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Teachers and Performance Pay in 2014: First Results of a Survey

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Abstract
From the autumn of 2014, a new performance pay scheme was introduced for school teachers in England and Wales. It makes pay progression for all teachers dependent upon their performance as evaluated by their line managers by means of performance appraisals. This paper reports the results of a the first wave of a survey of teachers' views about performance pay and their beliefs about its effects on their performance and that of their schools before the first decisions about pay awards under the new scheme. Further surveys are planned to follow the scheme over time. School leaders were also surveyed. The results so far confirm a broadly negative view among teachers as to the desirability and likely motivational effects of linking pay progression to performance, but they also show a more positive view of the process of performance appraisal. The results are compared with those of a similar CEP survey carried out in 2000 just before the previous scheme was introduced.

Key words: Compensation packages, payment methods, public sector labor markets, compensation
JEL codes: J33; J45; M52

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0. Summary

In the autumn of 2013, a new pay system was introduced for school teachers in England and Wales, linking future pay progression to performance. For teachers at an earlier stage in their careers, on the Main Scale, this meant that henceforth annual pay progression would be based on a performance review against agreed objectives and teachers' standards. For more senior teachers, on the Upper Pay Scale, this meant a reinvigoration of a link with performance that was judged to have declined since its introduction in 2000. In addition, schools were given greater flexibility to manage pay.

To investigate how the new system is working, and to follow its development over time, researchers at the London School of Economics designed a survey to track how teachers' motivation and work practices and those of their schools evolve as the new system takes shape. This paper presents provisional results from the study's first wave that took place between January and April 2014. This timing was designed to coincide with teachers being familiar enough with the new scheme to answer questions about it, but before they would have received any performance-related payments that might colour their perceptions. Some results are also compared with those of an earlier LSE study of the Threshold system of pay progression introduced in schools in 2000.

Overall, teachers remain very sceptical as to the benefits of performance-related pay in schools, with less than a quarter agreeing with the principle, and that it will lead to greater fairness, or reward good teaching. The great majority are also sceptical that, even if they perform well, their schools cannot afford to pay for their performance. Part of this scepticism can be attributed to a widely held belief that performance is the result of teamwork in schools, and of fears that it will lead to favouritism. Few think it will help retention. Teachers on the Upper Pay Scale were distinctly more negative than those on the Main Pay Scale, and early career teachers. School leaders are somewhat more positive about performance pay, but many voiced concerns about its suitability for schools and possible harm to teamwork.

A significant factor underlying negative attitudes to performance pay appears to be its perceived impact on groups of teachers at specific points on the former pay scales. In particular, those at the top of the old Main Scale (M6) experience a very sharp increase in negative views of performance pay which may be attributed to changes concerning Threshold progression. Among those at the top of the Upper Pay Scale, there is a similar rise in negative

views of performance pay which could be due to the lack of scope for further pay progression with or without performance pay, and a feeling that they could lose out under the new performance rules.

On the other hand, the great majority of teachers recognise that those who do their jobs well make a real difference to their students, and that there are significant differences in teaching effectiveness among their colleagues. Thus their opposition to the principle is based neither on a denial of differences in teaching performance, nor that they matter for their students. The question is whether linking pay to performance is the best way to address them. Some of the reasons teachers in the survey put forward for this variation could potentially be addressed by pay, for example, motivation or morale differences, but others may be more amenable to other policies, such as improved professional development. Performance reviews are recognised as one means by which such needs can be identified and addressed.

Although performance reviews address formally the themes that are specified in the regulations, there is more variation on the qualitative side, in terms of perceptions of how supportive they are, and how much influence teachers believe they have over their objectives. Among classroom teachers who had acted as appraisers, there was a general view that the reviews helped focus on work priorities, and they enabled a discussion of poor performance. However, there was less confidence that they address the factors teachers associated with differences in effectiveness, with the exception of professional development. Teachers also reported that the appraisal system had not really led them to make any radical changes in their teaching practice, although several acknowledged small or moderate changes. The exception was to focus more on improving student test scores.

Teachers' use of their non-directed time, how they allocate it between different school activities, could be seen as an example of where performance priorities can be altered in schools. In 2000, with the introduction of Threshold Assessment, teachers who were eligible for the assessment appeared to allocate more of their time to lesson preparation. There appears to be no equivalent peak in 2014. However, this may be due to uncertainty in the minds of many teachers about how the new scheme will operate, and it is possible that the greater flexibility of the new system spreads opportunities for progression more evenly across the pay spine whereas in 2000 the initial rewards were very much concentrated at the Threshold.

Well-conducted performance reviews are associated with more positive (less negative) views about whether performance pay is motivating or divisive. Teachers' commitment to their schools and their trust of their school leaders are also associated with a more positive assessment of performance pay. On the other hand, high work pressure, in the form of above median hours of non-directed time, is associated with negative views of performance pay.

It appears that implementation in most schools in the survey is fairly cautious. Although the sample numbers are small, most school leaders reported that their schools would reward meeting objectives for the current year, and would continue to use whole points on the former pay scale. Smaller percentages reported rewarding performance if sustained over several years. Most reported they would apply the same types of increase for the Main and Upper Pay Scales. Some reported that if allowed they would like to use one-off non-consolidated payments. Written-in replies report widespread use of templates from outside providers and their associations for teachers' standards and for pay systems.

Despite the negative views of performance pay, teachers' commitment to their schools and their students remains high, and arguably higher than in many other sectors of the economy. As one respondent wrote: 'No one comes into teaching to get rich'.

1. Introduction

School teachers constitute one of the largest groups of professionally trained employees in most advanced economies, and like many other professionals, they are highly educated and can exercise considerable autonomy in how they do their jobs. Their work as educators has the potential to raise the quality of the national workforce, and to contribute to the future well-being of their students, Recent research evidence confirms that good teaching has a measurable effect upon student achievements (Murphy, 2011 a and b). Hence, understanding better how best to reward good teaching concerns both school communities and national and local governments.

This paper presents first results of a long-term study to examine the relationship between teachers' pay and teaching performance in primary and secondary schools in England and Wales. Linking pay to performance is not new for teachers in England and Wales. It has existed for school leaders in various forms since the introduction of the new pay structure in 1991, and was introduced for classroom teachers with the 'Threshold' system in 2000.[1] The philosophy underlying this system was that practicing teachers should pass through a special Threshold Assessment in order to progress from the former Main Scale to a new Upper Pay Scale comprising three additional points. This is based on an evaluation of their teaching, including an element of pupil performance. Below the Threshold, progress up the Main Scale was by seniority, whereas further progress along the Upper Pay Scale was to be performance related. The then Education Secretary, Estelle Morris, had pressed for the upper scale to be 'tapered' so that proportionately higher standards were required for each step. Research evidence showed that the Threshold system had some initially positive effects on performance (Atkinson et al, 2004, 2009, Marsden and Belfield, 2007). However, reporting in 2012, the School Teachers' Pay Review Body (STRB) judged that these had disappeared during the subsequent years. The review body observed that very high success rates at the Threshold assessment meant that progression had become practically automatic. [2] It recommended a reinvigorated link between pay and performance for all classroom teachers in England and Wales (STRB, 2012), and greater flexibility for Threshold progression.

Introduced in 2013/2014, the new scheme links salary progression on the Main Pay Scale to performance, thus replacing progression by seniority, and providing more flexible pay scales (DfE 2013). It also seeks to reinvigorate the link with performance for the Threshold

Assessment and for progression along the Upper Pay Scale. Schools have been given greater autonomy as to how they determine performance criteria and the methods of assessment. In addition, they will no longer be bound by scale points, national pay fixing being confined to determining the minimum and maximum salaries for each scale. Although the new scheme links pay progression to teachers' performance reviews in schools in both England and Wales, there are some important differences in how it operates between the two countries.

Teachers' performance is assessed by means of reviews conducted by senior colleagues, who may themselves be classroom teachers, especially in large schools. In these performance reviews, teachers discuss their objectives for the coming year, and their performance is appraised against those of the previous period as well as against teachers' standards. Individual teachers' objectives are meant to be related to their school's general objectives as set out in the School Development Plan, and the system is designed to link objectives of individual teachers with those of their school as a whole. In theory, the discussion can be two-way, covering both agreeing objectives and determining what forms of organisational support will be provided, such as further professional development. When performance reviews and the Threshold were introduced, many teachers feared that formulaic targets, based on student test scores, would be imposed on them, despite guidance to the contrary from the DfEE (1999).

General oversight of the appraisal system within each school is the responsibility of the school's governing body to which the head reports. The quality of the performance review system, both within schools and nationally, is also subject to the scrutiny of the national school inspectorates, Ofsted in England and Estyn in Wales.

The survey was carried out by online questionnaire to teachers in England and Wales in late January-March 2014. Because there is no generally available list of teachers' addresses, the classroom and head teacher professional associations informed their members of the study either by emailing a random sample of their members, or by newsletter, or a combination of the two. The communication was accompanied by a note informing teachers that all the professional associations, the national governors' association and the Local Government employers had expressed a strong interest in the survey's results. Respondents were informed that identities of all teachers and their schools would remain strictly confidential. This was important because the introduction of performance-linked pay progression was the subject of dispute between some of the teachers' unions and the government at the time of the survey.

Two questionnaires were administered, one to classroom teachers seeking their views on performance pay, appraisal, and its relationship with their work and their school management, and one to school leaders focusing more on management aspects of the new scheme and how it would integrate with existing provisions. The survey attracted over 4000 responses from classroom teachers and over 200 from school leaders, of which about two-thirds were fully completed. The results presented in this paper are unweighted.

Box 1. The Teachers' pay system up to 2013 and the new implemented in 2013/14

The 2012/13 pay system: In 2012/13 the salaries of classroom teachers in England and Wales followed a system introduced in 2000 and developed over subsequent years according to which teachers progressed up the Main Scale by a series of increments based on years' experience until they reached the point for transition to their Upper Pay Scale. This transition involved passing a Threshold Assessment based on their teaching competence, which should include an element of student performance, although the then government faced strong opposition on this point. Progression on the Upper Pay Scale is related to performance. When the 2012 School Teachers' Review Body (STRB) reported, it observed that the system had become somewhat bureaucratic and rigid, and it recommended a reinvigoration of the link between pay progression and performance both to help motivate teachers and to assist recruitment by offering better pay prospects to good graduates.

The new scheme, introduced during 2013/14, and to apply to salary progression decisions in the summer of 2014, follows the recommendations of the School Teachers' Pay Review Body Report 2012, namely:

- Differentiated performance-based progression on the main pay scale to enable teachers to progress at different speeds, with higher rewards and more rapid progression for the most able teachers.
- More flexible performance-based progression to and within the upper pay scale, assessed against substantially simplified criteria, enabling abolition of the bureaucratic post threshold standards.
- Local discretion to pay a higher salary to the most successful teachers if a post (akin to the 'Advanced Skills Teachers') is required and meets simple yet demanding criteria on leading improvement of teaching skills.

(STRB 2012 Para 4.61)

It also proposes new more flexible criteria for progression from the Main to the Upper Pay Scale (to replace the former Threshold system)

- Substantial and sustained achievement of objectives, appropriate skills and competence in all elements of the Teachers' Standards, and
- The potential and commitment to undertake professional duties which make a wider contribution (which involves working with adults) beyond their own classroom.

(STRB 2012 Para 4.72)

2. Arguments for and against linking pay to performance in schools

The quality of teaching is widely believed to be a major factor in the quality of education received by students. It is also widely believed that well-trained and highly motivated teachers are key ingredients of teaching quality (Murphy, 2011a, b). Many of those engaged in public policy, including in many OECD countries, believe that pay and performance management for teachers can make an important contribution provided the right system can be found (OECD, 2005). This view has been taken in Britain by successive governments and in several reports of the School Teachers' Pay Review Body, for example in 1999, 2007 and 2012.

