Chaigneau, Pierre

Number of items: 14.
Public
  • Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex, Gottlieb, Daniel (2025). A theory of fair CEO pay. American Economic Review: Insights, 7(3), 306 – 324. https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20240332 picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex, Gottlieb, Daniel (2022). How should performance signals affect contracts? Review of Financial Studies, 35(1), 168 - 206. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhab026 picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex, Gottlieb, Daniel (2019). The informativeness principle without the first-order approach. Games and Economic Behavior, 113, 743 - 755. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.08.006 picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex, Gottlieb, Daniel (2018). Does improved information improve incentives? Journal of Financial Economics, 130(2), 291 - 307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.05.002 picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre, Eeckhoudt, Louis (2016). Downside risk neutral probabilities. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 756). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex, Gottlieb, Daniel (2014). The value of informativeness for contracting. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 737). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre, Sahuguet, Nicolas (2013). The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 725). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Bouvard, Matthieu, Chaigneau, Pierre, Motta, Adolfo (2012). Transparency in the financial system: rollover risk and crises. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 700). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre, Sahuguet, Nicolas (2012). The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 713). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre (2012). The effect of risk preferences on the valuation and incentives of compensation contracts. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 697). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre (2011). Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 693). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre (2010). The optimal timing of executive compensation. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 660). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre (2010). Aversion to the variability of pay and optimal incentive contracts. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 654). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre (2009). Essays on CEO compensation. [Doctoral thesis]. London School of Economics and Political Science.