Other inquisitions

Other Inquisitions

Colin Gordon

Six months later they had become archaeologists
Flaubert, *Bouvard and Pécuchet*

I.

This article (1) attempts to provide a concise introduction to the main problems addressed in Michel Foucault's work and to outline the relationship between his more recent investigations (most notably in *Discipline and Punish* and the *History of Sexuality*) and the themes of his earlier books. There are perhaps two reasons why this baldly exegetical undertaking may be of use as far as *Ideology & Consciousness* is concerned. First, given the publication in the journal's last two issues of analyses which are in various ways utilisations of Foucault, the time may be ripe for taking a closer look at their notional point of departure. Second, there are signs, in the pages of *Ideology & Consciousness* and elsewhere, that a re-examination of the nexus of theory and politics is becoming a fairly pressing matter of concern for the denizens of our left intellectual culture. Foucault's thought, through its sustained preoccupation with this cluster of problems – the possibilities and the (necessary or contingent) limits of theoretical activity as such: the philosophical-political problem of the social destiny of knowledge – seems to me to offer us a number of possible instruments for such a reflection.

Michael Foucault has himself said that the posing, or re-posing of these issues in his more recent work became possible largely as a result of the events of May 1968 and their repercussions, and first of all no doubt through the fact that the academic world happened to act as one of the principal focuses of a spectacular series of political and social upheavals. The effect of this circumstance was to cast a fresh light on questions concerning the relation of knowledge and politics in general; it also gave renewed currency and pertinence to some issues that Foucault's previous work had been an attempt to formulate. And through this retroactive effect it became possible to read these books in a different way. "When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was talking about, in *Madness and Civilisation* or *The Birth of the Clinic*, if not power? Yet I'm perfectly aware that I scarcely ever used the word and never had such a field of analyses at my disposal then" (2).

In order to properly analyse this phenomenon of recurrence, its origins would have to be traced back to a whole number of post-war currents in French thought, notably those of the penetration of Marxism into the universities, the renaissance in Hegel studies associated with the names of Hyppolite and Kojève, and the importation (in fact dating back to the early '30s) by Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and others of Husserlian phenomenology. But perhaps both the backcloth and the centre of preoccupation for Foucault's early work is above all that of the spectacular modern growth and ascent in influence and prestige of the series of disciplines collectively known as the social or human sciences. Two particular focuses of this development in post-war France are worth briefly noting here. The first, the school of historians associated with the journal *Annales* and led successively by Lucien Febvre and Fernand Braudel, promoted a synthesising research programme involving the collaboration of specialists in geography, economics, demography, sociology, ethnology and psychology. The Braudelian conception of 'general history' which crowned this interdisciplinary edifice was moreover intensely humanist; 'general history' was explicitly conceived as the history of Man. The breadth of influence of the *Annales* project is reflected in the efforts of Marxist philosophers as different as Sartre and Althusser to reach a certain accommodation between their respective positions and this 'new kind of history'. With regard to the second current which approached the centre of the stage during the sixties, designated under the somewhat dubious rubric of 'structuralism' and embracing an even more heterogeneous cluster of disciplines, it is worth here simply noting the fact that, for all the aggressively 'anti-humanist' ideology of some of its manifestations, its overall effect was emphatically one of reinforcing the implicit claims of the human sciences to constitute something like the self-evident rationality of the age.

Now the impossibility, or at least the extreme difficulty and inaccessibility of Foucault's venture during this period lay in the fact that, in contrast with those of Sartre or Althusser, it sought to problematise this universal credo by asking the question: how are the human sciences historically possible, and what are the historical consequences of their existence?The point of Foucault's efforts in *Madness and Civilisation, The Birth of Clinic* and *The Order of Things* to reconstruct and to demythologise the origins of modern knowledges of Man was condemned to remain obscure so long as the sense of this underlying interrogation of a whole contemporary order of rationality remained ungrasped or ungraspable. Discussion of these books tended instead to centre on their supposed affiliation with one or other of the main currents *within* the human sciences, the first being read as a 'history of mentalities' *à la* Lucien Febvre, the last as a structuralist extravaganza forming a companion piece to those of Lévi-Strauss, Lacan and Althusser, and the second as something of an uneasy synthesis of both. The discussion which the books were actually attempting to open remained blocked by a number of obstacles. The Left remained indifferent to their historical

material, which it regarded as unimportant or marginal; the books themselves were complex and elusive in their philosophical armature, lacked any overt declarations of ideological allegiance, and maintained an increasingly formidable effort of historical synthesis and abstraction. With hindsight one can also suspect that some of the external obstacles to their reception are internalised at those points where these texts anticipate in prophetically Nietzschean tones the impending dissolution of the figure of 'Man'.

Now while the effect of '68 in the universities had less the character of a fundamental interrogation of the human sciences than that of a fresh impetus for their renovation, developments elsewhere gave a topical point to questions previously posed by Foucault and others on the institutional matrices of the human sciences (the psychiatric asylum, the clinical hospital). The waves of new forms of working-class revolt (factory occupations, sequestrations of bosses, 'popular justice') and the dispersed struggles in a whole range of social institutions (housing, schools, prisons, asylums, hospitals, the army, social workers, magistrates and lawyers . . .) made increasingly visible the existing social forms of the exercise of power, and the particular roles of certain forms of specialised knowledge in the functioning of these apparatuses. Yet another series of effects of '68 are also pertinent, at a more subterranean level, to the trend of Foucault's work. One might say that the trouble with Foucault's work was that its originality was in inverse proportion to its utility for Marxism. Now factors such as the rather obvious discrepancy between the events of 1968 and the revolutionary time-table of the Communist Party both made it increasingly difficult for the organised Left to impose on its loyal intellectuals the strict conditions of service customary in the era of Zhdanov, and opened up the possibility on the Left for a reconsideration of some of the problematic features of Marxism. Among these features it is relevant to mention here two paradoxes about Marxism's relation to history.

It can be argued that Marxism's intellectual victory over other nineteenth-century forms of socialism had less to do with either the wonders of the dialectic of nature or the theorems on the rate of profit than with its comprehensive absorption of the theoretical advances of British, German and French historians over the preceding century. Yet it is also clear that communism as a political institution has exercised the most rigorous and exclusive control over the political utilisations of historical knowledge, an ideological policing codified in the axioms of 'determination in the last instance' and the Leninist/Stalinist strategic lore of the 'objective conditions' of the 'current conjuncture'. Secondly, whereas historical materialism has seemed in principle pre-eminently destined to construct a history of Western forms of rationality and scientificity superior to idealist narratives in terms of progress, spirit, 'influence' or the sublime accidents of genius, its actual achievement in this domain has remained depressingly meagre and problematic, paralysed all too often by the universal explanatory nostrums of class consciousness, class ideology and class interest. One

must recognise, all the same, that the problems here do not arise only for Marxists. If, no doubt in direct or indirect response to the challenge of Marxism, a certain broad consensus endorses the project of some kind of materialistic history of 'ideas', what is less often remarked on is the extreme sparseness of the fragments of such a project which have been convincingly realised, to say nothing of the very uncertainty regarding what is to count as success on this terrain, what kind of intelligibility is to be aimed for, what kinds of 'material' conditions are to be accepted as explanatory and what contemporary significance, if any, might attach to the results of such investigations.

