An English School Analysis of Colonialism, Decolonization and the Emergence of the Post-Colonial States on the Primary Institutions of International Society

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The following work presented is entirely my own. Parts of chapters Two, Five and Six have been republished in open access journal articles: Mellish, J. (2023). UN Resolution 1514: the creation of a new post-colonial sovereignty. Third World Quarterly, 44(6), 1306–1323. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2023.2180355 and Mellish, J. (2024). Returning to Hedley Bull: Necessity as an approach for defining primary institutions. Journal of International Political Theory, 20(1), 41-65. https://doi.org/10.1177/17550882231189755. However the work remains entirely my own and I retain all rights to the content of these articles which are available open source.

Abstract: Between 1945 and 1970 the world shifted from an international society dominated by colonial empires to a global body of nation states. At the same time many of the norms and practices of international society were either being contested or newly created. The United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other cornerstones of the contemporary international order were being founded to codify these new norms. This twenty five year period represented the biggest transition for the norms and practices of International Society for at least a century and created our contemporary international society.

Much of this change was driven by the newly emergent postcolonial world. These new states formed coalitions of interest, represented at the United Nations by bodies such as the Non-Aligned Movement, to try to develop new norms and practices in the interest of the newly emergent post-colonial world. This research seeks to take an English School approach to the study of this transition, and question first what role colonialism played in establishing the pre-1945 world order and then consider how the emergence of the post-colonial states contributed to the creation of the norms of contemporary international society from the previous colonial dominated international order.

The thesis is divided into three parts: the first section of this work situates the wider thesis in the intellectual tradition of the English School. The second section of this work will explore how colonialism functioned as a key organizing principle of international society prior to 1945. Having established the nature of international society in the previous colonial era, the final section of this thesis looks at each of the primary institutions of international society in turn and questions how the emergence of the post-colonial states changed international society from its previous colonial order to our contemporary global international society

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Introduction to Thesis

This thesis seeks to make an original contribution to both the development of English School Theory, and the understanding of colonialism as a set of norms and practices which shaped International Society. Colonialism is a relatively understudied part of the development of the international system by the English School, often relegated to a product of international society's history. A re-interrogation of the importance of colonialism as a practice and empires as a political unit is essential to properly understand the development of international society during the twentieth century, and the legacy it leaves on international politics in the current day. Decolonisation was central to the motivations and objectives of many of the emergent post-colonial states in international society, whose understanding of international politics was (and in part remains) rooted in the colonial experience.

This thesis advances this contribution to the English School and the understanding of colonialism over three sections. Section one further develops key theoretical paradigms of the English School: Chapter one situates the thesis within the ongoing debates in the English School, particularly the positivist pluralist debate, contextualizing the remaining thesis in the context of a positive vision of pluralism for international society. Chapter two provides a reassessment of how Primary Institutions (including colonialism) should be understood. Chapter two argues that Primary Institutions are better understood as a series of interrelated necessary conditions for international order making, the particulars of which develop as a set of historically contingent norms and practices. It then expands these ideas to consider how "domestic primary institutions" which develop between the state and its citizens shape and are shaped by the "international primary institutions" of international society. Chapter three makes the final contribution to the broader framework of English School Theory by drawing out a distinction between the "subjects" and "agents" of international society. This chapter seeks to more concretely distinguish between the individual policy makers of the state and the state as a legal character recognized by international society. This distinction is essential for the better understanding of non-

state actors in international society, who were fundamental to both the process of colonization and decolonization

Section two of this thesis is dedicated to assessing the historical development of colonialism as a set of norms and practice and its centrality to the establishment of the first global international society, as well as the modern European state bureaucracy. This chapter highlights the importance of colonial companies (such as the East India Company) to the formation of the first truly global international society during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This is a significant addition to the current English School understanding of the expansion of international society. Existing literature on the subject has yet to consider the role of colonial companies as private entities separate from the European state. This chapter analyses how the agents of these colonial companies served as the locus for the first interaction between European and Non-European societies, and analyses how the unique position as the agents of private corporations with interests separate from the state had a lasting impact on the development of colonialism and thus the linkages which bound global international society together.

Having constructed an understanding of the importance of colonialism to the development of international society, the final section of this thesis analyses the way in which the post-colonial world attempted to change the primary institutions of international society following their equal recognition as sovereign states in the middle of the twentieth century. Chapter five focuses on the efforts of the post-colonial world to enshrine sovereign equality for the post-colonial states following their emergence from a colonial order which had adopted a hierarchical view of sovereignty based upon a "standard of civilization" which excluded recognition and the protections of international society to the colonial world. This chapter analyses the role of post-colonial leaders in passing UN Resolution 1514, which established a new normative framework both for rights claims and sovereignty demands at the United Nations which would then be normalized through practice within international society as

a new understanding of soveriegnty. Finally, Chapter Six looks at the efforts of the post-colonial states to influence the practice of great power management of international society. This chapter covers the battles for the representation of the People's Republic of China at the UN Security Council, and more broadly the view of China as an "Afro-Asian" Great Power among the post-colonial states during the Cold War. It then looks at the initial reservations held by the post-colonial states in the formation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a form of unequal treaty. The chapter then engages in an analysis of the Pan-National movements that arose following decolonization as an opposition to the great power management of their regions, before concluding with an analysis of the Post-Colonial states attempt to organize for a more equitable distribution of the international political economy.

Section One – The English School Tradition

This section is divided into three chapters and serves as the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis. The first chapter provides an overview of the existing literature and places the work within the debates in the English School. Chapter One first gives an overview of the English School's intellectual history, unique characteristics and methodology. This Chapter then engages with three different approaches to question of the nature of international society; namely international society as a going concern, as an intellectual concept, and as an ideal type. This chapter then outlines the thesis' approach to the nature of primary institutions, the central focus of the thesis' research question, by engaging with the Structuralist vs Interpretivist debate within the English School, opting for a Structuration approach to the development of primary institutions. Answering these two questions places the work within the ongoing debates within the English School as well as outlining the epistemological and ontological commitments the work has to the major analytical concepts being discussed. This chapter then engages with the Pluralist vs Solidarist debate within the school and argues for this work's place as an advancement of a developing "Positive Pluralist" tendency within the English School. Finally with these preliminary areas unpacked, this chapter concludes with an overview of the existing English School writing on colonialism as a primary institution of international society. This chapter not only grounds the work in the ongoing tradition and debates of the English school, it also provides a space for a reflexive analysis of the premises of its intellectual tradition that will inform the empirical and interpretive work on colonialism and decolonization to follow.

With the existing literature outlined, Chapter Two seeks to develop this thesis' perspective on the nature of primary institutions. To properly analyse the role of Colonialism as a primary institution and how the Post-Colonial world shifted the primary institutions of international society, we must first put the concept of primary institutions itself under scrutiny. As such Chapter Two outlines my argument

on the nature of primary institutions. This chapter synthesises the Structuralist ideas of Bull who conceived of primary institutions as those norms and practices necessary for international order[1] with the historical contingencies favoured by the Interpretivist camp of the English School, by recognizing that certain features may be necessary to achieve international order, but that variation in the specific formulation which achieves these features is possible, and understanding these specifics is open to an interpretive approach. This chapter first defines these necessary elements and then compares the historic particulars of their expression during different modes of international society throughout history. This represents an advance in the New Institutionalist project of defining the nature of primary institutions through the synthesis of the Structuralist and Interpretivist camps, and will provide the foundation for the final section of the thesis in which this work will analyse the changes to the primary institutions of international society.

Chapter Three engages with the question of the agents vs the subjects of international society and the legal subjecthood of the nation states of international society. This is an essential distinction to make as the primary legal entities that would first advance colonialism in the international system were not state but colonial corporations, and the unique incentives of their agents can only be understood by placing them in their context as members of societies but not agents of their states. This chapter attempts to move away from the state personhood analogy to recognize the importance of individual policy makers and how their goals may not be synonymous with the state they represent, and how considering this is key to understanding state (and other political institutions) behaviour in international society

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[1] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1977).

Chapter One: The English School Debates - Methods, Pluralism & Colonialism

What constitutes the 'English School'?

What constitutes the body of work making up the 'English School' is complicated by the fact that its first generation of theorists not only shared certain theoretical positions and approaches, but were also members of a club that excluded certain authors who no doubt influenced the development of the school. The English School's first generation of scholars were members of The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics – a group of academics brought together in a loose organization first headed by historian Herbert Butterfield from Cambridge, but largely based around the intellectual life of the LSE. The British Committee ran from 1954 to 1985[2], and included a diverse range of historians, theologians, sociologists and international relations theorists[3]. Butterfield himself is best known for his work "The Whig Interpretation of History"[4] rather than any International Relations text. New generations would carry on the torch of the English School following the closure of the British Committee, drawing upon the ideas laid out by its first generation of scholars, while refining and building on them. This next generation of English School theorists would become a globally distributed network of scholars rather than the tight intellectual community of the British Committee. The membership of the contemporary English School is mostly concentrated in the United Kingdom, Northern Europe and The Commonwealth, with far more limited uptake in the United States.

The first generation of English School Theorists were influenced by a form of British (and Dominion) internationalist tradition that was prevalent among the British political elite and their counterparts in the British Dominions between the mid-1800s to the 1940s (as well as in Europe and the United States

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[2] Peter Wilson and Tim Oliver, 'The International Consequences of Brexit: An English School Analysis', *Journal of European Integration* 41, no. 8 (2019): 1009–25.
[3] B. Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach* (Polity Press, 2014).
[4] H. Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History*, Norton Library, N318 (Norton, 1965).

to a more limited degree)[5]. The key term associated with the English School – 'international society'

predates the work of this first generation and was a part of the thinking of these nineteenth and early

twentieth century internationalists which would influence the first generation of the English School.

Both groups conceived of a 'society of states' and that the (European) state order was a shared

community of norms and practices that encouraged the maintenance of international order and the

system as a whole. The most tight-knit community of norms for these British internationalists prior to

the Second World War was the British Dominion system which existed as something even more

strongly bound than a society; the Dominion was a 'family' of nations[6] with deep socio-cultural roots,

that worked together to maintain the British Empire as a political community (and would come to its

defence in 1914), and served as something of an ideal model for wider international society.

Following the failure of the League System and the Second World War, followed swiftly by the Cold

War, the horizons of imagination for this form of British Internationalism became far more limited.

Thus we have the first generation of authors such as Wight and Bull reimagining international society

as a much more limited set of practices based around its primary institutions. It is important to engage

with the intellectual history of the English School when conducting work using it as a theoretical

framework, as doing so allows for a reflection on the normative, ontological and epistemological

premises that underlie it as a theoretical tradition.

The contemporary English School is defined by two key premises that tie together the earlier

members of the British Committee and the generations of scholars that came afterwards. The first

premise is that the norms and practices which dominate how international relations is conducted (E.G.

How diplomatic recognition is given and received, or how territorial control is defined), have

developed over time through repeated diplomatic practice and are not structurally determined.

Historical enquiry thus underpins the theoretical contributions of the English School and the primary

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[5] Charlotta Friedner Parrat, 'The "Old School": Removing Obstacles to Globalising the English School?', *Millennium Journal of International Studies (Under Review)*, n.d.

[6] Kent Fedorowich and Carl Bridge, 'Family Matters? The Dominion High Commissioners in Wartime Britain, 1938–42', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 40, no. 1 (2012): 1–23, https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2012.656482.

institutions of international society are derived from empirical observation, both in the past and the present. There is a debate here between those who see international society as an abstract entity to be studied, and those arguing for a grounded theory of the study of diplomats and those conducting international relations[7] (more on this later), but both sides agree that it is empirical study of an existing and historical set of norms and practices that is the principal concern of the School. In a very similar vein, although abstracted beyond the methodological case to a general understanding of primary institutions, Terradas argues that primary institutions in the Bull view can be understood from an anthropological perspective[8]

The second key premise is the notion of " international society" – which separates the English School from other theoretical positions primarily interested in understanding the international system from a historical perspective. As discussed earlier, the concept originates with the British Internationalists of the Victorian era, but takes on influences from fields such as sociology (particularly with Bull[9]) as it transitions from a political project to a mode of analysis for International Relations. International society is a "second order" society whose membership is made up of the states of the international system, and it is the central focus of the English School to understand international society.[10] The English School broadly accepts anarchy as a background condition of the international system, but international society exists atop it, a body of norms and practices inculcated into states (in the form of their representatives) that makes these states part of an international society. These states operate not only in the interest of themselves, but also follow as Watson puts it a "*raison de système*"[11] which preserves international society, as states find it in their interest to be mutually bound by certain norms

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[7] Peter Wilson, 'The English School Meets the Chicago School: The Case for a Grounded Theory of International Institutions', *International Studies Review* 14, no. 4 (2012): 567–90.
[8] Nico Terradas, 'The Quest for Order in Anarchical Societies: Anthropological Investigations', *International Studies Review*, ahead of print, November 2018, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy078.
[9] Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*.
[10] Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, ed. H. Bull (Leicester University Press, 1977).
[11] Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2009).

and rules. It is the proposition of the existence of an international society that separates the English

School from theorists such as E.H. Carr,[12] who clearly influenced theorists such as Hedley Bull and

adopted a historical approach, but who lack of belief in an international society[13]. The innovation of

the English School for understanding the functioning of international society is the "primary

institution", first outlined by Wight in *Power Politics*[14] and *System of States*[15] and further developed

by Bull in *The Anarchical Society*[16]. Primary institutions are a combination of norms and practices

which states (more specifically their agents, leaders and diplomats) have become socialized into.

The English School and Other Paradigms

The English School is often presented by its advocates (in particular both Wight[17] and Keene[18]) as a

third alternative to the orthodox theories of Realism and Liberalism, and its concept of the

international society shares with Liberalism and Realism the goal of constructing a grand theory of

international order. Developing this idea Jackson[19] interrelates the English School's two traditions in a

tripartite relationship with these theories, with its Pluralist wing sharing ideas with Realism and its

Solidarist wing sharing ideas with Liberalism; while simultaneously retaining its own unique elements

such as its use of sociological and historical concepts that provides the English School its unique

character.

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[12] E.H. Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, Harper Torchbooks (HarperCollins, 1964).
[13] Although there is some international society thinking in Carr it is not dominant.
[14] Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (1978).
[15] Wight, *Systems of States*.
[16] Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*.
[17] Martin Wight et al., *International Theory the Three Traditions*, 1996.
[18] Edward Keene, 'Three Traditions of International Theory', in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies* (2014).
[19] R.H. Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2000).

Beyond Liberalism and Realism, the combination of a historical approach to international relations and a sociological view of an international society draws comparisons between the English School and Constructivism. Given international society is often understood in a socially constructed sense it is inevitable that it will draw upon constructivist ideas. Reus-Smit argues that both constructivism and the English School are similar projects aimed at understanding the social base of international relations[20], while Dunne[21] explicitly refers to Bull and other English School theorists as "classical constructivists". Manning would provide the English School its linguistic turn early in the school's life[22]. The similarities between the two positions merge even more closely with more 'moderate' constructivists such as Wendt who maintain a role for material factors in the generation of international norms.[23] However The English School is a distinct project from constructivism, and both projects have their own advantages. The body of Constructivist work has a far more developed understanding of how norms develop and change in the international system. On the other hand the English School has a more coherent understanding of the nature of international society both as it currently exists and in its change over time. Wæver argues this allows the English School to engage better with the Liberal & Realist schools.[24] Adding to this, the English School has a more significant normative debate ongoing within the school, which allows it to engage with Liberal and Realists paradigms in terms of 'ought' as well as 'is' when discussing the goals of international order. Constructivism and the English School are interrelated but not identical theories, and the English School has much to gain from integrating ideas from Constructivist thought. Constructivism masters the question of 'how' to the English School's 'what' when describing international norms and the development of international society.

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[20] Christian Reus-Smit, *The Constructivist Challenge after September 11*, Oxford University Press, 2004.

[21] Timothy Dunne, 'The Social Construction of International Society', *European Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 3 (1995): 367–89.

[22] Tanja E. Aalberts, 'Playing the Game of Sovereign States: Charles Manning's Constructivism Avant-La-Lettre', *European Journal of International Relations* 16, no. 2 (2010): 247–68, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066109343986.

[23] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, vol. 67 (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[24] Ole Waever, 'Four Meanings of International Society: A Trans-Atlantic Dialogue', *International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory* 2 (1998): 80–144.

There is also deep interdisciplinary engagement between the English School and other areas of study outside of International Relations research. In particular with sociology[25] linguistics (Manning)[26], Regime Theory[27], and Area Studies[28]. This is part of the ongoing interdisciplinary tradition of the English School since its founding. There has also been increasing interest among some English School theorists (myself included) with the Global IR project[29]. The English School, with its sociological approach to historical research is an ideal theoretical program for understanding the actions of states in the global south, drawing on an appreciation for their unique histories and meanings in conducting international relations.

With the unique features of the English School unpacked it becomes possible to identify its members and create a generational schema that allows us to better conceptualize the intellectual tradition of the English School. Some are core 'English School Theorists' while others dip into the methodology and debates within the school while also working in other frameworks, but have contributed to its development. It can be valuable to think about these theorists in terms of generations which contributed to the ongoing debates within the school – the list below is not exhaustive, but aims to demonstrate the development of the English School, and certain authors have been active over multiple generations.

Intellectual Forbearers: British Internationalists of the Victorian Era (discussed earlier), Leopold von Ranke (both the narrative conception of history and European socio-cultural civilization as an

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[25] Wilson, 'The English School Meets the Chicago School: The Case for a Grounded Theory of International Institutions'.

[26] Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 'The Dangers of Interpretation: C.A.W. Manning and the "Going Concern" of International Society', *Journal of International Political Theory* 16, no. 2 (2020): 133–52, https://doi.org/10.1177/1755088220905333.

[27] Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, 'Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A Comparison', *Millennium* 21, no. 3 (1992): 329–51.

[28] Shaun Narine, 'The English School and ASEAN', *The Pacific Review* 19, no. 2 (2006): 199–218, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740500473247.

[29] Filippo Costa Buranelli and Simon F. Taeuber, 'The English School and Global IR - a Research Agenda', *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace* 11, no. 1 (2022): 87–105, https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.1020713.

international relations concept), Philip Noel-Baker (Liberal Internationalist who gave the LSE's first IR course, including concepts of international society, succeeded by Charles Manning), Georg Schwarzenberger (Concepts of international law as part of international society, UoL lecturer in international law and Relations 1938-45), arguably E.H.Carr (influence on Bull's view of historiography). C.A.W Manning (arguably one of the three "big beasts" of the English School, separated here because he was never a member of the British Committee, but as the Montague Burton Chair of IR at LSE he clearly played a formative influence on the development of the British Committee and the school more widly).

First Generation: *Butterfield, Wight, Bull, Watson*, – Early members of the British Committee, this generation is characterized by eclectic theoretical perspectives and academic disciplines, including history and theology. They brought together these varied perspectives to engage in the contemporaneous debates in International Relations and developed the English School's core focus on primary institutions, sociology and historical analysis. They argued for a classical approach to International Relations as opposed to the increasingly scientific approach of US scholars of the period.

Second Generation: *James, JC Garnett, Stern, Spence, Parnell* – This generation is the direct academic offspring of Manning, Wight, Watson & Bull, conducting research and theorizing very much in the mould of the first generation of English School Theorists, with an interest in the expansion of international society beyond the boundaries of Europe.

Third Generation: *Mayall, Holsti, Suganami, Jackson, Navari, Wheeler, Linklater (not primarily ES)* – This generation becomes active in the 1980s and would begin to shape the English School in response to new developments in the wider field such as constructivism. Includes many of the first "New Institutionalists" who would revive the interest in and add greater specificity to the concept of primary institutions. Their research was characterized by an increased interest in normative aspects of the English School, as well as the development of a more rigorous methodological approach to English School theorizing. This generation sees the major expansion of the school outside of the British Committee (which closes around this time) and the LSE. Some members are still active within the school at the time of writing.

Fourth Generation: *Knudsen, Wilson, Suzuki, Keene, Jackson, Bain, Hall, Buzan, Dunne* – This generation becomes Active in the 1990s/early 2000s. This generation expands the methodological approach by engaging further with sociological ideas as well as a further generation of institutionalists who develop attempts to give more methodological rigor to the development and change of primary institutions. There is a reduction in interest in concepts of Great Power conflict following the end of the Cold War, and a strong shift towards Solidarist understandings of International Society. Particularly noticeable is Barry Buzan, whose significant contributions to field during the period significantly contribute to its popularisation and growing membership, after a period of decline in interest by much of the field. Nearly all of this generation is currently active.

Fifth Generation: *Myself, Schmidt, Schouenborg, Banai, Buranelli, Parrat, Spandler, Nantermoz, Zara, Bottelier, Taeuber, Zaccato*, – This generation becomes Active in the 2010s-2020s. Mostly made up of Early Career researchers continuing to develop the international society approach. This grouping is increasingly diverse and international, with a greater interest in interdisciplinary engagement with disciplines such as area studies. There has also been a greater interest in the concept of regional International Societies, as well as the study of the Global South more generally.

Beyond the core contributors to English School theorizing listed above, there has been a growing academic interest in describing historic regional, non-western international societies. Ideas from these authors will inevitably feedback into the English School, recent works include Zarakol[30] & Suzuki[31]. There are also authors from outside the English School that have used its methods or engaged with its ideas, contributing to its ideas including Falkner[32] & Acharya[33] and Linklater[34] (mentioned above).

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[30] A. Zarakol, *Before the West*, LSE International Studies (Cambridge University Press, 2022).

[31] S. Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter with European International Society*, New International Relations (Routledge, 2009).

[32] R. Falkner, *Environmentalism and Global International Society*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2021).

[33] A. Acharya and B. Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at Its Centenary* (Cambridge University Press, 2019); Amitav Acharya, *Constructing Global Order: Agency and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316756768.

[34] Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations* (Springer, 1990).

These authors and those listed above comprise the body of literature that this research draws upon for its theoretical underpinning. I notably start my story of the intellectual influences on the first generation of the school with the first generation's immediate precursors, with the exception of Ranke. Intellectual histories of the English School have often tied the ideas of the school to the far more distant precursors, particularly Hugo Grotius[35] who emerges repeatedly in English School writings, as a forefather of the English Schools understanding of particularly International Law. While there are certainly ideas handed down in part by Grotius that make their way to the English School (as there are for many early modern scholars), I argue that connecting the English School back any further beyond ideas that come into formation in the late nineteenth century is more a part of the intellectual myth making of the school rather than a useful intellectual history; much as tying contemporary realist thought to Thucydides or Machiavelli does more to ground a relatively modern academic tradition in a sense of intellectual timelessness than it does to explain its intellectual history. Thus Grotius (and some of the other oft mentioned early precursors such as James Lorimer, another international lawyer) are excluded from this list, but it should be noted that some claim them as intellectual forbearers of the English School.

What is the English School Method?

One of the ongoing critiques of the English School has been its lack of a distinct and/or recognisable methodology, in stark contrast to the Realist and Liberal Schools which have a deep relationship with quantitative as well as qualitative methods.[36] Bull argued for a "Classical Approach" as early as

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[35] Edward Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics*, LSE Monographs in International Studies (Cambridge University Press, 2002), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491474.

[36] Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach*.

1966[37] in opposition to a strict scientific method, and it is this approach which characterizes the first two generations of English School authors. Bull argues that the scientific approach favoured by Realists and Liberals cannot provide the answers to the major questions of international relations theory:

"What is the place of war in international society? Does a member state of international society enjoy a right of intervention in the internal affairs of another, and if so in what circumstances? Are sovereign states the sole members of international society, or does it ultimately consist of individual human beings, whose rights and duties override those of the entities who act in their name?...

These are typical of the questions of which the theory of international relations essentially consists. But the scientific theorists have forsworn the means of coming directly to grips with them. When confronted with them… they break free of their own code and resort suddenly and without acknowledging that this is what they are doing to the methods of the classical approach."[38]

What is this "Classical Approach"? Bull characterizes it as:

"[an] approach to theorizing that derives from philosophy, history, and law, and that is characterized above all by explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgment and by assumptions… these general propositions cannot be accorded anything more than the tentative and inconclusive status appropriate to their doubtful origin."[39]

Part of the ongoing problem with a scientific approach to what Bull describes as "the typical questions" is that these are normative as well as scientific questions. You cannot use quantitative theory to determine if a state has a right to intervene in the affairs of another state, because it is a normative question, dependent on both one's moral outlook, but also importantly in the English School case, the body of norms and practices that have built up over centuries to come to define the

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[37] Hedley Bull, 'International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach', *World Politics* 18, no. 3 (1966): 361–77.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.

boundaries of acceptable practice in international society. The Classical Approach consists of making assumptions about the way international society operates and applying the theorist's best judgement about those assumptions; given the empirical understanding of our current and historic international society we can observe in practice and the researcher's normative beliefs. Theorists might use more refined techniques to sharpen that empirical understanding (e.g. case studies, quantitative research, interpretive analysis), but the Classical Approach primarily consists of, researching the existing situation of international society, making a judgement on the value of what has come previously, and then applying our judgement to questions presented, trying to develop a theoretical understanding that explains empirical data. This is unavoidable, particularly when these questions have normative components, or ask questions like what role a certain phenomenon such as war plays in maintaining international order, as these questions cannot be answered scientifically.

This "Classical Approach" was predominant among the first two generations of the English School and is used by many contemporary English School theorists. However, efforts to add methodological rigor to the English School have been ongoing, particularly in the last two decades. The advent of constructivist analysis, which shares many assumptions with The English School approach but has a more rigorous method, no doubt played a role in the revival of interest in formulating an English School method. Pertinent to this discussion is Navari's *Theorising international society*[40] - an edited volume from numerous English School and adjacent theorists discussing the English School's method to International Relations research, particularly what can be gained from Constructivism[41], Historical Approaches[42], and the use of Ideal Types[43]. Beyond this work however, there has been little further formal discussion of method from within the school itself. Buzan's discussion of the topic of English

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[40] Cornelia Navari, ed., *Theorising International Society: English School Methods*, Palgrave Studies in International Relations (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009), https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230234475.

[41] Christian Reus-Smit, "Constructivism and the English School," in *Theorising international society: English School Methods*, ed. Cornelia Navari (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009), 58–77,

[42] William Bain, "The English School and the Activity of Being an Historian," in *Theorising international society: English School Methods*, ed. Cornelia Navari (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009), 148–66,

[43] Edward Keene, " international society as an Ideal Type," in *Theorising international society: English School Methods*, ed. Cornelia Navari (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009), 104–24,

School method in *Introduction to the English School*[44] briefly mentions the work by Navari before moving on to compare the English School to the other major schools of IR theory.

There have been some efforts to produce 'falsifiable' claims in the English School along the lines of Realist or Liberal theorizing, such as Watson pendulum model that postulates that both imperial and anarchical forms of international society are more unstable and trend towards a 'hegemonic' middle ground[45]. But this claim appears particularly feeble in comparison to Liberal and Realist hypothesizing, based more on the conventional wisdom that equilibriums between two extremes are more stable, rather than any concrete evidence, ignoring the centuries of stable imperial rule in both China and the Roman Mediterranean. Little benefit has been brought to the English School by trying to make these falsifiable abstract claims, beyond attracting unflattering comparisons to the other orthodox theoretical approaches. The English School is at its strongest when using the Classical Approach the school has been most well known for.

I am here in agreement with Wilson that:

"The English School does not have [a method]. Indeed its whole approach is antipathetic to method. A method suggests the identification and execution of a series of precise steps in order to achieve a specific goal… 'Approach' is a much more appropriate term, for it suggests a general outlook, the employment of a certain set of concepts, the advancing of a certain set of propositions, and the assumption of a certain style or character of argumentation. The goal is not the acquisition of a skill, or technique, or practical capability. Rather the goal is general understanding or a general appreciation of 'the relation of things'. I remain wedded to the Manningite notion of connoisseurship:

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[44] Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach*.

[45] Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*.

that is, refined judgment born of familiarity with and feel for a subject. This, rather than objectivity, or science, is what we should strive for in the pursuit of social understanding." [46]

This is in effect a reiteration of the defence of the Classical Approach, which remains one of the English School's greatest assets, not a weakness that needs to be resolved. It is the Pluralist approach to ways of studying international society that allows for refined judgement to be applied and gives the school its intellectual vibrancy.

A final way of thinking about the English School approach or the Classical Method when asking the question of what one is "doing" when theorizing within the English School is Linklater's[47] idea that Bull and Watson's approach is a form of hermeneutics for international society. The English School is engaged in a hermeneutic cycle of theorizing; analysing the building blocks of international society (the primary institutions): the practitioners who create international society (diplomats and statespeople): and the society as a whole. Shifting between these levels of analysis allows for a better understand of how international society functions. This mode of study involves interpreting historical events, texts, diplomatic practices and a state's engagement with international norms to better understand how states perceive international society and their role within it. Integrating this idea into our understanding of the "Classical Approach" gets to the foundation of what one is doing when theorizing within the English School.

I am therefore in agreement with Bull, Wilson and others that it is neither possible nor desirable for the English School to answer the big questions of international society with a formalised 'method', and this work does not seek to do so. It instead adopts the Classical Approach of earlier English

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[46] Peter Wilson, "The English School's Approach to international law," in *Theorising international society: English School Methods*, ed. Cornelia Navari (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009), 167–88,

[47] Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations*.

School scholars and seeks to refine the English School's theorizing about the primary institution of colonialism (and primary institutions more generally). The work recognizes colonialism as an understudied element of that (hermeneutic) interpretive cycle for understanding international society and aims to bring new argumentation about the role it played in the functioning of international society to better improve our understanding of both it and the development of the system as a whole.

What is International Society?

International society is the central focus of study in English School analysis, but significant ontological and epistemological differences exist among English School Theorists about what international society actually is. Thus, before engaging in questions of how primary institutions have been constructed and changed, it is important to be clear about the approach to the nature of international society to be taken here. The first approach to international society is that of a "Going Concern" in the minds of diplomats and statespeople. International society in this view is a thing that exists in the minds of the agents of states and its norms and practices affect their behaviour. This is a view most often attributed to Manning[48] and in this conception of international society through a grounded study of the actions of statespeople one is able to uncover the nature of international society. The second view is that international society is an intellectual concept that exists in the minds of researchers and political thinkers, an idea most commonly attributed to Wight[49]. Here international society is also a going concern, but in the mind of English School practitioners rather than the agents of states and a belief in international society is what separates English School theorists from Liberal, Realist or Critical theorists. The final understanding of international society is as an ideal type, here international society is a set of abstract concepts that external observers to international relations can compare to the actual international system in order to try to learn more about the actual system; this is

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[48] Jackson, 'The Dangers of Interpretation: C.A.W. Manning and the "Going Concern" of International Society'.
[49] M. Wight et al., *International Theory: The Three Traditions* (Leicester University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=mNmwQgAACAAJ.

a position advocated for by Keene[50] but which can also be seen in Bull's proposal of alternative orders which are themselves ideal types for analytical purposes[51].

This work adopts the first, Manningite approach to international society, that it is a going concern in the minds of the practitioners of International Relations (Diplomats, Statespeople, UN staff, etc). These individuals may not necessarily think of it in the exact term " international society" - actors may think of themselves as part of a 'common community of values', an 'international order', or an 'international community' and other permutations depending on their particular socio-political and ethical viewpoint, but this in practice mean the same thing on the level of statespeople – that they are bound by a set of norms and practices that are shared among other practitioners of international relations.

The evidence for this behaviour is widespread. Speech acts and documents from leaders and diplomats are replete with ideas of a collective purpose and community, this sense of collective community is made explicit in the UN Charter, the foundational document of the United Nations: *"we the peoples of the United Nations determined… to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom"*[52] Beyond the language of officials we can also recognize in their actions certain adherence to basic "rules of the game" around how states should operate in the international arena. sovereignty, Territoriality, international law are in general respected by states in international society (this is not to say practitioners never violate norms, but that norm breaking is not consistent and widespread, and the violation of the rules of international society damages the diplomatic prestige of states). The ongoing

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[50] Keene, 'International Society as an Ideal Type'.
[51] Hedley Bull, 'Part 3 Alternative Paths to World Order', in *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1977).
[52] United Nations, 'United Nations Charter', 1945.

effort to address climate change may be the best contemporary example of an existing raison de système, with states agreeing rules to limit their own exploitation of fossil fuels collectively in order to preserve the stability of international society as a whole by limiting the destabilising effects of climate change .[53]

Given the significant degree of conflict between East, West and the Global South during the period of study, one may ask if international society was truly a going concern during this period. If we consider the Cold War in terms of three broad camps – the Western States (The USA, Western Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand). the Communist World (Soviet Bloc, Yugoslavia, Albania and Cuba) and the Post-Colonial World, most states still considered themselves bound to a certain limited set of rules of global international society. For the Western allies, the foundation of the UN and the re-establishment and strengthening of the norms of international law following the devastation of the Second World War was of major importance to senior statespeople of the era. While conflict with the Soviet states dominated international politics, certain norms between the conflicting parties were maintained in order to not spill the conflict out into a generalized war that would destroy the system. For the Communist World, there was a similar engagement with the norms of international society which limited the conflict between East and West, clear from the sustained diplomatic practice that continued between the parties even during periods of war. Finally, most Post-Colonial leaders shared a desire for engagement with rather than the rejection of international society. The Bandung Declaration makes reference to the Post-Colonial world's political demands in terms of the UN Charter and UN Declaration of Human Rights, as well as in the shared normative language as the existing international society.[54] As we enter the 1960s, following the Suez Crisis, we see both the West and the Communist world increasing their engagement with the Post-Colonial world on a more equal footing, with the Soviets stressing the importance of socialism as anti-imperialist struggle, while

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[53] Falkner, *Environmentalism and Global International Society*.
[54] Bandung, 'Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung (24 April 1955)', Official documents, CVCE.EU by UNI.LU, CVCE.EU by UNI.LU, 1955, Indonesia, Bandung, https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/final_communique_of_the_asian_african_conference_of_bandung_24_april_1955-en-676237bd-72f7-471f-949a-88b6ae513585.html.

the US significantly reduced their support for their old imperial partners of Britain and France in favour of engagement with Post-Colonial leaders in Africa & Asia. While there were moments in which international society appeared under particular threat (the most extreme case being the Korean War and the Soviet boycott of the Security Council)., throughout the Cold War nearly all states maintained a belief in the rules of the international society, and spoke with the same normative language at shared political institutions.

Taking the Manningite view that international society is a going concern in the minds of statespeople as the approach of this research, it is important not to discount the Wight view that international society is also an idea that exists in the minds of researchers. As a researcher of international society I have my own conception of what certain norms and practices entail (E.G. what is the meaning of sovereignty, human rights, international law, etc). The goal of English School research in the Manningite mould is to as much as possible, ensure that the researcher's ideas of the subjects of study are as close to the understanding of the practitioners of international society. This is best achieved through a grounded approach to the study of practitioners of international society this is described by Wilson as: "*the gathering of "data that enable[s] the researcher to see the world from the research participants' point of view. The grounded researcher employs a variety of data collection methods, including participant observation, interviews, questionnaires, and textual analysis of records and reports. The object of the exercise is to reveal the participants' views, feelings, experiences, intentions, actions, as well as the contexts and structure of the aspect of their lives under scrutiny.*"[55]

Through the study of the patterns of behaviour exhibited by practitioners and textual analysis of archival material, the goal is to develop the researcher's own meaning of the norms and practices of international society such that it mirrors that of the practitioners. All the time while this is being done

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[55] Wilson, 'The English School Meets the Chicago School: The Case for a Grounded Theory of International Institutions'.

it is important to remain aware of the possibility for an epistemological gap that may exist between the researcher and subject. This becomes particularly important when studying the newly emergent Post-Colonial states as they enter international society and seek to change it. These nations have a multitude of histories and political meanings, and thus the likelihood for that epistemic gap increases, and indeed there is the possibility for a division on meaning within different practitioners of the Post-Colonial World because of this difference of experience. Part of the importance of entities such as the Non-Aligned Movement was that it served as a network for political actors to bridge these divides of meaning, much as the earlier Post-Colonial Internationalist movements had done. Thus when studying the Post-Colonial world, it is important to continually ask the question 'What did they really mean' when studying any practitioner's understanding of a norm or practice, to ensure the epistemic gap is minimized as much as possible.

The approach of this thesis, aims to chart significant changes at an international system level over a multi-decade period. It inevitably must sacrifice some of the depth of understanding of individual states and their practitioners in return for the ability to analyse a grand theoretical analysis that encompasses multi-decade change across the entire international system. It seeks to make up for this through the use of numerous secondary sources which are able to more deeply analyse individual states or periods during this transition. Through the synthesis of many secondary sources an interpretation of the grand narrative of change across international society can be constructed that maintains as much as possible the depth of understanding that deep grounded study allows for (while recognizing there will always be degrees of trade-off). The reinterpretation of these multiple deeply grounded sources into a newly interpreted grand narrative of the role of colonialism and decolonisation is the major contribution of this work.

Structure vs Interpretation – Structuration as Synthesis?

The English School is normally associated with an interpretive approach to the study of international relations, it focuses on the interpretation of the norms held and practices engaged in by the practitioners of international relations through a sociological/classical approach. There remains a debate among the English School on the role of structure in international society. Bull's *Anarchical Society* is referred to by Lechner as "normative structuralism" (as opposed to the scientific structuralism of Waltz)[56]. Bull's work takes primary institutions to be structural elements of international society that shape the activities of participants in it, as compared to Wight and Manning who adopt an interpretive approach to primary institutions.

However, even in Manning and Wight there are elements of structure, and a resort to pure interpretation is not possible. As Navari points out "anarchy as understood by Bull, Manning, the British Committee (BC) and its heirs is a structural concept."[57]. Anarchy for the English School is a systemic fact on which international society is established (it is not wholly what you make of it). How then can we square the circle between structure and interpretation?

This work shares the position with Navari that structuration theory is the answer.[58] In this view agents are *"suspended in a web of values, norms, rules, beliefs and taken-for-granted assumptions."*[59] And these agents are *"active in creating influential cultural products such as norms and rules as well as being influenced by them. But equally, the cultural elements define the way the world is and should*

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[56] Silviya Lechner, 'Why Anarchy Still Matters for International Relations: On Theories and Things', *Journal of International Political Theory* 13, no. 3 (2017): 341–59, https://doi.org/10.1177/1755088217713764.
[57] Cornelia Navari, 'Agents versus Structures in English School Theory: Is Co-Constitution the Answer?', *Journal of International Political Theory* 16, no. 2 (2020): 249–67, https://doi.org/10.1177/1755088219899429.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.

be."[60] Practitioners are thus operating within structures, some of which are material (Anarchy, Differentiations in State Capacity) and others are largely ideational (sovereignty, international law, etc). Most practitioners seek to be seen as members in good standing with the international community and thus bind themselves to these norms and practices, becoming fully socialized into international society's structures, acting as if these norms and practices were second nature . They are able to engage in changing as well as reproducing these norms and practices through their privileged position as the representatives of the primary subjects of international society. These agents have a capacity for reflexive creativity in terms of norms and practices but are bound by their specific historical contexts[61]. It is the actions of the post-colonial states in engaging in this creative norm-disruption practice that this thesis investigates.

The Pluralist vs Solidarist Divide

The English School's normative debate shapes many of the assumptions that undergirds the analysis authors arrive at regarding the interaction between states and international society. The concept of international society itself is loaded with normative character. The English School's *raison de système* logic is premised on the idea that the continuation of international society is an inherenta good (arguably the principal good), and as such it is inevitable that the English School will stray into normative questions. The principal question raised in these debates are the role of 'rights' in the international system, and if these rights belong to the state or to the individual. The 'Solidarists' adopt a position closer to liberalism on this question arguing that individual human rights play an essential role in international society and certain cosmopolitan values are possible between states. Meanwhile the "Pluralists" trend towards realism, arguing that the state is the only actor of importance in questions of international law and international society is a limited set of norms focused on order. The

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[60] Ibid.
[61] Mark Bevir, 'Situated Agency: A Postfoundational Alternative to Autonomy', in *Finite But Unbounded: New Approaches in Philosphical Anthropology* (2017).

key policy issue that has divided Solidarists and Pluralists within the English School in recent decades has been the role of humanitarian intervention to protect human rights as a feature of international society, with Solidarists adopting a more permissive view on the acceptability of abrogating sovereignty norms in order to protect life and individual's human rights.[62]

Early English School Theorists tended to fall into the Pluralist camp. Bull is archetypical of the Pluralist position, with the primary institutions outlined in the Anarchical Society (balance of power, war, great power management, diplomacy & international law) [63] heavily privileging both the maintenance of order over individual rights, and the state. Wight is equally Pluralist in his early writings, his 1966 essay on western values extolling the virtues of both Pluralist European international society and rejecting the ability for intervention on human rights grounds as unachievable except in the case of strong states disciplining the weak.[64] *System of States* is similarly interested in the rights of states that emerged within Europe following the wars of religion in the 1500-1600s that promoted a pluralist international society.[65] It is unsurprising that early English School authors adopted a pluralist position during the era in which they wrote, dominated as it was by the Cold War, a time for European observers where conflict appeared central to international society and consensus on international norms was thin.

The dominant normative trends within the English School have mirrored the political moments in which the work is produced, and as such there is a stronger emphasis on pluralism pre-1990, and during the 'Liberal moment' of the early 1990s, Solidarist thinking becomes more prominent. Post-1990, Solidarist institutions such as human rights obligations became the focus of more significant

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[62] Nicholas J Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (OUP Oxford, 2000).
[63] Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*.
[64] Martin Wight, 'Western Values in International Relations', *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics* 3 (1966): 89–131.
[65] Wight, *Systems of States*.

study within the school (for examples see Dunne[66], Navari[67], Bain[68]), as it did in other disciplines of international relations. In this new wave of Solidarist works was also an increased interest in the international political economy, particularly the growing body of international agreements that regulated global trade in the globalized international trade order.[69]

It is important to recognise that the Pluralist/Solidarist divide is not two distinct camps, but an ongoing conversation within the English School with two different set of referent objects and value systems. This gap provide a possibility for epistemic space and a pluralism of values, which makes it an effective normative model for investigating the Post-Colonial world, who also have a pluralism of values, meanings and ethics among its practitioners.[70] Pluralism remained within the school post-Cold War, particularly in Mayall[71] who focused on Nationalism as the fundamental institution of international society, with a limited space for international law as a master institution, largely constrained to defending the sovereignty of nation states. Early pluralism focussed on privileging order in international society. This work will refer to this approach as "Negative Pluralism" to distinguish from a developing trend toward "Positive Pluralism" in recent scholarship. The recurring divide between early Pluralists and Solidarists have been characterized as a conservative/progressive political divide[72], with Pluralists doubtful of the possibility of an international society built on justice. This is best characterized by Mayall[73] as well as Watson and Bull[74], the latter of which expressed serious doubts about the strength of international society in the face of a growing number of Post-

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[66] Tim Dunne, 'New Thinking on International Society', *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 3, no. 2 (2001): 223–44.

[67] C. Navari, *Internationalism and the State in the Twentieth Century* (Taylor & Francis, 2013).

[68] W. Bain, *Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power* (OUP Oxford, 2003).

