

The London School of Economics and Political Science

**The state effects of a state-led payment for ecosystem services scheme in  
Amazonian indigenous communities.**

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of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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## Abstract

This thesis is concerned with the reconfiguration of the state-indigeneity relationship through the implementation of a state-led payment for ecosystem services (PES) scheme in the Peruvian Amazon. As a case study, I examine the implementation of the National Programme for the Conservation of Forests (NPCF) within seven indigenous communities in Peru. This initiative provides conditional economic incentives to the communities for the conservation of Amazonian forests. My primary research is ethnographic, focused on the ordinary exchanges that take place on a daily basis between state bureaucrats and indigenous peoples. Despite the conservation aims, the NPCF also generates social and political impacts within communities. The new administrative responsibilities of indigenous authorities strengthen their sense of agency to access new state resources and funds. Likewise, state bureaucrats, in their efforts to make state-led PES scheme goals legible for their indigenous audience, adapt and ignore formal policy content, operating as brokers to demonstrate the accountability of the economic incentives, even if that means diverting attention away from conservation issues.

Economic incentives are framed by indigenous peoples as rewards and favours, producing contrasting forms of articulation with the state. Communities create an alternative interpretation of forest conservation as an asset that attracts development opportunities from external sources, including the state. Moreover, the main effect of state-led PES schemes is the bureaucratisation of the communities as a form of mediation with the state; that is to say, indigenous communities recognise that bureaucracy is, for them, a technique of citizenship and development. Indeed, for indigenous communities, bureaucratic skills allow them to become legible public policy users, able to exercise their citizenship at the margins. The common thread in this dissertation is the quotidian relevance of everyday bureaucratic procedures for accountability in a state-led PES scheme. Although NPCF administrative duties imply a heavy burden for indigenous communal leaders, they have embraced them to reconfigure their relationship with the state.

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIDESEP	Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Amazon
ARA	Sub National Environment Agency
CBF	Community based forestry
CI	Conservation International
CODEPISAM	Organisation for the Development and Defense of the Indigenous Peoples of San Martin
COP	Conference of the Parties
CLB	Community level bureaucrats
CBNRM	Community based natural resources management
CONAPA	Commission for Andean, Amazonian, and Afro-Peruvian Peoples
GORESAM	San Martin Sub National Government
GBP	British Pound
ICDP	Integral Community Development Programme
INDEPA	National Institute for the Development of Andean, Amazonian, and Afro-Peruvian Peoples
INEI	National Institute of Statistics and Informatics
FBT	Fernando Belaunde Terry Road
FEKIHD	Kichwa Federation from Huallaga Dorado
FERIAAM	Awajun Federation of the Alto Mayo
MAE	Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
MINAM	Ministry of Environment of Peru
MRTA	Tupac Amaru Guerrilla Movement
NGO	Non-profit organisation
NPA	Natural protected area
NPCF	National Programme for the Conservation of Forest for the Mitigation of Climate Change
OAAM	Aguaruna Organisation of the Alto Mayo
PDA	USAID Alternative Development Program
PEAM	Special Project Alto Mayo
PEHCBM	Special Project Huallaga Medio y Bajo Mayo
PEN	Peruvian sol
PES	Payments for ecosystem services
RAISG	Amazon Georeferenced Socio Environmental Information Network
REDD	Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
RIA	Amazonian Indigenous REDD
SERNANP	National Service of Natural Protected Areas
SETAI	Technical Secretariat for Indigenous Affairs
SL	The Shining Path
SLB	Street level bureaucrats
SUNARP	Peruvian Superintendency of Public Records
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNFCCC	The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
VRAEM	Valley of the Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro Rivers
ZOCRES	Areas for conservation and restoration of ecosystems

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

Between 2013 and 2015, while I was working for a regional programme for the conservation of the Amazon basin, I first became aware of the Peruvian National Programme for the Conservation of Forests for the Mitigation of Climate Change (shortened in this thesis to the NPCF). My first encounter was with the Forest Monitoring Unit within the NPCF, which is responsible for the remote monitoring of deforestation in the Peruvian Amazon using satellite images. This group of professionals became my first informants about this scheme, and I became increasingly curious about the NPCF. It was the largest public programme working with Amazonian indigenous communities in Peru conserving forests through a payment for ecosystem services (PES) scheme to fight deforestation. I was interested in exploring the political effects of this scheme in the quotidian life of communities enrolled in the programme. This was the first time that indigenous communities had the chance to manage cash granted by the state as a payment for the conservation of their forests.

The NPCF is a twenty-year programme created in 2010 and due to finish in 2030, to conserve 54 million hectares of tropical forests in Peru. By December 2019, 3 million hectares of forests from 274 Amazonian indigenous communities were managed under this scheme (MINAM, 2020a). In these communities, the NPCF offers economic incentives with a flat tariff of GBP 2 per hectare of conserved forest per year, conditional not only on the conservation of selected forested areas, but also on the implementation of communal development projects that discourage land use change behaviours, and on the conduct of forest patrols of the forested area under conservation agreements.

In Peru, as in other Amazonian countries such as Ecuador, Brazil and Bolivia, state-led PES within indigenous communities are part of their national forest conservation policies (Balvanera et al., 2015). PES schemes gained a novel reputation for encouraging sustainable land use behaviours through economic incentives. In contrast to traditional conservation strategies, such as protected areas or community-based natural resources management, PES programmes are differentiated by their voluntary mechanisms, the enforcement of conditionalities and the local management of cash transfers (Pirard, 2012; Dasgupta and Perrings, 2001). The implementation of state-led PES schemes has stimulated a significant amount of research, mostly on their cost-effectiveness as conservation strategies (Pagiola, 2008; Ferraro and Simpson, 2002). Yet not all the states choose to assess the social and political effects of PES, because they do not contribute towards environmental change (von Hedemann and Osorne, 2016; Milne and Adams, 2012). However, political assessments of the policy implementation process of PES are highly relevant as these schemes represent spaces for political engagement and increasing state presence in rural areas, especially when they target vulnerable and poor populations (Shapiro-Garza, 2013).

Trained as an anthropologist, with a background expertise working with Amazonian indigenous peoples, I considered the NPCF an original research niche to understand how an environmental initiative could reconfigure the political and fragile relationship between the state and indigenous communities. The current relationship between the Peruvian state and Amazonian indigeneity is complex. Throughout their historical encounters with mainstream society, indigenous peoples have suffered racial discrimination, exclusion, poverty, inequality, and land grabbing, while living in one of the most biodiverse regions of the world. Today, indigenous communities are still considered part of the margins of the state. The margins

evoke the geographical and political distance and precarious presence of the state that usually represent the situation of Amazonian indigenous communities in Peru. As such, the focus on the margins allows me to understand the state not only from its forms of political and administrative organisation, but “from the areas in which those forms of organisation are debilitated” (Das and Poole, 2004, p. 9).

The implementation of the NPCF as part of the public conservation policy, operates as an interesting arena in which indigenous peoples, as inhabitants of the margins, can find a platform to negotiate rights and responsibilities with the state as counterparts of a conservation contract. For these communities, PES can be an opportunity to interact with the state and its bureaucracy on different terms, with the establishment of new economic incentives and conditionalities to conserve their communal forests (Larson, 2008). As a PES scheme, the NPCF demands a new environmental governance strategy between the state and indigenous communities. On the one hand, the state must create a new institutional structure and design new bureaucratic procedures to implement its PES conservation strategy and supervise the proper accountability of the conditional cash transfers. On the other, indigenous communities as PES users must redefine their local rules about forest management and other institutional arrangements to fit into the new public scheme.

Over the course of fieldwork and writing, the focus of my dissertation shifted from an original interest in discussing the political concerns of the conservation of forests and PES schemes within indigenous communities to the importance of bureaucracy and citizenship. At the start of my research, I thought that indigenous communities would use current international narratives of climate change mitigation and of themselves as guardians of the forest to try to

negotiate with the state better tariffs, benefits and fewer conditionalities. However, other things happened instead. When I was almost halfway through my fieldwork, I accepted that my hypothesis of the NPCF as a space to negotiate rights and responsibilities over their land and forest resources was not confirmed.

I found that the implementation of the NPCF increased expectations of claiming other (non environmental) rights such as access to development initiatives. These reflections implied a process of customising indigeneity, recognising the importance of embracing state bureaucratic vocabulary procedures to exercise their citizenship. The relevance of these issues linked to indigeneity, citizenship and indigeneity was identified from observing and participating in quotidian and repetitive meeting events between NPCF front line workers and local indigenous leaders to revise and prepare accountability reports, and to elaborate, fix and understand budgets, cash balances and expenses.

Being able to observe the same actors (NPCF workers and community members, *comuneros* in Spanish), ordinary events and flows of paperwork for several months, I ended up recognising the will of the state to conduct public policy within indigenous communities, only by installing an audit culture at its margins and creating accountable subjects. In contrast, indigenous peoples strengthened their awareness of the importance of bureaucracy to access the state and embraced it. The relevance of bureaucratic issues in the daily actions of the NPCF contrasted with the lack of environment-related actions in the communities. During fieldwork, I never attended an environmental education session, nor workshops on forest management, but I did participate in NPCF sessions for *comuneros* to learn to understand Microsoft Excel and Word, to practise their signatures, and fill in cheques.

My main research questions are as follows:

- I. What are the socio-environmental implications of the implementation of PES schemes within Amazonian indigenous communities?
- II. How do community-level bureaucrats turn environmental policy into specificactions to conserve indigenous forests?
- III. What are the state effects of a state-led PES in Amazonian indigenous communities and how do these influence forms of citizenship?

For question (i), I explore how the PES scheme transforms the quotidian life of the communities outside the environmental goals of the scheme; in particular, how the conservation initiative, and the new local regulations, impact on the dynamics of local political governance structures, the appearance of social conflicts and the indigenous communities' awareness about their territory. When referring to "socio environmental" implications, I first discuss how social dynamics within a community such as leadership, cooperation and conflict are transformed, while the environmental dimension implies exploring the new rules about the management of forest resources.

For question (ii), I examine the performance of the NPCF front-line workers that interact directly with indigenous peoples as policy users of a PES scheme for the conservation of forests. To do this, I apply and adapt the definition of street level bureaucrats (SLBs) coined by Michael Lipsky (2010) to explore how practices of statehood and the features of SLBs such as distance from the centre of power, discretion and constraints affect their performance to translate, adapt and ignore state policy.

For question (iii), I examine the state effects of the implementation of a state-led PES scheme within indigenous communities. Based on the concept of state effects, understood as traces of rule in the quotidian life, I analyse indigenous interpretations of the NPCF programme, of the economic incentives for conservation and of the state, and how these understandings and forms of experiencing the state influence indigenous peoples' performance as users of public policy, the customisation of their indigeneity and their sense of citizenship. Then, I discuss the bureaucratisation of communities as the main effect of the implementation of a PES scheme, considered as the intent of the state to reproduce state forms and shape accountable subjects at the margins of the Amazonian region. The bureaucracy of a public policy can be so pertinent, quotidian, and repetitive that it might end up relegating the formal goal of that policy.


Based on these questions, my exploration of the state-indigeneity relationship in a conservation scheme, through the analytical lens of the state effects' approach, contributes to scholarship not only in addressing the social and political impacts of a conservation programme, but also in acknowledging the relevance of state bureaucratic procedures and documentation that indigenous peoples need to command in order to exercise citizenship. As such, my analysis of the NPCF contributes to studies about the intimate connection between bureaucracy, citizenship and the customisation of indigeneity in the implementation of public policy at the margins of the state.

Likewise, with this dissertation, I challenge the naturalised and depoliticised condition of forest conservation in Peru to reveal the political spectrum in the relationship the state builds with society over the control of nature (Büscher, 2010; McAfee and Shapiro, 2010; Martínez-Alier,

2002; Bryant, 1998). Beyond environmental outcomes, state interventions stimulate other types of effects on society; for example, reshaping local understandings of the state, transformations in local political and social organisations, new arrangements over natural resources management, but also new mechanisms in which the state decides to implement and assess public policy. The thesis is then positioned from a critical perspective, examining the political effects of policy, rather than the way in which technical instruments solve environmental problems (Li, 2007; Mosse, 2004).

When I started designing my research proposal in 2015, the NPCF was working only in three departments of Peru: Junín, Madre de Dios, and San Martin. As of 2021, the NPCF has 13 offices in 9 Amazonian departments. The focus on the NPCF San Martin as a case study allows me to conduct a detailed analysis of how NPCF CLBs and indigenous peoples interact and move across different locations to implement the programme, from the NPCF office to the communities and their plots, to other state agencies in different cities. Field sites in San Martin included the NPCF office in Moyobamba city, the capital of San Martin department, and seven indigenous communities that are NPCF users: Chirikyacu, Chunchiwi, Copal Sacha, Chirik Sacha, which belong to the Kichwa ethnic group, and Alto Mayo, Shampuyacu and Shimpiyacu, which belong to the Awajun ethnic group (see Figure1). I also add 3 non-NPCF communities: Aviacion, Kawana Sisa and Morroyacu, to compare if the socio-environmental implications I found in communities enrolled to the NPCF could also appear in other non-NPCF communities.

Figure 1: Map of NPCF communities. Developed by Johan Vergaray for this thesis, 2021



I chose to conduct an ethnography of the everyday implementation of the NPCF to address the micropolitics of the interactions between the community level bureaucrats (CLBs) and *comuneros*. I conducted 52 weeks of fieldwork between 2017 and 2019 in the communities where the NPCF is implemented and at the NPCF office in the city of Moyobamba. In these communities, I would eat, sleep, and hang out to also get a sense of quotidian life with and without the NPCF. Fieldwork within Kichwa communities was fun, inspiring, and rewarding. Kichwa *comuneros* were always interested in knowing about me, hearing stories, why I was there, where I was from, and if I had family somewhere else. This was not the case of Awajun communities. In the Alto Mayo landscape, *comuneros* were sometimes suspicious of my presence as of any other “foreigner” that arrives in their communities. Entries to the communities could only be accompanied by NPCF staff, and with previous authorisation of the FERIAAM leaders. Arranging interviews was difficult and many meetings were cancelled. I never had the chance to stay overnight in order to socialise with local families.

At the NPCF office, the second most relevant field site, I was granted a desk with the rest of the employees of the programme. This was fundamental and of enormous help in accessing the ~~day~~ life of the state bureaucracy of an environmental programme in a small city of the Peruvian Amazon. Commuting to the communities with NPCF representatives were my favourite moments with them. We could talk for hours in four-wheel drive trucks about the programme, the communities, the Peruvian state, San Martin and also about our personal lives. Outside of the NPCF, as a grantee from a public agency in Peru, I also faced the bureaucracy of accountability paperwork and the importance of signatures, except mine. All submitted documents sent to CONCYTEC needed the signature and stamp of my PhD advisor as proof of the veracity of my reports. Comparing these two bureaucratic processes, I could better

understand state efforts to expand the accountability procedures in all instances, regardless of the subjects that must deal with them.

This dissertation is organised as follows. This first chapter presents the overall aim of the thesis and the research questions. The second chapter explains the overall methodology of the thesis; the case study, the field sites, the conduct of fieldwork, including the main techniques for the collection and analysis of data. The third chapter provides a broad analysis of the situation of Amazonian forests in Peru and then describes the goals, features, rules, and political and institutional arrangements of the NPCF. Chapter 4 provides the theoretical frameworks and concepts used for this thesis. Chapter 5 explains the historic and contemporary connection between the Peruvian state and Amazonian indigenous peoples, in order to provide the necessary context to understand the interaction during the NPCF public policy intervention.

In Chapter 6, I discuss environment and development initiatives and San Martin and then provide an ethnographic account of indigenous peoples in this department. In Chapter 7, I analyse the socio-environmental implications of the implementation of the NPCF within indigenous communities in the department of San Martin, in terms of political organisation, social conflict and territorial awareness. Chapter 8 explores the quotidian performance of the NPCF front line workers, inspired by Lipsky's model of street level bureaucrats (2010). In Chapter 9, I analyse local interpretations of the NPCF, the scheme's economic incentives and of the state, while also discussing the main effects of the implementation of the programme within indigenous communities focused on bureaucracy, citizenship and the customisation of indigeneity. Chapter 10 presents conclusions, including a review of the research questions, to

summarise the main findings of this dissertation and reflect on their wider implications for relevant scholarship.

## Chapter 2: Methodology

### 2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I explain how I framed this research methodologically, including the argument for choosing a case study, the conduct of fieldwork, and the main techniques for the collection, systematisation, and analysis of data. The chapter concludes with some insights on fieldwork dynamics and my own positionality as a Peruvian researcher in my own country. The ethnographical approach chosen for this research responds to my theoretical interest in the micropolitics of the everyday interactions between the state and indigeneity over the regulation of forest management.

### 2.2. The case study

The NPCF was selected as an appropriate case study due to the novel nature of its institutional design. It is the first large scale conservation programme created by the Ministry of the Environment of Peru that has Amazonian indigenous peoples as its beneficiaries who receive economic incentives for the conservation of forests. A case study is an intensive, in-depth qualitative analysis of a single event which has been chosen for its distinctiveness and significant link to a broader context and scale (Yin, 2014; Baxter and Jack, 2008). It can be an individual, a specific case, an organisation, or geographical area (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). The undertaking of a case study enables understanding of how things work in a unique social phenomenon where the researcher has no control over how the phenomenon unfolds.

The unit of analysis of a case study represents the specific entities, events, and subjects to be identified in this research. As a unit of analysis, the NPCF office in San Martin, in the upper part of the Peruvian Amazon region, was examined at the level of regional offices at the time of the study's design in 2016, specifically the offices in Junín, Madre de Dios and San Martin. This scoping research included assessing the overall performance of the NPCF regional offices, size of staff, relationship with indigenous communities, number of user communities, local political and social contexts, and security.

The selection of San Martin relied on different motivations: safety, relative stability of local political institutions and logistics. Also, I was quite curious to get to know this office better due to the “prestige” the personnel of this office had in Lima for supposedly being proactive and innovative. By the time I was ready to conduct fieldwork, neither the city of Moyobamba where the NPCF office is located nor the communities affiliated to the programme faced security problems. In other regions where the NPCF started, there were such problems. For example, in specific districts of Junín department where the NPCF operated, I confronted remnants of drug traffickers and armed groups. In Madre de Dios, some NPCF communities had been fighting against illegal gold mining mafias, which made them insecure contexts to conduct fieldwork, especially for women.

In past decades, rural villages of San Martin have been important settings for the cultivation of coca for drug trafficking and some remnants still operate in the areas where I conducted fieldwork. After fifty years of severe landuse change for extensive agriculture in San Martin, including coca cultivation for drug trafficking, in the early 2000s, the sub-national state aimed to establish San Martin as a “green department”, with a stronger environmental policy,

including pioneering territorial ordering, increased conservation areas and sustainable agriculture projects. In terms of organisation, the NPCF San Martin office was the first regional office to be inaugurated and was considered by the NPCF's highest authorities as the most effective office during the time I was preparing my research design (LIM03, personal communication, NPCF Head office representative, Lima, December 2016).

## 2. 3. The ethnographic approach

For this dissertation, I opted for a qualitative research case study conducted with an ethnographic approach. An ethnography is a combination of analytical and methodological techniques to study the social, political, and cultural characteristics of a specific phenomenon, through face-to-face interactions with the subjects involved in the study (Crang and Cook, 2007). An ethnography examines actions and interactions in daily life and the local and broader contexts in which these interactions are embedded and connected (Emerson et al., 1995). The overall aim of ethnography is to understand, explain and interpret how social processes unfold over time (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; Tilly 2006). Conducting an ethnography demands the active participation of the researcher for an extended period of time, watching and listening to what people say, to reach a "thick description" about how things gain meanings (Geertz, 1974). The purpose of this ethnography is to build up theory based on empirical detail of the complexities of everyday life, including the examination of state formation in indigenous scenarios.

The appropriateness of ethnographic research depends on the nature of the research questions. It is more suitable to respond to questions about behaviours and processes and

less about measuring how much or how many, since its focus is on in-depth qualitative explanations, instead of extensive quantitative analysis. For example, for this research, I question how the NPCF is implemented, how the interactions between CLBs and indigenous communities condition the way the state is shaped, experienced, and understood locally.

Since the 1970s, social sciences' disciplines have increasingly turned to the use of ethnography as a methodology to build up theory based on empirical detail on the complexities of everyday life, including the examination of state formation in local scenarios (Winchester and Rofe, 2016; Dwyer and Limb, 2001). The application of ethnography to study the state contributed towards the analysis of micro levels of everyday state practices, shaping the state as "a set of social practices" (Painter, 1995: 34) rather than as a structured and coherent apparatus (Megoran, 2006; Hansen and Stepputat, 2001). Indeed, an important feature of an ethnography of the state is the effort to analyse the state as a dynamic social construction, highlighting details of daily actions of state actors and policy users in the same domain (Poole and Harvey, 2012; Harris, 2009; Wedel et al., 2005; Navaro-Yashin, 2002). Moreover, the ethnographic method also enables the understanding of the connections of state actors' practices with the broader political system, other state levels of power and overall public policy (Jerolmack and Khan, 2014). The ethnography of the state also emphasises the analysis of local citizens' reactions to public policy and explores local forms of experiencing and interpreting the state in specific local, cultural, and historical scenarios. As such, it examines grounded practices of state formation where the state is outlined, framed, and understood upon interactions between state actors and policy users (Sharma and Gupta, 2006).

Participant observation is the main data collection technique, yet ethnography also involves other methods of data collection, such as semi-structured interviews, informal conversations, and document analysis to triangulate data. Triangulation involves cross-verifying data from different data sources to confirm compatibilities and possible contradictions and to flag possible failures in data collection methods (Crang and Cook, 2007). Triangulation in ethnographic research involves obtaining similar data with different collection techniques, to contrast possible contradictory narratives, double discourses and to reassure the feasibility of techniques chosen. Triangulation also allows identifying research intertextuality, understood as the capacity of this study to dialogue with relevant research, using similar theories and/or targeting similar social contexts and backgrounds (Shank, 2008).

Despite the strengths of ethnography in qualitative research, its use cannot be left unquestioned. One of the main criticisms of ethnography questions the impact of the researcher on the progression of events studied, arguing that the researcher's participation affects the way people act, interact, and express themselves, avoiding relevant information or dismissing topics they do not want to reveal (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). However, as ethnography is based on extended periods of fieldwork of the researcher with informants, these subjects end up adjusting to the researcher's presence until there is a mutual gaining of trust and rapport.

Ethnographic generalisation is another source of explanatory concern. Ethnography relies on naturally occurring events embedded in specific contexts, which makes them difficult to generalise for other spaces and actors. In qualitative research, generalisability is concerned with in-depth explanations of the phenomenon, favouring intensiveness rather than

extensiveness of explanations (Baxter and Jack, 2008; Dwyer and Limb, 2001). Instead of generalisation, ethnographic research contributes to building up theory based on empirical inputs, which in this case are community-level bureaucracy, state effects and citizenship and environmental policy at the margins. For these reasons, I concentrate on one solid and robust in-depth explanation of NPCF operating in one region, instead of conducting potentially superficial accounts of different NPCF offices. Even if I am focusing on NPCF San Martin as a case study, it implies analysing the NPCF operation in Moyobamba city, its implementation in seven communities, with two ethnic groups, three landscapes and their own contexts of state formation and land use change processes due to their different historical, economic, and political scenarios.

For this research, I chose a single case study. Comparing different regional offices would have implied relying on extended periods of fieldwork. Comparing NPCF San Martin with other offices with the same data collection techniques would entail at least doubling the time intended for fieldwork. Due to the time limitations of PhD studies, implementing a comparative study would not allow me to collect in-depth data and build a reliable and strong evidence-based study with a profound understanding of the unit of analysis and its context (Baxter and Jack, 2008). Although I chose a single case study, it did imply a specific comparative dimension by contrasting the effects of the implementation of the NPCF within Kichwa communities from the Lamas and Sisa landscapes with Awajun communities from the Alto Mayo landscape. With these comparisons, I was able to discuss how different cultural and historical contexts shaped the effects of the NPCF.

To collect and systematise the data, I chose to combine inductive and deductive approaches in different chapters. For empirical chapters 7 and 9, I applied an inductive approach. This approach means that as a researcher I started data collection with field guides for semi-structured interviews, as well as research questions and topics I wanted to discuss and theorise, while also allowing new subjects to emerge and unfold while conducting fieldwork (O'Reilly, 2009). In contrast, for empirical chapter 8, I applied a deductive approach to test theory in a new setting. For this research, I wanted to question Lipsky's theory on street level bureaucrats' suitability to analyse the role of NPCF specialists. My focus on discussing new forms of understanding the model of SLBs did not mean that I had to narrow my perspective to only capture the local reality in terms of Lipsky's theory. Indeed, I revised Lipsky's theory and proposed new forms of theorising and of revising already settled ideas on bureaucracy.

#### 2.4. Field sites

In qualitative research, the "field" normally consists of a loose combination of multiple sites and connected actors, places and events that gain meaning in terms of the research study (Wedel et al., 2005; Marcus, 1995). Fieldwork for this research is framed as multi-sited (Marcus, 1995). This means that I conducted my research in multiple locations, following the dynamics of the programme and of key informants, rather than limiting the study to a specific geographical area. Fieldwork was conducted in the cities of Lima, Moyobamba, Tarapoto, Lima and Rioja, with 10 Awajun and Kichwa indigenous communities (7 that were enrolled on the NPCF and 3 that were not).

The focus on the NPCF in San Martin allowed me to trace how NPCF staff and members of enrolled communities interact and move across different locations, from the NPCF office in Moyobamba, to the communities and their farms, to other state agencies in different cities, including Lima, Tarapoto, Lamas, San Jose de Sisa, Nuevo Cajamarca, and Rioja. Field sites in San Martin comprise working with the NPCF office in Moyobamba city, the capital of San Martin department, in the Moyobamba province and in 7 of the 13 indigenous communities that are NPCF users. Despite the focus on the implementation of the NPCF in two indigenous groups, I do not address the interrelationships between these two, as the programme does not promote this relationship.

