Data and Code for: Disrupting Drug Markets: The Effects of Crackdowns on Rogue Opioid Suppliers
This paper estimates the impacts of doctor crackdowns on the quantity demanded of prescription opioids, across-market substitution, and across-product substitution. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in the timing and location of administrative actions, I find that cracking down on a single doctor decreases county-level opioid dispensing by 10%. This decline persists across space and grows over time. Additionally, significant heroin substitution occurs, yet overall overdose mortality decreases. These results highlight a critical tradeoff policymakers should consider with targeted crackdowns: reductions in the flow of new users must be balanced against the harm that arises when existing users substitute to more dangerous drugs.
| Item Type | Dataset |
|---|---|
| Publisher | OpenICPSR |
| DOI | 10.3886/e203901 |
| Date made available | 10 November 2025 |
| Keywords | enforcement, drug epidemic, opioids |
| Temporal coverage |
From To 2006 2014 |
| Geographic coverage | United States |
| Resource language | Other |
| Departments | LSE > Research Centres > Centre for Economic Performance |
Explore Further
- Soliman, A. (2025). Disrupting drug markets: the effects of crackdowns on rogue opioid suppliers. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 17(4), 165 - 191. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20230640 (Repository Output)