[69] Particularly - Navari, *Internationalism and the State in the Twentieth Century*.

[70] Hussain Banai, 'Rethinking "Middle-Ground Ethics" in the English School', *Millennium Journal of International Studies (Under Review)*, n.d.

[71] James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge Core, 1990), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511559099.

[72] See its presentation in Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach*.

[73] Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*.

[74] Hedley Bull, '14: Revolt Against the West', in *The Expansion of International Society*, ed. Adam Watson (Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1984).

Colonial states that did not share the values of the West. However, there is a less dominant strain of pluralism (see Jackson[75]) that does not see restraint, prudence and non-intervention in an inherently pessimistic light. This work is in that school of thought. I will refer to this tradition as part of the "Positive Pluralist" tradition to distinguish it from the more pessimistic Pluralist view described previously. There has been increasing interest in this "Positive Pluralist" school of thought as a new normative frontier for the English School;[76] in this view, instead of being conceived pessimistically as the limits of a thin international society, Pluralist normative claims in favour of strong state sovereignty provided the space for the emergence of the post-colonial states in the international system, free as much as possible from the external influence of the great powers. Much as previous generations have been influenced by the Cold War and the Liberal Moment of the 1990s, there is a growing space within the contemporary English School (brought about in part by the increasing multi-polarity of our current international order) for a reassessment of the English School's Pluralist normative position and the advancement it as a set of positive normative values. Positive pluralism is a normative position that values non-interference, international co-operation, development, peace and ideological diversity within international society as inherent goods. These were the normative values shared by many of the early post-colonial leaders who are the subject of this study, and as such by studying them this work seeks to propose an advancement of the Pluralist tradition into a currently underexplored normative and socio-historical space. This shift in the normative focus of the English School would also allow it better to engage with the project of Global IR, which shares many of these normative values.[77]

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[75] Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*.

[76] Costa Buranelli and Taeuber, 'The English School and Global IR - a Research Agenda'; Banai, 'Rethinking "Middle-Ground Ethics" in the English School'. At the 2022 ISA (Nashville) The participants of the roundtable on "Pluralism and Global international society" (Chaired by myself) spoke on the growing enthusiasm for a new positive pluralism and its links to Global IR.

[77] Amitav Acharya, 'Towards a Global International Relations?', *E-International Relations*, 10 December 2017, https://www.e-ir.info/2017/12/10/towards-a-global-international-relations/.

Why use English School Theory?

Given the subject of study is the change driven by the post-colonial world, it is necessary to justify the use of the English School as a theoretical approach rather than theories that have a greater degree of engagement with post-colonial states, such as Post-Colonial Theory. The first thing to note is that this is a project engaging with normative change on a global scale, through the lens of the post-colonial world's contribution to these changes, and as such it is interested in the norms and practices of diplomats and statespeople at a global level. It requires a theoretical perspective that sees these norms and practices as mutable, thus the preference for the English School over Realist and Liberal perspectives. It chooses to focus on the period roughly between 1945 and 1980, as it contends with the question of how a new group of policy makers from the Post-Colonial world entered the political arena as state representatives and thus changed the norms and practices of this elite diplomatic community, and thus it focuses on the point at which the Post-Colonial leaders joined the 'inside of the club', rather than the interwar period in which many of the anti-colonial movements were becoming more influential but remained as outsiders to international society.

Williams critiques the English School's engagement with the Global IR project (through its engagement with Chinese IR, but the same argument could be made of any Post-Colonial state) as being too interested in "elite level perspectives" and not interested enough in alternative (critical/marginalized) accounts[78]. But this is in many ways a feature rather than a failing of an English School approach to studying Post-Colonial states. These policy making elites were often far more socialized into the norms of international society than the general populations of the countries they represent. The political elites of post-colonial societies were in many cases unrepresentative of the average citizen of these new states (much as they are in most societies) , however given the degree to which they were able to wield power and change the norms of international society, studying these

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[78] John Williams, 'English School – "Chinese IR" Engagements : Order, Harmony and the Limits of Elitism in Global IR.', *Chinese Journal of International Politics.* 14, no. 1 (2021): 1, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poaa022.

individuals from a grounded, sociological perspective is an important addition to the ongoing development of both the English School and the historiography of International Relations more broadly. This research is thus specifically interested in the state as represented by elite policy maker interest, recognising the limitations of such a focus but also the benefit of clarity brought by this approach to the subject of study. The English School is one of a limited set of perspectives that is able to conceive of post-colonial policy makers and states as entities with the agency to change the norms and practices of the system they operate in. The focus on the power of hegemonic paradigms shared by Feminist theories, Post-Colonialists and Post-Structuralists underestimates the agency of these non-hegemonic states and their practitioners in the international system (both in their ability to change these norms and practices but also to adopt and co-opt the behaviour). Rational Choice theory fails to see the degree to which state actions are determined by socially constructed and mutable norms. Area Studies, while providing valuable data and empirical analysis, lacks the broad theoretical framework necessary to develop the understanding this work seeks to make on global norms and practices. The English School and its grounded sociological approach is one of the few theories suited for conceiving of the Post-Colonial elites as social agents on an international level, competing in and changing international society.

Existing Literature on Colonialism as a Primary Institution.

An exhaustive analysis of all the primary institutions that have been outlined by English School authors would not be within the scope of this work (for an overview of several of the prominent English School authors, see Buzan[79]). This section selects certain prominent English School authors, gives a brief introduction to their conception of primary institutions before looking at their approach to Colonialism as a primary institution.

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[79] Barry Buzan, 'The Primary Institutions of International Society', in *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge University Press, 2004).

What is notable for the first generation of English School theorists is the lack of attention paid to colonialism; despite writing during and immediately after the decolonial moment, colonialism receives only peripheral mention in the seminal works of the prominent scholars of the first generation of the English School when discussing primary institutions. However it can be found addressed in their less well known writings. Wight's *System of States* (a refinement of his concepts laid out in Power Politics[80]) is a comparative work between the Pre-Hellenic Classical Greek era and the contemporary international society that emerged after the Treaty of Westphalia. Colonialism receives little mention in this comparative analysis and the focus is largely on central Europe and Italy, areas of early modern Europe in which colonialism was marginal.[81] Wight's primary institutions are the practices that form the shared norms of the international system. Wight's primary institutions have a functional purpose, the primary institutions are not just any norm or practice, but the norms and practices that provide the shared character to international society that regulates its conduct. While Wight did not include Colonialism as a primary institution, he showed an interest in Colonialism and British policy towards its disintegrating empire. Wight contributed to W. Arthur Lewis' work *Attitude to Africa,*[82] a work advocating for Africa's readiness for decolonization and published his own work on the process of constitutional transfer from Britain to its colonial possessions as self-rule became inevitable[83]. These works largely address colonialism in the context of the emergence of new nation state formations and their domestic political institutions, rather than as an extractive, internationalized economic relationship between the metropole and colony. Wight's interest in the emergence of these new states onto the world stage was seen by him as an overcoming of the norms that limited international society to the West and Europe and its expansion to encompass the rest of the world.[84]

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[80] Wight, *Power Politics* (1978).

[81] Wight, *Systems of States*.

[82] W.A. Lewis et al., *Attitude to Africa. By W. A. Lewis, Michael Scott, Martin Wight, Colin Legum, Etc*, [Penguin Special. No. S.159.] (Penguin Books, 1951).

[83] Martin Wight, *British Colonial Constitutions, 1947* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952).

[84] Robert Jackson, 'From Colonialism to Theology: Encounters with Martin Wight's International Thought', *International Affairs* 84, no. 2 (2008): 351–64.

Bull has a similar approach to primary institutions, conceptualizing them as a series of norms and practices that provide structure to the international system. With a greater focus on the contemporary international order *The Anarchical Society* provides a shorter list of primary institutions than Wight, all of which overlap with Wight's formulations (Diplomacy, War, Balance of Power & international law)[85]. *The Anarchical Society* like Wight's *System of States* makes little reference to colonialism's role in international relations. Bull's later work with Adam Watson *The Expansion of international society* would analyse the historic process of colonization and decolonization.[86] The first part of the collected work tackles the emergence of a dominant European system and the second and third parts its dismantling into a new global order, with part four looking at the newly emergent global international society. Adam Watson's chapter *"European international society and its Expansion"* in the first section of his shared work with Bull outlines Watson's conception of the primary institutions of European international society and it again shares much with both Bull and Wight's list, made up of: The balance of power, international law, congress systems and diplomacy .[87] This work is important because it is an early English School work interrogating the existence of empires and the states outside the European system and their interaction with it, and lays an early groundwork for current investigations of non-European international societies. The work includes several chapters that can be seen as precursors to more contemporary concerns of the English School relating to colonialism, including chapters from Gong on the entrance of China to European International Society[88] (Gong would go on to make a further important intervention regarding the Standard of

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[85] Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*.
[86] Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, *The Expansion of International Society* (Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1984).
[87] Adam Watson, 'European International Society and Its Expansion', in *The Expansion of International Society* (Clarendon Press Oxford, 1984).
[88] Gerrit W Gong, 'China's Entry into International Society', in *The Expansion of International Society* (Clarendon Press Oxford, 1984).

Civilization as a model for acceptance into international society[89]) from Vincent on the issue of racial equality[90] and Suganami on Japan[91].

Bull, Wight and Watson all share the concept of a "European international society" that regulated relations between the European powers and was to some degree separate from the other international societies (Islamic, East Asian, etc). As such colonialism was not often seen as a primary institution of this society, as colonialism regulated the relationship between European international society and the rest of the world. The lack of focus outside of Europe reduces to rest of the world to the epistemic periphery, and the understanding of Europe's relationship with the rest of the world is a marginal afterthought. For these authors colonialism's role during the period was the territorial expansion of Europe, and the spreading of its norms to encompass the globe, rather than as a foundational practice in building the European order itself. However, Bull and Watson differ from Wight regarding their prognosis of the decolonial moment. While Wight was more optomistic on the issue of decolonial states, Bull was deeply pessimistic. In Bull's view *"the integrity of international law has been debased"*[92] by the normative divisions between the old European powers and the post-colonial world and he argued that *"The attitude of Third-World countries towards some parts of international law… has been to assert that they are not bound by it and to seek to change it."*[93] Bull was fundamentally pessimistic about the ability for international society to survive as more than a thin set of limited norms[94] but this pessimism was poorly placed, and the post-colonial world made major contributions to contemporary international society, including during the period in which Bull was active.

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[89] Gerrit W Gong, *The Standard of" Civilization" in International Society* (Clarendon Press Oxford, 1984).
[90] R.J. Vincent, 'Racial Equality', in *Expansion of International Society* (Clarendon Press Oxford, 1984).
[91] Hidemi Suganami, '12:Japan's Entry into International Society,' in *The Expansion of International Society*, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1984).
[92] Bull, '14: Revolt Against the West'. P228
[93] Hedley Bull, "The Third World and international society," in *The Year Book of World Affairs 1979* (Routledge, 2019), 15–31 p15.
[94] Ian Hall, 'The "Revolt against the West" Revisited', in *The Globalization of International Society*, ed. Timothy Dunne and Christian Reus-Smit (Oxford University Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198793427.003.0018.

Mayall divides his "primary institutions" into institutions and principles – the divide here can be thought of as practice vs norms, thus diplomacy and international law are institutions while sovereignty, human rights, & self-determination (among others) are principles. Similar to the preceding authors these institutions and principles are productive of international society and he gives "international law" as the bedrock institution that holds international society together[95]. Mayall does not recognize colonialism as either an institution or principle of international society for much the same reason as Bull, Wight and Watson. However, Mayall's primary work *Nationalism and international society* is unique for its focus on the effect of Nationalism as a bedrock for the establishment of the modern international order. It has two relevant chapters on *Post-Colonial Nationalism* and *The Third World and international society*[96] which chart the development of the new international order of these states and their domestic post-colonial nationalisms, highlighting how these arrive from a different context from the destructive European nationalisms of the 20th century. This approach to the study of post-colonial state formation and ideology shows the English School's attention to the social aspects of the national as well as the international, much as Bull's first chapters of *Anarchical Society*.

Holsti divides his institutions into "Foundational" and "Procedural" institutions. Foundational institutions provide the bedrock of international society, giving privileged positions to certain actors; examples of foundational institutions include: the state, international law, territoriality, and sovereignty as the bedrock institution. Procedural institutions are collections of repeated practices built on top of these foundational institutions – this includes war, trade, diplomacy and importantly colonialism, which is analysed in Chapter 8 of *Taming the Sovereigns*[97]. Despite being the first author in this list to have recognized colonialism as a primary institution, Holsti's analysis is deficient in

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[95] James Mayall, *World Politics: Progress and Its Limits* (Cambridge Polity Press, 2000).
[96] Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*.
[97] K. J. Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2004), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491382.

many respects. Much of its focus is on the norms and relations developed between the colonial powers rather than the relations between the colonial powers and colonized peoples. As such this Eurocentric analysis misses the opportunity to detail the most important aspect of colonialism, the way it structured relations between the vast majority of the global population and built the international trade and finance networks that form the heart of the period's economic system for the majority of the world's population. Holsti states *"Our concern is not with this early stage of European expansion, but with the creation of the modern empires that began in the early 1880s. This phase had all of the characteristics of international institutions as we have defined them."*[98] By beginning the analysis at this high watermark of formal, state-led colonialism, Holsti's analysis is one mostly of its unravelling as a primary institution, and as such it misses much of the history of Colonialism in its earlier expansionist phases leaving an unsatisfactory analysis of the institution.

Buzan provides "Master" and "Derivative" primary institutions when constructing his map of international society.[99] Derivative Institutions rely on the logic of Master Institutions. E.G. non-intervention is a derivative Institution of the master Institution of sovereignty. He defines primary institutions overall as *"durable and recognised patterns of shared practices rooted in values held commonly by the members of interstate societies, and embodying a mix of norms, rules and principles. In some cases these shared practices and values may be extended to, and accepted by, non-state actors"*[100] Colonialism for Buzan is a derivative Institution of "inequality of peoples". Here Buzan makes a serious category error with his inclusion of inequality as a primary institution. Inequality is not a shared pattern or practice, it is not a norm, rule or principle; it is a material reality. That reality may produce certain historical outcomes which lead to certain norms being developed (I.E. if the power differential between native peoples and the American settlers had been different, there would

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[98] K. J. Holsti, '8. Colonialism', in *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2004), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491382. p 239

[99] Buzan, 'The Primary Institutions of International Society'.

[100] Ibid. p181

likely have been very different norms developed regarding the expansion of European society to the new world, but this differential is not in and of itself a norm). Inequality is the one primary institution that abandons Buzan's own definition given earlier. By making colonialism a derivative of inequality, it fails to recognize the co-constitutive role it has with other primary institutions (although he does go on to list it as a challenge to sovereignty) and also fails to recognize the important role colonialism had in shaping the international economic and legal system of the 19th and 20th centuries.

Jackson shares Wight's interest in the formation of post-colonial nation states and their internal politics, his early work includes *Personal Rule in Black Africa*[101]. Much of this early work analyses how developments in the primary institution of sovereignty allowed for the formation of internally weak states in the post-colonial world, including his regularly cited work in *World Politics*[102] and the book *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*[103] Which went on to develop his view of sovereignty as the foundational institution of contemporary international society. In his later work *Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* Jackson recognizes colonialism as one of the primary institutions of international society prior to the decolonial moment[104]. His work is an important piece of the English School analysis of colonialism as it recognizes the co-constitutive nature of colonialism with the other primary institutions that dominated European international society. Jackson notes that the nature of sovereignty and other key primary institutions changed following the demise of colonial rule in the 1960s. It also adopts a position in favour of the positive potential of pluralistic institutions, rather than the pessimistic approach of Bull, Watson, Wight & Mayall, looking to the future of a pluralistic international society and the

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[101] R.H. Jackson and C.G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*, Political Science : African Studies (University of California Press, 1982), https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=8xa9Y0qush4C.

[102] Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood', *World Politics* 35, no. 1 (1982): 1–24.

[103] R.H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 1993), https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=8tc2UDYy-HAC.

[104] Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*.

development of future institutions that can help manage international order under a pluralistic framework.

Finally Keene would devote a significant portion of *Beyond the Anarchical Society* [105] to non-European international orders, examined from an English School perspective. Keene's focusses on colonialism as the exclusion of non-Western states from international society through the development of the concept of "civilization" as a metric for acceptance into international society. Keene approaches this by reconsidering the importance of Grotius to the development of the "law of states" that would become modern international law, and although he does not speak in terms of primary institutions, addresses the usual concerns of the English School, namely diplomacy, sovereignty and international law.

Conclusion

This Chapter has sought to ground the rest of the research in the intellectual tradition of the English School. This chapter began by tracing the intellectual lineage of English School ideas to the Victorian era British Internationalists that influenced the first generation of English School theorists, before outlining how the English School has engaged with other intellectual traditions, and gave a genealogy of English School theorists and their major contribution to the field's development. This chapter then outlines the nature of the English School method, making a defence of the "Classical Approach" as the approach for the thesis' research. It then engages in the ontological and epistemological debates about what is "international society" – arguing for a Manningite approach to international society. It also interrogates the greater risk of an epistemological gap when studying policy elites from cultures with diverse histories and meanings, particularly when they are separate from the political tradition of

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[105] Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics*.

the researcher. This chapter then engages with two key debates within the English School regarding primary institutions, arguing that the divide between structure and interpretation when conceptualizing primary institutions can be bridged through the use of structuration theory. It then engages with the Pluralist/Solidarist divide, placing this work as part of a minority but growing interest in what this work defines as "Positive Pluralism". This normative position of the English School will be invaluable in helping the English School engage with projects such as Global IR. Having engaged with the intellectual history and debates of the English School this work then goes on to give an explanation for its choice to use the English School over other methods. Finally this chapter gives a brief outline of the existing literature that has been written on Colonialism as a primary institution and key author's approaches to primary institutions more generally. All of this work has served to ground the thesis in the intellectual tradition of the English School and has provided space for a reflexive approach to those traditions that will inform the empirical and interpretive work on colonialism/decolonization to follow.

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Chapter Two: Necessity as an Approach for Defining Primary Institutions

A cornerstone of the development of the English School approach to international relations theory has been the deepening of its understanding of primary institutions. From early accounts of primary (or "foundational") institutions in the work of Wight[1] and Bull[2], before being revived as a topic of interest by the "New Institutionalists" such as, Buzan[3] Holsti[4], Schouenberg[5] and Navari & Knudsen[6] who each added to the school's collective understanding of primary institutions through analytical refinement. This chapter critiques aspects of the current approach of the New Institutionalists and seeks to return to Bullian notions of 'necessity' – namely the minimum institutional requirements for international order - when defining the primary institutions of international society. By doing so this work aims to provide two major contributions to the ongoing development of the understanding of primary institutions. Firstly, by using notions of necessity to develop a functional typology this work seeks to create an understanding of primary institutions that is capable of accommodating variation and change across different historical and regional contexts. This allows a move beyond conceptualising primary institutions as defined by the institutions particular to modern, global international society, contributing to growing work conceptualizing alternative historic and regional international societies. This work thus seeks to provide a framework that can bridge the gap between theoretical conceptions of primary institutions and empirical work describing international societies outside of the modern, global context. Secondly, this work seeks to provide a similar functional framework for an English School understanding of domestic society and the state (in terms of primary institutions) which mirrors the English School understanding of international society. This seeks to

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[1] Wight, *Power Politics* (1978).

[2] Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*.

[3] Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, vol. 95 (Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[4] Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*.

[5] Laust Schouenborg, 'The English School and Institutions: British Institutionalists?', *Guide to the English School in International Studies*, Wiley Online Library, 2013, 77–89.

[6] Tonny Brems Knudsen and Cornelia Navari, *International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order* (Springer, 2018).

bring the English School's theoretical model closer to the experience of real practitioners of international relations. It does this both by recognizing that these practitioners are socialized into the norms and practices of their domestic society as well as international society, and that the primary institutions of international society are influenced by domestic norms and practices (and vice versa). Overall, this work seeks to continue in the tradition of existing theoretical contributions to English School thinking by using a functional typology to provide greater clarity to the role that the primary institutions are playing in providing order in international society and thus further contributing to the understanding of primary institutions.

The Debate over the Nature of Primary Institutions and a Return to Necessity.

Before outlining a functional typology for the primary institutions of international society, this section seeks to answer the question - what is a primary institution? As well as contextualize this work in the wider debates ongoing within the English School regarding the nature of primary institutions and how they should be used when theorizing international society.

To begin with, the definition of a primary institution this work uses is: Primary institutions are particular expressions of the norms and practices which are the preconditions of establishing ordered relations between states. This definition builds upon ideas of Bull[7], Wight[8], Holsti[9], Duval & Wendt[10], and Knudsen & Navari[11]. These norms and practices provide the relational/regulatory rules by which states interact with one another (the "rules of the game" of international politics). Primary institutions

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[7] Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*.
[8] Wight, *Power Politics* (1978).
[9] Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*.
[10] Raymond D Duvall and Alexander Wendt, 'Institutions and International Order: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s', in *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s* (Lexington Books, 1989).
[11] Knudsen and Navari, *International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order*.

also provide a constitutive function, both defining the members and nature of international society and imbuing these members with agency.[12] "The preconditions of establishing ordered relations between states" is used in the definition to distinguish that these are the norms and practices necessary for international order, rather than just repeated patterns of practice between states. Duval and Wendt argue that these institutions were "fundamental" in that they were the preconditions of meaningful relations between states,[13] similarly Bull states "that these rules and institutions are part of the efficient causation of international order, that they are among the necessary and sufficient conditions of its occurrence."[14] "Particular expressions of norms and practices" is used to recognise that these norms are arrived at through the historic development of international practice, and that while they represent the necessary elements of international order; different particular regional norms and practices have existed historically which have fulfilled similar roles in international society.[15]

Before beginning to interrogate the idea of primary institutions, this work will begin with the maximalist case against primary institutions put forward by Wilson[16] - Why not abandon the use of primary institutions all together if it fails to capture the complexity of really existing international society through its reliance on what are inevitably categorical abstractions? It does appear that each of the lists of primary institutions; both from the first generation (Wight, Bull) and those New Institutionalists such as Buzan and Holsti have all left something to be desired, and are open to critiques of missing elements or the inclusion of elements that do not fit their own definitions. While I am deeply sympathetic to the proposed approach for the study of international society by Wilson and the other anti-institutionalists who advocate for moving beyond abstract primary institutions to a grounded approach to the study of diplomatic activity (and the inclusion of domestic norms and

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[12] Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*.
[13] Duvall and Wendt, 'Institutions and International Order: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s'.
[14] Hedley Bull, '3 How Is Order Maintained in World Politics?', in *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1977), 71.
[15] Wight, *Systems of States*.
[16] Wilson, 'The English School Meets the Chicago School: The Case for a Grounded Theory of International Institutions'.

practices in this chapter seeks to return us closer to real practitioners); adopting a grounded approach does not necessitate the abandonment of the New Institutionalists project to theorize international society's primary institutions.

If one is to adopt a grounded approach to the study of diplomatic discourse, it soon becomes clear that the diplomatic community shares a set of norms and practices around repeatedly used terms such as sovereignty, international law, diplomacy (among others) which are themselves abstractions. Those practitioners (the diplomats and statespeople) of international relations are no more able to escape the need to think in abstractions than those who study them. If there was not a shared language and a shared meaning around certain abstracted norms and practices, (what sovereignty means, how international law is to be applied, how diplomatic exchange is to be conducted), then there would be no functioning international society, as a working agreement on terms is the bare minimum for a shared diplomatic culture to develop. Practitioners continue to make reference to the primary institutions of international society when engaging in diplomatic activity, even when they are not themselves thinking in terms of international society. Therefore I do not see the need to abandon the effort of defining primary institutions if one wishes to adopt a grounded approach to international society. The use of a grounded approach can instead add richness to the researcher's understanding of the primary institutions such that they properly reflect the complexities of actual international relations practice. Primary institutions are still a useful conceptual tool for the study of international society, because it mirrors the thinking of real world practitioners, and provides the researcher with a focus of study for their investigation.

This raises the question of the nature of primary institutions: Navari & Knudsen argues that primary institutions are "intersubjectively real. They are real in the sense of shared understandings….that have

become codified into social practices or institutions." [17] Keene[18], Jackson[19] and others have engaged

in theorizing of elements of the international society as Weberian "Ideal Types". Here I would argue

that these concepts are interrelated, and that part of the intersubjective understanding for practitioners

is in the mental landscape of ideal types. For example, practitioners have an understanding of how

sovereignty should be practiced which is inevitably a simplified abstraction – much like an ideal type,

which due to its nature as a simplified understanding allows for it to be shared intersubjectively

between practitioners. Then beyond this there is the 'reality' of the way in which sovereignty is

actually practiced. But given that this idealized intersubjective understanding of sovereignty is a key

social constraint on the actions of practitioners, it is valuable for us as academics studying

practitioners to theorize understandings of these primary institutions as ideal types – with the goal that

the understanding of the ideal type of sovereignty held by academics and the view of practitioners be

as close as possible, informed through empirical analysis which grounds the academic in the

worldview of the practitioner, as advocated for by Wilson[20]

The Structuralist/Interpretivist debate has been key to differing notions of the nature of primary

institutions among academics theorizing international society. Are primary institutions describing the

necessary structural elements of international society (a Bullian approach) or are they describing

existing norms that are unmoored from any concept of necessity or structure (a Manning approach),

and are the norms of international society fulfilling a social function?[21] This work adopts instead a

Structuration approach [22] as outlined by Navari with relation to the English School, as a synthesis

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[17] Knudsen and Navari, *International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order*, 7.

[18] Keene, 'International Society as an Ideal Type'.

[19] Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 'Hegel's House, or "People Are States Too"', *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 2 (2004): 281–87, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210504006072.

[20] Wilson, 'The English School Meets the Chicago School: The Case for a Grounded Theory of International Institutions'.

[21] For more on the debate between structure and interpretation in the English School see Navari, 'Agents versus Structures in English School Theory: Is Co-Constitution the Answer?'

[22] Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, vol. 349 (Univ of California Press, 1986).

between these two concepts [23]. This work argues that there are certain necessary elements for the maintenance of international order, for example there must be a process by which political entities recognise each other's jurisdictions. However, there exists a range of possibilities for the way in which this could be enacted, and the particular approach international society takes to any of these necessary elements can differ over time and is historically contingent. Particular formulations of the necessary elements for international order to exist are arrived at through the negotiation and reinterpretation of these norms and practices by the practitioners of international society - namely the politicians and civil servants who define the policies of their respective states. However this ability for reinterpretation is not limitless, firstly because that new formulation must continue to fulfil the social functions of international society, and secondly because practitioners become socialized within the web of norms and practices that is already established in international society, which serves as a meaningful constraint on the ability to advance alternative international orders. [24]

Schouenborg argues that there are three dominant perspectives on primary institutions by theorists: Functional (Bull), Historical/Descriptive (Wight) and Typological (Holsti) [25]. This is an important distinction as most English School authors fall into the Historical/Descriptive camp (as exemplified by Wight), and thus while Bull is seen as one of the foundational authors in the English School canon, few researchers are engaging in his approach to primary institutions. What separates Bull from the Historical/Descriptive authors and the Typological authors in Schoenborg's[26] (and my) view is that Bull is primarily interested with the necessary conditions for international order, whereas other English School authors begin with trying to describe the general social phenomena of international society from an empirical basis. The question of necessity has led to the common reading of Bull's primary institutions as determined structurally, which I argue is a mistake. Bull explicitly states as much in Chapter 3 of Anarchical Society in reference to the particulars of his primary institutions

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[23] Navari, 'Agents versus Structures in English School Theory: Is Co-Constitution the Answer?'
[24] Ibid.
[25] Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*.
[26] Schouenborg, 'The English School and Institutions: British Institutionalists?'

"The present study is not an attempt to apply 'structural-functionalist' explanation." [27] If Bull believed that the primary institutions of international society were determined, he would not have been able to conceive of alternative forms of international society or international order, an effort which consumes the final third of the text. [28] Bull's interest in function (and structural-functionalism) came at the conceptual question of what was necessary and sufficient for international society, not what were the particulars of actually existing international society today. Schouenborg agrees that Bull did make attempts to empirically determine his primary institutions [29] and I would argue Bull in fact remains quite open to developments and alternative forms of international order/society.

What Bull does in *Anarchical Society* is outline the necessary and sufficient features for *an* international society to function, then observe the specific examples that exist contemporaneously, before conceiving of alternative ways that the same function could be fulfilled under different forms of norms and practices. This begins in Chapter 3 by outlining the need for "Common Interests" "Rules" & "Institutions" [30] to form an international society, before outlining those institutions that exist as Bull sees them (the primary institutions of international society in contemporary English School language. The question associated with Bull – what are the necessary conditions for order in international society is thus a different one from the question of what are the particular primary institutions of any given international society. The question of necessity is a conceptual one, it asks what social functions would be necessary in order to achieve an international society, however these social functions could be achieved in different ways given different social, technological or other contexts. For example the need for mutual recognition between agents could occur through systems of sovereign equality, or hierarchical suzerainty. If we think of the functionalist and historical approaches as answering two different questions, the approach of Bull becomes compatible (and in fact complimentary) with the historical approach of other English School authors, and Bull himself

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[27] Bull, '3 How Is Order Maintained in World Politics?', 70–71.
[28] Bull, 'Part 3 Alternative Paths to World Order'.
[29] Schouenborg, 'The English School and Institutions: British Institutionalists?'
[30] Bull, '3 How Is Order Maintained in World Politics?'

would use the historical approach to outline the nature of his primary institutions in *Anarchical Society*. [31]

This work aims to return to the thinking of Bull, and construct a functional typology of the necessary factors for an ordered international society, then consider what these elements look like now, and have looked like in the past. By thinking about social function before going on to the work of description, this chapter aims to provide a pathway to overcome the deficiencies of previous attempts at categorizing and describing international society's primary institutions. The goal here is not to try to provide a comprehensive list of the primary institutions as previous institutionalists have done, but to provide a set of functional categories necessary for international society, that can then be filled with the specific primary institutions of any given historic or regional international society as well as our contemporary global one. This chapter is thus a framework for thinking about primary institutions, which can be filled with later rich and grounded study of the particular primary institutions that exist within the categories and how they may have changed over time – this work thus sees itself in conversation with the previous and ongoing research within the English School.

An obvious objection (particularly from anti-institutionalists) to this approach arises - namely is this not simply another list, moving the problem up a conceptual level? If the previous English School Institutionalists failed to include certain key primary institutions in their analysis, does this work not risk simply reproducing this error by failing to include necessary categories? I aim to solve this problem in multiple ways. Firstly my approach compares the categorizations with the primary institutions given by multiple institutionalists who have come before, finding a category for each previously analysed primary institution. This hopefully forms a unified categorical approach to the research that has come in the field before. Secondly this work seeks to return to a social theorizing

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[31] Hedley Bull, 'Part 2 Order in the Contemporary International System', in *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1977).

about the necessary elements of a society (international and domestic), and thus by theorizing about their basic social functions avoid the missing of key primary institutional categories.

The English School Concept of the State – Domestic Primary Institutions

When discussing the English School approach, it is the concept of international society that stands at the forefront of discourse within the discipline, but this often misses the English School's analysis of the internal makeup of the state itself.[32] Before thinking about how states interrelate, it is important to determine the nature of the state itself, as these building blocks are the entities which make up (through the actions of their representative practitioners) international society. This chapter draws upon ideas from the upcoming work of Buzan[33] as well as authors like Mayall[34] Holsti[35] and Bull[36] who considered the state and its normative constitution deeply. This chapter proposes a greater recognition of domestic institutions which define the nature of the state as well as how these states interrelate in international society. This work seeks to maintain the English School focus on rulership, order and the state as the primary subject of interest for English School analysis. As such this section presents five functional categories of domestic norms and practices that define a practitioner's (and society generally) relationship to the state and are necessary for the establishment of ordered domestic rulership. This work proposes the title of – domestic primary institutions, to separate them from the 'international' primary institutions of the English School, while recognizing that they are deeply interrelated to them.

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[32] Mayall, nationalism *and international society*; In particular focuses extensively on the state, also. Bull, 'Part 1 The Nature of Order in World Politics'.

[33] Barry Buzan, 'Barry Buzan on Conceptualizing International Society as Global Society', paper presented at ISA 2022, Nashville. TN, 2022.

[34] Mayall, Nationalism and International Society.

[35] K. J. Holsti, '2 States and Statehood', in *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2004), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491382.

[36] Bull, 'Part 1 The Nature of Order in World Politics',

It is important to consider these domestic norms and practices, as the practitioners of international relations are first socialized into their domestic context before becoming practitioners, and as such we see that the norms and practices of international society, mirror the normative character of the domestic societies that practitioners have been socialized into. A distinction can be made between domestic and international primary institutions. This is a valuable tool for ordering our thinking about primary institutions. However, it is important to note that the co-constitutive nature of primary institutions operates between both types of primary institutions, and this is a way of structuring our understanding rather than a barrier between the external and the internal. For example, international norms of human rights have influenced the nature of domestic rights within states, while freedoms first developed on a domestic level now form a bedrock of international human rights law such as freedom to religious practice. Thus we should think of the barriers and categorizations set out in the following schema as porous and mutually reinforcing, rather than as strict dividing lines.

Expanding our thinking about primary institutions to include those norms and practices normally considered constitutive of the domestic state is a valuable addition to the English School understanding of primary institutions for three reasons. Firstly because as discussed the domestic and international primary institutions of international society influence one another and as such failing to integrate a thorough understanding of these domestic primary institutions lessens the understanding of both the nature and historic development of the international primary institutions. Secondly, it is essential to recognize that in order to become a member of international society, states must exist within a certain model of domestic political practice to be received by the international community as a state and thus part of the framework of international society. As such it is important to consider the domestic norms and practices which define the nature of the state, as these expectations equally define the nature of international society. Finally, when we talk about international society, it is important to remember that these states act through their representatives at the international level, who are in turn socialized by their nation's domestic norms and practices. As such, the boundaries of what is deemed appropriate practice for states by practitioners is in part determined by their experience of their own

state's practice. If we are to maintain the grounded approach to the study of the practitioners of international relations, it is important to consider how the domestic norms and practices of their state have also socialized them into certain practices on the world stage. Failing to do so divorces us as researchers from understanding the real practitioners of international relations and thus leaves us with an analytical blind-spot.

This work thus proposes including the necessary norms and practices that form the domestic framework of state power as a type of primary institution. The following elements outlined are those necessary political structures for a political entity to have sovereign power, a pre-requisite for being recognized within international society, which this work will refer to as domestic primary institutions. For most English School authors the notion of the modern state is fundamentally Weberian in character [37] (although for Manning it is Wittgensteinian). It is defined territorially, it is legitimated by a form of what Weber refers to as Legal Authority, and it wields a monopoly on the use of violence within the state [38]. While anarchy is the background upon which the partially consensual model of international society is built for the English School, it is the normative aspects that promote cooperation and avoid the need for direct violence that is the point of interest for the English School. The use of force is in many ways the mirror within the state, while it is true that the state ultimately enforces its will upon citizens through coercion, the point of interest for the English School is the social legitimation and legalistic/bureaucratic structures that the state builds in order to operate without needing to do so. A valuable addition of the English School to theorizing about the state, both in Bull's theorizing of alternative orders in *Anarchical Society* [39] and Buzan's newest work on global order [40] is to think about how we can conceive of 'The State' (or more broadly Rulership) beyond

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[37] Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 4th ed., trans. Hans Heinrich Gerth and C Wright Mills (Routledge, 2014).
[38] Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*; Bull, 'Part 1 The Nature of Order in World Politics'; James Mayall, '3 Nationalism and the Creation of States', in *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge Core, 1990), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511559099.
[39] Bull, 'Part 3 Alternative Paths to World Order'.
[40] Buzan, 'Barry Buzan on Conceptualizing International Society as Global Society'.

modes of modern Legal Authority but as political entities that share characteristics with pre-modern states reliant on Traditional and Charismatic Authority which fulfil the same necessary societal roles through different means. This work seeks to operate in this tradition and conceive of the units of international society beyond just the modern Weberian state, but in terms of the necessary functions that allowed for sovereign power to be exercised in its predecessors and possible future developments. The concept of primary institutions can also serve as a way of connecting the norms and practices that define the state internally to the international without which we are missing a significant part of the story of the development of primary institutions.

The first necessary element of a stable system of rulership and the first category of domestic primary institutions is a set of norms and practices which establishes the legitimacy of the ruler. By ruler here this work means both in the individual sense of the figure of a president or monarch, but also in the abstract sense of the structures of the state: the parliaments, courts, civil services, police, military, etc who command authority and obedience in society. While rule has been established with different degrees of consent vs violence in different systems over history, no stable and successful system of rule has been established without any consent from key parties underneath the ruler. Forms of legitimation are never universal across all those ruled, and are often differentially applied, but it remains an essential part of establishing a stable relationship between ruler and ruled. Modern forms of nation state rely on rational-legalistic forms of authority, but also require normative investment by the population in the continued existence of the state [41]. This investment can be derived through democratic practices, but also forms of charismatic legitimacy such as personal rule, popular presidents and religious leaders, nationalism (a subject of analysis for many English School authors) [42] and in some cases its more unsavoury cousin nativism plays another key element of legitimation in the modern nation state – to represent the will of the imagined collective of the nation is fundamental

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[41] Max Weber, '2. Power', in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 4th ed., trans. Hans Heinrich Gerth and C Wright Mills (Routledge, 2014), 196–266.

[42] Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*.

to the ongoing legitimacy of the state itself. Finally the advancement of materialist benefits to the people serves as another key plank of legitimacy in some states. Contemporary examples of primary institutions of legitimation include: Nationalism, Nativism, Materialism, Democratic Practices, Legalism, Monarchy, Personal Rule, Political Institutions and Religious Identity while historical examples include Dynasticism and The Divine Right of Kings. These domestic practices define the legitimacy of sovereignty in international society – as membership of international society relies upon the mutual respect of a state's legitimacy by the practitioners of other states. In the nineteenth century expectations on the legitimate forms of statehood were tightly prescriptive, the states of international society were expected to meet a certain standard of civilization[43]. Whereas in the contemporary era, legitimation of the state on the international level is far more pluralist. All of the above are examples of ways in which a state can legitimate itself allows the government of that state to argue they are a genuine embodiment of the collective will of a particular peoples. By legitimating themselves domestically, that government is seen internationally to be a genuine expression of self-determination, which is the contemporary measure by which states are legitimated into international society;[44] thus the domestic and the international principles are fundamentally intertwined.

The next necessary element for understanding the nature of rulership are the obligations established between the ruler and ruled. These norms and practices limit the use of power by the ruler on their subjects and are highly constitutive of the nature of the state. Rulership is rarely arbitrary in its demands but operates through a network of obligations and rights between the individual and ruler, less it undermine the legitimacy by which that rule is established and normalized [45]. In return for fulfilling these obligations, individuals receive legal protections enforced by the ruler. Key to this in the modern era is the concept of citizenship, which defines the individual as holding certain legal rights and obligations in relation to the state that others are excluded from. In the modern era this

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[43] Gong, *The Standard of" Civilization" in International Society*.
[44] Jack Robert Mellish, 'UN Resolution 1514: The Creation of a New Post-Colonial Sovereignty', *Third World Quarterly* 44, no. 6 (2023): 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2023.2180355.
[45] Weber, '2. Power', 196–266.

system is universalized.. Contemporary examples of primary institutions establishing obligations to and from the ruler include: Conscription, Citizenship, Constitutional Rights, Legal Equality and Individual Rights. Historic examples include: Serfdom, Tithes and Feudal Obligations.

The management of territorial space is another fundamental element of establishing rulership. Territoriality along with the legitimacy to rule and the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence form Weber's three elements of the state [46]. The establishment of territorial jurisdiction over regions is essential both for the state to control the productive capacity of the area but also for the implementation of state legal systems (although many states struggle to meet this criteria) [47]. These claims managing the jurisdiction of rulership can often differ between *de jure* and *de facto* claims, with disputed and breakaway territories often limiting the *de jure* claims of rulership to more limited *de facto* spaces.. How these claims clash with the competing claims of other entities is a key element of the international primary institutions of international society. Contemporary examples of primary institutions for managing space include: Territoriality, Sovereignty and historic examples include; Colonial Overseas Territories, Mandate Territories & Imperial Territory Management.

The next necessary primary institutions for understanding the nature of rulership are those which manage the productive forces within the state. Without the ability to manage productive forces to some degree, it becomes impossible for the system of rule to be maintained, as the obligations the ruler has towards the ruled could not be met, and the ability to maintain the rule against challengers would not be possible. This category not only includes the state's direct interaction with the economy such as systems of taxation, but also encompasses the norms and practices which define the predominant economic system of the state itself. As such contemporary primary institutions for the management of productive forces would include: Capitalism, Property Rights, Taxation, Corporate

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[46] Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, trans. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, vol. 2 (University of California press, 1978).

[47] Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*.

Personhood, and Environmental Law. While historic examples would include: Slavery, Guild

Systems, and Mercantilism. Domestic understandings of economic practices such as contract law and

property rights have shaped international regulative practices of trade between states.

The final important practice for understanding the nature of rulership and the state are the norms and

practices which form the nature of the state bureaucracy that administers the ruler's interaction with

these other primary institutions. The earliest and most basic bureaucratic institutions for the

management of rulership were highly personalized. The "bureaucratic staff" of feudal societies were a

combination of the personal retainers of the sovereign and church officials. The late-modern state is

characterized by a rationalization of these bureaucratic practices to increase formalization and remove

corruption and to open up the bureaucracy on a meritocratic basis [48]. This process is one that is

incomplete in many developing nation states and low levels of formalization of the bureaucracy is

often a marker of weak state apparatuses. Another unique element of the modern non-democratic state

with developed political party institutions is the party-led bureaucracy, in which states bureaucracies

are either formally or informally dominated by a single political party that both serve as legitimators

of the political process and administrators of the political will which can similar to formally

depoliticized civil services have different degrees of meritocracy vs corruption. Thus contemporary

primary institutions for the management of state bureaucracies include: Formalized Civil Services,

Political Patronage Networks, Party-Ruled States and historic examples include; Personal Retinues,

Religious Bureaucracies. The practices of state bureaucracy is an essential constitutive element of the

state that defines an individual's right to be a practitioner of international diplomacy and thus able to

represent the state in international society.

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[48] Max Weber, 'XII. Bureaucracy', in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 4th ed., trans. Hans Heinrich
Gerth and C Wright Mills (Routledge, 2014).

Fig 1: An English School Conception of the State

These five categories of domestic primary institutions combine to form an English School conceptual analysis of the state, as summarized in Fig 1. The list of institutions outlined over the preceding pages is not meant to be exhaustive, but to give examples of relevant institutions for each category. Firstly, it is important to note the space for historically determinant particulars of different states. For a state to be able to function, it requires each of these elements, but these elements need not necessarily present themselves similarly in all states. Historically regional international societies have operated in a similar way, with core necessities for the system to function, but the particular expressions of these institutions in for example the Islamic international society of the 1400s need not be the same as the European international society of the same period, as long as the social functions were provided for. These international societies of course interacted with one another, they were not sealed units, but

what separated the societies was a lack of mutual recognition and legitimation that existed within the regional international societies. As international society has expanded from regional formulations to encompass the entire globe, the opportunity for particularisms to exist between different international societies and between states have become more restrictive. Where greater degrees of differentiation continues to exist is within the states themselves, with different bureaucratic models, forms of legitimacy, citizen-state obligations, norms for economic management and the management of space. Of these five categories of primary institutions, it is the final two in which increasing degrees of uniformity have been imposed by actors in the international community on others – driven by the internationalized nature of the modern global economy and territorial relations.

