The unconsciousness of psychoanalysis : Robert Castel's *Le psychanalysme : L'order psychanlytique et le pouvoir*

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Robert Castel, *Le psychanalysme: L'ordre psychanalytique et le pouvoir*. Collection 10/18 (Union Generale d'Editions), 1976. First published by Francois Maspero, 1973. 440 pages, 16.60 fr.

The form in which the French intellectual scene is presented in this country has long been a cause of irritation and perplexity. The media of theoretical importation generate the image of an aleatory cluster of cross-Channel stars, severally gyrating in an occult heaven whose name is alternately semiology, theoretical practice, archaeology, deconstruction, theory of discourse, theory of ideology, theory of the unconscious. It would be unjust to blame all this on the importers, or to suppose that the constellation is deciphered with notably greater ease by observers domiciled in Paris. The French apparatus of promotion and manipulation of intellectual fashions doubtless far exceeds any capacities for mystification which may unkindly be attributed to English-speaking Althusserians, Lacanians or other acolytes. The 'nouveaux philosophes' currently featuring in the international press only signify, with their reduction of theory to pure publicity, the predictable nemesis of this system.

Nevertheless, importation acts as an additional, and powerful, selective filter, and one whose effects need to be examined and, where necessary, resisted. One such effect is the isolation of a select corpus of texts from knowledge of the social practices – academic, political, institutional – within which their production and effectivity in their country of origin is embedded. Likewise largely excluded by the filter of importation is knowledge of the collective, semi-anonymous work of small journals, study groups and professional organisations who contest both the apparatus of avante-garde publicity and the universalising field of academic-literary discourse. In the field of psychoanalysis and psychiatry, with which Robert Castel's book is concerned, both these forms of exclusion are strikingly evident. The reception of Lacan's writings among Left intellectuals in Britain is seldom accompanied by any acquaintance with the social and political issues surrounding the theory

and practice of psychoanalysis in France. Theoreticism, in this sense, is a structure of the media of importation.

The politics of the social practice of psychoanalysis is the theme of *Le Psychanalysme*. The wealth of concrete information it provides on French psychoanalytic and psychiatric movements, institutions and issues should make it an invaluable work for British readers in supplementing the failures of importation noted above. Further, it is this forceful and coherent concrete analysis which provides the basis for an argument of great theoretical depth and boldness, in which Castel develops a conception of the politics of psychoanalysis which distances itself from the framework of analysis's own theory and concepts.

The originality of Castel's project and the questions it poses entails a certain tentativeness, and sometimes an air of bricolage, in his construction of its theoretical armature. The most significant affiliations which can be seen at work are with the work of Bourdieu and Passeron on the structures of domination in education (in *La Rêproduction*), and with the work of Foucault on the birth of psychiatry (in *Madness and Civilisation*), and on the symbiosis of knowledge and power (in *L'Ordre du Discours* and subsequent texts). Castel was a member of the seminar led by Foucault on psychiatry and the penal system which produced the dossier *I, Pierre Rivière...* (1) (Foucault in turn pays tribute to *Le psychanalysme* in his *Survèillir et Punir*). Castel has recently published a major new work, *L'ordre psychiatrique* (2), which develops the theses of *Le psychanalysme* on the history of custodial psychiatry.

Castel discusses in *Le psychanalysme* the belief prevalent among western Marxists that psychoanalytic theory has an intrinsically revolutionary value, and that this value needs to be preserved or restored from the effects of its betrayal or *recuperation* within a *reactionary therapeutic practice* (3). He comes to the consclusion that "*it is totally out of the question that psychoanalysis could ever furnish a model for any political practice whatever*"; 'Freudo-Marxism' is "illusion in Freud's sense, and ideology in Marx's"; the belief in psychoanalysis as inherently political, *contestataire*, or subversive is "one of the greatest contemporary mystifications". The argument proceeds from a sociological description of the canonical dual relationship in psychoanalysis to a general analysis and deconstruction of the problematic of the recuperation of psychoanalysis. Castel locates the ideological and political functioning of this problematic within the history of psychoanalysis, institutional psychiatry, and the apparatuses of social power in which they perform an increasingly prominent role. He shows that the malaise affecting the Left's relations with psychoanalysis can only be understood in the context of the "social unconscious" of analysis itself. "Psychoanalysis is not just an ideology, still less one ideology among others ... but it is an incomparable system of production of ideology", endowed with the capacity to "dissimulate and occult ... its socio-political impact, an impact which more and more invades *its own content*". *Psychanalysme*

is Castel's term for this *effect* of psychoanalysis, not only through its social applications or misapplications but also in its internal apparatus, as a focal point of production of ideology. It is also a term for "what psychoanalysis costs us".

The *logic* of *psychanalysme* is defined by three interdependent theses: (1) the relation between psychoanalysis and its uses is never one of simple exteriority; (2) the pure analytical relation (between analyst and analysand) has immediate and specific social effects, which are never socially neutral: the convention which governs this relation has the effect of necessarily invalidating/disqualifying the impact of power in social relations; it operates as a principle of mis-knowledge (*méconnaissance*), or, in other terms, induces a blindness to power; (3) the interconnection of these first two theses "makes it possible to understand, from the interior of its apparatus, the privileged place occupied today by psychoanalysis within dominant ideologies and instruments of social power".

The problematic of recuperation has become for psychoanalysis itself the privileged mode of thinking the relationship between the intra-analytic and the (theoretically/socially/historically) extra-analytic. It represents the history of its theory as a cycle of contamination and purification through return to the Freudian source, and the history of the psychoanalytic movement as a chronicle of defections and splits, the crime of the traitors being above all that of having "opted in favour of the non-analytical". "There is no real history of psychoanalysis, but only a psychoanalytic hagiography, portraits of ancestors, edifying anecdotes, technically scrupulous reproductions of the self-unfolding of discourses, obsessional accounting for errors and deviations from theoretical purity". Castel's contention is that psychoanalysis is only recuperated in so far as it is itself always already *recuperable* and *recuperant*. What purists denounce as the abuse of psychoanalysis perpetrated in its transplantation into psychiatric institutions and therapeutic practices needs to be understood positively as a form of imperialism entirely consonant with the pure structure of psychoanalysis. "The possibility of such derivations is already inscribed at the origin of analytical experience, in the matrix of the dual relationship".