By the time I conducted fieldwork, the NPCF office in San Martin had 9 members up to 2019: one female director and five technical specialists (three men and two women) responsible for supervising the implementation of the conditionalities in the indigenous communities. In this office there were also: one female legal consultant responsible for the legal and administrative bureaucratic procedures to enroll communities, one female administrative assistant and a male driver. The seven indigenous communities selected were: Chirikyacu, Chunchiwi, Copal Sacha, Chirik Sacha, Alto Mayo, Shampuyacu and Shimpiyacu. For methodological reasons, I group these communities in three landscapes: the Lamas landscape, composed of Chirikyacu and Chunchiwi; Sisa, composed of Copal Sacha and Chirik Sacha and the Alto Mayo landscape, composed of Alto Mayo (community), Shampuyacu and Shimpiyacu (Figure 2).

These seven communities were chosen due to their accessibility and lack of bureaucratic problems that would hinder the adequate progress of the NPCF, such as lack of communal board registered at the National Records Office or severe internal political conflicts. The

selection of these communities also responded to the openness of CLB to allow me to join them in their fieldtrips to the communities. Not all CLBs were open to taking an assistant on their trips. The communities of Chirikyacu, Chunchiwi, Copal Sacha and Chirik Sacha communities belong to the Kichwa Lamista ethnic group from the Quechua ethnolinguistic family. The Lamas landscape located in the province of Lamas is composed of the communities of Chirikyacu and Chunchiwi. In these communities, the main economic activity is subsistence and cash crop agriculture such as cocoa, maize, and banana.

The community of Chirikyacu is located in San Antonio de Cumbaza district, Lamas province. The community had 117 inhabitants in 2017 (INEI, 2018). It was legally recognised and titled<sup>5</sup> as an indigenous community in 1997 with 5,003 hectares. Chirikyacu was affiliated to the NPCF in 2014, engaging 4,150 hectares of forests for conservation, receiving a total amount of GBP 8,104 (PEN 41,500) per year (Figure 3).

The community of Chunchiwi is also located in San Antonio de Cumbaza district, Lamas province. The community had 116 inhabitants in 2017 (INEI, 2018). It was legally recognised and titled as an indigenous community in 1997 with 7,183 hectares. Chunchiwi was affiliated to the NPCF in 2015, engaging 6,200 hectares of forest for conservation. The community receives an annual amount of GBP 12,107 (PEN 62,000) for five years.

The Sisa landscape, located in the El Dorado province, is composed of the communities of Chirik Sacha and Copal Sacha. Agriculture is the main economic activity in this landscape, and it is more market-oriented than in communities from Lamas. Indigenous and non-indigenous peoples living there cultivate cash crops such as rice, corn, papaya, and cocoa. Communities

in Sisa are better connected with the larger towns such as San Jose de Sisa, just 20 minutes away by *mototaxi* (a three-wheeled motorized vehicle). San Jose de Sisa is well-connected with Tarapoto, the main city of San Martin, along a paved road, in a 2.5-hour trip.

The community of Copal Sacha is located in San Jose de Sisa district, El Dorado province. The community had 1,423 inhabitants in 2017 (INEI, 2018). It was legally recognised and titled as an indigenous community in 1997 with 6,652 hectares. Copal Sacha was affiliated to the NPCF in 2014, engaging 4,266 hectares of forests. The community receives an annual amount of GBP 8,330 (PEN 42,660) for five years. *Comuneros* from Copal Sacha do not live in their communal territory, but in three nearby villages (*centros poblados*) of Santa Cruz, Centro América and San Juan de Miraflores, in the San Jose de Sisa district, where they also live with the non-indigenous population. Today, the communal territory is used for agriculture and forest conservation under the NPCF scheme (Figure 4).

The community of Chirik Sacha is also located in San Jose de Sisa district, El Dorado province. The community had 282 inhabitants in 2017. It was legally recognised and titled as an indigenous community in 1997 with 2,599.6 hectares. Chirik Sacha was the first community to affiliate to the NPCF in 2013, engaging 1,890 hectares of forests for conservation. The contract ended in December 2017. The community received an annual amount of GBP 3,691 (PEN 18,900) for five years.

The landscape of Alto Mayo is composed of the communities of Alto Mayo, Shampuyacu and Shimpuyacu. These communities belong to the Awajun ethnic group from the Jíbaro ethnolinguistic family. Most of the Awajun are settled in communities in the Amazon

department, along the Marañon river and its tributaries. The Awajun are the second largest indigenous group in terms of population in the Peruvian Amazon.

The community of Alto Mayo is located in Awajun district, Rioja province. The community had 674 inhabitants in 2017 (INEI, 2018). Alto Mayo was legally recognised in 1975 and then titled in 1999 as an indigenous community with 11,107 hectares. Alto Mayo was affiliated to the NPCF in 2017, engaging 3,088 hectares of forests. The community receives an annual amount of GBP 5,875 (PEN 30,088) for three years. Non-indigenous inhabitants also live in the community of Alto Mayo where they rent land for commercial agriculture.

The community of Shampuyacu is also located in Awajun district, Rioja province. The community had 577 inhabitants in 2017 (INEI, 2018). It was legally recognised in 1975 and then titled in 1999 as an indigenous community with 4,926 hectares. Shampuyacu was affiliated to the NPCF in 2017, engaging 4,770 hectares of forests for conservation. The community receives an annual amount of GBP 9,328 (PEN 47,770) for three years. The community of Shampuyacu also has non-indigenous residents who rent land for commercial agriculture. This population is not officially considered in the public census.

The community of Shimpiyacu is located in Moyobamba district, Moyobamba province. The community had 652 inhabitants in 2017 (INEI, 2018). It was legally recognised as an indigenous community in 1975 and then titled in 1997 with 15,649 hectares. Shimpiyacu was affiliated to the NPCF in 2017, engaging 4,800 hectares of forests. The community receives an annual amount of GBP 9,372 (PEN 48,000) for three years.

Figure 2: Communities enrolled in the NPCF in San Martín. Source: NPCF San Martín 2018/Self-elaboration

Community	Community extension in ha	Forests under agreement in ha	Cash per year (PEN)	Population	Population density per ha
<b>Chirikyacu</b>	5,003	4,150	41,500	117	0.02
<b>Chunchiwi</b>	7,182	6,200	62,000	116	0.016
<b>Copal Sacha</b>	6,652	4,266	42,660	1423	0.213
<b>Chirik Sacha</b>	2,599	1,896	18,960	282	0.108
<b>Alto Mayo</b>	11,107	3,088	30,880	674	0.06
<b>Shampuyacu</b>	4,926	477	4,770	577	0.117
<b>Shimpiyacu</b>	15,649	4,800	48,000	652	0.041

Figure 3: Community of Chirikyacu, 2018. Source: Valeria Biffi Isla



Figure 4: Community of Copal Sacha, 2018. Source: Valeria Biffi Isla



## 2.5. Fieldwork

Between 2013 and 2016, before pursuing my PhD studies, while working for a regional conservation programme, I first got to know about the NPCF. I became very interested in learning how it worked as a PES scheme in indigenous communities in the Amazon region. In 2014, I met the national coordinator of the NPCF and the members of the Satellite Monitoring Unit, who became my first informants. My numerous queries to members of this unit about the NPCF helped me design my research proposal. In December 2016, I met the director of the programme and requested his permission to conduct my investigation. I was given verbal consent. In March 2017, I sent a formal letter to the NPCF's director requesting authorisation to conduct my research in the San Martin office, including permission to join the NPCF bureaucrats on their fieldtrips to the indigenous communities. I was accepted by email.

As my intention was to conduct an ethnography of the state, I negotiated the possibility of having a desk at the NPCF office in San Martin to conduct participant observation of the “off field” performance of front-line workers. In return, I offered the collection and analysis of data on topics the programme considered important to improve the implementation of the NPCF. This request was accepted verbally, and I held a “spot” at the NPCF office for two years(2017 – 2019). I was given responsibility for analysing how the women’s handicraft association in Kichwa communities was operating, as well as the opportunities and challenges they face in generating income. These simple duties gave me the chance to access internal and non- public records related to the NPCF and to have longer conversations with NPCF staff without disregarding my own research and to gain their trust.

Regarding access to the communities, I was introduced by NPCF staff as a researcher. In my first visit to each community, I explained my willingness to visit them again to learn how the NPCF was operating and what their opinions were about it. I was granted verbal authorisation by local communal boards (Figure 5). I started fieldwork in San Martin in August 2017. Access to the field and informants was firstly through NPCF gatekeepers. Gatekeepers are specific persons who control the access to research sites, informants, and other sources of data. For this research, the first level of gatekeepers were the main authorities of the NPCF in Lima, from whom I had to ask formal permission to undertake my investigation. They introduced me to the local coordinator of the NPCF in Moyobamba. In Moyobamba, the coordinator of the programme became my new gatekeeper. She provided names, numbers, introduced me to NPCF staff, other local state authorities and even arranged the first interviews for me.

After a few weeks in Moyobamba, I was ready to recruit informants by myself, being CLBs or members of communities enrolled in the NPCF. My continuous presence in the field allowed me to build my own network of informants.

My first stage of fieldwork, between August and September 2017, was the preliminary phase. In this period, I learnt about the NPCF dynamics, introduced myself to NPCF personnel, and made my first visits to communities to choose the ones I was going to work with. I selected certain criteria such as distance and access, but also authorisation and openness of local authorities to accept my research, as well as my intentions to interview *comuneros* and to spend some time in their communities. This was also the stage to build networking and rapport; confirm the suitability of the communities chosen; revise the feasibility of research questions; demonstrate the appropriateness of the methods chosen to collect data, and finally understand the local logistics of living in Moyobamba and commuting to the indigenous communities. In the communities, language was not a barrier. Almost all Kichwa and Awajun *comuneros* I talked with were bilingual in Spanish, the main language in Peru and my own native language. Only in Awajun communities was a translator needed while attending communal assemblies, in which debates were held in their Awajun language.

In the second and third periods of fieldwork, from February to May 2018, and from August to December 2018 respectively, I focused on data collection within communities and the NPCF office. In my fourth stage from January to March 2019, I conducted interviews and completed new interviews with previous informants with adjusted questions. I also read and analysed state documents. I also explained to the communities that I was finishing my fieldwork and that it would take some time until I could return. Finally, between April and May 2019, I

conducted my last interviews in Lima with representatives from the NPCF head office. In June 2019, I went on maternity leave. Then, from March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic broke out with lockdowns, curfews and social isolation that made it impossible to return to San Martin.

*Figure 5: Doing fieldwork in Chirik Sacha. October 2017. Source: Valeria Biffi Isla*



## 2.6. Data collection techniques

Qualitative data collection techniques in an ethnographic study like this one are mostly based (but not restricted to) face-to-face interactions. For this research, I applied different techniques to collect data such as participant observation, in-depth interviews, informal conversations, and analysis of state documents.

### 2.6.1. Participant Observation

Participant observation is the most established tool of ethnography. It requires the presence and participation of the researcher in specific field sites to actively and respectfully observe, listen, and interact with stakeholders in their daily lives. The aim of participant observation is to explore ordinary aspects and behaviours in recurring scenarios of daily life, as well as identify patterns and contradictions between what people say they do and what they actually do (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; Megoran 2006; Guber, 2001). For this research, data collected through participant observation was documented in fieldnotes. Fieldnotes usually include descriptions of the field sites, the physical locations, the contexts, the actors, the actions, the interactions between CLBs with NPCF users and with me as the researcher (Katz, 1994). They also include methodological reflections on the advantages and disadvantages of participant observation and draft analytical notes on how data is linked to the theoretical framework (Emerson, 1995). Fieldnotes are usually taken as interactions occur unless sensitive topics are recognised so that I stop writing to respect informants' confidentiality and feelings and to pay them my full attention while they talk. Fieldnotes can be taken in addition to audio recording.

The main participant observation field sites were the NPCF San Martin office, and the seven indigenous communities enrolled in the NPCF. Participant observation at the NPCF office in Moyobamba concentrated on the CLBs' behaviours, their interactions as colleagues and also on their interactions with representatives from other state agencies. The fact that I was given a desk at the NPCF office in Moyobamba facilitated immensely the participant observation of the off-field performance of CLBs. This opportunity gave me the chance to access the everyday

dynamics of the office, the quotidian conversations, complaints, and relationships between CLBs. At NPCF communities, participant observation stressed the interactions between NPCF indigenous users and the CLBs in their quotidian meetings to follow up the programme. Participant observation at the NPCF office and in the communities was conducted for an overall period of 26 weeks, with 16 weeks at the office and around 10 weeks in the communities. My role as participant observant combined a passive and active performance. Sometimes I would only observe, listen, and write notes down, while in others, I would actively participate. For example, in the communities, I would help CLBs in their presentations, ordering receipts, sticking papers on the walls for presentations, arranging chairs, or filling in attendance lists. By 2019, I had written three complete 8" x 10.5", 100-pagenotebooks, that I keep in a safe place.

#### 2.6.2. Interviews

Research interviews are conversations, in face-to-face interactions, that have a structure and purpose to elicit personal knowledge related to a research topic (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2008). In an interview, interviewees guided by the researchers' questions talk about their ideas, perceptions, motivations, and their understandings regarding a specific topic ((ibid.). Interviews are suitable to gather data from past events and practices that researchers cannot observe (Katz, 1994). In this research, I employed semi-structured interviews, which combine pre-determined questions with the possibility of including new topics that the researcher and/or the interviewee may consider important for the development of the interview. It works as a dialogue, avoiding yes/ no answers to proposed questions that stimulate discussion and in-depth narratives (Dunn, 2016).

The epistemology of interviewing can be considered from two different frameworks, the realistic and the social constructionist epistemologies (Kvale, 2007). The realist approach emphasises the content itself, in what has been said and where the truth is discovered in the narration of reported events (Kvale, 2007). The social constructionist approach emphasises the meaning of what is being said and how and why things had been said. It is a process of knowledge construction where interviews are considered scenarios where knowledge is created throughout the interaction between the researcher and the interviewer, and not before it (Kvale, 2007).

For this research, the epistemology of interviewing was a mixture of realistic and social constructionist approaches. I chose this combination to give the same value to content of interviewees' narratives (realistic) without dismissing the possibility that my own form of asking may impact on the way the narratives are framed (constructionist). I intended to understand interviewees' perceptions, values and experiences related to the implementation of the NPCF and forest conservation, rather than collecting the "true" basic facts about the NPCF operation.

The sample selection of interviewees was based on a purposive approach. In the purposive sample, I chose the interviewees using my own judgement, considering the boundaries of the research topic and questions to respond to. I targeted individual semi-structured interviews with CLBs from the San Martin office, relevant representatives from the NFCP head office in Lima, and representatives from the seven NPCF indigenous communities. I also included representatives from the sub-national indigenous federations, the San Martin Environmental Agency, local environmental NGO representatives and local researchers.

For the selection of informants, I first examined the NPCF organigram and built my sample according to their responsibilities linked to the implementation of the NPCF in San Martin. I chose five members of the Lima office: the national NPCF executive director, the coordinator of sustainable projects, the coordinator of capacity building, the coordinator of the economic incentives unit and the specialist in forest resources management and agroforestry systems. For the San Martin NPCF sample, as the office was small and included six CLBs, I decided to interview all of them. I did not include the administrative assistant or the driver because they have almost no contact with the NPCF's indigenous users.

In the case of the indigenous peoples, I made an initial list of NPCF users' communities, then I built a map of the main social and political organisations, including committees within the indigenous communities related to the implementation of the NPCF, such as handicrafts, agriculture and forest patrols. Next, I identified the leaders of these organisations, including of course all the members of the communal boards, as potential informants. In these cases, recruitment was by direct approach during fieldtrips in the communities. I also involved male and female *comuneros*, and leaders from local sub-national indigenous federations that represent the communities I am working with.

Also, local, and international researchers, representatives of local NGOs, as well as Master's and PhD students working in San Martin. Although trying to keep gender equity in my informants' sample, it was not possible in the communities, as most of the *comuneros* linked to the NPCF are men. The members of communal boards, the representatives of forest patrol committees and of agriculture activities were also mainly men.

Some interviews were audio recorded with the authorisation of informants, while others were directly transcribed by me after verbally informed consent. On a few occasions, I preferred to listen and then write notes down. Besides interviews, I participated in several informal conversations with NPCF CLBs and NPCF users and community members who were not quantified. In informal conversations, I relied on spontaneity of events to start conversations that enabled collection of important data without the formality of a semi-structured interview and in a more flexible and informal mode. As such, informal conversations could not follow a predeterminate list of informants.

Interviewing high ranking representatives from the public service, indigenous communities and indigenous federations requires considering them as “elite” (Mikecz, 2012). Interviewing elites demands a different approach from interviewing ordinary people. It implies acknowledging that the interviewees hold power locally, are busy and are aware of what they want to express (ibid.). Elites usually have well-organised discourses about being public representatives. Once the interviewees agreed to meet me, I studied their political backgrounds, their responsibilities in their position, and any other relevant information, to mitigate the bias of their structured answers.

Overall, I interviewed 118 individuals, in 136 semi-structured interviews during fieldwork, including longitudinal interviews with key informants being the CLBs (Figure 6). Longitudinal interviews were applied to the same subjects to follow up important themes, to include new topics previously unconsidered and to identify changes in perceptions of the interviews over time. For this research, longitudinal interviews provided different benefits, such as the possibility to gather new data as the implementation of the NPCF advanced, new events

unfolded and new questions arose. Moreover, longitudinal interviews raised the possibility of strengthening my relationship as a researcher with interviewees, redefining questions and topics that did not work well during initial meetings (Hermanowicz, 2013).

136 interviews are a significant number to triangulate data and obtain in-depth and intensive explanations related to my research questions. This number enables saturation of data, understood as the moment during data collection when obtaining new data is not feasible anymore or the ability to obtain additional new information has been exhausted (Guest et al., 2006). Even when I had a broad list of interviewees, I was flexible in choosing new informants if I considered them relevant.

To do so, I followed a snowball technique. In this snowball sample technique, informants helped to recruit new informants from among their connections (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). During fieldwork, I learnt that commuting in and out of the communities (taxis, trucks, three-wheel vehicles, buses, or walking) was an excellent space to start informal conversations with CLBs. Sometimes, I would even participate in conversations started by others, but in which I found interesting starting points to ask relevant questions. In these informal spaces, I had the feeling that CLBs are more open in their answers than in their office.

*Figure 6: List of Interviewees*

Interviewees	Subjects	Total Interviews
NPCF Lima representatives	6	14
NPCF San Martín CLBs	8	18
Indigenous communal board leaders	14	14
NPCF Indigenous communities' members	35	35
Non NPCF indigenous communities' members	12	12
NPCF sustainable projects' members	10	10
NPCF forest vigilance committee members	7	7
Sub national indigenous federations leaders	8	8
San Martin Environmental Agency	4	4
Representatives' local municipalities	4	4
International and local environmental NGOs/ cooperation/ other researchers	10	10
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>136</b>

### 2.6.3. The analysis of documents

The last method of data collection was the analysis of documents. This means using written documents as a source of primary data, to interpret their content, to understand how they link between different concepts and how they construct subjects and objects discursively (Atkinson and Coffey 2011; Prior, 2003). In an ethnography of the state, the analysis of bureaucrats' documents is key since they mediate the relationship between state and society (Hull 2012). Specifically, I examined bureaucratic documents that mediate relationships within the NPCF's organisational structure, between the NPCF and communities, and within the communities themselves.

For the analysis of documents, I chose a broad purposive sample, which means that I chose documents that were background and supporting policy documents for the creation and implementation of the NPCF. This set of documents included official regulations about the

NPCF, the NPCF's management handbook, bureaucrats' performance reports and internal assessments. In the case of the communities, I included the indigenous contracts with the NPCF, communal development projects, the minutes of communal assemblies, and also accountability reports, receipts, handmade maps and sworn declarations. The importance of documents did not only rely on their contents, but also on the process of being produced and on how these documents operated as mediators between the state and indigeneity, and as relevant measuring elements to highlight the presence of the state at the margins and as evidence of the progress of the NPCF.


## 2.7. Data interpretation

The analysis of collected data in an ethnography requires explaining and interpreting patterns of meanings through specific methods of data interpretation. The data collected is considered "raw material" before it is analysed (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). It becomes evidence after a process of systematisation, interpretation and confrontation with the theoretical framework used and the context in which it is embedded. For this research, data interpretation was conducted through thematic analysis. Thematic analysis refers to the process of systematisation and codification of data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). In this research, it implied breaking down and decomposing qualitative, textual contents into codes and sub-codes to report understandings and meanings linked to the research questions and conceptual framework (Lecompte and Schensul, 2013; Emerson et al., 1995). Sub-codes were simple, straightforward descriptive labels that represent important attributes of the research topic. Codes were more implicit and analytical labels that merged groups of interrelated codes (Attride-Stirling, 2001).

Before reading the data corpus, I had an initial list of codes of topics I expected to find regarding the research questions. Analysis begins with a general reading of the data corpus, to “read as if written by a stranger” (Emerson et al., 1995: 174). Then, I created, merged, deleted, and fixed my sub codes and design codes as the categories that connect different types of correlations (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Emerson et al., 1995). Next, I read the data corpus again to start detailed coding. After finishing the coding, I built up correlations between codes and sub codes in relation to my research questions.

Thematic analysis was carried out using NVIVO software for the codification process. NVIVO is a qualitative data analysis software designed for qualitative researchers working with rich text-based information that requires deep levels of analysis, mostly on large volumes of data, such as in-depth interviews, participant observation fieldnotes and documents. NVIVO systematises textual data that helps with the analysis process. It enabled the conduct of coding and sub-coding of sentences and paragraphs, showing connections and correlations between codes and sub-codes and displaying quotes by codes (Figure 7). To learn about NVIVO, I attended two workshops at LSE in May and November 2017.

Figure 7: Screenshot of data systematisation with NVIVO software



## 2.8. Ethics

In this qualitative research, ethics refers to my behaviour as a researcher and my responsibilities to the subjects involved, especially informants (Winchester and Rofe, 2016). Ethical considerations include transparency over research purposes, consent from informants, my own reflexivity and positionality (AAG, 2009). An initial strategy to demonstrate transparency in the thesis is to include details of the process of fieldwork, data collection and the interpretation strategy conducted. With this, I intend to avoid any suspicion about making up data or selecting the evidence to support presumed findings. To follow a fair representation of informants, I integrate excerpts of fieldnotes, anonymised in-depth interviews, conversations, and policy documents to support discussion outcomes. Including quotes in the research findings is also a means of giving voice and actively including informants in the research process.

With regards to consent, in the case of interviews with NPCF staff, I used written consent forms using an LSE ethics template in which informants confirmed their understanding and willingness to participate in the research. This consent form states that interview records are kept as confidential as possible; also that only I have access to the files and any audio records, and that all personal data has been anonymised. For informal conversations, I received verbal consent. Yet, occasionally I made NPCF interviewees “remember” my role as researcher, telling them again what I was doing and why. In the communities, consent for interviews and informal conversations was verbal, which fits better due to local dwellers’ semi-literate status. Their data was also anonymised and coded with pseudonyms. All digital files, transcripts and summaries were given codes and stored separately from any names or other direct identification of participants.

Research ethics also involves reflecting on my own positionality as a researcher in the field, known as reflexivity. Reflexivity is the constant process of self-assessment of ethical conduct during researcher design, fieldwork, and writing. It implies being aware of and trying to resolve ethical dilemmas on potential harm and misrepresentation of the subjects of research if they occur (Winchester and Rofe, 2016). In conducting research across so many connected sites with different informants, I had to constantly reconsider how I presented myself to informants, how they interpreted me and how my gender, age, and position as a researcher affected my relations with the people I worked with.

In terms of my personal and professional positionality, I held a double and inconsistent role as an insider and as an outsider. My role as insider was first shaped by my personal features. I am Spanish speaker, Peruvian researcher, studying a Peruvian rural scenario. These features

helped me in creating rapport with NPCF workers, with whom I share cultural codes as a Peruvian. Speaking Spanish in the communities was fundamental in gaining access and also to mitigate traditional mistrust that indigenous peoples have with foreigners. My position as insider was then established when I was granted a desk within the NPCF office in Moyobamba to facilitate participant observation of local bureaucrats. Being at the NPCF office, I had better access to bureaucrats as informants, to the local dynamics of a state office and also to internal documents. To gain rapport at the office, I copied the women's dress code (t-shirts, jeans, and trainers, despite the tropical weather!), entered and left the office at the same time, ate lunch at the same places, celebrated birthdays and went for beers. All the way through fieldwork, they knew about my intention to study state bureaucracy.

My outsider role was framed by my intermittent presence as a researcher within the communities and the NPCF office, spending a few months in the field, and then disappearing to return to university in London. As an outsider, I held a certain degree of professional distance to understand why things gained meaning without approving, ratifying, or judging informants' behaviours and rationalities. Beyond that, I did not hold any personal or professional involvement with NPCF staff.

## 2.9. Conclusions

One of the most important challenges of ethnographic studies with a state agency and state bureaucrats is the uncertainty of still being allowed to conduct the research due to constant changes in the local political scenarios. During the length of my PhD, Peru, being in theory a democratic state, changed president four times! This meant political instability, weak

institutionality and many changes in key political authorities, including the NPCF's national coordinator. This uncertainty, driven by the instability of the national political situation, relates to the second challenge: the constant risk of not being allowed to continue fieldwork, of ending longitudinal participant observation, interviews, and conversations with the same CLBs due to the high rotation of public employees at the local level. Fortunately, governmental changes did not impact locally the permanence of CLBs during my fieldwork stage. However, immediately after I finished fieldwork in 2019, my two key informants at the NPCF's headquarters in Lima stopped working for the NPCF.

To sum up, this is a qualitative case study framed as an ethnography, particularly, as an ethnography of the state. In this research, I explored everyday practices, interactions, and effects of the state in the social realm of the NPCF, concentrating on CLBs and policy users in the same domain. Ethnography is the most appropriate method to answer my research questions because such studies are based on an observable and naturally occurring social reality. Likewise, the ethnographic approach provided me with the sufficient empirical evidence to assess theory on state formation, forest bureaucracy and statehood in the fields of political geography and political ecology.

## Chapter 3: The National Conservation Programme for the Conservation of Forests for the Mitigation of Climate Change

### 3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I analyse the situation of Peruvian Amazonian forests, in terms of biodiversity threats of deforestation and strategies to protect them, and how the NPCF fits into national policy and goals to contribute towards conserving forests. In the next section (3.2) I provide a brief account of the state of Amazonian forests and its main conservation strategies. In section 3.3, I explain the features, rules, political and institutional arrangements of the NPCF and the way it operates within Amazonian indigenous communities.