The second important element to note is the co-constitutive nature of these primary institutions. It is not possible to classify one of these categories as "more necessary" than the other, or more foundational to the nature of the state. The nature of each individual state unit depends upon the combination of all of these factors, the sum total of which could be considered the *logic of the state*. A change to one of the domestic primary institutions results in a transformation of the functioning of the other primary institutions. For example, the transition from serfdom to capitalism as a primary institution for managing productive forces that occurred in Europe in the 1500-1800s, resulted in new concepts of what it means to be a citizen, new legal rights and obligations for those freed from serfdom, the rise of nationalism, increasingly formal bureaucracy, and a concentration of power in the central state rather than the local nobility.

The Necessary Elements of International Society

There has been considerable research into the primary institutions that determine both the international recognition of states in international society and their proper practice (the "rules of the game" of international politics) by the English School. As such there is an extensive previous

literature on the topic of what constitutes these primary institutions of international society. This chapter aims to categorize the primary institutions listed by earlier authors by the necessary function they play within international society into a categorical framework. Buzan's 2004[49] work on primary institutions provides a comprehensive overview of many key authors within the English School and their understanding of primary institutions. However, rather than following the Buzan innovation of sorting these into master and derivative institutions, this work takes all primary institutions as co-constitutive and sorts them by function. It is important to recognize that differing theorists of primary institutions have approached conceiving of them using both different theoretical approaches and also for different purposes. Mayall looked to conceive of primary institutions in relation to nationalism and the nation state [50] Holsti seeking to create a typology of modern and historic institutions that influenced international society [51] and so on. However, a consistent approach to both the nature of international society and the premises of theorizing allow us to compare these differing primary institutions. This work seeks to provide a greater capacity for comparative investigations of historical and regional international societies, and a greater focus on the socialization of practitioners. Hence the focus on creating a functional typology that can be applied across different time and regional contexts.

The first necessary function of international society is the recognition and legitimation of entities within international society. In order for international society to function, it is necessary that the states within international society recognize each other and their areas of authority in order to not be in constant conflict. It is also necessary for those states within international society to accept that other states have legitimate claims to rulership within their respective territories. This has taken the form of sovereign equality in post-Westphalian Europe, but can also exist in hierarchical, suzerain led international societies such as the Pre-Qing East-Asian international order, in which China occupied a

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[49] Buzan, 'The Primary Institutions of International Society'. – It is important to note that while this is one of, if not the most comprehensive summary of the position of the core English School theorists positions on primary institutions, there are some oversimplifications of misrepresentations of positions – particularly Wight's views on War as a primary institution, Mayall's approach to international law, and James's reference to political boundaries and as such it is a good but not perfect guide.

[50] Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*.

[51] Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*.

special position of authority while simultaneously recognizing the legitimacy of the smaller tributary states to rule. International society is not able to function without these forms of mutual recognition and legitimation between states, as the constant conflict a lack of mutual recognition engenders would leave the development of any other forms of mutual international norms impossible. What differentiated the regional international societies of the early modern and prior eras and the contemporary global international order is that the system of recognition and legitimation has now expanded to encompass all states under the norm of the sovereign equality of states.

The key primary institution of recognition and legitimation in contemporary international society is sovereignty, recognised by Wight[52], Mayall[53], Holsti[54], James[55] & Jackson[56] as a primary institution (and for Holsti, James and Jackson it is the bedrock institution that all others are built upon). Sovereignty in the contemporary era both encompasses both the mutual recognition that other states have the equal right to rule over their respective territory, and also norms of non-intervention in states domestic affairs and territorial integrity. Mayall goes on to give territorial integrity as a separate "principle", Holsti gives territoriality as a foundational institution and James states that independence is the core of sovereignty[57]. These norms are usually encompassed as a necessary part of sovereignty. Mayall also gives both self-determination and non-intervention as principles, which for this work we can think of as methods of recognizing the legitimacy of states; namely the belief that peoples have a right to form states and that the domestic affairs of those states should not be interfered with, promotes the mutual recognition and legitimacy within international society and deters conflict.

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[52] Martin Wight, '1. De Systematibus Civitatum', in *Systems of States*, ed. H. Bull (Leicester University Press, 1977).

[53] Mayall, '3 Nationalism and the Creation of States'.

[54] K. J. Holsti, '4. Sovereignty', in *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2004), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491382.

[55] Alan James, 'The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', *Political Studies* 47, no. 3 (1999): 457–73.

[56] R.H. Jackson, '7. The Pluralist Architecture of World Politics', in *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2000).

[57] Alan James, 'Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish?', *Review of International Studies* 10, no. 1 (1984): 1–18.

Bull is one of few authors not to list "sovereignty" as a primary institution, but does analyse the state as a concept in Anarchical Society[58] which encompasses the norms of sovereignty within it, similar to Holsti. Finally from Wight we have "neutrality" as a primary institution, which is the most difficult to categorize, however the right to neutrality, much like self-determination and non-intervention is effectively a recognition that states are allowed to make foreign policy decisions free from coercive influence, and as such I have categorized it here as part of recognition and legitimation for the same reason listed prior. Mutual recognition of other states and the acceptance of them as having legitimate interests and claims is central to the English School analysis of international society. It is the recognition that the practitioners of international politics value the continued operation of international society and become socialized into behaviours that promote its continuation that separates the English School's analysis from realist concepts of international order.

The second necessary element of international society is the ability for the states in international society to communicate and reach mutual agreement with each other. Again, without the ability for states to reach agreement on issues, either bilaterally or multilaterally, it is impossible for an international society to be maintained. Historically this began through forms of bilateral diplomatic exchange, organized through emissaries. This early system was reliant on general norms both against deal-breaking and violence against emissaries of other states, norms that continue to exist today. Systems of mutual agreement would become multilateral and more formalized into international law in the early modern period, developing simultaneously with increasingly complex and formal legal practices [59]. International Law developed during the early modern period alongside understandings of domestic jurisprudence which have become normalized into most domestic societies. Practitioners of international relations are thus socialized domestically into certain expectations of legal practice

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[58] Bull, 'Part 1 The Nature of Order in World Politics', 1.
[59] Martin Wight, 'The Origins of Our States-System: Chronological Limits', in *Systems of States*, ed. H. Bull (Leicester University Press, 1977).

before ever becoming state representatives, which are mirrored at the international level in international legal practice. This highlights the importance of not dividing our understanding of international norms from domestic norms as researchers of international society.

Both diplomacy and international law are recognized as primary institutions of international society by Wight[60], Bull[61] Mayall[62], Holsti[63], James[64] and Jackson[65] so there is a general consensus among key authors of the importance of both of these norms. Considerable current work is still being done within the English School on both of these institutions. To these key primary institutions Mayall adds Human Rights and Non-Discrimination as key principles of international society, both forming the basis of much of international law. Finally Wight[66] adds Arbitration, Alliances and Guarantees as primary institutions, these later two are both forms of signalling to other members of the international community as well as repeated diplomatic practice between the states within the Alliance/Guarantee relationship. Alliance structures themselves are forms of mutual agreement between the participants to enter into the alliance, and the right to form alliances is itself part of international law. Arbitration is a form of mutual agreement building as part of diplomatic practice that involves not only the conflicting parties but also the broader international community, and is a quasi-legal method of conflict resolution which has standing in contemporary international law. Diplomatic practice and international law, like sovereignty, are both primary institutions that have been heavily analysed by English School theorists, and the dual institutions of international law and diplomacy covers the broad set of practices that facilitate communication and agreement making between states. Bull argues that international society

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[60] Martin Wight, '11. Diplomacy', in *Power Politics* (1978).
[61] Bull, 'Part 2 Order in the Contemporary International System', 2.
[62] James Mayall, '8 International Law and the Instruments of Foreign Policy', in *World Politics: Progress and Its Limits* (Cambridge Polity Press, 2000).
[63] K. J. Holsti, '5. International Law', in *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2004), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491382; K. J. Holsti, '6. Diplomacy', in *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2004), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491382.
[64] Alan James, '"International Society"', *British Journal of International Studies* 4, no. 2 (1978): 91–106.
[65] Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*.
[66] Wight, *Power Politics* (1978).

is made up of practitioners [67] - the diplomats and state leaders that engage in the 'high politics' of international relations, and thus international society is heavily concerned with norms of communication between these practitioners.

The third necessary element of international society is forms of exchange between states. While recognition and communication are necessary to have a framework under which states can develop shared norms, the "raison de système" logic should not be thought of purely in terms of limitations on state action. The ability for states to engage in forms of exchange provides a further reason for said states to prefer international society to conquest. Through exchange states are able to meet their needs without needing to resort to conquest, and therefore when a state is in a geopolitically dominant position it can prefer the enforcement and maintenance of international norms that promote beneficial exchange for that state over global conquest. I specifically use the phrase "exchange" here for two reasons. Firstly because exchange should be thought of as more than just the trade of goods and services between states. It is also the exchange of ideas, technology, people and other transfers. Secondly, I use the phrase exchange rather than trade or mutual exchange to recognise that international exchange systems are often coercive and enforced upon weaker powers in the international system, much as other norms are. What separates the primary institutions of exchange from the prior two primary institutions is that the prior institutions are based on frameworks of legal equality – sovereignty , diplomatic norms and international law all adopt a position of legal equality between the states, whereas the international political economy does not. However, the sometimes-coercive nature of its application is not to discount it as a grouping of norms and practices which shape the character of international society.

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[67] Bull, 'Part 2 Order in the Contemporary International System', 2.

Trade is the most basic form of primary institution regulating exchange between states, and is recognized by both Wight[68], Mayall[69] and Holsti[70] as primary institutions. The practice of international trade has become an increasingly complex network in the globalized system of international market relations that forms a key part of contemporary international society. Colonialism is the other primary institution recognized by Holsti[71] and Jackson[72] which regulated international exchange prior to its decline in the mid-twentieth century. Only Wight, Mayall and Holsti devote any significant analysis to questions of trade, and Holsti & Jackson's analysis of colonialism is less concerned with its role in international capital formation, rather their focus is on colonialism as a norm of global territorial/sovereign governance. The cause of a lack of interest in these primary institutions has been in part that they are not conducted primarily by the traditional subjects of English School analysis – statespeople, and thus its role in constituting the nature of international society has been heavily underrepresented. This is despite trade being the most regular interaction between states and significant amounts of international law and international governance existing to regulate international trade. The English School has always endeavoured to take an international sociological approach to understanding international society, by studying state relations through the diplomatic practices of its principal agents – namely diplomats. As the post-1945 world order has seen the rapid expansion of bodies to regulate and formalize international relations, this focus on one particular agent deserves revisiting. The English School should not divorce itself from its focus on rulership and the state, but should recognize that it is not only the formal diplomatic representatives that are participating in international society, but a wider body of NGO workers, intelligence operatives, financiers, international lawyers, and others who play key roles in international society.

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[68] Wight, '1. De Systematibus Civitatum'.

[69] Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*.

[70] K. J. Holsti, '7. International Trade', in *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2004), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491382.

[71] Holsti, '8. Colonialism'.

[72] Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*.

The final category of primary institutions of international society is the norms and practices of great power management. Stability of international society requires the buy in of all the great powers within the system in order for it to be maintained. This raises the question of what constitutes a great power. Bull provides a definition of the great powers as a group (there cannot be one great power or it becomes hegemonic) of top-tier military powers that are part of a club which order international society [73]. This is a good starting point for understanding the great powers, but its focus on military capacity misses other important factors such as prestige, diplomatic legitimacy, and economic power. Bull's definition of the great powers would exclude states such as Austria in 1815, or arguably contemporary China until its recent military modernizations of the last decade. I thus propose this simple and broader formulation of a great power. A great power is any state with the capacity (by whatever means, military, economic) to destabilize international order should it wish to, and as such concessions must be made to the state when it demands, less it become a revisionist power and aim to overturn the primary institutions of international society and reorder them to their benefit. This is a preferable definition for great power status because it gets at the major concern states have with great powers, that they are able to operate in international society with the threat of being able to upend the established order.

Great power management provides three necessary features for the functioning of international society. Firstly it discourages conflict between great powers which has the possibility for the disintegration of international society into conflict so great that international society can no longer function. Secondly, by setting the limits of great power activity, it allows the great powers to punish other norms violators in international society and maintain the overall stability of the system. Finally by allowing for accommodations between the great powers, it encourages the great powers to support the stability of the system rather than engaging in violent efforts to reorder the system for their advantage.

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[73] Hedley Bull, '9 The Great Powers and International Order', in *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1977).

Great power management has traditionally been viewed by the English School as a primary institution that promotes the health of the wider international society by limiting the ability for individual great powers to overwhelm international society through conquest. This has been the primary mode of great power interaction historically, where great power politics was largely conducted in a competitive, militaristic framework of alliance building and warfare. However, the increasingly globalized world economy, combined with a growing recognition of the need to protect the environment as a form of global commons has provided the possibility for new forms of great power management that are far more cooperative than prior modes of great power management. The arena that has received the most interest from the English School in this regard has been climate management, particularly from Falkner[74]. The great powers occupy their position in part because they are the largest economies of the world and as such are the primary contributors to climate change, placing them in the unique position to construct the rules necessary for the management of this newly recognized global commons. While climate change regulation is conducted multilaterally between large and small states, the viability of proposals for protecting the climate are decided by the ability for it to command the support of the USA, EU, China, and to a lesser extent, Brazil, India and Russia. This more cooperative form of great power (economic) management has adopted a mixed diplomatic and legalistic approach to cooperation between the great powers, and this, combined with the disproportionate role of the large economies makes international climate agreements better thought of as great power management rather than purely as international law. This new positive form of international management by the great powers may allow for the understanding of great power management to extend beyond simple concert and balancing arrangements to limit conquest.

The primary institutions associated with great power management are the most contentious among the key authors of the English School. The role of force in the maintenance of order has been a strong

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[74] Falkner, *Environmentalism and Global International Society*.

dividing line between different English School authors and as such different conclusions are reached

regarding primary institutions depending on if one agrees with authors such as Bull that believed that

conflict between the great powers can provide for the overall health of the system in the long run, or if

one considers great power conflict as a fundamental failure of international society to manage great

power relations. The Balance of Power is the quintessential primary institutions of this type for the

early English School, recognized by Wight[75] Bull[76] & Mayall[77] as primary institutions of international

society. A Balance of Power is necessary for the maintenance of great power cooperation, as

significant imbalances between great power alliance structures encourages the domination of one

power over the other and thus conflict, rather than cooperation. However the question remains the

degree to which states operate under a balance of power logic vs bandwagoning and other strategies in

the international system. A more important objection to the inclusion of the balance of power as a

primary institution is the question of if it is a norm or practice in which states attempt to participate in

consistently. While there have certainly been cases of deliberate balancing (the Concert of Europe in

the early nineteenth century being the paradigmatic case), Great Powers are just as often trying to

overcome the Balance of Power in their favour (such as during the Cold War). There have also been

cases of international societies in which the balance of power is not present, particularly the

international society in East Asia centred around Pre-Qing China, and arguably the Hegemonic US

position during the post-Cold War period. International Society endured because the hegemonic

power was willing to sustain the society system. The balance of power may be a material factor which

incentivises the compromises that encourage the formation of an international society. However this

author would argue that it differs from the other norms and practices of international society normally

defined as primary institutions, as it often lacks support from the practitioners of international

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[75] Martin Wight, '2. The States-System of Hellas', in *Systems of States*, ed. H. Bull (Leicester University Press, 1977).

[76] Hedley Bull, '5. The Balance of Power and International Order', in *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1977).

[77] James Mayall, '2. The Society of States', in *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge Core, 1990), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511559099.

relations, and thus this author would argue that it cannot be considered a norm or practice in the same way as international law or sovereignty.

War is another contentious feature recognised by Bull[78], Holsti[79] and Jackson[80] as a primary institution. War as argued by Bull is necessary in order to maintain the balance of power in international society and defeat revisionist powers, and thus serves to maintain international society in the long run. Even if this was true in the nineteenth century, this is a difficult argument to maintain in the contemporary world of nuclear weapons (as Bull recognised [81]). Bull believed that war as an institution also served to limit more heinous acts of violence through its developed structures and normative frameworks [82]. This author would argue this is a better argument for the inclusion of the "rules of war" to be considered a primary institution, rather than war itself – and normative frameworks such as just war theory have served to limit the exceptional violence of warfare in some cases. However, this author argues that both normative conduct in war, and the international societal limitations on war are too rarely followed to show a consistent sociological pattern of constraint on state activity. Too often warfare is the point at which the norms and practices of international society begin to be abandoned rather than strengthened as conflict offers an existential threat to the state. This particularly seems to be the case as wars become more protracted, and irregular, which tends to promote the further abandonment of norms that may have been held to at the beginning of a conflict. As such this author would argue against the inclusion of warfare as a primary institution of international society.

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[78] Hedley Bull, '8 War and International Order', in *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1977).

[79] K. J. Holsti, '9. War', in *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2004), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491382.

[80] R.H. Jackson, '9. Justifying Conventional War', in *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2000).

[81] Bull, '8 War and International Order'.

[82] Ibid.

The key element of this fourth category of necessary features of international society is the limitation of conflict (and promotion of cooperation) between the great powers. This is essential, given the destabilizing power held by the great powers in international society. This chapter gives arguments against the inclusion of both war and the balance of power as primary institutions, however strong arguments are given for these elements as primary institutions by other authors and it is beyond the scope and objectives of this chapter to fully refute their inclusion beyond the comments given here. Those authors who have argued in favour of their inclusion see the role of both institutions primarily as limiting the power of revisionist powers in international society, and thus these elements of international society could be considered under the same category of great power management.

Fig 2: Rules of International Conduct

These four categories of primary institutions combine to form the rules which are the basis of international society. Similar to the previously outlined domestic primary institutions of the state, these primary institutions are co-constitutive of each other, and no particular category of primary institution has primacy over the other. The combination of the domestic and international primary institutions form the 'Logic of International Society' (Fig 3, see overleaf). This represents the sum total of the norms and practices that define what a legitimate actor is within international society (in the contemporary era, the state) and how those actors should interact with one another. This highlights that international society has expectations both for state behaviour (domestic and international) as well as how a state should be constituted, and these expected norms and practices form a coherent network of norms and practices that states are expected to fulfil in order to be part of international society. When the particulars of the primary institutions of international society significantly change, then international society is operating under a new systemic logic.

The Norms and Practices of International Society

Domestic Primary Institutions

Legitimacy
Nationalism, Nativism, Materialism, Democratic Practices, Legalism, Monarchy, Personal Rule, Political Institutions, Religious Identity

Obligations
Conscription, Citizenship, Constitutional Rights, Legal Equality, Individual Rights.

Space
Territoriality, Sovereignty

Productive Forces
: Capitalism, Property Rights, Taxation, Corporate Personhood, Environmental Law

State Bureaucracy
Formalized Civil Services, Political Patronage Networks, Party-Ruled States

A Unit of International Society: The Nation State

International Primary Institutions

Recognition and Legitimation
Sovereignty, Territoriality

Communication and Mutual Agreement
Diplomatic Practice, International Law

Exchange
Trade

Great Power Management
Great Power Management, Climate Regulations -
War, Balance of Power

Rules of International Conduct: Global Sovereign Equality

The Logic of International Society: Global International Society

Fig 3: The Complete Representation of international society

Differentiation from Prior English School Theorists

Where then does the model proposed above differ from earlier models of primary institutions given by the key figures of the English School? I have assembled the primary institutions of international society given by Bull, Wight, Holsti, Mayall, James and Jackson in Fig 4 (overleaf), categorized into the four categories given above. The two notable omissions from my own conception of primary institutions are the exclusion of the Balance of Power and Warfare as primary institutions of international society (highlighted in red in Fig 4). Neither of these institutions are recognized by all six authors, although a sufficient plurality of preceding theorists recognize them as primary institutions of international society that they are worth addressing.

| Recognition & Legitimation		Communication and Mutual Agreement		Exchange		Great Power Management	
Primary Institution	*Author*	Primary Institution	*Author*	Primary Institution	*Author*	Primary Institution	*Author*
Sovereignty	*Wight, Hosti, Mayall, James, Jackson*	Diplomacy	*Wight, Bull, Holsti, Mayall, James, Jackson*	Trade	*Wight, Holsti, Mayall*	Balance of Power	*Wight, Bull, Mayall*
The State	*Bull, Holsti.*	International Law	*Wight, Bull, Holsti, Mayall, James, Jackson*			War	*Bull, Jackson*
Territoriality/ Territorial Integrity/ Independence	*Mayall, Holsti James*	Alliances, Guarantees, Neutrality, Arbitration.	*Wight*			Great Power Management	*Bull*
- Mayall and Holsti Recognize Colonialism as a primary institution of a previous era of international society. - Mayall provides the principles of Human Rights, Non-Discrimination, Self-Determination, Non-Intervention along with those listed above, but these are better conceptualized as principles of sovereignty and/or international law. - Wight gives Dynastic Principles and Religious Practices as primary institutions of historic international society.							

Fig 4: Existing English School primary institutions Categorized[83]

The choice to avoid the inclusion of war as a primary institution returns to the social goal of primary institutions as norms and practices for regulating the interaction between states such as to create an *ordered* international system. Order is not necessarily the same as justice, and the exclusion of war as

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[83] Buzan, 'The Primary Institutions of International Society'. Serves as an inspiration for this reformulated table

a primary institution is not to adopt a pacifist position that all wars are illegitimate in international society. There are often reasons to prefer war over peace on the grounds of justice (humanitarian intervention to halt a genocide, wars of national liberation, etc). However, that does not detract from their destabilizing nature in international society. This work rejects the notion that war can be used as a tool with which to limit the expansion of the great powers in the international system, particularly in the modern era in which these states have access to nuclear weapons. Bull would raise concerns about the operability of War as a tool of great power management in the era of the Cold War, with a possible replacement of it as a primary institution with deterrence. However our Post-Cold War experience has shown that deterrence is rarely effective when wars are often either internal, or involve a super-power warring against a small state that has no reasonable capacity for deterring the other. The wars of our contemporary era fall into two major camps, internal civil conflicts (which have often received outside intervention from great powers) and expansionistic (Kuwait (1990), Ukraine). Neither of these types of war have contributed to the stability of international order. The destabilization of states engaged in warfare, arms flows out of warzones, the radicalization of combatants who then move to other active warzones and the upsetting of established regional practices of order created by wars all go to create further international instability. In some occasions (such as in Kosovo or Kuwait) it may be preferable for an intervention to occur in order to punish further norm breaking (much as there are cases in which one might be justified in breaking societal norms for a greater purpose) but this does not promote a general doctrine of the use of force as norm or practice that creates order in international society. The regular resort to even handed condemnations of war on both sides of conflicts by the international community and calls for immediate ceasefire appears to be further empirical evidence of there being little acceptance of general support for a normative intervention, as was the majority rejection of the final pillar of R2P among the general assembly members of the UN.

This conception also excludes the balance of power as a primary institution of international relations. Firstly, there remain empirical questions about whether or not states engage in balancing behaviour,

particularly when alternative drivers of alliance structure such as ideology, nationalism, religious and cultural identity and the historic relationship between states, play an equal if not greater role in how states choose to structure their alliances as balancing. The archetypical form of balancing behaviour is the European great powers of the nineteenth century, an era in which there were (relatively) low levels of ideological diversity between the actors that allowed alliances to be formed and dissolved easily. Following the the highly ideological wars of the twentieth century, conflicting states appear to have far less room to manoeuvre when balancing and still remain within their ideological position. There is also questions as to what constitutes balancing as a practice. Turkey, a NATO state has arguably engaged in 'Soft Balancing' against both Greece and the United States without taking hostile steps such as leaving the alliance raising further questions about what constitutes balancing behaviour. Finally, different states empirically seem more or less inclined to engage in balancing behaviour for reasons that have little to do with state capacity. For example, France and Britain, both states of similar power in the international system, adopt different postures towards the United States, with one having historically adopted approaches closer to soft balancing (particularly during the De Gualle NATO Crisis and the Second Iraq War) while the United Kingdom adopts a bandwagoning approach. Balancing is also far more structural of a concept than the other primary institutions. It lacks clearly understood social norms, which would explain the differentiation in states willingness to pursue balancing as a behaviour. Balancing, unlike adherence to international law or state sovereignty, is not a socially expected category of behaviour among the international community (and it can often involve actions that are condemned by international society, for example funding terror groups or proxy wars). It may possibly describe a pattern of behaviour by certain states in international society, but it is neither universal enough, nor containing the normative element necessary to be considered a primary institution.

The concept of the State as a primary institution has here been developed into its constituent elements which can themselves be considered primary institutions. This may at first appear as a divorce from the traditional English School focus on international society, but it is very much in the tradition of

work such as Mayall[84] and Jackson[85] who both interrogate deeply the nature of the state units within international society as well as the states' relationships to each other. Where this work moves beyond authors is to recognise the pluralism that exists within the state structure and the way in which these norms and practices are co-constitutive with those that set the rules of state interaction in international society. Authors in the English School have largely either discounted the differentiation of states and viewed them as identical Weberian national units (I.E. Bull), or the focus has been on those states that fail to reach "the standard" of the nation state and how they should be managed as part of international society. (I.E. Mayall & Jackson). Instead this work recognises differentiation within the structures of the nation states as an inevitable part of pluralistic international society, and we should consider how the differentiation of the units drives competing goals within the international system that can change the norms of international society. It is in fact the differentiation between the primary institutions of the state units which create competing state interests even within an international society that has generally accepted the impermissibility of conquest. For example the differentiation in levels of national development produce competing interests in the arrangement of the global international trade system, which manifested itself in the competition between Western norms of free-trade and developmentalist norms from the Global South of tariffs and cartel export pricing (I.E. OPEC) in the 1970s.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to provide an opening for a reassessment of how the English School conceives of primary institutions in two major areas. The first has been a return to Bullian notions of necessity as a model for providing a functional typology of primary institutions. This functional typology seeks to firstly provide a framework for the expansion of thinking about primary institutions beyond our contemporary global political context. By having a functional typology, research into

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[84] Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*.
[85] Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*.

alternative historical and regional international societies can be grounded in the same English School language of primary institutions as those analyses of our contemporary international order. Secondly, it clarifies the social purpose of the wide ranging sets of primary institutions that have been designated by other authors and allows for a more contextualized understanding of their social function and historical development; this is particularly true given the comparative possibilities this functional typology offers. For example, the possibility for comparing alternative models of recognition and legitimation between different historical international societies, clarifies the historical development of the particular form of recognition and legitimation practiced in contemporary international society and decentres it as just one of a number of possible normative frameworks for achieving the same social function.

The second major intervention of this piece has been to provide a model for investigating the domestic norms and practices of a state which shape the socialization of their respective foreign policy practitioners, and interrelating them with the primary institutions which are the traditional subject of concern for English School analysis. This clarifies the ability for the development of international norms and practice to be driven by domestic contexts. It also highlights the domestic practices which have both socialized international relations practitioners, and which play a constitutive role in international society, as certain expectations about domestic state structures are necessary for a political entity to be recognized as a member of international society.

This work is thus an attempt to create an opening for the further study and conceptualization of primary institutions. It seeks to open space for considering alternative modes of international society, and for understanding our contemporary international society with greater understanding of both historical context and social function. This work aims therefore to be an opening of a conversation and a point of departure for further research within the English School. It seeks to provide a framework for further thinking about the social function of primary institutions, as well as work in

conversation with the existing literature on both primary institutions and regional/historical

international societies. A clear theoretical framework for the understanding of the nature of primary

institutions will form the fundamental basis for the rest of the exploration of the role of colonialism

and decolonisation on the other primary institutions of international society, which will take place

over chapters four, five and six.

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Chapter Three: Distinguishing between the Agents and Subjects of International Society

Buzan describes international society as a second order society - a society "where the members are not individual human beings, but durable collectives of humans possessed of identities and actor qualities that are more than the sum of their parts."[1] Beyond Buzan; the discussion of international relations is replete with the analogy of the state as a singular, personified entity, both by statespeople, academics and the public at large. States are imagined to have a "self-interest", they have an "opinion" on international events, a mind to make decisions and a body (politic) with which to exercise power[2]. For much of the English School, the state remains the principle subject of this second order society; the state is the privileged agent, with other agents playing only a marginal role in international society when compared to the centrality of states. If international society really is a second order society of "durable collectives" with the state as a central concern, it is notable many of those "durable collectives" have existed in their current formation for less than a single human lifespan. From the viewpoint of these newer states, international society appears far less durable than Buzan presents. The nature of these durable political collectives have also undergone phases of development and change throughout the modern era, as the constitutive institutions of international society have developed.

An ongoing debate within the English School is the question of what or whom is the important subject of study for those seeking to understand the functioning of international society. The answer of the early generations of English School theorists such as Bull[3] and Wight[4] was to study the state and the

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[1] Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 95:26.
[2] Iver B. Neumann, 'Beware of Organicism: The Narrative Self of the State', *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 2 (2004): 259–67.
[3] Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*.
[4] Wight, *Power Politics* (1978); Wight, *Systems of States*.

interactions of states from a perspective which drew upon both sociological approaches and traditionalist, pre-behavioural approaches of understanding the international system. Wilson[5] divides these approaches into "outsider" socio-structural approaches, and traditional "insider" approaches such as the study of diplomatics. These insider approaches are forms of deep understanding gained through the repeated interaction of academics imbedded within a community (in this case, bureaucrats and policy makers) while simultaneously studying it, which gives them a holistic and deep understanding of "the way they think". These two approaches seem to sit in inherent tension with one another, as outsider approaches assume that states are political entities that are driven largely by achieving assumed (and possibly fixed) objectives from their relative position within a system; which develops their relationship to various norms and practices in international society. The outsider approach of the English School provides it with an approach which is most methodologically similar with the big "orthodox" theories of international relations – Realism and Liberalism. On the other hand, an insider approach would imply that the diplomatic, political and bureaucratic "cultures" that develop within the state do matter, and that these structural explanations are not enough on their own. If all the decision making of states could be understood through outsider, structural explanations, then there would be no purpose in developing a deep understanding of a state's political and bureaucratic cultures; as they would offer no real understanding of a state's actions, it would provide at best an explanation of the self-motivated reasoning states would arrive at the decision the structure would dictate. It is the insider approach of the English School which makes which makes it methodologically similar to more critical approaches, particularly constructivism (other authors have argued the English School is effectively a form of proto-constructivism[6]), but in approaches such as Manning's[7], closer to approaches placed firmly in the critical methodological camp such as post-structuralism.

The tension between these insider and outsider approaches within the English School are not a weakness of the school, but are instead the strength of its approach. It provides the possibility for

[5] Wilson, 'The English School Meets the Chicago School: The Case for a Grounded Theory of International Institutions'.
[6] Reus-Smit, 'Constructivism and the English School'.
[7] C.A.W. Manning, *Nature of International Society* (Macmillan Education UK, 1975).

developing a semi-structural understanding of international society which also allows for the possibility that states exist within a framework; while simultaneously they can have different objectives and cultural relations to the wider norms and practices of international society that can make them act in different ways. These alternative understandings of the norms and practices of international society, along with different understandings of the objectives of the state by its policy makers and bureaucrats, can often be a cause of state actions which realists and liberals would consider irrational state behaviour that cannot be explained only by miscalculation. The English school is thus an approach which can provide for both the explanatory power of "grand theory" while also allowing for the critical and deep understanding of critical theory.

One of the key failings of many theorists to resolve the tension of the insider and outsider answers of the English School is a failure to understand that they apply to two different referent objects of study. The outsider approaches are tools for studying interactions at a system level, particularly the constraints of power (both material and normative) that confine the use of a particular political cultures expression of interests and the use of power. This is an important analytical tool as the constraints shape the expression of a state's political culture, and also because the total interaction of state and non-state subjects creates a system which itself can be analysed as a subject of interest for international relations scholars. On the other hand insider approaches are tools for understanding the political cultures and beliefs of the individuals who are the decision makers that determine the use of state power.

This chapter seeks to develop the analytical distinction between these two referent objects of interest for the English School, and thus synthesise insider and outsider approaches to the study of international society within the school. It aims to further clarify the analytical distinctions between the referent objects of interest for the English School and also provide historical insight into their emergence as social phenomena, and how this created modern international society.

The Subject vs the Agent of International Society

States hold a unique, privileged, political-legal status in international society that has be

institutionalised through the repeated development of norms and practices in the modern era[8]. Only

states can declare war on one another[9], sign and be bound by treaty obligations[10], and they are also the

enforcers of international law within their territories[11]. A state has a form of legal personhood in

international law, analogous to corporate personhood in domestic law, and is it is treated as a unitary

actor for the purposes of international legal arbitration[12]. It is because of this unique socio-legal

position (among other reasons) that the state has been the primary interest of English School theorists.

The importance of the analytical and legal distinctiveness of the state as a collective entity with legal

personhood has been interrogated by numerous international relations scholars. Notably Wendt[13] in a

forum on state personhood in Review of International Studies (2004), his argument critiqued by

Lomas[14], which received a reply from Wendt[15] and was further expanded on by later contributions to

the debate from Franke and Roos[16] and Schiff[17]. The Forum also included key contributions on the

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[8] James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law* (Oxford University Press, 2006).

[9] Christopher Greenwood, 'The Concept of War in Modern International Law', *International & Comparative Law Quarterly* 36, no. 2 (1987): 283–306.

[10] See first clause of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969).

[11] Michael Feit, 'Responsibility of the State Under International Law for the Breach of Contract Committed by a State-Owned Entity', *Berkeley Journal of International Law* 28 (2010): 142–78.

[12] Jorg Kustermans, 'The State as Citizen: State Personhood and Ideology', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 14 (2011): 1–27.

[13] Alexander Wendt, 'The State as Person in International Theory', *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 2 (2004): 289–316.

[14] Peter Lomas, 'Anthropomorphism, Personification and Ethics: A Reply to Alexander Wendt', *Review of International Studies* 31, no. 2 (2005): 349–55.

[15] Alexander Wendt, 'How Not to Argue against State Personhood: A Reply to Lomas', *Review of International Studies* 31, no. 2 (2005): 357–60.

[16] Ulrich Franke and Ulrich Roos, 'Actor, Structure, Process: Transcending the State Personhood Debate by Means of a Pragmatist Ontological Model for International Relations Theory', *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 4 (2010): 1057–77.

[17] Jacob Schiff, '"Real"? As If! Critical Reflections on State Personhood', *Review of International Studies* 34, no. 2 (2008): 363–77.

subject by Neumann[18], Jackson[19], and Wight[20]. This chapter seeks to build upon these existing arguments around the analytical nature of state personhood, by developing the distinction between the agents and subjects of international society.

Despite its recognition as an international legal principle, the "state as person" understanding of state subjectivity breaks down not only analytically, but also legally in exceptional legal circumstances. While states can be declared the guilty or victim parties in the case of the illegal invasion of one state by another, the legal fiction of state personhood is often done away with when considering the prosecution of individual guilty parties for crimes committed during war. For example, during the trials for war crimes and acts of aggression committed during the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Serbian government as a legal entity was accused at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of committing genocide[21] alongside collective organs of the state, such as the Serbian armed forces[22], but individual cases of genocide and crimes against humanity were brought against Serbian leaders such as Radovan Karadžić[23] and Slobodan Milošević[24].

What is being recognised in the legal decision to prosecute not only the state but also the leading individuals in command of the state apparatuses is that the state itself cannot have decision making agency. The state is an important legal fiction for the functioning of international society, but it is not a moral decision maker, real individuals must make the decisions around how a state deploys its

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[18] Neumann, 'Beware of Organicism: The Narrative Self of the State'.
[19] Jackson, 'Hegel's House, or "People Are States Too"'.
[20] Colin Wight, 'State Agency: Social Action without Human Activity?', *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 2 (2004): 269–80.
[21] Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 91 (International Court of Justice 2007), https://www.icj-cij.org/case/91.
[22] (IT-05-87) The Prosecutor v. Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir Lazarević, Sreten Lukić & Milan Milutinović (United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 2009).
[23] (IT-95-5/18) The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 2016).
[24] (IT-02-54) The Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 2006).

power, and those individuals are thus culpable for state actions. The decision to find individuals personally culpable for the actions of their state was first normalized as a legal principle during the Nuremberg trials in the contemporary framework of international law. However precedent for the recognition of distinguishing between the state as a legal entity and policy makers can be seen as early as the declaration of Napoleon as a legal outlaw by the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

Individual legal culpability in state action is an acceptance that, at least at a senior level, the power over a bureaucracy (and thus the agency to deploy state power) is concentrated sufficiently within the decision making of certain key individuals that they are able to determine the course of state action. Therefore understanding both the individual reasoning of these policy makers, and the wider bureaucratic culture in which they make decisions, should be a valuable referent object of study for English School theorists interested in understanding the causes of particular contemporary and historical events in international society.

Prior conceptions of the structure of international society that have attempted to account for its dynamic and evolving nature have used the concept of "interested agents in action"[25]. These "agents" in the Navari model were primarily states, but also encompassed key non-state actors in international society. In this model, the "interested agents" were socialized by the norms and practices of international society which creates a loose web of normative constraints on action. While this is a valuable theoretical model for understanding state-state and state-non-state interactions in international society it misses a number of key factors about the participants of international society. Building upon the ideas of Navari and Knudsen[26], this chapter recommends distinguishing between two distinct categories, the "subjects" and "agents" of international society. In this model, the subjects of international society are the legal political entities that are recognized by their particular legal place

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[25] Knudsen and Navari, *International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order*.
[26] Ibid.

in international society - The United Kingdom, The United States of America, The Russian Federation, are all examples of the subjects of international society. On the other hand, the individuals who occupy the key decision making positions within the bureaucracies of these state and other organizations are the "agents" of international society.

The subjects and agents of international society are interrelated categories. It is the existence of and the recognition of the authority of these legal subjects (both domestically and by the rest of international society), that empowers the agents of international society with the ability to marshal and direct power, and by doing so act in international society. It is thus an individual's position within a bureaucratic structure that allows them to wield power within international society and thus makes them an "agent" of international society. Similarly it is the existence of these agents which empower the subjects of international society with decision making capacity and the ability to act. The agents imbue the state/entity with agency through their concerted actions in international society, a subject is merely a legal fiction without the agents to staff the bureaucracy that allows it to exert the power its claims to hold as a subject of international society.

Distinguishing between the subject and agents of international society provides a number of analytical benefits to our understanding of state behaviour beyond considering the state as a unitary political actor. Firstly, it recognizes that the first network of socialisation for those agents that determine the decisions of the state is not international, but their domestic societies. Individual agents are first socialized into the political and ethical norms of their domestic culture before entering their state bureaucracy, in which these agents are again further socialized into the norms of conduct within the state bureaucracy (which will be influenced from without by international society) before finally being influenced by engaging with their interlocutors from other governments when becoming a trusted agent of international society.

This distinction thus directs those wishing to understand policy makers and their decision making processes at a deeper level to first investigate the domestic political culture of the state in which they operate, then going on to consider the state's bureaucratic culture, before finally considering the state's place in the structures of international society. In a period of increasing pluralism within international society, post-1945, It is the closeness in political domestic culture which can provide a significant explanation for the alliances between states and the development of regional international societies (such as the European Union), where states share domestic political cultures with a degree of commonality which eases collaboration and increases buy-in to the shared institutions built between state's as they can come from a common foundation of shared domestic political norms and practices. Understanding how a political culture understands international society and that state's role in it also provides significant explanatory power to the reasoning behind state behaviour. By distinguishing between the agent and the subjects of international society it becomes clearer the ways in which the agents of different states can have different understandings of the character of international society and their state's goals within it while officially operating from a position of uniformity/equality between states.

Moving beyond the understanding of the state as a unitary actor and returning to a focus on individual practitioners allows for the recognition of differing conceptions of proper state action by different agents within the state. State bureaucracies are staffed by (and political decisions are made by), a number of individuals that may belong to different political parties, class and social/ethnic groups. These groups develop shared social understandings of the "best interest" of the state and the way it should act to achieve this in international society through their repeated interactions with one another. Similarly, members of different political/cultural groupings within a state can be socialized into the norms of international society to different degrees, with some groups more readily accepting the norms and practices of international society, while others may adopt a more disruptive or revolutionary posture to established international institutions.

Analysis of the individual agents of international society allows for the recognition that decision makers within the state do not engage with international society as a collective mind, but as an individual, socialized into their understanding of their role as a representative of the state by their membership of the state bureaucracy. These individuals will thus have different approaches to their individual conduct in international society and also to their understanding of the way in which to best fulfil the state's objectives based upon their socialization, not only internationally, but also domestically, within the aforementioned groupings. Conceiving of the state as directed by agents is particularly important when analysing democratic states, for whom the transition from one political party to another can bring about a rapid shift in the state's approach to the political issues of international society, as the formal decision making powers of the state transition en-masse from agents of one political party to another.

Beyond the explanatory power offered by a refocussing on the domestic socialization of the agents of international society; recognizing the individual nature of these actors allows for English School analysis to move away from purely structural explanations for the actions of practitioners of international diplomacy. This move allows space for the genuine agency of policy makers in the international sphere to be integrated into the English Schools largely structural analysis. While most policy makers become so socialized into the expectations of correct practice within both their state and international society as a whole that they are functionally interchangeable, and thus their actions can be explained and predicted through a structural model, there remain individuals who are able to escape these social constraints to exercise real power and agency in their decision making. Kissinger's decision to break with state department orthodoxy and open US relations with the People's Republic of China is the best known example of this in the latter half of the 20th century. While his actions can to some extent be explained through the structural incentives driving the United States during the Cold War, it must be recognized the role played by Kissinger as a singular agent willing to risk seriously breaking with the international, and domestic political and bureaucratic cultural constraints that had stopped US-Chinese rapprochement in earlier decades. Kissinger's decision to open a new

phase of US-Chinese relations was facilitated in large part because of the considerable power of US state policy which was concentrated in himself as a singular individual (and similarly in his negotiating counterparts, Mao Zedong and Zhou-Enlai). We should expect that states in which decision making is more greatly concentrated into the hands of fewer individuals, and also states with a less developed bureaucratic culture (and thus fewer developed expectations of practice) would be more likely to break with the conventional expectations of state behaviour. This is because when power is diffuse throughout a bureaucratic system, there are more loci of resistance to policies breaking from convention than there are in systems in which power is concentrated. A situation of diffuse power thus reduces the capacity of those seeking to break with conventional norms and practice and also increases the personal cost upon them should such an effort fail. Thus the nature of the domestic norms and practices of the state are essential when considering the explanation for state behaviour, but the English School should also consider the distribution of power to the different agents representing the state.