Contractuality, Neutrality, Apoliticism

The dual relationship of analyst and analysand which founds the knowledge of the unconscious is a ritual formally constituted by a *contract* entered into by the two parties. For psychoanalysis, in Castel's view, the contract is not simply the formal framework, but the "productive matrix" of analysis. The rules of procedure laid down in the contract establish, for the two participants, the suspension of reality necessary for access to the unconscious. Castel remarks that this element of artifice in the contract, the stipulation as *necessary* of a set of *arbitrary* conditions, characterises the whole analytical operation. In the phrase of Durkheim, "there is always something non-contractual in the con-

tract". Extra-analytical reality is never in fact excluded from the analysis, but only *neutralised*. (It is in the treatment of psychosis, that is precisely in cases where the contractual neutralisation of reality cannot be effected, that analysis has had least success.) "The unconscious which psychoanalysis presents (*met en scène*) is, in its nature and in respect to knowledge of it, solidary with the convention which institutes it, with all that that implies of arbitrariness and a sense of the artificial relative to everyday practice. "("The paradox ... is that in order to let that speak which derides all decency, so many artifices are required.")

The social neutralisation of the analytical relationship is indispensable because the establishment of analytical transference depends on the neutrality of the status attributed to the analyst: only thus can the analyst serve as the blank screen for the projection of the analysand's fantasies. The necessary condition of this neutralisation is, according to Castel, either "the double conformism of analyst and analysand (in the sense of the conformity of their ideas with socially dominant ideas), which eliminate the political problem *de facto* from analysis", or, failing this, that the rules of the analytic convention themselves invalidate the effect of any real social or political differences. "Technically speaking, analytical neutrality is a condition of the possibility of transference: politically speaking, it is the incarnation of the politics of apoliticism." The 'neutral' in psychoanalysis is at the same time both neutralisable and neutralising: the relationship of neutrality does not merely presuppose but also produces apoliticism. "To the extent that it has power, the analytic process neutralises. It reproduces the neutralising power of the 'neutral' psychoanalyst." Castel sees this as confirmed by the fact (seldom remarked upon) that analysis generally has the effect of *attenuating political radicalism* in the analysand. Castel does not claim that analysis simply ignores or suppresses all material not exclusively relating to the analysand's relationship to his own desires; analytic theory does recognise the problem of its relationship to the 'extra-analytic'. Nevertheless this material is excluded by the analytical process to the extent that it is deemed incapable of analytical interpretation. Analysis regards the non-analytical principally as that which is *unanalysable*: the limit, obstacle or sticking-point of analysis. "Just as ancient philosophy could not conceive matter except as the *other* of the idea, as a stubborn and contingent presence, negatively qualified as being what the idea *is not* and existing only as this sense-less opacity, similarly psychoanalysis, at a recent stage of critical self-reflection, seems to be developing into a negative theology of the non-analysed, the uninterpretable, etc." This leaves open the options of either an analytical absolute idealism which suppresses or radically discounts the non-analytical, or an analytical Manichaeism which affirms the eternal irreconcilability (or irreducibility) of analysis and its 'other'. These sterile options feed both the problematic of recuperation and the flowering of a bogus analytical 'interdiciplinarity'. "The most sophisticated way of disposing of history is to act *as if* one were taking account of it, but only in so far as it threatens the autonomous rise of psychoanalysis."

Castel's initial thesis, then, is that the 'neutrality' of analysis cannot be taken at face value, that analysis operates rather as a positive force of social and political neutralisation. Demonstrating the effects of this force requires the rejection of the pretence that analysis operates in a self-enclosed domain of a-social abstraction, and the study of how real social conditions determine from within the essence of the psychoanalytic process. One such social condition which Castel discusses is the money relationship in psychoanalysis. The analytical convention demands that each session of the analysis be paid for by the analysand, in advance and in cash (except in the minority of cases undertaken free of charge – generally those which are 'deserving' in virtue of their unusual psychoanalytic interest). The function of payment in analysis is recognised and characterised by analytic theory, but only in respect of its imaginary or symbolic signification. Castel cites Thomas Szasz's *Ethics of Psychoanalysis*: the money payment safeguards the free play of transference and counter-transference; it ensures that the analyst is not worried that he is being exploited by the analysand, while the analysand need feel that he owes the analyst nothing except the payment. With this goes the customary insouciance of analysts as to the concrete significance for the analysand of the payment, the bland assurance that the analysand will always be able to meet the payment if he has a 'real' need for the analysis. As Castel argues, it is not the happy coincidence between the economic needs of the analyst and the symbolic demands of the analytical convention which is especially questionable, but rather the total subsumption of the former under the latter. "This would be the first time that the socio-economic base of a relationship had been reduced without residue *in fact* (as it nearly always is in ideology) to its symbolic significance." The fact that payment is a real economic condition of the existence of psychoanalysis, as well as a symbolic element in the structure of its convention, matters here because of the possibility that it may have its own effect on the constitution of the "other scene" - an effect to which psychoanalysis itself remains blind. (It also matters, of course, because of the unequal relation of power, and the conditions of social privilege, which it induces.) "It is a matter of understanding how the imaginary *as imaginary*, the symbolic *as symbolic*, are structured by another reality than that of desire or pain, the reality formed by the deep, concealed contradictions of the social reality within which individuals encounter the lines of force of their own destinies, *and which they interiorise*. What, among these conditions, passes over into the order of the unconscious? By what logic are they reinterpreted by psychoanalysis, even when they remain the principle of production of *two different sorts of effect* ... the effects of the unconscious proper (if there are any such) on the one hand, but also the effects produced by the unconsciousness of the presence of these conditions in the unconscious?" That psychoanalysis has offered no answer to these questions seems evident; its capacity to do so, to the extent that this would require the theoretical deconstruction of the act of abstraction which founds its own practice, seems doubtful.

