Introduction

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European integration and the cold war have both played a significant role in shaping the evolution of Europe since the Second World War. Each, in their own different ways, did much to divide Europe and to unify it. The integration process has from the outset drawn a sharp dividing line between those countries which chose to participate in the 'building of Europe' and those which did not. It also created strong bonds, economic, political and institutional, between the six, then nine, ten, twelve, fifteen and now twenty five countries which have been involved. Likewise the cold war underlined not merely the sharp distinction between Eastern and Western Europe, between the communist and free worlds, but also a less clear cut but still important fracture between those European countries which belonged to one bloc or the other and those neutrals which remained detached from the East-West conflict. The cold war too had a strong unifying effect, establishing lasting ties between the countries of each cold war alliance and making much more solid and enduring the interconnections between Western Europe and the undisputed leader of the Western world, the United States. Both processes, moreover, were born, or at least institutionalised, in the same crucial five years immediately after the end of the Second World War. And both were profoundly marked by many of the political heavy-weights of the post-war period. Ernest Bevin, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Charles de Gaulle, Paul-Henri Spaak, Dwight Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles or John F. Kennedy feature prominently in most accounts of both the integration of Europe and the development of Western Europe during the cold war.

Surprisingly, however, the history of each has tended to be studied and told with next no reference to the other. Much has thus been written about Western Europe and the early cold war.[1] And an almost equal amount of ink has been spilled in attempts to analyse the origins and early development of the European integration process.[2] But these two historiographies have tended to develop in parallel with few obvious points of intersection. Cold war historians have thus focused their attention on a narrative which stretches from the establishment of the blocs in the 1940s, through the high tension and confrontation of the 1950s and early 1960s, the détente of the later 1960s and 1970s, the 'second cold war' of the early 1980s and the final collapse of the cold war system and of the Soviet bloc in 1989-90. Historians of European integration meanwhile have refined a story in which the frustrated hopes of those aspiring to European unity in the 1940s were partially realised in the early 1950s, hard hit by the collapse of the putative European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954, dramatically revived in 1955 with the Messina conference and the start of the negotiations which were to lead to the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), consolidated by the Community's early success, depressed by the stagnation of the process during the 1970s and early 1980s, and revived once more by the renewed surge forward of the integration process in the mid to late 1980s. These twin tales, moreover, have been expounded, debated, and critiqued in different journals and at different conferences.[3] And they have been introduced to students in simplified form in separate textbooks designed for separate university courses.[4]

There are admittedly some partial exceptions to this rule. The most obvious, perhaps, is constituted by some of the writing on the late 1940s and early 1950s.

Analysts of the Marshall Plan, for instance, have been able to point out that the European Recovery Programme was not simply a cold war mile-stone and a crucial step towards the formation of a solidly western US-led bloc, but also a policy initiative intended by its creators to foster European unity and to encourage the economic integration of Western Europe.[5] Likewise, studies of the EDC have seldom been able to ignore its cold war origins – it was born in response to the outbreak of the Korean War and the increased urgency which this gave to the issue of whether or nor West Germany should be allowed to rearm – or to overlook the enormous energy with which the United States championed the project as both a crucial step towards strengthening Western Europe's defences against the Soviet threat *and* as major advance in the direction of that European unity for which the US had called since 1947.[6] Revealingly, however, both of these examples of cold war and integration cross-over are normally regarded as failures. Thus most European historians, at least, would view the Marshall Plan as a major economic success and as vital in establishing the Western bloc, but as something of a flop as far as European unity is concerned. US attempts to force the recipients of Marshall Aid to submit a single pan-European wish-list rather than multiple national requests or to accept the appointment of a heavy-weight secretary general of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) able to bang heads together and oblige the different countries to cooperate, were systematically thwarted by European resistance.[7] Over time the Marshall Plan thus did more to cement bilateral links between Washington and each of the major European capitals than it did to nurture multilateral European cooperation. And the institutions that were born out of the Marshall Plan – notably the OEEC – came to be regarded by many of those responsible for establishing the European Coal and Steel