Further development of the understanding of the agents of international society alongside the English School's focus on the subjects of international society would allow for a reintegration of traditionalist approaches to the English School's contemporary analytical framework, marrying the scientific, structural approaches to the macro-structure of international society with the deep understanding of traditionalist approaches when understanding the micro level of individual policy makers and domestic bureaucratic institutions.

The Historic Development of the Agents of International Society

The agent as an independent representative of the state is a historical development of the early modern period which presaged the establishment of the first true "international society" in our contemporary understanding as a political community of timeless, independent, sovereign entities. How then did we

arrive at this unique political structuring in the early modern period that had not been able to exist before? Prior to the emergence of the state in the early modern period, Europe was dominated by proto-state formations - namely Dynasties[27]. Dynasties of the late medieval period share a number of the characteristics we associate with states in modern international society. They are durable socio-political institutions, surviving beyond the death of the individual dynast. They have associated goals, ambitions, claims and beliefs, and these influence the actions of the dynasty over multiple generations. They were also able to lay claim to legal authority, power, and call upon the loyalty of individuals associated with the dynasty[28]. However one of the key distinctions between the late medieval system and the early modern system was that inter-dynastic relations during the feudal period were interpersonal and inter-familial, with obligations being owed between individuals and family units. Treaties of the period were conducted under canon contract law between individual monarchs/nobles, rather than an abstracted legal entity[29], and were often sealed socio-politically through inter-marriage of families in the case of particularly weighty treaties, such a peace agreements between previously warring enemies. It would not be until the early modern period in which the treaties would be signed under a sovereign's royal title rather than in his own name, implying a continued obligation to the abstracted dynastic state which existed beyond the individual ruler.[30] The nature of these treaty obligations being based in Christian canon law rather than the positive legal tradition of the later modern period was one of many barriers to the creation of an international society that expanded beyond the concept of "Christendom" to facilitate negotiation between Christian and Non-Christian sovereigns.

Feudal relations of the early and high-medieval period were defined by only a limited differential in power and prestige between monarchs and the most important regional noble families. However, a

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[27] Jeroen Duindam, 'The Modern State and the End of Dynasty', in *Dynasties: A Global History of Power, 1300–1800* (Cambridge University Press, 2016).
[28] Ibid.
[29] Randall Lesaffer, *European Legal History: A Cultural and Political Perspective*, ed. JanTranslator Arriens (Cambridge University Press, 2009), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107300866.
[30] Ibid.

series of localized political events combined with major structural crises such as the Black Death towards the middle and end of the late medieval period allowed for a consolidation of power into the hands of the sovereign for the first time. This shift in the material conditions of late medieval Europe created a change in the normative relationship between the monarch and those they ruled, and also in the relationships between royal dynasties. The consolidation of power during this period created a growing gap in prestige between the monarch and their nobles, which in turn created a greater normative distinction between royal dynasties and other influential families in Europe[31]. This differentiation allowed for the construction of a normative political framework which marginalized other feudal power holders from the inter-political relations of these newly enshrined "sovereigns". These changes in practice were reinforced by normative political developments in favour of Absolutist rule by the monarch. The right to rule was increasingly normatively understood to be held by a particular dynasty who legitimized their position not through strength of arms but by their family being selected by god to rule.

As power consolidated in the figure of the monarch during the late-medieval and early modern period, we simultaneously have the rise of the first recognisably modern practitioners of international relations, and thus the first true "international society". These figures usually arose from the late medieval/early modern transitionary role of the "court favourite" - a figure that held a close interpersonal relationship with the sovereign and was thus trusted to advance their interests in the sphere of inter-sovereign politics[32]. These figures were often from a lesser noble family that had access to the royal court but an insufficient power-base to be independent political actors their own right. Instead these individuals associated their personal and familial position with the advancement of the interests of the sovereign dynasty. This close personal association between a practitioners individual interests and the interests of the sovereign they represent, along with the development of

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[31] Sidney Painter, 'From Feudal to National Monarchy', in *A History of the Middle Ages 284–1500* (Springer, 1953).

[32] Elizabeth Wirth Marvick, 'Favorites in Early Modern Europe: A Recurring Psychopolitical Role', *The Journal of Psychohistory* 10, no. 4 (1983): 463.

early bureaucratic institutions of the state, and a permanent position as the sovereigns representative rather than serving in an ad-hoc capacity, are the features that make these political actors the forbearers of modern international relations practitioners rather than a continuation of feudal practices.[33] Key historical examples of these early modern practitioners include Cardinal Richelieu (France), Gaspar de Guzman the Count-Duke of Olivares (Spain), Count Axel Oxenstierna (Sweden) Prince Christian of Anhalt-Bernburg (Palatinate) among others. It is notable that many of these figures also served in the de facto position of prime-minister and would be foundational to the establishment of early state bureaucratic practices, as well as the key figure in negotiating their sovereign's foreign policy, as there was not yet a distinction between domestic and international state bureaucracy.[34]

The empowerment of individuals to act on the sovereigns behalf would give way to formalized bureaucratic civil service structures over the course of the nineteenth century. Alongside this the rise of nationalism moved the concept of the sovereign from an actual individual to the imagined community of the nation.[35] The early international society developed from the domestic culture of European courts, with the agents of the states socialized in proper diplomatic behaviour through their experience being socialized in the European court system. As states became more formalized and diplomatic practice moved away from negotiations between royal sovereigns to negotiations between sovereign entities, the nature of proper diplomatic practice would develop through the repeated interaction of the state's representatives.

Secondary Agents and Subjects of International Society

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[33] John Huxtable Elliott, *The World of the Favourite* (Yale University Press, 1999).
[34] Steven CA Pincus, *1688: The First Modern Revolution* (Yale University Press, 2009).
[35] Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*.

So far this chapter has focussed on the agents which serve as representatives of a particular state and are able to direct state decision making. This has been the principle focus of most English School analyses of international society. The existence of these state agents as the principle concern of English School theorists is justifiable not necessarily because these state agents are uniquely important to international politics; (arguably key individuals in large non-governmental organizations and multi-national businesses wield more power than the agents of some states), but because international society fundamentally a "second order" society (in the words of Buzan) in which the agents of the state are its primary members. The English School is the effort to take a sociological approach to the study of this society, and thus the focus on the agents of the state is not a reflection on the power of the state per se, but a recognition that the agents of the state are afforded special recognition within international society.

As previously discussed international society emerged as a something recognizable to its contemporary form at the end of the early modern period. It is not possible to give an exact dating to this event, as the transition from medieval to modern inter-state politics was inevitably a gradual, iterative transition, there was no singular date upon which "international society" was founded. Much work has recently been done rehistorizing the Treaty of Westphalia away from its imagined status as the "foundational" document of modern international relations, a position it has held in international relations canon since the early founding of the discipline[36]. However, we can place its emergence as a phenomenon to around this period, and the Treaty of Westphalia formalizes many of the informal developments of norms and practices that had already been occurring on the path to building contemporary international society. A defining characteristic of this new international society was the social exclusion of non-state actors (such as the catholic and state churches) from the political decision making process of international society, which was to be decided only by the representatives of the sovereigns (states). Prior to the twentieth century, institutions such as the Concert of Europe for

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[36] Tom Ginsburg, 'Eastphalia as the Perfection of Westphalia', *Ind. J. Global Legal Stud.* 17 (2010): 27.

the negotiated settlement of disputes within international society were ad-hoc affairs convened when needed by the agents of the states themselves. There was thus effectively only one type of agent of international society – the state/sovereign representative.

The agents of international society legitimate themselves as the only proper actors to wield authority in the international system through their mutual recognition of each other and the exclusion of non-state actors. This exclusion and mutual recognition has been the defining feature of contemporary international society which has sustained its political power since the early modern period, and legitimates the special authority of the state to wield coercive power both at an international and domestic level. The establishment of this unique political community emerges from the court structures of Europe, and continuations of the legacy of ennobling state representatives with a certain prestige of the royal sovereign can still be seen in the use of titles such as "your excellency" for ambassadors and state representatives. There is a mutually beneficial social game at play among state elites to enshrine their own power by elevating their prestige above other powerful heads of business or non-governmental bodies, and this in part explains the endurance of what Jackson describes as "quasi-states"[37], states with governments that are too weak to function as de facto political subjects, but which must receive equal social standing within international society to ensure the continued exclusion of non-state actors.

In the twentieth century we see for the first time the establishment of permanent, bureaucratic institutions for the management of interstate relations. Beginning in earnest with the establishment of the League of Nations and expanding following the post-1945 international political settlement which founded the United Nations, and other key international bodies such as the international court of justice, the international monetary fund, etc. This created for the first time a class of bureaucratic agents that operate within international society on a permanent basis but who did not themselves

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[37] Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*.

represent states. For the subjects of international society this development was important as it represented the first voluntary abrogation of power and sovereignty to permanent institutions established for the ordering of international society, rather than the bilateral and ad hoc approach to the management of international society that characterized the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries.

For the agents of international society this was an important development because it would create a new class of political agents. Key individuals such as the UN Secretary General, and their deputy, under and assistant secretaries interact within the social community of state policy makers. These individuals are often drawn from prior roles within the political bureaucracies of states, while others rise through the ranks of the United Nations bureaucracy itself. The establishment of these permanent institutions for the management of inter-state relations has necessitated the creation of a bureaucratic structure which defines the organization and provides the staff necessary to carry out its permanent functions. This in turn creates a new bureaucratic culture of UN officials, which have a particular way of understanding how to do politics, and the agents that move through this institution and are socialized into its bureaucratic culture themselves influence state agents through their repeated interactions with them in international society.

English School theorists have adopted the term "secondary institutions" to distinguish these entities from the "primary" or "foundational" institutions of international society (discussed earlier in the thesis). I argue that this is in part misunderstanding the nature of these types of international institutions. Instead of considering them as something different from the states that take part in them, a more useful distinction would be to consider the states and state policy makers as the "primary" subjects and agents of international society, and bodies such as the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, and other supranational bodies for organizing society as "secondary" subjects and the individuals serving in this bodies as "secondary" agents of international society. This distinction captures more clearly the nature of these bodies by understanding them not as formalized tools for the

management of state affairs, as is implied by the comparison with primary institutions, rather what these bodies are is legal subjects with claims to forms of authority mutually recognized by international society, which have created their own bureaucratic cultures around themselves and which provide agents that interact in international society on behalf of these institutions. Primary is used here for states and secondary for these supranational entities because these secondary entities are established with the understanding that they gain their power and authority from the voluntary surrender of it from the primary subjects. For example, the UN has no coercive power to raise taxes with which to fund its bureaucratic structures, it instead relies on contributions from the member states. There is thus a distinction of kind between these entities, and international law continues to maintain a privileged position for the role of the state as sovereign in international society. The reliance on consensus of the member states by these secondary subjects also changes the nature of the bureaucratic culture in which its agents are socialized, and thus it is valuable to make a distinction between these entities and states themselves despite both being bureaucratic political legal entities in international society. [38]

The relative wealth, power and prestige of these secondary subjects of international society has had a significant effect on the political culture of newly emergent states. Jackson highlights in *Quasi-States*[39] the problem of the existence of states which have de jure legal recognition to territoriality over a particular region but which lack the capacity to enforce those claims. Similarly there exist a number of states and semi-autonomous regions in the post-colonial and developing world in which the state is weak or near non-existent. In these regions, representatives of these new secondary subjects

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[38] The European Union serves as an interesting transition point between these primary and secondary subjects, as it is increasingly transitioning from a consensus based suprastate model to one in which it has coercive power over the European member states, and it holds seats in important trade bodies that would otherwise only be able to be held by nation states, showing that international society partially recognizes the EU as this body somewhere between a state and a supranational institution. It could be possible that bodies such as the African Union, ECOWAS, or ASEAN may develop towards a similar position, but currently only the EU has developed the depth of integration and coercive power over its member states to challenge the notion of if it is a secondary or primary subject of international society, but it raises interesting future questions for the possibility of entities to transition from one role to the other.

[39] Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*.

such as United Nations aid programs, or United Nations Peacekeeping operations operate within the region and replace the traditional role of the state. Both in case in which the domestic political agents are able to reassert control and in cases where issues remain protracted, the involvement of these secondary agents can have lasting consequences. The emerging political and state bureaucracies are often heavily influenced by agents of these secondary institutions, which work to strengthen domestic political institutions, and inevitably shape the understanding of how a "good state" should act upon the assumptions imbedded in their own institutions. Their relative wealth and power can also make these secondary subjects more appealing to local elites than domestic governance itself, and we often see in these areas of limit domestic capacity the emergence of an elite versed in the language of, and socialized into the norms of the supranational institutions that have influence in their local area, rather than their own relatively weak domestic political institutions.

Conclusion: Understanding Structure and Agency in International Society

Distinguishing between the subjects and agents of international society adds clarity to a number of key debates within the English School on how international society should be understood. Firstly, it answers the debate between the role of structure vs the role of the agency of practitioners. The answer to this in turn can provides the answer for the role of a scientific/behavioural approach to studying international society vs as traditional/interpretivist approach. By recognizing that states are not unitary entities but are legal subjects that wield power through decision makers embedded in bureaucratic cultures, we can then understand how the norms and practices act as constraints on state action. These constraints are "soft" in that they are not primarily enforced coercively, but exist because the bureaucratic cultures of states socialize practitioners into the norms and practices of international society. Due to the nature of these constraints, Navari's[40] argument that structuration serves as a good model for understanding international society as an entire system is a convincing one, as the majority

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[40] Navari, 'Agents versus Structures in English School Theory: Is Co-Constitution the Answer?'

of agents will be fully socialized to accept the constraints of international society's norms and practices as binding upon them by the time they have reached a point in their state's bureaucratic structures that they are able to have real decision making power. Thus, on an entire system level, the individual actions of agents can be partially predicted by scientific/behaviouralist approaches to understanding the constraints of the system and thus predicting how states will act.

However, by recognizing that states are controlled by agents that are individuals capable of escaping these constraints, we are able to recapture a place for the agency of practitioners within the English School. This becomes even more the case in which decision making power is concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of individuals. Key decisions which have served as turning points in the development of international history, cannot be fully understood without reference to the key individuals involved in taking those decisions. It is difficult to fully understand the American pivot to China in the late Cold-War, without understanding the particular character of Henry Kissinger, and the decision would have been far harder had there not been such a great degree of foreign policy decision making authority invested in him as a singular individual who was willing to break from both the domestic and international normative constraints that would have limited many other policy makers. The English School by recognizing this distinction can be an approach to the study of the international system that synthesizes both the system level reasoning and the agency of individual decision makers, recognizing that it neither entirely systemic reasoning nor entirely agentic "great man of history" reasoning that explains state action, but both, to different degrees depending on the context being studied.

The role of both individual practitioner agency and the unique bureaucratic cultures of each state and organization within international society thus encourages the deep understanding of these people/institutions that cannot be gained from system level modelling. Here the deep understanding of traditionalist/interpretivist methods can provide the granular understanding of the subjects and agents within the system that provides the English School with its unique approach to the study of

international society. Once the role of both agent and structure is understood in international society, we are then better equipped to fully understand how those norms and practices can develop over time through agent-agent interaction. The distinction of the agent and subject is particularly important for this thesis, as developed in chapter four, one of the key arguments of this thesis is that international society has been developed historically by the agents of non-state subjects (particularly colonial companies), and as such it is essential to understand the role of non-states and their agents in influencing international society. This continues in importance in chapter five and six, in which anti-colonial leaders that were not yet recognised agents of states played a key role in shaping the norms of international society.

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Chapter Four: The Colonial Company as a Fundamental Subject of International Society

The English School's primary understanding of international society is as a political community comprised of states that began to develop its contemporary form during the Early Modern Period. The foundational texts of the English School begin with a state-centric analysis, whether it be Bull's focus in *Anarchical Society* on a "society of states" [1] or Wight's analysis of a *System of States* [2] in his book of the same name. The traditional narratives of the development of international society which have dominated the field have been fundamentally state-centric affairs, with little to say about other forms of political authority, other than to highlight how their subordination to the state at the end of the mezdieval period is fundamental to the beginning of the first modern conceptions of sovereign authority. However, this chapter argues that a focus on states in the historical narrative charting the development of international society overlooks a key subject that maintained itself throughout the modern period until the early twentieth century – the colonial company. This chapter argues that the colonial company was fundamental to both the development of international society and the modern state itself, and should be included as a key contributor in any history of the development of the modern international system.

There are several reasons to consider the role of colonial companies as a key actor in developing international norms and practices during the modern period. Firstly, a more comprehensive understanding of the historical development of these norms and practices

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[1] Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 8.
[2] Wight, *Systems of States*.

provides the field with a deeper analytical understanding of these fundamental institutions of international society. Secondly, the importance of the colonial companies as agents in the development of international society has important implications for how we consider contemporary non-state actors and their ability to influence the development of international society in the present day. Finally, it expands the geographic confines of the traditional story of the development of international society beyond Europe to include the entire global system. The consideration of this new actor highlights the centrality of colonialism and its management to the development of contemporary international society and connects this work to the growing literature in the field of Global IR [3]. This is fundamental to understanding the degree to which decolonisation and the emergence of the post-colonial states changed international society's fundamental norms and practices post-1945 and the continuing divide between the Global North and Global South in their approach to norms such as sovereignty and practices such as humanitarian intervention.[4]

An immediate limitation of this chapter the author recognizes is the decision to focus particularly on the European agents of the colonial company. Significant work is being done in international relations to recognize the agency of colonized people throughout the development of the colonial system, and this is essential to understanding the colonial encounter. However, less work has been done distinguishing the unique role that the political structure of the colonial company played on the incentives of the European agents which contributed to the construction of the colonial system, and as such this chapter chooses to focus solely on this aspect of the colonial system, but recognizes throughout that these agents

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[3] Acharya, 'Towards a Global International Relations?'
[4] Mellish, 'UN Resolution 1514: The Creation of a New Post-Colonial Sovereignty'.

were influenced by the actions and agency of the colonized peoples who engaged with them in the colonial encounter.

This chapter considers the ways in which the colonial company shaped the creation of our contemporary international society and the ways in which they radically challenge the traditional notions of the subjects of international society. It does this first by assessing the Early colonial company's challenge to norms of territoriality and the role that the conflict between these companies played in forming the norms of freedom of maritime navigation. The chapter then goes on to consider the development of the state bureaucratic and military structures of the East India Company, and what this implies about the role of prestige and sovereign authority. It also considers how the practices of state formation attempted by the East India Company would be reimported to the British State in the nineteenth century. Next it considers the East India Company's role as the regional hegemon of India's local international society, and the implications of a private actor as regional hegemon, as well as the East India Company's role in the establishment of the norms which would create the foundation for the Standard of Civilization which dominated nineteenth century understandings of access to sovereignty. Finally, this chapter considers how the centrality of these private companies to the international system required their amalgamation into state structures, and their eventual loss of purpose during the late nineteenth century's period of high imperialism.

The Emergence of the colonial company as a Subject of International Society

The transition from the medieval period to modernity occurred slowly across Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However, if a single place and date were to be given for the beginning of modernity, a strong argument could be made for the 20th of March 1602 in the Netherlands. This date marks the foundation of the Dutch East India Company (VOC). This legal and political entity would eventually revolutionise the modern European state, society, and, in turn, the global international system.

The Early Modern Period would see the emergence of a new class of politically empowered subjects, the burghers that would make up Europe's proto-capitalist class, which developed in the wake of the waning power of Feudalism and the strengthening of sovereign authority throughout the 16-1700s. Spruyt's work *The Sovereign State and its Competitors* [5] argues that the short-lived alternatives to the large sovereign polities of Europe, such as the Italian and North German city-states, provided the expression of political subjecthood for a newly empowered merchant class in Europe. I argue that in addition to these political formations, the colonial company would develop as an entity for the political will of this new merchant elite that emerged in Europe in the seventeenth century.

To defend the profits from colonial trade and settlement, which empowered this new class, these companies would require an increasingly complex bureaucracy, military and trade infrastructure. These political entities would go on to capture and govern vast territories as

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[5] Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change*, vol. 176 (Princeton University Press, 1994).

private ventures. The governance practices of these political entities would be reimported through knowledge sharing to the European state itself, as well as strengthening the relative power of the company's stock holding class until these colonial corporations would become so expansive and central to the prosperity of many European states that it was necessary to amalgamate these companies into semi-state, semi-private entities that held significant political sway within the domestic governments that were nominally charged with overseeing their management.

Eventually these private political entities would become the primary interlocutors between European and non-European peoples between the seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries. Thus far from playing a marginal role in international order-making, they were the political units which built the first global international order and dictated the norms and practices that defined relations between European and Non-Europeans until the end of the nineteenth century, when colonial ventures were amalgamated into the state. Thus, to understand the development of the colonial international society, which the post-colonial states sought to overturn, it is first essential to understand the nature of colonial companies and their contribution to the development of international society prior to the twentieth century.

The VOC and The Establishment of Early colonial companies

Colonial companies operated in a distinct legal arena as subjects of international society, with their legal subjecthood confirmed by the sovereign, even as that sovereign struggled to maintain the authority over the colonial company and its agents, who became powerful political operators in their own right. It is unsurprising that the most successful colonial

companies (and thus the most successful colonial powers) were found in those nations where urban elites had a degree of influence over state policymaking – namely the Dutch Republic and England (later Great Britain). From their position of power within the legal structures of the state (such as membership within the parliament), the new elites of both Britain and the Netherlands were able to use state power to strengthen the fledgling expansion of their colonial companies, and then resist efforts of the state to extract power, wealth and authority from them. This ability to wield the state to benefit their colonial ventures gave British and Dutch colonial companies a distinct advantage over their European rivals. In time, the creation of colonial companies would change the nature of the global economy and the state itself. The establishment of these colonial companies (along with the growing economic trade in the region) also incentivised the development of a modern financial/banking system. This includes modern innovations, including a fractional reserve banking system, insurance systems, and the joint stock company itself, which initially served to raise capital for and limit losses from the risky venture of overseas colonisation[6]. Within Europe, these institutions would establish the necessary elements for an efficient national marketplace and the high capital investment required for a modern state.

The VOC was not initially established to develop into the globe-spanning quasi-governmental force it would become. Instead, it was established to respond to immediate pressures faced by the Dutch Republic. The VOC was established by Dutch merchants who desired to capture the profitable spice trade in Asian markets more effectively. This was partially driven by geo-strategic concerns alongside the desire for profit – the VOC was founded towards the end of the first phase of the Eighty Years War between the Dutch

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[6] Jan De Vries and Ad Van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815* (Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Republic and Spanish Hapsburgs. The trade income from the VOC allowed for the financing of the mercenary armies employed by the Dutch Republic to defeat the Hapsburg forces and secure their independence. The company was highly successful in contesting control of the Caribbean away from the Spanish over the succeeding decades, and conflict between the Dutch and the Spanish pushed the VOC to adopt an increasingly militarised presence. A key VOC military operation was the Battle in the Bay of Matanzas in 1628, in which the Dutch, under Admiral Piet Hein, captured much of that year's Spanish silver fleet off the coast of Cuba and broke Hapsburg's domination of the Caribbean[7]. Henry Hudson, a VOC explorer, also mapped the Hudson River, which led to the first Dutch settlements in the area and the eventual establishment of New Amsterdam (later New York). [8] The VOC thus played a major role in shaping new world colonisation and the eventual political makeup of the new world, starting from the early 1600s.

The VOC became one of the Netherlands' most profitable ventures and began establishing quasi-governmental features throughout the seventeenth century. The company's limited military capacity, first established for the defence of shipping, soon grew to the point that it was a serious military power in its own right, particularly its naval capacity. It would also begin to establish colonial territories in the Americas under private charter, governing these colonies as well as their widespread trading outposts across the exterior of Africa and Asia as the de facto government. As the seventeenth century unfolded, the locus of political and economic power in the colonial world would shift away from the Dutch (following a series of military defeats to various European powers) and towards the British. The Dutch, however,

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[7] Carla Rahn Phillips, *Six Galleons for the King of Spain: Imperial Defense in the Early Seventeenth Century* (JHU Press, 2020).

[8] Georg Michael Asher, *Henry Hudson the Navigator: The Original Documents in Which His Career Is Recorded* (Routledge, 2017).

had outlined the model for the powerful colonial joint stock company representing private interests that would be replicated by the British East India Company (EIC) and the other smaller British and European colonial companies that would operate from the 1600s through to the late 1800s.

Early colonial companies, Territoriality and Maritime Governance

The colonial company, both in England and the Netherlands, began in the Seventeenth century as a commercial venture. This involved the licencing, constructing and crewing of trade vessels to engage in profit-making overseas trade voyages. This contrasts with new-world colonisation, which involved conquering territory from indigenous populations and mass transferring European populations to the new world. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the former colonial type as the unexplored contributor to international order development. Still, it is essential to remember the role of colonial companies in the early colonisation of the Americas[9]. In the new world, European settlement and population transfer would destroy or marginalise the pre-existing inter-communal systems and replace them with nation-states mainly built in the European form. This changed the geographic expanse of the European international system and its member states but did far less to influence the development of new norms and practices of international order; these newly independent states were effectively integrated into the system over the nineteenth century on similar terms as their European counterparts had been.

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[9] For work on the contributions of the Americas to the development of international society, see particularly the work of Carolina Zaccato.

In comparison, in Asia and Africa, small numbers of European elites ruled over increasingly large areas of territory held by colonial companies, often via local intermediaries. The establishment of permanent rule over populations in Asia and Africa transformed the world system from one of multiple regional international societies which engaged in limited trade and encounters with one another into a singularly encompassing global international order built on a hierarchical notion of European civilisation. [10] The transition of international society from its regional character to a singular global international society is marked by the establishment first of permanent primary institutions that governed the relations between European and non-European populations approaching the end of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, their formalisation into permanent secondary institutions (international organisations). These primary institutions were developed at the site of the European encounter with non-European populations. As such, the agents of the colonial company inevitably played a key role in establishing this new global international society, as the European actors engaged in the encounter.

The needs of commercial shipping would drive colonial companies to increasingly take control of territory in the seventeenth century. The reliance of sailing vessels on the use of port infrastructure and waystations on the lengthy journeys between Europe and Asia inevitably necessitated the establishment of permanent land settlements, facilitating the movement of company shipping. In the early period of colonial expansion in Africa and Asia, this practice was first conducted by establishing singular port towns along the coastline, often on territory leased from local rulers or conquered militarily. These port towns would require permanent bureaucratic structures, with governors, administrators, and military personnel to

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[10] Gong, *The Standard of" Civilization" in International Society*.

staff them. From this point, the colonial company began to take on quasi-state-like features, including the control and regulation of territory, the raising of tariffs and taxation, the establishment of a military, and the provision of governance and the maintenance of order within the territory.

The territorial structure of the colonial company during the early expansion of colonialism was a mirror of the traditional European state. The colonial company operated as a constellation of small trading outposts dotted along the seaborne colonial trade routes, as opposed to the European state, which operated as a singular, contiguous and territorially bounded land. Territoriality, as a norm of international relations, holds the land as a space where states can claim singular authority, while the sea (beyond the immediate seaboard of the state) is a common territory to be managed by the international community. This distinction between the land and sea as spaces of singular and shared authority was not always a feature of international society. The domination of seaborne trading routes was essential to the power of the colonial company as a political unit. Throughout the seventeenth century, various European colonial companies attempted to exclude their competitor's access to these sea lanes.

Discussions of the centrality of sea power to the power of the state have existed since at least the nineteenth century, as exemplified by Mahan[11], However in Mahan (and his contemporaries) writings, the sea is still conceptualised as external to the state; it is an area of strategic interest but not constitutive of the state itself. For the colonial company in the

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[11] A.T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (S. Low, Marston, 1892), https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=DWw-AQAAMAAJ.

seventeenth century, dominion over the seaborne trading lanes was as constitutive to the company as its land territory. The normative assumption and practice of colonial companies at the beginning of the seventeenth century was that the sea trading lanes could be excluded from the use of other powers; firstly excluding other ships from their home nation by monopoly charter and then violently contesting other shipping access to these trading routes, much as a state army would contest the entrance of another state's agents into their territory.

The centrality of sea routes to the functioning of early colonial companies challenges notions of the territorially bounded political entity as the default for modern international society. Rather than a contiguous and bounded landmass, the political area of control for colonial companies in the early seventeenth century was a nexus of outposts and the freedom of passage between them. For the early colonial company, the sea (particularly the sea trade lanes) was considered internal to the political unit. All areas of the sea were not valued equally: rather, the common shipping routes that ran with the trade winds to and from Asia/the Americas were considered key terrain to be controlled by the colonial company, much as different areas of land can be of different value to states. The constitution of the colonial company challenges the notion of what sort of territory can be internal and external to political subjects which make up international society itself and that the sea need not necessarily be external to the political unit of international society, and historicizes the notion that the sea as a neutral third space.

The importance of free transit for the success of the early colonial companies, particularly the VOC, and the increasing conflict caused by attempting to exclude others from these sea lanes, would contribute to the development of the norms of freedom of navigation; particularly after

it became clear that complete domination of the trade routes would be impossible. Hugo Grotius [12] would advance the principle of *mare liberum* (free seas) in opposition to the Spanish position that enemy goods could be captured on neutral shipping. Freedom of the seas developed as an increasingly prevalent norm through bilateral treaties between states but would often be abrogated during times of war. It would not become a fully recognized international norm shared among all the great powers of Europe until the 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, [13] which normalised the idea of the sea as a neutral territory not to be contested by states or other entities. It is important to note here that the normative foundations and practice for the management of the seas were developed not only by states but also in collaboration with the agents of colonial companies, who led the development of the doctrines that defined the colonial trade system, the colonial company as the nexus of imperial trade which dominated the nineteenth century played a fundamental role in the development of international society's contemporary norms and practices of both territoriality and maritime governance.

The Development of colonial company Military and State Capacity

During the latter half of the seventeenth century, English and later British, colonial companies supplanted the Dutch to become the predominant colonial power; chief among them was the East India Company (EIC). As the complexity of the operations of the colonial company developed throughout the seventeenth century, it began to take on increasingly state-like functions as it developed both a permanent military structure and a governance capacity. The middle of the Thirty

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[12] Robert Feenstra, *Hugo Grotius Mare Liberum 1609-2009: Original Latin Text and English Translation* (Brill, 2009).
[13] Gabriela A. Frei, 'The Codification of International Maritime Law', in *Great Britain, International Law, and the Evolution of Maritime Strategic Thought, 1856–1914* (Oxford University Press, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198859932.003.0005.

Years War (1618-1648) saw the terminal decline of the private mercenary military in Europe following the death of Albrecht Wallenstein in 1634, with the remaining mercenary armies in Europe slowly subsumed into state structures or disbanded. However, in the colonial territories, large military structures remained in private hands and grew exponentially. At the Battle of Buxar (1764), the EIC military was numbered at less than 8,000; by the middle of the nineteenth century, the EIC had approximately a quarter of a million troops under arms and controlled by the agents of a private company.[14] The key leadership figures of these military formations would be essential agents of EIC international politics, simultaneously serving as administrators, generals and diplomats.

These large private armies were integrated with British crown forces in India, which had several important implications for the EIC's status as a political unit. British military forces operating on behalf of the EIC were a unique example of the socio-legal authority held by the board of directors in London, which mirrored a sovereign's authority. Military commissions in most states are delivered directly from the sovereign parliament/president/monarch to the officer in question. In Britain, military officers are still formally appointed on behalf of the monarch in their commissioning scripts; in other nations, this role is often replaced by the president. The appointment of officers in the military is, therefore, not merely a bureaucratic affair but a ceremony embedded in a socio-political and legal tradition that imbues the officer with the authority to act as the agent of the sovereign. The consolidation of the right to appoint military commissions (and thus the consolidation of who has the right to use violence) to a reserved prerogative of the sovereign was a defining element of the transition from the diffuse political authority of feudal societies and the consolidated power of the modern sovereign state.[15]

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[14] James P Lawford, *Britain's Army in India: From Its Origins to the Conquest of Bengal*, vol. 4 (Taylor & Francis, 2023).

[15] Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*.

By the 1800s in India, three broad categories of military regiments were operating under EIC command. There were Indian-raised regiments of company troops led by white British officers who received an officer's commission from the board of directors of the EIC, all white regiments of British/European-born soldiers recruited from Europe and led by EIC commissioned officers, and finally, British crown regiments, which were mustered by the British Crown and whose officers received their commission from the monarch. Despite EIC officers receiving their commissions directly from the board of directors rather than from the crown, in India, they had the same legal authority as crown officers in the integrated Crown-Company military command structure. Rather than playing a separate or subordinated role to the British state, EIC and crown military commands were highly integrated. Officers in the employ of the EIC had the right to order British crown troops and subordinate crown officers as if they were the equivalent rank in the British army, despite receiving no commission from the crown (although British Crown officers outranked equivalent EIC officers). In India, EIC commissions held real social and legal weight, and their orders could not be disobeyed by crown troops without facing the equivalent military punishments for disobeying a crown-appointed officer. This was further complicated by the fact the EIC commissions only held their legal authority east of the Cape of Good Hope.[16]

The operations of the joint crown-company military in India challenges the notion of the supremacy of the state over private institutions in international society in the post-Westphalian period. The EIC operated a mixed state and private military in India, where the state agents could be subordinated to private actors not merely in an informal sense but formalized into law. Given the predominance of EIC interests in India, the joint Crown-Company military command structure would, in most cases, be led by an agent of the EIC, not the crown. Thus, in India, a private company directly controlled significant numbers of British state military forces. Its military apparatus would also serve as a location for military knowledge production which would then be transferred to the British domestic

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[16] Peter Stanley, *White Mutiny: British Military Culture in India, 1825-1875* (C. HURST & CO. PUBLISHERS, 1998).

military and to other states in the international system. Military practices from the EIC would both be transferred back to Europe but also go on to influence its contemporaries in India, such as the Sikh Khalsa Army, which modernised with the assistance of European advisors with the EIC military as a model for the practices of their own militaries. [17]

Beyond the military, the colonial companies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries contributed significantly to the development of the modern European nation-state. For the practitioners and bureaucrats of the EIC, India and its colonial holdings existed in a liminal state, it was a space of governance both attached to British institutions but with a physical distance from Britain. This distance from the established entrenched interests of the British state allowed for the development of new practices of governance through experimentation.[18] Many of the officials of the EIC in India were not members of the wealthiest and most politically enfranchised families (who lacked the incentive to leave Britain). They were instead from the social class below this upper strata, who would have otherwise been limited in their access to political power. This class, free from the constraints of the old order, built new governance institutions that often outpaced those back in Europe. The EIC would establish a school for the training of civil servants in 1806, nearly half a century prior to the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms of the British civil service, which introduced the first large scale reform of merit-based appointments of officials.[19]

The necessity of building new structures for the survival of the EIC in Asia, including tax collecting and governmental structures following the usurpation of the Sultanate of Bengal by EIC officials in the 1760s provided a space of experimentation for the development of new practices and political

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[17] Dr Roy Kaushik, 'Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare and Indian Society, c. 1740-1849', *The Journal of Military History* 69, no. 3 (2005): 651–90.

[18] Rupali Raj Mishra, *Merchants, Commerce, and the State: The East India Company in Early Stuart England* (Princeton University, 2010).

[19] 'Records of the East India College, Haileybury' (127 volumes, 1749-1857), IOR/J, British Library: Asian and African Studies, https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/fc15e3e8-dc26-4b8f-a006-5f7a24f5fcda.

structures that would have been more difficult to develop within Europe itself with its entrenched political interests opposed to reform. This is not to argue that EIC governance of India was good or effective, with numerous and extreme famine events in Bengal under EIC rule [20], along with the general extraction of wealth from the subcontinent and the destruction of local industrial capacity. Only that the EIC was often a testing ground for the development of many practices of the modern state, with new knowledge obtained in India transferred back to the metropole in the form of best governmental practice[21]. From the successes and failures of the EIC, the British state was able to slowly integrate ideas which were effective but impossible to trial in the British domestic political situation due to the political resistance to reform . The EIC would thus contribute significantly to the understanding of the necessary capacities of a state and how it should best go about meeting these capacities, with many of the practices of the modern state being first constructed at the periphery of the European colonial project and once it had proven effective, it was reimported to the centre where it was institutionalised and normalised as a core part of the state.[22] The colonial corporation, through its military and bureaucratic development over the eighteenth and nineteenth period, played a significant role in the development of the domestic institutions of the modern nation-state itself. Thus it has played a significant role in shaping international society through its influence on the surviving subject of international society, the state and understanding the development of these political units requires an appreciation of the role of the colonial company in state formation.

Colonial Companies as Quasi-States: Questions of Authority

So far, this chapter has argued for the importance of the colonial company in developing (and challenging) the norms and practices of territoriality and state building, which in turn has a major

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[20] Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World* (Verso Books, 2002).
[21] James Lees, *Bureaucratic Culture in Early Colonial India: District Officials, Armed Forces, and Personal Interest under the East India Company, 1760-1830* (Taylor & Francis, 2019).
[22] Ibid.

impact on the other primary institutions of international society – sovereignty, international law, diplomacy which developed co-constitutionally.[23] This chapter has already highlighted some of the unique character of the colonial company as a political unit of international society, particularly its territorial structure. The question arises why the colonial company should not be considered merely as just an extension of the state which chartered it, or as just another state in the international system with a different internal political structure? (Much as the international system contained both absolute monarchies and democracies in the nineteenth century but both were states which held to the norms and practices of international society)

This chapter argues that colonial companies had a unique relationship with sovereignty and political independence from the state which chartered their operation, making them a unique political formation that differed from states. Colonial companies would simultaneously challenge, develop and reflect traditional notions of the role of both the sovereign and the practitioner of international relations in their operations during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The board of directors operated as what this chapter will refer to as the 'quasi-sovereigns' of the East India Company (building off Jackson's notion of Quasi-States[24]). The East India Company's board of directors derived their legal authority from a charter awarded by the crown, alongside the private property norms of English common law. There were certain limited rights to direct company operations reserved to the state, whose role in company governance increased over time. In practice, the board operated as an independent legal-political entity with contested oversight from the state, particularly within its colonial borders. Importantly, the board was the entity from which the agents of the colonial company drew their legal and social authority to act on behalf of, and the board had the power to appoint and remove agents acting on its behalf.

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[23] Jack Robert Mellish, 'Returning to Hedley Bull: Necessity as an Approach for Defining Primary Institutions', *Journal of International Political Theory* 20, no. 1 (2024): 41–65.
[24] Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*.

Robert Jackson, in his work Quasi-States, argues that a new type of state had emerged due to the strengthening of the norm against conquest following the Second World War. Jackson argued, "that numerous emergent states did not, and many still do not, disclose substantial and credible statehood by the empirical criteria of classical positive international law."[25] As these states "lack established institutions capable of constraining and outlasting the individuals who occupy their offices."[26] These states occupy a recognized legal position in international society; they can sign treaties and send delegates to the UN General Assembly, but lack the state capacity to enforce their will within their own borders. Jackson's work raises the question of what the necessary elements of a state are and analyses how the norms and practices of international society continue to function even in cases where the particular subjects of that society lack certain key elements to function domestically as a state. This concept of a political entity which is able to function in international society independently while lacking all the necessary capacities of a state is a useful model for considering colonial companies. Colonial companies operated as a reversal of Jackson's contemporary quasi-states: They had sufficient state capacity to enforce control over the colonial territories it governed, but the authority of its board of directors (from which its agents garnered their authority) was always granted at the will of the greater authority of the crown.

The early struggle to derive the foundational legitimacy of the agents of the colonial company when operating in the political realm of sovereigns can be seen in the early wars of conquest by the East India Company in India. Robert Clive signed the Treaty of Allahabad in 1765 "on behalf of the united Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies"[27] despite the crown formally reserving the right to make treaties from the EIC[28]. The Treaty of Allahabad makes no reference to Clive deriving any authority from the British crown, signing only on behalf of the Merchants of England

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[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] 'Treaty of Allahabad', 1765, Digitized copy can be accessed from the Library of Congress: https://www.loc.gov/resource/gdclccn.09026454/?sp=109.
[28] Michael Mulligan, *Chapter 3 The East India Company: Non-State Actor as Treaty-Maker* (Brill | Nijhoff, 2018), 39–59, https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004340251/BP000004.xml.

and notably on behalf of the Nabob Najim al Dowlah, Subahdar of Bengal. Clive was an agent acting without authority from the British crown and 'borrowed' the sovereign authority of another sovereign - the Subahdar of Bengal - in order to retroactively justify the legal authority for his actions when signing the peace treaty. The treaty's legitimacy could not be sealed only with the authority of the merchant trading companies – the action required the legitimating prestige of a recognized sovereign, even if that sovereign's de facto political power was absorbed by the company itself. The inability of colonial companies to act with the same degree of autonomy and prestige compared to the traditional state sovereigns of international society would be what fundamentally undermined their ability to function as independent political entities in the international system.

There have been previous efforts to analyse the unique nature of the East India Company's state-like features. Stern describes the East India Company as a "Company-State" [29] when understanding its state-like capacities, but Jackson's model of the Quasi-State also allows us to consider what was missing from the colonial company that meant it was incapable of true statehood. This chapter argues that what the colonial companies lacked and what would render them only effective as quasi-states were sovereign elites that desired full separation from their domestic polities. The colonial companies were never able to achieve what Charles Manning describes as "constitutional insularity"[30] from their parent states. The ability of the board of directors of these companies to act as a sovereign authority was always at the behest of the government which chartered them. Despite this lack of constitutional insularity, the colonial companies continued to act within international society, being mutually recognised as independent political entities by states and influencing the development of the emergent norms and practices of the modern international order. The colonial companies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were recognised political units within international society while lacking some of the necessary elements of full statehood, much like Jackson's view of contemporary quasi-states.

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[29] Philip J Stern, 'Seeing (and Not Seeing) like a Company-State: Hybridity, Heterotopia, Historiography', *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies* 17, no. 3 (2017): 105–20.
[30] C.A.W. Manning, 'The Legal Framework in a World of Change', in *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919-1969*, ed. Brian Brian Ernest Porter (Oxford University Press, 1972).