Castel, indeed, goes on to argue that psychoanalysis actually does everything to make such a development impossible, through the effect of its production of mis-knowledge (mēconnaissance) on three distinct levels: the level of the outward social circumstances of the analytical relation, that of the inner structure and economy of the relation, and that of its theoretical self-explication. What is masked on the level of the typical circumstances of the analytical relation is the superiority in power and prestige enjoyed by analyst over analysand by virtue of the analyst's actual class and cultural position, his professional status and standing, and the concrete circumstances of the analytical session (the analysand always travels to the analyst's place of work, not vice versa; the analyst is seated, invisible, in an armchair while the analysand lies on a couch). The mis-knowledge effected on this level consists in the confusion of symbolic reciprocity in the dual relationship with real equality. "The reciprocity of transfer and counter-transfer is not a relation of equality, but a structure of inequality set up to produce effects of controlled reciprocity."

The second level of mis-knowledge is that on which analysis conceals (partly thanks to the distaste or disdain often expressed by analysts for the role of undertaking a 'cure' or of offering personal 'help') the extent to which it partakes of the general socio-economic form identified in Erving Goffman's *Asylums* as the "personalised service relationship" – the form which "makes mental medicine a profession inscribed in the social division of labour and not just a simple inter-subjective relationship of help for personal suffering". The concepts which typify the relationship are those of the *competent specialist*; the *contract* between specialist and client; the professional *disinterest* in the specialist's exercise of his skill; the payment in the form of *remuneration* rather than of salary, a qualitative rather than a quantitative evaluation of the service performed; the negotiation of transactions in a liberal market economy; and the specific object of transformation presented by the client to the specialist – in this case, his own speech or psyche. This structure dominates the process of analysis because in the 'free' verbal exchange between analyst and analysand "the discourse of the subject under analysis becomes significant only when *contractualised*, that is, caught in this system of conventions, relations of knowledge and relations of power, which structure the dual relationship ... The result is the contractualisation of subjectivity itself, and the possibility of its manipulation in a system whose full implications escape the awareness of the protagonists, even if one admits that they are able to control their effect through the relation of transference and counter-transference."

The third level of mis-knowledge, that on which social conditions operate unrecognised upon the formation, through analysis, of analytic theory itself, is exemplified, for Castel, by psychoanalysis's mis-knowledge of feminine sexuality. On the connection of this with the real conditions of social subordination of women, especially in connection with the structure of the 'Oedipal' family, Castel refers to Deleuze and

Guattari's *Anti-Oedipe.*

The "Psychoanalytic Revolution"

Whereas the politics of the analytical relation itself have been lost in psychoanalysis's social unconscious, the politics of the psychoanalytical movement as a global intervention in Western culture have been a theme of positive mystification: its extreme form is the assurance of analysts, installed in the permanent revolution of the 'other scene', that their activity represents an engagement as least as radical as any work of merely political subversion. (In some cases this position is extended into an analysis of the neurotic bases of radical political *contestation.*) Against this, Castel cites Freud's statements on psychoanalysis and education to illustrate the *necessary* social conformism Freud attributes to analysis, a necessity based not merely on arguments from expediency. In the *New Introductory Lectures*, Freud rejects the argument that: "If one is convinced of the defects in our present social arrangements, education with a psychoanalytic alignment cannot justifiably be put at their service as well: it must be given another and higher aim, liberated from the prevailing demands of society." He replies, "This other aim which it is desired to give education will also be a partisan one, and it is not the affair of an analyst to decide between the parties. I am leaving entirely on one side the fact that psychoanalysis would be refused any influence on education if it admitted to intentions inconsistent with the established social order. Psychoanalytic education will be taking an uninvited responsibility on itself if it proposes to mould its pupils into rebels ... It is even my opinion that revolutionary children are not desirable from any point of view." (Pelican Freud Library edition, page 186.)

The confused notion of a "psychoanalytic revolution" has a certain valid basis in that psychoanalysis, in the early 20th century, could and did possess a subversive impact on social attitudes and relations towards sexuality (but not on the actual social relations between the sexes, which psychoanalysis has done nothing to modify). "The work of Freud, in particular this philosophy of the Enlightenment transposed into a methodology of the reduction of ideals, conscious values, 'spiritualist points of honour', in Marx's phrase about religion, had this impact *just to the extent that these norms constituted the ideological cement of the society of the period.*" That it had such an impact in the early part of the century is testified by the ferocity of the attacks it underwent. But, as Castel remarks, the social significance of psychoanalysis, like that of the liberal values of tolerance, varies according to the conjuncture in which it is situated. "When in a given historical situation the political expression of tolerance is apoliticism, it serves established power in spite of itself. One can perhaps dream of the pure functioning of analysis in a society where consciousnesses and unconsciousnesses meet face to face, a society without classes or violence. We know that such is not our situation. But in a certain manner psychoanalysis behaves *as if* this dream were a reality. It makes this reverie exist as a reality to the extent that it has the power, but this is a trun-

cated, depoliticised representation of reality. And it has a political significance which is unambiguous."

