Inderst, Roman

Number of items: 14.
Economics
  • Inderst, Roman, Laux, Christian (2005). Incentives in internal capital markets: capital constraints, competition, and investment opportunities. RAND Journal of Economics, 36(1), 215-228.
  • Inderst, Roman (2003). Alternating-offer bargaining over menus under incomplete information. Economic Theory, 22(2), 419-429.
  • Inderst, Roman, Müller, Holger M. (2003). Internal versus external financing: an optimal contracting approach. Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1033-1062. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00557
  • Inderst, Roman, Wey, Christian (2003). Bargaining, mergers and technology choice in bilaterally oligopolistic industries. RAND Journal of Economics, 34(1), 1-19.
  • Inderst, Roman, Wambach, Achim (2002). Capacity constrained firms in (labor) markets with adverse selection. Economic Theory, 19(3), 525-548.
  • Inderst, Roman, Müller, Holger M. (2002). Competitive search markets for durable goods. Economic Theory, 19(3), 599-622. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990000162
  • Inderst, Roman (2002). Why competition may drive up prices. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 47(4), 451-462. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00213-X
  • Inderst, Roman (2002). Contract design and bargaining power. Economics Letters, 74(2), 171-176.
  • Inderst, Roman (2001). Incentive schemes as a signaling device. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 44(4), 455-465. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00142-6
    • Financial Markets Group
  • Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, Inderst, Roman (2005). Conglomerate entrenchment under optimal financial contracting. American Economic Review, 95(3), 850 - 861. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054201260
  • Inderst, Roman, Laux, Christian (2005). Incentives in internal capital markets: capital constraints, competition, and investment opportunities. RAND Journal of Economics, 36(1), 215-228.
  • Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, Inderst, Roman (2004). Conglomerate entrenchment under optimal financial contracting. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 521). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Inderst, Roman, Muller, Holger M. (2004). The effect of capital market characteristics on the value of start-up firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 72(2), 319-356. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.06.001
  • Inderst, Roman, Müller, Holger M. (2002). Venture capital contracts and market structure. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 411). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Inderst, Roman (2001). Incentive schemes as a signaling device. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 44(4), 455-465. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00142-6
    • LSE
  • Inderst, Roman, Mueller, Holger M (2006). Informed lending and security design. Journal of Finance, 61(5), 2137-2162. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01053.x
    • STICERD
  • Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, Inderst, Roman (2005). Conglomerate entrenchment under optimal financial contracting. American Economic Review, 95(3), 850 - 861. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054201260
  • Inderst, Roman, Laux, Christian (2005). Incentives in internal capital markets: capital constraints, competition, and investment opportunities. RAND Journal of Economics, 36(1), 215-228.
  • Inderst, Roman (2001). Incentive schemes as a signaling device. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 44(4), 455-465. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00142-6