Similar to Stern, and much in line with the arguments of this chapter, Philips and Sharman argue that

Company-States emerge out of the lack of strict public-private divide that existed in the seventeenth

century, and would transition into more state-like models over the period of colonialism. They held

forms of hybrid governance that allowed them to adapt to the local situation and make bargains with

the indigenous polities. Philips and Sharman similarly reiterate the centrality of these company-states

to international society, and similarly argue that their decline was driven by political-economic

changes in the global economy, along with shifts in legal norms and degrees of European state

power[31]. This chapter agrees with this conclusion, with a focus on constitutional insularity as the

fundamental lacking aspect of sovereignty

In the Netherlands, the VOC had an integrated relationship with the sovereign elites of the Dutch

Republic. The Dutch Republic was ruled through a parliament made up of its regional elites, a rarity

for the Early Modern period (replicated only in England, the other dominant early colonial power),

which allowed for unprecedented interrelation between the VOC company and the Dutch leadership

itself.[32] Initial capital raised for the venture funded the entirety of the early operations, and the

incentive to sell the shares in the highly profitable and politically influential venture was low; thus,

ownership of the company and positions on its board passed through families, ensuring continuity

between the influential families in Dutch politics of the Early Modern period and membership of the

VOC's board. Similarly, in England (and later Britain), the political elites of parliament often

overlapped with the shareholders and board of directors of the East India Company. However, despite

the lack of separation between the board of directors and the state, these colonial companies were not

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[31] Andrew Phillips and Jason Campbell Sharman, *Outsourcing Empire: How Company-States Made the Modern World* (Princeton University Press, 2020).
[32] Oscar Gelderblom et al., 'The Formative Years of the Modern Corporation: The Dutch East India Company VOC, 1602–1623', *The Journal of Economic History* 73, no. 4 (2013): 1050–76.

simply subordinate private ventures to the state as they are often represented. In many cases, the relationship was symbiotic, and in certain periods, the company would often drive state policy making. The four Anglo-Dutch wars were driven in part by the fierce competition between the VOC and EIC over trading opportunities which resulted in open conflict between their respective states.[33]

These companies thus existed in a complex political position not previously seen which requires its own understanding as a unique type of political unit of international society. The colonial company often wielded the military power and influence of many contemporary states of the period; it was technically an entity of private individuals that held no status in sovereign status but was also deeply enmeshed in their states' national and international politics, oftentimes driving their foreign policy making. The interrelated nature of the political leadership of their respective states and the board of directors of the colonial companies themselves also made these political units different from just vassal or protectorate states; which similarly lack constitutional insularity from their parent states, as they are similarly under the influence of another sovereign authority. The difference is that vassals and protectorates are usually established because they represent some meaningfully different political formation that cannot be directly ruled by the overlord state, and there is a differentiation and subordinate relationship between the agents of the vassal and the overlord, whereas colonial companies often had agents that played key roles in both state and company simultaneously and drew from the same elites as the state itself to staff its bureaucracy.

Throughout the period of operation of the colonial companies, there was ongoing political contestation between representatives of the company and their respective governments to establish state authority over these colonial companies. Simultaneously, there were also conflicts over efforts to enforce governance by the board of directors in London/Amsterdam and the officials in the far-flung jurisdictions across the company's growing colonial empire, as these agents were effectively beyond

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[33] James Rees Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century* (Routledge, 2013).

the geographic reach of the board to control. Within the first decade of the establishment of the VOC, shareholders were already raising complaints regarding the governance of trade missions being conducted by the company; an example of the burgeoning quasi-state apparatus attempting to control its agents that theoretically were responsible to elites from which they received their authority but who in practice often operated to advance their own personal interests.[34]

Attempt to establish state governance over the East India Company was equally fraught with difficulties. The best known efforts are the reforms following the Indian Mutiny in 1858 which brought an end to company rule in India and formally annexed the territory into the British Empire.[35] However, throughout the life of the EIC, the British Parliament would repeatedly attempt to enforce greater degrees of parliamentary governance. As the wealth and prestige of the British state became evermore tied to its colonial holdings it became increasingly difficult for the company to evade parliamentary oversight. Robert Clive would face an inquest by the British parliament upon his return from his third tour in India for his handling of the Great Bengal Famine which devastated the population and wealth of Bengal.[36] The Great Bengal Famine would lead to the 1773 Regulating Act, which required the company to pay a dividend to the state, consolidated company holdings into a single administrative structure, and attempted to bar company officials from engaging in private dealings with the local population. It also established a company-controlled Supreme Court and appointed its first chief justice (Sir Elijah Impey) in an effort to standardize the legal apparatus in EIC territory[37]. These efforts to increase parliamentary oversight simultaneously encouraged the EIC to adopt further state-like features, including a legal system and a larger permanent standing army, which in turn caused the EIC to develop further towards a quasi-state.

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[34] Paul Frentrop, *A History of Corporate Governance, 1602-2002* (Deminor, 2003).

[35] Douglas M Peers, *India under Colonial Rule: 1700-1885* (Pearson Education, 2006).

[36] David Arnold, 'Hunger in the Garden of Plenty: The Bengal Famine of 1770', in *Dreadful Visitations: Confronting Natural Catastrophe in the Age of Enlightenment*, ed. Alessa Johns (Routledge, 2013).

[37] Bishwa Nath Pandey, *The Introduction of English Law into India: The Career of Elijah Impey in Bengal, 1774-1783* (Asia Publishing House, 1967).

The Regulating Act proved insufficient to oversee EIC activities in India and was supplemented by William Pitt's India Act in 1784, which would form the basis for EIC rule in India until its dissolution in 1858. The 1784 India Act appointed a government board of control, providing joint governance in India and oversight of EIC activities. The Governor-General became responsible both to the private owners of the EIC board via the court of directors, which remained in charge of commercial matters, and the parliamentary board of control, which nominally had control of political matters. This compromise effort allowed the company to remain in private hands while recognising the need for increasing state oversight. There was a desire to maintain the company's private independence as this both advanced the individual interests of many of the powerful parliamentarians who were directly invested in the EIC, and cohered to the classically liberal political orthodoxy of the time which resisted state influence in private companies. The oversight powers of the government remained poorly defined throughout the remainder of the EIC's existence, and conflicts between the British government and EIC board of directors were left up to the individual agents (particularly the Governor-General) to negotiate on an ad-hoc basis[38]. The India Act also failed to solve the problems of corruption and mismanagement that would lead to a series of famines throughout the remainder of the 1700s and 1800s, and eventually the Mutiny of 1857.

The colonial companies which established territorial dominion in Asia and Africa never achieved full statehood (as the colonial ventures in the Americas did). The elites who owned the colonial companies through their board of directors and their agents in the colonial territories lacked the desire to establish degrees of constitutional insulary over the company's affairs, leaving the institution in a quasi-state position. These colonial companies were able to build the state capacity necessary to enforce its political-legal system within its colonial territories. However, the agents of this state-like structure did not wish to separate from the domestic society that had birthed them, unlike the colonial

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[38] John Darwin, *Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain* (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2012).

elites in the Americas. Thus, in a contest over governmental oversight, the colonial companies could only ever resist and negotiate compromises; the option for a final rupture with the state and an assertion of constitutional insularity never existed. This starkly contrasts the settler colonial ventures in the Americas, which achieved constitutional insularity from their parent state. The difference between these societies and the quasi-states established in Africa and Asia by the colonial companies was the permanent transplantation of populations (and their elites) to America who began to consider themselves as different from the European society which birthed them and whose elites ruled over a population they shared an identity with. This combination of shared elite and common identity allowed these political entities to break away from the European powers, form their own societies, and achieve statehood. [39] In contrast, the VOC and EIC agents built state capacity to extract revenue from colonised regions, which would be sent back to Amsterdam or London to enrich elites at home. The goal of this capacity building was profit making in order to increase the power and wealth of the company owners within Dutch/British society, rather than establish their independent authority and polity. Thus, the VOC or EIC could never develop beyond the quasi-state status to a complete sovereign entity as the American colonies did.

Thinking of colonial companies in international society conceptually as quasi-states raises essential questions about the nature of the state and international society. Firstly, it highlights constitutional insularity as a crucial feature of a state, without which the political entity can only achieve quasi-state status. It also importantly shows that sovereignty may not necessarily be the fundamental primary institution of international society, as many authors have argued[40]. A necessary facet of true sovereignty is constitutional insularity, however, these colonial companies formed a cornerstone of international society of the eighteenth and nineteenth century and were mutually recognised by other states as both distinct legal entities and in practice engaged in all the acts of international society

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[39] Jack P Greene, *The Intellectual Construction of America: Exceptionalism and Identity from 1492 to 1800* (Univ of North Carolina Press, 1993); Jorge Larrain, *Identity and Modernity in Latin America* (John Wiley & Sons, 2013).

[40] Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (A&C Black, 2002); Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*; Bull, 'Part 1 The Nature of Order in World Politics'; Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*.

generally reserved for states, even if not legally empowered to do so. As such, it is quite possible to have key subjects of international society which do not necessarily hold full sovereignty, bringing into question the concept of a fundamental or master institution necessary for membership of international society (or at least questioning if this institution is sovereignty or statehood).

The East India Company's Influence on India's Regional International Society

The colonial expansion of the seventeenth century created, for the first time, a global international society, established on the basis of a hierarchical relationship between European and non-European peoples. Prior to the colonial period, several regional international societies existed, which were the highest level of system that existed prior to colonial expansion[41]. The size of these historic regional international societies were limited by the technological capabilities of the pre-modern world; without the communication and navigational innovations of the late medieval period, there was a structural limit on the geographical size of a regional international society before the distances of communication made it impossible to develop a shared cultural understanding of norms and practices among the subjects within the system. There existed trade, the exchange of ideas and conflict between different regional international orders, particularly where the peripheries of each society overlapped; but this is not the same as a developed set of norms and mutual recognition of rights and responsibilities. Colonialism built for the first time a weak set of institutions on top of, but not replacing, these regional international societies through repeated interactions between the representatives of colonial companies and local elites following their establishment of permanent

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[41] Andrew Hurrell, 'One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society', *International Affairs* 83, no. 1 (2007): 127–46; Filippo Costa Buranelli, 'The English School and Regional International Societies: Theoretical and Methodological Reflections', *Regions in International Society–The English School at the Sub-Global Level*, Masaryk University Press Brno, 2014, 22–44.[2]

settlements in Asia and Africa. The norms and practices of these interactions would solidify over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As colonialism became the dominant political and economic relationship of the nineteenth century, this global level international society increased in importance while diminishing the preceding regional international societies, creating the foundations of the contemporary globalised international society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

When the EIC and other colonial powers established themselves in the Indian subcontinent, there existed a regional international society highly analogous to early modern Europe. It was similarly comprised of a number of states, with religious and cultural divides among the sovereigns, but not to the degree that there was a lack of a mutual political culture, and with a politically dominant empire (The Mughals), who like the Hapsburgs, would enter terminal decline during the seventeenth century in as colonialism arrived in India[42]. The colonial companies were initially a minor political entity in India's regional international society when first arriving. However, as the Mughal Empire entered its terminal decline, the EIC was able to usurp the political structures of the states that attempted to break away from Mughal authority. The inflection point of EIC power on the subcontinent was the usurpation of the Sultanate of Bengal's legitimacy and territory, which was placed under de facto EIC rule after the conclusion of the Treaty of Allahabad in 1765. Following the defeat of the other major regional powers of India in the Anglo-Mysore and Anglo-Maratha wars, the EIC had developed from a minor actor to the hegemonic power in India's regional international society.

The EIC's position as the hegemon on the Indian subcontinent would have significant implications for India's regional international society and the growing global international society. The EIC would replace the Mughal and Maratha Empires as the hegemonic power in the system and became a model for the modernisation of the remaining powers of the Indian subcontinent, with emergent states such as the Sikh Empire developing its military, economic system and administrative state in part upon

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[42] Zarakol, *Before the West*.

European advancements and knowledge transferred from the EIC[43]. The anti-interventionist, Malthusian ideology, which informed many of the early EIC senior officials, also made the region far more susceptible to famines and exacerbated disasters as more territory fell under EIC rule, with millions dying in famines during the EIC rule of much of India and significantly increasing political instability. [44] The new colonial economy established in India destroyed existing feudal economic relationships in return for colonial capitalist development of the economic system. This economic system was designed primarily for the extraction of value from the region to be transferred to Britain, often through the direct taxation of peasant and urban surpluses, as well as the establishment of mercantilist trade policies which undermined the industrial/capital development within the region and arrested the development of the local capitalist class which had developed in Europe[45]. The economy was shifted from localised production of goods for local consumption to the extraction of raw resources with the majority of its value making final production processes taking place in the United Kingdom. For example, laws were passed to undermine the local textile industry, shifting the economy towards the production of raw cotton to be processed in Britain, rather than a complete localised textile industry.

The EIC's position as the hegemon of India's regional international society before its consolidation into the British state is vital for its consideration as a subject of international society. The EIC's place as the hegemon of India's regional international society must imply that non-state entities can be full subjects of international society (at least during this period) in the same mode as states. The alternative being that a hegemon of a regional international society was not itself a member of it. Theoretically, this is important for how we think about key non-political entities, both historic (such as the Catholic Church) and contemporary (Non-Government Organizations, Corporate Entities,

[43] Philip D Curtin, *The World and the West: The European Challenge and the Overseas Response in the Age of Empire* (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[44] Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World*.

[45] Hamza Alavi, 'India: Transition from Feudalism to Colonial Capitalism', *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 10, no. 4 (1980): 359–99, https://doi.org/10.1080/00472338085390251.

Terrorist Groups and Rebel Organizations). If full statehood is not a necessary condition to be a subject of international society, as the case of colonial companies implies, then it becomes essential to discern if and how these alternative sites of power interact with and are part of international society.

Colonial Companies and Constructing the Standard of Civilization

Beyond the effects on India's regional international society, as the European international society was changed and globalised by colonial expansion, new normative understandings of the relative positions of the powers within the system were established for the first time on a hierarchical basis for both European and non-European actors. These changes shifted the way in which the sovereigns of Europe and their agents understood and related to the rulers of the rest of the world. In the earlier periods of colonial expansion, in which European traders were just one of many powers within the regional international societies they were entering, relations were conducted from a position of equality or subordination to local rulers. Trade concessions were negotiated and granted for establishing a factory in Surat from the Mughal Emperor Jahangir as the EIC's first venture in India in 1612, with the Mughal authorities seeing the British traders as a marginal and unimpressive new political entity entering the regional order [46]. In this period, the English traders paid significant deference to the Emperor's position as regional hegemon, and communications between European representatives, the British Crown and the Mughal court positioned the two monarchs as equal in stature. This is a stark comparison to the late-nineteenth century, in which European powers had established a global hierarchical system based upon the "standard of civilisation" as a normative foundation which justified the exclusion of the non-European powers from the protections of international society, and placed rulers in Asia and Africa in a subordinated position to European sovereigns. [47] This would be formalized and codified into international law in the late nineteenth century, which legally

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[46] Richmond Barbour, 'Power and Distant Display: Early English "Ambassadors" in Moghul India', *Huntington Library Quarterly* 61, no. 3/4 (1998): 343–68.
[47] Gong, *The Standard of" Civilization" in International Society*.

distinguished between three categories of "peoples" – "Civilized", "Barbarian" and "Savage". This racially codified order which held European civilisation as the only group capable of accessing ideals of rationality justified the exclusion of non-Europeans from the norms and practices which protected states in international society, such as sovereignty and the fair application of international law. [48]

The racialized standard of civilisation as a normative framework became increasingly fundamental to the ordering of the regional societies of Asia and Africa as European colonial companies came to dominate these regions. The transition from a position of equality of prestige to non-recognition developed slowly and in a piecemeal fashion. In 1765, Robert Clive would justify his authority to sign the Treaty of Allahabad as a representative of The Nabob of Bengal, clearly recognizing the value of the sovereign authority of the local monarchs. The EIC and other colonial agents were fundamental in the development of this normative framework that would underlie the standard of civilization logic which dominated nineteenth century international thought as they sought to justify their legitimacy as regional hegemons. The agents of this private colonial corporation thus played a key role in developing one of the fundamental normative structures of nineteenth century international society as this hierarchical approach to legitimacy and prestige became a global norm.

The precursor to this encompassing standard of civilisation logic of colonial international society can be found in the development of the EIC's 'Doctrine of Lapse', which was the normative justification for the annexation of the Indian Princely States, over which the EIC had established suzerainty. The Doctrine of Lapse presages the broader understanding of a requirement to meet a "Standard of Civilization" to be able to hold claims to sovereignty, as it justified the annexation of these territories not on the grounds of conquest but because the local monarchs were incapable of providing proper governance to their Princedom. EIC representatives argued that this 'failure' to meet the 'Standard of Civilisation' by local rulers justified their 'intervention' into the affairs of the princely states, often

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[48] Mellish, 'UN Resolution 1514: The Creation of a New Post-Colonial Sovereignty'.

phrased in paternalistic or on explicitly humanitarian grounds. Early examples of the developing

doctrine emerge in the 1820s and 1830s, such as the annexation of the Kittoor in 1824 following the

death of its male sovereign and the title passing to his mother, who attempted to rule through the

adoption and installation of a new monarch. This was formalised into policy by EIC Governor

General James Broun-Ramsay, 1st Marquess of Dalhousie, in the 1840s, and would continue as

British policy after the EIC's dissolution and the establishment of imperial rule in India[49].

This doctrine represents a divergence from the actions of the EIC before their establishment as

regional hegemon following the Anglo-Maratha and Anglo-Mysore wars. During these conflicts, the

EIC operated as another equal subject of Indian regional international society, negotiated treaties with

defeated belligerents and gained concessions and territory following victory in war, as was the norm

in India and Europe. Following the EIC's victories against the other major powers in the region, it was

able to place itself as regional hegemon, and from this position, the EIC began to develop a normative

doctrine which would justify further annexations of the princely territories. The normative

justification for the doctrine of lapse was the incapability for rule of the leaders of annexed

populations. This doctrine justified the hierarchical position of European rule not only due to their

victories in battle but also because of a unique access to rationality and thus governance capacity held

be Europeans, which was a normative innovation for the period. Previously, powers such as the

Ottomans and other Islamic powers had been excluded from European international society for their

failure to adhere to Christianity[50], and political formations of indigenous peoples in the Americas had

been excluded as "uncivilised" by European colonists. This practice became further reinforced

following the wider acceptance of Darwinian evolution, which for many Victorian practitioners

further reinforced their racialised understanding of the world by providing a pseudo-scientific

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[49] Amod Choudhary, 'Doctrine of Lapse-A Frayed Link for Expansion of the British Empire in India', *Jounrnal of Law & Business* 16 (2009): 41.

[50] Iver B Neumann and Jennifer M Welsh, 'The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society', *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 4 (1991): 327–48.

underpinning to previous cultural categorizations by creating the idea of race as an imagined scientific category.

This normative and legal innovation of Dalhousie and other EIC practitioners, which justified their policy of local annexations, provided an ideological bedrock for the normative developments of the late nineteenth-century standard of civilisation when universally applied to non-European states. Importantly, it was EIC practitioners who first turned these normative ideas about the capacity of non-Europeans into practice as policy making, which played a significant role in these ideas becoming part of the bedrock understanding of how the primary institutions of international society were to be applied to non-European peoples. A lack of capacity to govern was a primary normative justification for colonisation in Africa and Asia in the latter half of the nineteenth century, which was often justified in humanitarian terms as 'saving' the populations from themselves [51]. Thus, we can see the contribution that practitioners acting on behalf of colonial companies had in generating the normative basis for the logic which dictated membership in international society throughout the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, until decolonisation returned the non-European world to the position of sovereign equals.

This normative and legal innovation of Dalhousie and other EIC practitioners, which justified their policy of local annexations, provided an ideological bedrock for the normative developments of the late nineteenth-century standard of civilisation when universally applied to non-European states. Importantly, it was EIC practitioners who first turned these normative ideas about the capacity of non-Europeans into practice as policy making, which played a significant role in these ideas becoming part of the bedrock understanding of how the primary institutions of international society were to be applied to non-European peoples. A lack of capacity to govern was a primary normative justification for colonisation in Africa and Asia in the latter half of the nineteenth century, which was often

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[51] Anna Johnston, *Missionary Writing and Empire, 1800-1860* (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

justified in humanitarian terms as 'saving' the populations from themselves [52]. Thus, we can see the contribution that practitioners acting on behalf of colonial companies had in generating the normative basis for the logic which dictated membership in international society throughout the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, until decolonisation returned the non-European world to the position of sovereign equals.

The End of the Colonial Company: Making the Company into a State

After the Indian Mutiny of 1857, the East India Company's political role in India was dissolved following the passing of the Government of India Act 1858, with direct crown rule finally being established in India after over a century of attempted reforms to the private management of the EIC quasi-state[53]. The maintenance of British dominion over the Indian subcontinent had become too essential to Britain's position of global hegemon for the administration to be left to private enterprise, and the British state had at last developed the necessary capacity to absorb the functions of the East India Company. However, the Indian Mutiny was not the death knell of colonial companies operating in international society. Established colonial companies continued to operate throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century (for example, the Hudson Bay Company operated a monopoly and governance of Prince Rupert's Land until 1870 when the territory was amalgamated into Canada[54]). New colonial companies also continued to be established after the Indian Mutiny, particularly following the development of the technologies necessary for European expansion into the interior of Africa. The Royal Niger Company, founded 1879 (first called the United African Company) was tasked with charting the Niger River and the territory claimed by the company which would be handed over to the crown in 1900 only after facing pressure from nearby French and

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[52] Ibid.

[53] Stanley A Wolpert, *A New History of India* (Oxford University Press, 2009).

[54] John S Galbraith, *The Hudson's Bay Company as an Imperial Factor, 1821-1869* (Univ of California Press, 2022).

German colonisation efforts.[55] The final company to be established for the purposes of colonization was the British South Africa Company – established in 1899 for the exploitation of resources in Mashonaland, (part of modern day Zimbabwe), the territorial region south of the Zambezi River. [56]

The "new imperialist" period of the late nineteenth century, which saw the colonization of the interior of Africa, is usually characterized as being dominated by state rather than private forms of colonialism. While there was a shift in focus towards the state direction of colonial efforts, private colonial companies continued into the latter nineteenth century. This was also when deeper frameworks for legalistic approaches to dispute resolution between the European powers were being established. As such, it was necessary for a mutual understanding of the nature of these colonial companies to be established, along with their place in international law. During the late nineteenth century, European powers recognised these colonial companies as political entities with independent legal authority. At the Berlin Conference (1884), the "International Association of the Congo" (IAC) was recognised by all participants as the sovereign legal authority over the Congo territory, not the Belgian crown. The IAC was a colonial company established by several shareholders but de facto was owned by them on behalf of Leopold II, King of Belgium.[57] With the emergence of nationalism as a central political norm in the late nineteenth century, the IAC was encouraged to adopt many of the trappings of a nation state by the participants of the Berlin Conference, even while it continued to operate as a private enterprise of Leopold II. The IAC would be given an internationally recognised flag, a national anthem when it transitioned to the Congo Free State (*Vers l'avenir – Towards the Future*), and a government apparatus which mirrored the recent developments in European governmental structures, with interior, finance and foreign affairs ministries headquartered in Brussels

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[55] G.L. Baker, *Trade Winds on the Niger: Saga of the Royal Niger Company, 1830-1971* (Bloomsbury Academic, 1996).

[56] John S Galbraith, *Crown and Charter: The Early Years of the British South Africa Company* (University of California Press, 2021).

[57] Jesse S Reeves, 'The Origin of the Congo Free State, Considered from the Standpoint of International Law', *American Journal of International Law* 3, no. 1 (1909): 99–118.

and modelled on their European state counterparts[58]. Thus, as states began to develop capacity in the latter half of the nineteenth century and subsume colonial companies into state apparatuses, the system encouraged private colonial companies to adopt further state-like characteristics.

The post-EIC understanding of the colonial company shifted from a profit making enterprise to a state-led vehicle for minimizing political risk to the state when exploring new territory, with the primary purpose of the colonial company transitioning to increasing the territory of the state rather than necessarily turning a profit. The assessment of these colonial companies in the 1911 by Duffield captured well the contemporary understanding of the role of these new colonial companies in the international society of the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries:

 "The chartered compaany of these days is therefore very strongly fixed within limits imposed by law on its political action.... With the exception of the Royal Niger Company, it would be incorrect to say that they have been financially successful, but in the domain of government generally it may be said that they have added vast territories to the British empire, and in these territories they have acted as a civilizing force…

The existence of such companies today is justified in certain political and economic conditions only. It may be highly desirable for the government to occupy certain territories, but political exigencies at home will not permit it to incur the expenditure, or international relations may make such an undertaking inexpedient at the time. In such a case the formation of a chartered company may be the best way out of the difficulty. But it has been demonstrated again and again that, directly, the company's interests begin to clash with those of foreign powers, the home government must assume a protectorate over its territories in order to simplify the situation and save perhaps disastrous collisions. So long as the political relations of such a company are with savages or semi-savages, it

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[58] Lewis H Gann, *The Rulers of Belgian Africa, 1884-1914* (Princeton University Press, 2015).

may be left free to act, but directly it becomes involved with a civilized power the state has (if it

wishes to retain the territory) to acquire by purchase the political rights of the company." [59]

We see from this assessment both the understanding that these colonial corporations had certain

"political rights" along with an assumption that they were de facto protectorates of their home

government. It also highlights the divide between Europeans and non-Europeans in prestige, with the

company able to determine the relations between themselves and "savages or semi-savages" but with

inter-European negotiations to be reserved for state-level intervention. These companies thus

independently held legally recognized political rights in international society but were de facto

recognized as extensions of their respective states themselves, which would step in to negotiate

between the company and other European nations. It was also recognised that these ventures were not

necessarily directly profitable, but were valuable for securing future exploitable resources, prestige

and strategic territory, thus making the underwriting of the project by the state key both to their

success and made the company integral to state policy. These colonial companies thus adopted the

new legal rights recognized to them by international society while increasingly surrendering any

political independence (and thus further limiting their constitutional insularity). By the late nineteenth

century, the colonial company was rendered a political unit fully recognized by international society

and integrated into its institutions, while it simultaneously lost any ability to act independently of the

governments which sponsored and underwrote their legitimacy in the international system.

The settlement of the League of Nations was the end point for the colonial company as a political

subject of international society. All original members of the League were states, with no recognition

for the right of colonial companies to hold territory as independent political units as there was at the

Berlin Conference[60]. By 1920, there were no further avenues for colonial expansion beyond the

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[59] William Bartleet Duffield, 'Chartered Companies', in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th ed., ed. Hugh Chisholm (Cambridge University Press, 1911), 5:952.
[60] League of Nations, *The Covenant of the League of Nations* (1920).

boundaries of the state, and as such, the colonial companies had largely lost their historic raison d'etre. The mandate system of the League would replace the role carved out for colonial companies in the late imperial period by transferring the control of the colonial management of the few remaining non-integrated territories directly to the trusteeship of states[61]. The rise in state capacity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries combined with the scramble for the remaining colonial territories in the late 1800s effectively closed off the space for these subjects of international society to operate, much as the rise in sovereign power in the seventeenth century closed out the avenues for independent feudal political subjects to act free from the emergent state. The interwar settlement was thus the closing point for the colonial company as a political subject of international society, leaving only the state as the supreme, central subject of international society.

Conclusion

The existing study of the expansion of international society during the modern period has been, in large, a state-centric affair. Bull and Watson's classic 1984 text, *The Expansion of International Society* [62] talks largely in terms of peoples and their relationship with the colonised world. For example, chapters include: "European International Society and its Expansion" [63], "British and Russian Relations with Asian Governments in the Nineteenth Century" [64], "European States and African Political Communities" [65]. While mention is made of colonial companies within the chapters, the mode of understanding fundamentally equates the European people's actions in Asia and Africa with European states. This error is often reproduced in the discussion around the expansion of

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[61] Ernst B Haas, 'The Reconciliation of Conflicting Colonial Policy Aims: Acceptance of the League of Nations Mandate System', *International Organization* 6, no. 4 (1952): 521–36.
[62] Bull and Watson, *The Expansion of International Society*.
[63] Adam Watson, 'European International Society and Its Expansion', *The Expansion of International Society*, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1984, 13–32.
[64] David Gillard, 'British and Russian Relations with Asian Governments in the Nineteenth Century', *The Expansion of International Society*, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1984, 87–97.
[65] Hedley Bull, 'European States and African Political Communities', *The Expansion of International Society*, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1984, 99–114.

international society and the globalisation of the international system during the colonial period. Doing so fundamentally misses that the expansion of international society was not conducted by states or on behalf of sovereigns until very late into the nineteenth century. For most of international society's expansion, the key subject driving the expansion of European international society was not the state, but agents operating on behalf of semi-independent (quasi-sovereign) colonial companies. A key factor in the effective independence of colonial company's agent was their significant distance from London. Prior to the nineteenth century (and particularly prior to the opening of the Suez Canal) the communication time required agents in the colonial region to make decisions without full oversight from either the state or board, rendering them effectively independent actors. [66] This meant that these private agents were able to build new norms and practices of governance and shaped their relations with the region in which they operated, contributing significantly to the development of that regional and global international society.

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[66] Daniel Headrick, 'A Double-Edged Sword: Communications and Imperial Control in British India', *Historical Social wResearch/Historische Sozialforscahung*, JSTOR, 2010, 51–65.

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Section Three – The Role of the Post-Colonial States in Shaping International Society

The process of decolonization was the greatest change in global international order in the twentieth century, radically altering the norms and practices of the international system, transforming it from a colonial international order dominated by the European powers to our contemporary global international society. The normative developments from 1945-1980 which this section focuses on was a period in which the post-colonial world was a significant driver of norm development. Despite this, the traditional historiography of the expansion of the international system in orthodox international relations theory has been the expansion of norms from the Western states to the rest of the world[1]. Meanwhile in critical theory there exists an extensive debate on the depth of resistance to the norms and practices which dominated international order making, but there is generally less interest in the use of existing international norms by post-colonial leaders to achieve their own ends.[2] This section seeks to serve as a corrective to both of these approaches, highlighting the role of the post-colonial world in the development of our contemporary international relations norms through strategic engagement with and the shaping of the normative language of post-war international society. This section builds on the growing scholarship around the agency of post-colonial leaders[3] and their contribution to the construction of global norms.

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[1] To restrict the focus to the English School, examples of this approach can be found in: M. Wight, *Systems of States*, ed. H. Bull (Leicester University Press, 1977); Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Macmillan international Higher education, 1979); James Mayall, "Nationalism and International Society," Cambridge Core (Cambridge University Press, January 1990), K. J. Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), although similar understandings can be found in other schools of mainstream international relations theory.

[2] Oliver P Richmond, 'Critical Agency, Resistance and a Post-Colonial Civil Society', *Cooperation and Conflict* 46, no. 4 (2011): 419–40.

[3] Examples include: Acharya, *Constructing Global Order: Agency and Change in World Politics*; Marcos Tourinho, 'The Co-Constitution of Order', *International Organization* 75, no. 2 (2021): 258–81, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000466.

This research analyses how the norms of European international society were not simply adopted or resisted by the post-colonial world as international society decolonized post-1945. Instead it argues that the norms of the contemporary international system were in large part created by concessions of existing powers to the demands of this newly emergent post-colonial world post-1945. This work rejects the common narrative that norms such as human rights are "liberal" or "European" in character, rather it shows the fundamental role the post-colonial world played in shaping these norms.

 This is most starkly clear in the development of the norm of sovereignty following the Second World War, which Chapter Five focuses on. Chapter Five goes on to analyse the post-colonial state's contribution to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, before bringing these ideas together to explain the way in which the post-colonial world advocated for sovereignty as the foundational right of a collective people, rather than for an individualized conception of human rights, while still drawing on the language of the declaration. Chapter Six engages with post-colonial contributions to the primary institution of Great Power Management, looking at the contestation between post-colonial desires for sovereign equality and the privileged role afforded to the five war winning Great Powers in United Nations institutions, particularly the security council. It also analyses the role of the post-colonial states in stewarding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to its conclusion and then considers the institutionalization of pan-national ideologies as a check on the Great Powers.

Chapter Five: The Post-Colonial Contribution to the Development of Sovereignty and Human Rights Law

This chapter seeks to highlight not only the challenges and resistance of post-colonial states and their leaders during the period to the existing norms of international order; but how they attempted to develop new norms based upon new moral claims, which had a unique mix of universalist and pluralist features, by co-opting and developing the language of international society. These new universalisms were advanced through reference to documents such as the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and through state led post-colonial internationalism of the period expressed at meetings such as the Bandung Conference (1955). This chapter in particular seeks to highlight the nuanced tensions between the post-colonial world's demands, which called both for a radical recognition of the equal rights and legitimacy of the post-colonial community and the conservative re-entrenchment of strong state sovereignty norms. By exploring more deeply the complex contribution of the post-colonial world to international norm creation post-1945 this work seeks to decentre Eurocentric accounts of both the formation of the norm of sovereignty and the history of post-war international diplomacy. This chapter thus asks: What role did the post-colonial world play in shaping the contemporary norm of sovereignty, which also allows for an interrogation of the contestations, compromises and conflicts within the post-colonial world and their demands for a future international order.

This chapter seeks to draw out and answer these questions through the following structure. It will first analyse the understanding of sovereignty that existed among the Western powers in the preceding colonial international society, to provide the necessary context for the period. It will then examine the early efforts of the post-colonial world to shape international norms through its contributions to the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), particularly the post-colonial world's demand for the inclusion of a right to self-determination for colonial peoples. It then analyses the shift

in the post-colonial world's normative outlook towards what a positive pluralist normative position,

particularly embodied at Bandung, in which a number of debates played out to bring the post-colonial

world together around a shared definition of sovereignty and a program for anti-colonialism. Finally,

this chapter shows how UN Resolution 1514: The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to

Colonial Countries and Peoples, mirrors closely the language reached at Bandung, and represented the

adoption of the post-colonial world's normative outlook on the legitimacy of colonialism. The chapter

closely analyses the important ways in which this new understanding of sovereignty differed from

prior conceptions and the ways in which there were normative continuities.

Describing Colonial International Society - Who was Recognised?

Prior to 1945, much of the world's population lived either as citizens in a colonial empire or as

colonised subject peoples [4]. colonial international order directly managed the relationship between all

peoples in the international system. For those populations not directly governed by a colonial state,

either in the metropole or imperial territories, the international relations their states conducted were

largely with colonial empires and in a context where colonial states were the major factor in the

balance of power in the international system[5]. Thus colonialism dominated the collective

understanding of concepts such as international law and sovereignty. The defining feature of colonial

international society was access to the protections of its norms based upon a racialized 'standard of

civilization' logic [6].

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[4] Angus Maddison, *The World Economy* (OECD publishing, 2006).

[5] For examples of this in East-Asia see Michael R Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy* (Harvard University Press, 2009); However, experience of diplomacy with imperial powers was universal for the period. See also K. J. Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491382..

[6] Gong, *The Standard of" Civilization" in International Society*.

Hedley Bull provides a description of the way in which international society of the late 1800s were stratified into three tiers of civilization[7]

> *In the 1880s the Scottish natural lawyer James Lorimer expressed the orthodox doctrine of the time when he wrote that mankind was divided into civilised humanity, barbarous humanity and savage humanity. Civilised humanity comprised the nations of Europe and the Americas, which were entitled to full recognition as members of international society. Barbarous humanity comprised the independent states of Asia - Turkey, Persia, Siam, China and Japan - which were entitled to partial recognition. And savage humanity was the rest of mankind, which stood beyond the pale of the society of states, although it was entitled to natural or human recognition*[8]

Bull's description of the international society of the period shows that the application of supposed universal foundational institutions of international society such as sovereignty were in fact regulated by a racialized, colonial logic.

The division of civilized, barbarian and savage peoples was dominated by a racialized conception of the 'civilized' state, the apex of which was the idealized European nation considered capable of self-rule and thus receiving access to the norms of international society [9]. Barbarian states were those states that had successfully resisted European colonialism or were seen as useful buffer states between the European powers, (such as Japan, Persia, and the Ottoman Empire). These states occupied a particular place in the European colonial imaginary as orientalised polities, both apart from the universal rationality that made European Nation states members of international society, but with a historic civilizational value and contemporary strength which meant they could be treated with in a

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[7] Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 36.
[8] Wight, *Systems of States*. (Leicester University Press 1977) deploys the same quote from Lorimer when discussing his understanding of the international order of the 1800s.
[9] Gong, *The Standard of" Civilization" in International Society*.

limited sense [10]. Finally the 'savage' populations of the colonial international order were those peoples who were excluded from all protections of the norms of international society, and made up significant proportions of Asia and Africa [11].

By dividing human populations into these three tiers, and then assigning to these groups different degrees of rights and recognition accordingly, the majority of the world was excluded from the rights and norms afforded to the Western states, including sovereignty and the fair application of international law. Without recognition as a valued subject of international society, the 'savage' and 'barbarian populations of the nineteenth century Western imagination occupied the position of international outlaws [12], afforded none of the protections and rights gained through membership of international society when dealing with the Western powers. The idea of 'savage' peoples failing to meet the standard of civilization necessary for self-governance was essential to the normative justification of the colonial project by the European and American powers, as their supposed lack of access to universal rationality justified the necessity of colonial rule over these peoples often in the missionary language of a humanitarian intervention to 'uplift' these peoples [13]. It would be this racialized standard of civilization as the foundational determinant of who had access to sovereign rights that the post-colonial states would seek to overcome in the formation of a new international society that emerged following the end of the Second World War. Much of this work was done at the newly formed United Nations which became a formalized venue for the expression of 'world opinion' and thus the defacto venue for international norm setting. The rest of this chapter will analyse how the long standing norm of the standard of civilization was replaced by the post-colonial world's demand for equal sovereign recognition and decolonization. This would culminate in UN Resolution 1514: Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

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[10] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (Pantheon Books, 1978).
[11] Bruce Buchan and Mary Heath, 'Savagery and Civilization: From Terra Nullius to the "Tide of History"', *Ethnicities* 6, no. 1 (2006): 5–26.
[12] David P Fidler, 'The Return of the Standard of Civilization', *Journal of the History of International Law* 2 (2001): 137.
[13] Fabian Klose, *Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence: The Wars of Independence in Kenya and Algeria* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

The Seeds of Decolonization Pre-1945 - International Recognition

The nature of the first challenges to the colonial order's understanding of sovereignty would occur in the early 1900s and were characterised not by the abandonment of the previously discussed stratified system of international recognition. Instead, the racialized nature of its structure was challenged by individual peoples who vied for recognition within the international community. This section discusses two of these challenges, Japan and India.

The Japanese Empire had embarked on a process of rapid industrialization and modernization upon European lines following the Meiji restoration in 1868.[14] The decisive victory of both the Japanese navy and army against the Russian Empire in the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 was an event that shattered many racialized conceptions about the capability of Asian powers held in the European world.[15] The Japanese empire now presented a powerful rising alternative for the Afro-Asian world to take inspiration from and destabilised the bedrock assumptions of the racially hierarchical order and its selective access to sovereignty.[16] This victory would go on to briefly inspire post-colonial independence advocates such as Rabindranath Tagore (although he would go on to condemn Japanese imperialism) and others across Asia until it became obvious that the Japanese intended to adopt their own Asian colonial empire[17]. Through this action along with the previous Japanese contribution to the Eight Nation Alliance during the Boxer Rebellion, Japan had shown itself to be a military force that demanded recognition by the European powers.[18] Japan's efforts for international recognition and prestige were a demand to have itself recognized as a civilised power equally entitled to the rights and privileges of statehood as the European powers. Japan took part in the Treaty of Versailles negotiations (in of itself

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[14] Marius B Jansen, *The Emergence of Meiji Japan* (Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[15] Rotem Kowner, *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War* (Routledge, 2006).

[16] Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia* (Columbia University Press, 2007).a

[17] Satoshi Mizutani, "Anti-Colonialism and the Contested Politics of Comparison: Rabindranath Tagore, Rash Behari Bose and Japanese Colonialism in Korea in the Inter-War Period," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 16, no. 1 (2015).

[18] Akira Iriye, "Japan's Drive to Great-Power Status," in *The Emergence of Meiji Japan*, ed. Marius B Jansen (Cambridge University Press, 1995).

a recognition of Japan's elevated place in international society as a "civilized" power), in which it pushed for the inclusion of a racial equality clause, which its leaders felt was essential to achieve full respect as an equal member of international society[19]. Japan did not object to the norms and practices of the colonial international order, and would go on to establish its own colonial empire in East Asia, its leaders instead narrowly objected to their own placement in the racialized hierarchy. The racial equality clause was vetoed by both Britain and The United States,[20] but shows the degree to which non-European leaders understood the era's international system as a racialized one. Japan's inclusion in the negotiations was a step for the state's transition from "Barbarian" to "Civilised" state, and it arguably occupied a limbo position between the two, prior to 1945; too powerful to not be included in international considerations, desired as an ally in East Asia by states such as the British Empire, but simultaneously racialised and lacking the prestige of European powers.

India (used here in the pre-1947 sense to encompass all areas of the British Raj under one colonial administration) presents another important shift in international recognition. India was a land of incredibly wealthy and powerful political entities prior to the British ascendancy in the region after the Battle of Plassey in 1757[21]. European relations with the Indian States in the 1700s were not dissimilar to those between Europe and the Ottoman empire, with these polities occupying 'barbarian' status within the schema. It was remarked on by early English traders who made contact with the Mughal Emperor for the first time in the early 1600s that he controlled impressive wealth, and he was treated in a similar fashion to other leaders of major Islamic political entities by these European traders and officials.[22] By 1858 and the incorporation of British East India Company territory under the crown, many Indian polities had been reduced in status beyond the recognition of statehood. The British used the so called "Doctrine of Lapse" to remove from power both heirless rulers of Indian polities and also

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[19] Naoko Shimazu, *Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919*, vol. 33 (Psychology Press, 2009).
[20]Ibid.
[21] Sudeep Chakravarti, *Plassey: The Battle That Changed the Course of Indian History*, 1st ed. (Kolkata: Rupa Publications, 2020)
[22] Sohail H Hashmi, "Political Perceptions in Early Anglo-Indian Relations," *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations* 12, no. 2 (2001): 211–32.

those they argued were incapable of self-rule. By the mid-1800s much of India was thus considered to occupy the savage position in the colonial international hierarchy.

By the early 1900s, India's fortunes had once again reversed in the colonial hierarchy. When the League of Nations was formed in 1920, the British Empire would be represented, along with 5 independently represented empire members: Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa and India. Other than India, the other four members represented the long established "White Dominion" members, the other colonial territories of the British Empire were considered fully incapable of self-rule, and were thus to be 'represented' by the British Empire delegate. The League of Nations would simultaneously include those recognised "Barbarian" powers – Abyssinia, Liberia, Turkey, Persia, Siam, and Japan[23]. The inclusion of India as the only majority non-white part of the British Empire to receive its own seat signalled that India had reached a certain standard of civilization in the political imaginaries of British colonial administrators; which when combined with the political realities of growing demands for forms of home rule necessitated its inclusion as a separate entity in the League.[24] India would co-sign the same document as the British delegate and the four dominion members, all six members simultaneously joining the league signing the same document, with two individuals signing on behalf of India, Sir Satyendra Prasanna Sinha on behalf of the Raj and Maharaja Ganga Singh of Bikaner on behalf of the Indian princes. This shows the new found prestige of non-white agents of the British Raj, the elites of whom were perceived by some to have received the necessary tutelage in governance to begin the transition to independent rule.[25]

The early 1900s thus saw the first ideological cracks in the existing colonial international order's racial delineation of international subjecthood with both Japan and India raising in relative status and the general inclusion of the so-called barbarian powers into the norms and international legal protections

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[23] Britannica, "League of Nations: Table of Membership," in *Encyclopedia Britannica* (Britannica, n.d.), Available online at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/League-of-Nations/Members-of-the-League-of-Nations.
[24] Karl Joseph Schmidt, "India's Role in the League of Nations, 1919-1939" (The Florida State University, 1994).
[25] Amritha V Shenoy, 'The Centenary of the League of Nations: Colonial India and the Making of International Law', in *Asian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 24 (2018)* (Brill Nijhoff, 2020).

of the League of Nations. However, this was not a rejection of colonialism as an inherent organising principle of world order by European/American states. Instead, it represented the recognition that individual peoples had reached certain standards of civilization necessary for greater degrees of recognition by the international community. This would set the framework for the more radical challenge to the colonial order that occurred post-1945, the contestation of the standard of civilization as a tool for legitimating sovereignty entirely, to be replaced by the state as representing a certain 'peoples'.