Since the time of Freud, "the threshold of social tolerance (or intolerance) of certain forms of ideological attack has fallen ... signifying a transformation of fundamental political issues." A principal aspect of this change is in "the modification of structures of *authority*, familial as well as social". One concrete index of this transformation is that the recognition, and representation (e.g. in the cinema) of incestuous desire becomes no more scandalous than was that of adultery in the age of vaudeville. This converging of psychoanalytic 'subversion' and cultural normality has not been accomplished without the active efforts of psychoanalysis itself. Firstly, the social fortunes of psychoanalysis have involved, along with the elaboration of its political discourse and didactic apparatus, its becoming a principal channel of induction into intellectual culture, one which increasingly takes the side of the autonomy of the cultural domain against 'vulgar' materialism or outdated 'scientism'. With the effective abandonment of the (perhaps half-hearted) Freudian project for the grounding of psychology in neurology, a significant shift has taken place with the abandonment of biological or physiological models in favour of linguistic models for psychoanalytic theory. A recent Lacanian text, Serge Leclaire's *Démasquer le réel*, (4) sets the theoretical seal on this development by recording the "displacement of the centre of gravity" of analysis, between Freudian and Lacanian analytical practice, from the scene of the family and the parental bed to the analytical couch. Castel comments: " 'The literal order', the articulation of signifiers, does not just gain over the realist order of lived experience, but also over the bio-econo-socio-political order of the familial institution ... the family becomes a sort of myth of origins. It deposits traces which have no effective existence except as taken up in the analytical apparatus. It is not in the family that the real incest takes place any more or is even desired, but in the analytical situation. All the drama of sexuality is henceforth orchestrated by the 'blind, deaf, dumb' person of the psychoanalyst, thereby 'perfectly adapted to his function of making-speak'. Psychoanalysis has gained its autonomy in a frozen universe of signs under the dead figure of the sphinx." This theoretical mutation induces real changes in the conditions of analytical practice. There is a change in symptomatology: patients who (obstinately or perversely) continue to exhibit the classic symptoms of the Freudian era are increasingly deprecated as archaic relics, living fossils; the symptoms of a 'good' analysand tend increasingly to merge with the expression of his own analytical culture: the 'symptom' is constituted in and through his theoretical formation. Hence, psychoanalysis now functions "less and less (as) a return to the affects which knit the destiny of each individual, and more and more as the participation in a vicarious existence ... the invention of sexuality lived in and through the mode of discourse ... Does that mean that 'the unconscious is structured like a language', or that language as a mode of existence devours both unconscious and existence?"

Castel stresses that this evolution is to be recognised as an authentic development within psychoanalysis, not as a 'recuperation' of it by external forces: the Lacanian 'return to Freud' is analytically valid even when it transposes the quasi-material problematic of the instincts into the order of pure discourse. "Thus, it is perhaps at the very moment when the subject believes himself liberated, dispossessed of the weight of the problems of power in the artifice of the analytical convention, that he is most subtly dispossessed and alienated by the dominant power. As Jean Baudrillard says of the ideology of the liberation of the body, but one can generalise his statement to the pretensions of liberations by sexuality, subjectivity, etc ...: 'Subjectivity is liberated here as a value. Just as labour is never liberated except as labour-power in a system of forces of production and exchange-values, so subjectivity is never liberated except as fantasy and value-sign in the framework of a controlled mode of signification, of a systematic of signification whose coincidence with the systematic of production is fairly clear. To sum up, "liberated" subjectivity is never liberated except in the sense of being seized upon by a political economy.' " (5)

Psychoanalysis and Apparatuses of Social Power

Perhaps the most crucial and valuable connection established in Castel's book is between his critique of the institution of the dual relationship in analysis and the detailed account he gives of the role being increasingly taken up by psychoanalysis within the global transformation of social power. Castel relates the mutation in analytical theory and practice described above to a fundamental change in the professional organisation of psychoanalysis; this latter development in turn converges with a general transformation of psychiatric institutions and their function within a general apparatus of social control. While rejecting the framework of a global 'theory of ideology', Castel takes the position adopted by Marx and Engels in *The German Ideology* to be a valuable model in the sense that their attack was directed, not at the dominant ideology of the society of the time, but at an ideological pseudo-alternative to the status quo which occupied a strategic position blocking the possibility of effective political action.

Castel's sketch of the history of the psychoanalytical profession draws on Bourdieu's study of the transformation of sects into churches. (6) The sect is formed around the person of a 'prophet', as an elective group of social marginals, linked by their devotion to the prophet. With the death of the prophet, the transition to the form of a church comes with the appearance of the priest as the official mediator of the prophetic message. The priest is characteristically one who "is more and more a man of the organisation, but presents himself more and more as an agent of initiation". For Castel, the paradox in the history of psychoanalysis is its capacity to preserve, or recreate, its form as a sect (e.g. Lacan and the *Ecole Freudienne*). This form, so he argues, has survived in part because of the functional utility to psychoanalysis of maintaining within the 'sect' the *illusion of the suspension of sociological determinations*: the sect is, for its members, no ordinary group or

institution but one which is informed and purified by the prophetic teaching, and in which the identity and interests of the prophet coincide with those of the collective. Such a structure serves to maintain the built-in claims of analysis to political neutrality and autonomy. Out of the original reality of its sectarian organisation, however, little now remains except a theory of the analytical institution which no longer corresponds to the reality. The transition from sect to church, from a charismatic to a bureaucratic organisation (career structures, regulation of professional status, etc.) has largely been accomplished. An internal professional hierarchy has developed with an outward-directed policy for the extension of its influence, particularly through the penetration of other social institutions. One major aspect of this change is the shift from an 'artisanal' to a 'semi-industrial' mode of production. The old sectarian structure exhibited the classic traits of the master-apprentice system, the primitive (even infantile) relation of pupil-teacher allegiance, the solidarity of a common vocation, the economic independence of qualified masters. At present analytical training is becoming the responsibility of the profession as a whole, through the elaboration of a regulated didactics administered by specialists and the formation of a middle cadre of technicians produced by a system of mass training (such as the psychoanalytic therapists trained at the University of Paris VII). The outward-directed cast of the profession is reinforced by the tendency for state institutions, rather than private practice, to furnish the main channel for the recruitment of its clientele, by the development of professional organisation into a system of marketing and job placement, and by the location of a floating population of young analysts, unable to secure full employment in the (lucrative and prestigious) sector of private practice, in search of institutional appointments.