Research on performance pay for teachers comprises a number of interrelated strands. Although each may be logically distinct, many practitioners would regard them as dealing with different, but complementary, facets of school life, and posing difficult trade-offs for both classroom teachers and school leaders. The first strand is based largely on research up to the late 1990s which was broadly sceptical. Murnane and Cohen (1986), concluded that performance pay had not spread greatly in the US, despite a number of experiments, because it was not suited to the special nature of teachers' work. Richardson (1999), and Dolton et al (2003) reached similar conclusions reviewing British evidence. Teaching involves teamwork; attempts to link pay to student results mechanistically can be divisive, and may encourage 'teaching to the test' and grade inflation. Although pay levels are a frequent source of dissatisfaction among teachers, financial incentives are not a major source of motivation (Vaarlem et al. 1992); many teachers have other intrinsic sources of motivation, such as a sense of achievement. As one head teacher respondent to the present survey wrote in: 'No one comes into teaching to get rich' (#174).

For the second strand, more recent work by economists suggests that teachers may improve their teaching in response to financial incentives (for example: Atkinson et al, 2004, and Lavy, 2004, 2009, Muralidharan et al., 2011, and Podgursky, 2007). Lazear's (1996) study showed that enhanced performance rewards may also contribute to recruiting high productivity employees. Lavy's study additionally explores some of the methods by which teachers sought to respond to the incentives, such as improved pedagogy, increased effort, and focussing on particular groups of students. In this vein, one head teacher commented that it will 'enable schools to give rewards for good performance' (#48). However, several others commented on the risks: budgetary restrictions could make it hard to fund performance pay (#313), and one warned that 'additional pay does not motivate to the degree that non-payment risks demotivation' (#120).

The third strand draws on the management literature, and takes another angle on the question. It looks at how the ways in which teachers' classroom goals are determined and evaluated affect performance outcomes. Folger and Cropanzano (2001) argue that employee perceptions of the fairness of the methods by which goals are set and performance evaluated play a critical role in their effectiveness. If teachers believe management lacks the competence to undertake these processes, or is biased in its evaluations, then the outcome could as easily demotivate them. Reviewing research on employee appraisal, Levy and Williams (2004) argue that employee voice plays an important part in making goal-setting and appraisal effective: top-down imposition of goals by management, and appraisal against these is less effective than involving employees in both the setting and the feedback. A similar point is made in relation to goal setting by Locke and Latham (2002): employees are more likely to take ownership of their work goals if they have been involved in their selection, and the goals are also more likely to be based on better information. One head commented that the new system was making teachers take appraisal 'much more seriously and [...] clearer about the improvements they need to make' (#141), and several commented on the need for fairness and transparency.

The fourth strand relates to the role of professional influences on teachers' work. In professional occupations, workers' expert knowledge gives them a major advantage over both the employer and recipients of their services. There is wide scope for self-seeking behaviour, that is, taking advantage of such knowledge to reduce effort and provide a sub-standard service (Kleiner, 2006). Often this is restrained by professional norms learned during training and by socialisation within the profession. On the other hand, professional norms may conflict with organisational priorities. For example, school leaders may want improved exam success for their schools whereas teachers may want to promote their pupils' intrinsic interest in their subjects. The process of reconciling organisational and professional priorities can be discussed at employer and union level, but the critical level which affects how work priorities are applied in the classroom needs discussion between individual teachers with school leaders. Unless individual teachers agree to changes in work priorities, they are hard to enforce. Thus, the appraisal and goal-setting process includes and element of negotiation, requiring give and take on both sides (Marsden 2004). One head wrote of the performance reviews as a 'supportive process' in which it is possible to 'celebrate teachers' achievements and contribution to our school... [and].. discuss career aspirations and for us to plan CPD to help them achieve their goals' (#22).

A fifth strand relates to the internal organisational pressures on management to be lenient, which can be a common problem with performance pay based on appraisals by line-managers. The need for cooperation from their staff in order to be able to do their own jobs, can sometimes cause managers to lenient with appraisals, and to award performance pay on the basis of seniority. These may be held in check by the external pressures on schools from public inspection reports, and from a quasi-market informed by public data on school performance, which families may use when selecting schools. This gives schools an incentive to achieve good results and to develop identities for particular types of education (Glennerster, 2002). One may hypothesise that the stiffer local competition from neighbouring schools, the greater the pressure on school leadership teams to use goal setting and appraisal effectively. Nevertheless, as one head commented on the different values in education and that 'schools' appraisal can't be like Barclays' appraisal system' (#55).

The head teacher comments illustrate the way in which each of these theoretical concerns has a practical echo in the daily lives of schools. At the same time, the existing system has many weaknesses. This is reflected in the comments of head teachers concerning how to reward teachers who are at the top of their respective pay scales, where incremental progression runs out. One head commented that: 'not everyone can be a director or manager!' (#48). Others commented on the unfairness of teachers at the top of their scale who appeared to be working less hard than their more junior colleagues, as one put it: 'this is where the perceived unfairness is in my school and other local schools' (#41).

This study explores the potential effects of performance pay by means of a number of indicators. Some are attitudinal and relate to potential effects on teachers' motivation. The latter are widely used by researchers in management and organisational psychology on the ground that motivation precedes action. Others relate to work behaviour, such as the prioritisation of different tasks in the classroom relate directly to performance, and the use of non-directed time. All types of effects need to be considered because employees' performance may sometimes improve even without their positive motivation, for example, as a result of increased management pressure or tougher economic conditions.

The provisional results reported in this paper start by looking at whether teachers believe that the new system gives them an incentive to sustain or improve their performance, thus whether they agree with the principle, whether they think it will make pay fairer, and whether they think their schools can deliver. It then looks at some of the factors influencing teachers'

responses, notably how their position on the existing pay scales affects their perceptions of the chance of benefiting or of losing out under the new scheme. It also considers some of the arguments about teachers' work orientations, and whether these affect their attitudes to performance pay, notably whether those with extrinsic or intrinsic orientations make them more or less favourable to financial incentives, and how far their commitment to their schools and trust in their school leaders affects these attitudes. The report then goes on to look at the appraisal system, as this will be the key link between performance and reward. It asks how well it functions, and also whether appraisal and objective setting, as presently construed, focus on the activities that teachers believe affect performance, and whether it has had a direct effect upon their teaching practice. In other words, do appraisal and objective setting as currently undertaken provide the basis for an effective link between performance and reward. The report then looks at the potential impact of performance pay on teachers' work priorities, using how they allocate their non-directed time between different school activities. The next step is to examine the responses from school leaders, notably on the risks and opportunities of performance pay, and about changes in their schools in preparation for implementation. The paper then concludes with an overview of the main issues at this early stage of the research.

3. Preliminary results on teachers' attitudes to PRP

The main psychological theories of work performance stress the importance of motivation. For example, Edward Lawlers's 'expectancy theory' argues that to be motivated, employees have to value the rewards, have scope to increase their performance by greater effort or skill, and believe that management is both capable of identifying good performance, and will play fair by doing so. Hence, a natural point to start is by asking teachers whether they believe the new scheme will motivate them.

3.1 Teachers' views on performance pay overall

About 60% of the teachers responding to the survey said they opposed the principle of linking pay to performance for teachers (Q1, Table 1). A similar percentage disagreed that it provides proper reward to good teaching (Q2), and nearly 80% disagreed that it would result in a fairer allocation of pay within schools (Q3). These percentages are broadly similar to those recorded at a similar point before the first outcomes of the Threshold system in 2000. Previous research by the Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) also showed that the teaching profession was more sceptical about the suitability of performance related pay to their work than other groups of public employees (Marsden and French 1998).

Associated with this general scepticism about performance pay in principle are negative views about its value as an incentive and whether schools can deliver. Few thought it would give an incentive to improve the quality of their teaching (Q5), and encourage them to remain in teaching (Q6). There was also scepticism that it would make them take their performance reviews more seriously (Q4). Many thought that its individual focus would conflict with team-working (Q7), and many thought their schools could not afford to pay for improved performance (Q8), and feared that school leaders would use it to reward their favourites (Q9). The percentages show a similar pattern to that prevailing at the same point before the Threshold was introduced in 2000.

The last two questions in Table 1 relate to teachers' views concerning teacher performance: that good teaching does make a difference to their students' achievements (Q11), and more importantly, that there is significant variation in teaching effectiveness among experienced teachers in their schools (Q12). This shows that despite their scepticism about paying for performance, respondents recognise that there are real differences in teacher performance. These percentages are also comparable with those found in 2000.

These attitudes reflect a particular point in time, and in its follow-up work on the Threshold system in 2001 and 2004, the CEP researchers found that some of the initial hostility did moderate as the new system settled in, and teachers became more familiar with its operation. Teachers' initial fears that the Threshold and upper pay scale performance would be assessed in a formulaic way did not materialise in most schools, and in a growing proportion of schools, appraisal and objective setting appeared to develop into an effective dialogue. On the other hand, it has been argued that the very high rates of success at the Threshold assessment allayed teachers' initial fears of failure. Nevertheless, some replies give concern. The initial concerns in 2000 about affordability were met by new money to pay for the numbers passing the Threshold and progressing on the new Upper Pay Scale. [3] At the present time, there is very little extra money for performance pay so teachers may fear that either they will not get any performance pay, or that it will be funded by redistributing money within schools' current pay bills. Such fears could underlie the replies about favouritism, which at first sight might seem surprising given that the appraisal system, on which performance pay progression will be based, has now been in operation for almost 15 years. The next section explores some of the differences among teachers that might underlie these patterns. It starts with their position on the pay scales, and then considers their work orientation and questions of workplace atmosphere in terms of commitment and trust in leaders.

Table 1. Teachers' views about linking pay to performance in schools

	Linking pay progression to performance:		Disagree	Neutral	Agree
	Fairness and recognition				
1	It is a good principle.	2014	59.7	16.8	23.5
		2000	*63.6*	*11.9*	*24.5*
2	It means that good teaching is properly rewarded.	2014	64.3	14.0	21.6
		2000	*53.7*	*20.7*	*25.6*
3	It will result in a fairer allocation of pay.	2014	79.3	12.4	8.3
		2000	*73.1*	*15.3*	*11.5*
	Incentives and retention				
4	It will make me take the objectives of my performance review more seriously.	2014	57.1	20.7	22.2
		2000	*48.4*	*28.7*	*22.9*
5	It will give me a real incentive to improve/sustain the quality of my teaching.	2014	73.8	18.5	7.6
		2000	*80.0*	*8.4*	*11.6*
6	It makes it more attractive for me to remain a teacher.	2014	82.9	12.1	5.0
		2000	*54.4*	*23.0*	*22.5*
	Perceptions of delivery				
7	The link is problematic because it is hard to relate the work done in schools to individual performance.	2014	4.7	8.4	87.0
		2000	*4.4*	*5.6*	*90.0*
8	Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt if my school can afford to reward me with a pay rise.	2014	8.3	18.9	72.8
		2000	*4.4*	*9.2*	*86.5*
9	Leaders will use performance pay to reward their favourites.	2014	10.4	20.0	69.6
		2000	*15.7*	*29.3*	*55.1*
	Pupil performance and effective teaching				
10	It is good that individual teachers' pay should take some account of pupil performance.	2014	55.8	21.6	22.6
		2000	*57.1*	*17.4*	*25.5*
11	Teachers who do their jobs well make a real difference to their pupils' learning.	2014	1.5	7.1	91.5
		2000	*0.8*	*1.7*	*97.4*
12	There is significant variation in teaching effectiveness among experienced teachers in my school.	2014	18.3	27.0	54.8
		2000	*24.5*	*16.5*	*59.0*

Notes: response to questions: in 2000, c 4,200, and in 2014, c. 2,950, excluding missing cases. Year 2000 responses were weighted by sample fractions by school type; 2014, overall random sample of individual teachers.

3.2 Attitudes to performance pay and position on the teachers' pay scales

Teachers' positions on their respective pay scales influence the opportunities and risks they experience with the new scheme. Those at the bottom of the Main Scale may have an opportunity to progress more rapidly than in the past, and the new provisions designed to simplify Threshold assessment may influence their views, either making it appear easier, or more difficult depending on how the changes are implemented in their schools. Those on the Upper Pay Scale, where progression has been performance-related for many years, might be

expected to be more relaxed about the new scheme. In fact, both groups of teachers are quite negative about performance pay, although Main Scale teachers appear moderately less so about all the questions on linking pay to performance (see Table 2). Upper Pay Scale teachers are more negative about the questions on fairness and recognition, and more pessimistic on delivery, except for possible favouritism where the difference between teachers on either scale is small and not statistically significant. Upper Scale teachers are also a bit more negative about its effect on incentives and retention than Main Scale teachers.