The Beginnings of an Anti-Colonial Universalism

We have so far seen challenges by individual peoples' to their place in the hierarchical colonial order of recognition within international society. How did these challenges develop into a wider demand by the post-colonial world for a new universalist sovereignty, rejecting the legitimacy of colonial rule? Early English School narratives (particularly Bull's) of decolonization focus on a 'Revolt Against the West' - a largely ideational 'awakening' of colonised people to resist colonial rule that rejected the norms of international society.[26] This was paired with a faltering in the resolve of Western powers to maintain colonialism, both materially and ideologically.[27] Hall revisits Bull and the early English School authors, stressing their concern that the expansion of international society beyond the boundaries of Europe and the Americas was diluting the common ideological framework of norms that made international society function.[28] A failing of Bull's analysis is that it both simultaneously understates the significant degree of resistance colonial powers such as Britain and France mounted to the

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[26] Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, *The Expansion of International Society* (Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1984) 217-229; see also Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Macmillan international Higher education, 1979). 74-95

[27] Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, *The Expansion of International Society* (Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1984);see also K. J. Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491382.

[28] Ian Hall, "The 'Revolt against the West' Revisited," in *The Globalization of International Society*, ed. Timothy Dunne and Christian Reus-Smit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 345–61, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198793427.003.0018.

disintegration of their empires post-1945 where possible, and also the degree to which those same colonial powers were willing to make accommodations with newly independent ex-colonies once said resistance to decolonization became infeasible[29]. The view of Bull also overstates the degree to which the "revolt against the west" represented a rejection of the norms of international society. Instead, many leaders of the post-colonial world during the era of decolonization would become strong advocates for the new universalist norms of the United Nations and particularly the language of the UN Charter and they would use this language to advance their demands for sovereign equality and national independence.

Bull and Watson's account's primary error was to overvalue the importance (and in some cases extent) of the rejection of international society by the membership of the mass movements that led to colonial independence. The account undervalues the opinion of governing elites in post-colonial states, which sought membership in the international community and the extension of the norms of international society to their states[30]. These leading elites often did not reject the norms of international society, only the stratified application of norms such that their polities were excluded from them. In fact, the 'third world' would become some of the strongest advocates for non-interference and a strong interpretation of national sovereignty within the international community following decolonization[31] Their rejection was instead a rejection of the standard of civilization as a criterion for determining claims of sovereignty. Post-colonial accounts of the decolonization process similarly stress the ideational break

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[29] Examples of Britain's continuing violent resistance to decolonization in the 1950s can be found in Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* (Macmillan, 2005); with regards to the Kenyan (Mau Mau) Uprising and in Robert Jackson, *The Malayan Emergency and Indonesian Confrontation: The Commonwealth's Wars 1948-1966* (Casemate Publishers, 2008) with regards to the Malayan emergency. At the same time as resisting decolonization violently in these arenas, Britain is trying to build positive relations with states such as India and Sri Lanka in South Asia, and signing the Baghdad Pact military alliance with numerous ex-colonial possessions.

[30] It is not plausible to outline the political ideology of every post-colonial leader, however introductions to key figures' can be found in: LS Rathore, "Political Ideas of Jawaharlal Nehru: Some Reflections," *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 4 (1985): 451–73; John David Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* (Editions Didier Millet, 2003); Anne Alexander, *Nasser* (Haus Publishing, 2005). These leaders did not reject the core principles of the nation state and sovereign independence (in fact they sought to strengthen them), and this was on the whole the model for most post-colonial leaders who saw themselves as modernizers of their state.

[31] Anthony Anghie, "Bandung and the Origins of Third World Sovereignty," in *Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures*, ed. Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri, and Vasuki Nesiah (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 3–32, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.

by the masses of post-colonial subject peoples from European ideational hegemony (often with enthusiasm rather than Bull's reticence)[32], but again fail to account for the importance of the preferences of policy elites who directed the actions of these states in the international arena, that were far more directed towards accommodation and co-option of the growing international normative consensus post-Second World War.

A change in the norms of international society requires two major factors: ideational and material. Given the reproducing nature of International Society,[33] radical change requires both a significant shock to the normal functioning of the system to rebalance power within it, and the emergence of entities with new political demands already in place to step into this new power arrangement. Taking these in turn: the ideational foundations of decolonization began to develop simultaneously with the expansion of the colonial system. But by the early twentieth century, these had changed in character, as the movements for decolonization began to become increasingly internationally linked. The engagement between post-colonial leaders during the interwar years would begin to build an internationally linked network that could develop new ideas and demands in favour of universal independence and sovereignty for the post-colonial world, whose time would come following the material shock of the Second World War.

In 1927, numerous future post-colonial leaders met at the first Brussels conference of the League Against Imperialism (LAI)[34]. The movement received significant support from the newly emergent Soviet Union, which had proclaimed its support for post-colonial movements achieving self-determination, as well as other European communist parties[35]. The founding organiser of the league was Willi Münzenberg, German communist, founding member of the KPD and delegate of the

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[32] See as an example: Cemil Aydın, "Beyond Civilization: Pan-Islamism, Pan-Asianism and the Revolt against the West," *Journal of Modern European History* 4, no. 2 (2006): 204–23.

[33] Cornelia Navari, "Modelling the Relations of Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations," in *International Organization in the Anarchical Society*, 1st ed. (London: Palgrave Studies in International Relations, 2019), 51–77.

[34] Maria Framke, "International Events, National Policy: The 1930s in India as a Formative Period for Non-Alignment," in *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi-Bandung-Belgrade*, ed. Natasa Miskovic, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boskovska (Routledge, 2014), 37–57.

[35] Michele L Louro, *Comrades against Imperialism: Nehru, India, and Interwar Internationalism* (Cambridge University Press, 2018).

communist international[36]. In attendance were delegates from 36 colonial territories including Jawaharlal Nehru, Mohammed Hatta (Future Vice-President of Indonesia), Messali Hadj (Father of Algerian Nationalism), as well as representatives from the African National Congress, and other prominent liberation movements[37]. The group also received support from public intellectuals such as Albert Einstein. This represented a shift that had begun with groups such as the Pan-African Association (1900) which helped forge links between anti-colonial movements in different territories and representing different peoples.[38] Importantly these links built an optimism for the future of post-colonial solidarity and sought to internationalize the struggle for post-colonial independence. The League also advanced an ideological argument that rejected the 'civilising mission' that served as the core ideological justification for the hierarchical application of sovereignty and the denial of independence to the colonial world.[39] It was during these interwar years though organizations like the League Against Imperialism that the foundation for the demands of the post-colonial world began to be formalised and structured into an international consensus among future leaders of the post-colonial world.

Following the conference Nehru and other future national leaders entered regular correspondence with each other, further strengthening the links of Afro-Asian solidarity that would form the basis of future institutions such as the Non-Aligned Movement[40]. The LAI also provided an avenue for the Soviet Union and the communist international to have direct involvement with the colonial world, providing resources and networks for their independence struggle. The assistance provided by the Soviets to the League (and other anti-colonial efforts) set the groundwork for the positive relationship leaders such as Nehru would have with the Soviets.

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[36] More information on the communist international links can be found in Fredrik Petersson, "' We Are Neither Visionaries Nor Utopian Dreamers': Willi Münzenberg, the League against Imperialism, and the Comintern, 1925-1933," 2013.

[37] Louro, *Comrades against Imperialism: Nehru, India, and Interwar Internationalism*.

[38] Framke, "International Events, National Policy: The 1930s in India as a Formative Period for Non-Alignment."

[39] Louro, *Comrades against Imperialism: Nehru, India, and Interwar Internationalism*.

[40] Fredrik Petersson, "From Versailles to Bandung," in *Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures*, ed. Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri, and Vasuki Nesiah (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 3–32, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.

The Second World War would serve as the material shock necessary to make the existing colonial order untenable. While the First World War had inflicted significant damage upon the primary colonial empires of France and Britain, the landlocked nature of their opponents left them with largely unfettered access to their respective empires, and Britain's naval dominance was never significantly challenged. The Second World War on the other hand had done significantly more damage to imperial prestige and direct control of the colonial powers, with Britain and France being expelled from many of their East-Asian territories by Japan. In the case of France and the Netherlands, their mainland had been militarily occupied and their economies had been devastated to a degree even greater than the First World War[41]. This second destructive European war reduced state capacity within the imperial powers such that they were now incapable of continuing to suppress the growing movements in their colonies demanding independence. Thus, the material space for a change in the governing norms of recognition within international society had been opened, and post-colonial leaders had already formulated the ideological demands necessary to seize upon that material opportunity. It is in these moments of shock to the material balance of power that actors agency is maximized. This process was aided by the two newly emergent superpowers, the USA and the USSR, both (often imperfectly) supporting the general principle of decolonization[42], which assisted these newly emergent states in receiving international recognition.

Post-Colonial Contributions to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Following the end of the Second World War, there was an opportunity for a radical reassessment of the normative structure of international society. There was an appetite among the major powers to ensure that the brutalities of the Second World War and the Holocaust would not take place again, which provided an opening for the establishment of new normative frameworks for international society based around the concept of human rights, which had a lengthy history of thought prior to 1945.

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[41] John Keegan, *The Second World War* (Random House, 2011).
[42] John D Hargreaves, *Decolonization in Africa* (Routledge, 2014).

The first attempt to establish a new normative direction for international order was the United Nations Charter. The first push to ensure the UN Charter provided a suitable normative character to this new order was the debate over the inclusion of the preamble to the Charter itself, which outlined the goals of this new institution; that it would - *"save succeeding generations from the scourge of war"* [43]. The figure who pushed most concertedly for the inclusion of this normative statement was Jan Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa [44]. The interest in normative content from such a state leader may be surprising to some, but was in many ways representative of the United Nations in 1945; which remained in large part a club made up of the same states as the League of Nations that preceded it, with little representation from Africa or Asia. The still colonized world would have little representation at the San Francisco conference to finalize the United Nations Charter.

With the negotiation of the UN Charter dominated by the Western and Soviet states, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) would serve as one of the first opportunities for the post-colonial world to express its normative desires for a new international order as equal members of international society [45]. Negotiated and signed throughout 1948, the drafting of the UDHR allowed for the full participation of the newly independent states of South Asia, particularly India. India's leaders felt an obligation to the significant number of colonized peoples that remained throughout the world. The Indian Independence movement had been part of a well-developed internationalist anti-colonial movement[46]. Nehru argued that his nationalism was different from chauvinistic forms of European nationalism, and was imbued by an internationalist character that relied on the equality of all peoples, expressed through self- determination and sovereign equality for the colonized world [47]. India was

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[43] United Nations, 'United Nations Charter'.

[44] Christof Heyns and Willem Gravett, '" To Save Succeeding Generations from the Scourge of War": Jan Smuts and the Ideological Foundations of the United Nations', *Human Rights Quarterly* 39, no. 3 (2017): 574–605.

[45] Robin Ramcharan and Bertrand Ramcharan, *Asia and the Drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (Springer, 2019).

[46] Michele L Louro, *Comrades against Imperialism: Nehru, India, and Interwar Internationalism* (Cambridge University Press, 2018).

[47] Manu Bhagavan, 'A New Hope: India, the United Nations and the Making of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights', *Modern Asian Studies* 44, no. 2 (2010): 311–47.

able to take a leading position among the Afro-Asian block during the UDHR's negotiation as the only Afro-Asian state of a similar level of power was China, currently represented in the UN by Chang-Kai Shek's nationalists, who were in a losing position in the Chinese civil war by 1948, leaving India as the key Afro-Asian power during the drafting process.

There were three broad goals of the states participating in the formulation of the UDHR - the first concern of the western states was the enshrinement of liberal individual rights (such as freedom of assembly, religion, speech and protections against arbitrary detention and state violence) following the defeat of fascism. The second concern, advocated for largely by the Soviets, was the inclusion of certain social rights (such as a right to food and shelter). Finally the third concern came from the post-colonial world, the inclusion of a right to self-determination for the still colonised peoples of the globe. India would be able to play a unique role in the formation of the UDHR, and would be essential to its drafting process[48]. India was looked to as both a state with significant moral prestige for its non-violent resistance movement and as a powerful post-colonial state which represented the demands of the wider post-colonial and still colonised world. It also played a role as an overlapping point of political opinion for each of the three camps, as a state in favour of both liberal, social and post-colonial rights during the drafting process.

The other key figure in setting India's position during the UDHR drafting process beyond Jawaharlal Nehru was Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, who headed the Indian delegation during the drafting process. Pandit and Nehru differed somewhat on their political outlook, with Pandit's own view more heavily influenced by Gandhian radicalism than Nehru who preferred an approach more accepting of existing international norms. Nehru had previously insisted that India accept fully the wording of the UN Charter, despite its failure to include the explicit anti-colonialist language that had been hoped for [49].

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[48] Ramcharan and Ramcharan, *Asia and the Drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*; Anna Lukina, 'Soviet Union and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights', *Max Planck Institute for European Legal History Research Paper Series*, nos. 2017–01 (2017).

[49] Bhagavan, 'A New Hope: India, the United Nations and the Making of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights'.

Nehru saw significant advantages to accepting the wording of the UN Charter as it allowed for the entrance of India as a sovereign equal for the first time in modern history; an important step for both securing the benefits of decolonization already won and to provide an opening for furthering the demands of the colonized world from within international society. Pandit had taken part as a non-government observer in the conference to determine the future of Asia that had been held prior to the San Francisco conference, against the wishes of the British government. During these events she made a number of speeches in favour of the self-determination of colonized peoples which were generally well received in the United States, further boosting her personal prestige prior to her participation in the drafting of the UDHR.

"*Pandit makes clear that the colonized throughout the world acquiesced to the power of the UN simply by reading the terms of the Charter differently"* argues Bhagavan[50]. This use of constructive ambiguity and the co-opting of the normative language of international society would become a key practice of the post-colonial international community to argue for self-determination for the colonized world [51]. India shared the goals of all three of the major camps in the drafting process of the UDHR, which allowed it significant influence as a powerful and normatively valued political force. India was a fellow democracy with an interest in enshrining liberal human rights protections into international law, with Pandit and the Indian delegation working closely with Eleanor Rossevelt and the U.S. delegation in the formalization of these norms. This would represent a high point for radical liberal idealism being promoted by the post-colonial world on the international stage, in part because the post-colonial coalition was represented by a very limited number of states in 1948, the senior of which was itself a democracy with liberal personal rights protections [52] This period is also the point at which India (and the post-colonial coalition as a whole) were at its most willing to adopt a prescriptive approach to the nature of a 'good state' by outlining these norms for a state's domestic structure. As the post-colonial coalition grew in size throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, and as revolutions and

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[50] Ibid., 232.
[51] Roland Burke, *Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).
[52] Ibid.

counter-revolutions took place, the ideological diversity of the coalition increased and the post-colonial world would shift from a prescriptive universalism to a radically pluralistic approach to domestic norms which valued independence and non-interference through strong state sovereignty over particular expectations on the structure of the state.

The UDHR would remain a key normative document of reference for the post-colonial world and it is very much both a liberal document and also a document that has the stamp of the post-colonial world upon it. The liberalism of the UDHR should not be considered an exclusively "Western" concept. During the drafting process India and other post-colonial states would argue in favour of the right to self-determination as a fundamental human right of colonized peoples that was necessary for human dignity. While the Western states were willing to agree with the need for universal principles to protect human dignity domestically, there was significant resistance to the inclusion of a right to self-determination for colonized peoples. Opposition to the measure by the British delegation was argued on the grounds that it was not possible to adopt a universal principle for post-colonial independence when states were at such varied levels of development and preparedness for self-rule [53]. This shows the use of a universalist argument from the post-colonial world against a particularist argument from the Western delegation, as well as the continuing strength of the standard of civilization logic that had existed prior to the Second World War, with the British delegation redeploying the argument that the peoples of the colonized world did not meet a standard of civilizational development that made them capable of self-rule in order to justify the continuation of British colonialism. The redeployment of this traditional framework for understanding sovereignty and self-determination shows the significant and radical departure from existing norms the post-colonial world were demanding by arguing for sovereign equality and independence for the colonized world.

India and the post-colonial coalition at the United Nations were unable to win the inclusion of a right to colonial self-determination in the UDHR. One of their allies in the effort to secure the inclusion

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[53] Ibid.

was the Socialist bloc, including the Soviet Union, who believed they had solved the so called "national problem" through the coequal SSRs that represented the different nations of the USSR. The Socialist and post-colonial bloc was insufficiently influential to win the necessary concessions from the European colonial states that would not sign onto a program that included a right to self-determination for their colonial territories. The Socialist bloc would choose to abstain on the final wording of the UDHR, concerned about enshrining certain rights of association and speech, as well as arguing that the failure to include the right to self-determination was unacceptable. The only other two states to abstain were South Africa (in opposition to its anti-racial discrimination clauses) and Saudi Arabia (in opposition to the freedom of religious practice clause) [54].

Despite the failure to achieve all of the wanted inclusions for the post-colonial world, India and the other post-colonial states would adopt the Nehruvian approach of making concessions to the imperfect existing international system, becoming signatories of the UDHR both due to genuine support for the measures it included and also to win the continued prestige of membership of international society's normative community at a moment in which norms were still in deep flux. The UDHR would serve as the first opportunity for the newly independent post-colonial world to attempt to shape the normative character of the United Nations (fast becoming the defacto venue for the expression of international opinion) as state rather than non-state representatives. The recognition of these states significantly improved the international prestige of the post-colonial coalition. India in particular emerged from the drafting process with further bolstered prestige, both for its support of strong individual human rights protections and as a voice for the still colonized world in advancing their national aspirations.

Pandit's ambiguous approach to "reading the UN charter differently" in the words Bhagavan would return with the UDHR, which would be taken up as a mantle by the post-colonial world in future international efforts, such as at the Bandung conference where states would argue that the 'true vision' of the UDHR could not be fulfilled until decolonization was complete. Decolonization would be

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[54] Lukina, 'Soviet Union and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights'.

continued to be argued for in universalist moral terms, particularly in reference to the UDHR, and both the role the post-colonial states had in drafting it, as well as the way in which it would be enthusiastically adopted by the post-colonial world and rhetorically built upon by the post-colonial coalition makes the UDHR as much a post-colonial document as it is a Western liberal one. This was a moment in which the goals of the post-colonial world were embodied by a radical liberal idealism, and we will see a shift towards a more radical pluralist outlook on the nature of the state as the 1940s and 1950s progressed, but support for the UDHR would remain.

The Shift to a Pluralist Agenda for National Sovereignty in the Post-Colonial World

For both the leaders of the still colonized world and the new post-colonial states, the central normative demand during the period of change in international norms following the end of the Second World War remained a recognition for a right to self-determination from colonial domination, and equal respect for their national sovereignty. This was expressed both in terms of a formal end to colonial rule, but also as a broad ranging intellectual, cultural, economic and governmental movement for 'genuine' independence, both from the old imperial powers of Europe and from the growing concern of neo-colonial domination. The ongoing concern about the continued existence of colonialism in the 1950s and the growing encroachment of neo-colonialist practices in Asia and Africa prompted further collaboration between the post-colonial powers and independence movements to achieve greater degrees of freedom for the post-colonial and still colonized world [55] These relationships would become increasingly formalized: in the international political sphere through institutions such as the Non-Aligned Movement, in the economic sphere with projects such as the New International Economic Order, and culturally/intellectually through the growing interest in Pan-African, Pan-Asian, Pan-Arab and other cultural-political identities that existed beyond the national borders that had been defined by the colonial powers (and often sought to reconstitute them). This included an intellectual project to rediscover the linkages between the colonized peoples of Asia, Africa and the Middle-East.

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[55] Natasa Miskovic et al., *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi-Bandung-Belgrade* (Routledge, 2014).

As the late 1940s and 1950s unfolded, the newly independent states in the post-colonial coalition would expand and become increasingly ideologically diverse. To enable the collaboration of an increasingly diverse post-colonial coalition that would include parliamentary democracies, revolutionary one-party states, progressive officers movements, monarchies and anti-communist juntas, the post-colonial coalition would need to develop a political consensus which could advance the goals of these states for increasing international political independence while managing the political differences within the coalition. This would result in a shift away from the prescriptive approach to defining the nature of a 'good state' from within the post-colonial coalition to instead a political consensus formed around strongly enforced state sovereignty rights and domestic political independence. This allowed for the advancement of the desire for national independence while also negotiating the disagreements within the post-colonial coalition as to how a state should be structured. This chapter argues that the particular goals and constraints of the post-colonial coalition produced a unique normative outlook that was in part highly radical, seeking to overturn the racialized international order that had dominated throughout the long nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, while simultaneously being partly conservative, interested in reinforcing existing norms of strong national state sovereignty that had predominated in the prior era for Western powers. This position also accepted, in large part, traditional notions of state prestige, thus reinforcing aspects of the existing international order at a time in which it was at its greatest contention for over a century.

The negotiation of the different conceptions of the good state by the different political leaders of the post-colonial coalition during this period was not merely a compromise to avoid the difficult questions on the nature of their differing domestic politics. This chapter argues that the political, ontological and epistemic differences between the leaders of the post-colonial states produced a normative position of 'Positive Pluralism' which recognised the differences within the post-colonial world as a good in and of itself, rather than a problem to be negotiated through. The positive pluralist position recognised that the differences between states could in fact be generative of new synthesised ideas. Still, when that was not possible, a mutual respect for domestic differences became the

preferred norm, which was in turn expressed through a support for strong state sovereignty and domestic non-interference. This chapter argues that this positive pluralist normative position remains strong within international society as a whole, but is particularly prevalent in the global south, and as such it is valuable to analyse the political developments of the 1950s and early 1960s, which would shift the post-colonial world, and then international society more generally towards this positive pluralist outlook. These notions would become formalized into UN structures through the passing of resolution 1514: Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the remainder of this chapter charts the development of the normative arguments within the post-colonial coalition that would create this unique outlook and bring the rest of international society more closely in line with this position.

The Development of Pluralistic Post-Colonial Solidarity

The interwar period was an era of increasing internationalism for the future leaders of the post-colonial states. The League Against Imperialism (formed 1927) helped formalize international links between those struggling for independence. International links between the post-colonial states were thus being formed prior to the establishment of any post-colonial state's independence [56]. The first international conference in the emerging post-colonial environment was held in Delhi in 1947 [57], prior to India's formal independence. This conference would include representatives from across Asia, including the 'Asian' SSRs of the Soviet Union, the Republic of China, and other Asian powers such as Ceylon. From this first post-colonial conference, the idea that the Asian world had much to learn from one another's differing political systems was promoted, as well as a collective spirit of a shared pan-Asian culture and history that had both been supressed by colonialism and also emerged from the

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[56] Maria Framke, 'International Events, National Policy: The 1930s in India as a Formative Period for Non-Alignment', in *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi-Bandung-Belgrade*, ed. Natasa Miskovic et al. (Routledge, 2014).

[57] Carolien Stolte, '"The Asiatic Hour": New Perspecitves on the Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, 1947', in *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi-Bandung-Belgrade*, ed. Natasa Miskovic et al. (Routledge, 2014).

shared experience of it. These ideas would be built upon by further international conferences in Colombo (1948, 1954), Bogor (1949), New Delhi (1949), and Beijing (1952) among others.

The ideological culmination of these prior conferences was the Bandung conference of 1955, which built upon the tradition of normative pluralism in an effort to unite the newly emergent Afro-Asian powers around an international program of change for the international system, as well as continuing to develop post-colonial intellectual ties between the newly independent states [58]. A series of political committees made up of state representatives attempted to bring together the states around consensus positions on pressing political issues for the post-colonial world. To focus on the question of sovereignty, this work will analyse the debates that emerged at Bandung regarding what constituted colonialism, the degree to which it was illegitimate and why, and how sovereignty claims should instead be legitimated.

These debates would form the foundation for the post-colonial demands for reform of the practice of sovereignty in international society. In the final Bandung communique which outlined the position of the participant nations, the spirit of Pandit and her recommendation of reading differently could clearly be seen. The Bandung communique was framed explicitly in terms of the UN Charter and the UDHR. The Bandung Communique would adopt both documents as its own by arguing that:

> *"The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nation and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation."* [59]

In this way, despite the failure to achieve explicit rights to self-determination in either document, the post-colonial world used the normative language of both human rights and the Charter to argue that colonialism constituted a violation of the international normative political order.

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[58] Luis Eslava et al., 'The Spirit of Bandung', in *Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures* (Cambridge University Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.
[59] Bandung, 'Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung (24 April 1955)'.

The shift towards an increasingly pluralist approach to post-colonial cooperation did not necessitate a rejection of earlier prescriptive normative documents, such as the UDHR, rather these documents were integrated into the post-colonial perspective on international norms. This shows the willingness to adopt the language of the international system by the post-colonial world while continuing to insist on its particular normative meaning. This was a highly effective strategy of normative engagement and co-opting of these documents towards the end of post-colonial independence, which would lead to a collapse in normative support for the continued existence of colonial rule by the new global super-powers. This was achieved both through successful political pressure by the post-colonial states, but also through their adoption of the language of dignity and human rights (of which the Western states were signatories) to oppose the normative basis for colonialism and produce new norms in favour of self-determination and strong state sovereignty. The ability to use the language of international society in order to advance the normative objectives of the post-colonial world shows the agency that the post-colonial states had in negotiating the normative terrain of international society; which is often overlooked when the engagement is viewed through the lens only of acquiescence or resistance. In actuality, the acquiescence to the norms of international society by the newly emergent post-colonial states was done both for moral reasons and in order to build the normative case for furthering the demands of these states.

What is Colonialism? The Determination of Bandung's Final Communique

At Bandung the post-colonial coalition debated the nature of colonialism; despite the ideological diversity of the states involved there was a consensus around the illegitimacy of colonialism as a practice, even among those states with close ties to the Western powers. The divide among the post-colonial coalition came over the question of the recent expansion of the USSR into Eastern Europe. Anti-Communist post-colonial leaders at Bandung argued that the Soviet Union's actions in Eastern Europe constituted the same illegitimate practice of colonialism. Included among this bloc arguing for a condemnation of the Soviet Union was the Hashemite Monarchy of Iraq, which sought to limit Nasser's growing influence in the Arab world through the formation of the Western aligned Baghdad

Pact [60], as well as Sir John Kotelawala, Prime Minister of Ceylon, and a close ally of the United

Kingdom. Kotelawala declared at Bandung:

> *"those satellite states under Communist domination in Central and Eastern Europe ... Are*
>
> *these not colonies, as much as any of the colonial territories in Africa and Asia?... Should it*
>
> *not be our duty openly to declare our opposition to Soviet colonialism as much as Western*
>
> *imperialism."* [61]

Opposition to this position was widespread, both from those states who shared ideological ties with

the Soviet Union, as well as non-communist states which maintained friendly relations with the Soviet

Union [62]. The Soviet Union had historic ties with a number of post-colonial states which stretched

back to their support of anti-colonial efforts in the interwar era [63]. The Soviet Union was also

recognized by many as an essential balancing power against the United States. The consensus position

reached at Bandung was in favour of separating the Soviet Union's activities in Eastern Europe from

traditional colonialism. The decision was a combination of pragmatic necessity and genuine

recognition of a unique character of European colonial rule which separated it from the question of

Eastern Europe. Pragmatically, most post-colonial states' desired to continue positive relations with

the Soviet Union, and anti-communist states desired not to lose influence within the anti-colonial

coalition that was being built at Bandung. Here positive pluralism was expressed, with the coalition

preferring to allow states to decide their own relationship with the Soviet Union, without dictating a

particular approach, recognizing that the coalition could still effectively work together on anti-

colonial issues for which there was agreement and provide space for states within the coalition to

pursue their own policies when consensus could not be reached.

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[60] Matthieu Rey, '"Fighting Colonialism" versus "Non-Alignment": Two Arab Points of View on the Bandung Conference', in *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi-Bandung-Belgrade*, ed. Natasa Miskovic et al. (Routledge, 2014).

[61] Shelton U Kodikara and Kashi Prasad Misra, *Documents on Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy, 1947-1965*, ed. Amal Jayawardane (Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 2004).

[62] Rey, '"Fighting Colonialism" versus "Non-Alignment": Two Arab Points of View on the Bandung Conference'.

[63] Fredrik Petersson, '*We Are Neither Visionaries Nor Utopian Dreamers': Willi Münzenberg, the League against Imperialism, and the Comintern, 1925-1933*, \AAbo Akademi-\AAbo Akademi University, 2013.

Beyond pragmatism, was the genuinely held belief in the difference between European colonialism and the Soviet Union, and this would go on to shape the expression of the new sovereign norms that the post-colonial world attempted to build within international society. Bandung recognized the particular, racialized nature of colonialism that remained from the international model of the nineteenth century, which had judged (and continued to argue) that certain territories were unfit for self-rule on a racialized standard of civilization grounds. It was this racialized legitimation of the rights to sovereignty that was the major norm to be overcome for the post-colonial world. This separated the question of colonialism from the question of Soviet involvement in Eastern Europe, in which states maintained their own domestic communist parties that were not excluded from participation in the socialist world on racial grounds in the same way that the post-colonial states had been. This framed the opposition to racial discrimination as central to the post-colonial world's opposition to, and definition of colonialism. It also made "self-determination" the only legitimate model of international sovereignty, and importantly for the pluralist post-colonial coalition; self-determination need not necessarily be expressed in the form of a parliamentary democracy, but rather through the ruling cadre of the state having some form of organic link to "the people", be that elected or not.

The Bandung communique would enshrine this position in the following statement:

> *"The conference is agreed:*
>
> *(a) In declaring that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should be brought to an end;*
>
> *(b) In affirming that the subjection of peoples to __alien__ [my emphasis] subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation."*[64]

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[64] Bandung, 'Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung (24 April 1955)'.

Here, it is the concept of freedom from "alien" subjugation that defines the new normative anti-colonial standard for sovereignty. This avoided the question of the Socialist Bloc (which were led by their own domestic communist parties and thus not subject to alien rule). It also centred the form of state legitimation around the concept of self-determination. This was a radical departure from the existing forms of state legitimation, in which, while self-determination played a part, it was the standard of civilization and recognition by the Western powers that defined membership of international society. The demands of the post-colonial world were a mixture of the normatively radical (as it challenged the mechanism of legitimation in international society) while also normatively conservative, not demanding a radical reformation of the rights of sovereignty.

UN Resolution 1514: International Society for All?

UN Resolution 1514 is a key political moment in the process of decolonization, and expressed a new normative consensus on the nature of sovereignty. Passed by the 947th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly in December 1960. UN Resolution 1514: The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples - received the support of eighty-nine states, mostly from the post-colonial world and the Soviet bloc. It was brought to the UN by a group of post-colonial states, whose international UN cooperation had been strengthened following the Bandung conference. Resolution 1514 was a ratification at a global level of the normative demands expressed at Bandung. Importantly for the establishment of a new norm against the legitimacy of colonial sovereignty, no states were willing to vote against the motion, signalling that even the colonial powers no longer could continue to justify the continuation of colonialism as a legitimate form of international sovereignty. Only nine states would finally abstain on the resolution: the United Kingdom, France, the United States, the Union of South Africa, Portugal, Spain, Australia, Belgium & the Dominican Republic [65]. The United Kingdom and France placed considerable pressure on the United States to abstain on the motion, and the abstaining states were either states with remaining colonial possessions

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[65] Wolfgang F Danspeckgruber, *The Self-Determination of Peoples: Community, Nation, and State in an Interdependent World* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

or their close geostrategic allies [66]. Latin American and European allies without colonial territories fell decisively in line with the post-colonial position. This effectively signalled the end of any attempt to justify colonial rule as a legitimate form of sovereign rule, overturning a century's long norm in international society.

While recognising that UN General Assembly Resolutions are not legally binding in the way previously discussed documents such as the UN Charter and UDHR are; in terms of the normative character of international society, UN General Assembly Resolutions can be powerful tools for expressing the normative consensus of international society, which need not necessarily be legally binding. Thus when discussing the development of norms, UN General Assembly Resolutions deserve close scrutiny and interpretation. The question may be asked what practical effect this normative change had on international politics of the period, given that the Cold War was a period in which state sovereignty, was often undermined. While this is true, the period did see the terminal decline of the legitimacy of formal colonial practices. Violations of post-colonial independence was not conducted through the establishment of formal colonial rule by the imperial powers as they had done in the previous centuries. Instead, aligned proxy states with local leadership cadres were established. These states were often accepted by the post-colonial world as legitimate. Sovereignty has always been a norm that has been imperfectly respected by the great powers, and this new decolonial sovereignty was no different. But this is not to say that the norm of sovereignty did/does not exist or provide certain constraints on the actors in the international system.

A comparative textual analysis of both UN Resolution 1514 and the Bandung Communique shows a continuity of language, goals and ambitions. This shows the significant role the post-colonial world played in shaping the new normative vision of sovereignty in the 1950s and 1960s. UN Resolution

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[66] Victor Kattan, 'Self-Determination as Ideology: The Cold War, the End of Empire, and the Making of UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (14 December 1960)', *International Law and Time: Narratives and Techniques (Not yet Published)*, 2016.

1514 mirrors exactly the wording of the Bandung Declaration on the nature of colonialism and its illegitimacy as a continued form of sovereign rule:

> *"1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation."* [67]

The specific use of the wording alien again highlighted the opposition to a racialized standard of civilization model of international sovereignty, and allowed for the full support of the Soviet Union. It also allowed for the support of post-colonial states with their own separatist issues [68]. The resolution thus made explicit the post-colonial world's normative concern over racialized European colonialism in Africa and Asia, while sidestepping ongoing political issues in their own territories.

The radical elements of the post-colonial states' demands was not merely restricted to their inclusion in equal sovereignty but who has sovereignty - the resolution read:

> *"7. All states shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all states, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity."* [69]

A noticeable departure from the previous conception of who has access to sovereignty was the phrasing *"respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples"*. Prior to this, sovereignty was understood as a legal right which states had, not peoples. Under this new conception of sovereignty, those peoples still colonized by the imperial powers already held sovereignty as a 'people' that was being violated by the continuation of colonial rule, which was a radical departure from a legal regime which recognized states, not 'peoples' as a political entity. There was of course an ambiguity about what

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[67] United Nations, 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV)', 1960, Copy available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Independence.aspx.

[68] Luwam Dirar, 'Rethinking the Concept of Colonialism in Bandung and Its African Union Aftermath', in *Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures*, ed. Luis Eslava et al. (Cambridge University Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.

[69] United Nations, 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV)'.

constituted a 'people' group, but it was clear to the international community that the European colonizers constituted a different peoples from those they ruled over in Asia and Africa, and as such, this ambiguity maximized the political objectives of the post-colonial states.

UN Resolution 1514 makes explicit both that it is all peoples who have access to these sovereign rights, and also reiterates a maximalist interpretation of what sovereignty meant. *"2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic social and cultural development"* [70]. This maximalist interpretation of sovereignty was an attempt to foreclose on attempts at neo-colonial practices which left states nominally independent but lacking the agency to escape the influence of the great powers. This is a maximalist interpretation of the traditional right to non-interference implied by sovereignty. This would later be reinforced in 1965 with the passing of "UN Resolution 2131 – Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty" which states in its first declaration *"No state has the right to intervene directly or indirectly for any reason whatever in the internal or external affairs of any State"* (United Nations 1965). This position is again a reiteration of the centrality of the state to international politics, and a defence of the old order of national sovereignty rights, mixing the radically transformative and the conservative in its demands for the international system.

Finally, the Bandung Declaration and UN Resolution 1514 is an inversion of the traditional logic of individual rights. UN Resolution 1514 declares:

> *"2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."* [71]

Similarly the Bandung declaration states

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[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid.

> *"the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination which is a **pre-requisite** [my emphasis] of the full enjoyment of all fundamental Human rights"* [72]

In this understanding, the principle right is the right to self-determination, which is a right that is held collectively, rather than by the individual. Then from this freedom to form a state and to avoid interference from outside powers, the other associated goods that make up human rights can be developed within that peoples own socio-political context. This is a shift away from the prescriptive understanding of individualized human rights as understood in the UDHR towards a more pluralist context, as well as a collectivization of those rights from the individual to the peoples group. This, in combination with later resolutions such as Resolution 2131 is a clear statement that the primary protector of rights is the domestic political structures of the state, not the international community.

UN Resolution 1514 was a turning point in the international approach to the permissibility of colonial territories. It represented the culmination of a decade of normative change driven by the post-colonial world which shifted the legitimate holders of sovereignty from those that met a racialized conception of the standard of civilization to the representatives of distinct 'peoples' groups. This is the normative understanding held today by the international community. Overturning the prior norm was a radical departure from over a century of international relations practice dominated by the European states. However, it was also reinforcing of certain elements of the international system, demanding changes to who was accepted as holders of sovereignty, but not what that sovereignty meant for the newly admitted states.

A New Sovereign Rights Regime: Who Was to be Recognised?

An important question to grapple with when analysing the integration of the post-colonial world into the existing international society was the way in which different ontological commitments and assumptions about the nature of states, individuals and societies interacted with each other and the existing international society. For international society to become truly 'global' it would need to

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[72] Bandung, 'Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung (24 April 1955)'.

integrate the understanding of states and peoples previously marginalised. Getachew highlights the deep links to the international held by post-colonial national independence movements - these groups while fighting for national determination were also trading and sharing knowledge and engaging in knowledge production with an international sphere of anti-imperialist activists[73]. Esclava et al described the Bandung communique which influenced UN Resolution 1514 as a "trans-civilizational document" that draws upon varying ontological frameworks of the different participants about the nature of the international system.[74] These varied ontologies had to engage with the European liberal project of international society that dominated the foundations of the UN Charter and preceding institutions such as the League of Nations. To achieve this The Bandung Communique summons a new universalist foundation for Afro-Asian cooperation from an imagined past rooted in Afro-Asian religious and cultural exchanges that were stopped by colonialism.

> "Asia and Africa have been the cradle of great religions and civilisations which have enriched other cultures and civilisations while themselves being enriched in the process. Thus the cultures of Asia and Africa are based on spiritual and universal foundations."[75]

But at the same time, the Bandung communique draws heavily on the language of the original UN Charter:

> "in affirming that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation;"[76]

There was general spirit of universalism among leaders of the post-colonial world of the last 1950s and early 1960s that engaged with the universalist principles of the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights. This helped stitch together the new international society that emerged

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[73] Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire* (Princeton University Press, 2019).
[74] Eslava, Fakhri, and Nesiah, "The Spirit of Bandung."
[75] Bandung, "Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung (24 April 1955)."
[76] Ibid

following the Second World War, even if both groups were approaching international society from their own universalisms. The post-colonial world would thus deploy the language of the UN Charter, and particularly the UN Declaration of Human Rights, but would come to new conclusions in the way to interpret them, discussed in this section.

Repeated reference to the values of the Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights as grounding the demand for decolonization is consistently found within the political documents of the post-colonial world during the period; both the Bandung declaration and UN Resolution 1514. There are however two important aspects that make these documents ontologically distinct from the liberal, western, post-war framers of these documents. The first is the focus on self-determination - in UN Resolution 1514 it states:

> "2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."[77]

This is a subtle inversion of traditional human rights logic. UN Resolution 1514 declares that all individuals have the right to self-determination, and by virtue of that right, other political rights are implied to flow from that core right to self-determination.

Similarly, the Bandung declaration states:

> "the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination, which is a **pre-requisite** *[my emphasis]* of the full enjoyment of all fundamental Human Rights."[78]

From this understanding, the principal right that *must* exist is the right to self-determination. Without the ability for a 'peoples' to form their own nation state other rights become unachievable - self-determination is the prerequisite and vehicle through which human rights are achieved. This is again a maximalist understanding of sovereignty, where the nation state is the guarantor of human rights, not

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[77] United Nations, "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV)."

[78] Bandung, "Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung (24 April 1955)."

the international community. This also has important implications for the primary institution of sovereignty, as this maximalist interpretation makes sovereignty the fundamental element of international law, from which other rights and duties are both garnered and can be suborned in order to protect state sovereignty. This is a break from the original interpretation of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, where rights are tied to the individual regardless of their ability to achieve self-determination.

Finally, it is important to highlight the focus on "peoples" in both UN Resolution 1514 and the Bandung Communique as a referent object from which a state derives its legitimacy. While there is significant reference to the UN Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) as legitimising documents for demands towards decolonization, both these documents are noticeable for their lack of interest in peoples (collective) as a legitimate political entity.

The UNDHR makes no reference to "peoples" as a political object that is afforded rights[79]. The rights outlined in the UNDHR are individual rights, not collective rights. Similarly, the UN Charter, other than brief mention in the preamble, makes no reference to "peoples" as a political entity until "Chapter XI: Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories". The UN Charter instead refers specifically to either "Members" or "Nations" as the legitimate actors of international society, not "peoples".[80]

For the leaders of post-colonial states, their legitimacy to govern was tied to the idea that they represented a distinct collective socio-political entity (a people), which had an inherent right both to their own nation state, and to freedom from domination from an 'alien' colonial power that was foreign to this group. This shift in the language used to justify a state's legitimacy in UN Resolution 1514 is not purely a semantic one, it forms the bedrock of the decolonial project and provides a subtle shift in

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[79] United Nations, "United Nations Declaration of Human Rights," 1948.
[80] United Nations, "United Nations Charter," 1945.

the way in which states derived their sovereign legitimacy. States were legitimised not from recognition by fellow states, but by representing a particular cohesive national people - a shift that had been accelerating since Wilson's 14 points and the end of the First World War.[81] This shift undermines the legitimacy of an imperial state structure in which a metropole nation rules over other "peoples" explicitly considered foreign by the ruling power. This was again a radical shift from an international society of only half a century prior in which all great powers were also imperial powers to some degree. These changes would make contributions to the developing body of international jurisprudence.[82] However the concept of what is a 'peoples' would remain ill-defined and return to haunt certain post-colonial states as their own ethnic minority populations sought separation from the central government.

The text of UN Resolution 1514 can provide numerous insights into the nature of the post-colonial world's integration into the existing international society. Far from rejecting the norms of international society as Bull originally feared[83], post-colonial states often argued for the most maximalist interpretation of international rights afforded to states, in particular the protections of sovereignty. The radical shift in international society came not from demands for what rights emerged from the state, but to who those norms were to be applied to. Firstly, limitations on recognition on the grounds of failure to meet certain standards of civilization were actively fought against by the post-colonial world with UN Resolution 1514 stating that. *"3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence."*[84] Secondly, the concept of "peoples" as a legitimising entity gained greater salience as the legitimising principle that justified the formation of a state. This was the culmination of a nationalist project which began in the 1800s, was strengthened by Wilson following the First World War, and reached its universal application during

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[81] Woodrow Wilson, "Transcript of President Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points (1918).",'' *Our Documents. Org*, 1918.
[82] Tiyanjana Maluwa, "International Law-Making in the Organisation of African Unity: An Overview," *African Journal of International and Comparative Law* 12 (2000): 201.
[83] Bull and Watson, *The Expansion of International Society*.
[84] United Nations, "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV)."

decolonization. Finally, the alien rule of foreign colonial states was delegitimized as an internationally acceptable form of state formation in international society.