It is against these problems that the value of Foucault's work needs to be measured. What one in fact finds in the researches he has pursued since 1968-9, often in parallel with a direct personal participation in a number of the struggles evoked above, is a progressive reworking and reformulation of these paradoxes and difficulties in terms of a characteristic set of basic questions. (a) A 'genealogical' question: what kind of political relevance can enquiries into our past have in making intelligible the 'objective conditions' of our social present, not only its visible crises and fissures but also the solidity of its unquestioned rationales? (b) An 'archaeological' question: how can the production in our societies of sanctioned forms of rational discourse be analysed according to their material, historical conditions of possibility and their governing systems of order, appropriation and exclusion? (c) An 'ethical' question: what kind of relations can the role and activity of the intellectual establish between theoretical research, specialised knowledge and political struggles? (d) Lastly, a further question fundamental to the possibility of analysing the preceding ones, the question of the proper use to be made of the concept of power, and of the mutual enwrapping, interaction and interdependence of power and knowledge.

II.

This last question, which Foucault designates as that of *pouvoir-savoir*, 'power/knowledge', constitutes the strategic fulcrum of his recent work. Yet the very generality of these two terms, power and knowledge, is liable to obscure the particularity and originality of the manner in which Foucault conceives their interaction. We can begin here by pointing out a few differences between this approach and the earlier, and in some respects analogous, contribution made by the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School with its analysis of the dialectics of *Vernunft* and *Herrschaft*, reason and domination. (It is of interest that the one prior study of the general practice of punishment discussed by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish*, Kirschheimer and Rusche's *Punishment and Social Structure*, was published in America in 1939 under the auspices of the exiled Frankfurt Institute for Social Research.) Adorno and Horkheimer's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, probably the Institute's central historical text, takes as its point of departure the seventeenth-century thought of Bacon and Descartes, the revolutions

in the mathematical and physical sciences, and the technological project of the mastery of nature (Bacon's 'Knowledge is power'), the objectification of the world articulated in the philosophical divorce between the subject and the object of knowledge. Foucault's studies, on the other hand, repeatedly centre around the latter part of the eighteenth century and the decades around 1800 as the period of the initial constitution of the human sciences in their modern forms and of the elaboration of certain new 'technologies' for the governance of people, both developments being linked to a new philosophical conception of 'Man' as a simultaneous subject and object of knowledge.

The purpose of this comparison is not to set up a controversy about the exact nature and chronology of 'the' scientific revolution, but to illustrate through the differences we have noted here the methodological shifts encapsulated in Foucault's view of power and 'power/knowledge'. Within the horizon of contemporary political theory it is difficult indeed to entertain the possibility of any basic change in our conceptualisation of power. Outstanding issues in this area are treated as matters of nuance, of the synthesis and harmonisation of alternative approaches, the equitable administration of complementary insights. If nevertheless it is to be argued that Foucault's work marks a new departure here, one must begin by noting the novelty of a reflection on power in terms beyond good and evil, located that is to say outside the fields of force of two antithetical conceptions of power whose conjunction and disjunction determine the ground rules of most modern political thought: on the one hand, the benign sociological model of power as the agency of social cohesion and normality, serving to assure the conditions of existence and survival of the community, and on the other the more polemical representation of power as an instance of repression, violence and coercion, eminently represented in the State with its 'bodies of armed men'. Each of these conceptions of power carries with it a framework of moral and political objectives: either the optimal instrumentalisation and distribution of power, or its overthrow, dismantling and 'withering away'. The appeal of the Leninist conception of revolutionary politics is perhaps that of the fusion of these dual projects within a single scenario. In any case, the very possibility of such a synthesis derives from the common presuppositions of these opposed politico-philosophical theorems. Foucault's initiative marks a break with this shared premise that power, whether localised or invested in a monarch, a community of citizens or a class dictatorship, consists in some substantive instance or agency of *sovereignty*. He introduces the double methodological principle of neutrality or scepticism of an analysis of power – or rather an analysis *in terms of* power, which bases itself neither on a moral philosophy nor on a social ontology. It is through this dual precaution of method that the positive sense of Foucault's notion of power-knowledge becomes apparent. One can say that in these two respects his thought is at once intensely Nietzschean and profoundly Kantian, inspired both by the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Genealogy of Morals*.

It may appear an implausible move within the problematic of materialist history to invoke the precedent of Kant's transcendental idealism. Yet it is in fact at this point that Foucault's work, from *Madness and Civilisation* to *The Will to Know*, manifests a certain characteristic philosophical and historical irony. The *Histoire de la Folie* and the projected *History of Sexuality* are in fact not histories of madness or sexuality at all. Nor is the former text even a history of attitudes to, or modes of treatment of madness. Its working hypothesis could be taken on the contrary to be that 'madness' does not signify a real historical-anthropological entity at all but is rather the name for a fiction or a historical construct: the problem which it addresses is hence that of the series of conceptual and practical operations through which madness, as mental illness, has been constituted in our societies as an object of certain forms of knowledge and a target of certain institutional practices. Foucault's general attitude to 'power' is somewhat analogous. "Power in the substantive sense, *'le' pouvoir*, doesn't exist" (3). "Clearly it is necessary to be a nominalist: power is not an institution, a structure, or a certain force with which certain people are endowed; it is the name given to a complex strategic relation in a given society" (4). So, as with Kant, the task is not that of fixing an ontologically primitive, definitively 'real' stratum of historical reality, but in tracing the mobile systems of relationships and syntheses which provide the conditions of possibility for the formation of certain orders and levels of objects and of forms of knowledge of such objects: the uncovering of what Foucault terms a 'historical *a priori*'. This methodology does not mean an indefinite phenomenological 'bracketing' of the history of material life, although it does imply certain reservations about the historical materialism which posits the real in the form of a total process, a general, continuous and unitary human substance. On the contrary, Foucault would no doubt say that 'sexuality', for example, is all the more a historical object because it is a fictive or constituted entity, and that working hypotheses of this form serve not to supplant or invalidate such parallel investigations as those of historical sociology and ethnology but to make available to historical analysis a whole additional range of objects and relations.