The opportunities for the outward expansion of analytic practice arise within what Castel sees as a historic change in the functioning of (non-analytical) psychology and psychiatry: "the progress of modern psychology passes, schematically, through two stages. The first phase: objectivity as the paradigm, measure as the means, the experimental laboratory as the place of work. The second phase: the person as paradigm, motivation as the means, human relations in concrete situations or groups as the place of research". The first phase belongs historically with the Taylorist phase of industrial management. The psychological subject is taken as the object for scientific investigation, the individual from whom the knowledge of his character and capacities is straightforwardly (and cynically) extracted. The consciously envisaged aim of this psychology is the capacity to select the individual according to his/her adaptability to the specific conditions of his/her own exploitation. It is unambiguously geared towards the interests of the institution in which s/he is to be inserted, not those of the individual. With the second age of psychology, such exploitative aims become less visible "above all because they are often clothed in a humanist pathos: receptivity, empathy, sympathy, contact, participation, etc." Behind this language

of socio-technocratic enlightenment lies the operation of a more thorough and sophisticated process of control, which takes hold of the subject *as subject* to probe and correct the motivations which ensure his own 'personal' engagement in fulfilling the complex and varying demands imposed by an advanced capitalist economy. The subject is induced to co-operate as an agent of his own surveillance. "The most striking aspect of the evolution of modern psychiatry lies perhaps in this broadening of its point of view which passes from the determination of aptitudes to the diagnostic of personality." (7)

It is under this ethos of 'participation' that psychoanalysis acquires the appearance of a truly emancipatory intervention in psychology/psychiatry. In analysis, it is through the discourse of the analysand that the truth of the analysis comes to be expressed, not through the scientific verdict decreed by the analyst. Viewed as a practice of transformation of discourse, psychoanalysis, at least in its Lacanian forms, can make the claim to being a restitution to the subject of his own truth. But is this emancipation of discourse not rather the most subtle of the metamorphoses of the apparatus of psychiatric power? As Castel remarks, the subject is indeed enabled through analysis to speak of himself, but he is enabled to do so only through the double mediation of analytic doctrine and the person of the analyst. Again, psychoanalysis often stresses that its practice does not guarantee an apodictic, scientific certainty in its results, but is an enterprise full of risks. But for whom, and by whom, are the risks taken?Castel argues that analysis, in its interventions in psychiatric institutions just as in the dual relationship, assigns to itself a position of power without responsibility. The characteristic approach of the analyst, when working (normally in a directing role) in a psychiatric institution, exhibits the same calculated detachment, or neutrality, towards the functioning of the institution as, in the dual relationship, he adopts towards the discourse of the analysand. The analyst presents himself as the interpreter of the institution. "The originality of the status of the analyst in an institution derives in large part from the off-hand way in which he treats the concrete effects of the situation he imposes. If the word 'off-hand' gives offence, then let us say indifference to whatever in the institution cannot be retranslated into the economy of the unconscious." (cf. the discussion of the role of payment in the dual relationship.) Such a position of detached superiority towards the personnel and inmates of the institution is overdetermined by the superior class, theoretical and cultural standing of the analyst-director. Conversely, the resistance to his 'leadership' which the lower echelons may display can be retranslated by the analyst into the terms of 'defence mechanisms' against the threat posed by the irruption of the unconscious. "But analytical discourse proves its totalitarianism by reducing the whole of the threat it carries to that particular threat which it itself explains. Totalitarianism, because this imposition implies not only relation to a knowledge (the interpretation of the institution and the behaviour of its agents), it also masks a relation to power (justification of the analyst's 'leadership' in the institution). Analytical discourse imposes itself here as *symbolic violence*,

and all symbolic violence ... is supported by a position of power." Castel draws the concept of symbolic violence from Bourdieu and Passeron's seminal study of power relations in pedagogy, *La Rēproduction* (8): "Every power to exert symbolic violence, i.e. every power which manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the power relations which are the basis of its force, adds its own specific force to those power relations." For Bourdieu and Passeron, the fact of symbolic violence dies in the element of *arbitrariness* in the meanings which are imposed. For Castel, the significations attributed to, and even assumed by the subject in analysis involve an arbitrariness just "because 'not everything in the contract is contractual' and *because the analytical apparatus functions as if everything were* ". Psychoanalysis claims to stand outside of the knowledge/power structures of psychiatry because it refuses the functions of psychic *assistance or cure*: what is omitted from this repudiation, however, is the (perhaps more insidious and powerful) dimension of *tutelage*. Moreover, the relationship of psychoanalytic tutelage incorporates (in common with psychology) a practice of extraction of knowledge from the subject: the subject contributes willy-nilly to the analytical edifice by furnishing the analyst both with the material for a *case study*, a contribution to the professional literature, and with the general means for development of the analyst's theoretical and practical knowledge.

The Great Disinternment

The contemporary transformation in psychiatry involves not only a fundamental change in the principles governing its epistemological relation to the patient but also in those relating to its therapeutic vocation. Castel remarks that a 'happy coincidence' has always existed in psychiatry between medical and political/administrative considerations. In the regime of asylums instituted in France by the law of 1838, the demand of mental medicine for the therapeutic isolation of the insane coincided with the demand of social administration for their sequestration. At the present time, the increasing awareness of the political and economic drawbacks of closed psychiatric institutions converges with the reformist tendencies in psychiatric theory. Psychoanalysis appears as strategically placed to play a crucial role in the movement for the 'de-institutionalisation' of psychiatry. Castel traces the stirrings of the current 'progressive' psychiatric policies in France after 1945. (9) The crucial demand then formulated was that for the "unity and indivisibility of prevention, prophylaxis, cure and post-cure"; the terrain of psychiatric intervention was designated as being henceforth that of the pathogenic situation, rather than the pathological case. A 'community' psychiatry was called for which could apply the categories of mental illness to the identification and therapy of social problems: the treatment of a "sociopathy". Castel comments: "To speak of sociopathy means to invalidate even the possibility of thinking a social causality or a social negativity without reference to the medical norm of health. It is also to eliminate any intervention in the conditions of illness which is not of the order of care, assistance,

'management'." In Castel's view, it is largely psychoanalysis which has enabled psychiatry to overcome its classical dichotomies, rigid categories and brutal modes of intervention, opening up the means to a 'capillary' penetration of society at large. Psychoanalysis makes it intelligible to "impute a possible pathology based in unconscious structures even before any suspected symptoms are manifested in behaviour": an important precondition for a preventive, prophylactic psychiatry.