Community (ECSC) or the EEC as examples of how *not* to integrate and as the archetype of ineffective intergovernmental structures doomed to paralysis.[8] Similarly, the EDC became European integration's most celebrated failure – the project that momentarily threatened to bury the whole endeavour.[9] Here too, therefore, enthusiastic American backing seemed to have been in vain and possibly even counter-productive. Dulles' celebrated threat that the rejection of the EDC might trigger 'an agonising reappraisal' of the US commitment to Europe proved totally futile with French parliamentarians choosing to call his bluff and vote down the ambitious treaty in August 1954. Overall, therefore, even the two main exceptions to the normally separate narratives of integration and the cold war in Europe seem only to justify the normal detachment between the two fields. For on the rare occasions where the two did interconnect, cold war inspired US pressure led the integration process astray and failed to have a lasting impact. European integration, the implication seems to be, has worked only when it has been carried out by Europeans for European reasons rather than when it has been foist upon Western Europe by a well-meaning but over-enthusiastic superpower.

The gulf between the two fields has only been increased by recent trends in the historiography of both European integration history and cold war history. The former, for instance, has been deeply marked by the emphasis placed by Alan Milward and his followers on the economic causes of the integration process. The notion that ECSC was the product of a particular crisis in the French steel industry, or that the EEC constituted a Dutch-inspired attempt to rescue the European nation state by consolidating and making irreversible the intra-European trade boom of the 1950s, left little space for cold war considerations.[10] The 'cold war' indeed does not register in the index of either of

Milward's influential two volumes on the origins of European integration.[11] Likewise, the proliferation of detailed archivally-based studies of each individual country's path to the EEC has also tended to lessen the emphasis on the cold war as a motivation. For the central figures of many of these new studies have been national civil servants, often based in either economic ministries or those portions of the foreign ministry most concerned with commercial affairs, who were much less involved professionally with the parallel evolution of the cold war than were the statesmen and parliamentarians who populated earlier, less detailed, accounts of integration's origins.[12] Cold war historians, meanwhile, have responded in kind. Over the last two decades there has been a fairly systematic attempt to demonstrate that the Western European powers did matter in a cold war context and that events were not entirely determined by the superpowers.[13] But much of this emphasis on the power or even tyranny of the weak has concentrated on the way individual European states were able to manipulate and use Washington to their own ends.[14] The emphasis has thus been bilateral and transatlantic rather than multilateral and pan-European. With a few honourable exceptions, neither 'new cold war history' nor the most recent writings of integration experts have broken the pattern described above; many of its products have if anything made the separation more acute.[15]

This volume and the conference at Pembroke College, Oxford out of which it emerged were designed to examine these parallel histories and to begin to assess whether or not their lack of interconnection was justified. Those invited to participate were historians who had shown interest in either cold war history or European integration history or occasionally both. Indeed several of those who attended belonged to that comparatively rare breed of scholar who had published about both fields, although

revealing even they had most often done so in different volumes and in different articles rather than in single works.[16] The players on which they concentrated – France, West Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, the United States and the Community institutions - were those deemed most likely to have had significant roles in both the cold war and the European integration process. And the period upon which they were invited to focus – the second half of the 1960s and the early 1970s - was one of some importance to both the development of European integration and the cold war, but equally one where the interconnections between the two fields had not previously been explored. It therefore constitutes a good testing ground for the hypothesis that the separation between cold war and European integration history described above was artificial and too extreme.

The 1960s were an important period in the development of Western Europe. Economically, the period was one during which the continent's remarkable post-war rise seemed to continue.[17] There were a few minor interruptions. And the relatively sluggish British economy went on defying the wider trend. Overall, however, the period was one of high growth rates, booming exports, minimal unemployment and controllable inflation – a performance that did much to cement in the minds of Western European policy-makers and citizens an equation between European integration and economic success that would be largely absent from those countries like Britain that were only to join the EEC in 1973, the very year that the economic bubble burst. Politically, meanwhile, the gradual rise of the political left after the dominance across Western Europe of the centre-right during the 1950s seemed to be occurring in a controlled and unthreatening manner – until 1968 at least. And in international terms, the rapid liquidation in the early 1960s of Western Europe's remaining colonial empires, meant that Britain, France, Belgium and