The other aspect of Foucault's methodological scepticism emerges if it is recalled that the historicisation of the Kantian problem is a preeminently Nietzschean theme. The function of the notion of 'power/knowledge' belongs within a version of the Nietzschean project of genealogy dependent on the principle of ethical as well as ontological scepticism. At first sight, Foucault's concern with the intrinsic links between knowledge and power might be taken for a variant of certain radical currents in sociology and 'critique of ideology' influenced by the Frankfurt School and *The German Idealogy*: that point of view which (to caricature it a little) condemns all dominant and socially ratified forms of knowledge as masks and instruments of oppression. But the purpose of the concept of power/knowledge is not thus to cut through the Gordian knots of epistemology and history, nor to act as

an offensive weapon of ideological struggle by confronting various 'bourgeois' academic disciplines with the complicities inscribed in their origin. It is not a scalpel serving to extract from the body of good, true science those ideologies which act as comprador allies of repressive power. What is at issue is indeed a certain series of historical connections which become visible and intelligible in terms of power, but these relations are not for Foucault the symptom of a violent transgression of the bounds of legitimate knowledge. On the contrary, if certain knowledges of 'Man' are able to serve a technological function in the domination of people, this is not so much thanks to their capacity to establish a reign of ideological mystification as to their ability to define a certain field of empirical truth. And the history of their utilisation in this field is perfectly compatible with their authentic espousal of the humanist values of self-emancipation, self-improvement and self-realisation. Nor are such values automatically taken as being 'objectively' a ruse or a fraud: Foucault is perhaps less of an anti-humanist than Nietzsche on this point.

It is these features of Foucault's genealogy which make it into the opposite of a critique of ideology that give point to his insistence on the *positive, productive* characteristics of modern apparatuses of power and his contention that their effectivity rests on the installation of what he calls a politics or a regime of truth – as opposed to a reign of falsity. His object is not to arrive at *a priori* moral or intellectual judgements on the features of our society produced by such forms of power, but to render possible an analysis of the process of production itself. It turns out in fact that this scrutiny of power in terms of knowledge and of knowledge in terms of power becomes all the more radical – and this is indeed the condition of its possibility – through its rigorous insistence on this particular kind of neutrality. In fact, if one takes the contrasts drawn above between Foucault and the Frankfurt School, it becomes possible now to see how this seemingly innocuous methodology depends on the confrontation of a series of blockages and obstacles which span the fields of the history of science and political theory; one can decipher a logic whereby Foucault's initial and seemingly unspectacular explorations and subject-matter lead to a series of unexpected consequences concerning the question of power.

One notion of Foucault's which has a particular tendency to jar on the sensibilities is that of 'technologies' of power, a term which has the sound of a strange and tendentious metaphor when applied to the mastery of people rather than that of nature. It is worth asking why this is the case. First there is the fact that, as Foucault remarks (5), philosopher-historians of science have concentrated largely on the great transformations of the physical and mathematical, rather than the social and biological sciences. Perhaps as a consequence of this, there is a tendency to consider the social and political effects of scientific technology as historically derivative from the growth of these same sciences. Power as exercised over people has, in its modern forms, largely been interpreted as a particular form or effect of the

mastery of nature and of the resources of violence or coercion assured by that mastery. What corresponds here, and particularly in the thought of the Frankfurt School, to a technology of power is the oppressive process of the objectification of human beings which falsifies their real essence as it does that of the natural world as well. Moreover, where technology as such is a theme of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy, notably within the hermeneutical tradition of Dilthey and Heidegger, it is used as a criterion for distinguishing the activity of the physical sciences from that of the human sciences or *Geisteswissenschaften*. Again, in *The Crisis of the European Sciences* Husserl attributes the disasters of twentieth-century history to the 'mathematisation of the world' inaugurated by Galileo. The extent to which the very notion of 'technologies of power' has a lurid and disagreeable ring in some ears is a testimony to the enduring strength of the humanist conviction that technology is intrinsically alien to the human sphere. The employment of this notion depends on the violation of a multiple system of taboos. It is first of all not the empirical contestation of certain quasi-orthodoxies regarding natural science, human science and technology which is crucial but the conceptual displacements necessary in order for the issue to be posed at all. Foucault's position involves neither the dismissal of the vexed question of the epistemological differences between natural and human science, nor does it assert the radical autonomy of 'human' from 'physical' technologies (6). Its minimum thesis is that the historical matrix of conditions of possibility for the modern human sciences must be understood in relation to the elaboration of a whole range of techniques and practices for the discipline, surveillance, administration and formation of populations of human individuals. These forms of knowledge and these apparatuses of power are linked in a constitutive interdependence (7). In order for a genealogy of this relationship to be possible, two complementary shifts of philosophical perspective are necessary: firstly, the discarding of that ethical polarisation of the subject-object relationship which privileges subjectivity as the form of moral autonomy, in favour of a conception of domination as able to take the form of a subjectification as well as of an objectification; and secondly, the rejection of the assumption that domination falsifies the essence of human subjectivity and the assertion that power regularly promotes and utilises a 'true' knowledge of subjects and indeed in a certain manner constitutes the very field of that truth. The whole of Foucault's work from *Madness and Civilisation* to *The Will to Know* can be read as an exposition of these two theses; it is possible to think that their significance may be commensurate with the influences and assumptions which have hitherto rendered them inadmissible. It must be pointed out that the 'subject' is thought of by Foucault as a fictive or constructed entity (as are certain objects), though this does not mean that it is *false* or *imaginary*. Power does not itself give birth to actual people, but neither does it dream subjects into existence. The key here to Foucault's position is his methodological scepticism about both the ontological claims and the ethical values which humanist systems of thought

invest in the notion of subjectivity. To repeat: the point is not to judge or to subvert these values, only to investigate how they become possible and not to content oneself with ascribing them to the teleology of progress.

The question of progress in fact marks the point where the rather shallow antithesis between neutrality and critique implied in the preceding remarks can be transcended. The various precautions of method and displacements of perspective that have been described are indeed preliminaries to the deployment of a certain form of critique, one whose terms and objects must now be stated. At the same time we may be able to see how a number of very wide-ranging theses are developed in Foucault's work from a starting-point in a fairly restricted sector of the history of the sciences. The uncertainty of the interface within historiography between general history and the history of the sciences itself comprises or symptomatises one of the major obstacles to the quest for a materialist history of forms of rationality. It is this complex set of relationships between the notions of historicity and rationality that forms the framework of Foucault's critical thought.