Table 2 Teachers' views about linking pay to performance in schools: Main Scale compared with Upper Pay Scale teachers.

	Linking pay progression to performance:		Disagree	Neutral	Agree	
	Fairness and recognition					
1	It is a good principle.	Main Scale	53.9	18.6	27.49	****
		Upper Scale	*63.2*	*15.9*	*20.92*	
2	It means that good teaching is properly rewarded.	Main Scale	78.2	12.8	9.02	****
		Upper Scale	*81.0*	*11.8*	*7.22*	
3	It will result in a fairer allocation of pay.	Main Scale	78.2	12.8	9.02	****
		Upper Scale	*81.0*	*11.8*	*7.22*	
	Incentives and retention					
4	It will make me take the objectives of my performance review more seriously.	Main Scale	50.6	21.1	28.29	****
		Upper Scale	*60.0*	*20.6*	*19.44*	
5	It will give me a real incentive to improve/sustain the quality of my teaching.	Main Scale	68.4	20.6	10.98	****
		Upper Scale	*76.8*	*17.6*	*5.65*	
6	It makes it more attractive for me to remain a teacher.	Main Scale	82.6	12.0	5.35	****
		Upper Scale	*84.0*	*11.7*	*4.28*	
	Perceptions on delivery					
7	The link is problematic because it is hard to relate the work done in schools to individual performance.	Main Scale	5.5	8.9	85.62	**
		Upper Scale	*3.7*	*7.9*	*88.46*	
8	Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt if my school can afford to reward me with a pay rise.	Main Scale	11.3	20.5	68.17	****
		Upper Scale	*7.1*	*18.0*	*74.94*	
9	Leaders will use performance pay to reward their favourites.	Main Scale	10.6	19.4	69.97	ns
		Upper Scale	*9.1*	*19.6*	*71.26*	

Notes: N=2691-2695; significance levels: at 1%, ****, 2% ***, 5% **, 10% *, ns difference between main scale and UPS not significant at 10%. Significance levels calculated on the original five-scale questions.

According to the School Workforce Census, in 2012, 15% of teachers were at the top of the old Main Scale (point M6), and a further 29% at the top of the Upper Scale (UP3). For the latter group in particular, there is limited scope for further progression, and some might fear that they could lose out in the new flexibility in school pay awards. To take a closer look at how teachers' views change between different points on their salary scale an index based on the questions in Table 2 was computed (Figure 1). Factor analysis was used to combine the answers to the nine questions and compute an index of how 'motivational' and how 'divisive' teachers considered the link between their pay progression and performance. Figure 1 shows that negative views on divisiveness peak on Upper Scale point U3, whereas positive views on the motivational aspects of linking pay progression to performance peak for teachers on Main Scale point M5, and plunge at M6. The dotted lines show the margin of statistical error for each index.

Thus, a possible factor behind the greater pessimism of UPS teachers may be that so many of them are at the top of their scale, and feel they have little to gain from performance pay. Pay insecurity may also have risen for this group because part of the new package on performance pay is to remove the guarantee that teachers changing schools will retain their previous salary level. In addition, the substitution of a scale with maximum and minimum points, but no intervening scale points, also raises the possibility that the pay of teachers on the higher UPS points may grow more slowly than the average for their schools, depending on how performance pay is implemented. As will be seen later, such fears may be unfounded, in the short-run at least, in view of the cautious approach of schools to the new pay arrangements (Section 9 below).

Among teachers on the Main Scale, those on M6 in 2014 would have been due to pass their Threshold Assessment in 2013/14 under the old arrangements. They will have seen the change of rules, and mooted tightening up of the standards for passing, combined with increased competition for progression from teachers on lower points on the Main Scale. They would therefore feel doubly uncertain about their prospects. With so many teachers on M6 and UPS3, there is a large group facing uncertainty, and a fear of losing out with the new scheme's implementation.

Figure 1 Teachers' views on motivation and divisiveness of linking pay progression to appraisal



Notes: The indexes of whether PRP is motivational or divisive are based on a factor analysis using the questions in Table 2. Factor analysis produces an index whose mean is zero, and for which about two-thirds of responses fall within plus or minus 1. The dotted lines show the margin of statistical error such that there is a 5% chance that the true figure lies outside the range between the upper and lower 95% lines. The wide margin of error for motivation and divisiveness for salary points M1-M3 reflects the greater variation among the answers by teachers on these points and their smaller sample numbers.

3.3 Teachers' work orientations and performance pay: intrinsic and extrinsic motivations

An important distinction made in the literature on reward systems and motivation is between *levels of pay* that are needed to recruit and retain employees, and *how rewards are paid* in order to incentivise performance (Fernie and Metcalf, 1999). It is possible that although many are attracted to teaching by non-pay factors, the way they are paid is can nevertheless be a source of dissatisfaction, and this could be a source of general scepticism about the merits of performance pay in schools. When asked to identify the three most important factors that attracted them to teaching, listed in Table 3, 86% cited the sense of achievement from their work among the top three. Turning to their current levels of satisfaction, 68% said they were satisfied with their sense of achievement (Table 3, right hand panel). In contrast, 74% cited their current workload as one of the three top sources of dissatisfaction with teaching, and only 9% were satisfied with their workload. The high degree of satisfaction teachers derive from the scope for achievement in their jobs has been observed in previous studies (see Varlaam et al 1992, and in previous CEP studies). 'The kids' as a source of satisfaction was

one of the most frequently written-in replies in the survey. In common with these studies, although pay is not high on the list of factors attracting teachers to the job, only 24% cite it as an attraction, nearly 40% of the respondents expressed dissatisfaction over pay.

Table 3 Teachers views on attractiveness of teaching and on current satisfaction

	What makes teaching attractive to you?		What is your current level of satisfaction?		
	% citing among top 3 sources of attractiveness of teaching	% citing among top 3 sources of dissatisfaction with teaching	Dissatisfied %	Neutral %	Satisfied %
The sense of achievement you get from your work	86.2	8.3	18.8	13.0	68.3
The scope for using your own initiative	54.5	15.5	24.8	16.4	58.8
Your job security	36.8	25.6	31.3	24.1	44.6
The opportunity to develop your skills in your job	31.1	18.0	36.2	24.9	38.8
The amount of influence you have over your job	24.4	38.7	43.4	21.8	34.8
The amount of pay you receive	24.1	23.2	39.6	26.4	34.0
The training you receive	11.8	31.5	42.1	26.1	31.9
Your current workload	5.5	74.3	78.2	12.9	9.0

Attractiveness to teaching: In terms of what attracts you to teaching, what are the three most important sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction for you? (Q2.2) Current satisfaction: 'How satisfied are you with the following aspects of your job?' (Q2.1).
Attractiveness question: percentage citing a particular top 3 item out of respondents citing any item in listed in Q2_2, n=3377). Current satisfaction: row percentages. (n=3458-3464).

Although most teachers emphasise the intrinsic rewards of helping their students develop, an important minority emphasise the extrinsic, material and financial rewards. Comparing these two groups enables one to explore the link between such orientations and attitudes to performance pay. The features that made teaching attractive were simplified into two broad categories: whether they focused on intrinsic aspects of teaching, namely a sense of achievement, influence and initiative, or whether they focused on extrinsic aspects, notably pay, job security and work load. Teachers who cited at least two of the three intrinsic aspects among the three requested were classified as having an intrinsic orientation, and those who cited at least two of the three extrinsic ones were classified as extrinsic. The others were classified as 'in between'.

In fact, answers to several of the general questions about performance pay for teachers were not significantly different between the intrinsic and extrinsic groups: they were small enough

Table 4 Teachers' views on linking pay to performance depending on whether they are attracted to teaching by intrinsic or extrinsic factors *(row percentages)*

	Disagree	Hard to say	Agree	Sig
It makes it more attractive for me to remain a teacher.				
Intrinsic	81.9	12.5	5.6	***
In between	85.9	10.5	3.7	
Extrinsic	81.7	13.3	5.0	
It will give me a real incentive to improve/sustain the quality of my teaching.				
Intrinsic	73.8	18.7	7.5	ns
In between	75.5	17.9	6.6	
Extrinsic	71.2	19.0	9.8	
Leaders will use performance pay to reward their favourites.				
Intrinsic	10.6	22.1	67.3	**
In between	9.2	17.8	73.0	
Extrinsic	10.3	16.4	73.3	
It is good that individual teachers' pay should take some account of pupil performance				
Intrinsic	56.9	19.5	23.7	***
In between	55.3	24.4	20.3	
Extrinsic	53.4	24.6	22.1	
I share many of the values of my organisation				
Intrinsic	9.0	12.7	78.3	****
In between	16.0	16.5	67.5	
Extrinsic	12.0	13.7	74.4	
Teachers who do their jobs well make a real difference to their pupils' learning.				
Intrinsic	1.1	5.8	93.1	****
In between	2.0	8.9	89.1	
Extrinsic	1.9	8.0	90.1	
There is significant variation in teaching effectiveness among experienced teachers in my school				
Intrinsic	20.5	26.6	52.9	****
In between	15.8	29.5	54.8	
Extrinsic	15.2	24.5	60.4	

N: 2921-3075. Significance: **** 1%, ** 5%, ns, not significant at 10%. (note significance based on full five-point response scale).

to have come about by chance. Table 4 focuses on those that were significantly different. Even though some of the differences are quite small, on the whole, teachers in the 'intrinsic group' were more likely to think that performance pay makes it more attractive to remain a teacher, and were more sympathetic to considering an element of pupil performance in performance pay. They were also more likely to share the values of their schools, and to believe that good teachers make a difference. However, they were also more likely to be concerned about favouritism in awarding performance pay. Teachers in the 'extrinsic group' were more likely to think performance pay gives them an incentive to improve their teaching

quality. An interesting difference between the two groups can be found in attitudes to differences in teaching effectiveness: teachers in the extrinsic group were more likely to believe there are such differences in their schools.

3.4 School atmosphere: commitment to the school, and trust in its leaders

The social environment and teachers' feelings of being part of a group to which they feel committed may also affect views on performance pay. It is sometimes argued that use of financial incentives can 'crowd out' more pro-social types of motivation (eg Osterloh and Frey, 2000). Those who undertake many parts of their job 'for the good of the' school as an organisation or as a community, may feel that this conflicts with the assumptions of incentive pay, that emphasise both the economic side of the exchange, and the contractual authority of managers rather than employees using their discretion to contribute to a successful school.

The most recent evidence comparing teachers with other occupational groups in Britain is provided by the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) for 2011. This asked a sample of teachers how they felt about the organisation they worked for: whether they felt proud to work there, if they shared its values, did they feel loyal, and did they use their own initiative a lot to carry out tasks that went beyond a strict definition of their jobs. In other words, did they feel a sense of commitment to their organisation? The WERS results show that many employees across the economy feel committed to the organisations they work for, but teachers did so to a greater degree than the others. According to WERS 2011, 81% of teachers felt proud of their school, and 87% shared its values and felt loyal to it (Table 5). As a result, if we follow the theory of commitment, they regularly used their initiative for the good of their organisation (84%). The same questions were asked in the LSE teachers' survey, and they also show high levels of commitment among teachers, and where similar questions were asked in 2000, they confirmed the picture. One puzzle is the lower level of commitment among the LSE survey's respondents. It may be that feelings of commitment have declined since 2011, or that asking the same questions in the context of a contested pay system elicits different answers. It is also possible that teachers who were more opposed to performance pay felt more motivated to complete the questionnaire.

Table 5 Commitment to schools by teachers.