the Netherlands no longer found themselves besieged by world opinion and liable to criticism even from their superpower ally about their imperial policies in the way that had been the case throughout the latter half of the 1950s. The speed and dignity with which each power left its former Asian, African and Caribbean holdings varied significantly – but in all of the European colonial powers the sense of relief at the end of empire seemed to outweigh any regret for diminished international influence. Indeed Gaullist France was probably not unique in believing that it could operate more effectively on the world stage after it had lost its empire than it had been able to when it still ruled directly over significant portions of Africa and South-East Asia.[18]

Western Europe's renewed self-confidence – fuelled by its economic success and facilitated by colonial disengagement – did not however correspond to increased centrality to global affairs. From a cold war history perspective the 1960s are the decade when the centre of gravity of cold war confrontation shifted most decisively away from Europe and towards the Third World. This reflected the fact that, while the European status quo was comparatively stable – Trachtenberg talks of a European settlement having been reached by 1963[19] – the battle over the international alignment of the newly independent states of Asia and Africa had only just been joined.[20] The way in which headlines and news reports about the situation in Vietnam or the state of Sino-Soviet relations had all but replaced bulletins from Berlin or anxious speculation about the fate of Trieste as the main daily reminders of the ongoing cold war accurately symbolised the change. Likewise the manner in which the one clear cold war crisis which did occur in Europe in the latter half of the 1960s – the crushing of the Prague Spring in August 1968 – was not allowed by either East or West to interrupt more than momentarily the slow

progress of détente, demonstrates the extent to which each bloc had accepted, *de facto* if not *de jure*, the presence and the geographical limits of the other.[21]

To a large extent this stabilisation of the European cold war front was good news for Western Europe. The fading fear of Soviet invasion or subversion certainly contributed to that sense of growing confidence and well-being noted above. But it also significantly reduced the pressure on each European country to march in tight formation behind the United States as far as their international policy was concerned. By the mid-1960s not only had the countries of Western Europe long since rid themselves of that financial dependence on the US which had characterised the early cold war but they were also self-confident enough to feel that they could each devise their own distinctive approach to East-West relations. This allowed the diversity of national approaches which will be analysed in the chapters that follow. And it also carried with it the potential that disagreements over cold war policy could spill over and interconnect with that other key area of intercourse between European countries, namely the development of the EEC. Dissension in NATO might, in other words, contaminate the successful process of European integration thereby endangering Western cooperation over much more than just military or security matters.

The opening two chapters of the volume focus on France – the first western country to break ranks significantly in its approach to the cold war. Georges-Henri Soutou thus sets out to contrast the European and cold war policies of the two French Presidents to occupy the *Elysée* during the 1965-73 period, namely Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou. Both Presidents were supposedly Gaullist. Pompidou indeed won the 1969 elections partly by presenting himself as the candidate of continuity after the de

Gaulle's surprise resignation earlier that year.[22] But as Soutou demonstrates each had very different approaches to the cold war, to European integration, and to the interconnections between the two. Thus while de Gaulle's whole strategy centred upon a belief that the cold war division of Europe could be overcome and that the Soviet Union (or Russia as he preferred to call it) could be re-integrated into a pan-European system, Pompidou's vision was much more cautious as far as East-West relations were concerned. This underlying strategic gulf meant that each then turned towards greater Western European cooperation (although neither liked integration as such) in radically different circumstances. For de Gaulle it was a fall-back option to be explored most energetically when the prospects for détente were least encouraging – as they were in the early 1960s. For Pompidou, by contrast, Western European cooperation became most attractive in the latter half of his presidency when détente appeared to be in danger of advancing too far too fast. Closer European cooperation might give France some degree of control over Germany's Eastern policies and somewhat lessen the danger of a superpower condominium over Europe.