### 3.2. Peruvian Amazonian forests in context

Peruvian Amazon forests play a key role in the regional cycle of water, as they constitute the upper basin in which water travels through the Amazon to the Atlantic Ocean (MINAM, 2016b). For rural people, including indigenous peoples, forests provide food, fresh water, fibers, medicines, fuelwoods, and other resources that support their livelihoods (MEA, 2003). Despite its richness in natural resources, the Peruvian Amazon region hosts high percentages of poverty, especially within its indigenous communities. Analysing the social context of San Martin is interesting as it is the department in Peru with the highest percentage of accumulated deforestation (20% of accumulated deforestation), but it is also a department with a significant number of sub-national environmental policies. It is in this contrasting scenario that the NPCF is conducted.

Peru occupies the fourth place worldwide in tropical forests, exceeded only by Brazil, Congo, and Indonesia, representing 57% of the national territory (MINAM, 2016b). Forests in Peru constitute the ecosystem with the largest area, with 73,280,424 hectares. They are classified broadly into three types: Amazon forests, covering 54% of the country and 94% of the total forests nationwide; the dry forests of the coast, covering 3.2% of the country and 5.6% of total forests; and humid Andean relict forests, covering 0.2% of the country and 0.3% of total forests (MINAM, 2016b). Peru occupies the second place worldwide in bird diversity, the fifth in mammals, fifth in reptiles and fourth in amphibians in the world; most of this biodiversity exists in Amazonian forests (MINAM, 2014). The Peruvian Amazon is the largest surface ecosystem in the country with 68 million hectares.

The Amazonian region hosts 3.67 million inhabitants, which represent 13% of the national population. This is the region with the lowest population density in Peru, with 3.3 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>. Today, 54% of the Amazonian population is urban and 46% is rural, contrasting with the national average of 70% of the Peruvian population living in urban areas (INEI, 2018; Barrantes and Glave, 2014). The Peruvian Amazonian forests cover the eastern slope of the Andes and are divided into two broad groups: mountain forests and lowland forests. The mountain forests are located on the eastern slopes of the entire Andean flank. They cover about 14 million hectares between 800 and 3500 MASL<sup>9</sup>. They are very dense and humid forests with temperatures between 4°C and 28°C (MINAM, 2014). The lowland forests constitute the largest region in Peru (FAO 2016; MINAM, 2009). They cover about 54 million hectares between 80 and 800 MASL. The weather is warm with constant temperatures between 24° C and 36 ° C.

Notwithstanding the richness of the Peruvian Amazon, deforestation is an increasing problem. Deforestation refers to the loss of forest cover through the felling and burning of vegetation and the change of land use for other activities like agriculture, ranching, extractive industries, infrastructure, or urbanisation (MINAM, 2016a). Among the many consequences, deforestation impacts on biodiversity loss, reduces rainfall, water flows and fisheries, provides less shelter against natural disasters, and provokes soil erosion and landslides (Foley, et al., 2007). Besides this, in Peru, deforestation generates around 50% of all greenhouse gases, increasing the effects of climate change, releasing CO<sub>2</sub> into the atmosphere (MINAM, 2019). Between 2000 and 2019, the Peruvian Amazon lost more than 2.43 million hectares of forest (MINAM/PNCB, 2021). Deforestation occurred in 42% of areas without allocated rights; 32% in private and communal areas (of which 17% was within indigenous communities); 23% in forestry production areas and 3% within NPAs. Deforestation was concentrated in the departments of San Martin, Loreto Ucayali, Huánuco and Madre de Dios, accounting for 79% of deforestation throughout the Amazon region (MINAM/PNCB, 2018a).

According to the Peruvian state, the main direct cause of deforestation is small-scale agriculture (MINAM, 2016a), which between 2001 and 2019 caused 75% of deforestation within units smaller than 5 hectares (MINAM, 2020a). Indirect causes of deforestation include institutional and economic factors. The institutional factors are reflected in the weak capacity of the state authority to enforce the rules and its limited public management capacities. In terms of economic factors, the lack of technology, proper inputs and planned land use cycles are common practices that generate the loss of nutrients in the soil, and therefore fertility loss. Poor farmers, including indigenous peoples, have limited access to funding and technology to increase soil productivity. In those scenarios, farmers prefer to restart forest

clearing in other areas, looking for better soil, rather than practising intensive agriculture. The poor valuation of forests' ecological goods and services, in the context of a growing national and international demand for commodities, creates another major incentive to clearforests for agriculture (MINAM/PNCB, 2018a).

Despite the official assertion of small-scale agriculture as the main driver of deforestation, this environmental knowledge has been contested. Some scholars suggest that this argument is based on inaccurate data that leads to the design and implementation of environmental policy that may not be sufficient to tackle the real magnitude of deforestation. Critiques also highlight incorrect political decisions when the Peruvian state decided to create the NPCF targeting indigenous communities as potential threats of deforestation, when the real problem of deforestation lies elsewhere, for example, in areas with non-allocated rights.

For Ravimar et al. (2017), the Peruvian state's reliance on remote sensing of forestpatch sizes as the main evidence for deforestation is not supported by other studies based on field data, nor by the analysis of the actors responsible for small-scale agriculture. These authors suggest that the method to address deforestation based on satellite images alone cannot explain who the actors are nor their motivations behind small-scale agriculture. Similarly, for Marquardt et al. (2018), small-scale agriculture as a driver of deforestation is a simplistic view of the complex process of forest transitions and land use change in the Amazon.

The focus on actors, rather than on processes, diverts attention away from the role of state agriculture policy and initiatives that promote land use change at the national and sub-national level (Bennett et al., 2018; Chávez et al., 2014). For example, according to the

Peruvian Legislative Decree N° 1089, smallholders can deforest to demonstrate the economic use of the land, which is a requirement to obtain private titles. In this case, the Peruvian Amazon can be an example of what Rudel et al. (2005) suggest about the challenges of conservation in Amazonian countries: that regulating agrarian policy is much harder and politically conflictive than promoting conservation policies. Indeed, the creation of the NPCF relates to Rudel et al.'s affirmation. In this scenario of increasing land use change in Amazonian forests, the Peruvian state created the NPCF in 2010 to prevent deforestation amongst indigenous communities. Of course, this is not the only measure, and the package of conservation initiatives since the 1970s has impacted in different ways the indigenous people's livelihoods.

### 3.3. Conservation strategies and indigenous peoples

Since approximately the late 1970s, diverse conservation initiatives in the Peruvian Amazon have directly and indirectly affected indigenous livelihoods. Indeed, state-led forest conservation initiatives within indigenous lands are critical scenarios to explore state-indigeneity relations and claims of citizenship (Radcliffe, 2017). In forest conservation initiatives, indigenous peoples have been a targeted group due to their historical association with forests, as their livelihoods rely on the goods and services that forests provide. In these interventions, the Peruvian state often attempts to regulate the behaviour of indigenous peoples according to the different fashions of the international conservation agenda (Radcliffe, 2017; Del Cairo, 2012).

Representations of indigeneity throughout conservation schemes are usually framed in terms of stereotypes, as guardians or destroyers of the forests (Forsyth and Walker, 2008; Brosius,

1999). These depictions tend to hinder the possibility of considering indigenous peoples as political actors with the capacity to participate in the public sphere of environmental policy construction, but instead consider them rather as subjects whose lack of agency places them in a vulnerable condition, requiring national and international, as well as public and private aid (Brosius, 1999). In spite of international and national policy agreements for a proper inclusion of indigenous peoples as agents of conservation in forest conservation policy, one of the main obstacles to achieve this goal is the deep-rooted, historical, and cultural discrimination from society towards indigenous peoples (Colchester, 2005), as well as the continuing incapacity of the state to adapt the public bureaucratic apparatus to the local lives of indigenous peoples.

In Peru, there are three main strategies that frame most of the conservation programmes: natural protected areas (NPAs); community-based natural resource management projects (CBM), and market-oriented conservation solutions. The first strategy, NPAs, are the oldest and most popular scheme. An NPA is a defined geographical space, managed through legal means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values (Dudley, 2008). The creation of protected forested areas, in different parts of the world, has signified the exclusion of local dwellers, including indigenous peoples, from their traditional territories through evictions, blocking land and resource access, and dismissing the recognition of territorial rights, to prioritise the conservation of pristine forests without human intervention (Neumann, 1998). In these conservation schemes, states usually dismiss forest dwellers' practices and institutions that contribute to conserving the landscapes, in order to prioritise scientific data and solutions (von Hedemann and Osborne, 2016).

NPAs in Peru are the main conservation strategy to protect different ecosystems' representativity, including Amazonian forests. As of 2020, Peru has 76 NPAs that cover 23 million hectares nationwide, representing 18% of the national territory. 85% of the total areas of NPAs are in the Amazon. The evidence of the relationship between NPAs and rural and indigenous peoples in Peru is mixed with both negative and positive effects. On the one hand, the promulgation of NPAs has signified an obstacle for indigenous peoples to demand land rights for areas overlapping with NPAs.

Similarly, NPAs have restricted indigenous peoples' access to areas traditionally used to hunt, fish, and collect food and fibers to support their livelihoods (Dourojeanni and Quiroga, 2006). In San Martin, the creation of the Regional Conservation Area *Cordillera Escalera* in 2005 for example, overlapped with requests for land titling from Kichwa indigenous communities, a still unsolved controversy (Valderrama, 2017). On the other hand, there are NPAs that have been created following the demands of indigenous communities to protect areas from increasing deforestation due to the presence of illegal loggers and miners. Indeed, communal reserves are specific categories of NPA, requested by indigenous communities, created to benefit rural and indigenous populations' use and commercialisation of natural resources (Law of Protected Natural Areas, N° 26834).

As of 2020, there are 10 communal reserves in the Peruvian Amazon, yet none have been solicited by indigenous groups to be established in the department of San Martin. In contrast, in this department, the main strategy of conservation of forests is based on granting private conservation concessions managed by individuals and non-profit organisations. The co-management of conservation areas with the participation of indigenous peoples has not been

relevant for GORESAM conservation policy at all. In fact, the creation of the Regional Conservation Area *Cordillera Escalera* and of conservation concessions over territory, which are also claimed by Kichwa indigenous peoples, is a clear example of the exclusion of indigenous peoples from NPAs' strategy.

Regardless of the work accomplished with the communal reserves and the NPA paradigm shift, NPAs have not yet installed a clear vision of co-management that identifies indigenous communities as full allies in conservation. The management of NPAs is determined by the values of their biodiversity, and not prioritising the needs of the communities that also depend on those areas to ensure their livelihoods (Baldovino, 2016). Still, NPAs in the Peruvian Amazon have been shown to be the territorial category with the lowest rate of deforestation (Orihuela and Perez, 2019; MINAM/PNCB, 2018a).

Critical views about NPAs, and the move towards people-oriented conservation schemes started in the 1990s. Exclusionary conservation strategies were criticised for risking rural dwellers' livelihoods after introducing new rules on resource management that included neglecting indigenous people's access to resources, generating a risk of impoverishment for forest dwellers (Brockington, 2002; Neumann, 1998). These strategies were also criticised because states, especially in poor countries, have been incapable of controlling vast and sometimes remote landscapes (Colchester, 2005).

The second strategy, the CBM, appeared in the 1990s. In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), known as the Rio Earth Summit, was a keystone event to debate new conservation schemes. In this meeting, inclusive and people-oriented

conservation mechanisms were discussed, underlining the need to address the improvement of local livelihoods besides conservation outcomes (Gilmour, 2016). This turn towards inclusive conservation schemes introduced the active participation of indigenous peoples as agents of conservation (Colchester 2005).

In this context, a new environmental trend was fundamental: the creation of Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs). These aim to promote economic activities compatible with conservation, as a means to compensate rural and indigenous communities for restrictions on the use of NPAs or other strict conservation strategies (RRI, 2015). The most well-known ICDPs relate to community- based forest management (CBF) and community-based natural resources management (CBNRM). These conservation strategies integrate indigenous peoples' participation in the implementation and decision-making around forest management and other natural resources to discourage deforestation and ecosystem degradation.

These inclusive strategies commonly frame indigeneity as forest guardianship, recognising the role of indigenous peoples in protecting the ecosystems on which their livelihoods rely (Forsyth and Walker, 2008). Nonetheless, these inclusive initiatives also garnered criticism for having limited effectiveness in discouraging deforestation and for not promoting market opportunities for forest products (Robbins, 2000; Wells et al., 1999). Furthermore, ICDPs have not been able to provide sufficient evidence to link higher household incomes with conservation for CBF practices (Ferraro and Simpson, 2002). In Peru, CBF and CBNRM have been widely implemented since the 1990s, mostly by national and international non-profit organisations that work with rural and indigenous communities located in NPA buffer zones

or areas of conservation priority. These schemes usually focus on the commercialisation of sustainable timber and non-timber products to increase income opportunities for indigenous families without relying on deforestation or illegal logging. In these projects, the main challenge is to deal with the weak Peruvian forestry regulation and with illegal loggers that abuse indigenous communities' timber harvest permits. For example, this occurs whenever timber companies extract more timber or different species than the legal permits allow. Another common problem with these schemes is that indigenous territories are not properly demarcated and may overlap with forest rights from other landholders. Similarly, ICDPs fail to promote long-term market opportunities for forest products (Cossío et al., 2014).

The third and more recent conservation strategies are the market-oriented conservation mechanisms. These mechanisms create prices for environmental goods and services valued by existing markets. The origin of this discussion is based on the UNFCCC meetings. It was within the COPs that the first debates on the economic value of ecosystem services appeared through "Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation" mechanisms (REDD). REDD initiatives are designed to offer economic incentives to different types of landowners to invest in low-carbon development activities to reduce emissions from their land, while discouraging unsustainable activities such as expansive agriculture, illegal logging, and ranching. In COP 13, in Bali in 2007, REDD+ was first coined. The plus sign "+" signifies the sustainable management of forests and conservation of forest carbon stocks.

Since 2008, Peru has been working on the preparation of its national REDD+ institutional framework to receive financial incentives for REDD+, also known as REDD readiness (Robiglio et al., 2014). This implies the generation of updated data on deforestation and forest

degradation; analysis of the current causes of deforestation and forest degradation; analysis of the legal framework for the conservation of forests, as well as the design and implementation of an environmental monitoring system to incorporate environmental safeguards (Cordero, 2012).

One of the main strategies of market-oriented mechanisms is the payment for ecosystem services schemes (PES). PES schemes are voluntary transactions, between one ecosystem service provider and one ecosystem service user, to guarantee the conservation and supply of ecosystem services and goods (Muradian and Rival, 2012; Pirard, 2012; Wunder, 2015, 2005; Engel et al., 2008). In Peru, the NPCF was designed and launched within the REDD scheme and as PES initiative to mitigate the effects of climate change through the prevention of deforestation in the Amazon region. The NPCF can be considered an improvement on previous conservation strategies due to their strength in the conditionalities that encourage indigenous peoples to change land behaviour to maintain standing forests.

### 3.4. The implementation of the NPCF for the conservation of Amazonian indigenous forests

In July 2010, the Peruvian state, through the Ministry of the Environment, launched the National Programme for the Conservation of Forests to Mitigate Climate Change (NPCF) to conserve 54 million hectares of tropical forests as a contribution to mitigate the effects of climate change. This programme was created as a ten-year programme in 2010, and then obtained an extension to operate until 2030. My primary research and period of fieldwork occurred between 2016 and 2019.

The use of these economic incentives is conditional on the implementation of a local development project to promote sustainable activities and on the conduct of forest patrols to discourage deforestation. Until 2020, the NPCF enrolled 274 Amazonian indigenous communities, engaging 22,000 families to conserve 3 million hectares of forests in 9 Amazonian departments. By 2030, the goal of the NPCF is to conserve around 10 million hectares of indigenous forests and achieve conservation agreements with one thousand Amazonian indigenous communities (MINAM/PNCB, 2020b).

To manage 3 million hectares of forests, the NPCF operates through 13 regional offices in 9 departments: Amazonas, San Martín, Loreto, Ucayali, Madre de Dios, Junín, Pasco, Huánuco, and Cusco. These regional offices are responsible for the local implementation of the NPCF contracts with the communities. They work under the direct supervision of the head office in Lima. Each office organises fieldtrips to communities to supervise the progress of the NPCF contracts. When I finished my fieldwork in San Martin in February 2019, the NPCF had 12 actively enrolled communities, one graduated community (Chirik Sacha) and one suspended for financial misuse (Mushuk Llaqta de Chipatoa). In total, San Martin NPCF has around 55,000 hectares under conservation agreements.

The NPCF's purpose of conserving forests also responds to the Peruvian state's international environmental commitments, especially related to UN treaties and national environmental policy goals. In COP 14, in Poznan 2008, the Peruvian state announced the creation of a conservation strategy to protect 54 million hectares of tropical forests to mitigate the effects of climate change, reducing the emissions from greenhouse gases from deforestation. In COP 15, in Copenhagen 2009, the Minister of the Environment of Peru committed to reducing to

zero the net deforestation rate for tropical forests by 2021, which would represent 48% of Peru's greenhouse gas emissions. In July 2010, the Ministry of the Environment created the National Forest Conservation Programme.

The NPCF has peer programmes in Latin America. In Ecuador, in 2008, the Ministry of the Environment launched SocioBosque to tackle deforestation and poverty. The goal of SocioBosque is to conserve 4 million hectares of Amazonian forests and high-altitude tropical grasslands, providing economic incentives to communities and to individual landowners. Payments are differentiated, varying from USD 0.70 to USD 35 per hectare per year, depending on the size and location of the area. The smaller and poorer holders receive the better rates, and the conservation agreements are signed for 20 years (MAE, 2012). In Brazil, in 2007, Bolsa Floresta was launched as a public scheme in the state of Amazonas. It provides monthly payments of USD 15 to households who have lived in protected areas for at least two years that commit to zero-deforestation and to implementing development projects to improve local livelihood opportunities that discourage deforestation. As of 2019, Bolsa Floresta covered over 10 million hectares.

In Bolivia, the Climate Action Project Noel Kempff was established in 1997 in Santa Cruz department, to avoid deforestation through the purchase of logging concessions to increase the area of the Noel Kempff National Park by 70%. The goal of this initiative is to store carbon that otherwise would have been released by timber harvesting and deforestation. This Bolivian initiative is a partnership between the government of Bolivia, The Nature Conservancy, the national nonprofit organisation, *Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza* and multinational energy companies: American Electric Power, Pacificorp and British Petroleum.

Adjacent communities to Noel Kempff National Park received technical assistance to promote sustainable economic activities to ensure that their livelihoods would not be adversely affected by the extension of the park (Robertson and Wunder, 2005).

The proposal of providing economic incentives for conservation to communities was also inspired by already existing conditional cash transfer schemes (CCT) for social protection and poverty alleviation in rural areas in Peru (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). CCT programmes provide economic incentives to poor households, with the condition of using public services. In Peru, the National Programme of Direct Support to the Poorest, JUNTOS, created in 2005, is a CCT that provides GBP 20 (PEN 100) per month to the poorest rural households, with the conditionality of complying with children's education and health check-ups. To differentiate the NPCF from JUNTOS, communities enrolled in this programme have the conditionality of managing economic incentives by means of a communal development plan and the conduct of forest patrols.

The formal definition of the NPCF intervention within communities for conservation purposes also theoretically corresponds to a Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) model. PES schemes are voluntary transactions between an ecosystem service provider and an ecosystem service user to guarantee the conservation and supply of the ecosystem services. These transactions are implemented under specific rules outlined in conservation contracts (Muradian et al., 2013; Muradian and Rival, 2012; Pirard, 2012; Engel et al., 2008; Wunder, 2005). In the case of the NPCF as a state-led PES, the state commits to pay communities if they guarantee to conserve their forests over a period of time to avoid deforestation. As such, the NPCF can be framed as a PES scheme that provides economic incentives to regulate indigenous people's

environmental behaviours to guarantee the sustainable management of forested ecosystem services and goods.

However, for NPCF authorities in Lima and CLBs in San Martin, the NPCF is not a PES scheme because it does not meet the real economic value of forests under conservation agreements (personal communication with NPCF head office representatives LIM02, LIM03, LIM05, LIM06). The flat rate of GBP 2 (PEN 10) is considered an incentive to trigger sustainable productive activities. In spite of this discussion, according to Wunder (2015), it is very difficult to implement PES schemes in their strict theoretical definition, even when there is a payment that indigenous communities receive for the conservation of forests.

Although the NPCF is aligned with the climate change international agenda and with local environmental policy instruments and regulation, its creation was not exempted from local political conflicts. In the years leading to its creation, other sectors of the state were not convinced of the importance of conserving forests within indigenous territories. Before launching the programme, the Peruvian Ministry of Economy and Finances, responsible for the allocation of the national budget, did not accept the pure conservation goal of the NPCF and demanded the inclusion of a development goal. In its first years, the NPCF included poverty alleviation as a complementary goal besides conservation (MINAM/PNCB, 2011). This goal was later removed in 2016 (MINAM/PNCB, 2016).

In a personal meeting in 2017, the former NPCF Executive Director argued that poverty alleviation was not the responsibility of the Ministry of the Environment, but of the Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion. Likewise, the Ministry of Agriculture criticised the

initiative as a potential threat to the expansion of agriculture which supports the economy of most of the rural poor in Peru (Rosa da Conceição et al., 2015).

The key social and political event that triggered the need to launch the NPCF was an indigenous protest against land regulations. In 2008, as part of the negotiations between Peru and the United States to sign the United States-Peru Free Trade Agreement (PTPA), Peru launched legislative decree N° 1090 that approved the National Forest and Wildlife Policy, and legislative decree N° 1064 that promoted forest land use change to expand agriculture. This regulation package was rejected by indigenous peoples, social movements, and some pro-indigenous non-profit organisations who considered these measures a potential violation of indigenous collective land rights. These critical voices were not heard by the national authorities. The rejection of these legislative decrees and the state's reluctance to enter dialogue led to violent clashes between indigenous peoples and the state in June 2009, known as the *Baguazo*. As part of the protest, Awajun and Wampis peoples, especially men, blocked for 55 days part of the Fernando Belaunde Terry road, near to the city of Bagua, also known as the devil's curve (*curva del diablo*), in the Amazonas department. On June 5, the police intervened to unblock the FBT road with gunfire. This tragic event left 33 people dead between policemen and indigenous men (Defensoría del Pueblo de Perú, 2009).

It was the *Baguazo* that ended up convincing the highest political authorities about the NPCF as a political opportunity to reconfigure the broken relationship between the state and the Amazonian indigenous peoples (Rosa da Conceição et al., 2015). After the *Baguazo*, the above-mentioned legislative decrees on forest land use change were also derogated. The NPCF was then created to increase state presence at the margins to consolidate its authority and

legitimacy in Amazonian communities. However, the design of the NPCF was carried out as a top-down initiative without the participation of indigenous representatives. This occurred although indigenous peoples were the target of the programme and the responsible actors for guaranteeing the provision of protected ecosystems' services. The NPCF considered neither an intersectoral nor a multilevel approach to tackle the multiple causes and dimensions associated with deforestation in the Peruvian Amazon. In sum, the last decision to create this environmental scheme for the protection of Amazonian forests responded to a specific political setting that aimed at reconfiguring a broken relationship between the state and the indigenous peoples.

#### 3.4.1. The operative cycle of the NPCF within communities

The formal application of the NPCF within communities has an operative cycle that communities follow as users of this environmental programme. It has four steps, prioritisation, affiliation, implementation, and disaffiliation (MINAM/PNCB, 2018a, 2018b).

**Prioritisation:** Before enrolling communities, the head office of the NPCF in Lima carries out a first process of targeting the landscapes where the NPCF could operate, according to a projection of deforestation threats in the Peruvian Amazon. Once prioritised landscapes for conservation are chosen, the NPCF narrows the selection of areas, assessing communities meeting some key requirements, such as having a land title, areas with a large surface of primary forests, relatively easy accessibility, and previous experiences within development projects. Communities that are to be affiliated should not have a sanction and/or current fines for illegal logging or illegal land use change (MINAM/PNCB, 2018a). With this criterion, far

away communities are left behind.

The NPCF also prioritises other environmental, social, and political indicators. For example, communities that have suffered natural disasters or that live with remnants of armed groups or drug trafficking gangs may also be selected. The first communities chosen to enroll in the NPCF had been affected by the remains of the Shining Path armed group and drug traffickers in the Valley of the Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro Rivers (VRAEM) in the central Amazon region of Peru. The second area chosen to enroll in the NPCF was the department of Amazonas, where many Awajun indigenous peoples that participated or were involved in the *Baguazo* lived.

Communities in San Martin do not necessarily correspond with these criteria, especially the communities from the Alto Mayo landscape, which have alarming levels of deforestation. Besides this, two other Awajun communities with fines for illegal logging were enrolled. To achieve an accurate profile of potential communities to enroll, the NPCF works with the subnational governments and local indigenous federations to validate the list of communities that meet the selection criteria. This part of the process is as important as it is politically complex. These different stakeholders push the election of communities according to their own political agenda.

**Affiliation:** Once potential communities to enroll are identified, the NPCF offers the communities the possibility to affiliate. With the participation and advice of the leaders of indigenous organisations, the NPCF organises socialisation meetings in the communities in which they explain the goals, conditionalities, rules and procedures of the programme. In some occasions, the NPCF hires a local interpreter so indigenous people can easily understand the

scope of the programme in their own language.

In the case of San Martin, first affiliation attempts occurred between 2011 and 2013 and unfortunately failed. By that time, the goal was to affiliate 10 communities but only one was enrolled in 2013. For NPCF local representatives, the reason behind the failure to enroll communities was the lack of staff with adequate intercultural and language skills to properly communicate the scope and benefits of the NPCF. For them, the unfortunate misunderstanding of the NPCF, during the first processes of affiliation, generated fears from indigenous communities about expropriation of their land, suspicion that the scheme may involve creating a national park, and that the NPCF was a constraint to their autonomous use of forests (interview with CLBs MOY01, MOY03, August 2017).