	Disagree	Neutral	Agree
I am proud to tell people who I work for			
Teachers 2014	12.3	21.6	66.1
Teachers 2000	10.7	21.5	67.8
WERS 2011 teachers	5.3	14.1	80.6
WERS 2011 all employees (excl teachers)	9.3	23.2	67.6
I share many of the values of my organisation			
Teachers 2014	11.4	14.1	74.6
WERS 2011 teachers	3.9	8.9	87.2
WERS 2011 all employees (excl teachers)	7.9	27.7	64.4
I feel loyal to my organisation			
Teachers 2014	12.9	15.3	71.8
WERS 2011 teachers	4.8	8.1	87.0
WERS 2011 all employees (excl teachers)	7.9	17.5	74.6
Using my own initiative I carry out tasks that are not required as part of my job			
Teachers 2014*	3.5	28.0	68.5
WERS 2011 teachers	3.8	12.4	83.9
WERS 2011 all employees (excl teachers)	9.1	20.4	70.5

Notes: * Teachers 2014 classified responses on initiative as 'never', 'sometimes' 'quite often' and 'very often'. 'Sometimes' was classified as 'neutral' and quite and very often as 'agree'.

Many of the written-in comments as well as some of the theories reviewed at the start indicate a link between feelings of commitment to the school as a collectivity, trust in management to be fair, and judgements about whether performance pay is likely to be divisive or a positive factor in the school. To look as this association in more detail, indexes were calculated of commitment, using the questions in Table 5: those on teachers' perceptions of trust and fair dealing by the school's management, and those on the link between pay and performance in schools. For a simple cross-tabulation, respondents were then divided according to whether their responses were above or below the median (top or bottom 50%) in terms of commitment, trust and whether they thought performance pay divisive (Table 6). Thus, among teachers who were highly committed, 68% had high trust in their school's leadership, and only 47% considered performance pay to be divisive. Likewise, those who trusted their school's leadership were less likely to think that performance pay will be divisive.

The quality of the objective setting process is often the weak link in performance pay systems. If it is done badly, employees often feel that the system is unfair and arbitrary. A first cut at this question was made by taking the more objective questions on teachers' latest objective setting meeting, and computing a similar index to those above (see Table 7 below). These questions were chosen in preference to the more judgemental ones on this process because

they are least likely to be coloured by teachers' views on commitment, trust, and performance pay. The questions selected include whether specific objectives had been set, they related to the School Development Plan, they included measures of pupil progress, whether how they would be monitored was clear, and whether the respondent knew how they would be linked to pay progression. The results shown in Table 6 underline the importance of the review system in schools. Teachers who experience good objective setting procedures are less likely to consider performance pay divisive (45:55%), and more likely to feel committed to their schools (56:43%), and to trust their schools' leadership (59:41%). This association bears out the idea that objective setting and appraisal play a very important part in building a good ethos in schools, and can be the weak link in incentive systems based on peer and management evaluation. However, it does not establish causation. For example, it is possible that tense relations in schools make it very difficult to conduct an effective appraisal and objective setting system.

Table 6 Teachers' judgements about whether performance pay is divisive, commitment and trust in school leadership[4] *(row percentages)*

	Trust in school leaders		
Good objective setting procedures	Low	High	
Top 50%	40.7	59.3	100
	Commitment to school		
Good objective setting procedures	Low	High	
Top 50%	44.3	55.7	100

	Performance pay will be divisive		
Good objective setting procedures	Low	High	
Top 50%	54.9	45.1	100
Commitment to school	Low	High	T
Top 50%	53.1	46.9	100
Trust in school leaders	Low	High	
Top 50%	58.4	41.6	100

	Trust in school leaders		
Commitment to school	Low	High	T
Top 50%	32.0	68.0	100

N: commitment: 2841 and trust: 2774. Each of the indexes is based on factor analysis of survey questions, and the 'Low' and 'High' values correspond to those below or above the median. Commitment questions are in Table 5, objective setting in Table 7, and performance pay, see footnote 3. 'Top 50%' indicates that the teachers whose answers were the 50% most positive (least negative) on the questions.

4. Appraisal and objective setting

As in any system of appraisal-based pay, objective setting and appraisal provide the key link between teachers' work and pay progression. This section looks first at the conduct of objective setting and appraisal as experienced by teachers. It then looks at teachers' and appraisers' views on the outcomes of appraisal: how has it changed teachers' classroom practice, and whether it addresses the factors teachers believe underlie differences in teaching effectiveness.

4.1 The conduct of appraisal and objective-setting

When pay is linked to performance appraisals, it is clearly very important that the appraisal process works well. One possible reason for teachers' scepticism about performance pay is that they lack confidence in the appraisal process: whether it is taken seriously by their school leaders, whether they have a chance to establish what they consider to be realistic and relevant goals, and whether it will be fairly operated.

Nearly all respondents (88%) reported having had an objective setting meeting for 2013/14 by the time of the survey, and in nearly every case, these set objectives for the coming year (Table 7). Allowing for those changing schools, and for possible implementation delays, this suggests that the procedures for performance review are operating at least in formal terms. However, in the experience of respondents, the quality of the process appears to be more variable. On the positive side, objectives are clear and specific, and they relate to wider objectives of the school, teachers mostly felt they had the opportunity to discuss their objectives and knew how they will be reviewed. And they included indicators of pupil progress. On the negative side, a majority of teachers were less certain about whether their objectives focused on matters within their control, whether they were fair and reasonable, and whether they had much influence over the objectives chosen. A good deal of research on performance appraisals (Locke and Latham, 2002, Cawley et al 1998) suggests that employee influence on the selection of objectives can be beneficial because it means that the objectives chosen are better informed, and that employees are more likely to take ownership of them. A separate cross-tabulation of questions in Table 7 shows that teachers who felt they had no influence over their objectives were more likely to consider them unfair. Finally, if a performance pay system is to motivate, then employees need to know how their performance will translate into pay progression. The last question in Table 7 suggests that a great many teachers are uncertain on this score, although this may change as the new system becomes established.

Table 7 Teachers' views about their own objective setting meeting for 2013/14
(Row percentages)

	No	To some extent	Yes, definitely
Did the meeting establish specific objectives for the current school year?	1.1	19.2	79.7
Did they relate to the wider objectives in the school, eg., as in the School Improvement Plan or department or team plans?	4.5	26.5	69.0
Did you understand how they will be monitored and reviewed?	9.2	38.9	51.9
Did you have the opportunity to discuss them with your head or team leader?	12.4	32.7	54.9
Did they include indicators of pupil progress?	4.6	13.3	82.2
Were they focused on matters over which you have direct control?	16.1	64.1	19.8
Do you consider them to be fair and reasonable?	23.1	57.3	19.6
Could you influence which objectives were chosen?	27.1	50.8	22.1
Do you know how they will be related to your pay progression?	42.2	29.8	28.0

Notes: Number of responses: 2722-2730 out of 2800 who reported having had

4.2 Effects of appraisal on classroom practice

Turning to the outcomes from appraisals, teachers were asked whether appraisal had led directly to changes in different aspects of their classroom practice, including such items as classroom management, instructional practices, handling student discipline, and focusing on improving student test scores. If appraisal is to improve performance, then one would expect it to work through concrete changes in such practices. One of the key findings of Lavy's (2009) study was to trace a path from the incentive scheme in his sample of Israeli schools through classroom practices to student performance. The list of practices in Table 8 is close to that used in the OECD's TALIS international study of schools to enable future comparisons (OECD, 2010). The great majority of teachers reported either no change or a small change, suggesting that objective setting and appraisal are not widely used to address these questions, or if they are, the effect is relatively small. It is possible that pre-Threshold teachers would benefit more from such advice than experienced teachers such as those on the Upper Pay Scale. However, a first test cross-tabulating each of the practices in Table 8 with whether or not a teacher was on the Upper Pay Scale showed there were no statistically significant differences.

Table 8 Teachers' views on how appraisal and objective setting at their school has changed various aspects of their teaching.
(Row percentages)

	No change	A small change	A moderate change	A large change	Not applicable
Your classroom management practices	46.4	22.3	18.9	8.4	4.0
Your knowledge and understanding of your main area or subject field	65.6	14.5	11.2	4.8	3.9
Your knowledge and understanding of instructional practices in your area	58.3	18.6	13.7	4.4	5.0
Your development or training plan to improve your teaching	49.7	24.2	15.7	6.1	4.2
Your handling of student discipline and behaviour problems	73.3	11.9	6.9	3.3	4.6
Your teaching of students with special learning needs	65.3	16.1	8.9	4.4	5.2
Your teaching students in a multicultural setting	76.7	5.7	3.3	1.2	13.1
The emphasis you place on improving student test scores in your teaching	29.2	15.2	19.7	30.9	5.0

Notes: Question: Has the process of appraisal and objective setting at this school directly led to, or involved, changes in any of the following aspects of your teaching? Number of responses: 3124-3136.

4.3 Does appraisal address the factors underlying differences in teaching effectiveness

A second test of how effective a link appraisal and objective setting could establish between pay and performance is to consider how appraisal deals with the reasons attributed to variations in teaching effectiveness (Table 1 Q12). Providing support to less effective teachers is one way in which schools can raise their overall performance. The results of the current survey are shown in Table 9 for both classroom and head teachers. They are broadly similar between the two groups and for 2000 and 2014. The main difference is that classroom teachers place more emphasis on workload difficulties. This may be because head teachers have a more synoptic view of the link between workload and effectiveness than classroom teachers especially in large schools. Another possible factor is the current level of concern among teachers about workloads (see Table 3 above).

As in 2000, differences in teaching skills and in the ability to motivate their pupils are among the most important reasons, and so one might think that improved professional development would be the most suitable remedy. The ability to motivate pupils in most cases would seem also to be a skill that can be learned. Morale and motivation are often somewhat diffuse issues that need to be explored in order to find remedies, as is often the case with workload problems. Thus, these would seem to be issues for which financial incentives may have an indirect effect,

but the appraisal and objective setting meetings would seem necessary in order to give them focus.

Table 9 Reasons given for differences in teaching effectiveness among experienced teachers in their school *(column percentages)*

	Classroom teachers			Head teachers	
	Main reason 2014	Second reason 2014	*Main reason 2000*	Main reason 2014	*Main reason 2000*
Differences in teaching skills	24.4	18.8	*23.5*	50	*44*
Differences in motivation and morale	28.7	28.8	*31.5*	19	*24*
Differences in age	2.1	5.1	*1.4*	1	*1*
Differences in the ability to motivate pupils	9.9	16.6	*21.3*	18	*18*
Difficult workload	32.8	25.3	*12.8*	5	*6*
Other	2.2	-	*5.9*	7	*7*
Multiple reasons			*3.6*		
N	2853	2644	*3055*	95	*260*

Source: 2000 and 2014 surveys

To explore the issues addressed by appraisals and objective setting, head teachers and classroom teachers and who had carried out appraisals were asked how appraisal had addressed a number of issues, including those teachers thought related to teaching effectiveness (Table 10). Both groups think that they contribute to teaching effectiveness by means of professional development, imparting a sharper focus on work priorities, and relating them to those of their school. Both groups also thought that the reviews provide an

Table 10 Appraiser and head teacher views on how appraisal has helped in their school

	APPRAISERS (Classroom teachers)			Head Teachers		
	No	Hard to say	Yes	No	Hard to say	Yes
Appraisals help:						
More systematic focus on work priorities	26.2	22.6	51.2	7.7	21.2	71.2
Opportunity to discuss poor performance	23.4	20.0	56.6	18.8	20.0	64.7
Address problems of teacher morale or motivation	55.3	20.6	24.2	45.4	23.7	30.9
Identify and resolve difficult workload issues	65.5	16.4	18.1		Na	
Teachers with difficulty motivating students	48.1	27.1	24.8	47.7	31.1	21.2
With professional development needs		na		15.1	17.0	68.0
With difficult workloads		Na		46.4	33.1	20.5

Notes: respondents: Classroom teachers 944, Head teachers: 170

opportunity to discuss issues related to poor performance, and help identify teachers professional development needs. In contrast, most appraisers thought that reviews did not help them to address problems of teacher motivation and morale, difficulty to motivate students,

and workload. It is perhaps a reflection of this that only one fifth thought reviews represented good value for money in terms of the time invested in them.