Garret Martin's chapter, by contrast, adopts a rather different approach. For instead of looking at how French policy developed over the whole of the period, he focuses in some detail on one crucial eight month period, from September 1967 to April 1968. This allows him to prove how tightly entwined were the different strands of French foreign policy. Thus the mounting frustrations of French Eastern policy – which were ever more apparent during these months despite the seeming success of de Gaulle's state visit to Poland – were closely connected to France's growing isolation vis-à-vis its Western partners. And this last was in turn accentuated by the way in which the French

struggled to rally Germany and the other EEC member states to its side in the ongoing debate about how global monetary cooperation should be organised, while at the very same time seeking to defy those same Community partners by blocking the British bid for EEC membership. While Soutou explores the linkages between the cold war and European integration at the level of overall French strategy, Martin thus reveals the ways in which the two fields could become entangled at a tactical level.

In chapters three and four the focus shifts to West Germany. The Federal Republic had, for understandable reasons, been the most orthodox and reliable ally throughout most of the early cold war years. Both its approach to East-West relations and its engagement with European integration had been everything that the United States could have wished for during all but the last few months of the lengthy period when Konrad Adenuaer remained Chancellor. Indeed, if misunderstandings or mistrust did arise between Washington and Bonn in this era, it was normally because Adenuaer's government proved itself *plus royaliste que le roi* in its steadfastness towards the East and its enthusiasm for cooperation with the West![23] And even Adenuaer's brief final flirtation with de Gaulle, which did ring alarm bells in Washington and cast momentary doubt over West Germany's reliability, seemed to have been decisively ended by Adenauer's successor, the ultra-loyal Atlanticist Ludwig Erhard.[24] Much was to change, however, with the rise of Willy Brandt, initially as Foreign Minister of the Grand Coalition government which ruled the FRG from 1966 to 1969 and then, from September 1969, as Chancellor of a centre-left government. Both chapters on Germany thus centre their attention on the Brandt years.

The chapter by Wilfried Loth focuses on the crucial relationship between the new German Chancellor and his French opposite number. Theirs was not a particularly easy relationship: the Brandt-Pompidou pairing has not been treated with the same sort of retrospective reverence in the burgeoning literature on *le couple franco-allemand* as de Gaulle and Adenauer, Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing or François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl.[25] As Loth shows, however, they did make an effort to find areas where the two countries could cooperate closely and were not totally without their successes. Importantly for this volume their dialogue encompassed both the evolving pattern of East-West relations and the question of how the early successes of the EEC could be built upon. Quite a lot of their attention was therefore directed towards the possibility of building a more political Europe, one able to assert itself more clearly from the United States over foreign policy matters in general and the direction of détente in particular. Ironically, though, these discussions emphasised the extent to which Germany and France had swapped positions by the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the Brandt era it was thus Germany that put forward the radical ideas as much about Transatlantic relations as about the approach to Eastern Europe, while it was France that played the role of conservative brake on a partner prone to over-ambition. Germany's radicalism is explored still further in Andreas Wilkens' chapter. This traces the development of *Ostpolitik* back to Brandt's formative years as mayor of Berlin during the 1950s and early 1960s, before explaining how the new approach to Eastern Europe and to the German Democratic Republic was implemented when the Social Democrats became the dominant party of government in Germany in 1969. It also explores the extent to which Brandt's new Eastern policy was rooted in the earlier success of the Federal

Republic's *Westpolitik*. On this Wilkens suggests some interesting divergences between the ideas of the Chancellor and those of his closest aide and collaborator, Egon Bahr.

The two chapters on Britain both concentrate on the years when the United Kingdom found itself outside of the European Community but deeply preoccupied with the question of how to get in. Helen Parr confronts the vexed question of Community enlargement head-on in her chapter, identifying the reasons behind Harold Wilson's belated conversion to the idea of European integration and elucidating how the Labour government hoped to avoid its bid to enter the EEC being thwarted by de Gaulle in much the same manner as Harold Macmillan's 1961 membership application had been. Ultimately, of course, the French President did bar Britain's path once more. But as Parr explains, the General's second veto turned out to be a Pyrrhic veto – a short-term success that actually revealed more about de Gaulle's weakness than it did about his strength. *En passant*, Parr's chapter also demonstrates that the question of EEC membership was one of the aspects of early European integration where the interconnections with the over-arching cold war were strongest and most clear.