Conclusion: A New Post-Colonial Sovereignty

What is to be taken away from our new understanding of the development of sovereignty in the 1950s and 1960s? Firstly a reorientation of the historic narrative about the expansion of state sovereignty. In contrast to the traditional narrative, which presents the norm of state sovereignty originating in Europe in the 17th century and slowly expanding out to encompass the globe. Instead, the norm of sovereignty prior to decolonization was a particularized understanding for inter-European relations, it is the post-colonial world that insists on a universal model of sovereignty in the 1950s and 1960s.

Following the end of the Second World War, the states of Africa and Asia had a shared vision of the international that they sought to create in order to secure the independence and equality of their states. In order to achieve this, ideologically disparate post-colonial states worked together to craft a framework for cooperation. This normative framework was a 'Positive Pluralist' position for international cooperation. This framework did not necessarily see differences between the states as a weakness that needed to be compromised through or overcome, but as a positive aspect of the international system. The diversity of domestic political structures and ideologies within the post-colonial world was valued by the participants, and the post-colonial states argued for strong domestic non- interference norms as a result. Getachew [85] highlights the deep links to the international held by post-colonial national independence movements - these groups while fighting for national determination were also trading and sharing knowledge with an international sphere of anti-imperialist activists. Eslava et al (2017) described the Bandung communique as a "trans-civilizational document" that draws upon varying ontological frameworks of the different participants regarding the nature of the international system.

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[85] Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire* (Princeton University Press, 2019).

At the same time as adopting this positive pluralist position, the post-colonial states did not eschew engagement with ideals of universalism. The post-colonial world played an essential role in the formulation of the UDHR. These documents were not Western liberal documents, but had significant input from key post-colonial states, in particular India. The Bandung Charter would make claim to these universalist values and deploy them in the normative case against colonialism, arguing that the ongoing colonial rule of parts of Asia and Africa represented an abrogation of human rights. The Bandung Communique itself summons a new Universalist foundation for Afro-Asian cooperation from an imagined past rooted in Afro-Asian religious and cultural exchange that laid claim to universalist moral values which were also strengthened by the exchange of cultural particularisms. The Bandung Declaration would declare: *"Asia and Africa have been the cradle of great religions and civilizations which have enriched other cultures and civilizations while themselves being enriched in the process. Thus the cultures of Asia and Africa are based on spiritual and universal foundations"* [86]

Positive pluralism is an important facet of the normative understanding of contemporary international society; while power differentials no doubt exist between states, there is no longer a standard of civilization logic which dictates membership of the international community based upon a racialized conception of what a "good state" looks like. Instead legitimacy rooted in representation of peoples forms the key basis for statehood on the normative level. From this a diversity of domestic political structures for states have proliferated and states are free to represent differing domestic political arrangements. The passing of UN Resolution 1514 was the abolition of colonialism as a legitimate form of international state structure. This overturned over a century of international political norms and created a new norm around how sovereignty was to be legitimated. It also reconceived the recipient of sovereign rights as "peoples" groups rather than the state. These were major shifts in the way in which sovereignty was understood in international society and helped establish the ongoing normative consensus around sovereignty that currently exists. UN Resolution 1514 also expanded the

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[86] Bandung, 'Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung (24 April 1955)'.

referent object of the right of sovereignty from the state to 'peoples' by shifting the way in which

sovereignty was legitimized, from the mutual recognition of other states in international society to

being a representative of a "peoples".

UN Resolution 1514 represented a significant development in international society's understanding of

sovereignty. This work has sought to decentre the Eurocentric approach to understanding the norm of

sovereignty as a consistent practice of European international society, and instead has shown the key

role the post-colonial world had in establishing our contemporary sovereignty norms, the radical

disjunctures it produced from the old international order, as well as the lasting continuities.

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Chapter Six: Post-Colonial Contributions to Great Power Management

The core international organisations that would institutionalise the new norms and practices of contemporary international society were established in the wake of the Second World War. Many of these institutions would have veto rights and special privileges established into their structure for principle war winners that would go on to be the new great powers of the international system. For the post-colonial states, these special privileges were disconcerting in two aspects: Firstly, two of the five great powers (Britain and France) were the principle colonial powers of Asia and Africa, and codifying special privileges for these states into the structure of post-war institutions was seen as a threat to decolonisation. Secondly, the existence in general of special privileges for powerful states was a divergence from the principle of sovereign equality. As discussed in the previous chapter, preventing the re-establishment of a formally hierarchical system of norms and practices for international society was the primary concern of the post-colonial states and, as such, any challenges to the principle of sovereign equality were of major concern to post-colonial leaders.

The coalition of post-colonial states which entered the international system thus broadly held two goals in relation to reforming the institution of great power management. The first was to limit as much as possible the special privileges afforded to the Great Powers at a legal and institutional structure level. The following chapter will focus more in-depth on the contribution of the post-colonial states to the developments of international law in the latter half of the twentieth century, and as such this chapter will focus more heavily on the role of special privileges afforded to the Great Powers at an institutional structure level. Beyond the institutional structures of international society, the post-colonial states would endeavour to develop political coalitions to oppose the influence of the great powers in the regional affairs of the post-colonial world.

This chapter begins by analysing the post-colonial states' response to the emergence of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the only "Afro-Asian Great Power" of the international system. The political battle at the United Nations over the PRC adopting the Chinese seat was a key debate in the 1950s and 1960s between the post-colonial and Western states, with many believing that the PRC represented an opportunity for a state which held privileged great power status as a permanent member of the Security Council to serve as a bulwark for the post-colonial world. The chapter then looks at the negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the politics of nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly the concept of disarmament vs the "Afro-Asian Bomb" – the idea that the Chinese nuclear program might serve as a post-colonial sovereignty guarantee in much the same way as NATO did for European states. The next part of this chapter will look at efforts to build deeper post-colonial solidarity, starting with the concept of "Afro-Asia", and then focusing in on the three "Pan" movements which developed the greatest degree of legitimacy, Pan-Asianism, Pan-Arabism, and Pan-Africanism. Finally, this Chapter will look at the Non-Aligned Movement, and wider efforts to limit western influence in post-colonial regions, as well as reorient international institutions (particularly economic institutions) towards greater assistance and power for the post-colonial states through greater democratization.

The People's Republic of China – An Afro-Asian Great Power?

The United Nations did not begin as the premier venue for the expression of global international society's opinions, as it has become, but rather as a coalition of anti-Axis forces. The principal members of this coalition (the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom, China and later France after its liberation from Axis forces) represented the war-winning powers of the Second World War. These states would form the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and along with 45 other nations, ratified the UN Charter in 1945. As early as the precursor treaties (in Moscow and Tehran 1943), there was already the idea of a permanent role being afforded to the principal powers for the management of order in international society post-war. These were initially dubbed the "Four

Policemen" (later five) by FDR.[1] This was a recognition by all participants of an established principle of international relations that the "great powers" of the system, however historically determined, had a role to play in the policing of international order, and this gave them certain responsibilities and privileges. This role had been a formalised part of international society (particularly European international society) at least as early as the post-1815 Concert of Europe. The new "Five Policemen" were to become the permanent members of the Security Council and they would receive special privileges and veto rights (as well as theoretical duties) for the management of international society as a whole. Importantly, the veto powers of the members of the Security Council gave them significant influence over the creation of international legal precedent under the new formalised, multi-lateral international law regime, which draws upon the decisions of the Security Council (and to some degree the General Assembly) for precedent. Permanent membership of the Security Council thus gives these states a unique position in the decision making of international law that ungirds the legitimacy of the entire international system[2]. In the new post-1945 international society that emerged from the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations, permanent membership of the Security Council is the decided mechanism of great power management for international society – in that it reserves certain privileges and importantly a veto for 5 particular states of the international system on security matters, and thus the opinions of their government agents must be taken into account on matters effecting the balance of power and overall security of international society.

The static nature of the permanent members of the Security Council shows the issue inherent with the formalisation and institutionalisation of the position of a great power and bestowing upon those states certain privileges, either formal or informal. Namely, that the process is inevitably retrospective, and reflects the power distribution as it was constituted at the time of its institutionalisation. Great Power concerts have historically emerged following catastrophic wars which showed policy makers

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[1] D.L. Bosco, *Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World* (Oxford University Press, 2009), https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=GQIlV7bADjsC.
[2] David D. Caron, 'The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council', *American Journal of International Law* 87, no. 4 (1993): 552–88, https://doi.org/10.2307/2203616.

viscerally the importance of the need for cooperation between and mutual respect and recognition of the differing interest of the great powers, the archetype of which was the Concert of Europe following the Napoleonic Wars. It is rare for middle powers (who may become future rivals to the current great powers) to be included as holders of these privileges when these systems are formalized. This problem is compounded by the fact that once these positions are formalised with certain privileges afford to them by, those states will often attempt to leverage those privileges to maintain their relative advantage over other states. This is particularly problematic in the case of the Security Council, as the 5 permanent members of the Security Council hold considerable formal legal power over both international law-making and the constitution of the membership of international society, not just de facto informal privileges.

Due to the role of the Security Council in setting international legal precedent, attempts to limit the use of these powers by a permanent member no longer acting for the good of international society as a whole or to remove a member who no longer holds great power status from their permanent membership of the Security Council, risks unravelling the legal foundation for much of the post-1945 international order. The privileges held by the permanent members of the Security Council are strongly guarded by their holders. A repeated criticism of the structure of the UN Security Council is that its permanent members, for all practical purposes, can never be changed given their veto over new members being added or removed[3]. Numerous recommendations have been made over the years for the expansion of the Security Council to make it both more representative of the Global South, more representative of the different region/continents and to integrate emergent powers on the cusp of Great Power status. Commonly recommended expansions to the Security Council raised by policy makers concerned with Security Council reform include India, Brazil and Indonesia, Japan (during its economic rise in the 1970/80s), as well as the idea of replacing France (previously Britain and France) with a representative from the EU, following deeper integration of its Foreign Policy.

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[3] Michael J Kelly, 'UN Security Council Permanent Membership: A New Proposal for a Twenty-First Century Council', *Seton Hall L. Rev.* 31 (2000): 319.

Four of the five permanent members of the Security Council are concentrated in the Global North, with China as the only permanent member from the Global South. China, therefore, plays a key role within the legitimation of the Security Council for the post-colonial world. Prior to 1945, China had occupied a liminal space between colonised and independent state, not fully annexed as India, Africa or South-East Asia was into formal European Empires, nor fully sovereign. China had its sovereignty repeatedly violated by the European powers, America and Japan and was forced to sign unequal treaties with these states throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many post-colonial states, while aware of the inequalities of the United Nations system, looked to China as a possible counterbalance and representative of post-colonial interests. This made the representation of China at the Security Council (and at the United Nations more broadly) a key issue of interest for the post-colonial states.

China was initially represented at the United Nations by Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist forces. Kai-Shek had been the central figure of Chinese reunification during the interwar period and was recognised by the Allies as the de facto leader of China. However, in the immediate aftermath of the defeat of the Japanese in 1945, the Chinese Civil War began, with Nationalist forces losing ground to Mao's communist forces between 1945 and 1949, until the People's Republic of China controlled all of mainland China and the Nationalist Army was forced to retreat to the island of Taiwan.[4] Despite no longer holding any part of the Chinese mainland, Chiang Kai-Shek and representatives of the Nationalist (Republic of China) government continued to hold the Chinese seat at the United Nations until October 1971, with the conflict effectively frozen by the intervention of the United States in favour of the Republic of China, preventing the PRC's final invasion of Taiwan. This frozen conflict created a crisis of recognition for China, both at a bilateral diplomatic level and at the United Nations. Most western nations would continue to recognise Kai-Shek and the Nationalists as the legitimate

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[4] Odd Arne Westad, *Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950* (Stanford University Press, 2003).

government of China throughout the 1950s and 1960s, while the emerging post-colonial world would prefer relations with the Peoples Republic of China, which, while holding no official recognition at the United Nations, was the de facto ruler of the vast majority of Chinese territory.

The Republic of China's (ROC) loss of control of the entire Chinese mainland to the PRC precipitated a legitimacy crisis for the Republic of China at the UN Security Council. The arrangement of veto powers was already perceived with scepticism by the representatives of some states in the post-colonial world[5], with the permanently embedded power differential between the Global North and Global South reminiscent of the unequal treaties of the nineteenth century. The Security Council is one of the few organs of the United Nations not to function on the principle of one state (member) one vote, and thus it stands in stark contrast to the generally accepted practice of United Nations institutions[6]. This arrangement was difficult enough to justify in the immediate aftermath of World War Two, a period in which the United Nations had yet to embed its deep legitimacy as the venue for international decision making. The legitimacy crisis for the institution of the Security Council was exacerbated in the post-colonial world by having the one Global South permanent member now represented by a government that many agents of the post-colonial world viewed as illegitimate.

The ROC's continued membership of the Security Council and recognition as the legitimate representatives of China became a central plank of its foreign policy prior to 1971[7]. The approach of the ROC to its role in the Security Council sought to limit the risks to its relationship with the United States, upon whom it was reliant for its defence against the PRC, and to avoid angering international opinion more broadly. As such, the ROC adopted the policy of non-use of its veto except in the case

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[5] Katharina P Coleman, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Decisions: Three Hierarchies, Upward Mobility and Institutionalised Inequality among Member States', *Global Society* 34, no. 3 (2020): 318–34.
[6] Marie-Claude Smouts, 'International Organizations and Inequality among States.', *International Social Science Journal* 47, no. 144 (1995).
[7] H. Lin, *Accidental State: Chiang Kai-Shek, the United States, and the Making of Taiwan* (Harvard University Press, 2016), https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=z_3lDAAAQBAJ.

of what it perceived to be an exceptional risk to its fundamental interests. This ensured it would not put itself in opposition to US policy interests, maintaining its most important security relationship with the United States, as well as not further alienating UN member states by vetoing resolutions brought to the Security Council, while holding questionable legitimacy to sit in the seat in the first place. This policy was facilitated by the limited scope of the Republic of China's foreign policy interests, given its de facto rule extended only to a small island off the Chinese mainland, the maintenance of its independence through US support was its overriding foreign policy concern. The Republic of China would only use its veto once during its membership of the Security Council, to block the admission of Mongolia to the United Nations in 1955, which the Republic of China considered a province of China dating back to the Qing Empire, and continued to hold territorial claims to[8], angering both the United States and Soviet Union. While the policy of non-use helped limit further alienating other member states and driving support for the removal of the ROC from the Security Council, it also left the Security Council without any effective representation for the post-colonial world until 1971 when the agents of the ROC were replaced by PRC in the China seat.

While the ROC was becoming diplomatically isolated from the rest of the post-colonial world, the PRC was attempting to build bilateral and multilateral diplomatic ties and receive recognition from the post-colonial world. Representatives of the PRC would be invited to the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung in 1955[9], as well as the preceding Delhi conference in 1954, to represent China amongst post-colonial powers. The Nationalist Chinese were typically looked upon with a degree of scepticism by the post-colonial world for their close alliance with Western states. This scepticism was exacerbated by their post-1948 reliance on a US guarantee to maintain their hold on their only remaining territory in Taiwan, effectively reducing them to the position of a US protectorate. In comparison, the post-colonial world in general looked favourably on the newly emergent Communist

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[8] Keith Allan Clark II, 'Imagined Territory: The Republic of China's 1955 Veto of Mongolian Membership in the United Nations', *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 25, no. 3 (2018): 263–95.
[9] Eslava et al., 'The Spirit of Bandung'.

Chinese as a more genuinely independent leadership of China aligned with the goals of the post-colonial world in achieving further decolonisation in Africa and Asia. Key diplomatic agents of the PRC would also play a major role in aligning China with the rest of the post-colonial world in the struggle for decolonisation and forging close diplomatic ties between the PRC's and other post-colonial states.

Central to this effort was Zhou En-Lai, the PRC's premier and Mao's de facto deputy. En-Lai was a skilled diplomatic operator who simultaneously presented the PRC as a radical force in favour of decolonisation while also moderating China's international image amongst the post-colonial coalition. En-Lai normalised relations between China and its neighbouring Asian states, making repeated diplomatic guarantees to the post-colonial states that the PRC respected the pluralism of governmental structures within the post-colonial coalition, and had no plans to export its revolution to neighbouring states in the post-colonial world. This was demonstrated at Bandung, where En-Lai encouraged ethnic Chinese populations in Asia to commit fully to their respective homelands and promised to refuse Chinese citizenship to ethnic Chinese populations outside of China's territory, thereby encouraging their full commitment to their respective states. This was a critical diplomatic overture to the many Asian states with significant ethnic Chinese minorities that feared they might one day serve as a fifth column for Chinese revolutionary influence in their countries[10].

Beyond the policy decisions Beijing made to assure the post-colonial states of their good intent, En-Lai, as an agent, was a highly successful diplomatic negotiator - this stood in stark contrast to Nehru, whose patrician character and diplomatic style were often received as condescension by other post-colonial leaders. On the other hand, En-Lai's more reserved and respectful diplomatic style charmed

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[10] Chen Yifeng, 'Bandung, China, and the Making of World Order in East Asia', in *Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures*, ed. Luis Eslava et al. (Cambridge University Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316414880.

many of the post-colonial leaders at Bandung and the preceding Colombo conference[11]. The effective

diplomatic approach of the PRC's agents helped challenge the assumed authority India would hold

among the post-colonial coalition and created Beijing as an alternative concentration of power among

post-colonial states, beyond Delhi.

Chinese representation at the Security Council became an increasingly important issue for the post-

colonial world as the 1950s and 1960s unfolded, as it became clear that the PRC had permanently

solidified its position as the legitimate government in Beijing and controller of the entire Chinese

mainland. In 1961 the United States led an effort along with a number of other member states

including Italy, Japan, Australia and Columbia which designated the "representation of China" an

"important matter" for the United Nations[12] which, under Article 18 of the UN Charter, requires "a

two-thirds majority of the members present and voting" [13] to change the policy of. This was in part

spurred by the perceived threat of a large number of new post-colonial powers joining the United

Nations from Africa in the coming year, which would likely be sympathetic to the PRC's claim to the

China seat at the United Nations.

There would be repeated efforts to expel the ROC delegates over the decade, with a successful motion

finally brought to the General Assembly by Albania, Romania, Yugoslavia and 14 other post-colonial

states in 1971. The resolution was argued by the proposers to not require a two-thirds majority

because it was not making any change to the recognition of the member state of China; it was simply

expelling the illegitimate delegates of Chiang Kai-Shek from the assembly, not China as a member

state. The United States raised an amendment to this resolution stating that the matter in question was

an "important question" as per Resolution 1668 A/L 632, but this amendment was defeated in a

narrow 61 to 51 vote, with 16 abstentions. The majority of the 61 no votes came from the post-

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[11] Miskovic et al., *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi-Bandung-Belgrade*.
[12] United Nations, 'United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1668', 1969.
[13] United Nations, 'United Nations Charter'.

colonial world, with the 51 votes for the US amendment coming largely from its Western European and Latin American allies. The full resolution to remove the delegates of Chiang Kai-Shek was then adopted, with a vote of 76 in favour to 35 against, with the ROC delegates walking out in protest. As the status of the membership of China was not changed (only the recognition of the credentials of the delegates claiming to represent China), the Security Council permanent members did not hold a veto over this change. The majority of states in the post-colonial world, who were not closely allied to the West or opposed to the PRC, would vote for the motion. This would include key western allies in the post-colonial world that might have been expected to support the United States, such as Iran, as well as key European allies including the United Kingdom and France, who both had their own diplomatic reasons for wishing to see relations normalised with mainland China by 1971[14]. Support for the PRC occupying the China seat at the United Nations was consistent among the post-colonial states, even at times in which there were high degrees of tensions between these states. India would continue to advocate for the PRC to take up the China seat following the 1962 Border War, with Nehru arguing that it was correct on a matter of principle, even if the two states had come into conflict[15].

With the PRC admitted to the United Nations in 1971, parts of the post-colonial world felt they finally had an "Afro-Asian" advocate on the Security Council that could continue to advocate for a continuation of the gains made during decolonisation. The irony of the admittance of the PRC to the Security Council as an advocate for the post-colonial world is that it required a majority vote which came mostly from the post-colonial world, and as such, the PRC would not join the UN until the process of formal decolonisation was largely over, with the vast majority of the British and French colonial territories. Due to their unique position, the PRC would be one of the last post-colonial governments to take up their seat in the United Nations and be formally recognised by UN institutions. The PRC shared the ongoing concerns of the post-colonial world, including the further

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[14] United Nations, 'Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. Resolution 2758', 1971.
[15] Anatol E. Klass, '"China Marching with India": India's Cold War Advocacy for the People's Republic of China at the United Nations, 1949–1971', *Cold War History* 0, no. 0 (2023): 1–21, https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2023.2217763.

exclusion of both South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia from international institutions and the encouraged their diplomatic isolation at the United Nations (along with the support of revolutionary forces, such as the ZANU-PF in Rhodesia). The early years of the PRCs membership of the United Nations were marked by a strident anti-colonialist rhetoric, particularly under the remaining five years of the Mao regime.[16]

Prior to 1971, the UN was in the position that the government of a nuclear armed state which ruled over roughly 15% of the world's population, whom was one of the most powerful post-colonial states, and one of the most geo-strategically important states in East Asia, was unable to send representation to the United Nations. Instead, its seat was held by the government that had been defeated in that country's Civil War and maintained only through the intervention of the United States. The PRC's position on the Security Council became a demand for the post-colonial states across the political alignment of the Cold War. This includes key Western-aligned states, including Turkey, Iran and rivals, such as India. For the majority of states, it was an affront to both the respect for post-colonial sovereignty to refuse to seat the representatives of the government that ruled over the majority of the Chinese population because their interests opposed many of the Western-aligned states, which dominated the early United Nations. The refusal to seat the PRC in the China seat was also, for most post-colonial states, a refusal of the Western powers to accept the political reality of decolonisation in favour of a more functional Security Council. The exclusion of the Beijing government from UN institutions hindered the proper diplomatic functioning of international society and weakened the legitimacy of its post-war institutions, a problem widely acknowledged as needing to be addressed by the post-colonial world. However, beyond the broad consensus within the post-colonial world that the unfairness of the China position needed to be addressed, there were more committed allies of Beijing in Africa and Asia, who looked to the People's Republic as a possible bulwark against any backsliding of the gains won by the post-colonial world during decolonisation. These states

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[16] Wei Liu, *China in the United Nations* (World Scientific, 2014).

envisioned China playing a similar role to the United States in Europe for the defence of the sovereignty of the Post-Colonial world as an "Afro-Asian" superpower[17]. This position will be unpacked further in the next topic of interest for post-colonial contributions to Great Power management – the limitation of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, with a particular focus on the Chinese Nuclear Program.

An Afro-Asian Bomb?: Post-Colonial Views on the Development of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Two months after the conclusion of the 1945 San Francisco conference, the world would be introduced to the reality of nuclear warfare, with the US dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The detonation of the US nuclear weapons over Japan caused the Soviets to rapidly accelerate their own nuclear program, achieving their first detonation in Kazakhstan in August 1949, almost exactly four years after the US bombing of Japan. The British would become the third member of the nuclear club in 1952, after detonating a nuclear device in the Monte Bello islands off the coast of Western Australia, based, in part, on their contributions to the Manhattan Project. By the mid-1950s, the global nuclear stockpile exceeded over a thousand nuclear weapons and serious concerns for the fate of the world mounted across the non-nuclear states. The politics of denuclearisation was dominated by three principle concerns: firstly, reduction of the growing nuclear stockpiles held by nuclear states (particularly the United States and the USSR); secondly, limitation of the spread of nuclear weapons beyond their current holders; finally, limitation on the development of more destructive nuclear warheads with greater payloads.

The limitation of the spread and further development of nuclear weapons was raised early by the post-colonial states as the centrality of these weapons to the growing Cold War became clear. The

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[17] Lorenz Luthi, 'The Non-Aligned: Apart From and Still Within the Cold-War', in *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi-Bandung-Belgrade*, ed. Natasa Miskovic et al. (Routledge, 2014).

Bandung Communique would give the broad view of many post-colonial leaders who looked upon nuclear weapons with increasing concern, and sought to limit their development and proliferation, stating in its final document that:

> *"The Conference considered that disarmament and the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons of war are imperative to save mankind and civilisation from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction.*
>
> *The Conference considered that effective international control should be established and maintained to implement such disarmament and prohibition.*
>
> *Pending the total prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, this Conference appealed to all the powers concerned to reach agreement to suspend experiments with such weapons."*[18]

The post-colonial world's relationship with nuclear weapons and non-proliferation was a complicated one and spoke to the broad concerns of legal and sovereign inequality between these states and the Global North, as well as the fear of undue coercion by these states on the post-colonial world. It was clear that these weapons in the hands of a very limited number of states would enshrine a disproportionate, world-ending power in the hands of a very small group of elite states concentrated in the Global North. As discussed in Chapter 2, a great power is a state whose existential interests have to be accommodated, less they destabilise the fundamental order of international society, and nuclear weapons, especially arsenals of the size of the USA and USSR, threatened the possibility of bringing a final, apocalyptic end to not just international order but life as it was presently constituted, should those states existential interests be challenged, permanently sealing their great power status.[19]

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[18] The Asian-African Conference, 'Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung (24 April 1955)', 1955, Copy available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Independence.aspx.
[19] Mellish, 'Returning to Hedley Bull: Necessity as an Approach for Defining Primary Institutions'.

In the early-1950s, the world had its first worrying experience of possible nuclear combat in the Korean Peninsula. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) as a doctrine was a policy that would take time to establish itself in the consciousness of American military leaders and policy makers, especially as the Korean War broke out only 10 months after the Soviet Union's first confirmed nuclear detonation, and as such there was not yet a balance of nuclear forces which limited their use by the United States. The "nuclear taboo" – the strict rejection of the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield had not yet been internalised at the outbreak of the Korean War; nuclear weapons were seen as just another tool in the arsenal for strategic and theatre-level commanders. The destructive power of nuclear weapons was initially seen by a quantitative step up in destructive power, but not qualitatively different from the conventional ordinance already in use.[20] Curtis LeMay and Douglas MacArthur had both wanted to use the US nuclear arsenal to stop the Chinese advance at the Yalu River, with the consideration of threatening Beijing with nuclear attack if Chinese forces refused to withdraw. It took the intervention of President Truman, who was determined to limit the scale of the Korean intervention, along with diplomatic pressure from European allies, particularly London, as well as from post-colonial leaders, including Delhi, to halt the use of nuclear weapons[21].

Although the world emerged from the Korean conflict having avoided the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, the risk of the use of nuclear weapons by the United States on a non-nuclear armed adversary highlighted a principle concern of the post-colonial world – that these weapons gave the great powers that held them overwhelming coercive power. The post-colonial response to this issue was divided between the public statements of post-colonial leaders and the private policies of many states. Publicly, the post-colonial states were committed to the limitation of nuclear arms proliferation and development; this is unsurprising as for many post-colonial states, the technological requirements of establishing a credible nuclear deterrent was prohibitive, and therefore there was a strong relative

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[20] Nina Tannenwald, 'Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo', *International Security* 29, no. 4 (2005): 5–49.
[21] Roger Dingman, 'Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War', *International Security* 13, no. 3 (1988): 50–91.

power argument in favour of being part of a coalition of states applying pressure for nuclear

disarmament. However, this rationalist argument should not underplay the utopian spirit of the early

1950s for many post-colonial leaders. Bandung and the liberation of the Afro-Asian states appeared

for a time to be a point at which, through international cooperation, the possibilities for the post-

colonial world appeared near limitless; thus, the possibility of a nuclear-free future for international

society was not necessarily out of the scope of the post-colonial imaginary at the point of Bandung.[22]

At the same time as the Bandung declaration and the growing public commitment of the post-colonial

world, the top echelons of industrialised post-colonial states with the capacity to do so began to

investigate covertly the possibility of developing their own nuclear weapons programs. Nehru would

publicly state his opposition to India developing a nuclear weapons program and declared that its

nuclear program would be used only for peaceful means (although he maintained the proviso that if

threatened, India reserved the right to develop such technology). India would open its first research

reactor in 1956, with Nehru, and his successor Lal Bahadur Shastri initially, remaining publicly

committed to global nuclear disarmament and India remaining a nuclear-free state, until Shastri

announced he would pursue "peaceful nuclear explosions"[23] with the understanding these could be

quickly weaponised. Some Indian nuclear scientists had been advocating for the development of

weapons capacity as early as the opening of the first reactor in 1956, and it is unclear at what point the

development of weapons capacity became state policy. India's first nuclear weapon would be

detonated in 1974, despite their previous commitment to non-proliferation.[24]

The PRC would be the first post-colonial state to achieve nuclear weapons capacity when it achieved

its first nuclear detonation in October 1964 and developed its first successful nuclear weapon in

[22] Eslava et al., 'The Spirit of Bandung'.
[23] Vipin Narang, 'Chapter 3: The Varieties of Hedgers: India, Japan, West Germany, Brazil and Argentina, Sweden and Switzerland', in *Seeking the Bomb: Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation* (Princeton University Press, 2022).
[24] Ibid.

December 1966.[25] The PRC's experience in Korea drove the state towards the development of their own nuclear arsenal, and the PRC's nuclear program would receive initial help from the Soviet Union. Soviet technology sharing assisted in developing China's first uranium enrichment sites in 1958, and its first plutonium facilities in 1960. However, as the Sino-Soviet split deepened over the course of 1960 and Khrushchev met with the Americans to engage in arms control talks, information and expertise sharing was halted. Nevertheless, by this point, the Chinese nuclear program was sufficiently developed and its domestic scientists sufficiently trained that it was able to complete the program independently.[26] These were the only two post-colonial states to achieve nuclear weapons capacity during the Cold War. Beyond the Cold War, Pakistan and North Korea would become the only other post-colonial states to develop nuclear weapons capacity, in 1998 and 2006, respectively. A small number of other Global South nations would attempt and then cease the effort to develop nuclear weapons capacity during the Cold War, notably Argentina and Brazil, but these nations would end their programs before achieving a nuclear detonation.[27] The PRC was thus an outlier in the post-colonial world in developing its nuclear program aggressively in the 1950s and early 1960s, achieving a nuclear detonation prior the signing of the non-proliferation treaty alongside France, Britain, the United States and the USSR (although they would not accede to the treaty until 1992) and would thus become one of the five accepted nuclear-weapon states included in the non-proliferation treaty[28].

The development of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a contentious process, particularly for the post-colonial world; despite the majority of post-colonial states lacking the technological capacity to become nuclear weapons states and being committed publicly to the limitation of nuclear weapons. The first efforts to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons by international treaty would begin in

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[25] John Wilson Lewis and Litai Xue, *China Builds the Bomb*, vol. 3 (Stanford University Press, 1991).

[26] Lewis and Xue; Further primary source documents on Sino-Soviet nuclear cooperation can be found at the WIlson Centre in E-Dossier 43 as follows: Austin Jersild, 'Sharing the Bomb among Friends: The Dilemmas of Sino-Soviet Strategic Cooperation | Wilson Center', 2013, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/sharing-the-bomb-among-friends-the-dilemmas-sino-soviet-strategic-cooperation.

[27] Narang, 'Chapter 3: The Varieties of Hedgers: India, Japan, West Germany, Brazil and Argentina, Sweden and Switzerland'.

[28] United Nations Office For Disarmament Affairs, 'Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)', 1968.

1958, at the point at which only the USA, UK and USSR held nuclear weapons (France would join these three in 1960). These early efforts were led by European neutralist nations, particularly Ireland, along with Switzerland and Sweden, which all played major roles in the early efforts to develop predecessors to the NPT. Ireland would be the first successful nation to bring a multilateral framework to the United Nations General Assembly in 1958 in the wake of the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Suez Crisis and British and US interventions in the Middle East. Ireland held a unique position as a neutralist country and one both respected for fair play, and while being European, it held a degree of anti-colonial bona fides that the other European Neutralists did not, bolstered further by their early support among European nation-states for the recognition of the PRC at the UN[29]. While the Irish Resolution would receive non-binding approbation in 1959, the UN General Assembly would then constitute a Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee (TNDC) in 1960, made up of 5 Western and 5 Communist states, but this would collapse following the failed 1960 Paris disarmament talks.[30]

Despite the post-colonial states' enthusiastic support for nuclear disarmament at Bandung, the Irish resolution and the initial TNDC received limited support from the post-colonial states. The inclusion of only the Western and Eastern states played into the major concern of the post-colonial world regarding a non-proliferation treaty: that the imposition of a ban on the development of nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear superpowers represented a continuation of the unequal treaties of the nineteenth century.[31] In their view, any treaty which would limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons amongst their states while enshrining the right of the existing powers to hold them would permanently enshrine a legal inequality between the existing nuclear superpowers, which were all European states, and the post-colonial world. The General Assembly would successfully reconstitute an Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) with the addition of eight post-colonial states; India, the

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[29] Jonathan R Hunt, 'Neutral and Nonaligned Nations in the Making of the Postcolonial Nuclear Order', in *Neutral Europe and the Creation of the Nonproliferation Regime* (Routledge, 2023).
[30] Ibid.
[31] Caroline Fehl, 'Understanding the Puzzle of Unequal Recognition: The Case of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty', *Justice and Peace: The Role of Justice Claims in International Cooperation and Conflict*, Springer, 2019, 67–85.

United Arab Republic (Egypt & Syria), Nigeria, Burma, Ethiopia, Mexico, Brazil, & Sweden. The post-colonial additions to the committee, including two of the five founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement, helped stabilise the ENCD to bring about the drafting of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by giving both the Western and Soviet aligned states an incentive to not be seen as the party walking away from the talks that the post-colonial states were now equally invested in. The need for the limitation of nuclear weapons was further reinforced by the events of 1962, particularly the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the ENCD would help facilitate the Washington–Moscow hotline, which was proposed following the crisis in 1963[32].

The Sino-Indian Border War of 1962 pushed India further towards the United States, culminating in a joint exercise with US Strategic Air Defence in 1963, and a diplomatic effort by India to isolate the PRC from the rest of the post-colonial states as they attempted to complete their nuclear weapons program. The second Non-Aligned Movement summit would meet in 1964 in Cairo, concluding on the 10th of October, in which the Non-Aligned Movement stated in its final document:

> *"The Conference, regrets that despite the efforts of the members or the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and in particular those of the non-aligned countries, the results have not been satisfactory. It urges the 'great powers' in collaboration with the other members of that Committee, to renew their efforts with determination with a view to the rapid conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.*
>
> *The Conference requests the Great Powers to abstain from all policies conducive to the dissemination of nuclear weapons and their by-products among those States which do not at present possess them, It underlines the great danger in the dissemination of nuclear weapons and urges all States, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons, to conclude non-*

[32] C.D. Blacker et al., *International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements*, ISIS Studies in International Security A Series (Stanford University Press, 1984), https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=WTKrAAAAIAAJ.

dissemination agreements and to agree on measures providing for the gradual liquidation of the existing; stock-piles of nuclear weapons.

As part of these efforts, the Heads of State or Government declare their own readiness not to produce, acquire or test any nuclear weapons, and call on all countries including those who have not subscribed to the Moscow Treaty to enter into a similar undertaking and to take the necessary steps to prevent their territories, ports and airfields from being used by nuclear powers, for the deployment or disposition of nuclear weapons. This undertaking should be the subject .of a treaty to be concluded in an international Conference convened under the auspices of the United Nations and 0pen to accession by all States, The Conference further calls upon all nuclear powers to observe the spirit of this declaration."[33]

Six days from the conclusion of the Cairo summit, China would detonate its first nuclear device, a considerable diplomatic embarrassment for the Non-Aligned Movement and particularly Nehru, who had placed significant political capital on the possibility of the containment of nuclear proliferation.[34] Despite the public embarrassment inflicted on the Non-Aligned Movement by the Chinese nuclear test, this would not fundamentally undermine the ENDC's efforts and would only further push the previously ambivalent Non-Aligned States towards the neutralist position of a formal treaty on Non-Proliferation. The Eight Non-Bloc nations would play a central role in outlining the final framework for what would become the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1966, finally being brought to the United Nations for ratification in 1968. The Eight Non-Bloc member states played a key role not only in providing stability to the ENDC and thus avoiding a collapse in talks when relations worsened between East and West, as had occurred with the TNDC. They also advanced the need for the sharing of economic assistance for peaceful nuclear development for the non-nuclear armed states, and the establishment of international bodies for the monitoring of nuclear weapons, which were not

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[33] Non-Aligned Movement, '2nd Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement (Cairo) - Final Document Section on Nuclear Disarmament', 1964.
[34] Luthi, 'The Non-Aligned: Apart From and Still Within the Cold-War'.

controlled by either of the major Cold War blocs. These contributions significantly reduced the inequality inherent in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and led to its broad ratification by the majority of post-colonial states within the first decade of its existence.[35]

The Post-Colonial States concerns around the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, despite the broad consensus around the goal of the limitation of non-proliferation, speak more broadly to the approach of the post-colonial and non-aligned world to the institutions of great power management, which separated them from Neutralist European nations such as Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland. A primary concern of the Non-Aligned/Post-Colonial states was the imposition of a form of "unequal treaty" which was a key experience of the international legal architecture of colonialism. There was significant reticence towards enshrining special privileges in international law that would be held only by the great powers, even when it benefited their overall objective of nuclear non-proliferation. However, despite these concerns, the post-colonial states were willing to play a fundamental role in the process of the formulation of the NPT, and without the 8 Non-Bloc members (6 of whom came from the Non-Aligned/Post-Colonial world), there would not have been the stability and diplomatic continuity to conclude the negotiations between East and West and establish the NPT as a legal regime. The post-colonial states amongst the 8 also played a key role in democratising the oversight of nuclear non-proliferation and ensuring compensatory promises within the treaty for the support of peaceful, developmentalist approaches to peaceful nuclear technology.

Pan-National Coalitions to Resist Great Power Rule: Pan-Asianism, Pan-Arabism & Pan-Africanism

The emergence of post-colonial states in the 1950s and 1960s was also a moment for the political emergence of international political imaginaries that envisioned unified political interests across the

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[35] Hunt, 'Neutral and Nonaligned Nations in the Making of the Postcolonial Nuclear Order'.

colonised and post-colonial world, transcending national borders. These "Pan-National" movements conceived of a wider identity for a peoples that went beyond the nation state; the three most influential of these during the Cold War were "Pan-Asianism", "Pan-Arabism" and "Pan-Africanism". All of these ideologies existed before the emergence of the first post-colonial states in the late 1940s, with ideological roots and organisation which stretched back to the nineteenth century, seen in figures such as W.E.B. Dubois, Rabindranath Tagore, Jurji Zaydan and other intellectual and political leaders[36]. The emergence of these movements during the colonial era was influenced by the borders of colonial states, drawn up by the European powers, which often did not cohere to any sort of organically existing political/cultural community. While all states are and identities are to some degree constructed by the existence of the state and its boundaries, these colonial era boundaries were particularly recent and imposed by the colonial rulers, who had no interest in constructing a state building project that encouraged local populations to consider themselves as holding shared interests, thus leaving these states feeling artificial in the imaginaries of many anti-colonial and post-colonial leaders. Compounding the effect of the state's artificiality was the need for anti-colonial activists to resist European empires that were themselves international, and thus it made sense to engage in anti-colonial organising at a level beyond the boundaries of the colonial state. These political and intellectual ties with anti-colonial activists and thinkers in other colonies created a political coalition and group identity that transcended colonial borders.[37] These developing identities all shared two broad features. The first was a view of their contemporary experience and recent history that was defined by colonial oppression. Particularly for Pan-Asianism and Pan-Africanism, there was a recognition of a shared experience of all colonial peoples which transcended (and shaped) experiences of ethnicity, language, gender, and politics, which was their experience of oppression as colonised peoples. There was a recognition of the way in which their own identity had been forged in and shaped by the experience of colonialism, and thus they shared features of their identities even if they

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[36] Cemil Aydın, 'Beyond Civilization: Pan-Islamism, Pan-Asianism and the Revolt against the West', *Journal of Modern European History* 4, no. 2 (2006): 204–23.

[37] Cemil Aydın, 'Pan-Nationalism of Pan-Islamic, Pan-Asian, and Pan-African Thought', in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism* (Oxford University Press, 2013), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199209194.013.0034.

spoke different languages or were parts of different ethnic/cultural groups, as all these groups had been shaped by the contemporary experience of colonialism. Secondly, there was the construction of a deep historical imaginary that delved into a pre-colonial past and connected these different peoples together. Different thinkers would focus on different aspects of the pre-colonial past, be it shared religious institutions, the linkages created by pre-modern traders and explorers, the transfer of medieval art, music and culture, and shared religious/cultural practices, philosophies and beliefs between cultures. The actual impact of these ideas and practices on pre-colonial society in these regions was of far less importance than the role the notion of these linkages existing prior to colonialism which contributed to the construction of a pan-cultural identity, giving that identity a historical legitimacy in the present day.

For those with political objectives, the primary goal of these founding members of their respective pan-identity movements was to construct an anti-colonial identity which was capable of resisting colonial rule. After the end of formal colonial rule during the early Cold War, these collective identities served as an organizing political structure for post-colonial resistance to outside influence from both the European colonial powers and the USA/USSR. These ideologies would also form a site of contestation within the new post-colonial world; particularly in cases where European empires handed control to chosen successors who would be challenged both internally by their own peoples holding these ideologies and by external political agents. Pan-Arabism particularly would be a serious challenge to several of the monarchies (such as the Hashemite Monarchy in Iraq and the Faud dynasty in Egypt) that took power immediately after the exit of France and Britain from the Arab world. More broadly, in many post-colonial regions, there was a significant split between those rulers who held to a pan-nationalist ideology and believed in the pooling of national sovereignty or the creation of a pan-nationalist super-state, and the (often more conservative) post-colonial national leaders who sought to consolidate power within their established colonial national borders and build the institutions of the state with strong opposition to influence from fellow post-colonial leaders who held to a broader

cross-national identity.[38] It is important to recognise the level of contestation to these identity claims both among post-colonial leaders and post-colonial populations more broadly, with certain classes and political and cultural groupings more likely to adopt a pan-national identity. The most radical Pan-Arab and Pan-African leaders would often attack the legitimacy of their more nationalistic counterparts in the region as the "lackeys" of their ex-colonial oppressors or the United States, rather than recognising the deep and authentic opposition among many post-colonial populations to these ideas. The effectiveness of these pan-national identities in resisting great power influence in the politics of their respective regions depended in large part on their ability to institutionalise these broad ideas of identity into actionable political frameworks for organising regional international societies, both to shape integrated policies across these nations (and at a wider global level) and to resist great power influence. However, all of these ideologies would have a significant impact on the development of Cold War great power politics and the norms and practices of great power management more broadly that developed during this period; both through their influence on the primary institutions of international society and also by creating lasting challenges to Great Power influence from beyond the nation state.