*When the socialisation took place, we supported the intercultural dialogue in the assemblies, we participated, not everyone understood Spanish. I was the translator, so that they (comuneros) could understand the message better. The federations participated to transmit trust, because in the communities there exists mistrust against the leaders for corruption and misappropriation of community funds. Mistrust is also towards the state, that is why they did not accept (León, Awajun CLB, Moyobamba, June 2017).*

The first community to enroll in San Martin was Chirik Sacha in 2013. The community accepted enrolment after considering that they “*had nothing to lose*”, because besides the communal territory, most of the households own private plots in villages nearby that would secure their livelihoods if the NPCF did represent a threat to take their land (personal communication with the former president of the community of Chirik Sacha, August 2017). It was only after the enrolment of Chirik Sacha that other communities started considering affiliation to the NPCF (personal communication with the former president of Copal Sacha, September 2017). In 2014, the NPCF enrolled 5 communities: Mushuk Llaqta de Chipatoa, Chirikyacu, Chunchiwi,

Copal Sacha and Yurilamas. In 2017, it enrolled 8 more: Kachipampa, Chumbaquihui, Nueva Arica de Kachiyacu, Shimpiyacu, Shampuyacu and Alto Mayo. There were no new enrolments in 2018.

When a community accepts enrolment, the bureaucratic process starts with the production and exchange of different documents between the community, the NPCF office in San Martin and the head office in Lima, to validate the legal requirements to participate in the NPCF. To prove their acceptance of enrolment and start the affiliation, the community sends a formal letter to the NPCF expressing their intention to affiliate. This letter must be attached to the collective agreement of all community members that accepted the programme during a communal assembly. This means including a copy of the minutes of the communal assembly, inscribed in the communal Book of Records, in which *comuneros* confirm their approval of the enrolment in the NPCF including their signatures and fingerprints of all attendees to the communal assembly.

After this step, the community submits documentation to the NPCF that demonstrates its legal recognition as a community by the state: their land title, the communal board registration at the National Records Office, and a copy of the communal board members' identification cards. This phase of gathering the legal community documentation usually takes several months, as communities do not tend to have these documents updated. Recurring reasons for delays in the NPCF affiliation are that communities cannot find their community title; the communal board, as a legal counterpart of the NPCF, is not registered at the Public Records Office; or the members of the board do not have updated identification documents, have lost them or they have expired. For the next step, the community selects the location and

extension of the forested area to be under the conservation agreement with the NPCF. With the support of the CLBs, a plain community map from the national cartography database is displayed for *comuneros* to identify the existing areas for agriculture, forest management and conservation (including hunting spots and collection of non-timber forested products), and areas of cultural and historical value. With this internal classification, *comuneros* collectively discuss and choose the area to conserve as part of the NPCF agreement.

My fieldwork never coincided with an affiliation process. However, from information provided by the CLBs and *comuneros'* interviews, the process of creating the maps and the chances of recognising the communal territory and their resources was reported as a very useful and even fun event for community members. For many *comuneros*, this was the first time they had the chance to visualise their community perimeter, borders, rivers, creeks, lakes, mountains, sacred spaces, and other resources in a cartographic format.

With the forested area for the conservation agreement identified and mapped, the community verifies the area in situ. The community organises an initial forest expedition to georeference the forest borders and milestones, to then compose a specific map for the forested area under conservation agreement. This map is later used by the community to organise their forest patrols and by the NPCF Satellite Monitoring Unit in Lima to conduct early warnings of potential cases of deforestation and other environmental crimes. The georeferencing of the community perimeter is also key to accurately map the forest area to be conserved, and therefore the level of economic incentive a community would receive. As mentioned above, for each hectare of forest that the community commits to protect, it receives an amount of GBP 2 (PEN 10) each year, for the duration of the conservation

agreement (MINAM/PNCB, 2018a; 2018b). It is usually at this point that communities get to know the final amount for their economic incentives. After this step, the community designs the development project in communal assembly, which is one of the main conditionalities of the NPCF, besides the conservation of forest and the conduct of forest patrols.

With the legal documentation of the community, the map of the selected forested area for the conservation agreement and the communal development plan designed, the NPCF and the community sign the contract. This is a standard contract for all communities nationwide. In this, the NPCF commits to transfer the economic incentives according to the numbers of hectares of conserved forests, to provide technical advice for the accomplishment of the communal development plan and to strengthen community capacities, manage the economic incentives and protect their forests. On their side, the community commits to conserve their forest, to properly manage the economic incentives to implement the development project and to keep the NPCF informed on the progress of the development plan through their quarterly reports.

**Implementation:** After signing the contract, the NPCF makes the first deposit of the economic funds for incentive payments for the first year of implementation in the community bank account from the National Bank (*Banco de la Nación*), explicitly opened for the NPCF. The communal bank account can only be managed by the president and treasurer of the communal board. With the cash withdrawn from the NPCF's economic incentives the community starts the implementation of its development plan. For all presidents and treasurers interviewed in San Martín this has been the first time they have ever filled in cheques and has signified a big challenge for them to fill them in correctly.

While doing fieldwork, the NPCF never failed to deposit the appropriate economic funds to communities in San Martin. Sometimes, there were delays due to bureaucratic procedures in Lima, but communities would always get their money. There were also delays within communities in withdrawing the cash because communal members were not registered at the National Record Office or they did not have their identity documents updated and therefore could not withdraw cheques.

Once the community starts using the economic payments to implement the development plans, CLBs also begin their work of supervising communities' compliance. To prove adequate management of economic incentives, communities are required to submit quarterly accountability reports and annual evaluation reports, demonstrating the financial and physical progress of their development plans. *Comuneros* are not ready to prepare and submit these documents themselves. Many *comuneros* have never used a computer and even fewer have filled in Excel sheets before. The CLBs actually become the authors of the accountability reports.

At the end of the first year of the contract, if the community accomplishes the conditionalities and submits the accountability reports on time and with the accurate data, and has fulfilled the conservation goals, the NPCF ratifies the contract for another year until the contract expires at the end of five years. NPCF contracts can be suspended if the community misuses the economic incentives for purposes different than those established in the development plan or fails in the submission of the accountability reports on time. Yet communities can remove this suspension if they address the identified problems on time.

**Disaffiliation:** This occurs when communities finish their contracts after the compliance of their development plans. Disaffiliation can also occur due to non-compliance of conditionalities before the contracts formally end. Contracts can be cancelled in severe cases of deforestation; also if the community conducts illegal activities or if the community misuses the economic incentives for different purposes and does not pay back the economic incentive payments. During the history of the NPCF in San Martin, since 2015 only one community has had its contract cancelled for misusing the funds for purposes different from the NPCF's conditionalities. The community in question, the Kichwa community of *Mushuk Llacta de Chipatoa*, invested the economic incentive payments in buying land, which was against the rules about how to use the economic incentives of the NPCF.

### 3.4.2. The conservation contract

The conservation contract of the NPCF between the state and indigenous communities, based on economic incentives for conservation, has the formal goal of stimulating indigenous behavioural change in land use practices to prevent deforestation and to increase their local valuation of standing forests. The assumption is that indigenous peoples reduce forest clearing for farming if they get enough income from sustainable economic activities. To be part of the NPCF, each community signs a contract in which they are responsible for the conservation of forests and the proper management of the economic incentives to implement their development projects and to conduct forest patrols. The NPCF, as a representative of the state, deposits the economic incentives as an advance payment for one year and provides technical assistance to communities to fulfil their environmental and non-environmental conditionalities. Contracts have four sections: the economic, environment, social and

management sectors.

This economic component is aimed at promoting sustainable economic activities to discourage forest clearing and generate household incomes within communities enrolled in the NPCF. In theory, the chosen activities must articulate with the local, social, and economic interests of *comuneros* and with the geographic, environmental, and economic properties and potentialities of their territory, according to the sub-national land planning scheme. In San Martin, the selected activities for the economic component were the improvement of cash crops (cocoa and coffee). According to CBLs, these activities were chosen by the NPCF. Four of the seven communities studied in this research also included handicraft (Kichwa knitted belts, locally known as *chumbis* and *watus*) run by women as complementary economic activities to develop under the NPCF contracts.

Cocoa and coffee are the most popular cash crops in San Martin, especially since the 2000s, as part of different alternative development plans to eradicate coca cultivation for drug trafficking. Today, the improvement of cocoa and coffee plots are regularly promoted through sub-national state-led projects, NGOs, and local commercial enterprises. As part of the NPCF, these farming activities are conducted with the technical assistance of an agriculture extensionist, hired as part of the development plan. Extensionists are usually young professionals from nearby small cities. They are directly hired by the communities and earn on average GBP 200 monthly. These extensionists are responsible for helping *comuneros* increase their cash crop productivity following sustainable practices to avoid the expansion of the agriculture frontier. What they teach is entirely up to them, as there were no official guidelines from the programme on sustainable cash crop cultivations.

Cash crop farming in communities from San Martin was chosen by NPCF staff without a detailed assessment of the feasibility of the activities or the real market opportunities for their products at either the sub-national nor national level. This situation risks communities falling into agricultural failure, if we also take into consideration the cases in which activities funded by the economic incentives are not enough to support the complete market value chain of cash crops, when the benefits financed by the economic incentives cannot be distributed equally among community members, or when communities cannot afford to receive adequate technical assistance. None of the communities chose economic activities based on forest management, such as extraction of non-timber forest products, legal timber logging or ecotourism, even when the challenge of the NPCF is actually to promote the valuation of standing forests. In San Martin, there is a consideration of agriculture as the most important economic activity, which has long been promoted by the sub-national government rather than the conservation of forests.

The NPCF environmental component includes the requirement to conduct forest patrols every three months, to monitor the conserved state of the forests under agreement. This component is managed by the forest patrolling committee, created specifically by the NPCF, and composed only of *comuneros* from each of the enrolled communities. This committee is responsible for choosing the patrol members, organising the patrol journey, preparing the patrol reporting, and buying required implements for the forest brigades such as food, machetes, boots, medicine, batteries, etc. They are also in charge of organizing with the CLBs GPS and cartography training to improve forest monitoring skills. In the forest patrol journeys, the brigade is expected to identify potential cases of deforestation and other environmental crimes. They also clean trails and place warning signs on the limits of the forested area under

conservation agreement with the NPCF and of the community itself to discourage potential encroachers. During fieldwork, I discovered that these routes are also used for hunting (Figures 8 and 9).

Forest patrols are not new for indigenous communities. In their daily life, most indigenous communities conduct forest patrols to check on their borders and clean their trails once or twice per year. In these journeys normally male *comuneros* participate. The difference with the NPCF is that, under this programme, they must conduct forest patrols at least four times a year, using GPS to georeference their journeys and key milestones such as creeks, hunting spots, seed trees or forest cleared areas, then write reports including hand-drawn maps. NPCF forest patrols take longer than traditional patrol routes, lasting on average around a week. In contrast, traditional patrols last between one or two days.

*Figure 8: Comuneros on forest patrols. Source: NPCF San Martin, 2017. Source: NPCF San Martin*



Figure 9: Cartography workshop in Shimpiyacu, 2018. Source: Valeria Biffi Isla



The NPCF social component is aimed at improving specific and urgent social needs within communities, such as building a communal house or communal health centre, providing a first aid kit, or buying a water pump. This component is also managed by the communal board. This is the less important component. While doing fieldwork, I could not find active social activities in the communities I was studying. I recorded only an abandoned communal orchard in Chirik Sacha that nobody took care of, and an unfinished communal building that was mainly home to bats in Copal Sacha. During the first years of implementation of the NPCF in San Martin, it was assumed that social activities would be developed in association with other state agencies operating in the same communities, but this situation never came about.

The management component is aimed at supervising the overall implementation of the contract, managing the economic incentives, and elaborating and submitting the accountability reports to the NPCF. These activities are the responsibility of the communal

board, as the highest political organisation within an indigenous community. In theory, communal board members must also participate in meetings and workshops led by the NPCF to strengthen their governance skills for better management of the community resources. Every three months, members of the communal board must submit accountability reports that include Excel sheets with information on total expenses by month, and remaining balances. They must complement these documents with sworn declarations, numerous receipts and narrative texts explaining the advance of the economic, social, and environmental components of the contract. As I explain in the following chapters, these management responsibilities are very challenging tasks for indigenous community members but are ones that allow them to bring the state closer to their communities.

### 3.5. Conclusion

The design of the NPCF to work in, and with, indigenous communities is a complex and bureaucratic process that demands onerous paperwork in order to fit in with the state bureaucratic apparatus and its own mechanisms of validation, transparency, and accountability. During fieldwork, it was clear that administrative procedures demand new skills for communities to comply with all the agreements of their contracts. The role of CLBs in the communities is fundamental for the effective implementation of the NPCF, not necessarily to guarantee that the conservation of forests is achieved or to ensure communities change their land use behaviours to discourage deforestation, but to fulfil the accountability requests that represent the effective presence of the state in the communities.

#### 4.1. Introduction

As a representation of state power and environmental authority, the NPCF instructs indigenous peoples on how they can use forests and guides them towards specific land use behaviours to meet conservation goals. To do so, the NPCF offers benefits, introduces new rules and constraints and forms of interaction as partners in conservation, mediated by bureaucratic procedures and documents.

The theoretical framework I employ to address these issues in the implementation of the NPCF is interdisciplinary, including political geography, political ecology, and anthropology. The literature review in this chapter is divided into four sections. The next section (4.2) examines the political implications of payments for ecosystem services, especially in terms of political organisation, social conflicts and territorial awareness; the third section (4.3) critically examines the scholarship on state bureaucrats and their role turning policy into action; the fourth section (4.4.) explores state effects and their connection to the bureaucratisation of communities; and the fifth section (4.5) reflects on the connection between indigeneity and citizenship.

#### 4.2. The political implications of payment for ecosystem services

Payment for ecosystem services schemes (PES) are voluntary transactions between at least one ecosystem service provider and one ecosystem service user to guarantee the

conservation and supply of ecosystem services and goods (Muradian and Rival, 2012; Pirard, 2012; Wunder, 2015, 2005; Engel et al., 2008).

The providers of ecosystem services are the landowners that are legally responsible for safeguarding and managing the delivery of such services (Engel et al., 2008). In theory, PES target ecosystems that providers are poorly motivated to protect because they do not gain benefits from conservation (Engel et al., 2008; Albers and Ferraro, 2006). The service users are the actors that demand the provision of specific ecosystem services that providers manage. Users can be private or public entities, such as governments acting on behalf of society's wellbeing (Ferraro and Kiss, 2012; Engel et al., 2008). To accomplish the delivery of ecosystem services, providers receive cash incentives to change their land use behaviours towards more environmentally friendly activities (Muradian and Rival, 2012). As transactions, both the ecosystem service provider and user agree to implement a PES contract over specific rules of natural resource management (Wunder, 2015).

This mechanism works on the condition that the service user pays if the provider commits to deliver the defined ecosystem service over a period of time (Wunder, 2015; Engel et al., 2008; Wunder, 2005). The overall goal of PES is to "create incentives, subject to clear conditions, to align individual and/or collective resource use decisions with the social interest in the management of natural resources" (Ishihara et al., 2017: 45). This means that incentives, frequently economic transfers, should cover at least the opportunity costs of land use change to ecosystem services providers to be effective. PES also need to operate on a clear identification of additionality. This means that forest conservation occurs due to the presence of the PES programme, which would not happen otherwise (Persson and Alpizur, 2011).

Besides these fundamental elements, there are other institutional and political features that PES needs to be effective. These characteristics include clear property rights over land that ensure the provision of ecosystem services (Ferraro and Kiss 2012; Engel et al., 2008); concrete and feasible behavioural change possibilities in land use for ES providers; strong governance between stakeholders for decision-making and agreements; and an institutional structure for forest conservation monitoring (Wunder, 2015; Pagiola, 2008; Wunder, 2005). These characteristics demonstrate the complexity of implementing effective PES. This is the reason why some scholars prefer to refer to 'PES-like' initiatives, instead of referring to a strict model (Wunder 2015).

For this dissertation, PES schemes are understood not only as economic transactions between social actors that create incentives to regulate environmental behaviours that further the sustainable management of ecosystem services and goods (Muradian et al., 2010). Instead, they are also a political arena for the state and social actors to reconfigure their relationship in terms of responsibilities and rights. Indeed, political assessments of PES are highly relevant because its single implementation and co-responsibilities, benefits and sanctions can impact on the way landowners, including rural and indigenous peoples, perform as public policy users. As such, social science disciplines like political geography, political ecology and anthropology can reveal what else happens beyond the transactions and the environmental goals of conservation and the wider socio-political contexts of their operation.

Political geography, as a subdiscipline of geography, explores the control of the state over nature with the purpose of reproducing state power in a delimited territory (Ioris, 2014; Whitehead et al., 2007; Painter, 2006). This discipline also-examines the extent to which the

control of nature for economic, political, and environmental reasons contributes to state building and the reproduction of power (Ioris, 2014; Bakker and Bridge 2008; Whitehead et al., 2007; Matthews, 2004; Scott, 1998; Neumann, 1998). Yet this scholarship also acknowledges that the state exercise of power is uneven across the territory, both messy and prosaic (Duit et al., 2015; Robbins, 2008; Painter, 2006; Mann 1984). Using political geography to study a PES scheme allows me to understand how the state exercises its authority by proposing rules of environmental behaviour to indigenous peoples, defining how their territory should be used and how communities respond to these instructions and redefine the way in which they understand and experience the state. Among the many characteristics the state maintains, political geography questions its regulatory ability to control the use of nature and mediate the relationship with society, and of society with nature (Whitehead et al., 2007; Mitchell, 1991).

Similarly, political ecology, as an interdisciplinary research field in social sciences, is also concerned with state-society-nature relations and the exercise of power (Kull et al., 2015; Escobar, 1999), questioning the social, economic and political consequences of state environmental interventions in terms of inequalities for non-state actors (Harris, 2017; Robbins, 2008). In terms of PES, political ecology queries who wins and losses from the implementation of environmental initiatives, what the new dynamics around land use are, how these schemes are used and appropriated by state and non-state actors, including how these schemes are contested (Kull et al., 2015). Analysing the impacts of a PES scheme through the lenses of political geography and political ecology provides the appropriate theories and discussions to explore the social and political impacts of these initiatives, while the state is trying to regulate indigenous forests and peoples.

Scholarship on the political outcomes of PES discusses the local institutional transformations within PES users' communities to fit into this new scheme, for example, on forest use constraints (Corbera et al., 2009; Vatn, 2010). They also address the role that power plays amongst PES participants in terms of the sharing of PES benefits and decision-making (Rodríguez de Francisco et al., 2013; Persson and Alpizur 2011). Other studies explore the effects of PES strengthening or weakening local governance structures (Bixler et al., 2015; Felipe-Lucía et al., 2015; Pascual et al., 2014; Shapiro-Garza, 2013; Chan et al., 2012; Milne and Adams, 2012). Finally, scholarship on the political impacts of PES explores the extent to which the implementation of PES could contribute to strengthening indigenous peoples' sense of social and political recognition and trust in the state (von Hedemann and Osorne 2016; Shapiro-Garza, 2013; McAfee and Shapiro, 2010; Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010).

Evidence on the political matters of PES is divided on whether they make a positive or negative impact. Literature on the positive social and political impacts discusses the efficiency of PES in terms of leadership and empowerment (Muradian et al., 2010; Pascual et al., 2014; Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010); as well as social capital, cooperation, trust, and social recognition (Bremer et al., 2014; Van Hecken et al., 2015). In terms of political organisations and leadership, some authors propose that once responsibility of forest management relies on community members as forest users, communal representatives can strengthen their leadership, agency, and empowerment in relation to state authorities and within their communities (Palmer, 2014; Pascual et al., 2014; Chan et al., 2012; Haller et al., 2008). For example, evidence of the national PES in Ecuador suggests that this scheme improved social capital in well-organised communities, promoting inclusive decision-making and strengthening local environmental governance (Bremer et al. 2014). Similarly, if the local

population perceive a sense of fairness in the proposed benefits, such as economic incentives being distributed, the scheme can increase the credibility of the state, if it is the provider of benefits, or of the scheme itself (Pascual et al., 2014; Grieg-Gran et al., 2005).

Other advocates of PES reinforce the connection of PES with strengthened social capital (Clements et al., 2010; Corbera et al., 2007). Here social capital is understood as “networks that follow common rules and values and that are prone to work together and cooperate to pursue common benefits” (OECD, 2020). The idea here is that the success of PES schemes is only possible with strong social capital considering that the group of providers of ecosystem services agree to collectively protect, manage, and respect the resources under PES schemes (Bremer et al., 2014; Clements et al., 2010). In terms of cooperation, advocates of PES suggest that strong pre-existing community organisation would be enhanced with the implementation of PES schemes, as these require strong social networks (Krause and Loft, 2013; Clements et al., 2010; Corbera et al., 2007). Similarly, in terms of the management of the communal territory, enrolling communal lands into PES schemes might have strong potential to boost community organisation. In contrast, individual agreements may cause conflict among stakeholders (Corbera et al., 2007a).

An important discussion about the impacts of PES schemes is the territorial awareness of the possibility of securing land, clarifying property rights, and promoting the legalisation of communal land for participating in the scheme (Herbert et al., 2010). For example, Shapiro Garza (2013) shows that small farmers from Mexico participate in PES projects for the possibility of securing land before the threat of displacement due to neoliberal agrarian policies. Yet, on the other hand, many PES schemes might only work with communities that

are titled. This means that the ones that remain without a title not only face the constant threat of encroachers but have also been disregarded from environment and development initiatives. As such, PES schemes like the NPCF may reinforce inequalities among rural communities (Wunder and Alban, 2008; Wunder, et al., 2008a; Corbera et al. 2007; Grieg-Gran and Bishop, 2004).

On the other hand, critics of PES suggest that disseminating inadequate or poor information about these schemes, especially about what is being sold and bought and the abstract concepts involved, can generate suspicion, misunderstanding and confrontation about the very nature of the project (Herbert et al., 2010). Similarly, communal disagreements on PES constraints over natural resources can generate internal conflicts, institutional weakness, and lack of leadership (Rodríguez de Francisco and Boelens, 2014a, 2014b; Cleaver, 2002). These critics also highlight that when benefits cannot be distributed fairly among community members, conflicts arise (Alpizar et al., 2012). In terms of access to resources, PES can potentially limit the access to the resources they must conserve, affecting their livelihoods based on the extraction of natural resources in favour of conservation outcomes (Francisco and Boelens, 2014).

Another concern with PES targets is the reinforcement of social asymmetries among ecosystem providers' communities (Rodríguez-de-Francisco et al., 2013; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010). The literature suggests that PES contracts often operate over unequal power holders (von Hedemann and Osborne, 2016; Van Hecken et al., 2015; McElwee et al., 2014; Shapiro-Garza, 2013; McElwee, 2012). When powerful actors have the control of managing the PES schemes locally, they can decide to regulate access to natural resources, reducing the

possibilities of use by non-empowered actors (Felipe-Lucia, 2015). The common concern here is the risk of elite capture. The concept of elite capture refers to the control of decision-making and even benefits by a small group, usually associated with local political authorities and decision-makers that perform as intermediaries between the promoters of the PES schemes and the community's providers of ecosystem services (Larson et al., 2015). While capturing information, decisions and benefits, elites can exclude other community members (Andersson et al., 2018; Larson et al., 2015; Lund and Saito- Jensen, 2013).

For Corbera et al. (2007), in rural communities from Latin America, where power asymmetries are “deeply engrained” in local social structures, the implementation of PES schemes reinforces local power inequalities. For example, PES schemes in Colombia and Ecuador mainly target larger and better-off landowners, rather than small and poor ones because they have stronger political power to reach promoters of the PES initiatives (Rodrigues de Francisco and Boelens 2014; Rodríguez-de-Francisco and Budds, 2015; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010). Similarly, in Costa Rica and Mexico, states prioritise economic incentives in areas of low additionality, rather than areas with real deforestation threats, but whose landowners are powerful social groups that have the power to claim their participation in these schemes (Muradian et al., 2013; Porras, 2010; Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008).

As such, richer groups can keep benefiting from environmental services. The economic incentives given to the less vulnerable stakeholders reproduce inequalities in access to natural resources and household incomes (Martínez-Allier, 2002). The sense of inequity in the distribution of benefits could risk the success of conservation aims. Indeed, excluded members could trigger negative perceptions about the scheme, provoking social conflicts,

law-breaking and protests that could end up destabilising environmental results (Felipe-Lucia, 2015; Pascual et al 2014; Vatn, 2010; Corbera et al., 2007; Brockington and Igoe, 2006).

PES are also appraised for encouraging perverse incentives, in which communities as ecosystem providers protect ecosystems only if they receive the amount of money they require (Kerr et. al., 2014; McAfee, 2012; Bowles and Polonia-Reyes, 2011; Corbera et al., 2007). As such, PES are criticised for the possibility of crowding out moral attitudes towards conservation for the commodification of nature, meaning that nature can be conserved only if paid for (Muradian et al., 2013; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010). Likewise, these schemes are judged for the possibility of crowding out social rules regarding the sustainable management of the commons (Clements et al., 2010; Muradian et al., 2010; Grieg-Gran et al., 2005).

Yet as mentioned above, the motivational crowding literature is nuanced, with some studies showing evidence of crowding out, while others show evidence of crowding in. In general, the literature on the social and political impacts of PES is mixed. Impacts depend on a myriad of contextual elements, from design, implementation but also local features of the communities in which PES are to be conducted, and even the broader political context. This brief review of literature is useful to situate my own results within the current scholarship.

#### 4.3. The forest bureaucracy turning environmental policy into action

The study of the state in its attempt to conserve forests requires an exploration of the role of front-line workers as the ultimately responsible for turning policy into specific actions and for invigorating state bureaucracy and bringing it to the margins of the state. In this dissertation,

the analytical framework is the interdisciplinary approach to Michael Lipsky's model of street level bureaucrats. The starting point for most studies on bureaucracy is the work of Weber on state bureaucracy. For Weber, a state bureaucracy requires standardised rules and protocols that show consistency in both organisation and management practices; a specialised division of labour based on meritocracy in which employees are appointed based on their experience and competence; a well-defined hierarchy in which employees with higher positions can direct and watch over individuals of lower positions; a work policy founded on impersonal relations to ensure unbiased and equal treatment among employees; and a culture of recording and archiving of rules, procedures, decisions and actions to preserve bureaucratic consistency and accountability (Weber, 1947 in Mommsen, 1974).