The entrism of French psychoanalysts occurs on all the fronts of contemporary psychiatric advance. In the asylums, analysts preside over the introduction of therapeutic techniques. Castel interprets this process as more of an ideological "replastering" than a real transformation: psychoanalysis offers itself as a 'treatment' of the institution itself which recognises in it only a structure of interpersonal relationships forming a field for the play of symbolic values in an economy of fantasy. The real structures of the institution are scarcely available for modification by the analyst, since they fall within the 'social unconscious' of analysis itself.

The more profoundly significant area of advance, however, lies not in the classic asylums but in the new psychiatric apparatus, more open and flexible in its institutional structures, introduced under the French law of 1960 for *sectorisation* (the establishment of complete services of psychiatric care for each unit of population of 70,000). A further area of expansion is in the 'parapsychiatric' institutions developed as part of the state judicial, education and welfare structures. (Castel notes here the contrast between the dominant social catchment areas of 19th and late 20th century psychiatry; in the former, the "failures of urbanisation"; in the latter, the "failures of scholarisation"). These new structures are the consequence of the questioning of the 19th century policy of specialised internment and treatment for the different categories of the indigent, the delinquent, the sick, the insane etc. It is under the auspices of the generalised psychological category of *deviance* that the division of social marginals into fixed species is broken down and the prospect emerges for an 'interdisciplinarity' of experts operating within a variety of hybrid institutions and exercising a form of authority founded on manupulation and persuasion rather than on coercion. Castel sees psychoanalysis as offering the possibility of a type of social medicalisation distinct from both of the classical medical structures, the hospital and private practice. The desegregation of the psychiatric patient is presented by professional authors as necessarily linked to the desegregation or 'de-alienation' of the functions of the psychiatrist, opening up the possibility of his personal engagement, free from institutional mediations, in his relationship with the deviant individual. A recent book entitled "The psychoanalyst without a couch" (10) argues for the key function of the analyst in the renovated institution as a "model for identification" for his psychiatrists and therapists, and as a "collective model as a functional ego" for the patients. A new role of leadership is created for the analyst in what Castel cites Peter L. Berger as terming the "social casework/welfare organisation" model of

social control, based on the dual premise of a generalised 'science of deviance' and a 'sociopathy' or psychopathology of social relations. (11) Analysis itself offers a massive reinforcement to the power of psychiatric practice, firstly by facilitating the identification of the operation of the institution with the magical prowess of the analyst/psychiatrist, and secondly by imposing as the *exclusive* means of interpreting the objective structures of the institution a 'psychosociology' in terms of the discourse of the unconscious. (Castel notes that in *Civilisation and its Discontents*, Freud at once predicted and deprecated such a generalised "application of psychoanalysis to the civilised community".)

Freudo-Marxism and the Politics of Psychoanalysis

The latter part of *Le psychanalysme* is a discussion of the place occupied by psychoanalysis in the political discourse of the Left. Castel reconstructs the problematic of Freudo-Marxism as part of an ideological 'crisis' in the relationship between politics and subjectivity. He contends that the pretensions of psychoanalysis, once again, obstruct the thorough re-evaluation of this problem, and that psychoanalysis itself represents an impasse in the problem of the subject in history. The impasse begins in the conflicting tendencies in Freud's own writings. Castel identifies two main Freudian lines of approach to the issue. The first is the study of the libidinal investment of the individual in a particular social structure (e.g. the identification with the chief, discussed in *Essays in Psychoanalysis*). The second tendency, which Castel is concerned to criticise, is towards "the deduction of the objective characteristics of an institution from the avatars of the libido, or, if one prefers, the derivation of the structure of social organisations from the structure of psychic conflicts" (as in *Collective Psychology and Ego Analysis*, where "nothing specifically new emerges when one passes from the ego to the collectivity"; the behaviour of crowds, for example, is seen by Freud as only the expression of latent evil in the individual psyche). The *New Lectures* affirm that "sociology is nothing but applied psychology"; *Moses and Monotheism* displays a cavalier attitude to ethnographic data in its deduction of social morals, law and matriarchy from the starting point of the libidinal economy.

According to Castel, Freud perpetually oscillated between these two conflicting approaches without ever making a clear distinction between them. After Freud the literature deteriorates into the banality and tautology of psychoanalytic sociology and 'crowd psychology' (Reich commented: "This utopian rationalism – which moreover displays an individualistic conception of social phenomena – is neither original nor revolutionary, and exceeds the functions of psychoanalysis as well."(12)

