdf
  • Manara, Martina, Regan, Tanner (2020). Eliciting demand for title deeds: lab-in-the-field evidence from urban Tanzania. (Geography and Environment Discussion Paper Series 19). Department of Geography and Environment, LSE. picture_as_pdf
  • Matouschek, Niko, Ramezzana, Paolo, Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric (2008). Labor market reforms, job instability, and the flexibility of the employment relationship. (CEPDP 865). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
    • LSE
  • Bergemann, Dirk, Gan, Tan (2023). Manage persuasion robustly: the optimality of quota rules. (Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 2372). Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  • Blanes i Vidal, Jordi (2007). Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse. Economics Letters, 94(2), 163-169. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.024
  • Gan, Tan (2024). Robust advertisement pricing. Social Science Research Network (SSRN). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4788687
  • Gan, Tan, Hu, Ju, Weng, Xi (2023). Optimal contingent delegation. Journal of Economic Theory, 208, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105597 picture_as_pdf
  • Naroditskiy, Victor, Steinberg, Richard (2015). Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution. Games and Economic Behavior, 93, 24-41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.010
  • Onuchic, Paula, Ray, Debraj (2023). Conveying value via categories. Theoretical Economics, 18(4), 1407-1439. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE5026 picture_as_pdf
  • Onuchic, Paula, Ray, Debraj (2023). Signaling and discrimination in collaborative projects. American Economic Review, 113(1), 210-252. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211729 picture_as_pdf
    • LSE Health
  • Costa-i-Font, Joan, Mossialos, Elias (2006). The public as a limit to technology transfer: the influence of knowledge and beliefs in attitudes towards biotechnology in the UK. Journal of Technology Transfer, 31(6), 629-645. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-006-0019-3
    • Management
  • Alonso, Ricardo (2014). Recruitment and selection in organizations. (USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series). University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business.
  • Alonso, Ricardo, Brocas, Isabelle, Carrillo, Juan D. (2014). Resource allocation in the brain. Review of Economic Studies, 81(2), 501-534. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdt043
  • Alonso, Ricardo, Matouschek, Niko (2008). Optimal delegation. Review of Economic Studies, 75(1), 259-293. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00471.x
  • Azevedo, Eduardo M., Gottlieb, Daniel (2019). An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Games and Economic Behavior, 116, 152 - 157. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.007 picture_as_pdf
  • Coelho, Marta, de Meza, David (2012). Do bad risks know it? Experimental evidence on optimism and adverse selection. Economics Letters, 114(2), 168-171. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.012
  • Cordella, Antonio, Cordella, Tito (2017). Motivations, monitoring technologies, and pay for performance. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 133, 236-255. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.10.016
  • Cusumano, Carlo M., Gan, Tan, Pieroth, Ferdinand (2024). Misaligning incentives in teams. Social Science Research Network (SSRN). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4533867
  • De Meza, David, Reito, Francesco, Reyniers, Diane J. (2021). Too much trade: the hidden problem of adverse selection. Journal of Public Economics, 204, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104551 picture_as_pdf
  • Drugov, Mikhail, Macchiavello, Rocco (2014). Financing experimentation. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(1), 315-349. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.1.315
  • Fuchs, William, Garicano, Luis, Rayo, Luis (2015). Optimal contracting and the organization of knowledge. Review of Economic Studies, 82(2), 632 - 658. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdu043
  • Gan, Tan, Wu, Nicholas (2024). From doubt to devotion: trials and learning-based pricing.