In summary, while the appraisal process appears to do well on the elements specified in regulations, it appears to do less well, according to teachers, on the supportive elements, and according to appraisers, it appears to provide only limited help in tackling some of the sources of less effective teaching. It also appeared to score modestly on stimulating changes in classroom practices that might lead to improved teaching, with the notable exception of a greater emphasis on improving students' test scores.

5. Work priorities and teachers' use of non-directed hours

One of the aims of appraisal and objective setting, backed up by performance pay, is to facilitate alignment of teachers' classroom objectives with those of their schools. Clearly, no school relies exclusively on appraisal to achieve this, and there are many other occasions when teachers and team leaders work together on objectives, but the justification of appraisal related pay progression is that it should support this process. Such discussions are particularly important in occupations where employees are relied upon to exercise a good deal of discretion in their jobs, as this relies on agreed priorities. One notable area of work discretion in schools concerns teachers' non-directed hours. These relate to non-timetabled activities which are a required part of a teacher's job, and because time allocation depends on a teacher's discretion it will reflect their work priorities. Thus, an increased emphasis on student results might lead teachers to allocate more of their discretionary time to lesson preparation, whereas if the emphasis were on subject knowledge or instructional techniques they might allocate more time to professional development. To explore this question more fully, we shall need to await the findings of the second wave of this study, after performance pay has been fully introduced. Nevertheless, preliminary results from the first wave illustrate the potential for change in teachers' working time allocation.

Among respondents, the median full-time teacher worked 18 hours a week of non-directed time. This was spread across a number of activities, ranging from lesson preparation through to individual professional development (Table 11). With some allowance for answers based on memory, it is clear that more than half of non-directed time is used for lesson preparation and student feedback, followed by administration and meetings, as indeed it was in the 2000 survey. These are averages for all teachers, and there are variations: for example more

experienced teachers need to do less preparation, but they also spend more time on leadership activities.

Respondents were asked to select the two main reasons for undertaking these activities (Table 12). Giving a high quality of education is prominent among the replies in both 2014 and 2000, especially for lesson preparation and seeing parents and pupils. This is consistent with the large numbers reporting that the sense of achievement and other intrinsic aspects of their work attracted them to teaching. Signs of work pressure are also apparent: 'getting the work done' for preparation and administrative activities. There also appears to be a subtle change from 2000 in terms of management direction becoming more prominent for meetings, administration and professional development in 2014 compared with benefiting the school and quality of education in 2000. In 2000, the performance review system was in the process of being set up, and so did not figure among the reasons for use of non-directed time. However, in 2014, meeting objectives of the performance review had become the most important reason cited for individual professional development, displacing the more diffuse and less directed idea of 'quality of education'.

Table 11. Distribution of non-directed time across different activities.

Non-directed activity	Percent of non-directed time 2014	% non-directed time 2000
Lesson preparation and marking (including report writing, pupil records, etc)	54.8%	54
General administrative tasks (e.g organising resources, general record-keeping, photocopying)	16.2%	14
School/staff management meetings, management activities etc (including appraising staff)	11.1%	11
Seeing parents and pupils outside class time (e.g for additional help with work, guidance)	7.7%	10
Involvement in school clubs, sports, orchestras etc.	5.1%	5
Individual & professional development activities (e.g professional reading, courses, conferences, and being trained or being appraised)	5.1%	5
Total %	100	100
Hours (non-directed time)	18.4	17
N	2989	3939

Notes: Data for 2000 from Marsden (2000: Table 3). Percentages of hours computed on the basis of the total hours teachers reported for each activity. Total non-directed hours as reported in the survey returns, and relate to the most recent full teaching week at the time of the survey. Total hours based on full-time teachers. Percentages of time use for full and part-time teachers.

Table 12 Most important reasons for undertaking selected activities outside directed hours

	2014		2000	
	Main reason	Second reason	Main reason	Second reason
Lesson preparation etc.	Quality of education (50%)	Get the work done (22%)	Quality of education	Get the work done
General administrative tasks	Get the work done (47%)	Management pressure (12%)	Get the work done	Benefit the school
School/staff management meetings etc	Management pressure (32%)	Activities occur after school hours (25%)	Management pressure	Benefit the school
Seeing parents and pupils outside class time	Activities occur after school hours (23%)	Quality of education (20%)	Activities occur after school hours	Quality of education & don't want to let down colleagues & students
Involvement in school clubs etc	Activities occur after school hours (22%)	Benefit of my school (19%) & enjoy the work (18%)	Activities occur after school hours	Benefit of my school & enjoy the work
Individual professional development activities	Meet the objectives of my performance review (17%)	Activities occur after school hours (14%)	Quality of education	Activities occur after school hours
Other				

Notes: 2000 data from Marsden (2000 Table 3).

The potential effect of performance management on teachers' work priorities can be illustrated by the introduction of the Threshold in 2000 on how teachers allocated their time between different activities, and notably towards lesson preparation. In 2000, it concentrated the 'prize' for good performance at the top of the old Main Scale, Point 9. [5] With the 2000 reforms, teachers approaching the Threshold had the prospect of moving onto the new Upper Pay Scale. The results of both the CEP study (Marsden and Belfield, 2007), and that of Atkinson et al. (2007), using different methodologies, suggested that the Threshold did have an impact on teachers' work and contributed to improved test results for their students. Atkinson et al emphasised the incentives for individual teachers eligible for the Threshold, whereas Marsden and Belfield highlighted more general improvements in coordinating teachers' and school goals through performance review. These are not mutually exclusive, and the impact can be seen in increased allocation of non-directed time to lesson preparation, that is activities that were likely to be most beneficial for passing the Threshold. At the time, there was much discussion of including measures pupil progress as part of the assessment.

Figure 2 shows that in the run-up to Point 9, where most teachers could apply for the Threshold, there was a moderate increase of about three percentage points to 55.5% of non-directed time. Because many teachers also held responsibility points, the second series shows the percentage of preparation time by scale point excluding responsibility points, and so gives an approximation to what were then called 'experience points' of which there were nine.[6] This

series may also include the effect of points awarded for other types of duties, and it is possible too that some respondents misreported their responsibility points. Nevertheless, with some allowance for potential inaccuracies, both series show that teaching preparation time increased in the run-up to Threshold eligibility in 2000. A separate analysis of total non-directed hours by scale point for both series shows no equivalent increase between points 8 and 9, so one may conclude that the extra time for lesson preparation was diverted from other activities. Teachers were changing their work priorities in response to the Threshold.[7]

The 2012 School Teachers' Pay Review Body took the view that any performance link for the Threshold and indeed of Upper Pay Scale progression had been lost during the subsequent decade. Figure 3 shows the distribution of non-directed time between different activities by scale point in 2014. Although the new provisions for the Threshold give schools greater flexibility as to its timing for individual Main Scale teachers, evidence in Section 7 below suggests that many schools' are starting cautiously, so that widespread use of early Threshold assessment seems unlikely. Therefore, one might have expected to see a similar peak in 2014 to that in 2000, which is not apparent in Figure 3. This may be a result of the considerable uncertainty at the time of the survey about how the new system will operate, as many teachers did not know how their appraisal would relate to pay (see Table 7, last line). Nevertheless, there was also a great deal of uncertainty in 2000 about future operation. The chart may also reflect the STRB's view that the performance link in teachers' pay progression has faded.

Figure 2 Non-directed time (%) on lesson preparation etc. by salary scale point: 2000.



Notes: weighted sample, for wave 1, 2000.

Figure 3 Non-directed time (%) spent on different activities, by salary scale point: 2014.



Apart from the decline in preparation time as teachers progress up the scale, which may be linked to increasing experience, there is an increased proportion of time spent on coordinating activities (meetings), and which include appraisals. The other notable point is the gradual

increase in the share of time devoted to continuous professional development (CPD), once teachers have passed their induction stage at point M1. This is displayed in more detail in Figure 4. A question to be explored later in this research is how far this reflects an emphasis on CPD in appraisals and objective setting: part of the organisational support offered to teachers to help them achieve agreed objectives, mentioned earlier.

Figure 4 Percent of non-directed time spent on CPD activities by salary scale point



6. Overview and interrelationships

So far, a number of facets of performance pay and appraisal have been examined separately. This section seeks to provide a first view of some of the interrelationships. It also provides an opportunity to see how work pressure, which emerged as a major source of dissatisfaction in Table 3, might colour some of the interrelationships between pay, appraisal, and the work environment. For example, it was mentioned that schools may find it difficult to run a good appraisal system in a tense work environment. High workloads could be one factor, reflecting an imbalance between the pressures on some schools and their resources. Their effect is explored using the number of non-directed hours worked as their reporting is unlikely to be biased by views on appraisal and performance pay. High work pressure would make the environment for objective setting and appraisal difficult, and so could underlie the earlier observation of a link between appraisal quality, commitment, and views on performance pay (Table 6 above).[8]

To explore this relationship, the same questions are used as in Table 8 on the experience of performance reviews. They were combined in an index of these two dimensions using factor analysis: whether key procedures were followed and how supportive they were. The responses were divided into those above and below the median: comparing the top 50% and bottom 50% of appraisals in terms of appraisal procedures and supportiveness. The same procedure was used earlier for commitment and intrinsic motivation. Position on the teachers' pay spine was included because that has already been seen to influence attitudes to performance pay. Gender is included because one might expect women teachers to experience greater pressure from family commitments than their male counterparts, and so find performance pay more challenging. Finally, working above median non-directed hours is taken as an indicator of work pressure, and above median percentage of time on CPD activities could be seen as a measure of organisational support provided by schools. A logit regression using all these variables was carried out to show how they relate to the probability of teachers judging PRP either motivational or divisive. The coefficients in the top row show that experiencing the best 50% of appraisal procedures is associated with a 5% increase the likelihood that teachers will be more favourable to PRP, and a 10% reduction in the likelihood that they will find it divisive. The 50% of teachers most committed to their schools are 7% more likely to judge PRP to be motivational, and 4% less likely to judge it divisive.

Turning to the current pay scales, teachers on the Upper Pay Scale appear to be the most sceptical of any motivational benefits of PRP and those most convinced of its divisiveness: 20% less likely to judge it motivational, and 13% more likely to judge it divisive. Despite the competing pressures on women teachers' time, they appear more favourable to PRP than men. In the present very limited analysis, the type of school does not seem to make much difference, whether primary or secondary, and whether or not an academy.

Finally, the 50% of teachers working the most non-directed hours are 8% less likely to judge PRP motivational and 5% more likely to consider it divisive. In a similar regression, in the lower panel of Table 13, teachers working above median non-directed hours were 10% less likely to find objective setting and appraisal supportive. A similar result, not shown in the Table, was found when using the question on teachers' dissatisfaction with their current workloads.

Table 13 Factors associated with more positive motivational, and more negative divisive views of performance pay for teachers (full-time only).

	More favourable to PRP	Significance	PRP is divisive	Significance
Good objective setting procedures	0.053	**	-0.106	****
Commitment to school	0.070	****	-0.043	*
Intrinsic motivation	0.025	-	-0.015	-
Upper Pay Scale	-0.203	****	0.127	***
Main Pay Scale	0.110	*	0.057	-
Unqualified Teacher Scale	0.027	-	0.190	-
Female	0.142	****	-0.048	*
Primary school	-0.006	-	-0.033	-
Above median non-directed hours	-0.076	****	0.053	**
Above median % CPD hours	0.057	**	-0.016	-
N	1863		1883	
Pseudo R2	0.0348		0.0193	
	Good objective setting procedures		Supportive objective setting procedures	
Upper Pay Scale	0.002	-	-0.108	*
Main Pay Scale	-0.123	**	-0.056	-
Female	0.025	-	-0.013	-
Primary school	0.064	***	-0.014	-
Above median non-directed hours	0.028	-	-0.100	****
Above median % CPD hours	0.044	*	0.071	****
N	1942		1948	
Pseudo R2	0.0129		0.0129	

Logit regressions, marginal effects. All judgemental variables coded 1: >median for sample, 0 <= median. Full-time only. Significance levels: 1% ****, 2% ***, 5% ** 10% *, based on robust standard errors.