The reception accorded to psychoanalysis by the Left in France is traced by Castel through three successive (but no doubt overlapping) phases. Before and after the Second World War the Communist Party attacked psychoanalysis as a manifestation of bourgeois decadence and frivolity (sharing the contempt of Lenin and Clara Zetkin for the preoccupation of militants with sexual questions). During the Cold War,

the promotion of psychoanalysis was seen as part of an American effort to defuse the threat of socialism in Europe, and analysis itself as scientifically incompatible with official Pavlovian communist psychology. (Castel does not consider that the element of class suspicion in the Party's hostility to psychoanalysis was wholly without foundation.) The 'Freudo-Marxism' period which succeeded the phase of outright hostility originated, Castel notes, in the German S.P.D. after the defeat of the 1918 revolution; it penetrated France intially through the politically marginal groups of Surrealists and isolated Left intellectuals. The climate in which it gained prominence in the post-war years was one in which the prospect of revolution had receded and "politics was lived in the mode of existence rather than that of action". The problem of individual liberation and its 'complementarity' with collective liberation gained importance as a (humanist-academic) preoccupation at a time when the question of power appeared to have lost its political immediacy. Although only indirectly linked to analytic theory, Castel sees Sartre's *Critique of Dialectical Reason* as "the last upsurge of the constitutive intention of Freudo-Marxism ... a fascinating monument whose conceptual architecture exhibits the dreamed-of reconciliation of subjectivity and history, 'the reciprocity of perspectives between singular life and human history' " — a reconciliation displaced, however, from society into philosophy.

The third phase in Castel's outline is that in which the (humanist) problematic of reconciliation of Marxism and psychoanalysis is succeeded by that of articulation. "The problematic of *articulation* ... comes to replace that of reconciliation: no longer in order to unify ... the subjective interests of the individual and the conditions of his social destiny, but to *situate* in relation to each other two irreducible epistemological sectors, that of unconscious formations and that of the social practices which constitute their support, and to which they are subordinate in the last instance." Castel queries whether the effect of the emphasis here on relative epistemological irreducibility may not involve the fetishisation of domains of objectivity, tending towards the establishment of a dual theoretical monarchy with Althusser and Lacan each ensconced in their own mutually independent, inviolable domains. The problematic constituted around the "articulation" of different levels/instances/domains of objectivity is suspect insofar as it forms a spurious resolution of the difficulties generated by the epistemological decree of mutual irreducibility of domains of knowledge. The discourse of articulation, because it offers only a pseudo-solution, therefore blocks the way to the examination of knowledge and power in psychoanalysis which Castel wants to initiate. It functions as "the principal 'epistemological obstacle', if I may put it thus, to access to the understanding of the mechanisms of constitution of social practices in general, and psychoanalysis in particular", "an interdict which hinders posing the problem of the relation of knowledge to its historical processes of constitution and exploitation". The questions which matter most here concern *how*, and *for whose benefit*, these processes operate; in other words, "*what is the relation of (analytical) knowledge to (socio-*

political) power, in the process of its production (the first question) and in the field of its exploitation (the second question)?" Foucault briefly raised these questions in *Madness and Civilisation*; their point, for Castel, is not to reduce the content of psychoanalysis to an account of its historical and social conditions of emergence and propagation, but to question the pretensions of analysis to absolute autonomy in its own self-interpretation.

Castel outlines some features of the present political conjuncture which affect the possibility of such an inquiry. Globally, the recognition that no revolution is imminent in Western Europe means that the 'problems of subjectivity' cannot be shelved in militant politics, and in certain respects the concept of militantism is itself changing. In the field of classic party politics, Castel notes that the French Communist Party has opened up a détente towards psychoanalysis, leading to its possible assimilation in a new conception, "supple, but realistic and effective", of social authority. Psychoanalysis offers reinforcement for the PCF's defence of the family as a pillar of social stability against the threats posed by social-political 'spontaneism' and the 'crisis of youth'. He quotes a recent statement in *Le Nouvel Observateur* by the veteran party polemicist, B. Muldworf: "... in designating the couple and the family as structures of constraint, forces and energies are sidetracked against an imaginary enemy which would be better employed against the present class enemy, the *monopolistic bourgeoise*. Just as our energy and our pens would be better used to work in common for the concerting of the forces of the Left, rather than discussing the thousand and one ways of making love." (13) (The same writer published in 1970 an autocritique of the P.C.F.'s denunciations of psychoanalysis to which he had subscribed in 1949.) For Castel, the change of attitude to psychoanalysis in the PCF reflects the political reorientation from the arbitrary postulation of proletarian sexual normality, dictated by Leninism in the interests of class militantism, to the more complex basis of proletarian 'maturity' called for in the context of an electoral party strategy. In this sense, the Communist Party becomes one more promising field for institutional penetration by psychoanalysis.

The other major development Castel cites is the proliferation of local sites of struggle and politicisation in the state institutions of the law, education, medicine, psychiatry, prisons etc. "As this offensive is most often conducted from the starting point of the personal position which the subject occupies within these structures and his deep investment (positive or negative) in them, these practices call in question the old cleavages between psychological and social, private and public, desire and action, subversion of one's own subjectivity and external revolution." It is often psychoanalysis which is called upon, in such areas of struggle, to bridge these dichotomies. Castel, not unexpectedly, evinces a certain irony over this rapprochement. "A complete misunderstanding arises as to what is being demanded of psychoanalysis and what it can provide, and actually provides. The result is that sort of psychotherapeutic appetite which paradoxically goes together with the political