  • Gan, Tan, Wu, Nicholas (2025). From doubt to devotion: trials and learning-based pricing. Journal of Political Economy, picture_as_pdf
  • Garicano, Luis, Rayo, Luis (2016). Why organizations fail: models and cases. Journal of Economic Literature, 54(1), 137-192. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.54.1.137
  • Gottlieb, Daniel, Moreira, Humberto (2022). Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard. Theoretical Economics, 17(3), 1357 – 1401. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2992 picture_as_pdf
  • Greenstone, Michael, He, Guojun, Jia, Ruixue, Liu, Tong (2022). Can technology solve the principal-agent problem? Evidence from China’s war on air pollution. American Economic Review, 4(1), 54 - 70. https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20200373
  • Miravete, Eugenio J., Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio (2013). Consumer inertia, choice dependence and learning from experience in a repeated decision problem. Review of Economics and Statistics, 96(3), 524-537. https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00386
  • de Meza, David, Xie, Gang (2014). The deadweight gain of insurance taxation when risky activities are optional. Journal of Public Economics, 115, 109-116. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.02.004
    • Mathematics
  • Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit, Hernández, Penélope, Neeman, Zvika, Solan, Eilon (2023). Markovian persuasion with two states. Games and Economic Behavior, 142, 292 - 314. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.001 picture_as_pdf
  • Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit, Tsodikovich, Yevgeny, Viossat, Yannick (2023). I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions. Economic Theory, 76(4), 1329 - 1362. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01498-w picture_as_pdf
  • Aïd, René, Bonesini, Ofelia, Callegaro, Giorgia, Campi, Luciano (2025). Continuous-time persuasion by filtering. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 176, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105100 picture_as_pdf
  • Campi, Luciano, Cetin, Umut, Danilova, Albina (2013). Equilibrium model with default and dynamic insider information. Finance and Stochastics, 17(347), 565-585. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00780-012-0196-x
  • Cole, Richard, Correa, Jose, Gkatzelis, Vasillis, Mirrokni, Vahab, Olver, Neil (2015). Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games. Games and Economic Behavior, 92, 306 - 326. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.011 picture_as_pdf
  • Danilova, Albina, Julliard, Christian (2015). Information asymmetries, volatility, liquidity and the Tobin Tax. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 748). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Ekmekci, Mehmet, Gossner, Olivier, Wilson, Andrea (2012). Impermanent types and permanent reputations. Journal of Economic Theory, 147(1), 162-178. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.006
  • Gietzmann, Miles B., Ostaszewski, Adam J. (2014). Why managers with low forecast precision select high disclosure intensity: an equilibrium analysis. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 43(1), 121-153. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-013-0367-7
  • Gietzmann, Miles, Ostaszewski, Adam (2023). The kind of silence: managing a reputation for voluntary disclosure in financial markets. Annals of Finance, 19(4), 419 - 447. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-023-00430-5 picture_as_pdf
  • Gossner, Olivier (2010). Ability and knowledge. Games and Economic Behavior, 69(1), 95-106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.011
  • Gossner, Olivier, Hörner, Johannes (2010). When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? Journal of Economic Theory, 145(1), 63-84. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.002
    • STICERD
  • Ashraf, Nava, Bandiera, Oriana, Jack, Kelsy (2012). No margin, no mission?: a field experiment on incentives for pro-social tasks. (Discussion paper 8834). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Ashraf, Nava, Bandiera, Oriana, Jack, B. Kelsey (2014). No margin, no mission? A field experiment on incentives for public service delivery. Journal of Public Economics, 120, 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.06.014
  • Bandiera, Oriana (2007). Contract duration and investment incentives: evidence from land tenancy agreements. Journal of the European Economic Association, 5(5), 953-986. https://doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2007.5.5.953
  • Bandiera, Oriana (2002). Land distribution, incentives and the choice of production techniques in Nicaragua. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Bandiera, Oriana (2002). Land distribution, incentives and the choice of production techniques in Nicaragua. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Bandiera, Oriana (2000). On the structure of tenancy contracts: theory and evidence from 19th century rural Sicily. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Bandiera, Oriana (2001). On the structure of tenancy contracts: theory and evidence from 19th century rural sicily. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Bandiera, Oriana, Levy, Gilat (2004). Robin Hood's compromise: land reforms, inequality, redistribution and moral hazard. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Banerjee, Abhijit, Ghatak, Maitreesh (2003). Eviction threats and investment incentives. (DEDPS 39). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Bergemann, Dirk, Pesendorfer, Martin (2007). Information structures in optimal auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 137(1), 580-609. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001
  • Bergemann, Dirk, Pesendorfer, Martin (2001). Information structures in optimal auctions. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Besley, Timothy, Pande, Rohini (1998). Read my lips : the political economy of information transmission. (Theoretical Economics; TE/1998/355 TE/98/355). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Chassang, Sylvain, Padró i Miquel, Gerard (2008). Mutual fear and civil war. Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development, Harvard University.
  • Cornelli, Francesca, Felli, Leonardo (2010). How to sell a (bankrupt) company? Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Dasgupta, Amil, Prat, Andrea (2003). Trading volume with career concerns. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Dridi, Ramdan, Germain, Laurent (2000). Noise and competition in strategic oligopoly. (EM 395). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Martimort, David (2000). A theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. Annals of Economics and Finance, 1(2), 231-263.
  • Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Martimort, David (1998). A theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. (TE 356). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, Reiche, Sonje (2003). Dynamic yardstick regulation. (TE 459). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Ghatak, Maitreesh (2000). Contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk. Journal of Development Economics, 63(2), 303-326. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00116-4
  • Ghatak, Maitreesh, Karaivanov, Alexander (2011). Contractual structure and endogenous matching partnerships. (Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers EOPP 024). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Ghatak, Maitreesh, Morelli, Massimo, Sjostrom, Tomas (2002). Credit rationing, wealth inequality and allocation of talent. (TE 441). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Hart, Oliver, Moore, John (1998). Cooperatives vs. outside ownership. (TE 346). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Jofre-Bonet, Mireia, Pesendorfer, Martin (2001). Estimation of a dynamic auction game. National Bureau of Economic Research.
  • Jofre-Bonet, Mireia, Pesendorfer, Martin (2014). Optimal sequential auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 33, 61-71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2014.02.002
  • Levy, Gilat (2003). Careerist judges. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Levy, Gilat (2003). Careerist judges. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Levy, Gilat (2000). Strategic consultation in the presence of career concerns. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Levy, Gilat, Razin, Ronny (2003). It takes two: an explanation of the democratic peace. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Levy, Gilat (2005). Careerist judges. RAND Journal of Economics, 36(2), 275-297.
  • Madarász, Kristóf, Prat, Andrea (2010). Screening with an approximate type space. (Discussion Paper 7900). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Mariotti, Thomas, Meier, Martin, Piccione, Michele (2005). Hierarchies of beliefs for compact possibility models. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 41(3), 303-324. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.11.009
  • Palomino, Frédéric, Prat, Andrea (1999). Risk taking and optimal contracts for money managers. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Pesendorfer, Martin (1998). Pollution claim settlements under correlated information. Journal of Economic Theory, 79(1), 72-105. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2374
  • Piketty, Thomas (1992). Imperfect capital markets and persistence of initial wealth inequalities. (TE 255). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Prat, Andrea (1999). Campaign advertising and voter welfare. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Prat, Andrea (1997). Campaign advertising and voter welfare. Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University.
  • Prat, Andrea (2002). Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies. Journal of Economic Theory, 103(1), 162-189. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2793
  • Prat, Andrea (1998). Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies. Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University.
  • Prat, Andrea (2002). The wrong kind of transparency. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Prat, Andrea (2005). The wrong kind of transparency. American Economic Review, 95(3), 862-877. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054201297
  • Prat, Andrea (2003). The wrong kind of transparency. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Raith, Michael A. (1996). Product differentiation, uncertainty and the stability of collusion. (EI 16). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Sanchez-Villalba, Miguel (2006). Anti-evasion auditing policy in the presence of common income shocks. (DARP 80). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
    • Social Policy
  • Costa-i-Font, Joan, Mossialos, Elias (2006). The public as a limit to technology transfer: the influence of knowledge and beliefs in attitudes towards biotechnology in the UK. Journal of Technology Transfer, 31(6), 629-645. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-006-0019-3
    • Statistics
  • Campi, Luciano, Cetin, Umut, Danilova, Albina (2013). Equilibrium model with default and dynamic insider information. Finance and Stochastics, 17(347), 565-585. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00780-012-0196-x
  • Cvitanić, Jakŝa, Xing, Hao (2018). Asset pricing under optimal contracts. Journal of Economic Theory, 173, 142-180. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.10.005
  • Papadimitriou, Dimitris, Tokis, Konstantinos, Vichos, Georgios, Mourdoukoutas, Panos (2023). Managing other people's money: an agency theory in financial management industry. Journal of Financial Research, https://doi.org/10.1111/jfir.12344 picture_as_pdf
    • Systemic Risk Centre
  • Anderson, Ronald W., Bustamante, Maria Cecilia, Guibaud, Stéphane (2012). Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 711). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Cipriani, Marco, Guarino, Antonio, Uthemann, Andreas (2019). Financial transaction taxes and the informational efficiency of financial markets: a structural estimation. (Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers 88). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Cipriani, Marco, Guarino, Antonio, Uthemann, Andreas (2022). Financial transaction taxes and the informational efficiency of financial markets: a structural estimation. Journal of Financial Economics, 146(3), 1044 - 1072. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.04.007 picture_as_pdf
  • Danilova, Albina, Julliard, Christian (2014). Information asymmetries, volatility, liquidity, and the Tobin Tax. (Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers 24). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Ho Hwang, Jong (2014). A proposal for an open-source financial risk model. (Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers 9). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Plantin, Guillaume, Tirole, Jean (2015). Marking to market versus taking to market. (Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers 51). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Uthemann, Andreas (2017). Competitive screening of customers with non-common priors. (Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers 73). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf