Items where Author is "Piccione, Michele"

Number of items: 28.
Article
  • Sequential voting procedures in symmetric binary elections. (2000) Dekel, E; Piccione, Michele
  • Coalition formation under power relations. Piccione, Michele; Razin, Ronny
  • Correlation misperception in choice. Ellis, Andrew; Piccione, Michele
  • Cost-reducing investment, optimal procurement and implementation by auctions. Piccione, Michele; Tan, G
  • Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring. Nava, Francesco; Piccione, Michele
  • Entry and exit in hub-spoke networks. Hendricks, K; Piccione, Michele; Tan, G
  • Equilibria in networks. Hendricks, K; Piccione, Michele; Tan, G
  • Equilibrium in the jungle. Piccione, Michele; Rubinstein, Ariel
  • Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs. Ellis, Andrew; Piccione, Michele; Zhang, Shengxing picture_as_pdf
  • Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games. Binmore, K; Piccione, Michele; Samuelson, L
  • Finite automata equilibria with discounting. Piccione, Michele
  • Finite automata play a repeated extensive game. Piccione, Michele; Rubinstein, A
  • Hierarchies of beliefs for compact possibility models. Mariotti, Thomas; Meier, Martin; Piccione, Michele
  • Luxury prices: an expository note. Piccione, Michele; Rubenstein, Ariel
  • Manipulating market sentiment. Piccione, Michele; Spiegler, Ran
  • Modeling the economic interaction of agents with diverse abilities to recognise equilibrium patterns. Piccione, Michele; Rubinstein, Ariel
  • On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall. Piccione, Michele; Rubinstein, A
  • Price competition under limited comparability. Piccione, Michele; Spiegler, Ran
  • The absent-minded driver''s paradox : synthesis and responses. Piccione, Michele; Rubinstein, A
  • An approach to asset-pricing under incomplete and diverse perceptions. Eyster, Erik; Piccione, Michele
  • The curse of wealth and power. Piccione, Michele; Rubinstein, Ariel
  • The economics of hubs : the case of monopoly. Hendricks, K; Piccione, Michele; Tan, G
  • The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring. Piccione, Michele
  • A simple model of expert and non-expert bidding in first-price auctions. Piccione, Michele; Tan, G
  • The strategic dis/advantage of voting early. Dekel, Eddie; Piccione, Michele
    • Report
  • Efficiency in repeated two-action games with local monitoring. Nava, Francesco; Piccione, Michele
    • Working paper
  • Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring. Nava, Francesco; Piccione, Michele
  • Modelling the economic interaction of agents with diverse abilities to recognise equilibrium patterns. Piccione, Michele; Rubinstein, Ariel