Foucault has acknowledged that one of the initial reasons for his opting to work in the history of sciences other than the philosophically 'noble' disciplines of physics and mathematics was the example of Georges Canguilhem, who, since the 1940s, has produced a remarkable body of studies devoted entirely to the history of the biological sciences (8). What this work has shown is that the philosophically recalcitrant aspects of the development of these sciences impose on the historian certain methodological reflections which yield a series of novel philosophical insights. Precisely because the biological sciences do not emerge out of discoveries validated through the adequacy and rigour of their mathematical formalisation, it becomes unsatisfactory and inadequate for their historian to assume the present standpoint of a more or less definitive scientific truth and to reconstruct their development as the immanent logic of a series of ordered transformations through which that truth is attained or revealed. The history of biology does not thus transparently unfold itself before the gaze of present truth. But neither can it be made intelligible through a simple descriptive sociology of the beliefs and practices of successive generations of savants. Nor does the solution lie in an amalgamation of these two approaches. Rather, the standard of truth/falsity is a necessary internal component of a history of science, but this history must be given the form, not of a history of the truth itself, but of a history of what Canguilhem, following Bachelard, terms *veridical* discourses, practices governed by the norm of a specified project for the formulation of true propositions. Such discourses are scientific not directly through the actual truth-content of their propositions but through the veridical normativity of their organisation as a practice: not their truth but their relation towards a truth. Canguilhem also shows how the manner in which this norm is defined in the biological and biologistic sciences has

a further important property which we will return to below, namely that this norm is internally related both to conceptions of the intrinsic normativity of its natural objects, the phenomena of life, and also to various other normative forms of social practice. But a further thesis of Canguilhem's that interests us here is that the relation between truth and historicity is an intrinsic element in the rationality of these sciences; the advance of biological knowledge involves a particular kind of continual recurrential re-evaluation, a retrospective transformation and reutilisation of different preceding stages of that knowledge. Biology thus progresses through a constantly open-ended and provisional critique of its own progress.

Foucault's thought performs a further elaboration and extension of these considerations. The scientific model of progressivity, at least in its formal attributes as a sequence of cumulative and non-reversible transformations, corresponds to a more global and general accumulative process characteristic of our societies, a process whose reality, however enigmatic, is obvious and indisputable. The uncertain and yet suggestive status of the history of the sciences consists in the fact that it exhibits a kind of rationality which may be taken either as a formal model, an exemplar, a component or an explanation of this ensemble of social-historical processes. Now there is an important and essential corollary to the manner in which the phenomenon of historical progressivity in general is experienced: this experience always engenders and is incorporated in a certain conception of *the present*. And here Foucault's method of genealogy utilises Canguilhem's analysis and critique of this conception of the present as a standpoint of scientific thought and a standpoint of the history of that thought. We can say that the object of Foucault's critique is the status of the present. It is in this sense that Foucault characterises his enterprise as the 'history of the present'. Not a history for which the present means the real terminal point of explanatory narratives, nor a history for which the present functions as the given existential site determining the questions which the historian addresses to a past. But a history of the present as 'modernity': the present as the form of a particular kind of domain of rationality, constituted by its location on a diachronic gradient; a 'régime of truth' composed of a field of problems, questions and responses determined by the continuity or discontinuity, clarity or obscurity of the administered ensemble of relations which constitute the partition between present and past, 'new' and 'old'. (It is here that the wider critical import of Foucault's concern with establishing that the failure of the prisons is an older problem, and 'sexuality' a newer problem than is officially maintained, becomes fully apparent.) The present is a fundamental figure of power/knowledge, the correlate of a form of social practice within which historiography is only one aspect or component. Here again once has a certain kind of nominalism. If Foucault poses a philosophical challenge to history, it is not to question the reality of 'the past' but to interrogate the rationality of 'the present'.

As an account of Foucault's views this probably strays into the margins

of exegetical fiction. It must be said in any case that Foucault's genealogy is certainly not a master-schema purporting to govern all other possible forms of historical explanation. (Though it may offer them a supplementary dimension or reflection.) What it may possibly provide is a principle of intelligibility for some at least of the historical relations covered by the category of power/knowledge, in so far as these are constituents of an effect of progressivity/modernity. More precisely, it suggests a mode of examination of the general signification of the history of particular forms of rationality and scientificity. This would consist in the exact opposite of the rationalist historicism where the truth of history is interpreted as the effect of a metahistorical process of rationalisation; it would mean a study of the specific effects of practices whose rationale is the installation of a regime of truth. (Alternatively, one might say: the study of rational practices whose effects are intelligible in that they 'secrete' a certain kind of historicity.)

III.

In the remainder of this background sketch we will attempt to look more closely at some of the details of Foucault's method, beginning with two of Foucault's earlier texts and turning our attention from the 'genealogical' question to the 'archaeological' question. *The Birth of the Clinic* (1963) contains one of the most remarkable studies to date relating the transformation of a field of knowledge during a specific period to its context in the field of extra-theoretical material circumstances and events. It demonstrates how the conceptual and epistemological mutations effected in medical knowledge during the first decades of the nineteenth century were bound up with the redefinition of the social and medical function of the hospital, the incidence of revolution and war on the organisation of, and relations between medical teaching, research and practice, the ethical, epistemological and political transformation of the relation between medicine and its patients and of the professional status of medical personnel, and the complementary projects of a science of the individual case and a hygienic policing of an entire population (9). What is interesting about Foucault's method here is that it does not conduct an ontological search for the determinant-in-the-last-instance, nor attempt to deduce these diverse orders of events from causal principles of sufficient reason such as an economic mode of production or the intentions and interests of a class. Instead it analyses a multiplicity of political, social, institutional, technical and theoretical *conditions of possibility*, reconstructing a heterogeneous system of relations and effects whose contingent interlocking makes up what Foucault calls the historical *a priori* of the 'clinical gaze'. What it thus achieves is a form of historical intelligibility whose concreteness and materiality resides in the very irreducibility of the distinct orders of events whose relations it plots.

The Archaeology of Knowledge develops this approach further by proposing a theoretical reworking of certain problems traditionally assigned to the histories of science, ideas and ideologies. This project of an 'archaeology' is conceived as the study of forms of knowledge and

rationality at the level of their material manifestation as bodies of discourse composed of finite sets of effective oral or written utterances. The aim is to render these discourses accessible to description and analysis as a specific order of historical reality, whose organisation is irreducible either to the history of the careers, thought and intentions of individual agents (the authors of utterances) or to a supra-individual teleology of discovery and intellectual evolution (the truth of utterances). His conception of an order of discourse presents Foucault with a specific area in which to examine one aspect of the general problem of the intelligibility of the historically contingent. His procedure is that of the reconstruction of 'rules of formation' for particular discourses such that not only is the formulation of certain individual utterances *possible* in these discourses (in the sense of conforming to a model of acceptability comparable to that of a grammar) but it is these utterances (and not others) that are effectively *produced*. The material for this double descriptive/analytical investigation is thus a set of phenomena or object-events whose conditions of possibility are at the same time their conditions of existence. Further, the particular rules of formation of discourses specify these intrinsic forms of regularity in terms of relations with other orders of historical phenomena: the roles and qualifications for the utterers of specific discourses, the mode of specification of their objects of knowledge, the conceptual frameworks for the derivation, formalisation and systematisation of utterances, and the strategic relations of conditioning and effect operating between discourses and other forms of social practice. While at first sight reductionist in its focusing on one narrowly defined 'level' of historical objects, this approach in fact yields through the very delicacy and rigour of its discriminations an enriched conception of the historical interaction of logical, epistemological and social relations.

It is sometimes supposed that Foucault's subsequent thematisation of power tacitly jettisons as obsolete the ambitious methodological edifice of the *Archaeology*. In fact the features of the latter which we have just evoked form the essential ground for the further concepts Foucault was to introduce. The extension and enrichment of these earlier analyses was undertaken through two successive and complementary moves. First, in his 1970 lecture *The Order of Discourse*, Foucault shows how the rules of formation of discourses are linked to the operation of a particular kind of social power. Discourses not only exhibit immanent principles of regularity, they are also bound by regulations enforced though social practices or appropriation, control and 'policing'. Discourse is a political commodity. It is true that here Foucault adopts a somewhat negative view of the articulation of discourse and power as a phenomenon of exclusion, limitation and prohibition (somewhat as in *Madness and Civilisation*). But his more recent books bring to attention a different and converse form of articulation whose effects are much more positive and productive in character. This phenomenon consists in the singular emergence in Western thought during the past four centuries of discourses which

construct *programmes* for the formation of a social reality. The existence of these discourses, whose object-domains are defined simultaneously as a target area for intervention and a functioning totality to be brought into existence, has a significance for historical analysis which prior to Foucault seems never to have been fully exploited. *Our world does not follow a programme, but we live in a world of programmes*, that is to say in a world traversed by the effects of discourses whose object (in both senses of the word) is the rendering rationalisable, transparent and programmable of the real.

Before proceeding further we need to recall Foucault's insistence on the use of the concept of power in a relational rather than a substantialising mode. Power for Foucault is not an omnipotent causal principle or shaping spirit but a perspective concept. Thus it is not a question here of simply reinterpreting the kinds of relations of conditions and effects studied in *The Birth of the Clinic*, as relations programmed by a power. On the other hand this *is* a conception of the exercise of power as a type of operation which *establishes* certain relationships between heterogeneous elements. If we say that all human practices are possible only within relations, and subject to conditions which are only finitely modifiable at a given point and time, then the exercise of power can be conceived as the general aspect of practice within which these relations and conditions function as a material and a terrain of operation. Power is exercised not only subject to, but through and by means of conditions of possibility. Hence for Foucault power is omnipresent in the social body because it is coterminous with the conditions of social relations in general.

Foucault employs three concepts of general forms of rationality pertinent to the study of power/knowledge: the concepts of *strategies*, *technologies* and *programmes* of power. All three concepts serve as means of conceiving relations of power in terms of the differential and differentiated interaction between distinct orders of historical events. In order to understand their functioning, it is necessary to keep in mind a basic distinction between three general orders of events: that of certain forms of explicit, rational, reflected *discourse*; that of certain non-discursive social and institutional *practices*; and that of certain *effects* produced within the social field. These three categories do not of course represent watertight ontological compartments; the same events can be considered in turn under each of them. The point is to clarify certain of the ways in which they intersect and interact. Readers of Foucault sometimes emerge with the dismaying impression of a paranoid hyper-rationalist system in which the strategies-technologies-programmes of power are fused into a monolithic edifice of social subjection. The misunderstanding here consists in a conflation of historical levels which reads into the text two massive illusions or paralogisms: an illusion of 'realisation' whereby it is supposed that programmes elaborated in certain discourses are integrally transposed to the domain of actual practices and techniques, and an illusion of

'effectivity' whereby certain technical methods of social domination are taken as being actually implemented and enforced upon the social body as a whole. (These misunderstandings are perhaps both metaphysically rooted in a neo-Hegelian tendency to identify realisation with effectivity, both notions being copresent in the Hegelian concept of *Wirklichkeit*. For Foucault's thought it is essential that they remain distinguished from one another.) One needs to beware the pitfalls inherent in the word 'power' itself. Foucault's thesis of the *omnipresence* of relations of power or power/knowledge is all too easily run together with the idea that all power, in so far as it is held, is a kind of sovereignty amounting to untrammelled mastery, absolute rule or command. Hence Foucault is taken to attribute an absolute *omnipotence* to 'apparatuses' of power. It hardly needs to be pointed out that if this were the case history would assume the form of a homogeneous narrative of perpetual despotism, and the subtleties of genealogical analysis would be entirely superfluous. In fact, the concepts of strategies, programmes and technologies of power serve to analyse not the perfect correspondence between the orders of discourse, practice and effects, but the manner in which they fail to correspond and the positive significance that can attach to such discrepancies.

This kind of non-correspondence is not a new discovery, of course. But the ways in which it is most commonly treated, in terms for example of the gulf between the intentions of human agents and the results of their actions, leave a number of options unexplored. This point is admirably stated by Albert O. Hirschman in a recent essay which connects at a number of points with the current researches of Foucault and others (10). In *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph* (Princeton, 1977), Hirschman compares his own discussion of the intellectual antecedents of capitalism with that of Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. As Hirschman remarks, Weber's thesis of the paradoxical effects on economic behaviour of Calvinist theology and morality "spelled out one of those remarkable unintended effects of human actions (or in this case, thoughts) whose discovery has become the peculiar province and highest ambition of the social scientists since Vico, Mandeville and Adam Smith" (p 130). He goes on to suggest that

> discoveries of the symmetrically opposite kind are both possible and valuable. On the one hand, there is no doubt that human actions and social decisions tend to have consequences that were entirely unintended at the outset. But, on the other hand, these actions and decisions are often taken because they are earnestly and fully expected to have certain effects that then wholly fail to materialise. The latter phenomenon, while being the structural obverse of the former, is also likely to be one of its causes; the illusory expectations that are associated with certain social decisions at the time of adoption may keep their *real* future effects from view. (...)

> Moreover, once these desired effects fail to happen and refuse to come into the world, the fact that they were originally counted on is likely to be not only forgotten but actively repressed. (p.131)

Thus the empirical non-correspondence between the level of discourses and the level of historical effects can be analysed in other terms than the sociological inference of a hidden hand which orchestrates the unexpected, without lapsing into the interpretation of history as the realisation of some (articulate or inarticulate) project. And just because non-realised programmes tend to be dropped from the official record, it becomes all the more important and fascinating to investigate what may have been the mode of their real but unprogrammed effects.

