Items where Author is "Gottlieb, Daniel"

Number of items: 20.
  • Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard. (2022) Gottlieb, Daniel; Moreira, Humberto picture_as_pdf
  • Lapse-based insurance. (2021) Gottlieb, Daniel; Smetters, Kent picture_as_pdf
  • Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents. (2021) Gottlieb, Daniel; Zhang, Xingtan picture_as_pdf
  • Corrigendum:long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents (Econometrica, 89, 2, (793–824), 10.3982/ECTA17126). Citanna, Alex; Gottlieb, Daniel; Siconolfi, Paolo; Zhang, Xingtan picture_as_pdf
  • Does improved information improve incentives? Chaigneau, Pierre; Edmans, Alex; Gottlieb, Daniel picture_as_pdf
  • Experimentation and project selection:screening and learning. Gomes, Renato; Gottlieb, Daniel; Maestri, Lucas picture_as_pdf
  • How should performance signals affect contracts? Chaigneau, Pierre; Edmans, Alex; Gottlieb, Daniel picture_as_pdf
  • Imperfect memory and choice under risk. Gottlieb, Daniel
  • Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents. Gottlieb, Daniel; Zhang, Xingtan picture_as_pdf
  • Moral incentives in credit card debt repayment:evidence from a field experiment. Bursztyn, Leonardo; Fiorin, Stefano; Gottlieb, Daniel; Kanz, Martin picture_as_pdf
  • Narrow framing and long-term care insurance. Gottlieb, Daniel; Mitchell, Olivia S
  • Perfect competition in markets with adverse selection. Azevedo, Eduardo M.; Gottlieb, Daniel picture_as_pdf
  • Risk-neutral firms can extract unbounded profits from consumers with prospect theory preferences. Azevedo, Eduardo M.; Gottlieb, Daniel
  • Should educational policies be regressive? Gottlieb, Daniel; Moreira, Humberto
  • Stochastic impatience and the separation of time and risk preferences. Dillenberger, David; Gottlieb, Daniel; Ortoleva, Pietro picture_as_pdf
  • Time lotteries and stochastic impatience. DeJarnette, Patrick; Dillenberger, David; Gottlieb, Daniel; Ortoleva, Pietro picture_as_pdf
  • An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Azevedo, Eduardo M.; Gottlieb, Daniel picture_as_pdf
  • The informativeness principle without the first-order approach. Chaigneau, Pierre; Edmans, Alex; Gottlieb, Daniel picture_as_pdf
  • A theory of fair CEO pay. Chaigneau, Pierre; Edmans, Alex; Gottlieb, Daniel picture_as_pdf
  • The value of informativeness for contracting. Chaigneau, Pierre; Edmans, Alex; Gottlieb, Daniel picture_as_pdf