Under these conditions, the Weberian bureaucracy appears to be more suitable in urban and well-organised state agencies, and less so in messy and disorganised ones. In messy states, bureaucrats of low rank agencies at the margins, such as rural areas, distant from centres of power, are less able to find and follow standardised rules and protocols and are more constrained in their efforts to turn policy into action (Uprety, 2013). Likewise, Weberian bureaucrats' efforts to create effective states seem to be driven mostly by rational choice, without considering the local context in which they have to work, and the role that cultural patterns, subjectivities and affection play in decision-making and the conduct of state regulation (Nugent, 2004).

In comparison to Weber's bureaucracy, Lipsky's (2010) studies on street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) appear to be a more accurate portrayal of community-level bureaucrats working in Amazonian indigenous communities. Lipsky defines SLBs as the front-line public employees

that interact in daily life with citizens to implement public policy. They represent the first contact for citizens to experience and understand the state (Lipsky, 2010; Maynard- Moody and Musheno, 2000). Another important feature of Lipsky's SLBs is the hierarchical and symbolic distance from centres of power and official decision-making. This distance may arise from constraints such as limited time to resolve problems, overwhelming workloads, poor logistics and even a lack of clarity about the policy goals they need to pursue (Gilson, 2015; Uprety, 2013; Lipsky, 2010).

In rural areas in Peru, geographical distance is a particularly important issue to consider, as existing elements such as poor connectivity and precarious public services may contribute to widening the political distance from the highest authorities, and therefore the impossibility of understanding the logic behind decision-making at the NPCF and Ministry of the Environment headquarters. Besides this, front-line workers may have fewer channels to express potential concerns about deficiencies in their work. As such, they also often face the lack of awareness of higher authorities of their work, making the challenges of working in rural settings invisible to central state actors. Nonetheless, the distance from the centre of power and the closeness to public policy users provide SLBs with a certain degree of discretion.

Discretion is the portion of flexibility that these agents hold to adapt public policy in their own terms and interpret bureaucratic procedures according to the contextualised local needs and cultural values, distributing benefits and assigning sanctions to policy users. To use discretion and make policy legible, SLBs must have a certain degree of real autonomy, which is either granted by higher authorities or taken by them themselves, shaping or even avoiding official regulation, as they consider whether the tasks assigned to them require local reframing

(Gilson, 2015; Seva and Jagers 2013; Lipsky, 2010).

Despite the importance given to discretion in studies of SLBs, front-line workers typically given a certain degree of discretion, meaning that this feature is not an exclusive advantage of SLBs (Evans, 2011). What differentiates SLBs from other front-line state workers is that they have the prerogative to decide how public policy is to be carried out because of their distance from centres of power and decision makers. Indeed, this distance allows SLBs to become informal policy shapers in the field (Seva and Jagers, 2013; Lipsky, 2010; Meyers and Vorsanger, 2007). For Lipsky (2010), SLBs' strategies to cope with constraints and uncertainties of how to conduct their work are the policy itself. In other words, Lipsky proposes thinking of public policy as produced during the interactions between SLBs and citizens through quotidian interactions, rather than as the formal design of state interventions and rules in high-level offices (Lipsky, 2010).

To make legible state rules and administrative protocols, especially to rural, ethnic policy users, SLBs can use their discretion to reshape and reinterpret the know-how of bureaucratic procedures in specific contexts and according to local cultural values. But that is not enough. To be effective in implementing rules, SLBs must hold a certain degree of authority. They could rely on the power that being representatives of the state provides, and as such, assign sanctions if procedures are not followed. However, strengthening authority based on their power for enacting sanctions can induce asymmetrical and negative consequences for forest users, whenever bureaucrats overexploit their authority on rule implementation, or when their decision-making relies on negative perceptions of forest users, restricting opportunities for forest users to have a voice regarding policymaking (Acharya, 2004).

To shape the role of SLBs, these state representatives do not make choices based only on state regulation and environmental knowledge, but by their subjectivities (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000). Subjectivities are the self-production of our ways of thinking about social reality, about ourselves against other individuals, framed by our own positionality in terms of gender, ethnicity, class, and history. Subjectivities shape values, worldviews, and prejudices (Arts and Buizer, 2009). CLBs may hold ambiguous perceptions about the state they are working for, especially if they come from rural or precarious locations, where state presence has been historically uneven (Corbridge et al., 2005; Vasan, 2000). However, these ambiguous considerations about the state are not necessarily arguments against it as a ruling institution but are about finding better ways to synchronise with forest policy users' interests and even CLBs' own interests (Rubenstein, 2004).

Based on these features, SLBs are also expected to act as gatekeepers, to advocate on behalf of their clients for their best experience of the state. Gatekeepers can help communities' access to the state apparatus, paperwork, and legal vocabulary, as these communities do not have the skills to manage these factors themselves. At the margins, such as within indigenous communities, SLBs might not only perform as gatekeepers but as brokers. Brokers are actors that trade on social, political, and economic gaps, allowing actors and groups with poor capital access to institutions and other actors from whom they may gain benefits. Brokers trade mostly with flows of information, opportunities, and knowledge (Burt, 2000). Brokers choose when to follow the rules to shorten the gap with actors that they need to interrelate with, while on other occasions, they can choose to be more flexible in their interpretation of the rules to fit with local needs and culture (Bartholdson and Porro, 2018; Mosse and Lewis, 2005). Common scholarship on brokerage highlights that brokers benefit economically and politically

from enabling vulnerable people's access to resources, services, and entities they cannot reach themselves (James, 2011). Yet there are other types of brokers that perform beyond these scenarios. According to Obstfeld (2005), there are four scenarios in which brokers may engage with: "i) coordinate action or information between distant parties who have no immediate prospect for direct introduction or connection; (ii) actively maintain and exploit the separation between parties; (iii) introduce or facilitate pre-existing ties between parties; and (iv) introduce or facilitate interaction between parties while maintaining an essential coordinative role over time" (2005, p. 104).

Over these responsibilities as brokers, the performance of SLBs to enact statehood contributes towards public policy users' ideals of the state and consequently their claims as citizens. The effectiveness of policy implementation regulating the behaviours of citizens does not depend only on state rationality and policy design, but also on individual practices of statehood enacted by state bureaucrats that interact daily with policy users. As such, the practices of bureaucrats have a direct effect on the proper operation of policy, and on the constructed image of the state by public policy users (Migdal, 2001). In doing so, SLBs have a strong responsibility shaping local forms of experiencing and understanding the state, depending on their own experiences and histories and their cultural views about public policy. Indeed, the way CLBs enact statehood frames how indigenous peoples, users of the NPCF, represent themselves as different kind of subjects before the state, exercising different forms of citizenship.

Categories such as ethnicity, gender, class, and socio-economic status of the SLBs impact on the delivery of statehood. These features may contribute to SLBs' decisions to benefit certain

groups and constrain others, because of their considerations of worthiness built on cultural and social categories (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000). Harris-White (2003) demonstrates that in India, the gender and caste of citizens as public policy users are highly connected to the delivery of policy by bureaucrats. Similarly, Meyers and Vorsanger (2003) reveal that the conduct of policy that targets a well-educated and politically influential population is more efficient than in low socio-economic status groups.

SLBs not only perform on behalf of fairness and correctness based on a public and legal framework, but on their moral judgment of policy users' worthiness. Consequently, their use of discretion could make them work in favour of or against certain people. They may even use positive discrimination to help those policy users they consider most in need. They might also strengthen their authority against individuals or groups for whom they hold negative perceptions, even reaching the point of neglecting the services they aim to provide (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000). At the margins of the state, the moral judgements that SLBs have of policy users could also increase due to their sense of embeddedness in the local communities they work with. However, this belonging could place these bureaucrats in a social trap. On the one hand, they could reduce the cost of information collection and sharing, hold a better sense of the local needs, and shape state rules in order to be culturally appropriate.

However, on the other hand, embeddedness may encourage corruption and clientelism if bureaucrats are pressed to allocate benefits to a preferred local network or community. Scholarship on the role of bureaucrats conducting environmental policy is mostly situated in urban scenarios from developed countries. For example, Seva's (2015) examination of SLBs working on water and fishery policy in Sweden explores how personal understandings of

policy, in terms of problems and solutions, affect their decision-making and therefore, the success or failure of environmental policy. Similarly, Trusty and Cerveny (2012) use the SLB framework to examine how the personal values of SLBs affect their administrative actions about the recreational use of natural parks in the United States. Nielson (2006) examines how Danish SLBs differentiated treatment of regulated companies according to their coping techniques. May and Winter (1999) demonstrate that bureaucrats' different techniques of enforcement impact on environmental stakeholders' compliance with rules and regulations.

The use of an SLB approach for the conservation of nature at the margins of the state is under-developed in the academic literature. Still, there are interesting studies outside the SLBs' narrative that investigate park rangers and other types of state representatives responsible for conducting forest conservation policy within rural areas. Fleischman's studies (2016, 2014, 2012) in central India demonstrate that local forest bureaucrats, in order to keep their work and status, adopt conservation practices that are likely to fail, such as tree planting, but that look good politically among local elites and higher bureaucrats. Vasan's work (2002) in northern India reveals that forest guards' shared cultural background with policy users locates them in a social and political "trap" that works currently as an opportunity and constraint in regard to their duties. These agents enforce forest regulation, while attending to the demands of local elites with whom they are bound, and who participate in illegal trafficking of forest products.

Similarly, Robbins' work (2009, 2000a, 2000b) in Rajasthan, India, demonstrates that forest guards' social status in rural communities makes them unaware of the poorest people's needs, while cooperating with local elites in illicit resource extraction. In contrast, Matthews'

(2005, 2004) work in southern Mexico suggests that the poor political capital of forest officials, responsible for fire control, affects their capacity to perform their duties, as local political elites try to control their work.

Most of these studies agree that, at the local level, turning environmental policy into action is more likely to be *negotiated in the field* than in higher rank offices, in a similar approach to Lipsky's SLB model. They also argue that failure in conservation has less to do with the bureaucratic structure itself and more to do with forest agents' position within local social and political networks. There are other studies from a more institutional angle that address the motivations of state agents to conduct environmental policy and the importance of bureaucracy itself.

Joshi's (1999) study of forest officials in West Bengal, India, demonstrates the complexity and ambiguity in forest representatives' responsibility to conduct state environmental rules. She fashions a categorisation of these state actors as innovators, mediators, or saboteurs to demonstrate their motivations in adapting and implementing forest policy. The innovators use creativity to achieve environmental goals, despite institutional constraints. The mediators accept and reproduce commands without contestation or adaptation to local grounds. The saboteurs try to undermine the conservation of forests, for fear of losing power or rent seeking.

Finally, from a different perspective, Kaufman's classic analysis (1960) of forest rangers in the United States suggests that these professionals are highly effective forest policy implementers due to the well-designed organisational structure of the US Forest Service, which allows

rangers to adapt environmental national goals to local contexts. For Kaufmann, the effectiveness of forest policy implementation relies on proper formal institutions governing bureaucratic behaviour.

The studies mentioned above focus on the success or failure of conservation goals, but do not sufficiently analyse the quotidian interactions between bureaucrats and citizens and how these negotiations reshape public policy locally. Subsequently, applying Lipsky's model of SLBs becomes a novel approach to understand what forest officials do in their everyday interactions with public policy users to implement conservation initiatives, whether they fail or not, and how citizens react, understand, and experience the state through the performance of these SLBs.

Despite the relevance of state documentation as part of front-line workers' quotidian responsibilities, the SLB model does not discuss this topic in depth. Indeed, the work of SLBs adapting rules and processes to specific audiences implies translating the illegibility of state instructions (Mosse 2005; Das, 2004). The reliance on documents has always been a fundamental feature of state bureaucracy (Weber, 1948). Today, documents constitute the material culture of modern states (Navaro Yashin, 2007). State documents are produced, circulated, and consumed to show proof of public policy progress, as evidence of effective state insertion into the social realm, and as sources of information for the targeted population (Hoag and Hull, 2017; Bear and Mathur, 2015; Hull 2012).

Here, state documents are significant in two ways. First, as the foundation of the illegibility of the state rules and protocols that bureaucrats must translate for public policy users in

specific contexts. Second, paperwork is also used as the evidence of state insertion into society through accountability reporting.

State documents make difficult and complex processes appear feasible and coherent (Das, 2004; Hull, 2003). Documentation does not only represent an illusion of legibility, but also represents the evidence of state development. In other words, documentation makes illegibility appear as legible by the circulation and production of paperwork (Mathur, 2015). The challenge to front line workers in dealing with the illegibility of state regulation does not occur because of their incapacity to understand the rules, but the effort to make these rules achievable at the margins of the state (Mathur, 2015).

Therefore, these margins can be seen as spaces of illegibility. Front line workers such as CLBs play a crucial role in overcoming this illegibility through their own interpretation of rules and procedures (Mathur, 2015; Das, 2004). This is especially important considering that the state at these margins is mostly present through exchanged, signed, and sealed documentation (Hull 2012; Gupta, 2012; Hetherington, 2011). Indeed, documents constitute the presence of the state. As Hull (2012, p. 253) argues, “[t]hey are constitutive of bureaucratic rules, ideologies, knowledge, practices, subjectivities, objects, outcomes, and even the organizations themselves” (see also Allard and Walker, 2016; Frohmann, 2008).

The increasing amount of paperwork nowadays in public policy corresponds to the values of transparency and accountability that neoliberal states have adopted to demonstrate and prove outcomes (Mathur, 2015; Navaro Yashin, 2007). As such, documents are important because they also make state actions and practices auditable (Power, 1999). Indeed, the audit

culture is an emblematic value of modern states. Auditability is today considered a mechanism that demonstrates quality, transparency, and efficiency. It also situates financial and physical accounting as the core elements of public policy evaluation and progress (Wright, 2012; Shore 2008; Shore and Wright 1999).

The Peruvian state, as a neoliberal state, has also reframed its public policy to set auditability, transparency, and accountability as the main values of the public good. In 2002, the Peruvian state launched the Framework Law for the Modernisation of State Administration (Law N° 27658). After ten years of corruption during the authoritarian government of Alberto Fujimori (1990 - 2000), the return to democracy in 2001 urgently required the modernisation of the state and of new public values. Therefore, the state situated anticorruption, transparency, and accountability as the fundamental values of democratic management. One of the actions on which the modernisation process of the state relied was the institutionalisation of results-based evaluation through public accountability to guarantee measures that allow the state to control its actions.

The main stress on accountability in state management affects the way organisations and programmes operate (Power, 1999). As such, organisations, and state representatives (as CLBs) might reshape their activities to prioritise the ones that can be measured. In this realm, it is equally important to question what accountability renders unseen and unmeasurable, but that can have strong impacts on the way that public policy is implemented (Shore and Wright, 2015). Accountability demands a process of simplification to standardise the elements of public policy to evaluate. This is a way in which the state can also make society legible to govern it (Scott, 1998). In the case of the Peruvian state, the execution of public policy is

simplified through the accountability of physical and financial figures, while non-quantifiable elements such as the local social and political impacts are left aside. However, it is precisely these practices that explain why some public interventions end up with different results than expected.

At the margins of the state, SLBs have the responsibility to turn these simplified values and the policy rules into legible actions, language, and procedures for their local, indigenous audience. Their work, distant from centres of power, provides them with the discretion to adapt rules according to their own understanding of the state and of the local policy users. In that sense, CLBs have the opportunity to re-adapt the PES instructions and protocols of PES schemes to simplified versions in their own terms.

Lipsky's concept of SLBs appears to be a suitable category to explore the role of CLBs in implementing a PES scheme in indigenous communities at the margins of the state. Particularly, I highlight the main SLB characteristics of these state representatives to use it as an analytical tool in the process of examining how CLBs turn policy into actions, and what effects these practices produce in terms of the relationship between the state and indigenous peoples.

#### 4.4. State effects of public policy at the margins

In this section, I discuss the concept of state effects as a theoretical and analytical tool to understand the everyday presence of the state at the margins. Through the state effects approach, I question how the quotidian implementation of a public PES scheme contributes

to reconfiguring the state indigeneity relationship, emphasising local forms of understanding and experiencing the state and therefore also, shaping forms of exercising citizenship. For this, I highlight the social notion of citizenship more than the legal status recognised by a state. With this perspective, I try to move forward scholarship on the state indigeneity relationship that discusses this connection through the history of the implementation of indigenous public policy, the advances, and gaps in the national legal framework to protect indigenous people's rights, and the challenges of building indigenous institutionality within the state apparatus (Alza and Zambrano 2015; Durand 2014; Meetzen, 2007; Urrutia, 2006; Yrigoyen, 2002; Dean, 2002). Instead, the aim with a state effects perspective is to focus on the micropolitics of the everyday life of indigenous communities in their interactions with the state, showing how strategies of statehood are implemented; and how these reconfigure the way indigenous peoples experience and understand the state at the margins.

State effects are produced by different representations of statehood, understood as the state tactics to positioning the state as the main political authority over the territory and the population. Following Migdal (2004), this analysis contributes to the claim that the state and society cannot be understood one without the other, even in those areas, like the margins of the state, where the presence of the state is precarious. As for the definition of the margins, for Das and Poole (2004), these are those territorial and political landscapes defined in three different ways as: i) the peripheries where people that are poorly integrated into the state system live, and who need to become lawful citizens through technologies of rule or force; ii) spaces where the state controls peoples' bodies (like asylums, hospitals and refugee camps); and iii) illegible documentation and practices through which the state aims to control population and territories, and through which social actors understand and experience the

state.

Based on this theorisation, I frame the margins of the state as those political, social, and geographical areas that, according to the state, need to be transformed so their inhabitants can become citizens and their territories can be controlled as part of national society. Specifically, for this research, I treat Amazonian indigenous communities where the NPCF works as the margins of the state, with the following features: remoteness or physical distance from centres of power, where vulnerable people (such as indigenous peoples) live and lack power to influence state actions or claim state presence, and where state services are precarious. These characteristics of the margins often make them difficult landscapes to exercise state power, and at the same time, attractive to environment and development projects (Robbins, 2008).

Positioning my research through the analysis of the margins does not imply strengthening the dichotomy between centre and periphery, but rather analysing the nuances that characterise the presence of the state in the everyday life of specific marginal settings whose populations claim citizenship. But the state effects approach is not the only strategy to analyse the state society relationship. As part of the postmodernist turn, since the 1970s, social science scholars have revisited classical theories of the state to revalue its connection with society in terms of territorial networking, social cooperation, self-regulation and state effects.

Regarding the connection of the state and society through territorial networking, *Neo-Weberian* scholars explore the institutional and authoritative capacity of the state to exercise

power and enforce policy across the limited territory it claims to control (Soifer and vom Hau, 2008). Mann (1984), as one of the main representatives of the *Neo- Weberian* approach, labels this ability as infrastructural power, defined as the social and spatial networks of power between state and non-state actors, in different territorial scales, to influence citizens' behaviour and control the population (Soifer and vom Hau, 2008; Mann, 1984). With infrastructural power, the state spreads information that makes the state administrative apparatus and its regulations known and legible to society. To properly operate, the state needs the active cooperation of society, instead of the imposition of rules by force (Mann, 1984). Although focusing on social cooperation, infrastructural state power dismisses considering the role of citizens when participating in different forms of collaboration with the state, which is in fact one of my main concerns in this dissertation.

In terms of self-regulation, the *technologies of rule* approach analyses of the state through strategies that shape citizens' behaviour encouraging the production of desired conducts and preventing undesired ones, applying subtle forms of power such as knowledge, language, human capacities, and ideology instead of the use of the force (Corbridge et al., 2005; Rose, 1999). Foucault's idea of governmentality (1991) and later of environmentality, coined by Luke (1995), and then popularised by Agrawal (2005) refer to state mechanisms to make people follow the rules as if under their own initiatives. Through the environmentality lens, the state advances specific types of ecological knowledge, which construct what is considered as the truth regarding environmental behaviour.

Despite the extensive discussion of environmentality, there are shortcomings in this framework that make it inadequate for this study. Environmentality studies typically assume

that citizens that regulate their behaviours, also known as environmental subjects, are docile individuals without the willingness or opportunities to resist environmental rules and are deprived of creativity to respond to state environmental regulation (Cepek, 2011).

From this perspective, there is little commentary on how environmental subjects interpret and react to environmental regulation. It also assumes that state regulation is implemented exactly as intended by policy makers at the local level which, based on the literature on street level bureaucrats as outlined above is difficult to materialise. In that sense, environmentality fails to explore in-depth the role of state officials in the field, neglecting their agency in encouraging (or not) policy goals (Orihuela, 2017). Indeed, as already mentioned, state representatives have their own forms of understanding the state and the way policy should be implemented.

Considering the previous analysis of different approaches to analyse the state-society relationship, the theoretical position chosen in this dissertation is the state effects approach. The state effects approach examines the state as a set of practices and processes and the effects they leave in society as a work in progress, rather than as a structured and coherent apparatus (Trouillot, 2001; Painter, 1995). As such, the state effects are understood as the traces of state rule in the everyday lives of citizens.

The analysis of state effects focuses on how the conduct of public policy makes the state appear to exist, and how encounters between state and non-state actors invoke the materiality of the state that otherwise would remain abstract in citizens' everyday lives (Erikssen, 2017; Mitchell, 1991). In this manner, the state effects approach implies paying attention to the daily practices

in which the state is visible and tangible locally, through human interactions, between state representations and citizens, but also with infrastructure and state bureaucracy (Harvey and Knox, 2015). When citizens connect randomly with these forms of experiencing the state (Poole 2004), they activate and renew their forms of understanding the state.

Interactions between state and non-state actors involve explanation, dialogue, and negotiation of rules, followed by acceptance, adaptation, contestation, rejection and reshaping of actions (Eriksson, 2017; Trouillot, 2001). Indeed, state effects are not only based on state actors' unidirectional performance but are reshaped by social actors' reaction and contestation according to their understanding of the state. The agreement of the population to follow the rules depends on the performativity of statehood, referring to the strategies and narratives state frontline workers use to position the state as the highest political authority and, as such, to make citizens regulate their behaviour, endorsing incentives and sanctions (Mason and Khawlie 2016; Ioris, 2014; Whitehead et al., 2007; Corbridge et al., 2005).

Regarding the production of state effects through state infrastructure, in an analysis of roads in the Peruvian Andes and Amazon region, Harvey and Knox (2015) discuss how these infrastructures contribute to redefining state formation, through which different actors negotiate their expectations, economic livelihoods, and even corrupt acts around the construction of a road. Harris' study of irrigation infrastructure in Turkey (2009, 2008) demonstrates that the state's physical presence in the form of dams impacts on local senses of citizenship and social inclusion. As such, state infrastructure stimulates citizens to recast their own political identities as citizens reinforcing their possibilities of political action as part of state modernization efforts.

The different responses that citizens have regarding the implementation of public policy and of strategies of statehood produce specific effects, not only on the functioning of the policies implemented, but on the image of the state locally (Migdal, 2001). The constitutive ideas about the state are also embedded in cultural, social, and geographical characteristics of local and territorialised contexts (Sharma and Gupta, 2006; Ferguson and Gupta, 2002). Localised understandings of the state are also contrasted with prior exercises of imagination about what the state is in relation to previous experiences, other stories, and even collective memory (Nugent, 2001). It is through these understandings of the state that social actors choose how to perform as citizens and users of public policy.

Still, understandings of the state are far from being a clean process and are better portrayed as messy, vague, and blurry (Painter, 2006; Gupta 1995). In that sense, exploring the state through state effects also implies acknowledging the uneven capacity of the state to intervene in different territorial scales and with different social groups. Painter (2006) proposes analysing *prosaic stateness* as the ordinary state practices filtering into everyday life to reveal its heterogeneous, uneven, and relational characteristics, and to highlight the analytical impossibility of decoupling the state from daily social life (Painter, 2006; Mitchell, 1991). For this research, grounded on the interactions between the state and indigenous peoples living at “the margins”, instead of prosaic, I rather frame the everyday state as “precarious” to underline its unarticulated, uneven, and complex presence, as well as its inconsistency as an environmental actor, not necessarily capable of enforcing law, especially at the margins of the state (Robbins, 2008).

#### 4.5. The bureaucratisation of communities

An important state effect of the implementation of public policy is bureaucracy. The presence of the state, particularly at the margins, is usually materialised through documents, signatures, applications, procedures. As mentioned in the introduction, my original hypothesis required reorientation as initial fieldwork findings encouraged me to pay more attention to the quotidian and repetitive bureaucratic rituals of the PES scheme within communities. Given my training as an anthropologist, these findings invited me to consider discussions from anthropology of development and anthropology of bureaucracy.

Anthropology of development problematises the role of power within development initiatives that are considered as technical strategies to solve complex problems like poverty, inequality, and even mismanagement of natural resources and environmental problems. (Ferguson, 1990). It also discusses theoretical concerns around the success or failure of the initiatives implemented (Gardner and Lewis, 2015; De Sardan, 2005; Gow, 2002). In this realm, studies on anthropology of development debate that the failure of development does not necessarily depend on technical weaknesses but on the neglect of overseeing the structural socio-political aspects of local cultures.

James Ferguson's (1994) book *The Antipolitics Machine* was a landmark piece for analysing the reasons behind the failure of a set of development initiatives in Lesotho between 1990 and 1980. For this author, the complex problems of the country were only assessed by development practitioners as being technical, simplifying how power and politics operate locally, a practice he labelled as "the anti-politics machine" of development. With this

problematic exposed, Ferguson revealed the fragile and limited knowledge produced by development experts about the settings and conditions that need to be improved at the local level. For Ferguson, regarding the case of Lesotho, the failures of development actually impacted on growing state power, as local public bureaucracies expanded to offer the operational support for the implementation of proposed development solutions.

In a similar vein, in *Seeing like the State*, James Scott (1998), suggests that the failure of high modernist interventions relies on state attempts of simplifying the social settings for an effective implementation of development initiatives with clear and legible participants. This willingness of the state for legibility implies deleting local knowledge, values and practices to prioritise the technical understandings of complex problems based on modern and scientific data. Li (2007) in *The Will to Improve* speaks also to this debate. She shows that rendering complex problems as technical masks the structural conditions that produced the problems being targeted by development interventions. Failures in development then lead to development experts to blame the policy users, identifying “poor behavioral change” without considering the projects’ design and their own practices and roles in creating certain types of knowledge.