Foucault's work suggests a further means of exploring the positive significance of the phenomena Hirschman describes. If the effects of a programme transcend the criterion of whether its intentions are fulfilled, this is largely because a programme is always something more than a formulation of wishes or intentions. Every programme also either articulates or presupposes a *knowledge* of the field of reality upon which it is to intervene and/or which it is calculated to bring into being. The common axiom of programmes is that an effective power is and must be a power which *knows* the objects upon which it is exercised. Further, the condition that programmatic knowledge must satisfy is that it renders reality in the form of an object which is *programmable*. This operation is reminiscent of the function Kant attributes in the *Critique of Pure Reason* to the concept of the schema, which, as Deleuze puts it, "does not answer the question, how are phenomena made subject to the understanding, but the question, how does the understanding apply itself to the phenomena which are subject to it?"

A characteristic solution to this problem is the positing of a reality which is programmable by virtue of an intrinsic mechanism of self-regulation, an inherent *economy*. Hirschman brings out certain properties of such systems in his remarks on Steuart's *Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy* (1767).

> The basic consistency of Steuart's thinking is best understood through his metaphor of the watch to which he likens the 'modern oeconomy'. He uses it on two different occasions to illustrate in turn . . . two aspects of state intervention . . . On the one hand, the watch is so delicate that it 'is immediately destroyed if . . . touched with any but the gentlest hand'; this means that the penalty for old-fashioned arbitrary *coups d'autorité* is so stiff that they will simply have to cease. On the other hand, these same watches are continually going wrong; sometimes the spring is found too weak, at other times too strong for the machine . . . and the workman's hand becomes necessary to set it right'; hence well-intentioned, delicate interventions are frequently required. (p 86-7)

Here the genius of the programmer consists in positing a real mechanism which itself 'programmes' the appropriate form of intervention upon it. Even more sophisticated schemas can be constructed, of course. Those which Foucault has discussed most extensively are the programmes which invent forms of automatism for the correction of the automatism of the economy and in particular for the rectification of the human elements of its materials. Such a model is that of Bentham's *Panopticon*. Bentham completes the economy of exchange with an economy of power. In such models, where one begins to approach the thematic field of the human sciences, the notion of mechanism is supplemented with a perhaps even more powerful conception, that of the *norm* of behaviour and functioning of human individuals and collectivities.

Here one encounters a complex and intimate series of relations between programmes of power and technologies of power. One property of human norms is that deviation is no longer, as with the watch, an adventitious consequence of the imperfection of its construction. Abnormalities come to be understood as effects of a human and social pathogeny which is as natural as the norm itself, and hence the object of a complementary form of knowledge. Further, the concept of a norm is inseparable, as Canguilhem has shown (12), from concepts of normativity and normalisation; the specification of a norm is inseparable from the specification of natural and technical operations which effect or correct this normativity. Indeed without the availability of means of normalisation a norm is hardly knowable. In turn, techniques of normalisation themselves suffer from defects which necessitate correction and adjustment.

Thus a programmatic schema fulfils its vocation only in so far as it is complemented by the elaboration of a technology. This internal relation between the programmatic and the technological, the normal and the normative, has as its precondition the conceptualisation within the discursive form of the programme itself of an ineluctable discrepancy between discourse and actuality. Now this programmatic point of view on phenomena of 'non-correspondence' is not the last word on this matter for the genealogist of programmes. But it does already allow one to indicate one basic mode of the historical effects of 'unsuccessful' programmes, namely the manner in which every programme caters in advance for the eventuality of its own failure. What Foucault illustrates here is a curious anti-functionality of the norm: the failure of prisons to fulfil their planned function as reformatories, far from precipitating their breakdown, acts instead as the impulse for a perpetual effort to reform the prison which continually reinvokes the model of its original, aborted programme. The history of the prison is one of many such epics of failure in the annals of social policy. Failure here is the norm (13). Yet a further factor, the complement of this one, is the possibility that the untoward effects of a technique which mark a failure within one programme can still be recouped as 'successes' within the coordinates of another one. This is exactly what happens with the prisons.

Effects of this type belong within what Foucault terms the domain of *strategies* of power. In contrast with the normative logic of the programme, the characteristic of strategy is its artificial, improvisational, factitious nature. Whereas programmes/technologies of power have essentially to do with the *formation* of the social real, strategic activity consists in the *instrumentalisation* of the real. In effect Foucault's notion of strategy defines the minimum form of rationality pertaining to the exercise of power in general which consists in the mobile set of operations whereby a multiplicity of heterogeneous elements (forces, resources, the features of a terrain, the disposition and relation of objects in space-time) are invested with a particular functionality relative to a dynamic and variable set of objectives. Strategy is the exploitation of possibilities which it itself discerns and creates. What is important is to avoid merging the concept of strategy into that of the programme by way of the image of the grand strategist and his plan. (It is necessary here to distinguish clearly between Foucault and his authors. Bentham's *Panopticon* may well be described a design for an automatic strategy of social power. But Foucault for his part is not under the illusion that such an integrated strategy has even been translated into reality. Nor is his position the futile hypothesis that everything happens 'as though' such a plan had been implemented). The basic difference is that strategy, unlike the programme, is an essentially non-discursive rationality. Discourse is not a medium for strategy but a resource (14). And the point where the perspective of strategy becomes indispensable for genealogy is where the non-correspondence of discourses, practices and effects creates possibilities for operations whose sense is, in various ways, either unstated or unstateable within any one discourse. Strategy is the arena of the cynical, the promiscuous, the tacit, in virtue of its general logical capacity for the synthesis of the heterogeneous. This is what Foucault means by the 'anonymity' of certain effects within the field of power-relations: it is not that these effects lack an agent but that they lack a programmer.

What is at first less clear is why Foucault asserts that these effects manifest, at certain points and in certain circumstances, a recognisable overall coherence in terms of strategy. A field of strategy is one which is traversed by a multiplicity of more or less coordinated or uncoordinated, intelligent or stupid agencies. (And it must be remembered that the human 'elements' of the field are themselves not an inert and passive material.) Thus the logic of strategy cannot in itself entail any necessary coherence whatever. In other words, a history cannot be *based* on the concept of strategy. The concept only becomes pertinent as an instrument for historical decipherment at the point where the strategic *instrumentalisation* of the social terrain interacts with procedures for its *formation* by programmes and technologies of power (15). The latter (conceptual and practical) operations, by establishing certain new forms of objects and relations, engender strategic possibilities and, in particular, provide a matrix of crystallisation for organised effects of strategy. What is meant by a strategy of power

is the interplay between one or more programmes/technologies and an operational evaluation in terms of strategy: a logically hybrid (and sometimes elusive) conplex which couples the production of effects with the utilisation of those effects.

In what follows we will briefly sketch some of the general forms of this interplay. But it must be stressed that these concepts do not compose any self-sufficient 'theory' of history: their concrete utility can only be seen and tested at the level of their empirical, narrative deployment in studies such as *Discipline and Punish*.