"Afro-Asian" as an organising identity would be the most encompassing pan-national identity that emerged during the early period of decolonisation. It would emerge much later than Pan-Arab/Pan-Asian/Pan-African political identities, which had their roots in nineteenth-century colonial elites. The idea of an imagined "Afro-Asian" community/political identity emerges more concretely in the interwar period as anti-colonial leadership cadres across the European empires became increasingly structured, formalised and deepened their international ties to other anti-colonial movements. "Afro-Asia" as an organising principle would reach its apex in the mid-1950s, particularly at the 1955 Asian-African conference held at Bandung, whose legacy was central to the creation of multiple international organisations, particularly the Non-Aligned Movement. "Afro-Asian" as an organising

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[38] Fonkem Achankeng, *Nationalism and Intra-State Conflicts in the Postcolonial World* (Lexington Books, 2015).

principle was unique amongst the pan-national identities by not being rooted in a particular colonial experience. The Bandung conference would include representation from non-European nations not formally colonised, including representatives from Iran (which had experienced significant interference by the European powers, particularly during the 1940s, but had remained a sovereign entity). Most controversially, the Bandung conference included Japan as one of 29 attending members, despite Japan having taken on the role of a colonial power in East Asia in the early twentieth century and inflicted particular recent harm on the populations of a number of member states, particularly China, the Philippines and Indonesia.

Bandung would hold not only political subcommittees but also a subcommittee on culture, dedicated to the development not only of post-colonial cultural identities but also of constructing and reinforcing the idea of a shared Afro-Asian culture.[39] Afro-Asian as an identity movement would suffer from a failure to achieve political coherence and meaning as the Cold War continued for much of the same reasons the ideas of Pan-Asianism did. The use of both ideas was strongest among anti-colonial elites at a time in which colonialism was a unifying experience, and in the immediate aftermath of decolonisation. This period was marked by a unique utopianism among post-colonial states about the future possibilities for harmonious relations an Asia and Africa, which made the imaginary of a shared post-colonial Asian or Afro-Asian identity more plausible. As the divisions within Asia sharpened in the late 1950s and 1960s, particularly between India and China, the sustainability of Pan-Asianism and Afro-Asianism became impossible. This was heightened by both the relatively late and inconsistent adoption among post-colonial agents of the ideas of Pan-Asianism and the relative strength of the national cultures and state bureaucracies in the region. In Asia, pre-colonial proto-state bureaucracies were far more developed than in the Arab world and much of Africa. European colonial companies (and eventually the state) in Asia would engage far more heavily

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[39] Jurgen Dinkel, '"To Grab the Headlines in the World Press": Non-Aligned Summits as Media Events', in *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi-Bandung-Belgrade*, ed. Natasa Miskovic et al. (Routledge, 2014).

in the co-option of local elites and political structures, which left Asian post-colonial states more capable of constructing coherent domestic identities based partly on a continuation of the work done in state creation/co-option from the period of colonial rule.[40] The relative strength of the national identities in Asia made the strength of a pan-Asian identity relatively weak, even amongst intellectual elites, and with increasing Cold War competition between the major states of Asia, the idea of both "Afro-Asian" and "Pan-Asianism" as an organising principle had largely lost its salience by the mid-1960s.

Pan-Arabism in the Middle East would have the most politically organised and nationally influential adherents of the three major pan-national ideologies during the Cold War. While Pan-Arabism in various forms would have different local leaders in most Middle Eastern and North-African nations with a sizeable Arab population, there was a vastly greater concentration of authority and legitimacy concentrated in the figurehead of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who became President of Egypt in 1956 and ruled until his overthrow in 1970.[41] Nasser was a popular Lieutenant Colonel in the Egyptian military who came to power following a military coup d'état which overthrew the Egyptian monarchy. He initially took power as one of two chief leaders of the "Free Officers Movement" in Egypt alongside Mohamed Naguib, who became the first president of Egypt in 1953, before being forced to resign by Nasser. The Free Officers Movement (FOM) was characteristic of the sort of leadership cadres that would promote Pan-Arab nationalism across the Arab world from the 1940s to the 1970s. Young (initially membership of the FOM was restricted to officers under-35), educated, secular, progressive and nationalistic, often from a military background and from low to lower-middle class families; the FOM collected ambitious reformers who were dissatisfied with the monarchies that had been left throughout the Arab world following the withdrawal of Britain and France from the region. Equivalent movements would arise in the militaries of Syria, Iraq, Libya and many other Arab

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[40] Prasenjit Duara, 'The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism', *Journal of World History*, JSTOR, 2001, 99–130.
[41] Robert Eugene Danielson, 'Nasser and Pan-Arabism Explaining Egypt's Rise in Power' (PhD Thesis, Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2007).

majority states in the region and from these political movements would be birthed many of the future

ruling cadres of their respective countries, including Muammar Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein and Hafez

Al-Assad, who all served in the military before taking on a key role in the military coup that

overthrew their respect governments, following up by either immediately taking power, or

manoeuvring out other initial rivals from the same movement to take on the position of leader of their

respective countries.[42]

While Pan-Arabism had a uniquely Arab character to it as a political movement and is thus not

perfectly analogous to any other political ideology[43] (drawing as it did from its own unique history

and ideological figures), it had clear similarities with other movements within the Global South.

These include progressive officer movements in Africa (although these often had a more explicitly

Marxist worldview) as well as groups such as the Young Turks, who although divided from the Pan-

Arab movement by ethnicity and the history of Ottoman rule over the Middle East, share many

similarities in the types of progressive, secular, modernising military officers who also made up the

leadership cadres of the Pan-Arab movement. The concentration of influence in the Pan-Arab

movement in the late 1950s and 1960s towards Gamal Abdel Nasser gave Pan-Arabism a greater

degree of ideological coherence and international political structure than Pan-Asianism and Pan-

Africanism, by virtue of a single leadership figure being able to have far more influence on the

direction of the broader movement. Nasser was already a central figure in the Pan-Arab movement

during his rise to the presidency, but his influence and legitimacy would be massively enhanced by

the Egyptian victory in the Suez Crisis in the first year of Nasser's presidency.[44] Nasser would give

the Pan-Arab movement further ideological coherency beyond just Arab Nationalism through his

advocacy for "Arab Socialism" which mixed beliefs and practices of progressive military nationalism,

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[42] C Ernest Dawn, 'The Formation of Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 20, no. 1 (1988): 67–91.

[43] Michael Scott Doran, *Pan-Arabism before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question* (Oxford University Press, USA, 1999).

[44] Barry Rubin, 'Pan-Arab Nationalism: The Ideological Dream as Compelling Force', *Journal of Contemporary History* 26, no. 3 (1991): 535–51.

post-colonial self-reliance, secularism, state management of the economy and land reform. This progressive, secular, Arab Socialism would become the predominant form of Arab Nationalism across the Arab world, which gave an effective political imaginary for the future of the Arab world, which helped it gain further adherents, particularly following the demonstration of strength post-Suez.[45]

Structurally, the Pan-Arab movement was the closest of the three pan-national post-colonial movements to achieving a broader encompassing state, consolidating their wider pan-national identity into a unified political structure. Inspired by the success of Nasser's program, a similar officer-led movement would overthrow the Syrian government and form a federated government structure with Egypt – the United Arab Republic (UAR) – in 1958. The experiment would last only three years before being dissolved by Syrian officers in 1961. This was the first sign of the disadvantage of the centrality of Nasser as a singular leadership figure in the Pan-Arab movement. The Syrian officers who had overthrown their government to form the UAR had expected to be co-equal participants in the government of the UAR, but found that power was quickly consolidated in Cairo, with Damascus treated far more as if it were a region of a larger super-state than as co-equals with the wealthier, more populous Egypt. The Syrian leadership would dissolve the union of the state and reform Syria as an independent nation again in 1961, although relations between Cairo and Damascus remained close.[46] Muammar Gaddafi would try a similar effort to join Libya with neighbouring North African Arab majority nations in the 1970s, but all efforts would run into the similar roadblocks of an unwillingness by established political leaders to sacrifice their sovereignty, power and influence to leaders of other states in order to establish a unified government structure. Institutionalisation and state formation would be the greatest struggle for all three of the pan-national movements; hampered in many ways by the fact that states had in many cases already been institutionalised and empowered local elites, whose belief in the broader ideology had to be balanced against the maintenance of the position of

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[45] Ali Kadri, *The Unmaking of Arab Socialism* (Anthem Press, 2016).

[46] James P Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

power for themselves they had already established. In comparison, other revolutionary national movements of the nineteenth century were seeking to overcome a multi-national imperial state structure, and thus, the revolutionary actors rarely had to sacrifice their own sovereign power in order to form the new nation.

A fatal blow was delivered to Pan-Arabism as an ideological project by the 1967 Six-Day War between a coalition of Arab states (primarily Egypt, Syria and Jordan), and Israel. During the Six-Day War, the Arab coalition was soundly defeated militarily by the Israeli forces, despite the relatively greater size of the Arab forces. The impact of the defeat was compounded by propaganda broadcasts in the early days of the war, which informed the Arab world that victory was imminent, some delivered by Nasser himself. Post-conflict, much of the blame for the poor performance of Egyptian forces (and the defeat of the Arab coalition as a whole) fell upon the infighting between Nasser and his senior general, Abdel Hakim Amer. The centrality of Nasser to the Pan-Arab project by the late 1960s only exacerbated the damage done to it by the Six-Day War, as the loss in the conflict not only threw into question many of the assumptions of the inevitability of a Pan-Arab state, but it also undermined the prestige and legitimacy of its central figure.[47]

At the Arab League summit in Khartoum, which followed in the immediate aftermath of the Six-Day War, the Arab World looked to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia for new leadership of the Arab world. Saudi Arabia's increasing role in world oil markets during the period had already brought significant wealth and influence to the state. Saudi Arabia had sent forces to assist Jordan in the Six-Day War, although they had not been deployed into combat, and had emerged largely unscathed by the conflict, both diplomatically and in terms of casualties. Faisal, along with Libya and Kuwait, set up a fund of 378 million dollars, of which it was the largest contributor, to be distributed to help those effected by the Six-Day War. He used the opportunity for the diminishment of Nasser as a political figure to rally

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[47] Fouad Ajami, 'The End of Pan-Arabism', *Foreign Affairs* 57, no. 1 (1978): 355.

the Arab world, leading the formulation of the final Khartoum resolution, which included the famous "Three No's" –

> *"The Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political efforts at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the aggression of 5 June. This will be done within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab States abide, namely,* **no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it,** [Bold is my emphasis] *and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country."*[48]

The approach of Faisal gave a new rallying point for the Arab states whose leadership felt militarily humiliated, and the magnanimous approach of giving funds to help war reconstruction of his rivals for power in the Arab world was a masterful diplomatic move which gave Saudi Arabia significant prestige over Nasser, Faisal's primary rival for power and influence in the Arab world. Faisal also took the opportunity of the Khartoum Conference to bring about a close to the Yemeni Civil War with favourable terms for their client, which was being fought between Royalists and Anti-Royalist forces, with Royalist forces receiving support from Saudi Arabia and their opponents receiving support from Egypt. The Khartoum Conference was the inflexion point for the Pan-Arabist movement, which had previously been on the march across the Arab World. Importantly King Faisal was not just an individual leader but represented a figurehead for the growing opposition to Secular Arab Nationalism/Pan-Arabism. Faisal became a figurehead for a reactionary Pan-Islamist movement which unified anti-secularist and monarchist forces (in those countries with remaining monarchies in the Arab world) in opposition to the secularising/modernising program of the Arab socialist leaders. Faisal was able to be effective not only in taking the leadership position at Khartoum but in consolidating his leadership position in the Arab world (until his assassination in 1975) because he

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[48] League of Arab State, 'Khartoum Resolution', 1967.

represented a political movement within the Arab world which had as deep of a political base as the pan-Arabist secular movement, and which was able to draw upon a large body of organised political activists and influential domestic figures, both within those nations aligned with Saudi Arabia and within the nations of competing powers.[49] Faisal would play a significant role in constructing a cross-national, reactionary, Pan-Islamic movement across the 1970s, accelerated particularly by Operation Hurricane, which received further organisational support from the United States. While this Pan-Islamist movement would not supplant the secular Pan-Arab forces in the Arab world, and new leaders broadly in the Arab Socialist mould would still come to power in the 1970s and beyond, the shift in power from Cairo to Riyadh broke the possibility of institutionalising Pan-Arabism in the form of a unified nation state, particularly following the 1970 overthrow of Nasser by the more Pro-US Sadat, which left the Pan-Arab movement without the central leadership figure that had directed the movement internationally since coming to power in 1956. The Pan-Islamist movement would have less of an influence on the Great Powers during the Cold War, as the Pan-Islamic movement was much more closely aligned to the United States than the Pan-Arab movement, which stressed post-colonial independence. Cooperation between Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamist aligned states would also continue throughout the Cold War to advance general Arab/Islamic post-colonial interests while competing for influence within the region, the most notable of these was the cooperation between the Pan-Islamist and Pan-Arab members of OPEC during the Yom-Kippur War.[50] The relative centrality of this small number of member states in international oil production allowed them to enforce their demands upon the United States and other Western powers. This raises the question of the role of coalitions of otherwise lesser powers to be able to act as Great Powers when led in a structured organisation to reach certain demands.

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[49] Abdullah M Sindi, 'King Faisal and Pan-Islamism', in *King Faisal and the Modernisation of Saudi Arabia* (Routledge, 2019).

[50] Diana Schumacher, 'The 1973 Oil Crisis and Its Aftermath', in *Energy: Crisis or Opportunity?* (Springer, 1985).

Pan-Africanism was the third dominant pan-national ideology of note to influence international society following the emergence of the Post-Colonial States in 1945. Pan-Africanism would be most dominant in Sub-Saharan Africa, with North Africa dominated by Pan-Arab ideologies, although certain North African leaders, particularly Muamar Gaddafi, would attempt to synthesise ideas of Pan-Arabism and Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism was also arguably the most integrated ideology between anti-colonialist activists in Africa and actors in the colonial core, in large part because of the American (and to a lesser extent European) black liberation movements. Senior members of the Black advocacy movements would simultaneously assist and advocate for the decolonisation of Africa, including W.E.B. Du Bois, who helped organise several Pan-African conferences and would retire to Ghana for his final years. The first Pan-African Conference would meet in London in 1900, and these regular meetings helped build a network of future anti-colonial activists and post-colonial leaders.[51] With the independence of Ghana in 1957, the first post-colonial African state emerged into international society. In April 1958, the first All-African Peoples Conference (AAPC) was held in the Ghanian capital of Accra[52]. The first AAPC was key for a number of reasons: Firstly, it involved the attendance of all independent African states at the time of the conference, including the North African states, which was a key moment for the collaboration between Pan-African and Pan-Arab leaders; it also committed the conference to a number of key objectives of interest for the future of Africa, namely an end to formal colonialism by the British, French and Portuguese, support for the forces resisting French occupation in Algeria, and a commitment to the principles of self-reliance and harmony among post-colonial states as expressed at the Bandung Conference in 1955.

Increasing numbers of African states would emerge as independent nations over the succeeding years, particularly from 1960-1964, when the majority of the British and French colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa would gain their independence. Kwame Nkrumah would remain a key leader on the African

[51] Ali A Mazrui, 'Pan-Africanism and the Intellectuals: Rise, Decline and Revival', *African Intellectuals: Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender and Development*, Zed Books London, 2005, 56–77.

[52] Marika Sherwood, *Origins of Pan-Africanism: Henry Sylvester Williams, Africa, and the African Diaspora* (Routledge, 2012).

continent, particularly among the other African leaders committed to a Pan-African future for the continent. In 1961, six key left-wing, Pan-African leaders met in Casablanca, representing Ghana, Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Libya and Morocco[53]. These leaders believed in a deep, political integration as the only practical means of creating an independent Africa, free from the influence of the former colonial powers, and sought the creation of a federated super-state to encompass most of Africa. A number of actions had triggered a desire for a more formalised effort to advance Pan-African ideals on the continent. One of these was the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, who had been a key radical Pan-African leader after being elected in the Congo's first election, only to be overthrown in a military coup and assassinated, with the suspected assistance of the CIA and European colonial powers, particularly Belgium. This action would begin the Congo Crisis, plunging Sub-Saharan Africa's largest state into a five-year civil war, the instability of which the country has arguably never recovered from. The assassination of a key Pan-African leader with involvement by the Cold War superpowers, along with the felt need to continue to apply pressure on France to leave Algeria, prompted a more coordinated effort by the radical Pan-Africanists.[54]

In opposition to the Casablanca group, an informal alliance of eighteen more conservative African States would form, made up of the twelve members of the Francophone African dominated Brazzaville Group - Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dahomey (Benin), Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Senegal, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), and Niger, which had been established to try to mediate between France and the Algerian independence movement and took a more conciliatory approach to France than the Casablanca Group, along with Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, and Tunisia. These states would meet in Monrovia (Liberia) for the first time on the 8th May, 1961, for the "Conference of Independent African States" and became known

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[53] David Williams, 'How Deep Is the Split in West Africa?', *Foreign Affairs* 40, no. 1 (1961): 118–27.
[54] Ebere Nwaubani, 'Eisenhower, Nkrumah and the Congo Crisis', *Journal of Contemporary History* 36, no. 4 (2001): 599–622.

informally as the "Monrovia Group".[55] Most of these states also considered themselves Pan-

Africanists to different degrees, but took a more gradualist approach to the question of African

Unification, privileging the maintenance of the existing state sovereignty and autonomy of the already

existing African states over a federated model, promoting the development of state nationalism over a

Pan-African identity/nationalism, as well as strengthening each individual states bureaucracies,

militaries and state capacity as a whole. This divide on the approach to the future of Africa and its

development between the radical federalists of the Casablanca group and the more moderate national

sovereignty position of the Monrovia Group would define the debates over Pan-Africanism and

African institution-building throughout the Cold War.

While the gradualist views of the Monrovia Group encompassed the leaders of more African states

than the more radical, federalist views of the Casablanca Group, radical Pan-African ideals existed to

some degree in most populations in Africa (particularly among the educated, urban elite), including in

the Monrovia Group states. Pan-Africanism had arguably the deepest and most widespread adherence,

not only as a political program but as both an identity and an imaginary for the future of Africa among

the wider (at least urban, politically active) population than Pan-Arabism or Pan-Asianism. Ali

Mazrui would argue that there was a uniquely deep following of Pan-Africanism among post-colonial

leaders:

> "*But is the Egyptian an African in the same sense that Nkrumah is one? The answer must be a*
>
> *qualified "No." To the extent that they are both within a continent that underwent some form*
>
> *of colonial rule in recent history, and to the extent that this gives them a certain sense of*
>
> *fellow feeling, the Egyptian and Nkrumah are both "Africans." But while the Egyptian is an*
>
> *African only in the sense that Nehru is an Asian, Nkrumah is an African in a more significant*

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[55] Monde Muyangwa and Margaret A. Vogt, 'Part One: An Overview of the Creation of the Organization of African Unity', in *An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, 1993-2000* (International Peace Institute, 2000), http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09583.6.

meaning. To put it way, Nasser is an Egyptian in a deeper sense historically than Nkrumah is

a Ghanaian, but he is an African in a shallower sense emotionally than Nkrumah is an

African. The continental feeling built up by colonialism was more emphatic in Africa south of

the Sahara than it ever was either north of the Sahara or in Asia. The particularly marked

artificiality of the sub-Saharan "nations," even when compared with those in Asia or North

Africa, is certainly an important part of the explanation."[56]

Ali Mazrui on his analysis of African Identity would argue that three factors cause the depth of Pan-African feeling in sub-Saharan African leaders; the relative lateness of colonisation, the relative artificiality of African borders (which crossed tribal/ethnic boundaries and did not necessarily hold to any pre-existing historical kingdoms); and the centrality of blackness to the experience of colonialism in Africa which transcended the borders of the colonial state. All these factors worked to create a commonality of experience to being "African" which did not exist in, for example, Asia, where the experience of colonial rule was highly differentiated by the local regimes of power that had been co-opted by the European powers. Mazrui argues that the artificiality and relatively short-lived nature of African colonial borders made an African elite "feel more African" and less Kenyan, Ghanian, etc, as compared to, for example, an Indian elite who would "feel more Indian" as their primary identity, and only identify as "Asian" in a more distant sense that was less fundamental to their identity. The notion of the state being "African" was essential to the ontological security[57] of these newly independent African states, and as such, while there were strong disagreements on approach and extent, both Monrovian and Casablanca Group states adopted a policy of moving towards degrees of African integration and often the rhetoric of Pan-Africanism.

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[56] Ali A Mazrui, 'On the Concept of "We Are All Africans"', *American Political Science Review* 57, no. 1 (1963): 88–97.

[57] Jennifer Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 3 (2006): 341–70.

Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, in particular, held significant international prestige as the first Post-Colonial leader to achieve independence from Britain or France, who led a relatively wealthy and populous state, and was himself an impressive author and writer with an ideological framework for the future of Africa. The Pan-Africanist movement would be significantly undermined when Nkrumah's increasing corruption and turn towards authoritarian tactics led to public protests, which would oust him from the presidency in 1966[58]. Nkrumah would go into exile in Guinea where he would be honorary Co-President until his death, a statement of Guinea's commitment to the creation of a Pan-African federation. A combination of both the downfall of the most influential Pan-African Federationist, along with covert actions by the USA and European Powers, significantly diminished the influence of radical Pan-Africanists by the mid-1960s. The Casablanca – Monrovia split was healed in 1963 through the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which explicitly sought to bring both groups together to forge a shared future for Africa[59]. The Monrovia vision for the future of Africa had largely won the debate between the two camps, with the body established in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, one of the senior Monrovia group members. The primary focus of the OAU at its founding was the elimination of the final vestiges of colonialism and white rule on the African continent, with a particular focus on the Portuguese Colonies, Apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia following the exit of France and Britain from the majority of the continent. The OAU stressed the intensification of co-operation between African States, but also the importance of the strengthening of African state sovereignty and territorial integrity, a clear reiteration of the concerns of the Monrovia group and their preference for voluntary integration over the federation of African states.

The Organisation of African Unity has been criticised for failing to do more than provide a venue for discussion on the African continent, but the institutionalisation of a venue for collaboration between African leaders preserved an institutional framework for creating consensus among African states.

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[58] Ama Biney, 'The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in Retrospect.', *Journal of Pan African Studies* 2, no. 3 (2008).
[59] Joel Ng, *Contesting Sovereignty: Power and Practice in Africa and Southeast Asia* (Cambridge University Press, 2021).

The OAU would succeed in a number of consensus-driven concerns of African leaders, particularly in the organisation of support for liberation movements operating in Apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia, as well as organising African governments to collaborate with UN institutions for the purposes of peacekeeping. It also maintained the possibility for further institution-building in Africa by closing the growing rivalry between radical and conservative Pan-African states. The platform for Intra-African cooperation that these initial Pan-Africanists' experiments allowed for the creation of deeper experiments in African institution building and sovereignty sharing, such as ECOWAS.

The experiment with the OAU would lay the foundations for the African Union (AU) to continue the legacy of Pan-Africanism and Intra-African cooperation. While the Casablanca block may have lost its prominence by the mid-1960s, a new generation of integrationist Pan-African leaders would influence the development of African politics, particularly Gaddafi and Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe. Approaching the turn of the century, a number of factors strengthened the case for deeper integration on the African continent. The end of the Cold War made cooperation more necessary to resist Western influence, and the horrors of the Rwandan genocide showed the problem of an extreme sovereignty-centric approach, particularly in comparison to the success of intervention in Sierra Leone. Finally, the success of more regional international bodies at integration, such as ECOWAS, provided a model for African-wide integration efforts. Particularly following the debates over the "Responsibility to Protect (R2P)" at the United Nations, there was a growing belief among African leaders that there was a need for African states to integrate their economic and political structures, as well as police serious violations of human rights norms, less Europe and the USA take these violations as an excuse to intervene in African affairs. These arguments for the need to pool sovereignty and sacrifice an absolutist position on non-intervention for neighbouring states, in order to protect that sovereignty from non-African states interfering in African affairs would not be alien to the original radical Pan-

Africanists of the pre-decolonization era or the Casablanca group, but tempered by the concerns for the development of the national state of the original Monrovia group.[60]

Pan-Asianism as an approach was thus the most short-lived of the three post-decolonisation pan-national ideologies, and was in decline by the end of the 1950s, despite the strength of support for an Afro-Asian coalition at Bandung in 1955 only a few years earlier. Pan-Arabism would similarly flourish in the 1950s and 1960s, but unlike Pan-Asianism, it held a far greater degree of organic support within Arab political communities. Its institutionalisation was greatly assisted by the centrality of its organising figure in the 1950s and 1960s, Gamal Abdel Nasser, but this was also key to the fragility of Pan-Arabism as a political structure. Nasser's desire to concentrate power in Cairo brought an end to the brief attempt to form a Pan-Arab state between Egypt and Syria (The United Arab Republic), and Egypt's defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War with Israel fundamentally undermined the legitimacy of the Pan-Arab project. Pan-Arabism's secular, progressive nationalism was also challenged by an overlapping pan-national ideology within the Arab world – namely Pan-Islamism, and the defeat of Nasser in the Six-Day War gave the diplomatic initiative to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, a central figure of the Pan-Islamic movement. Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism would wrestle for influence in the Arab world throughout the rest of the Cold War, but Pan-Arabism in its secular, nationalist and socialist character of the Nasser era would never return to the prominence it had in the early 1960s. Pan-Africanism was the Pan-National ideology that had arguably the greatest depth among (particularly the urban population) of their respective post-colonial regions. Pan-Africanism had a deep history that created international linkages between post-colonial leaders and between these leaders and activists particularly in the United States and the imperial core. Mazrui argues that the depth of support for Pan-Africanism was so well embedded in Sub-Saharan African elites because of the relative artificiality and short length of existence of the national boundaries of African states,

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[60] Jeremy Sarkin, 'The Role of the United Nations, the African Union and Africa's Sub-Regional Organizations in Dealing with Africa's Human Rights Problems: Connecting Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect', *Journal of African Law* 53, no. 1 (2009): 1–33.

along with the similarity of the African colonial experience across colonial boundaries, as well as the universal African experience of racialisation. While the most radical federalist Pan-African leaders were politically defeated in the early 1960s by the national sovereigntist aligned African states, these state leaders still held to their own form of Pan-African ideals. Pan-Africanism would be institutionalised by not a singular state but through the creation of a lasting Pan-African International Society. This grew out of the OAU in the late 1960s, as well as the formation of successful regional groupings in Africa, such as ECOWAS, that were able to provide a model for deeper integration between its member states. The OAU's successor institution, the African Union, has maintained many of the ideals of the original more radical federalist Pan-African leaders, with considerations for an African Standby Force (ASF)[61] and deeper economic and political integration at a regional and Africa-wide level. This has been driven by the same Pan-African concerns that drove the original radical federalists of keeping European interference out of Africa as well as promoting greater development within the continent.

Pan-Africanism has thus arguably had the greatest long-term impact on Great Power Management of the three largest post-colonial, pan-national ideologies that emerged following the end of colonialism. By successfully institutionalising itself, it provided a normative and ideological framework for a feeling of shared norms, beliefs and culture, which are the bedrock for the formulation of a regional international society to gain deep adherence and support. This regional international society would be able to organise (to a limited extent at first) to manage its own affairs internally and consequently exclude the intervention of the global great powers from the region. While African state capacity and the institutional capacity for regional management as a whole remains less in African than the very well developed international society in Europe, over the coming decades Pan-Africanism may have laid the ideological framework for the creation of an integrated international society at the regional level that can act collectively to exclude great power interference and protect the primacy of the

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[61] Linda Darkwa, 'The African Standby Force: The African Union's Tool for the Maintenance of Peace and Security', *Contemporary Security Policy* 38, no. 3 (2017): 471–82.

region in its internal affairs. These states were also able to act collectively to engage global institutions, such as the United Nations, to reshape norms and practices towards the needs and interests of their states, such as the passing of UN resolutions 1514 and 2758 previously discussed in the prior chapter. The development of a deeply integrated and institutionalised regional international society in Africa which acts to exclude the Great Powers is a serious challenge both to the rights and assumed responsibilities of the Great Powers for global order making, and thus this institution has the possibility to continue to reshape international society more broadly in the coming decades, should it be able to overcome the challenges of regional integration as has occurred in Europe.

The Non-Aligned Movement and International Trade – Failures in Great Power Management?

The three Pan-National ideologies were deeply impacted by their emergence during the Cold War. While traditionally conceptualised as a contest between Capitalist West and Communist East for the future of international order (and this is undeniably a key factor), the Cold War can also be considered from a colonial lens as the Global North (Both the USA/Western Europe and the USSR) trying to enforce their vision for international society upon the Global South, particularly the newly emergent post-colonial states. This is a compelling understanding of the Cold War when one considers the cross-ideological coalitions that would form within the Global South and beyond to resist the influence of either the West or the USSR.

The primary and most broad membership body, heavily represented by the Global South, was the Non-Aligned Movement. Charting the ideological developments and political connections which founded the Non-Aligned Movement is dependent on the analytical understanding of the role of the Non-Aligned Movement in international society. Esclava places the foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement at Bandung in 1955, and the foundational document of the Non-Aligned Movement mirrors much of the language of the Bandung communique, particularly around sovereignty and non-

intervention of the Great Powers. The point at which the Non-Aligned Movement diverged from previous attempts at institutionalising post-colonial cooperation was at the precursor preparatory conference for organising the Non-Aligned Movement in Cairo in 1961. Here, the primary debate of importance was between the inclusivists led by Nehru and the exclusivists led by the Casablanca Group states on whether to include Neutral European states or to make the NAM an institution primarily concerned with post-colonial affairs.

The decision to include European Neutralists was a major turning point for the role of the Non-Aligned Movement, despite only one European member state taking part (Yugoslavia). The first formal conference of the NAM would be held in Belgrade in the same year, and Tito would be one of the 'big five' (alongside Nehru, Nkrumah, Nasser and Sukarno), who were the dominant political leaders of the NAM. Non-Alignment was never an institution designed to provide institutionalised management of post-colonial affairs/regions, or as a formal military alliance for projecting hard power to resist interference by the great powers. Instead, the NAM served as an organising body for the member states to push diplomatically for changes in the norms and practices of international society. Yugoslavia played a key ideological role in the presentation of the Non-Aligned Movement in providing it legitimacy as a body not only interested in the sectional concerns of the post-colonial nations in international society. Particular at the point of its founding, in 1961, where much of the world was either still emerging or had only just emerged from colonialism, and the universal application of sovereignty rather than a racialised application of a standard of civilization logic, was only just becoming the consensus position of international society, Tito as a European leader gave the NAM a prestige he held as a European national leader. Tito was able to align the NAM with the broader neutralist movement during the Cold War without sacrificing the centrality of arguing for the sovereignty of the post-colonial states and rejecting any special right for the interference in them by the European great powers.

The coalition building work done at the Non-Aligned Movement contributed to the maintenance of unity of the post-colonial states when advocating for their shared interests at broader international organisations such as the United Nations. It is not possible to exactly quantify the importance of the role of the NAM in holding this coalition together to bring about these changes, but given it remained one of the most broad membership post-colonial dominated international organisations during the Cold War period, the institutional existence of the NAM as a body for post-colonial consensus building certainly played a central role in the successful establishment of the goals of the post-colonial states in regards to sovereignty, rights and great power management.

One area the post-colonial states were less capable of influencing was the international economic system. Taking inspiration from OPEC, throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the post-colonial states would meet regularly to discuss the establishment of a "New International Economic Order" (NIEO). The Non-Aligned Movement was one of the principle venues for the negotiation of the post-colonial demands for this NIEO before they were brought to the United Nations, along with the Group of 77, a group of developing states operating collectively at the United Nations[62]. The post-colonial states began meeting seriously to determine the outlines of a vision for this NIEO in 1964, and would finally conclude with the passing of General Assembly resolution 3201 – "Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order"[63]

> The NIEO Resolution had demands including:[64]
>
> *"just and equitable relationship between the prices of raw materials, primary commodities, manufactured and semi-manufactured goods exported by developing countries and the prices of raw materials, primary commodities, manufactures, capital goods and equipment imported*

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[62] Robert L Rothstein, *Global Bargaining: UNCTAD and the Quest for a New International Economic Order* (Princeton University Press, 2015).
[63] United Nations, 'Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order - Resolution 3201', 1974.
[64] Ibid.

by them with the aim of bringing about sustained improvement in their unsatisfactory terms of trade and the expansion of the world economy;

Securing favourable conditions for the transfer of financial resources to developing countries;

Ensuring that one of the main aims of the reformed international monetary system shall be the promotion of the development of the developing countries and the adequate flow of real resources to them;

It also included key post-colonial demands around the norms of sovereignty and decolonisation, reiterated in the context of the increasingly globalising economy of the 1970s.

"Full permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural resources and all economic activities. In order to safeguard these resources, each State is entitled to exercise effective control over them and their exploitation with means suitable to its own situation, including the right to nationalization or transfer of ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of the State. No State may be subjected to economic, political or any other type of coercion to prevent the free and full exercise of this inalienable right;

The right of every country to adopt the economic and social system that it deems the most appropriate for its own development and not to be subjected to discrimination of any kind as a result;

Sovereign equality of States, self-determination of all peoples, inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force, territorial integrity and noninterference in the internal affairs of other States;

Regulation and supervision of the activities of transnational corporations by taking measures in the interest of the national economies of the countries where such transnational corporations operate on the basis of the full sovereignty of those countries

> *The right of all States, territories and peoples under foreign occupation, alien and colonial*
>
> *domination or apartheid to restitution and full compensation for the exploitation and*
>
> *depletion of, and damages to, the natural resources and all other resources of those States,*
>
> *territories and peoples;"*[65]

Notable here are demands for restitution for ongoing occupation and colonialism by any remaining colonial powers of their lands, and notably to people's groups suffering under the experience of Apartheid. This is again another notable recognition of the rights of "Peoples" separate from the state or the individual as discussed in Chapter Five. In addition to this is a reiteration of the absolute sovereignty of the state, the need for trans-national corporations to be sublimated to state control, and full rights for any state to choose the economic system of its choice and hold sovereignty over its resources.

As far as developments of the international system, the NIEO sought to radically shift both the nature of the international financial system to rebalance global trade flows towards the global south, and finally sought to establish a minimum pricing regime for primary natural resources which dominated the production and export economies of many post-colonial states because of the extractive nature of their economic development during the colonial period, much as OPEC had been successful doing so with oil. This was the area in which the NIEO had the least effect, with the ability to form a cartel-like group for the majority of primary resources impossible given their general abundance. The United States rejected the NIEO proposals strongly, as did most developed economies. Without the agreement of these large industrialised states that made up the vast amount of the value chain of the global economy, it was impossible for the economically weaker states to enforce their demands on the dominant economic powers of the system, and the resolutions passed at the General Assembly meant little without the agreement of the Great Powers to these demands.[66] This shows the limits of the ability of the post-colonial states to engage in extracting demands from the Great Powers, as in the

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[65] Ibid.

[66] Rothstein, *Global Bargaining: UNCTAD and the Quest for a New International Economic Order*.

field of economics, their consensus was not required as in the 1970s despite representing such a large portion of the global population, the Global South consisted of such a small amount of the global value chain in international production that the Global North was able to effectively dictate terms to these states, less they be locked out of the financial, development and trade institutions of the Global North states.

Conclusion

The post-colonial states would have an important impact on both the membership of the "great powers" club and the limits and special privileges afforded to it under the post-war international framework. They would also make their own efforts to create pan-national coalitions who were capable of resisting the intervention of the Great powers within their domestic politics. The first post-colonial intervention into Great Power management was the broad agreement to work within the established framework of the United Nations and, particularly, the United Nations Security Council. While there have been debates within the international community on the need for reform of the Security Council as an unrepresentative institution, the post-colonial states agreed in respect to the special privileges of the permanent members of the Security Council and thus be bound by its rules. It is important to recognise the active participation of the post-colonial states in engaging with the United Nations system, and as analysts of the international system, we should not naturalise the authority of United Nations organisations as a given. By agreeing to the rules of the UN Security Council and to respect the privileges afforded to its members, the post-colonial world allowed for the system to function as a form of management for wider international society which would not have been possible had they used the post-colonial coalition building institutions such as the Non-Aligned Movement to form an alternative to the United Nations rather than to challenge its norms and practices from within the institution itself.

The post-colonial world was essential in the establishment of the People's Republic of China in the China seat on the UN Security Council, which radically rebalanced the power dynamic of

international society's primary institution of Great Power Management. This was done both for pragmatic reasons (it was unworkable to have the most populace state in the global system not represented at the United Nations) but also because some post-colonial states saw the possibility of having an "Afro-Asian" power unbound from the influence of either Moscow or Washington on the security council as another safeguard of post-colonial rights at the Security Council. While Beijing's imagined role as the protector of Afro-Asia was never fulfilled (and was not wanted by the Beijing government itself), the People's Republic of China shared many of the same concerns around strong sovereignty norms and limited rights towards domestic intervention that the post-colonial states did, and as such they do to some degree fulfil the role of a post-colonial representative on the security council.

Nuclear proliferation was another major concern of great power management of the post-1945 era, as proliferation of nuclear weapons was not only feared to make the world more unsafe, but access to a large nuclear stockpile would, by its destructive capacity alone, plausibly make that state a great power that had to be considered seriously in the design of international society. The post-colonial states were thus in a difficult situation in both their desire to limit the destructive risk of nuclear weapons, but also enshrining their ownership to only those states that already held them which exacerbated the inequality of the Great Power Management system in international society. This concern was often represented in concerns over a Non-Proliferation Treaty being a form of "unequal treaty", recalling the legacy of the treaties enforced on China and other Kingdoms in Asia and Africa by Europeans that gave permanently unfair terms to the participants. Despite this concern, the post-colonial states would play a significant role in stewarding the NPT through its negotiation process by providing a permanent structure of third-party states that discouraged either the USA or USSR from walking away from negotiations with.

Finally, it is useful to consider the way in which pan-national ideologies provided a challenge to the traditional architecture of Great Power Management of international society. All three ideologies analysed, Pan-Asianism, Pan-Arabism and Pan-Africanism, all had a similar goal of creating a cross-national unity between colonised people that could eventually be used to overcome colonialism, and later the interference in the domestic affairs of their states by the Great Powers. These ideologies were thus significant challenges to the Great Powers, in that even if they could not project power externally, they provided a check on the ability of the great powers to manage the regional affairs of international society. This chapter argues that it was Pan-Africanism that has the most lasting legacy in this regard because, as a set of norms, it has been able to be effectively institutionalised into some of the supra-national institutions in Africa, such as the African Union. A key objective of the deepening integration in Africa is to provide a regional infrastructure to settle African affairs on the continent and thus exclude the Great Powers from having a role in the management of the region. The institutionalisation of this pan-national normative framework thus has the possibility of being a major contributor to Great Power management as the 21st century unfolds.

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Concluding Remarks

The decolonial moment represented the greatest change in the development of international society since the initial expansion of the European regional international society into the global colonial international society of the nineteenth century. Decolonization ended the legitimacy of the empire as a political unit of international society, an astonishing alteration of the norms of international society which for the last two hundred years had been dominated by political empires as their most influential political units. Decolonization ended a racialized standard of civilization as the foundational principle for legitimating a subject of international society's right to recognition within it. This again radically altered the fundamental normative structure of international society, and for the first time gave representation to the majority of the world's population under governments that had some claim to be legitimate representatives of the peoples groups they ruled over. The study of this period of history is thus fundamental to understand the changes we observe in international society and the contemporary view of the norms and practices of the Global South to the institutions of international society.

This thesis has been the first comprehensive effort to make an English School analysis of the effects of colonialism and decolonization as a single cohesive narrative which ties together the establishment of the global international system to colonialism and thus recognizes the radically transformative shift that decolonization represented. This work makes explicit the meaningful changes (and also the failures to achieve change) of the post-colonial states in the immediate moment after decolonization and where it became institutionalized into the international system as a permanently understood norm or practice of international society. This work is also part of a new generation of academic work being done in the English School which bucks the trend of some of the earlier generations of English School authors by looking upon decolonization and the pluralistic broadening of international society's norms

and constitutive members as a positive rather than a negative disordering turn for international

society[1].

This work has moved beyond much of the work done before concerning colonialism as a primary

institution of international society (particularly Holsti[2]), by recognizing the fundamental role that non-

state actors operating for private companies played in establishing the norms and practices of this new

global international society, and also of the modern European nation state itself. It has also centered

the view of change and development of the post-1945 primary institutions of international society not

on the large, post-war organization building done by the allies immediately post war, but in the

emergence of a new body of subjects of international society into the formal political arena for the

first time who sought to advocate for the equality of their states with the existing powers. This is not

to downplay the important of these organizations, which along with the emergence of the post-

colonial state radically altered the international institutional architecture of the post-war era. However,

these organizations required the support and buy-in from the newly independent states if they were to

achieve the universal and global governance power that is now a given when analyzing these

institutions, and as such why the post-colonial states chose to join these institutions and how they

sought to change them is also fundamentally important to the story of post-war organization building.

There is still more work to be done within the English School (and more broadly within international

relations research) on the role of decolonisation in establishing the current primary institutions of

international society. The topic of post-colonial contributions to international society is so vast that it

would be impossible to contain within a single even thesis length work. This thesis has heavily

focused on the contributions of the post-colonial state from a diplomatic history perspective, looking

at the primary and secondary source documents relating to interactions between state leaders and

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[1] Bull, '14: Revolt Against the West'.
[2] Holsti, '8. Colonialism'.

senior civil servants, and tells the narrative through a series of "big events"; often conferences, UN resolutions, conflicts and changes in governments. This was a purposeful decision to give focus and clarity to the overall work by limiting its scope, and has served to increase the overall coherency of the thesis as a whole while focusing on the author's expertise. This decision leaves space for the further development of understanding of the contribution of post-colonial states to international society within the English School. Two areas of particular interest for further research in this field are firstly the contribution of the post-colonial states to the development of international trade and the international political economy. This thesis covers the question of international trade and the international political economy through its analysis of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) in Chapter Six, but this work could be significantly expanded by marrying an International Political Economy approach to an English School Analysis to question further the changes decolonization made to the trade practices which made up the world economy, as well as the institutionalization of "development" at an international society level. The second area for further study and development would be through taking a deeper look at the post-colonial role in the development of international legal institutions and case law, and its effect on the application of international law. This would require the work of a specialist in international law, but the work would greatly deepen the English School's understanding of post-colonial approaches to international law and how it interrelates to post-colonial views on sovereignty and international governance.

This thesis has made a significant contribution both to the development of English School Theory, and the understanding of colonialism and the decolonial moment through the use of an English School Framework, alongside new analysis of primary and secondary sources. The theoretical contributions to the English School come not only in the significant theoretical work done in Section 1 of the thesis, but in playing a part in reorienting the focus of English School analysis to account for the Global South's contribution to international society, alongside much of the contemporary scholarship from the current generations of academics in the English School. This work shows both the exercise of independent critical power and through which new facts about international society and its primary

institutions have been discovered and emphasized. It provides a critical assessment of the literature existing on the topic and engages widely with the English School as a framework, and engages with the ongoing questions of methodology within the school. I thus submit this work for consideration as a thesis making a suitably significant contribution to be considered for the award of a PhD in International Relations.

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