The reflections of these authors about the neglected political dimension of public policy and development initiatives is useful in questioning how the state and its bureaucracy often attempts to simplify their social settings in order to create legible public policy users for technical interventions. More particularly, I build on Ferguson’s idea of development as a mechanism to expand bureaucratic state power. Yet instead of focusing on the role of the experts of development producing knowledge, I highlight *the effects that these initiatives*

*produce*, exploring local forms of embracing the idea of development and the bureaucratic practices.

To explore local forms of embracing state bureaucratic practices, I also consider scholarship on anthropology of bureaucracy. This is a subdiscipline of anthropology that explores the functioning of different bureaucracies, the effects they produce in society and the strategies different groups use to audit themselves (Mathur, 2017). Across the extensive set of anthropology studies on bureaucracy, such as of civil servants and bureaucrats (Fleischmann, 2016; Mathur, 2015; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 2014; Gupta, 2012; Matthews, 2005; Gupta and Ferguson, 2002), documents (Allard and Walker, 2016; Hull, 2012; Hetherington, 2011) and bureaucratic infrastructures (Penfield, 2016; Lund, 2001), my interest is in exploring local forms of understandings and the attempted appropriation of bureaucracy by indigenous communities to enable them to better connect with the state.

Any form of appropriation of bureaucratic skills starts with the condition of commanding the official language that the state speaks. Literacy is a fundamental asset of bureaucracy and of the relationship that the state establishes with its citizens, whether citizens master literacy skills or not (Ames 2004). In fact, literacy is the means through which social actors can claim their citizenship and paperwork the mechanism for encountering the state in terms of rights and responsibilities (Sharma and Gupta 2006).

For centuries, literacy has been an important weapon for indigenous peoples to fight against the abuse of dominant actors (Zavala, Niño-Murcia and Ames, 2004; Aikman 2004). In Amazonian societies, literacy, and especially writing, has also been an important form of

mediation to access western external agents, especially those that are expected to contribute to improving their lives and communities, like the state (Santos Granero, 2009; Gonzales, 2016; Walker, 2016). Amazonian indigenous peoples understand that writing and documentation put them in a better position to negotiate with the state and the wider society (Allard and Walker, 2016; Espinosa, 2016b). They have also acknowledged the importance of acquiring linguistic competencies in Spanish and the bureaucratic jargon of the state to become legible users of public policy (Allard and Walker, 2016; Espinosa, 2016a, 2016b).

Since the mid-1970s, Amazonian indigenous peoples have learnt about the importance of minutes, certificates, documents of identification and reports to obtain legal titles over their ancestral territories (Greene, 2009; Goody, 1977). Indeed, the relationship between indigenous peoples and the state, whether for requesting basic services, rights on land property land or other claims, has always been mediated by written documents. However, writing is not enough. Citizens must command navigation skills through state bureaucratic apparatus to write and present their paperwork in the correct paths.

Forms of Amazonian indigenous political organisations tend to replicate the structure of the state bureaucratic apparatus. Communal board members are elected democratically by secret vote every two years. Their duties are inscribed in community statutes that emulate the Peruvian civil code. Likewise, communal decision making takes place in general assemblies, in which *comuneros*' participation is mandatory. In these meetings, the board secretary records agreements, and decisions in the communal minutes book, which is legalised by a notary (Pinedo, 2014). The increasing exposition and articulation of Amazonian indigenous peoples to the national society has intensified their adoption of state bureaucratic procedures as

representations of being part of civic life (Brown, 1993). In general, within Amazonian communities, development projects from the public and private sector, like non-profit organisations, also demand that indigenous peoples master administrative and literacy skills as users of these interventions (Pinedo 2014; Aikman 2001).

Scholars interested in bureaucracy among rural groups at the margins, have focused on the positive outcomes of local appropriations of bureaucratic forms to connect with the state and the national society. For example, Walker's (2016) study of Urarina peoples in the northern Amazonian part of Peru has shown how despite low levels of literacy, this indigenous group engaged with written documents as a mechanism to intensify demands, harnessing the persuasive power of paper. Gonzales (2016), in her study of the health system within Yanomami communities in Venezuela, suggests that written documents, like letters, elicit a better and more effective form of communication with health agents, rather than oral and face to face communication.

Besides the significance of written documents and symbolic power attached to them to achieve better results in bureaucratic procedures and communication in general, for indigenous peoples it is also relevant to have expertise regarding how to circulate them through different state bureaucratic circuits and infrastructures. Penfield (2016), in her study of the bureaucratic journeys to state agencies conducted by Venezuelan Sanema indigenous men, demonstrates that these displacements and maneuvers of paper are also culturally valued. Besides the conduct of specific bureaucratic procedures, these journeys for knowledge allow men to increase and consolidate their social network outside their communities to become well-respected community leaders. Lund (2001) in her exploration of obtaining

national identity cards in the Peruvian highlands, underlines that the corporeal experience of travelling to urban settings and dealing with bureaucratic infrastructure and artifacts (identity cards) provide Andean indigenous peoples “with an embodied experience of the state that forms their subjective experience of the self” (2001: 20).

While these authors explore the performative role and political power of documents among Amazonian indigenous peoples, beyond their textual contents (Walker, 2016; Gonzales, 2016), and the cultural reinterpretation of the bureaucratic journeys and maneuvering of paper to let them flow through the correct paths (Penfield 2016; Lund, 2001), in contrast, I explore the importance of the “know how” of preparing documentation. I take a step forward from this debate and choose to focus on the expectation of increased bureaucratic agency among indigenous representatives and the embrace of the subtle attempts of the state to install an audit culture at the margins of the state.

The appropriation of state bureaucratic features among indigenous peoples advances as some states keep exploring innovative forms of bureaucratic participation and co-management in environment and development initiatives (Fache, 2014). Despite the positive aspects of embracing bureaucracy by indigenous peoples, it can also impact on increasing the existing power relationship between indigeneity and states. For the Kluane First Nation peoples in Canada, Nadasdy (2003) proposes that their participation in land claims’ procedures and wildlife co-management in Yukon, theoretically aimed at empowering them, ended up prolonging asymmetrical power relations between indigenous peoples and the Canadian state.

As part of the management of wildlife, the Kluane were required to learn and adopt official and scientific knowledge about animals and land property in new terms, very different to the cultural meanings they attach to wildlife and ancestral land. For Nadasdy, this scenario shows effective results for the Canadian state, expanding its hegemonic control over indigenous territories by installing official institutional norms without adapting to indigenous values. Similarly, Fache (2014), in her study of indigenous rangers in Northern Australia, suggests that the ranger system contributes towards the expansion of neoliberal bureaucratisation into Indigenous communities, as these subjects are expected to consider their relationships with nature on the basis of neoliberal rationales and requirements.

Another problematic aspect of adopting bureaucratic procedures among indigenous peoples is dealing with accountability. The enthusiasm of state and most development agencies for indigenous participation with accountability may intensify the burden of paperwork that express numbers and indicators of progress, that later represent the success of states penetrating the social realm, even if these numeric procedures remain as part of the illegible aspects of state bureaucracy. For Gupta (2012), writing can be a mechanism to exercise violence against the poorest and, at the same time, the means by which the state is materialised at the margins. However, the poorest are still willing to reinforce this connection with the state, developing different strategies like forging documents or educating their children to learn to write.

In general terms, despite the challenges in bureaucratising communities, it is still embraced by local peoples. Although Nadasdy (2003) argues that co-participation of indigenous peoples in land management and conservation projects are far from empowering, they still make the

effort of becoming bureaucrats themselves and of creating bureaucratic infrastructures for interfacing with the state.

#### 4.6. Indigeneity and citizenship

One of my interests about analysing bureaucratisation of indigenous communities in terms of state effects is to explore how indigeneity can be politically reconfigured for a better exercise of citizenship. The traditional concept of indigeneity refers to subjects and groups that represent themselves as holding an indigenous quality as distinctive from dominant societies (Radcliffe, 2017). This definition also implies that those groups holding the criteria of indigeneity are deeply attached to a territory with which to have cultural repertoires of meaning, that consolidates a strong sense of connection and belonging (Li, 2000). These standardised explanations of indigeneity also accentuate and comprise the historical and power-embedded features of indigeneity against dominant national states and societies (Radcliffe, 2017; Merlan, 2009).

The concept of indigeneity has been widely discussed (De la Cadena and Starn, 2010; Merlan, 2010; Tsing, 2010) in addressing it as a political field rather than a essentialized concept that connects indigenous peoples to traditional land, as it does not necessarily fit into today's global scenario of migration, diaspora and multiculturalism. Many of the current discussions on indigeneity take Barth's (1969) study on ethnic boundaries to highlight that the construction of indigeneity relies on the contrast of the indigenous against what is not indigenous, highlighting its relational meaning. After Barth, debates on indigeneity propose it as a dynamic category that moves across social boundaries and able to be detached from

specific landscapes (Del Cairo, 2012).

In the analysis of the reconfiguration of the state indigeneity relationship through the implementation of a PES scheme, it is important to address indigeneity as a political field. Focusing on the political realm of indigeneity in public policy and environment and development initiatives in general implies acknowledging the power dynamics between indigenous peoples and the state, instead of reflecting on who is indigenous and why (Shah, 2007), and dismissing the discussion around ethnic belongings to highlight the dynamics of indigenous people willing to exercise their citizenship, claiming social wellbeing and economic opportunities (Merlan, 2020).

Another important state effect of the implementation of public policy within indigenous communities is their resilience and willingness to customise indigeneity as a path to exercise citizenship, claiming the presence of the state and its services at the margins, learning new skills such as literacy and bureaucratic procedures (Greene, 2009; Gow, 2007). Indeed, bureaucracy can be considered as a technique of development and citizenship (Bakonyi, 2018; Ferguson, 1994).

Originally, the term 'customising indigeneity' was coined by Shane Greene (2009) to refer to the process by which Awajun peoples in the Alto Mayo valley in San Martin, Peru, looked for alternative paths to adapt to modernity, finding ideological references to their culture and politics that make these mechanisms appear meaningful. I argue that the notion of customising indigeneity is potent and replicable and can be applied more generally to indigenous peoples in the Peruvian Amazon in their effort to connect with the state and claim

citizenship. In the process of customising their identity, Amazonian indigenous peoples have understood that to articulate with the state, they had to adapt to its bureaucratic procedures, but also to resist public initiatives they considered negatively affected their livelihoods and collective rights. As such, indigenous peoples have adapted to state forms to access development opportunities generated by the process of modernisation.

In Peru, for example, from the 1970s onwards, with the land titling law, indigenous peoples learnt the convenience of living in sedentary settlements under the legal title of indigenous communities recognised by the Peruvian state, even if that meant demarcating and reducing their ancestral territory. In contrast, indigenous peoples have embraced resistance to state interventions considered as threats to the continuity of customary practices, values, and cultural landscapes. For instance, today many indigenous groups in Peru have long confronted the state over the granting of licenses for extractive industries to operate in their territories (Zuñiga and Okamoto, 2019; Espinosa, 2009).

In customising their indigeneity, indigenous peoples face the dilemma of state recognition. If they adapt to and agree with state interventions, for example, environmental schemes to conserve forests, they are recognised as good citizens and “ecological natives” (*nativo ecológico*) (Ulloa, 2004). Ecological natives are represented as protectors of the Amazonian territory for cultural, moral, and symbolic reasons. In contrast, if they resist state regulation or projects considered as threats to their livelihoods, they are targeted by the state as problematic and obstacles to development (Alza and Zambrano, 2014) and even to nature, when framed as forest destroyers (Forsyth and Walker, 2008). As such, indigenous peoples can perform their citizenship only if they become “the permitted Indian” (*Indio permitido*)

(Hale, 2004). This socio-political category implies that indigeneity is celebrated by the state, only if they accept the national development agenda.

The exercise of citizenship relates to the rights and responsibilities, individuals and groups like indigenous peoples are able to enjoy, granted by a state as the highest political authority (Pieck, 2013). Being a citizen also implies the mechanisms individuals use to establish their sense of belonging to the state. Therefore, citizenship is a demand of membership for a political community (Lund, 2016). The constitution of citizenship, as a construction of a sense of belonging to the state, includes not only a legal recognition, with official identification documents, but through other subtle and symbolic mechanisms constructed in the everyday, like the possibility of accessing public services. The relevance of defining citizenship beyond the legal status is how indigenous peoples connect to the state and fix their sense of belonging that allows them access to state services (Glenn, 2011).

Taking into account these considerations, the discussion of citizenship and indigeneity for this research is more linked to what Schiller (2005) describes as social citizenship as the possibility of claiming rights through social practice rather than the law. Although Schiller defines social citizenships as transborder citizens, the concept can be applied in other scenarios like the NPCF. This also implies that the exercise of citizenship can be represented in subtle manners like demanding the presence of the state, public services and participating in bureaucratic procedures to achieve them.

Following Lund, “rights do not simply flow from authority but also constitute it” (2017, p.1). Claims of rights are claims for citizenship, which also implies the recognition of authority and

the governing capacity of the state. In that sense, strategies for the consecution of citizenship are about the constitution and recognition of political authority and at the same time, the claim for membership to a political community. Being part of a political body is a strategy for visibility and legibility. This demand is particularly relevant for the individuals and groups at the margins where the presence of the state is precarious. However, this call for visibility does not necessarily mean it is granted. This means that the exercise of citizenship is not performed as there may not be reciprocity or, recognition from the state (Lund, 2016).

#### 4.7. Conclusions

This research aims to contribute to scholarship on the state-indigeneity relationship by studying the implementation of a PES scheme in Peruvian indigenous communities. In particular, I examine the micropolitics of the interactions between community-level bureaucrats and indigenous peoples as a key scenario in which environmental policy with a strong bureaucratic component is implemented, contested, and through which indigeneity and citizenship are redefined. Likewise, this study also expects to contribute to filling the gap in scholarship on Amazonian Forest conservation policy interventions within indigenous communities, adopting an interdisciplinary, ethnographic approach that provides empirical evidence to assess theoretical claims on PES political implications, the everyday state, environmental statehood, forest bureaucracy and state formation at the margins.

In terms of geopolitics, this research expands the still underrepresented scholarship on the everyday state bureaucracy in the Amazon region and on state formation through environmental policy. Most of the literature of political geography and anthropology debating the concepts of everyday state, environmental statehood, forest bureaucracy and

local state formation is based on South Asia (McConnel, 2016; Fleischmann, 2012; Corbridge et al., 2005; Harris- White, 2003; Li, 2000), and developed countries (Cox et al., 2008). The recognition of these gaps are opportunities to apply and explore everyday state theory in Amazonian, rural scenarios. In the Peruvian context, PES schemes as platforms to strengthen the political relationship between the Peruvian state and indigenous peoples have not been fully explored. This everyday aspect is important because a PES scheme can create conditions for political engagement and opportunities for indigenous peoples to interact with the state in a new light, under the new terms of economic incentives and the management of conditionalities (Larson, 2008).

## Chapter 5: The state and indigeneity in Peru

### 5.1. Introduction

The Peruvian state is a democratic, social, independent, and sovereign republic. Its government is representative and decentralized. Peru is also a multi-ethnic and multicultural state; according to the National Political Constitution (1993): “[e]veryone has the right: to their ethnic and cultural identity. The state recognises and protects the ethnic and cultural plurality of the nation” (article 2, paragraph 19). Throughout contemporary history, the relationship between the Peruvian state and Amazonian indigenous peoples has been complex.

The Peruvian Amazon hosts 51 different indigenous groups,<sup>11</sup> with approximately 300,000 inhabitants, who represent 9% of the national population. Amazonian indigenous peoples live in around 2,700<sup>12</sup> communities (INEI, 2018); of which around 1,500 are legally recognised. Amazonian indigenous communities have legal ownership of the 17% of Peruvian Amazonian land, around 12 million hectares, in addition to five reserves for indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation, occupying another 2.8 million hectares (MINAM, 2016b).

Amazonian indigenous peoples live in one of the richest forests of the world in terms of biodiversity and environmental services, yet they are one of the poorest populations in Peru. Half the Amazonian indigenous population in Peru is poor. This is an extremely high percentage compared to the national average of 17%. Of the 50% of indigenous poor, 37% are non-extreme poor, while 13% are extremely poor (Ministerio de Cultura, 2020). The extreme poor are those who live on less than GBP 43 (183 soles) a month. In terms of basic services, only

3% of the Amazonian indigenous population have access to drinking water, sewerage, and electricity, in contrast to 77% of the urban non-indigenous population; while 88% of these households use polluting fuel for cooking. In terms of education, 48% of indigenous peoples have attended elementary school; 13% of indigenous peoples are illiterate and only 2% have reached higher education. These social indicators represent the evidence about the need to improve public policy for the wellbeing of indigenous peoples.

Indigenous peoples have faced severe problems of exclusion, poverty, inequality, and land grabbing. They have historically been portrayed and treated as second-class citizens founded on a deeply rooted racial discrimination. Yet, since the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, the state has made modest, sometimes failed, efforts to promote the wellbeing of indigenous peoples, generally in the form of development projects. Most of these schemes have attempted to modernise indigenous peoples, through economic activities, as the main path to transform them into citizens. In this chapter, I study the contemporary relationship between the Peruvian state and Amazonian indigenous peoples to situate the NPCF as a mechanism that reconfigures the state-indigeneity relationship. In the next section (5.2), I examine the recent history of public policy interventions in the Peruvian Amazon targeting indigenous peoples. I then provide some conclusions in section (5.3).

## 5.2. Public institutionality for indigenous peoples

One of the main challenges for the Peruvian state to achieve the development and respectful inclusion of Amazonian indigenous peoples into society is to create a strong institutional and legal framework and the implementation of public policy for indigenous citizens (Alza and

Zambrano, 2014). Today, despite the fact that the main collective rights of Amazonian indigenous peoples are regulated by law, indigenous peoples still face barriers to connect with the state in terms of the recognition of their collective rights, and the implementation of adequate policy to guarantee their position as Peruvian citizens. Effective policy implementation for indigenous peoples requires the state to adapt to their local social dynamics, and capabilities as public policy users, instead of trying to reproduce forms of administration that only appear illegible in the everyday lives of communities. In Peru, the current legal framework that protects indigenous peoples has been integrated into the public life of Peruvian society through a long process of struggles and contradictions, advances and setbacks. It is through the everyday actions of the conduct of public policy targeted at indigenous communities that the challenges that the state faces to adapt its services for indigenous populations have become clear.

Since the mid-20th century, public interventions in the Amazonian territory have sought to modernise and capitalise on this region, seen as unproductive land, an empty frontier of the nation, and also to "civilise" and socially include the apparently unruly indigenous population into national society to transform them into citizens (Greene, 2009; Dean, 2002; Chirif, 1997). The different initiatives conducted in the Amazonian region had been founded on western views of inclusion and development, meaning also asymmetrical forms of interacting between the state and indigenous peoples. As a consequence, development projects in the Amazon produced unintended, problematic scenarios for the indigenous population, which did not necessarily increase their wellbeing (Bravo, 2016). Even when indigenous peoples have gained attention from the state with social infrastructure like public health centres, schools and social protection programmes, the historical apathy of the state towards indigenous peoples still

shapes indigenous peoples' sentiments of distrust and suspicion against the state (Santos-Granero and Barclay 2011; Meetzen 2007).

The presence of the state in the daily life of indigenous peoples started intensifying around the 1960s, with the introduction of large-scale development projects in the Amazon region, as part of the goal of integrating indigenous populations living at the margins of the state. As mentioned before, since the 1960s, conservative visions of the Amazon as an unproductive landscape inspired state interventions to expand the agricultural frontier. The state promoted the colonisation of the Amazon region by Andean migrants to compensate for a shortage of farmland in the Andes.

The government of President Fernando Belaunde Terry, which ruled between 1963 and 1968, encouraged the colonisation of the Peruvian Amazon, using the slogan: "land without men for men without land". In this period, the construction of the Fernando Belaunde Terry (FBT) road was the key infrastructure project supporting these policies. However, the FBT road and the colonisation project generated conflicts between indigenous peoples and migrants over the possession of land, when colonists started settling in their forested territories (Yrigoyen, 2002). For president Belaunde Terry, Amazonian indigenous peoples represented an obstacle to the modernisation of the Amazon (Dourojeanni, 2017).

In the late 1960s, in the context of the increasing presence of Andean migrants in the Peruvian Amazon, indigenous groups started organising politically to demand legal recognition of their traditional territories. In 1969, the first of three Peruvian Amazonian indigenous organisations appeared, including one Awajun organisation (Soria, 2018). Since then, many other indigenous

federations have been created. In the process of building the Amazonian indigenous movement, indigenous leaders learnt to imitate the political structures of the Peruvian state as an effective means of becoming legible interlocutors (Pinedo, 2014; Aikman, 2001). As the indigenous political movement grew, indigenous leaders embraced the legal vocabulary of the state and the formal use of documents to conduct bureaucratic procedures to claim collective rights and access public services (Allard and Walker 2016). Likewise, indigenous people's performance of bureaucratic actions through having a command of Spanish language allowed them to navigate the modern world that the state represented (Green, 2009; Brown, 2014).

In 1968, the military conducted a coup d'état against president Belaunde Terry. Juan Velasco Alvarado, the president of the military dictatorship (1968 - 1974), thought the military had to be the responsible entity for breaking down the Peruvian landowning elite. Velasco launched the National Agrarian Reform programme. For the military, the agrarian reform would remove the potential threat of a communist uprising by indigenous peoples, especially Andean indigenous communities.

In the context of the military government, Amazonian indigenous peoples appeared as legitimate actors in the public and political scene, with the legal recognition by the state of their communities as collective property and with the promulgation of the Law of Indigenous Communities and Agricultural Promotion of the Jungle and Mountain Jungle Regions (Decree Law 20653), launched in 1974. With this law, the military government coined the term "indigenous community" (*comunidad nativa*), to be used instead of the label of "tribe" (*tribu*). By that time, 'tribe' was a pejorative term that evoked the notion of indigenous peoples as "savage indians" (Greene 2009). Likewise, the word "indian" (*indio*) was forbidden to be used

as an alternative to “native” (*nativo*). The military pursued the legal recognition of indigenous territories as a means to integrate them into mainstream Peru and allow them to become formal political actors.

Law N° 20653 was launched to recognise indigenous communities as owners of the lands they use, granting them the status of being "inalienable, imprescriptible and indefeasible." By that time, the military aimed to incorporate indigenous peoples into “civilisation” (Dourojeanni, 2017). This law was later modified in 1978. With this law N° 22175, indigenous peoples were given differentiated land rights: land directed towards agriculture and to conservation and forestry activities. The former would remain the property of the communities, while the latter would be allocated under the terms of "assignment in use". In other words, communities titled after 1978 would not be the owners of the forests within their territories, but merely of the areas with agricultural potential. With this strategic move, the state increased its control over forests and created the opportunity of granting Amazonian land to companies for agricultural or agro-industry projects classified as “national priority” (Chirif and García, 2007). This law is still in force today.

With the indigenous land titling law, the indigenous population adapted their traditional political and social forms of organisation to new ones proposed by the state. They had to create communal boards (*juntas directivas*) as the main instrument of political authority, instead of their tradition of having only one general chief. Likewise, non-sedentary indigenous peoples, previously involved in hunting and gathering, had to settle in delimited territories to be legally titled as indigenous communities. Although the law for titling communities meant the public recognition of the formal existence of indigenous communities, it also subordinated

indigenous peoples to the political authority of the state and its institutional apparatus (Galvez, 2003). However, the military government was legitimately interested in affirming the dignity and confidence of indigenous peoples, supporting the recognition of their collective rights and of both modernising and integrating them into national society (Soria, 2018).

In 1975, a new military coup d'état defeated President Velasco Alvarado and, in 1978, a Constituent Assembly was created as a national authority until 1980 to facilitate the return to democracy. In 1979, a new version of the National Constitution was released. This Constitution promoted the protection of indigenous collective lands. Indigenous communities became unseizable, imprescriptible and inalienable, and could only be alienated if requested by a majority of the community members.

In 1980, Belaunde Terry became president again (1980 – 1985), resuming the developmentalist and colonialist approach to public policy in the Peruvian Amazon. Yet, in the early 1980s, the entire country began experiencing the violent action of armed groups, which was to last 20 years until 2000. The Shining Path and the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (SL and MRTA respectively, for their acronyms in Spanish) aimed at a social revolution to end the democratic government and install a socialist system. They both started their mobilisations in poor rural areas of Peru. Amazonian forests were preferred sites to hide from national armed forces. The presence of these armed groups in the Amazon became a justification for the state to treat indigenous peoples as potential enemies.

SL, in its early stage, gained the sympathy of some indigenous groups in the central Amazon region, with the ideal of bringing radical social and political change to their communities

(Santos-Granero and Barclay, 2002). However, SL forced the enlistment of children and murdered indigenous leaders, indigenous peoples pushed SL out of their territories.

The government of Alan Garcia Perez (1985 - 1990) made efforts to bring the state closer to rural communities, organising large-scale meetings with indigenous leaders from the entire country. In these meetings, all participants could speak to the president and present their list of demands. These meetings became very important at the time, since there was no significant political presence of local governments that indigenous communities could rely on (Urrutia, 2006). However, despite the richness of the exchanges in these meetings, they never served to create concrete policies for the indigenous peoples (Meetzen, 2007).

The government of Alberto Fujimori (1990 – 2000) marked a major shift to neo-liberal economic policymaking. The neoliberal state of the 1990s increased economic control over Amazonian territories, ratifying the historical tendency of the Peruvian state to favour agriculture over the conservation of forests. In this period, an important growth of the extractive industry of hydrocarbons and timber occurred in the Amazon, including in indigenous territories. However, to proceed with these extractive activities, the state had to start a process of ordering land tenure, including titling indigenous communities (Greene 2009). Indeed, in San Martin, Kichwa communities started their titling processes during this period.

Nevertheless, the government of Fujimori launched a new edition of the National Constitution in 1993, which reduced the three main features of indigenous communities- inalienable, unseizable and imprescriptible- to only one: imprescriptible. Although the state actively

encouraged the erosion of indigenous rights, in 1995 the state also signed the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention Nº169 on the protection of indigenous rights. Also, in the 1990s, the Peruvian state tried to include indigenous peoples into the national development agenda, through the implementation of social programmes to alleviate poverty (Valdivia et al., 2007). These initiatives had a populist slant to engage rural people, including the Amazonian indigenous peoples, in a clientelist relationship to seek political support (Oliart, 2002). Most of these public service and infrastructure projects were of poor quality, revealing a general disinterest in the real situation of indigenous peoples (Meetzen, 2007).