7. School Leaders' views on performance pay in their schools

One of the aims of the head teacher survey was to find out how schools are adapting to the new pay system. The low number of responses (about 200) means that the results cannot be treated as representative, but they do cover a range of different schools, and so present a good deal of interest. They divide 56:44 between primary and secondary schools, and 41% were local authority maintained and 18% were academies.

School leaders were asked some of the same questions as those put to classroom teachers about the link between pay and performance (Table 14). In many respects, they expressed similar misgivings to classroom teachers, although they were somewhat more positive about performance pay. It was also possible to compare replies for some questions with those posed

before implementation of the Threshold system in 2000. Although schools have run appraisals for nearly 15 years, and had performance progression for the Threshold and the Upper Pay Spine, in principle, many of the misgivings expressed in 2000 remain: in particular concerns about effects on teamwork and tensions with those who do not receive performance increments. With caution because of the small sample, leaders are a little more positive about the link with pay reinforcing the review process, but share of 'disagrees' and 'hard to says' also reveal a wide scepticism among many of them.

Turning to the review process, adding the link with pay progression changes the stakes for both parties in the review process. When bad appraisal ratings and poorly conducted meetings have potential consequences for their pay, employees are more likely to challenge the result. To avoid this situation, management may tighten up the process, to ensure that appraisers prepare well for review meetings, that they have good information, and that they conduct the process fairly. School leaders play a pivotal role in the appraisal and objective setting process: in the sample, 84% either did appraisals themselves or moderated appraisals done by other colleagues. They are therefore the 'expert witnesses' for their schools. They were asked whether they had introduced any changes to their school's objective setting and appraisal reviews, and if so, why, and what they were. Just under half had done so, and of these, 80% were in preparation for the link with pay. Those who had not made changes reported that they thought their system was already sufficiently robust. Among the changes made, the most commonly cited were steps to ensure greater consistency (82%), to improve the identification and support for weak performance (77%), and better links with school-wide objectives (71%). Other common changes were greater use of both test pass rates and classroom observation, as well as greater involvement of senior leaders in objective setting and appraisals. Many heads also gave written-in examples, and their variety gives a flavour of the concrete measures adopted within schools.

School leaders' answers on the weight given to different types of evidence used in appraisals highlights the primary emphasis on classroom observation (75% answered 'a great deal'), and on pupil test scores (50% 'a great deal'). However, there was also emphasis, albeit less, on other factors such as examples of lesson plans, innovations, contributions to teamwork, and continuous professional development.

Table 14 School leaders' views about linking pay to performance in schools
(row percentages)

	Linking pay progression to performance:		Disagree	Neutral	Agree	N
	Fairness and recognition					
1	It is a good principle.	2014	25.54	17.2	57.3	157
		2000	*52.1*	*12.5*	*35.1*	
2	It means that good teaching is properly rewarded.	2014	-	-	-	
		2000	*35.7*	*20.1*	*41.8*	
3	It will result in a fairer allocation of pay.	2014	41.9	22.6	34.8	155
		2000	*40.3*	*28.9*	*28.8*	
	Incentives and retention					
4	It will make everyone take the performance review more seriously.	2014	26.0	11.0	63.0	154
		2000	*25.9*	*17.6*	*55.2*	
5	It will help schools motivate teachers who are 'coasting'	2014	29.7	32.3	38.1	155
		2000	-	-	-	
6	It will give teachers greater incentive to focus on pupil attainments	2014	30.3	25.8	43.9	155
		2000	*36.2*	*27.3*	*36.6*	
	Perceptions on delivery					
7	The link is problematic because it is hard to relate the work done in schools to individual performance.	2014	28.4	12.3	59.4	155
		2000	*10.6*	*11.6*	*77.3*	
8	It can do little to raise performance because teachers already work as hard as they possible can.	2014	38.1	23.9	38.1	155
		2000	*30.9*	*19.7*	*58.0*	
9	It will cause jealousies among teachers who get less pay progression than other teachers in their school.	2014	13.5	37.4	49.1	155
		2000	*7.9*	*15.7*	*76.7*	
	Pupil performance and effective teaching					
10	It is good that individual teachers' pay should take some account of pupil performance.	2014	14.3	12.3	73.3	154
		2000	*46.3*	*16.7*	*36.7*	
11	Teachers who do their jobs well make a real difference to their pupils' learning.	2014	0.6	0.0	99.4	176
		2000	*0.4*	*0.5*	*99.1*	
12	There is significant variation in teaching effectiveness among experienced teachers in my school.	2014	41.6	4.5	53.9	178
		2000	*42.6*	*11.5*	*45.3*	

The new system gives schools a greater margin of freedom as to how they link pay progression and appraisal. During interviews with various stakeholders, the author was told that schools were likely to be cautious in the first year. Given the annual cycle of performance review in most schools, pay for achieving objectives in the current year is arguably the simplest adaptation, and that would explain why half of the respondents cited this option (Table 15). However, given budgetary pressures, and the limited number of points on the former pay scale, one can understand why some schools would look at sustained performance over several years.

The CEP's earlier work on performance pay in the administrative public services revealed a widespread perception among employees that those who received performance payments were either more able or more adept at negotiating easy objectives (Marsden and French, 1998). Either way, there was a perception that performance pay would always go to the same group of employees. The questionnaire therefore asked whether schools anticipated using a more sophisticated approach, for example, linking pay to exceeding objectives, to achieving more challenging objectives, particular workloads, or to making greater progress towards some objectives than others. In this small sample, it seems that for the moment schools are proceeding cautiously.

Table 15 How schools propose to link pay progression to performance: *(row percentages)*

		Pay progression for performance:			
	No (4)	in the CURRENT YEAR (5) only	sustained over SEVERAL YEARS (6) only	in current year AND sustained	N
Pay for achieving objectives	21.3	51.6	20.0	7.1	155
Pay for exceeding objectives only	80.9	9.6	8.8	0.7	136
Greater pay for more challenging objectives	74.1	12.2	13.0	0.7	139
Pay for above average progress towards their objectives even if some are missed	50.4	36.7	9.3	3.6	139
Pay for exceptional workloads (e.g, piloting a new reform, covering for a long-term sick colleague)	59.7	31.6	6.5	2.2	139
Other	85.2	3.7	3.7	7.4	27

Q6.1 How will your school link teachers' pay progression to performance appraisal for the current school year? N=155.

As for the manner of the link with pay, 90% of school leaders answered that their schools would continue to award whole points based on the former scale, and just under 85% planned to award increases on the same basis on the Main and the Upper Pay Scales. In difficult budgetary times, one might expect schools to want to award a larger number of fractional points, and about one sixth of schools were planning to do this. Finally, again given budgetary pressures, the survey asked whether schools would like, if allowed by pay regulations, to award one-off, non-consolidated, increases for exceptional performance, and about half replied that they would.

8. Conclusions

The results reported here are for the first wave of a planned multi-year study of performance related pay progression for teachers in England and Wales, and this analysis needs to be

completed by linking the replies to additional data about schools from other sources. Therefore, any conclusions must be provisional.

One of the head teacher respondents (#120) expressed the fear that the motivational effect of performance pay could be outweighed by the risks of demotivation on non-payment. There is prima facie evidence among the teachers' replies that those at the top of the old Main Scale and the Upper Pay Scale may be experiencing just this. An areas of potential demotivation can be seen in the drop in positive judgements about linking pay to performance among those on the old point M6 who would, a year ago, have been eligible for Threshold Assessment under the old rules (Figure 1). Likewise, another potential area of loss of motivation can be seen in the increase in perceived divisiveness among those at the top of the Upper Pay Scale.

One of the big puzzles about performance management in schools in England and Wales is what happened to the scheme introduced in 2000. CEP research found evidence of a gradual but progressive improvement in objective setting and appraisal between 2000 and 2004, and that where this occurred, there was some evidence that school exam performance had also improved relative to other schools (Marsden and Belfield, 2007). Finer grain research by Atkinson et al (2009) found that teachers who were eligible for the Threshold improved the test performance of their students. Evidence shown in this paper, also suggests that teachers at the Threshold in 2000 had increased the share of their non-directed time towards lesson preparation. Yet, when the 2012 STRB reported, it could find little evidence of any effective link with performance. The distribution of non-directed time reported in 2014, albeit with caveats, appears to show no clear sign that non-directed time is being reallocated towards lesson preparation at any of the crucial points for teachers' career advancement, notably the Threshold. As in 2000, teachers' judgements about the motivating and divisive aspects of performance pay appear remarkably similar to those of 2000. Many of the same concerns remain about possible damage to team-working, potential favouritism, and even more this time, lack of money to fund performance increments. Both classroom and head teachers pointed out that increased performance in schools does not bring increased revenue to pay for it, which means that schools have either to make teachers who perform well wait their turn for pay progression, or they have to find the money from other sources, with some higher paid older teachers fearing this could be at their expense. As the study progresses, it may find that schools use the new flexibility over pay in constructive ways that avoid this dilemma. For example, some head teacher respondents mentioned an interest in one-off, non-consolidated payments.

The initial effect of the Threshold in 2000 also invites other interpretations. At the time, it was often seen as a form of performance related pay, but it was also a gateway to a higher status in schools, a form of promotion. Its initial intent, as stressed in a number of government papers at the time was to increase the scope for teachers to improve their rewards while remaining in the classroom rather than taking on managerial or other duties. Thus, one could interpret the extra time devoted to lesson preparation among those eligible for the Threshold in 2000 as preparing for promotion instead of responding to performance pay. One head teacher respondent mentioned self-determination theory as a guide to understanding motivation in schools (#34). The difference between promotion and performance pay is that whereas the former is chosen by employees, the latter is often imposed upon them.

Another feature of the period in 2000 was that teachers' pay had fallen behind, and many schools faced serious problems of recruitment and retention. Then, teachers on Point 9 were earning less than average white collar pay. The Threshold pay rise would change this, and so many schools were faced with a dilemma: did they implement the assessment as it was intended by the then government; or did they get their teachers fill in the forms and to do what was necessary to apply for the extra money. Unfilled vacancies trump considerations about performance. The findings of the earlier CEP study suggest that many schools only began to look at performance more seriously once retention had been dealt with.

The status quo on rewards for teachers is not ideal. Nearly 30% of teachers are bunched at the top of the Upper Pay Scale with no scope for further pay progression, with or without performance, and a further 15% are bunched at the top of the old Main Scale (see Appendix). For many of those at the top of the Upper Scale, seniority progression ceased several years ago, and there is the possibility that some of those at the top of the old Main Scale will remain there. This creates a potentially difficult situation in which a large percentage of teachers will not benefit from the new system, but it is also one for which schools can use it neither as an incentive nor as a reward. The STRB judged that the performance element in pay progression had been lost since 2000, but did not comment on why this had occurred. One risk with the current imbalance of eligibility is that it will create an environment in which it is difficult to establish a link between appraisal and pay progression, and this may imprint on how the new scheme will operate in the future. How this is resolved may depend on how schools use their new flexibility over pay to redesign, something this research hopes to explore in more detail in the future.

On a more positive side, this survey's results suggest that the practice of performance reviews and objective setting has taken root, and consolidated over time. Although the survey so far has highlighted some of its limitations, the results in Table 7 show that many teachers experience a reasonable degree of peer support and dialogue over their work objectives and how they relate to those of their schools. It was also notable that when schools offer support, such as time for CPD, teachers are likely to respond more positively about appraisal and performance pay progression.

Objective setting and appraisal are less catchy themes than pay for performance. However, given the complexity of teachers' work and the level of job discretion they enjoy, it seems unlikely that any simple formulaic approach to performance and pay will work. This means that for the foreseeable future, any link to pay will depend upon the review process, how it is used to link teachers' individual work priorities to those of their schools, and how it can be used to foster a dialogue between teachers and school leaders so that objectives are well-informed and felt to be fair. This process can take place without pay being linked to it. Indeed, if the STRB was correct about the link between performance and pay progression fading, the consolidation of appraisal over the years since 2000 suggests that the two policies can be considered independently. The link with pay may make people take them more seriously, but as with all policies, one has to consider the benefits of alternatives. In a previous project, the LSE researchers interviewed the Human Resource Directors of two similar NHS hospital trusts. One used a hospital-wide bonus, and the other, individual performance pay.[9] The first believed strongly that linking pay to appraisal would contaminate appraisals. The second believed equally strongly that the link with pay was needed to make line managers take appraisal seriously.

