Items where Author is "Prat, Andrea"

Number of items: 99.
Article
  • Managing the family firm:evidence from CEOs at work. (2018) Bandiera, Oriana; Lemos, Renata; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella
  • The wrong kind of transparency. (2005) Prat, Andrea
  • Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies. (2002) Prat, Andrea
  • Campaign advertising and voter welfare. (2002) Prat, Andrea
  • Active and passive waste in government spending: evidence from a policy experiment. Bandiera, Oriana; Prat, Andrea; Valletti, Tommaso
  • CEO behavior and firm performance. Bandiera, Oriana; Prat, Andrea; Hansen, Stephen; Sadun, Raffaella picture_as_pdf
  • Credible pensions. Besley, Timothy; Prat, Andrea
  • Do women respond less to performance pay? Building evidence from multiple experiments. Bandiera, Oriana; Fischer, Gregory; Prat, Andrea; Ytsma, Erina picture_as_pdf
  • Financial equilibrium with career concerns. Dasgupta, Amil; Prat, Andrea
  • Games played through agents. Prat, Andrea; Rustichini, Aldo
  • Handcuffs for the grabbing hand?: media capture and government accountability. Besley, Tim; Prat, Andrea
  • Hierarchies of processors with endogenous capacity. Prat, Andrea
  • Inefficient equilibria in lobbying. Kirchsteiger, Georg; Prat, Andrea
  • Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns. Dasgupta, Amil; Prat, Andrea
  • Institutional trade persistence and long-term equity returns. Dasgupta, Amil; Prat, Andrea; Verardo, Michela
  • Is private campaign finance a good thing?: estimates of the potential informational benefits. Prat, Andrea; Puglisi, Riccardo; Snyder, Jr., James M.
  • La cittadinanza dei bambini. Bertocchi, Graziella; Prat, Andrea
  • Language and the theory of the firm. Crémer, Jacques; Garicano, Luis; Prat, Andrea
  • Lo "spettro" delle frequenze radio. Valletti, Tommaso; Prat, Andrea
  • Matching firms, managers and incentives. Bandiera, Oriana; Guiso, Luigi; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella
  • Miti e realtà della scuola italiana. Prat, Andrea
  • Perché nella ricerca non facciamo gli inglesi? Bandiera, Oriana; Prat, Andrea
  • Risk taking and optimal contracts for money managers. Palomino, Frédéric; Prat, Andrea
  • Sellers with misspecified models. Madarász, Kristóf; Prat, Andrea
  • Shared knowledge vs diversified knowledge in teams. Prat, Andrea
  • Should a team be homogeneous? Prat, Andrea
  • Spectrum auctions versus beauty contests: costs and benefits. Prat, Andrea; Valletti, Thomas M.
  • Torino-Lione: 13 miliardi spesi bene? Prat, Andrea
  • Una lezione dal Peru. Prat, Andrea
  • The allocation of authority in organizations:a field experiment with bureaucrats. Bandiera, Oriana; Best, Michael Carlos; Khan, Adnan; Prat, Andrea picture_as_pdf
  • An economic analysis of campaign finance. Prat, Andrea
  • The price impact of institutional herding. Dasgupta, Amil; Prat, Andrea; Verardo, Michela
  • The value of public information in monopoly. Ottaviani, Marco; Prat, Andrea
    • Chapter
  • Efficiency properties of a constant-ratio mechanism for the distribution of tradable emission permits. Prat, Andrea
  • Incentives in funds management: a literature overview. Bhattacharya, Sudipto; Dasgupta, Amil; Prat, Andrea
  • Mass media and political accountability. Besley, Timothy; Burgess, Robin; Prat, Andrea
  • Rational voters and political advertising. Prat, Andrea
    • Conference or Workshop Item
  • Active and passive waste in government spending: evidence from a policy experiment. Prat, Andrea; Bandiera, Oriana; Valletti, T.
  • Active and passive waste in government spending: evidence from a policy experiment. Prat, Andrea; Bandiera, Oriana; Valletti, T.