1. Clearly the effectivity of the discursive form of the programme does not reduce itself to some magical efficacy attributed to the thought of the programmer as master-mind. Rather it possesses an inherent strategic utility as a public space for the articulation of problems and the contention, negotiation and collaboration of different forces and interests. The paradigm of strategy as a zero-sum war game is inappropriate here. Where the terrain of strategy is the social, there is always a likelihood that the outcome of two competing or conflicting strategy-programmes will be the composition of a third one. The built-in logical coherence of the programme serves here as a vehicle for the improvisational flexibility of strategy.

2. Over and above the internal relation that links the elaboration of human technologies of power to the rationality of the programme, technology possesses an intrinsic rationality of its own, independent of the phenomena whereby particular techniques either fail to produce the results prescribed by a programme or produce other, unforeseen results. In fact this is true of any technology: the concept of technology signifies precisely the specific level of intelligence, progressivity and rationality characteristic of the technical. The history of this rationality cannot be reduced to that of its individual or institutional users, to the times and places, or to the ulterior purpose of its applications. Foucault's account in *Discipline and Punish* of the development of technologies of discipline and surveillance comprises, in terms of all these extra-technological dimensions, a random collage of scattered and heterogeneous elements. But this does not vitiate the analysis: the coherence of the phenomena described is to be found in the order of the technological itself, rather than in some other order. (It should be added that conscious forms of technological experimentation regularly occur in the forms of institutional 'models': the model eighteenth-century prisons in America, for example.)

This 'relative autonomy' of the technical permits it to act as an independent principle for the multiplication, adaptation and reorganisation of effects. Whatever its *logical* interdependence with the framework of the programme in general, a technology of normalisation always admits of a certain free play with respect to any specific programmatic norm. This opens up a whole range of strategic possibilities. The auto-

nomous diffusion and adaptation of techniques makes it possible for programmes based on quite different normative analyses (political economy, social economy, eugenicist psychology, psychoanalysis . . .) to enter into a complex play of permutation, exchange or complementarity of technical roles. It is also possible for a technological apparatus like the prison to continue operating while adapting itself to a strategic role diametrically opposite to that of its initial programme: not the elimination of criminality, but its exploitation.

3. To grasp the full range of these possibilities we must consider more closely the notion of the norm. The term has been partly used here as a short-hand notation for a whole cluster of what Kant might have termed 'regulative ideas', ideas conceptually affiliated with the entire gamut of forms of knowledge of Man: system, structure, rule, order and exchange for example (16). But beneath this multiplicity of alternative and complementary concepts it is possible to identify a basic structural bipolarity which characterises modern projects of human governance. If the general object-material for the relations and networks of power studied by Foucault is that of the concrete forms of conduct and behaviour of human beings, then one can say that operations designed to form or re-form this material articulate themselves according to two broad modalities, 'microscopic' and 'macroscopic': techniques which effect an orthopaedic training of the body and soul of an individual, and techniques which secure and enhance the forms of life and well-being of a population or 'social body'. Now it is possible to effect a partial classification of programmes, strategies and technologies according to how their field of operation focuses within one or other of these modalities, and how a double epistemological-practical activity of shaping their material into a normal-normative-normalisable form is weighted towards the focus of the individual or that of the population. But at the same time every such practice is conceived as having necessarily to be evaluated simultaneously on both levels. Modern forms of governance are thus conceptualised in terms of a double surface of effects, or by means of a double-entry system of calculation. And the *ratio* of this bipolarity is the basic premise of modern forms of governmental practices which requires that a good and legitimate government or governance of men must be one which is *omnium et singulorum*, of all and of each. What underpins the evergreen moral and ontological arguments in social and political theory about 'the individual and society', including their current forms as theories of 'the subject' and of 'socialisation', is the strategic rule by which organised relations of power are called upon to integrate these dual imperatives of good government.

Two supplementary clarifications must be added here. Firstly, the 'macroscopic' focus of the population is not to be equated with Foucault's conception of the field of strategic effects in the real. The logic of the processes he describes is not that of an inexorable globalisation of effects of power towards the ideal horizon of a perfectly

subjected totality. Thus Foucault distinguishes his characterisation of our societies as *disciplinary* from the fantasy of a *disciplined* society populated by docile, obedient, normalised subjects. Secondly, although Foucault locates the basis of power in minute, capillary relations of domination, relations which act as the lasting substratum for the transitory politico-historical edifices of State and Revolution, this is not to assert that the governance of collectivities is merely a resultant or a projection of a discipline of individuals pioneered in closed institutions such as the prison. The different forms of exercise of power focused around the regulative ideas of individual and society are genealogically interdependent and coeval. A social government is as much constituted out of minute capillary relations as is individual pedagogics. The 'capillary' is not equivalent to the individual: it may be sub-individual or trans-individual. And the State is neither the definitive form assumed by government nor its subject, but rather one of its effects or instruments (17).

IV.

Foucault's thought on strategy has certain political and ethical applications and corollaries. Perhaps it is now clear that if Foucault's reflection on power is rather more extended than those which historians usually permit themselves, it is not the kind of obsessive serenade which sublimates the desire to personally lay hands on the levers of control. It does not produce a mock-up of a political control room. Nor do its illustrations of the multiplicity, fecundity and productivity of power-relations imply their collective imperviousness to resistance. The study of the history of forms of rationality imposes a certain bias which necessitates greater attention being paid to forms of domination than to forms of insubordination. But the facts of resistance are nevertheless assigned an irreducible role within the analysis. The field of strategies is a field of conflicts: the human material operated on by programmes and technologies is inherently a *resistant* material. If this were not the case, history itself would become unthinkable.

The strategically coordinated apparatuses of power which Foucault identifies do not have the status of a trans-historical law. Those which he describes, organised during the nineteenth century around the 'objects' of criminality and sexuality, are implicitly situated as local episodes within a more general history of the political. They constitute an inherently fragile structure and their instruments and techniques are always liable to forms of reappropriation, reversibility and re-utilisation, not only in tactical realignments from 'above' but in counter-offensives from 'below'. This is why no one good or bad ideology of oppression or subversion is possible: thematic implements of power – individual conscience, norms of sexuality, the security of a population – have been and are constantly being 'turned round', in both directions.

Even so, it may be objected that Foucault never locates his theoretical enterprise 'on the side of' resistance by undertaking to formulate a strategy of resistance, and it may hence be inferred that the cunning of

strategy is taken as being the exclusive property of forms of domination. Foucault does indeed refuse the kind of articulation with the political whereby theory undertakes to provide proof that its ideological identity papers are in proper order. He also consistently refuses to assume the standpoint of one speaking for and in the name of the oppressed (18). These refusals correspond to a certain caution about the project of formulating, at last and once again, the lines of a 'correct' political strategy. In conclusion we will attempt to formulate some of these reservations as they arise from Foucault's discussions of power, strategy and resistance.