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10. Endnotes

[1] There had been a long period of performance for school teachers in England and Wales between 1863 and 1890, when it was abandoned (Nelson, 1987, Jabar 2013). I am grateful to Peter Dolton for this information.

[2] This view is challenged on the ground that school leaders will only propose colleagues for the Threshold if they believe they have a good chance of success. This point was put to the STRB, but there is no easy way to assess how far this changes the situation.

[3] On passing the Threshold, teachers would gain a £2000 pay increase combined with the scope for further progression on the then new Upper Pay Scale.

[4] The trust questions were Q9.4 in the questionnaire and comprise four questions about school leaders: Can they be relied upon to keep their promises (1), Are they sincere in attempting to understand classroom teachers' views (2), Do they understand about staff having to meet responsibilities outside work (3), and Treat staff fairly (4). The PRP questions were from Q7.1, and comprised: It is a good principle (1), It means that good teaching is properly rewarded (2), It will result in a fairer allocation of pay (3), It makes it more attractive for me to remain a teacher (4), The size of payments is too small to make me want to work harder to get them (5), It will cause resentment among teachers who feel they perform well but do not receive an award (6), It will have no effect on the quality of my work because it is already at the appropriate standard (7), It will give me a real incentive to improve/sustain the quality of my teaching (8), It will make me take the objectives of my performance review more seriously (9), Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt if my school can afford to reward me with a pay rise (10), The link is problematic because it is hard to relate the work done in schools to individual performance (11), Leaders will use performance pay to reward their favourites (12), It is good that individual teachers' pay should take some account of pupil performance (13), For all that is said about improving teaching quality, the new pay system is simply a device to get more work done (14). In case these results were affected by

PRP divisiveness questions being too closely related to those on trust, the same analysis was done using only those that asked positive questions about the link with pay. The results were the same to within on percentage point.

[5] Up until 2000, advancement by experience points ran out at Point 9, and further advancement depended on taking on additional responsibilities, responsibility points, and on points awarded for other qualification or job demands. Up to 2000, the teachers' scale included 9 experience points, 5 for responsibility, 3 for recruitment and retention, and for excellence, and 2 for qualifications and for SEN (STRB 1999, Table 13).

[6] In fact, the great majority of responsibility points were awarded to teachers who already had nine experience points.

[7] By use of regression it is possible to look at the figures in Figure 2 while controlling for other factors, and in 2000, notably school effects. These regressions confirmed that points 8 and 9 were indeed associated with higher percentages of time assigned to preparation, and shows that they were statistically significantly different from other points on the scale.

[8] At this stage of the research it not possible to say with any certainty whether such pressure relates to individual teachers or their schools as a whole.

[9] Marsden and French, (1998).

11. Appendix 1: Survey methods and sample characteristics

The survey was carried out electronically, using Qualtrix, a secure method designed for ease of use and protection of respondent data. Contact with teachers inviting them to complete the survey was made by email by the teachers' professional associations to a sample of their members, and to most head teachers by newsletter from their associations informing them of the link. All communications stressed the value of the survey, and that identities of respondents and their schools would remain strictly confidential. They survey went live at the end of January 2014, and closed three months later. It was timed to take place before teachers would know the results of their first appraisals under the new system.

The contents of the questionnaires were discussed with the professional associations and at meetings with their members. They were also discussed with the National Governors' Association, and the Local Government Association which represents local authority employers, and with the Department for Education in London. At all times, it was stressed that the project is independent academic research, but results would be discussed with the stakeholder organisations.

Where possible, respondents' gender, age, salary scale point and type of school are compared below with equivalent data from the School Workforce Census for 2012 (England).
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/school-workforce-in-england-november-2012
The survey response was higher in secondary than in primary schools, and higher among older teachers on higher salary scale points, and especially among those on the Upper Pay Spine.

Classroom teachers: demographic characteristics

Gender	%	School work-force census 2012 (%)		**Years a teacher**	%
Female	71.1	75		Less than 1 year	2.1
Male	28.9	25		1-2 years	3.4
Total %	100	100		3-4 years	7.3
N	2876			5-9 years	22.8
Employment status				10-19 years	35.5
				20 or more years	28.9
Full-time	81.8	76		Total %	100
Part-time	18.2	24		N	2876
Total %	100	100			
N	2875				
Age	%			**Years at the present school**	%
Under 25 years	2.4	6		Less than 1 year	11.0
25-29	10.0	18		1-2 years	11.4
30-34	12.7	17		3-4 years	15.0
35-39	13.3	14		5-9 years	28.8
40-44	15.7	13		10 or more years	33.8
45-49	16.0	11		Total %	100
50-54	15.1	10		N	2873
55-59	11.4	9			
60 and above	3.4	2			
Total %	100	100			
N (complete replies)	2883				

Pay spine	Survey 2014 %	School workforce census 2012 (%)
Leadership scale	4.2	-
Upper Pay Scale	65.5	49.8
Main Pay Scale	28.8	41.2
Unqualified Teachers Scale	0.5	-
Other	0.9	9.0
Total %	100	100
N	2865	
Salary Scale Point	%	
UQT	0.53	
M1	2.47	7
M2	2.64	6
M3	4.02	6
M4	3.56	5
M5	4.09	5
M6	12.29	15
U1	11.55	15
U2	11.38	11
U3	36.03	29
U>3	7.19	
L1-2	0.42	
L3-5	0.85	
L>5	2.99	
Total	100.00	100
N	2839	

School type and status

	Survey 2014		School workforce census 2012
School type	Classroom teachers	School leaders	Classroom teachers
	%	%	%
Primary	37.7	55.6	48.7
Secondary	53.8	43.5	47.7
Sixth Form College	3.0	0.8	-
Special School	5.5	-	3.6
Total	100.0	100	100
	2332	124	
School status	Classroom teachers	School leaders	Classroom teachers
	%	%	
Local Authority Maintained	16.0	41.2	70.5*
Academy	68.1	18.5	26.6
Other	15.9	40.3	2.9
Total	100.0	100	100
	1284	119	

*Note many schools became academies after 2012. Note: non-response was higher for the questions about teachers' schools.

12. Appendix 2: teachers' questionnaire and summary of results

Appendix: LSE Teachers survey questionnaire and summary of replies

Note: Replies received by 19.5.2104, unweighted totals.

Q2.1 How satisfied are you with the following aspects of your job?

	Very Dissatisfied (1)	Dissatisfied (2)	Neutral (3)	Satisfied (4)	Very Satisfied (5)	Total %	N
The sense of achievement you get from your work (1)	4.6	14.2	13.0	50.4	17.9	100	3464
The scope for using your own initiative (2)	5.8	19.0	16.4	44.7	14.1	100	3458
The amount of influence you have over your job (3)	12.9	30.5	21.8	29.6	5.2	100	3462
The training you receive (4)	12.9	29.2	26.1	26.6	5.3	100	3463
The opportunity to develop your skills in your job (5)	10.4	25.8	24.9	31.8	7.0	100	3460
The amount of pay you receive (6)	10.4	29.2	26.4	30.6	3.4	100	3460
Your job security (7)	10.9	20.4	24.1	36.3	8.3	100	3463
Your current workload (8)	44.9	33.3	12.9	8.3	0.7	100	3463

Q2.2 In terms of what attracts you to teaching, what are the three most important sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction for you?

	SATIS-FACTION (1) % clicked	DISSATIS-FACTION (2) % clicked	N
The sense of achievement you get from your work (1)	92.7	8.9	3140
The scope for using your own initiative (2)	79.1	22.5	2325
The amount of influence you have over your job (3)	39.2	62.4	2098
The training you receive (4)	27.3	73.0	1458
The opportunity to develop your skills in your job (5)	64.1	37.1	1640
The amount of pay you receive (6)	38.3	63.2	2129
Your job security (7)	59.7	41.5	2080
Your current workload (8)	7.0	94.0	2667
Other (9) (write in)	27.8	73.5	1004

Note: % based on 1 and 0 not including -99s

Written-in responses (689 replies)

Q3.1 I should like to ask you about the objectives set in your performance review for the current school year.
Because arrangements differ between England and Wales, please say where your school is located:

- England (1) 3091
- Wales (2) 243
- Skipped 85
- Missing 1003
- Total 4422

Q3.2 I should like to ask you about the objectives set in your performance review for the current school year:

	Yes (1)	No (2)	Not applicable (3)	Total %	N
Have you already had an objective setting meeting for the current school year? (1)	84.3	11.4	4.3	100	3326

Q3.3 Please tell me about the objectives established at your review meeting:

	No (1)	To some extent (2)	Yes, defin-itely (3)	Total %	N
Did the meeting establish specific objectives for the current school year? (1)	1.1	19.2	79.7	100	2732
Were they focused on matters over which you have direct control? (2)	16.1	64.1	19.8	100	2729
Did they relate to the wider objectives in the school, eg., as in the School Improvement Plan or department or team plans? (3)	4.5	26.5	69.0	100	2730
Did they take account of your professional needs? (4)	35.5	45.3	19.2	100	2729
Did they include indicators of pupil progress? (5)	4.6	13.3	82.2	100	2728
Did you understand how they will be monitored and reviewed? (6)	9.2	38.9	51.9	100	2726
Did you have the opportunity to discuss them with your head or team leader? (7)	12.4	32.7	54.9	100	2728
Could you influence which objectives were chosen? (8)	27.1	50.8	22.1	100	2728
Are you in a position to achieve them? (9)	12.3	67.2	20.5	100	2728
Do you consider them to be fair and reasonable? (10)	23.1	57.3	19.6	100	2722
Do you know how they will be related to your pay progression? (11)	42.2	29.8	28.0	100	2723

Q3.4 How many objectives were recorded?

1 to 3 (1)	73.7
4 to 5 (2)	21.3
More than 5 (3)	4.9
Total %	100
N	2699

Q3.5 Are your objectives very similar to those for 2012/13? Please answer 'not applicable' if for example you only joined your current school this year.

	Yes (1)	No (2)	Not applicable (3)	Total %	N
Are your objectives very similar to those for 2012/13? (1)	46.2	42.3	11.5	100	2715

If No Is Selected
Q3.6 If they are different, would you like to give an example?

795 written-in replies

Q4.1 Could you please tell me about the feedback you received on your past year's work at your performance review? Please answer 'not applicable' if for example you only joined your current school this year.

	Yes (1)	No (2)	Not applic-able (3)	Total %	n
Did you receive feedback from your appraiser on your last year's performance? (2)	61.8	23.3	14.9	100	3272

If Yes Is Selected
Q4.2 Did this feedback:

	No (1)	To some extent (2)	Yes, definitely (3)	Total %	N
Give clear reasons for the assessment? (1)	13.9	46.9	39.2	100	1990
Help you identify areas for your further professional development? (2)	32.9	43.8	23.3	100	1995
Refer to evidence that you have met the objectives agreed in your previous performance review? (3)	10.1	36.5	53.4	100	1989
Refer to evidence based on classroom observation? (4)	16.3	31.9	51.8	100	1991
Include a recommendation on pay, if you are on the Upper Pay Scale? (5)	72.3	8.6	19.1	100	1896

Q4.3 Please tell me how supportive you found your recent appraisal and objective setting meetings

	Disagree strongly (1)	Disagree (2)	Hard to say (3)	Agree (4)	Agree strongly (5)	Total %	N
They enable me to discuss how my own work priorities fit with those of my school (1)	12.3	23.5	23.4	35.2	5.6	100	1953
They make school leaders better informed about the demands of my job (2)	25.2	35.9	20.5	15.8	3.6	100	1952
I was able to discuss what I want to achieve in my job with school leaders (3)	17.8	27.1	16.5	32.2	6.5	100	1951
I could have a frank and open discussion about how to improve/ sustain my performance (4)	15.8	25.1	18.4	32.7	8.1	100	1950
The discussions make more confident to try out new ideas in my teaching (5)	23.1	34.8	23.3	15.4	3.5	100	1952

Q4.4 Has the process of appraisal and objective setting at this school directly led to, or involved, changes in any of the following aspects of your teaching?

