Items where Author is "Xu, Cheng-Gang"

Number of items: 35.
Article
  • Attribute coordination in organizations. Qian, Yingyi and Roland, Gerard and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Chinese township village enterprises as vaguely defined cooperatives. Xu, Cheng-Gang and Weitzman, Martin L
  • Coordination and experimentation in M-Form and U-Form organizations. Qian, Yingyi and Roland, Gerard and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Financial institutions and the financial crisis in East Asia. Haizhou, Huang and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Financial syndication and R&D. Huang, Haizhou and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Governing emerging stock markets: legal vs administrative governance. Pistor, Katharina and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Governing stock markets in transition economies : lessons from China. Pistor, Katharina and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Incentives, information, and organizational form. Maskin, Eric and Qian, Yingyi and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Incomplete law. Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Innovation and bureaucracy under soft and hard budget constraints. Qian, Yingyi and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Institutions, innovations, and growth. Haizhou, Huang and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • The M-form hierarchy and China's economic reform. Qian, Yingyi and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Profit-sharing and financial performance in the Chinese state enterprises: evidence from panel data. Zhuang, Juzhong and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Soft budget constraint and the optimal choices of research and development projects financing. Haizhou, Huang and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Soft budget constraint theories : from centralization to the market. Maskin, Eric and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Why China's economic reforms differ:the M-form hierarchy and entry/expansion of the non-state sector. Xu, Cheng-Gang and Qian, Yingyi
  • Why is China different from Eastern Europe? Perspectives from organization theory. Qian, Yingyi and Roland, Gerard and Xu, Cheng-Gang
    • Chapter
  • Beyond law enforcement - governing financial markets in China and Russia. Pistor, Katharina and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Commitment, financial restraints, and innovation: market socialism reconsidered. Qian, Yingyi and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Coordinating activities under alternative organizational forms. Qian, Yingyi and Roland, Gerard and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Coordinating changes in transition economies. Qian, Yingyi and Roland, Gerard and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Fiduciary duty in transitional civil law jurisdictions: lessons from the incomplete law theory. Pistor, Katharina and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Soft budget constraint theories: from centralization to the market. Maskin, Eric and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Why China grew: the role of decentralisation. Xu, Cheng-Gang and Zhuang, Juzhong
    • Working paper
  • Coordinating tasks in M-form and U-form organisations. Qian, Yingyi and Roland, Gerard and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Financial crisis, economic recovery and banking development in former Soviet Union economies. Huang, Haizhou and Marin, Dalia and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Financial institutions and the wealth of nations: tales of development. Tong, Jian and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Financial institutions and the wealth of nations:tales of development. Tong, Jian and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Incentives, scale economies, and organizational form. Maskin, Eric and Qian, Yingyi and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Law enforcement under incomplete law: theory and evidence from financial market regulation. Pistor, Katharina and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Law enforcement under incomplete law: theory and evidence from financial market regulation. Pistor, Katharina and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Ownership and managerial competition: employee, customer, or outside ownership. Bolton, Patrick and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Ownership, incentives and monitoring. Bai, Chong-En and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Soft budget constraint theories: from centralization to the market. Maskin, Eric and Xu, Cheng-Gang
  • Why China's economic reforms differ:the m-form hierarchy and entry/expansion of the non-state sector. Qian, Yingyi and Xu, Cheng-Gang