In 1998, the Peruvian state created the Technical Secretariat for Indigenous Affairs (SETAI, for its acronym in Spanish) to formulate policies and norms and to coordinate projects to benefit indigenous populations. In subsequent years, this institution responsible for addressing the needs of indigenous peoples would change its name and legal status many times, demonstrating the low priority that the development of indigenous peoples has had in the state in recent decades (Pajuelo, 2007).

After ten years of government, President Fujimori resigned by fax in 2000 over a highly charged case of alleged state corruption. A transitional democratic government was installed between 2000 – 2001, led by president Valentín Paniagua Corazao. In this period, the Peruvian state demonstrated its willingness to attend to the interests of indigenous communities (Valdivia et al., 2007). New initiatives that claimed to integrate indigenous development needs with environmental policy goals were conducted. The state designed the territorial category of communal reserves, as natural protected areas, aimed at benefiting indigenous communities with the direct use and consumption of natural resources from these areas to support their

livelihoods (Valdivia et al., 2007).

In 2001, the state installed a special commission to study the situation of Amazonian indigenous communities to formulate new norms to promote their economic development. This commission launched an action plan with concrete norms, activities, and budgets, such as respecting indigenous peoples' property rights and ensuring the participation of indigenous peoples in the management and benefits of protected natural areas (Gamboa, 2018). When the transitional government ended and a new democratic government was inaugurated in 2001, these previous arrangements were dismissed, and a new indigenous institution appeared again.

In the first decade of the 2000s, with the decentralisation process, sub-national governments started assuming new responsibilities, such as titling indigenous communities. Unfortunately, in some transfers of authority, documentation was lost, delaying most of the titling processes of communities. Titling indigenous communities eventually diminished due to poor information, endless bureaucratic procedures and because the state preferred to grant logging, mining and hydrocarbon concessions and infrastructure projects, many of them in areas overlapping with land claimed by indigenous groups (Larson, et al., 2017).

During the government of Alejandro Toledo Manrique (2001 - 2006), the SETAI became the Commission for Andean, Amazonian, and Afro-Peruvian Peoples (CONAPA). This agency retained the similar goals of its predecessors: of leading development strategies for indigenous peoples, respecting cultural values and eliminating all forms of discrimination for indigenous peoples from the Andes and the Amazon, as well as for Afro-Peruvians. However,

the CONAPA could not achieve organisational stability and ended up failing. Indigenous leaders that operated as civil servants within this institution were kept in the minority, and most of the decision-making was held by the “first lady”, Eliane Karp, a Belgian anthropologist, who served as director of the institution, and her management committee, which did not include indigenous representatives.

In 2004, CONAPA was dissolved and, in 2005, the National Institute of Development for Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian Peoples (INDEPA, for its acronym in Spanish) appeared. INDEPA had a vision of indigenous development linked to improving indigenous peoples' agriculture to integrate them into national society as economic actors. Similarly, it approached indigenous matters in a superficial manner, for example, promoting folkloric activities rather than addressing the political grievances of indigenous communities (Alza and Zambrano, 2014).

In the period 2001 - 2006, the state prioritised economic investments for the extraction of resources, notably hydrocarbons in the Amazon region. Indeed, the biggest gas extraction concession (Camisea) was granted in 2002, partially within a reserve for non-contacted indigenous groups (Feather, 2014). The focus of extractive activities within indigenous territories caused substantial levels of distrust amongst indigenous peoples towards the state (IBC, 2018). In 2006, Alan García became president again (2006 - 2011). In this period, the state negotiated the Free Trade Agreement with the United States. The signature of this agreement demanded that the Peruvian government improve its environmental regulations and create a Ministry of the Environment. In this scenario, the state launched new norms in forestry matters that triggered the mobilisation of Amazonian indigenous peoples to consider the new norms

as a way of weakening their ownership over indigenous land, as these would propose reducing the requirements to sell indigenous lands (Legislative decrees 1090, 1015 and 1073).

Besides these legal changes, president García also published, in the main Peruvian newspaper, "El Comercio", three articles entitled "The dog in the manger syndrome" (*El síndrome del perro del hortelano*). In these articles, García suggested that the exploitation of Amazonian natural resources was crucial for national development. Nevertheless, this economic practice was blocked, he claimed, because the groups that control these resources (indigenous peoples) did not know how to exploit them, since they followed logic contrary to those of the market: "[t]here are many resources that are left unused, that don't receive investment and don't generate employment. All of that is due to ideology, idleness, laziness, or the law of the dog in the manger: if I don't do it, no one should do it. The first such resource is the Amazon" (García, 2007). Such discourse, and the promulgation of the three legislative decrees aimed at facilitating the extractive development of indigenous communal territories, triggered the Baguazo protest in 2009 (See Chapter 2).

Paradoxically, in 2010, the Peruvian Ministry of Culture was created to conduct policies for Amazonian and Andean indigenous peoples and Afro-Peruvians, and to promote the inclusion of an intercultural approach in all public services and policies. With this new ministry, INDEPA disappeared. In 2015, the state launched the national policy for the mainstreaming of the intercultural approach, which aimed to adapt public services and policy according to indigenous peoples' needs and cultural practices. The government of Ollanta Humala Tasso (2011 - 2016), a former radical nationalist leader, was acknowledged through his social policy initiatives to favour the social inclusion of the rural poor, including Amazonian indigenous peoples. In this period, the Ministry of Social Inclusion was created to close the social and

economic gap between the rich and the poor, including indigenous peoples. One of the most important milestones in the history of inclusion of indigenous peoples occurred in this period, with the declaration of the Prior Consultation law in 2011. With this law, indigenous communities started to have the right to communicate their concerns in agreeing or disagreeing with state and private investment projects and legislative measures that might affect their livelihoods.

In 2016, the economist and entrepreneur Pedro Pablo Kuczynski was elected president. His government launched several “low impact” policies to favour indigenous peoples, such as the national policy on indigenous languages, oral tradition and interculturality, to institutionalise the use of indigenous languages in the implementation of the public administration and in the provision of public services. However, similar to previous governments, the promulgation of economic regulation to activate the Amazonian region rapidly triggered the concern of the indigenous political organisations. For example, Legislative Decree N° 1333, launched in 2017, included flexibility measures to allow for the expropriation of indigenous territories to facilitate infrastructure investments in the Peruvian Amazon. After a new dynamic of social mobilisation from indigenous organisations and pro-indigenous non-profit organisations, this law was later derogated.

In 2018, Kuczynski resigned and his vice-president, Martín Vizcarra Cornejo assumed the presidency until November 2020. In the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, in November 2020, Vizcarra was removed by parliamentary decree over former presumed acts of corruption. Then, the president of the parliament, Miguel Merino, became the president of Peru. During the first days of this new regime, the launch of polemic environmental measures was attempted, such

as allowing alluvial mining in Amazonian rivers. The presidency of Merino provoked social resistance with massive protests in different parts of Peru. Two young men were killed by the police during violent clashes. Merino resigned after six days as president. In November 2020, congressman, academic and liberal industry engineer, Francisco Sagasti, became the fourth president since 2016, continuing until July 2021.

### 5.3. Conclusions

In general, in the late history of Peru, there have been diverse and often contradictory efforts to mediate the relationship between the state and indigeneity. The Peruvian state has made significant progress in the construction of regulatory and institutional frameworks to protect the rights of indigenous peoples and in the operation of different schemes to promote indigenous peoples' development. But on the other hand, it has also tried to develop the national economy based on the use of the Amazonian territory and its natural resources, even if that meant breaking indigenous peoples' collective rights, particularly the land rights of the indigenous population. The current challenge is to turn these regulations and policies into concrete actions to guarantee successful interventions on behalf of indigenous peoples that can strengthen the state-indigeneity relationship.

In this brief historical account of the state-indigeneity relationship in Peru, the proposal of the state to integrate Amazonian indigenous peoples in mainstream Peruvian society has been delineated through national regulation, especially to grant and restrict land rights; a failed attempt to create a public institution on behalf of indigenous peoples; and a failure to design effective development projects targeting indigenous peoples. The impossibility of building

robust policy on behalf of indigenous peoples is evidence of state weakness and political unwillingness to negotiate indigeneity.

### 6.1. Introduction


In this chapter, I examine the overall social and political background of San Martin, including a brief ethnographic account of indigenous peoples living in this department. This background information is fundamental to understand the current role of Kichwa and Awajun peoples as users of public policy and their perceptions about the state as a source of development. In section 6.2., I describe the overall socio-economic features of San Martin; I then provide a brief account of the history of development initiatives in San Martin (6.3); I go on to analyse the situation of indigenous peoples in this department, particularly the Kichwa and Awajun peoples (6.4). I finish by offering some conclusions (6.5) about the advances and challenges of indigenous institutionality in Peru.

### 6.2. The socio-economic background of the department of San Martin

San Martin is one of the 24 political and administrative units in Peru, known as departments. It is divided politically into 10 provinces and 77 districts. The capital of San Martín is the city of Moyobamba. In this city, the main sub national agencies are located as well as the NFCP office. San Martin is located in the north-east of the country, in the upper part of the Amazonian region. It covers 5.1 million hectares, approximately 6% of the national territory of 1.28 million km<sup>2</sup>. The territory of San Martin is geographically situated in an area of highland forests which covers the hillsides of the Andes and their connection with the Amazon forest. Land altitudes vary from 140 to 4000 MASL. Due to its location between these two ecological zones, its

highland forests are considered a biodiversity hotspot (Myers et al., 2000). The territory of San Martin has, broadly, four sub-regions divided by water basins: Alto Mayo; Bajo Huallaga; Huallaga Central and Bajo Mayo; and Alto Huallaga. For this research, I worked in the northern sub regions of Alto Mayo and Bajo Huallaga where the NPCF communities studied are located (Figure 10).

Figure 10: Sub-regions of San Martin. Source Renzo Piana for this thesis, 2021.



Alto Mayo: This sub region is in the provinces of Moyobamba and Rioja. The Alto Mayo Valley lies in the zone known as mountain jungle (*selva alta*), fringing the tropical forest, at elevations between 500 to 1500 MASL, dividing the Andes from the Amazonian lowlands. This is a broad and flat valley. Geographically, it is composed of flat terraces, suitable for agriculture. The Alto Mayo is one of the most dynamic areas in terms of commercial agriculture and therefore, one of the most deforested areas in San Martin. Alto Mayo also hosts the Protection Forest Alto

Mayo (BPAM) that covers 61% of the valley. This natural protected area (NPA) of 182,000 hectares was created to guarantee the supply of water to the Alto Mayo valley, especially to the farmland. Alto Mayo is the landscape where the Awajun communities are located. This landscape is very well connected with the coast and Andes regions due to the proximity of the Fernando Belaunde Terry (FBT).

Bajo Huallaga: This sub-region is located in the provinces of El Dorado, Lamas and San Martin. Geographically, it is composed of lowland forested landscapes and floodplains. In contrast to the Alto Mayo, the Bajo Huallaga has fewer communication nodes, and no possibility of fluvial communication, as the rivers are not navigable. The population is mainly rural, including the Kichwa indigenous peoples. This is the landscape where Kichwa communities from Sisa and Lamas, studied in this research, are located.

Huallaga Central and Bajo Mayo: This sub-region is located in the provinces of Mariscal Caceres, Bellavista, Picota and Huallaga. It is composed of alluvial lands suitable for agriculture and ranching. This area has a poor road system that hinders the commercialization of crops.

Alto Huallaga: This sub-region is located in the province of Tocache. Its land is suitable for agriculture. This has been an area of intensive cultivation of coca for drug trafficking since the 1970s and has also been controlled by armed groups since the 1980s (CVR, 2003). In this area, farmers cultivate palm oil, cocoa, coffee, and fruit trees.

The population of San Martin was 813,381 inhabitants in 2018, with a population density of 14.2 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup> (INEI, 2018). This department has one of the highest population


growth rates in Peru due to constant immigration from Andean settlers looking for agricultural land. Since 1940, the department has increased its population more than 8 times (INEI, 2018). 68% of San Martin's population is urban and 32% rural. The poverty rate in San Martin is 25%, higher than the national rate of 22% and extreme poverty is 3% (INEI, 2017). The highest percentage of the educational level achieved is secondary education with 36.8% of the population, followed by incomplete elementary school with 36%; with 21% having reached higher education; 5.8% with no education at all; and 0.4% only having achieved preschool education. The percentage of people over 15 years old in San Martin that cannot read or write is 7%. By sex, the illiteracy rate in women is 10%, while in men it is 5%. In terms of residence, the illiterate population in urban settings is 5%, while the figure rises to 12% in rural communities (INEI, 2018).

The main engine of San Martin's economy is agriculture, ranching and forestry, which represents 29% of GDP, followed by trade (13%) and the manufacturing sector (10%). The services of public administration and other services constitute the second group of greater relevance in the regional economy, adding in total about 35% of the GDP of San Martín (BCRP, 2017). Agriculture in San Martin, as the main economic activity, occupies 52% of the economically active population and generates 46% of the regional employment (Rodriguez et al., 2009). According to the last National Agricultural Census (INEI, 2012b), in San Martin the total available agricultural area is 1.3 million hectares, from which almost 400,000 are cultivated, while the remainder is in rest, fallow or has not been sown. 41% of the overall cultivated area in San Martin is coffee with 94,000 hectares, which represents 22% of the total area of coffee cultivation in the country (Robiglio et al., 2015). Between 1995 and 2010 coffee production increased by 75%. In 2015, San Martin was the largest coffee producer in Peru.

The second crop in area cultivated is pasture for cattle with 60,000 hectares, and then cocoa with 47,000 hectares (GORESAM, 2017b).

Today, San Martin represents 13% of the national accumulated deforestation in Peru, with 1.4 million hectares of forest loss. It is estimated that by 2000 San Martin had lost 1 million hectares of forests (INRENA, 2005). Between 2001 and 2019, deforestation in San Martin was 447,546 hectares. From a total extension of around 5.1 million hectares of territory, 3.3 million hectares remain as forests (MINAM/PNCB, 2020c) (Figure 11).

Figure 11: Deforestation in San Martin



### 6.3. Brief history of development in San Martin

San Martin has an interesting history of development intervention since the 1960s. One of the main impacts of these events is reflected in the high levels of deforestation today. In the 1960s, the Peruvian state began conducting emblematic development projects to modernise the Amazon region and integrate it into national society. At that time, the Peruvian state used to frame the Amazon as a vast space of agricultural possibilities that needed strong investment to transform it into a productive and dynamic landscape (Morel, 2014; Valqui et al., 2014; Espinosa, 1995). To do so, three long-term development strategies were implemented to expand the state's presence in the Amazon: expansion of a road network, colonisation, and agricultural modernisation (Santos and Barclay, 2002). Before the 1960s, San Martin was a largely inaccessible department (Limachi et al., 2006). Once the new settlements started to consolidate, it was necessary to connect these new populations in San Martin with urban centres on the coast and the Andes through a road network. The Fernando Belaunde Terry (FBT) road was therefore built (Morel, 2014).

In San Martin, the construction of the FBT road started in 1963 and was completed in 1978, crossing the entire department from north to south. With this road, San Martín became the gateway to the Amazon from the Andes and the coast (Maskrey et al., 1991). Today, the FBT crosses the eastern flank of the Andes and integrates a series of roads totalling more than 2,500 km (Smith and Rios, 2015). To obtain enough labour to work on the road project, and in order to reduce the increasing population density in Lima, the capital of Peru, the state implemented a colonisation programme in the region. Colonisation was indeed a continuous process throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. With this initiative, thousands of migrants

arrived at San Martin through the recently built FBT road, looking for land and better life opportunities (Aramburú and Bedoya, 1986). Supposedly free areas, but many under the traditional possession of indigenous peoples, were grabbed for agricultural use and land titles were given to new farmers (Mendoza, 2013).

Besides the construction of the FBT road and the colonisation programmes, the state implemented agriculture modernisation schemes, disseminating technological and training packages to small scale farmers, including the Andean migrants and local indigenous peoples in San Martin (Smith and Rios, 2015; Greene, 2009). With the construction of the FBT road, the implementation of agricultural projects and the colonisation processes, San Martin began a steady process of deforestation (Díaz Ísmodes, 1992; Aramburú, 1989). Most of this deforestation occurred on lands that were traditionally used by indigenous peoples but were not legally recognised by the state. Indeed, since the 1960s, indigenous peoples were constantly outnumbered and pushed away from their traditional lands, forcing them to find new spaces for settlements that, in many cases, were occupied by other indigenous groups (Mendoza, 2013).

In 1968, these colonisation programmes were interrupted after the armed forces overthrew President Belaunde to install a military dictatorship (1968 – 1975). The military government sought to impose a nationalist programme, reinforcing the presence of the state in the Andes and the Amazon, mainly through the implementation of agrarian reform and the nationalisation of oil extraction. In 1969, this government launched the agrarian reform to promote, once again, colonisation in the Amazonian region. This plan continued the occupation of the Amazonian territory, the improvement of agriculture and the expansion of

public services.

In 1973, the international oil crisis impacted on the Peruvian national fiscal treasury. Subsidies to improve agriculture production were cut, affecting farmers in San Martin in multiple ways: low capitalisation, no access to credit and low profitability (Durand, 2005; Díaz;Ísmodes, 1992). Therefore, for two decades, the Peruvian state was unable to provide long- term and steady benefits to rural farmers, losing control over the impacts of its uneven development mechanisms, especially the economic ones, but also the environmental impacts, like disorganised land use change.

Deforestation for agriculture and deficient soil management caused poor productivity that negatively affected all local crop production except for the cultivation of coca (*erythroxylum coca*) for the illegal drugs trade. By the mid- 1970s, coca cultivation in San Martin was driven by Colombian drug traffickers in the Amazon who did not encounter any resistance from the state (Villarán et al., 2012; Aramburú, 1989). Coca, unlike other crops, adapts to degraded soil, resists pests and can last for several years (Dourojeanni, 1989). Against the background of an economic crisis, coca was regarded as a reliable crop (Eguren, 2006; Díaz Ísmodes, 1992, Maskey, et al., 1991).

After the military dictatorship ended in 1979, former President Belaunde was elected again (1980 - 1985). He resumed his vision of the Amazon as a territory to integrate and exploit as the “barn of the big cities” (Durand, 2005; Rumrill, 1982). Throughout the 1980s, special projects were conducted in different Amazon departments to promote agricultural production and expand the road network. In San Martin, three special projects were

implemented: i) Alto Mayo, ii) the Huallaga Central y Bajo Mayo and iii) the Alto Huallaga. Users of these special projects enjoyed sustained growth and San Martin became the second agrarian region of the country for coffee, cocoa, corn, and rice, commercialised for urban markets in the Andes and the coast (Maskrey et al., 1991).

In 1984, the prices of rice and corn dropped significantly, and the commercialisation of these crops collapsed. Many farmers, including indigenous peoples from San Martin, who got agrarian loans for agriculture technification suffered the consequences. Farmers achieved good production but failed to find a market niche for their products. Awajun indigenous communities, users of the Alto Mayo Special Project, were encouraged to cultivate rice and corn, transforming their traditional agricultural practices, and pushing forest clearing (Works, 1984). Unable to repay the state loans, the Awajun people chose to illegally divide their communal territories among households to then rent them to third parties for agriculture. Renting varied in each community, but the general trend was to lease agricultural seasons (Vila, 2015). Awajun communities did not design control mechanisms to supervise compliance of contracts with renters, and a series of conflicts arose as some Awajun families rejected the renting practices and some renters breached their contracts (Maskrey et al., 1991). These renting practices were the beginning of the critical deforestation that has nowadays hit the Alto Mayo valley.

In the 1980s, the crisis of the prices of rice and corn coincided with the increased price of coca in the international market. This led to the second expansion of coca crops in San Martin. By the mid-1980s, the largest amount of coca crops in the country was concentrated in San Martin. In this period, Peru established itself as one of the first links of international cocaine

trafficking (Manrique, 2015). Coca cultivation was a rentable activity, due to the high prices in US dollars, about ten times the price of corn, rice, or cocoa (García Sayán, 1989).

While production expanded, so did the internal armed conflict (Villarán, 2012; Kernaghan, 2009). The department of San Martin directly suffered from the presence of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Guerrilla Movement (MRTA). Between the 1980s and 1990s, boats navigating the Huallaga river had to pay the “revolutionary tax” to the MRTA or otherwise the boats would be (illegally) confiscated by this armed group. The MRTA also used to attack representatives and volunteers from non-profit organisations; foreigners were constantly at risk of being kidnapped or targeted as an enemy by the national army. Any foreigner was suspected of terrorism, including foreigners working with indigenous communities conducting development projects (CVR, 2003).

Fighting against drug trafficking and armed subversive groups at the same time was unbearable for the Peruvian state (Manrique, 2015). There were no conditions to guarantee the security of the coca eradication personnel due to the active presence of armed groups (Villarán, 2012). Besides that, the local population in San Martin strongly opposed state attempts to eradicate coca production, as the eradication was carried out in hostile circumstances for farmers, and the state did not have any alternative crops for coca. In this scenario, the state decided to first fight against armed groups, even if that meant the continued expansion of coca for drug trafficking, because there were no special forces to fight traffickers besides the armed guerrilla groups. The rise of drug trafficking in the 1980s was the main cause of deforestation in San Martin, especially in marginal areas of difficult accessibility (Villarán, 2012).

Some of the areas where the armed groups, the Shining Path and the MRTA, operated in the 1980s coincided with NPCF communities that are part of this research. During fieldwork, I encountered anecdotal narratives of *comuneros*, who in their youth in the 1980s, worked for the coca industry, carrying supplies, or working in the “cooking spots” hidden in the upper parts of their forests. Some of these spots are now located within forests under conservation agreements with the NPCF. Some other areas are now coffee and cocoa farms installed since 2000 with the support of international cooperation.

The 1990s was the period in Peru in which neo-liberal policies were adopted for the liberalisation of markets and promotion of foreign private investments for extractive industries. These measures impacted on agricultural production, when agrarian loans were cut, and agricultural research and extension services reduced. These measures contributed even more to the illicit expansion of coca. The Alto Mayo valley became one of the preferred areas for the cultivation of coca (Morel, 2014). Yet, also in the 1990s, San Martín saw an improvement in its security situation, with more effective measures against the production of illegal drugs. San Martin experienced a sharp decrease of coca cultivation between the early 1990s and the mid-2000s. The cultivation of coca decreased from 28,600 hectares in 1992 to 483 hectares in 2014 (UNODC, 2014).

The decline of violence allowed the return of state institutions and private investments in the department (Manrique, 2015). Indeed, the sub-national authorities of San Martin, with the support of international cooperation promoted development projects to cultivate cash crops such as coffee and cocoa to eradicate coca (Muñoz, et al., 2016; Villarán et al., 2012). The growing presence of the state and the better security conditions facilitated the

implementation of these alternative development programmes, making the state a more visible entity locally (Manrique, 2015). One of the most important development projects was the Alternative Development Project (PDA), sponsored by USAID, between 2002 and 2008 (USAID, 2008).

PDA was a voluntary scheme to turn coca into coffee and cocoa. The PDA package included providing technical assistance to improve crop productivity; transferring seeds, fertilisers, and technology; supporting rural villages with the construction of social and productive infrastructure, from schools and health clinics, to bridges and roads, and to processing and packaging plants; while also providing students to farmers to conduct the farming activities to improve their plots, and to the local population in general to participate in the construction of local social infrastructure (Villarán, 2012). *Comuneros* from NPCF communities that participated in the PDA also remembered that they sold many of the tools that were given to them to improve crop production. Even today, the PDA is one of the main references of rural development schemes in San Martin, including amongst indigenous communities.

In the 2000s, Peru started a national process of decentralisation to strengthen sub-national governments (Muñoz et al., 2016). This decentralisation involved the transfer of competences and functions, from the central government to the regional governments to generate and manage their own regulations and budgets, and to implement public works and development programmes. The first elections for regional presidents were held in 2006. The regional party *Nueva Amazonia*, composed of local professionals with long experience in non-profit development, won the elections. In this new scenario of decentralisation, the new sub-national government of San Martin (GORESAM), run by the *Nuevo Amazonia* party, assumed

responsibilities to enhance rural development, commercial agriculture and stronger conservation policies (Marquardt et al., 2018).

The GORESAM prioritised agriculture of cash crops, like coffee, cocoa, and rice to place San Martin as an export leader in the country and to provide continuity to the previous development projects on alternative development led by international cooperation (GORESAM, 2008). For the GORESAM, the transition from subsistence agriculture to commercial agriculture became one of the pivotal axes of its sub-national politics and policy. However, the consequence of these measures meant the expansion of the agriculture frontier towards forests, which later pushed the sub-national government to regulate land use through forest conservation policies, as concerns about water supply for agriculture and human consumption in the main cities, like Moyobamba, started to appear (Leon and Renner, 2014).

In 2006, the GORESAM designed its regional land planning scheme. This land planning scheme was aimed at ordering the regional territory to grant land use rights according to the potential and limits of the territory. To implement this planning scheme, the GORESAM created the economic and ecological zoning structure (ZEE is its acronym in Spanish) as the main instrument of land categorisation management to secure the sustainable use of natural resources and the conservation of forests (Marquardt et al., 2018; Rodriguez et al, 2009; GORESAM, 2006). With the ZEE, the territory of San Martin was divided into 5 categories: i) productive areas, including agricultural activities, forestry production and fishing; ii) conservation areas such as NPAs and conservation concessions; iii) special treatment areas such as archaeological sites; iv) areas of urban or industrial vocation; and v) zones of land recovery for forest conservation and forestry management, known in Spanish as ZOCRES.

ZOCRES are the most controversial category of the ZEE. They are incompatible with activities of perennial agriculture, ranching, and extraction of timber and non-timber products. With this category, the GORESAM can register areas as state assets for conservation priority, meaning that land use change is forbidden. Communities located in areas considered as ZOCREs would not be titled. According to the ZEE, 65% of the San Martin territory is suitable for conservation and forestry management, 14.85% for agriculture and ranching, 20% for recovery and 0.15% for urban settlements (GORESAM, 2009).