  • Career concerns in financial markets. Dasgupta, Amil; Prat, Andrea
  • Codes in organizations. Prat, Andrea; Cremer, Jacques; Garicano, Luis
  • Handcuffs for the grabbing hand: the role of the media in political accountability. Besley, Timothy; Prat, Andrea
  • Italian managers: fidelity or performance. Bandiera, Oriana; Guiso, Luigi; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella
  • Organizational economics with cognitive costs. Garicano, Luis; Prat, Andrea
  • Reputation and asset prices: a theory of information cascades and systematic mispricing. Prat, Andrea; Dasgupta, Amil
  • State television and political information. Prat, Andrea; Stromberg, David
  • The political economy of mass media. Prat, Andrea; Stromberg, David
  • The political economy of state television. Prat, Andrea; Stromberg, David
    • Report
  • Managing the family firm: evidence from CEOs at work. Bandiera, Oriana; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella
  • Reputation and price dynamics in financial markets. Dasgupta, Amil; Prat, Andrea
    • Online resource
  • Greater transparency at the Fed has led to better informed, though sterile, internal debate and discussion. Hansen, Stephen; McMahon, Michael; Prat, Andrea
  • In family-owned businesses, professional CEOs work longerhours than owner-CEOs. Bandiera, Oriana; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella
  • Information inequality makes voters vulnerable to manipulation. Prat, Andrea; Kennedy, Patrick
  • A political economy view of financial regulation. Prat, Andrea
    • Working paper
  • Active and passive waste in government spending: evidence from a policy experiment. Bandiera, Oriana; Prat, Andrea; Valletti, Tommaso
  • Asset price dynamics when traders care about reputation. Dasgupta, Amil; Prat, Andrea
  • Campaign advertising and voter welfare. Prat, Andrea
  • Campaign advertising and voter welfare. Prat, Andrea
  • Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies. Prat, Andrea
  • Career concerns in financial markets. Dasgupta, Amil; Prat, Andrea
  • Codes in organizations. Cremer, Jacques; Garicano, Luis; Prat, Andrea
  • Commercial television and voter information. Prat, Andrea; Stromberg, David
  • Common agency and computational complexity: theory and experimental evidence. Kirchsteiger, G.; Prat, Andrea
  • Communication within firms:evidence from CEO turnovers. Impink, Stephen Michael; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella picture_as_pdf
  • Credible pensions. Besley, Timothy; Prat, Andrea
  • Dynamic incentives in the money management tournament. Palomino, Frédéric; Prat, Andrea
  • Endogenous communication in complex organizations. Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; De Martí, Joan; Prat, Andrea
  • Games played through agents. Prat, Andrea; Rustichini, A.
  • Handcuffs for the grabbing hand: media capture and government accountability. Besley, Timothy; Prat, Andrea
  • Handcuffs for the grabbing hand: media capture and government accountability. Besley, Timothy; Prat, Andrea
  • How homogeneous should a team be? Prat, Andrea
  • Institutional trade persistence and long-term equity returns. Dasgupta, Amil; Prat, Andrea; Verardo, Michela picture_as_pdf
  • Institutional trade persistence and long-term equity returns. Dasgupta, Amil; Prat, Andrea; Verardo, Michela
  • Managing the family firm: evidence from CEOs at work. Bandiera, Oriana; Prat, Andrea; Lemos, Renata; Sadun, Raffaella
  • Managing the family firm:evidence from CEOs at work. Bandiera, Oriana; Lemos, Renata; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella picture_as_pdf
  • Matching firms, managers, and incentives. Bandiera, Oriana; Guiso, Luigi; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella picture_as_pdf
  • Matching firms, managers, and incentives. Bandiera, Oriana; Guiso, Luigi; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella
  • Measuring the impact factor of agents within an organization using communication patterns. Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio; Prat, Andrea
  • Mutual fund tournament: risk taking incentives induced by ranking objectives. Goriaev, Alexei P.; Palomino, Frédéric; Prat, Andrea
  • Mutual fund tournament: risk taking incentives induced by ranking objectives. Goriaev, A.; Palomino, Frédéric; Prat, Andrea
  • Pension fund governance and the choice between defined benefit and defined contribution plans. Besley, Timothy; Prat, Andrea
  • Pension fund governance and the choice between defined benefit and defined contribution plans. Besley, Timothy; Prat, Andrea
  • Risk taking and optimal contracts for money managers. Palomino, Frédéric; Prat, Andrea
  • Risk taking and optimal contracts for money managers. Palomino, Frédéric; Prat, Andrea
  • Screening with an approximate type space. Madarász, Kristóf; Prat, Andrea
  • Sequential common agency. Prat, Andrea; Rustichini, A.
  • Span of control and span of activity. Bandiera, Oriana; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella; Wulf, Julie picture_as_pdf
  • Spatial asset pricing: a first step. Ortalo-Magné, François; Prat, Andrea
  • Trading volume with career concerns. Dasgupta, Amil; Prat, Andrea
  • Transparency and deliberation within the FOMC: a computational linguistics approach. Hansen, Stephen; McMahon, Michael; Prat, Andrea
  • Transparency and deliberation within the FOMC: a computational linguistics approach. Hansen, Stephen; McMahon, Michael; Prat, Andrea
  • What do CEOs do? Bandiera, Oriana; Guiso, Luigi; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella picture_as_pdf
  • What do CEOs do? Bandiera, Oriana; Guiso, Luigi; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella
  • The political economy of housing supply: homeowners, workers, and voters. Ortalo-Magné, François; Prat, Andrea
  • The price impact of institutional herding. Dasgupta, Amil; Prat, Andrea; Verardo, Michela picture_as_pdf
  • The wrong kind of transparency. Prat, Andrea
  • The wrong kind of transparency. Prat, Andrea
  • The wrong kind of transparency. Prat, Andrea
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  • How do internal communication flows change when a new CEO is appointed? Impink, Stephen Michael; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella picture_as_pdf