James Ellison's chapter is somewhat more cold war centred in its focus, but again brings out the existence of links between the cold war and the EEC. A study in Anglo-American relations, the piece investigates the way in which London and Washington coordinated their response to de Gaulle's March 1966 decision to withdraw France from NATO's integrated military command. Central to British and American strategies was their shared belief that Britain's capacity to establish itself as a rival pole of attraction to France and thereby prevent the General's actions having the detrimental effects on Western unity which both London and Washington feared was tightly wrapped up with

the UK's attitude towards the EEC. The Wilson government's realisation that it needed to revive the issue of British EEC membership and move the country closer to, and if possible into, the European Community was thus in part a response to the crisis in NATO and to the wider challenge posed by de Gaulle. Other aspects of the same basic strategy involved the resolution of the long-standing question of how to give Germany some influence over Western nuclear strategy without allowing the Federal Republic to acquire nuclear weapons of its own, the settling of the acrimonious wrangle between the United States, Britain and Germany over the costs of allied troops stationed in Germany, and the public demonstration of NATO's commitment to the pursuit of détente. The chapter hence underlines both the scale of the challenge which Gaullist France was deemed to pose to the West and the multifaceted nature of the Anglo-American response.

Jan van der Harst's contribution on Dutch foreign policy acts as a salutary reminder that in neither NATO nor the EEC did the larger countries have it entirely their own way. The Netherlands in particular emerged as a doughty adversary of General de Gaulle and a determined defender of Atlanticist orthodoxy. This reflected its profound belief that while European integration was economically vital to a small trading nation, Dutch security interests were much better looked after in a wider grouping including the United States and Britain than they would be in any rival European entity. The Hague government was thus strongly opposed to the premature development of a coordinated European foreign policy – in 1962 it had played a central role in blocking the so-called Fouchet Plan, de Gaulle's most systematic attempt to create such foreign policy coordination[26] – and deeply suspicious of anything that might lessen the ties between Europe and the US. In an interesting reminder, however, of the potential influence of

public opinion and domestic political change over foreign policy, van der Harst explains how several of the certainties of 1960s Dutch foreign policy were over-turned when the veteran foreign minister Joseph Luns was replaced in 1971 by Norbert Schmelzer. The Netherlands moderated, for instance, their hard-line stance towards détente and became more supportive of the idea that the soon-to-be-enlarged European Community could acquire some involvement in the field of foreign policy coordination. The presence of the British, after all, was believed likely to minimise the chances of any dangerous drift away from Atlantic alignment.

As Piers Ludlow explains in chapter eight, the Community institutions themselves remained somewhat detached from the cold war and the question of East-West relations throughout the 1960s. Contacts were thus minimal between the European Commission and a Soviet bloc which still regarded the integration process as a vehicle for German *revanchisme*; the agenda of ministerial discussions in the EEC Council of Ministers involved little which directly impinged upon East-West relations; and there were both bureaucratic and tactical reasons militating against any real linkage between the EEC's development and the wider cold war. Despite this, however, the chapter maintains that there were a number of more indirect connections between the integration process and the East-West struggle. In particular, the chapter argues that the whole environment within which the early Community was able to flourish was profoundly shaped by the cold war alliance between Europe and the United States. As a result it is impossible fully to understand what went on in the Brussels institutions without being aware of parallel developments in the cold war.