The identification of resistances. Every programme of revolution or subversion which espouses the dictum that 'it is right to revolt' is obliged to limit its generosity by distinguishing those acts which it authenticates as right and as revolts from those other occurrences and agents which it disqualifies as adventurisms, provocations, left-wing infantilisms, criminality, hooliganism or whatever. What needs to be problematised here is the subordination of the category of resistance to the normative criteria of a political programme. A corollary of Foucault's de-substantialisation of power is a certain desacralisation of canonical forms of resistance identified by a politico-ideological affiliation. Without rushing to the opposite extreme of a romanticism of noble savagery, it can be argued that within a general reflection in terms of power, the category of resistance cannot be made to exclude its (supposedly) 'primitive' or 'lumpen' forms of manifestation. There is another problem about the political definition of resistance. If one turns, not to the fictitious schema of the disciplined subject but to the question of what is it for real people to reject or refuse, or on the other hand in some manner to consent to, acquiesce in, or accept the subjection of themselves or of others, it becomes apparent that the binary division between resistance and non-resistance is an unreal one. The existence of those who seem not to rebel is a warren of minute, individual, autonomous tactics and strategies which counter and inflect the visible facts of overall domination, and whose purposes and calculations, desires and choices resist any simple division into the political and the apolitical. The schema of a strategy of resistance as a vanguard of politicisation needs to be subjected to re-examination, and account must be taken of resistances whose strategy is one of evasion or defence – the Schweijks as well as the Solzhenitsyns. There are no 'good' subjects of resistance.

The focusing of resistances. Certain contemporary apparatuses of power are evocative of a different kind of mechanism from that envisaged by a Steuart or a Bentham. Foucault has likened the French legal system to the paintings of Tinguely: "one of those immense pieces of machinery, full of impossible cog-wheels, belts which turn nothing and wry gear-systems, all these things which 'don't work' and ultimately serve to make the thing 'work' " (19). Even the stupidities, the failures, the absurdities, the 'weak links' of the existing order of things are capable of a positive utility within the strategic field. For

this and other reasons a certain prudence is advisable regarding revolutionary strategies which utilise these phenomena as levers for the realisation of a programme which is more rational, more intelligent, and hence more acceptable and better than that of the prevailing regime. There is a different kind of challenge which might be considered here: what if instead of stigmatising the unacceptable in order to supplant it by the acceptable, one were to call in question the very rationality which grounds the establishment of a régime of acceptability and the programmatic logic whereby the 'unacceptable' is regularly restored to the 'acceptability' of a norm? It is at the points where the role of a whole species of rationality and the status of a whole regime of truth can be made to open itself to interrogation that the possibility of a more profound logic or revolt may begin to emerge. Here, as Foucault has made clear, the object is neither a denunciation of the effects of knowledge in general, nor the fabrication of a knowledge for the instruction, correction and guidance of every possible resistance. At this point the contribution of the intellectual as historical analyst ends and gives way to the reflection and decisions, not of the managers and theoreticians of resistance but of those who themselves choose to resist. For the recent eruptions of 'popular knowledge' and 'insurrections of subjugated knowledges' which he celebrates, what Foucault may have to offer is a set of possible tools, tools for the identification of the conditions of possibility which operate through the obviousness and enigmas of our present, tools perhaps also for the eventual modification of those conditions.

Notes

1. Based on a preface written for a collection of translations of shorter texts, interviews and lectures by Michel Foucault, to be published next year by the Harvester Press under the title *Power/Knowledge, Selected interviews and other writings 1972-77*. The texts translated in this volume are listed in the bibliography below, numbered (1) to (11). In these notes they are referred to by these numbers. I am grateful to Graham Burchell and Nikolas Rose for their advice and comments on earlier drafts. Many of my ideas about Foucault come from Pasquale Pasquino, Giovanna Procacci and Jacques Donzelot. I have also made use of a number of recent, as yet unpublished texts and communications by Michel Foucault. But this is in no sense an authorised version of his views.
2. (6).
3. (11).
4. *La Volonté de Savoir*, p 123, my translation.
5. (6).
6. On this see the discussion of the 'man-machine' motif in *Discipline and Punish*, Part III Chapter 1. On machinofacture and the body, see notably the book cited by Foucault: Didier Deleule and Francois Guéry, *Le Corps Productif*, Paris 1972.
7. Despite the intervening changes of perspective it is still useful to read, in parallel with the morphology of disciplines in Part III of *Discipline and Punish*, the final two chapters of *The Order of Things* dealing with 'Man' and the human sciences.
8. Especially valuable are the Introduction to his (1977) and a forthcoming preface by Foucault to the English translation of his (1972).
9. Cf (9).
10. Foucault's recent lectures have dealt with liberalism and neo-liberalism as forms of governmental rationality. Cf his lecture in this issue, Pasquino

(1978), Procacci (1978) and Donzelot (1979).

11. Deleuze (1963).
12. Canguilhem (1972).
13. Donzelot (1977) traces the 'failure' of the modern family to fulfil its assigned functions, and the functionalisation of that failure. Cf Hodges and Hussain (1979) and Burchell (1979).
14. These remarks are no more than a crude allusion to a series of problems that are barely touched on here. The term 'non-discursive' is used in the sense assigned to it in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. The point here is largely that of identifying a reasonably precise use for Foucault's notion of strategy which differs from the role played by the concept of ideology in the political interpretation of texts. This article does not purport to be a definitive glossary and syntax of Foucault's key concepts, only a *possible* way of explicating some of them. Moreover, there are certain areas of genealogical-archaeological analysis (notably in the study of political discourses) where a concept of *discursive strategies* may have an important and valid function. To avoid confusion it should be said that I am not seeking here to harmonise Foucault's recent application of the concept of strategy with its (to my mind different and in some respects unsatisfactory) employment in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*.
15. The reference here to 'the social terrain' evidently begs the question: what does it mean to characterise a terrain of strategic investment as *social?* The fruitfulness of this line of analysis in terms of strategies and programmes really depends on whether it leads into a more rigorous genealogical explication than is attempted here of the category – or categories – of the 'social'. In subsection 3 below a few preliminary clarifications are offered on this point.
16. Cf *The Order of Things*, p 355ff.
17. See note 10 above. If Foucault has shifted his attention since *Discipline and Punish* from the discipline of individuals to the government of populations, this does not as such entail any theoretical 'break'. In Chapter V of *La Volonté de Savoir*, the strategic importance of sexuality is defined as that of a point of interchange between the 'microscopic' and the 'macroscopic'.
18. Cf Foucault and Deleuze (1973).
19. *Le Monde*, October 21 1978.

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A good select bibliography of material on Foucault in French and English is contained in M. Morris and P. Patton (eds.) *Michel Foucault: Power, Truth, Strategy*. Sydney: Feral, 1979. This includes a number of valuable pieces by, about and relating to Foucault.

I am grateful to Princeton University Press for permission to quote from O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests*, Princeton: 1977.