critique of the functions of psychotherapy." The Left attacks psychotherapy's institutional complicities, while preserving intact the prestige of the "charismatic competence of the therapist in essential problems". (But such confusions have always been for psychoanalysis a profitable side-effect of the division of therapeutic labour between 'heavy' and 'light' cases, psychoses and neuroses: the innocence and prestige of the private practitioners are maintained at the expense of the scandals and misdeeds of the institutions.) Castel relates these present contradictions to an interesting retrospective survey of the strengths and weaknesses of Reich's attempt to found a politicised psychoanalysis. Reich assigned to psychoanalysis the strangely limited role of an analysis of political irrationality: he distinguished the 'objectivity' of a political situation (e.g. a strike) from the 'subjectivity' of political agents (the strikers), and conceived psychoanalysis as resolving the discrepencies between the two domains. On the other hand, Reich had the important merit of also distinguishing between the 'psychologising' or 'clinical' operation of psychoanalysis on desire and the social and political practice of the search for the reconciliation of desire with reality. "Reich limited himself to denouncing the idealist character of the psychoanalytical theory of culture and rectifying certain fundamental elements of Freudian metapsychology. It seems that he did not see clearly to what an extent psychoanalysis as a whole was adapted to a process of privatisation directly contradictory to the politicism which inspired him. Yet psychoanalysis, as I have been trying throughout to demonstrate, inscribes itself in the whole movement of depoliticisation of Western thought in so far as it attains a new, autonomous or pseudo-autonomous sphere of psychism, set on a social no man's land. In this respect it has taken over from the humanism which it helped to demolish. As Michel Foucault has shown, humanism was for long the ideology expressing belief in the permanence of an existential site of feelings, thoughts and values deriving from the sole tribunal of the person. In 'de-centring' the subject, psychoanalysis has displaced the subject's functions, that is, carried them elsewhere and *further*. It has literally transported into the most 'personal' domain, the unconscious, the movement of dispossessing the subject of the problematic of power which humanism had orchestrated on the level of conscious subjectivity: this is the fundamental operation which it reiterates on all levels, and which I have subsumed under the concept of *psychanalysme*."

The Psychanalysme of the Unconscious

As was indicated at the beginning of this review, Castel abstains throughout the book from intervention in, or against, the analytical theory of the unconscious *per se*. He does not, for instance, when identifying the unconscious as a new instrument or stake of subjection, ideologisation and neutralisation, identify it as the *product* of these processes, in the way that Foucault identifies the 'subject' of humanism as such a product. The prestige of the unconscious as such remains intact. This means that while Castel does (to me) seem to be right in identifying a coherent logic of '*psychanalysme*'; the limits and consequences of his critique are unclear because the central object or domain of analytical

knowledge itself is left exempt from the attack on analysis's political effects. Castel tentatively views *L'Anti-Oedipe*, Deleuze and Guattari's theoretical critique of psychoanalysis in the name of a better knowledge and practice of the unconscious, as "complementary" to his own social and institutional critique. But for this complementarity to take a coherent form would, it would seem, presuppose the possibility of a radical break or reversal in the logic of *psychanalysme*. And in fact Castel, while he credits Deleuze and Guattari with having renewed our conception of the investment of desire in social practices and provided "a coherent framework for relating the position occupied by the family to the whole ensemble of social production and reproduction", questions whether their theory is not in essence a 'salvation' or redemption of psychoanalysis rather than a thoroughgoing transformation or subversion. Most crucially, he queries the very possibility of a knowledge of the unconscious in which the constitutive hegemony of the Oedipus complex is overturned – though it is not clear what consequences he draws from this.

On this issue I suspect that the obscurity of Castel's position is connected with an incompleteness in his argument, in that, for all his exemplary persistence in tracing the roots of *psychanalysme* in the fundamental structures of analytic practice, the nature of *psychanalysme* is established *by derivation*, that is, as a system of effects or consequences of psychoanalysis. But to establish a basis for assessing a work such as *L'Anti-Oedipe*, where the knowledge of the unconscious itself is at stake, Castel's position needs to be developed so as to characterise analytical knowledge positively as a specific instance *within* the logic of *psychanalysme*. The language of *effects* is insufficient for a definitive deconstruction of the problematic of recuperation just because the status assigned to analysis itself as *cause* leaves it (contrary to Castel's manifest intention) in a transcendent, privileged and ultimately mysterious site within the overall structure. The only coherent line of advance here would seem to lie in grasping the nettle of "reductivism" and rigorously establishing the structural unity of analysis and *psychanalysme*, prolonging Castel's critique of institutions and practices into the heart of analytical knowledge, namely the positing of the unconscious itself. For some, this may seem a high price to pay for coherence. At all events, the discussion on this must not be allowed to relinquish the indispensable social and political perspectives which Castel has opened up.

Notes

(1) *Moi, Pierre Rivière...*, edited by M. Foucault, Gallimard/Juillard, Paris, 1973. English translation by Frank Jellinek: *I, Pierre Rivière...*, Random House/Pantheon, New York, 1975.

(2) Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1977. On the same subject see Bernard de Frêminville's *La Raison du plus fort*, editions du Seuil, Paris, 1977, a brilliant history of repressive practices in psychiatry.

(3) Cf. *Ideology & Consciousness* 1, page 35.

(4) Editions du Seuil, 1971.

(5) Quotation from J. Baudrillard, "Le Corps ou le charnier des signes", *Topique* No. 10, October 1972.

(6) P. Bourdieu, "Genèse et structure du champ religieux", *Revue française de sociologie* XII 1971, pp. 320-321.

(7) Quoted from Didier Deleule, *La psychologie, mythe scientifique*, Laffont, Paris, 1969, p. 173.

(8) Editions de Minuit, 1970; English translation by Richard Nice: *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, Sage Publications, 1977.

(9) On the history of this movement in France, Castel gives as the main source the issues from 1945 to 1960 of *L'information psychiatrique*.

(10) P. Racamier et al., *Le psychanalyste sans divan*, Payot, Paris, 1970.

(11) Peter L. Berger. "Towards a sociological understanding of psychoanalysis", *Social Research* vol. 32 no. 1, spring 1965.

(12) French-language source in *Materialisme dialectique, materialisme historique et psychanalyse,V*; cf. W. Rich, *Sex-Pol*, Vintage Books, 1972. éditions de la Pensée molle, 1970, p. 2.

(13) *Nouvel Observateur* no. 311, 26/10/70. Castel also cites Muldworf's articles in *Nouvelle Critique*, April 1969 and January 1970 and *L'Humanité*, 18 and 25/9/70 and 30/10/70, and his books, *Le Métier du Père*, Casterman, 1972 and *Liberté sexuelle et nécessités psychologiques*, Roger Maria, 1972.