Chapter nine by Jussi Hanhimäki turns its attention to the United States. America's importance in the calculations of all of the European players examined in the book is obvious, but as Hanhimäki reminds us Washington was less centrally concerned with European affairs in the late 1960s and early 1970s than it had been a decade or so before. The salience of Western European affairs in American foreign policy had steadily diminished in a period where the key issues preoccupying US policy-makers were the protracted war in Vietnam, crises in the Middle East, and the exciting prospects of superpower détente and triangular diplomacy. By the end of the period reviewed, the Watergate scandal and the domestic failings of the Nixon administration constituted an additional distraction. The US did, however, remain involved in Western Europe – its largest trading partner as well as its main cold war ally – and was therefore in a position to react to de Gaulle, to co-opt Brandt's opening to the East into its own policy of détente, to support the enlargement of the EEC, and to engage, albeit belatedly, with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Despite a number of transatlantic *contretemps*, notably Henry Kissinger's ill-fated attempt to designate 1973 as the Year of Europe, the United States continued to be a key actor in Western Europe exercising a vital influence over both the course of East-West relations and the development of the EEC. This alone added a further layer of interconnection between the cold war and European integration.

A final chapter will then bring together a number of preliminary conclusions and suggest a possible agenda for future research. Much more remains to be studied in this field. Serious international history writing about the late 1960s and early 1970s remains very much in its infancy. And the long-standing divide between cold war history and the

history of European integration is too well established and too profound to be entirely bridged by just one edited volume. Overall, however, there is enough in the chapters of this book to suggest that there were multiple points where the cold war and integration narratives did intersect and that when they did not their separation was often an act of deliberate policy which deserves to be studied and explained rather than taken for granted. Even in an era of détente largely free from the cold war crises which had punctuated earlier decades, European countries worked and interacted on an international stage which they were obliged to share with both of the superpowers and which had been deeply shaped by the East-West struggle. Ignoring this fact is a step that no one writing a detailed history of post-war Europe's efforts to unite can afford to take.

[1] See, for instance, Trachtenberg (1999), Young (1991), Reynolds (1994), Graml (1985).
[2] See, e.g., Poidevin (1986), Schwabe (1988), Deighton (1995), Milward (1984).
[3] Amongst the specialist journals in each field are *Journal of Cold War Studies* and *Cold War History* and *Journal of European Integration History* and *Journal of Common Market Studies*. The most complete series of conferences on European integration history are those organised by the European Community Liaison Committee of Historians. These have led, amongst others, to Poidevin (1986), Schwabe (1988), Serra (1989), Deighton and Milward (1999), and Loth (2001).
[4] On European integration history see e.g. Stirk (2001) and Urwin (1995); on the cold war, Reynolds (2000), Crockatt (1994), Soutou (2001).
[5] See, e.g., Hogan (1987).
[6] On the EDC see Dumoulin (2000); on US policy towards German rearmament Large (1996).
[7] Milward (1984) and Esposito (1994).
[8] See Snoy's comments cited in Jaumin-Ponsar (1970), pp.99-100.
[9] See Quaroni's assessment cited in Serra, E. 'L'Italia e la conferenza di Messina' in Serra (1989), pp.93-4.
[10] Milward (1984), esp. pp. 362-420 for the former; Milward (1992) for the latter.
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] Lynch (1997), Bossuat (1996), Rhenisch (1999), Mahant (2004)
[13] Reynolds (1994) is a good example of the genre.
[14] See e.g. Esposito (1994)
[15] Probably the clearest exceptions to the rule are Schwabe (2001) and Giauque (2002). While both are useful, however, they do not go nearly far enough to undermine the basic contention of this section.
[16] Georges-Henri Soutou, Wilfried Loth and Jan van der Harst have all written about *both* cold war history and European integration history, albeit normally on separate occasions.
[17] Boltho (1982).
[18] The sense of liberation felt by Gaullist France after the end of the Algerian *imbroglio* comes across very clearly in Vaisse (1998).
[19] Trachtenberg (1999), pp.352-402.
[20] In general see Westad (2005).
[21] See, e.g., Hughes (2004).
[22] Roussel (1994), p.282.
[23] Adenauer's nostalgia for the cold war certainties of Dulles and mistrust of Kennedy's greater flexibility is a central theme of Schwarz (1991).
[24] See Bange (1999), Granieri (2003) and Oppelland (2002).
[25] See for instance Bitsch (2001).
[26] See Vanke (2001).