	No change (1)	A small change (2)	A moderate change (3)	A large change (4)	Not applicable (5)	Total %	N
Your classroom management practices (1)	46.4	22.3	18.9	8.4	4.0	100	3134
Your knowledge and understanding of your main area or subject field (2)	65.6	14.5	11.2	4.8	3.9	100	3131
Your knowledge and understanding of instructional practices in your area (3)	58.3	18.6	13.7	4.4	5.0	100	3124
Your development or training plan to improve your teaching (4)	49.7	24.2	15.7	6.1	4.2	100	3136
Your teaching of students with special learning needs (5)	65.3	16.1	8.9	4.4	5.2	100	3135
Your handling of student discipline and behaviour problems (6)	73.3	11.9	6.9	3.3	4.6	100	3136
Your teaching students in a multicultural setting (7)	76.7	5.7	3.3	1.2	13.1	100	3132
The emphasis you place on improving student test scores in your teaching (8)	29.2	15.2	19.7	30.9	5.0	100	3134

Q4.5 In the last three years, have you tried any new ideas that have helped you teach better? (excluding national initiatives)

	Yes (1)	No (2)	Total %	N
Have you tried any new ideas? (1)	93.0	7.0	100	3120

If this was the result of your own or a group initiative, would you like to give an example?
906 written-in answers

Q4.6 Were these new ideas something that you undertook:

	Yourself, at your own initiative? (1)	As a group initiative with a small number of your colleagues ? (3)	As the result of a management proposal or decision? (2)	As the result of discussion at a perform-ance review? (4)	Other (5)	Total %	N
Please select the most appropriate description (1)	47.7	23.4	21.1	3.4	4.4	100	2879

Q5.1 I should like to ask your views about performance among teachers in your school

	Disagree strongly (1)	Disagree (2)	Hard to say (3)	Agree (4)	Agree strongly (5)	Total %	N
Teachers who do their jobs well make a real difference to their pupils' learning (1)	0.4	1.0	7.1	35.1	56.4	100	3092
There is significant variation in teaching effectiveness among experienced teachers in my school. (2)	3.1	15.1	27.0	35.7	19.1	100	3084

If you answered 'agree' or 'agree strongly' to question Q5.1, please answer Q5.2:

Q5.2 In your school, what do you believe are the two most common causes?

	Differences in levels of teaching skills (1)	Differences in motivation or morale (2)	Differences in age (3)	Ability to motivate their pupils (4)	Some teachers have a very difficult workload / group of students (5)	Other (6)	Total %	N
Most common cause (1)	24.4	28.7	2.1	9.9	32.8	2.2	100	2853
Second most common cause (2)	18.8	28.9	5.1	16.6	25.3	5.4	100	2644

Q6.1 In your most recent full week of teaching, approximately how many hours did you spend working outside directed hours such as in the evenings, before the school day and at weekends?

Non-directed hours	Mean	Standard deviation	N
Full-time	19.5	9.7	2341
Part-time	14.2	7.3	504
All	18.5	9.6	2845

Q6.2 If this was NOT a typical week, did you work:

	More hours than usual (1)	Less hours than usual (2)	Total %	N
Did you work:? (1)	37.2%	62.8%	100	999
	Hours	Hours		
Average hours: FT	21.0	17.4		
Average hours PT	14.5	13.2		

Q6.3 Considering the two most recent school weeks (excluding holidays and INSET days), roughly how many hours per week have you spent on each of the following activities outside directed hours such as in the evenings. before the school day and at weekends?

	Please answer to the nearest whole hour (1)
Lesson preparation and marking (including report writing, pupil records, etc) (1)	54.8%
Seeing parents and pupils outside class time (e.g for additional help with work, guidance) (2)	7.7%
Involvement in school clubs, sports, orchestras etc. (3)	5.1%
School/staff management meetings, management activities etc (including appraising staff) (4)	11.1%
General administrative tasks (e.g organising resources, general record-keeping, photocopying) (5)	16.2%
Individual & professional development activities (e.g professional reading, courses, conferences, and being trained or being appraised) (6)	5.1%
Total %	100
Hours (non-directed time)	18.4
N	2989

Q6.4 What was the most important reason for undertaking these activities outside directed hours? The drop-down menus list some common reasons why teachers work such hours. Please select the one that best describes your position:

(Activities appear in the columns, and the reasons for undertaking them, in the rows: column percentages)

	Lesson preparation etc. (1)	Seeing parents and pupils outside class time (2)	Involvement in school clubs etc (3)	School/staff management meetings etc (4)	General administrative tasks (5)	Individual professional development activities (6)
- I wanted to get the work done (1)	21.9	4.2	1.0	4.1	46.9	7.1
- I felt under pressure from management (2)	9.1	8.4	13.9	31.8	11.8	8.1
- To meet the objectives of my performance review (3)	1.6	2.4	3.5	5.6	1.6	16.8
- It is the only way to give high quality education to my pupils (4)	50.1	20.3	6.5	2.1	18.1	12.9
- I had taken on extra responsibilities because I need the money (5)	0.3	0.7	1.0	2.2	0.6	1.2
- I enjoy the work (6)	0.8	2.3	18.3	0.1	0.3	13.5
- I do it for the benefit of my school (7)	1.1	12.8	18.8	14.2	3.7	7.0
- I don't want to let down my colleagues or my pupils (8)	10.5	17.5	5.6	5.0	7.2	3.1
- The activities are available only outside formal school hours (9)	3.1	22.6	21.5	24.7	6.3	14.1
Other (10)	1.5	8.7	9.9	10.3	3.5	16.2
N	2939	2359	1726	2533	2772	1913

Q7.1 I should like to ask your views about linking pay progression to the performance review:

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)	Total %	N
It is a good principle (1)	34.4	25.3	16.8	21.2	2.3	100	2949
It means that good teaching is properly rewarded (2)	31.8	32.6	14.0	18.9	2.7	100	2949
It will result in a fairer allocation of pay (3)	41.6	37.7	12.4	7.0	1.3	100	2941
It makes it more attractive for me to remain a teacher (4)	53.0	29.9	12.1	3.7	1.3	100	2943
The size of payments is too small to make me want to work harder to get them (5)	5.2	9.4	43.2	26.5	15.7	100	2942
It will cause resentment among teachers who feel they perform well but do not receive an award (6)	3.7	2.0	4.5	37.8	52.0	100	2948
It will have no effect on the quality of my work because it is already at the appropriate standard (7)	2.8	4.3	18.8	38.3	35.8	100	2950
It will give me a real incentive to improve/sustain the quality of my teaching (8)	42.7	31.1	18.4	6.5	1.2	100	2947
It will make me take the objectives of my performance review more seriously (9)	29.8	27.3	20.7	18.0	4.2	100	2945
Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt if my school can afford to reward me with a pay rise (10)	2.6	5.6	18.9	32.3	40.5	100	2950
The link is problematic because it is hard to relate the work done in schools to individual performance (11)	1.9	2.7	8.4	32.1	54.9	100	2945
Leaders will use performance pay to reward their favourites (12)	2.7	7.7	20.0	31.8	37.9	100	2938
It is good that individual teachers' pay should take some account of pupil performance (13)	27.5	28.3	21.6	20.5	2.1	100	2942
For all that is said about improving teaching quality, the new pay system is simply a device to get more work done (14)	2.6	4.9	22.0	32.5	38.0	100	2945

Q8.1 To what extent do you agree with the following statements about working in your school?

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)	Total %	N
I share many of the values of my school (1)	2.8	8.5	14.1	54.4	20.2	100	2938
I feel loyal to my school (2)	4.2	8.8	15.3	45.8	25.9	100	2937
I am proud to tell people which school I work for (3)	4.1	8.2	21.6	39.3	26.8	100	2937

Q8.2 How often do you engage in the following activities in your school?

	Never (1)	Some-times (2)	Quite often (3)	Very often (4)	Total %	N
Attend team conferences for the age/subject group I teach (1)	25.3	35.6	23.2	15.9	100	2922
Teach jointly as a team in the same class (2)	58.2	30.7	6.8	4.4	100	2926
Engage in joint activities across difference classes and/or year groups (e.g projects) (3)	31.7	48.5	13.6	6.2	100	2930
Using my own initiative, I carry out tasks that are not required as part of my job (4)	3.5	28.0	33.0	35.5	100	2929

Q9.1 Does your school use any of the following methods to try to produce better academic performance?

	No (1)	Occas-ionally (2)	Regul-arly (3)	Not sure (4)	Total %	N
Learning about educational practices used at comparable schools scoring strongly in school 'league t8ables' (England) or school banding (Wales) (1)	22.5	35.9	24.9	16.8	100	2893
Discussing ways to improve your school's academic performance at group or dept. meetings within your school (2)	5.4	20.8	71.2	2.6	100	2898
Learning about educational practices used at other comparable schools (3)	11.9	48.2	33.2	6.7	100	2901

Q9.2 When important educational targets are, or look likely to be, missed in your school, in your view, which of the following best characterize the response of leaders in your school?

	Leaders consider the problem, and propose a course of action to the school (1)	Consult and then propose a solution (2)	Sit down with the relevant year or subject groups to work our a solution together (3)	Seek to identify the individual teachers who might be responsible (4)	Ignore the problem and hope it will go away (5)	Total %	N
Most common response (3)	55.8	9.5	12.1	18.4	4.2	100	2865
Second most common response (4)	19.1	27.8	20.8	23.9	8.5	100	2686

Q9.3 Overall, how good would you say managers at this school are at:

	Very Bad (1)	Bad (2)	Neither Good nor Bad (3)	Good (4)	Very Good (5)	Total %	N
Seeking the views of classroom teachers or teacher representatives (1)	21.1	27.4	23.6	23.4	4.6	100	2885
Responding to suggestions from classroom teachers or teacher representatives (2)	17.4	29.6	26.7	22.8	3.5	100	2884
Allowing classroom teachers or their representatives to influence final decisions (3)	21.8	32.5	26.8	16.7	2.1	100	2880
Work together with teachers to develop the priorities in the School Improvement Plan (4)	18.8	29.3	28.5	19.3	4.1	100	2877

Q9.4 The leadership group in my school:

	Never (1)	Rarely (2)	Some-times (3)	Most of the Time (4)	Always (5)	Total %	N
Can be relied upon to keep their promises (1)	6.4	18.8	39.6	30.1	5.1	100	2879
Are sincere in attempting to understand classroom teachers' views (2)	11.7	25.6	32.3	22.2	8.2	100	2884
Understand about staff having to meet responsibilities outside work (3)	13.5	24.2	30.0	23.5	8.8	100	2880
Treat staff fairly (4)	6.7	14.8	34.5	35.8	8.2	100	2869

Q10.1 Have you acted as the APPRAISER for one or more of your colleagues at their Performance Review?

Yes (1)	33.3
No (2)	66.7
Total %	100
N	2888

Q10.2 On the basis of your experience as an APPRAISER, would you say that the performance review meetings have helped your school in any of the following ways?

	Not at all (1)	No (2)	Hard to say (3)	Yes (4)	Yes, defin-itely (5)	Total %	N
Relate teachers' objectives to the wider objectives of the school, e.g as in the School Improvement Plan, or that of their department or team? (1)	3.4	8.8	18.6	55.6	13.6	100	944
Link individual teachers' professional development with school objectives? (2)	3.0	10.7	16.3	59.1	10.9	100	944
Provide an opportunity to discuss issues related to poor performance? (3)	3.7	19.7	20.0	49.6	7.0	100	941
Encourage teachers to think more systematically about their own work priorities? (4)	4.0	22.2	22.6	45.3	5.9	100	943
Identify and deal with problems of teacher morale or motivation? (5)	20.9	34.4	20.6	21.0	3.2	100	943
Identify and resolve difficult workload issues? (6)	25.8	39.7	16.4	16.3	1.8	100	940
Help teachers who have difficulty motivating their students? (7)	14.8	33.3	27.1	22.7	2.1	100	942
In terms of staff time, the meetings represent good value for money for my school (8)	16.5	27.8	34.0	18.7	3.0	100	943

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