In 2009, the central government transferred functions to GORESAM to grant permits and forestry concessions and to enforce the national regulation on forest management. To fulfil these duties, the Regional Environmental Authority (ARA) was created. The ARA is a sub-national decentralised body responsible for improving the state's capacity to conduct forest management policy and guarantee the conservation of local ecosystems against the increasing rates of deforestation. The ARA is responsible for the ZEE and has authority over other GORESAM projects in areas where environmental conservation could be affected. For example, the ARA could restrict or condition the construction of infrastructure in areas classified as ZOCRE (GORESAM, 2006). In 2018, to complement the land planning scheme, the GORESAM created its sub-national forest planning system. This is a technical and binding instrument that limits the alternatives for the use of forest resources and wildlife, in accordance with ecological and economic zoning regulations (GORESAM, 2017a).

The GORESAM's efforts to institutionalise its environmental powers with the creation of the ARA and the implementation of its land planning schemes are still controversial, especially for indigenous peoples. The ZEE raises a series of conflicts for overlapping uses between

indigenous territories and areas of conservation. For example, in 2014, an indigenous community in El Dorado province was catalogued as ZOCRE that interfered with the community's requests to create a school. The ARA only allowed the construction of the school if the community committed to reduce deforestation rates (Chaparro, 2018). By 2021, San Martin had 3 NPAs, 2 regional conservation areas, 14 ZOCRES, 7 private conservation areas, 28 concessions for conservation and 24 more in the grant process, as well as 12 indigenous communities under conservation agreements with the NPFC. All together these land categories cover more than 50% of the territory under conservation schemes.

The ostensible environmental profile of the GORESAM does not interact with the NPFC office in Moyobamba. These agencies signed a formal inter-institutional cooperation agreement (2017–2020) to coordinate efforts for the implementation of economic incentives for the conservation of forests in San Martin, to fight against deforestation and contribute towards the mitigation of the effects of climate change (interinstitutional cooperation agreement between the NPFC and the GORESAM, signed on 17/02/2017). Beyond this formality there was no real co-managed work towards conservation.

In sum, until 2019, San Martin had an accumulated deforestation rate of 1.38 million hectares, 20% of the territory of San Martin. After several years of increased deforestation in San Martin because of different development initiatives based on intensive agriculture and a national road, San Martin is now redefining its sub-national policy in terms of sustainable development and conservation. This effort is challenging and complex. There is a persistent tension to improve cash crops, while new proposals for conservation appear and the indigenous peoples also increase their demand for land titling. It is in this very complex scenario of overlapping

land uses that the NPFC implements conservation agreements amongst indigenous communities. Its implementation has become a key scenario to understand how changing land uses in indigenous communities' impact on the reconfiguration of the state-indigeneity relationship and the presence of the state in rural areas.

#### 6.4. Indigenous peoples of San Martin

In San Martin, around 6% of the population is indigenous (47,511), divided into four ethnic groups: Kichwa (86.70%), Awajun (11.80%), Shawi or Kanpu Piyapi (1.30%) and Yaminahua (0.2%). This indigenous population is distributed across 101 indigenous communities, but only 31 are formally titled (*Ministerio de Cultura*, 2020). These communities have an extension of 230,000 hectares, 5% of all San Martin's territory. In San Martin the relationship between the state and indigenous peoples has usually been tense, especially among those Kichwa communities still waiting for the titling of their territories, and among Awajun communities in territorial conflicts with encroachers that the state is reluctant to solve. According to fieldwork interviewees, state initiatives in San Martin to create regional conservation areas and deliver private conservation concessions on territories also claimed by indigenous peoples, represents a clear lack of political willingness to recognise indigenous territorial rights (personal communication with *Protierras* representative 01; *Paz y Esperanza* representative 02; also interviews with indigenous leaders: COD001; COOD2; COD3; FEP01; Also see Che Piu and García 2011).

#### 6.4.1. The Kichwa peoples

Inhabitants of the NPCF communities of Chirikyacu, Chunchiwi, Chirik Sacha and Copal Sacha in the Lamas and Sisa landscapes belong to the Kichwa ethnic group. The Kichwa peoples are also known as Kechwa. They speak a variant of the Quechua language, the most important language in the Peruvian Andes. They live in the departments of Loreto, Madre de Dios, and San Martin; with a population of 71,311 people (*Ministerio de Cultura*, 2020). In San Martin, the Kichwa people are the largest indigenous group with a population of 41,200 inhabitants (*Ministerio de Cultura*, 2020). Until 2018, the Kichwas had 15 titled communities. These communities are located along the provinces of Huallaga, El Dorado, San Martín, and Lamas, mainly across the valleys of Mayo, Pamashto, Sisa, Shanusi, Chazuta and Shapaja rivers.

The Kichwa Lamistas are descendants of Amazonian indigenous peoples who were forced to speak Quechua (official Andean language) by Catholic missionaries during the 16th century after Spanish colonisation (*Ministerio de Cultura*, 2020). Therefore, they have a long history of subjugation due to colonialism (Greene, 2009; Calderón, 2003). Their connection with the colonial state also meant asymmetrical relations with the Mestizo society. Mestizos are the descendants of the Spanish colonialist settlers and local indigenous peoples. Today, in San Martin, Mestizo is an ethnic but also a political category that is embedded in power relations, turning into discrimination and even racism against indigenous peoples, mostly against the Kichwa, but also the Awajun peoples.

The contemporary city of Lamas, in the province of Lamas, has been located on the site of a colonial reduction (*reducción de indios*) since the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Colonial reductions were

settlements created by Spanish rulers in Spanish America that relocated, forcibly if necessary, indigenous inhabitants for their control, labour exploitation, and the promotion of their evangelism (Brown, 2014). In Lamas, the Jesuit missionaries displaced ethnic groups from the mid and low Huallaga and Mayo basins in Lamas and forced them to speak Quechua. Over the years of subjugation, the cultural practices of these indigenous peoples (Amasifuenes, Motilones, Suchiches, Tabalosos), gradually disappeared, and ended up merging with Amazonian Kichwas (*Ministerio de Cultura*, 2020).

The expulsion of the Jesuit missionaries in 1768 left the control of indigenous peoples to local Mestizo elites. Over time, the colonial indigenous reduction in Lamas transformed and became what we know today as the Kichwa community of Wayku, adjacent to the city of Lamas, the capital of the province of Lamas and the centre of the Mestizo elite in the same province. Throughout history, the Mestizos have been the perpetrators of abusive relationships towards Kichwa peoples, exploiting them as a cheap work force (Chaparro, 2018; Calderón, 2003).

During the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Kichwas from Lamas expanded their connection with mainstream society and the state. This first occurred in the 1930s, through the recruitment of Kichwa men by the army in the Peru-Colombia war, as porters or soldiers. Also, through the introduction of schools, the use of the Kichwa language was banned for many years (Chaparro 2018; Scazzocchio, 1979). By the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Kichwa peoples were used as cheap labour growing coffee, corn, and cotton: crops that were commercialised by Mestizo elites from Lamas. Mestizo elites kept reproducing a colonial model that situated the Kichwa as the lowest rank of the rural working class (Barclay, 2001).

The Mestizos used to sell the Kichwa basic goods, at extremely high prices, under a debt system that passed from generation to generation (Brown, 2014).

The modern interaction between the Kichwas and the state increased in the 1960s with a conflictual episode related to mountain salt. Many indigenous groups in the Amazon have extracted mountain salt for centuries, including from those mountains located in San Martin, like Pilluana, Callanayacu and Tiraco, for their consumption (Chaparro; 2018; Mendoza, 2013). These salt mines have always been a meeting point between the Kichwas from different parts of the department and a place of cultural and commercial transactions (Mendoza, 2013).

Between the 1960s and 1980s, the state banned the unrestricted extraction of mountain salt deeming it a public commodity that required the payment of taxes. This situation was further exacerbated when in 1980 the Pan American Health Organization and the Peruvian Ministry of Health promoted a campaign against the use of mountain salt arguing that it produced goitres due of its lack of iodine. This campaign impelled the state agencies to conduct actions against the Kichwa people, such as forbidding them from accessing their ancestral territories to extract salt and preventing them from consuming it. The police even confiscated the salt that Kichwas kept in their houses (Rengifo, 2009).

The colonial mentality and political control of the Mestizos towards the Kichwa peoples started declining in the 1970s when the Military Government (1969 - 1975) launched the agrarian reform and the law on titling indigenous lands. However, none of the Kichwa communities affiliated to the NPCF were titled in this period. In contrast with the Awajun, the Kichwa people took longer to establish a regular relationship with the state in terms of

collective land tenure.

In the late 1980s, Kichwa leaders were trained as bilingual teachers to improve the quality of education for indigenous peoples. These leaders/teachers began familiarising themselves with the laws on indigenous issues and started scrutinising the role of the state in safeguarding indigenous rights. With this new legal knowledge about the state, Kichwa leaders recognised the need to organise politically to demand territorial, cultural, and social rights (Rengifo, 2009).

Also in the 1980s, the Kichwa started participating in state development initiatives implemented with the Special Project *Huallaga Medio y Bajo Mayo* (PEHCBM, for its acronym in Spanish). In San Martin, the PEHCBM constructed new roads, granted loans to improve agriculture and gave technical advice to Kichwa farmers to boost their agricultural production in the Huallaga and Bajo Mayo basins. With these new activities, the migratory flows from the Andes intensified and the agricultural frontier to grow rice and corn extended over Kichwa territories that were not yet legally titled (Maskrey et al., 1991; Puga Capelli, 1989).

During the fiscal crisis of the 1980s, the Peruvian state was unable to maintain the subsidies for these cash crop programmes. This crisis coincided with an increase in the price of cocaine in the international market. This led to the expansion of coca cultivation within Kichwa communities from Lamas and Sisa. Some conservation areas under the NPCF within Kichwa communities were “cooking points” to produce cocaine paste by drug trafficking mafias. The expansion of coca promoted more migration, the increased presence of drug traffickers and of armed groups like the MRTA. As in the case of the Awajun from Alto Mayo, state and non-profit development interventions would resume in the 1990s.

In 1997, 14 Kichwa indigenous communities were recognised, including the communities studied for this research. In contrast to Awajun communities that were titled in the 1970s, the recognition of Kichwa communities took longer because in previous decades the Kichwas tended to deny their indigeneity for fear of stigma and abuse (Egerlid, 2015; Mendoza, 2013). Through erasing features of indigeneity, the Kichwa hoped to avoid discrimination and their representation being regarded as uncivilised (Calderon, 2003; Scazzochio, 1979). The idea of being civilised is so powerful that it has become a category used and expressed as a quality for being chosen to participate in the NPCF.

Despite the indigenous land titling law launched in the mid-1970s, the narratives of uncivilisation discouraged Kichwa peoples from legally constituting as indigenous communities as part of their attempts to dismiss their indigeneity. This stigmatisation of indigenous communities led many Kichwas to buy small plots in non-indigenous villages (Calderón, 2003). The process of titling Kichwa communities in San Martin was a legal requirement in the national economic context of granting forestry concessions for the extraction of Amazonian timber in the 1990s. One of the requirements for the implementation of forestry concessions was recognising the property rights of landholders from the areas in which the concessions were to be granted (Calderon, 2003). In the process of titling communities, the Kichwas realised that part of their ancestral territories had already been granted to third parties in previous years (Chaparro, 2018; Egerlid, et al., 2016).

This situation was especially critical for Kichwa communities from the Sisa landscape, who found out that most of their traditional territory was already part of other forms of property and land use, from private plots to local conservation areas and forestry concessions. Today,

there are still very active demands for the recognition of Kichwa territories as part of indigenous communities that overlap with the Regional Conservation Area *Cordillera Escalera*. In the process of titling Kichwa communities, Kichwa peoples customised their indigeneity, revaluing what they had previously neglected: their ethnicity. In contrast to the conflicts between the state and the Kichwas from the Huallaga for land recognition, the Kichwas from Lamas tend to be characterised by the urban Mestizo elite and the sub-national state in San Martin as the ecological natives, because of their openness to accepting development projects, and because their communal forests are in a very good state of natural protection. The representation of the Kichwas as ecological natives enables the sub-national state, but also the environmentalist urban elite of San Martin, to evoke the colonial imagery of the “good savage”, with which they also recall the subordinated position of the Kichwas as indigenous peoples, instead of considering them as active political actors in the conservation work.

While conducting fieldwork, there were a few public and private environmental projects in the communities of Chirikyacu and Chunchiwi. Kichwa peoples in these communities welcome most interventions with the expectation of benefiting from development opportunities, regarding the responsibilities they must conduct as participants of these initiatives. In contrast to Awajun communities from Alto Mayo, Kichwa communities have low rates of deforestation, on average 9% their communal territory is deforested, becoming easy targets for environmental schemes.

In Kichwa communities, each household has its own farming plot. These areas can be entire polygons or different plots around the community. *Comuneros* obtain farming land by different mechanisms. The first mechanism implies requesting it from the communal board.

In these cases, authorities identify available areas and assign them to specific families for an unlimited time. The second mechanism is through inheritance from fathers to sons. In very few cases, daughters would inherit from their fathers. The local tradition is that once a woman gets married, she then belongs to her husband's household and community. Most Kichwa families from Lamas have a multi-sited residence pattern. This implies having a residence in their communities and a small house in Wayku in Lamas.

Indeed, Wayku is the cultural and political meeting point of most Kichwas from different communities in the province of Lamas. During fieldwork, I noticed that in families with children of high school age, mothers would live with all their children in Wayku from Monday to Friday, so their children could attend high school, as there are no high schools in the communities. Although there is a Kichwa/Spanish bilingual school in Wayku, Kichwa parents prefer to send their children to the school where Mestizo students attend, because it is considered of better quality. The negative side of this is that sometimes Kichwa students are victims of discrimination by Mestizo students and their parents (Personal communication with CHW006; CHI 003).

The connection in terms of infrastructure between Wayku and the communities is very poor. Roads are not paved and are regularly in very bad condition because of the constant rains. The trip from Kichwa communities to the city of Lamas and Wayku lasts an hour on average. There is only informal public transportation in 4x4 trucks that cost 1.8 GBP per ride per person. This is quite an expensive fee for Kichwa families. On a rainy day, cars cannot travel and to get to Wayku *comuneros* must walk, many of them carrying firewood and their products on their backs to sell in the local markets of Lamas. Whenever I used to commute in the Lamas

landscape with the CLBs in the programme's four-wheel drive truck and there were Kichwa people walking towards Lamas or the communities, the truck would stop to allow people on the truck, especially the elderly and mothers with small children. These multi-residence dynamics, based on schooling needs, creates a situation of having men alone in the communities, while their children attend school in Lamas and their wives look after their children. Once chatting with local men in Chirikyacu, they referred to them as the "single men of the community". They complained that they had to learn to cook. Perhaps these displacement dynamics may change Kichwa demographics within communities, increasing the Kichwa population in the city, particularly if those children, that finish high school in Lamas, do not return to communities and work as farmers.

In the case of the communities from the Sisa landscape, it is estimated that these communities were organised in the first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In the 1920s and 1930s, many Kichwa families from Wayku, to avoid conflicts between clans and to expand their areas for the extraction of natural resources and hunting, sought new settlements. Some families relocated close to Mestizo commercial areas, like Chirik Sacha and Copal Sacha in the Sisa landscape, where they could find farmland and offer their services as workmen (Maskrey, 1991; Scazzochio, 1981). These geographical dispersions also promoted cultural divisions as well. Although they are all Kichwas, a Kichwa villager from Sisa would be barely identifiable with the Kichwas from Lamas (Puga Capelli, 1989).

The Kichwas that settled in Sisa from the early 20<sup>th</sup> century developed a greater involvement in the market economy with cash crops such as rice and corn, using modern inputs and agricultural techniques to improve their productivity, in contrast with the communities from

Lamas, who developed cash crops for the local markets from Lamas city. *Comuneros* from Chirik Sacha and Copal Sacha communities, despite not living in their communal territory, have the right of access to the territory for hunting, fishing, and gathering forest resources for consumption. They can also participate in development projects conducted in their communal territory like the NPCF (Valencia et al., 2018).

*Comuneros* in the Sisa landscape receive external aid, from local state agencies and also from private enterprises that provide technical agricultural assistance to improve their production of cocoa, and rice and maize to then sell to the regional, national and international markets, especially the cocoa. If the Kichwa peoples from Lamas are connected to development aid, in Sisa they are integrated more with agricultural markets. In Sisa, *comuneros* have easy access to the local and regional markets and to health centres, elementary and high schools and higher education. Communities from Sisa were very well connected to Tarapoto through a relatively new road as part of the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America.

Before the 1990s, the Kichwa in San Martín chose to minimise characteristic features of their indigeneity with the expectation of avoiding discrimination that the local Mestizo elite exercised over them, especially in terms of the commercialisation of agricultural and forest products (Calderón, 2003). The Mestizo elite had also historically situated the main political authorities without much concern to equitably position the indigenous population in the larger society, who were considered instead as second-class citizens. In this context, many Kichwa families preferred to settle in rural settlements like the rest of the rural Mestizo population, rather than in indigenous communities.

It was only following the experience of other indigenous groups in the Amazon region that claimed territorial rights, and the support of non-profit organizations, that since the late 1980s the Kichwas began building their local political movement with the goal of demanding land rights, through the constitution of indigenous communities. The Federation of Kichwa Communities of the San Martín Region (FEPIKRESAM) was established in 1987. The founders of FEPIKRESAM were bilingual Lamas teachers who, after acknowledging mechanisms of political representation in other Amazonian departments, decided to create a political organisation themselves to represent the Kichwa in San Martín (Mendoza, 2013; Pardo, Doherty and Sangama, 2001).

In 2010, four communities from the El Dorado province, affiliated to FEPIKRESAM, created a new federation, the Federation from the Huallaga Dorado (FEKIHD), since their distance from the FEPRIKESAM located in Lamas made communication difficult. As of 2020, FEKIHD represents 14 Kichwa communities in the El Dorado province, including Copal Sacha and Chirik Sacha. This organisation focuses on promoting the titling of communities, implementing Spanish-Kichwa bilingual education, intercultural health, and justice.

Notwithstanding the important efforts to organise politically, particularly to promote land rights, today, the overall Kichwa population of San Martín has not been able to complete their titling processes, especially due to overlaps with other rights of use and incompatibilities with the territorial zoning process of the region (Chaparro and Valderrama, 2018). The long history of dependence of the Kichwa population with reference to Mestizo society has also influenced the construction of an ideal of development, coming from an external source, such as the state, and assuming a relationship of subordination from which they expect protection and

help. In return, they offer to fulfil their civic role as users of public interventions (Mendoza, 2013; Calderón, 2003, 2000).

Both Kichwa and Awajun peoples, besides the Shawi, are politically represented by the Organisation for the Development and Defense of the Indigenous Peoples of San Martin (CODEPISAM, for its acronym in Spanish). This organisation was created in 2007 to represent, defend and promote the development of the Awajun, Kichwa and Shawi groups. By 2020, CODEPISAM represented 122 native communities and 8 federations.

Unlike the Awajun population from the Alto Mayo, the Kichwa population, especially groups from the Lamas landscape, have had longer and closer contact with the local Mestizo elites than with the state. These connections have been strongly shaped by inequality, in which the indigenous populations have been subjugated as cheap labour or as suppliers of forest and agricultural goods based on a peonage system. This situation changed mainly after the titling of the communities in the late 1990s. With their titles, from the 2000s onwards, the communities of Lamas and Sisa were able to benefit from environmental and development projects due to the healthy state of their forests.

#### 6.4.2. The Awajun peoples

The inhabitants of the communities of Shampuyacu, Shimpiyacu and Alto Mayo, users of the NPCF in San Martin, belong to the Awajun ethnic group. This is the second largest indigenous group in the Peruvian Amazon, with almost 66,000 inhabitants (*Ministerio de Cultura*, 2020). The Awajun peoples are geographically located in the northern part of the Peruvian Amazon,

in the departments of Amazonas, Cajamarca, San Martin, Loreto and Ucayali. In San Martin, the Awajun population is 5,612 inhabitants (*Ministerio de Cultura*, 2020) distributed among 14 communities in the Alto Mayo valley, in the districts of Moyobamba and Awajún. The Awajun peoples are originally from the neighbouring department of Amazonas. Unlike the Kichwas, the Awajun held back the Spanish conquest in the seventeenth century. Since the first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Awajun peoples began settling in villages, motivated by the Evangelical Church, which also focused on promoting bilingual education in Alto Mayo. Nowadays, the Awajun have developed an understanding of how to make visible their advocacy for collective rights, defying the state (Brown, 2014; Greene, 2009).

Their settlement in the Alto Mayo started in the 1940s, when a group of Awajun individuals from the Marañon basin in the department of Loreto migrated, searching for new trade routes to connect to Amazonian cities, looking for new land and better hunting areas (Rumrril and Novoa, 2002; Works, 1984). According to Brown (1984), the Awajun migrated from the Alto Marañon fleeing conflicts with another indigenous group, the Huambisas, their traditional enemies. Over the years, other families from the Marañon area kept migrating, choosing to settle in the uplands, as the floodplains, close to riverine areas, were already in the possession of local Mestizos (Works, 1984).

Since the 1960s, the Alto Mayo valley was a targeted area to connect with the coast, the Andes, and other Amazonian cities in the northern part of Peru. With the construction of the FBT road and the promotion of colonisation projects, groups of Andean migrants arrived in the Alto Mayo valley looking for fertile farmland, encouraged by the state (Espinosa, 2009). The colonisation of Alto Mayo caused immediate conflicts between indigenous peoples and

migrants over the possession of land, when colonists started settling in indigenous forested territories (Yrigoyen, 2002). The new Andean migrant population, also known as Mestizo, started the cultivation of cash crops such as coffee, rice, cassava and beans, a practice that began a long process of deforestation in Alto Mayo.

But the encounters between the Awajun and Mestizo population also meant that the Awajun started learning about the economic dynamics of cash crops and the local market. Through the years, the interactions between Awajun peoples and the Mestizos would increase, especially after the Awajun started renting land from them for farming in the late 1990s. The Mestizo presence in Awajun communities would intensify even more when Mestizo men started marrying Awajun women, generating kinship relationships (Greene, 2009).

In the 1970s, a second wave of Awajun migration from Alto Marañon to the Alto Mayo valley occurred. Awajun bilingual teachers, trained by missionaries from the Summer Linguistics Institute, arrived to “civilise” their Awajun kin, through the promotion of schooling (Brown, 2014). In 1972 the first elementary school was completed in Alto Mayo. Education meant a noteworthy change in the life of Awajun peoples. It allowed the Awajun to understand the “secrets of paper”, meaning that they learnt to read and write in Spanish and started having a better understanding of the use of money and of the legal and bureaucratic documentation that implied dealing with the state (Brown, 2014; Greene, 2009). The other goal of the bilingual teachers from Alto Marañon was to propose that the local Awajun peoples organise themselves as communities to defend their territory against the colonists’ invasion of their traditional territories (Vila, 2015).

In 1975 the threat of encroachment on Awajun traditional lands due to the increasing presence of Mestizo farmers was mitigated with the official recognition of 14 Awajun communities across a total area of 60,000 hectares (GORESAM, 2007). With the titling of these communities, a sort of contract was sealed between the Awajun and the state. The Awajun recognised the authority of the state and accepted its rules of living in a bounded territory and with a specific type of political authority, the communal board (Barclay, 2001; Works, 1984). In return, the state granted the Awajun their territories as indigenous communities (*comunidades nativas*).

After Awajun communities were titled in 1975, Awajun families in Alto Mayo granted themselves a de facto right to decide how to use their plots, including forested areas. The families of those individuals that arrived in the 1940s, called the “*naturals*” (*naturales*), were the ones that got the largest and best quality plots. Awajun families that arrived years later were given smaller plots which were less viable in economic terms, such as the rocky areas, areas prone to flooding, and wetlands. Today, this asymmetrical distribution of land within communities has impacted on the constitution of a small Awajun elite formed by the largest land holders that act as a kind of rural land bourgeoisie (Greene, 2009).

With their communities titled and their better level of literacy, the Awajun from Alto Mayo were ready to organise the first Awajun indigenous federation in the mid-1970s, the Alto Mayo Aguaruna Organisation (OAAM, for its acronym in Spanish). This association performed as a broker between indigenous communities and the state to defend their territorial rights against invaders and to help them become cash crop farmers (Brown, 2014). But in the subsequent years, the local indigenous federation would demonstrate weak institutionality by closing and

opening new organisations with different names. In 2006, the Indigenous Federation of Alto Mayo (FERIAAM) was created and is the current political organisation for the Awajun peoples from the Alto Mayo valley.

In the late 1970s, some Awajun families started participating in agriculture projects promoted by the military government that aimed at modernising indigenous peoples and transforming them into citizens. For the state, cash crop farming in Awajun communities was considered a mechanism of social inclusion and contribution to national progress, especially cultivating rice for the national market (Brown, 2014). This kind of project saw the first interactions of the Awajun peoples with the complex and precarious workings of state bureaucracy. In the case of the cultivation of rice, Awajun farmers could only sell the rice to the state and were never warned that the price that the state paid for the rice depended on its quality and the number of impurities. Awajun farmers were paid in cheques that had to be cashed in banks, which meant showing identity documents that the Awajun individuals did not have.

In this same decade, the 1970s, interactions with state agents and other market intermediaries were also difficult. The differences in language and social status led to discrimination from urban Mestizo state agents towards Awajun indigenous peoples (Works, 1984). The Awajun that were hunter-gatherers and self-subsistence farmers started to be pressed by the state to customise their indigeneity and livelihoods, to adopt urban lifestyles and become market actors (Greene, 2009).

In the 1980s, when the FBT road was completed, a new economic cycle in agriculture for the Awajun started due to the new connection between the Alto Mayo and urban markets from

the coast and the Andes. In this decade, the Peruvian state promoted a series of “special projects” to modernise the Amazon. Special projects were inspired by the Green Revolution Development model, focused on transferring technology to increase agricultural production, and raise local incomes. One of these projects was the Special Project Alto Mayo (PEAM). This began in 1981 and is still working. The PEAM was designed as a multidimensional scheme to pursue the economic and social development of the Alto Mayo valley.

The inclusion of Awajun peoples in the PEAM started in 1985. The PEAM meant the second great contact of the Awajun with the development state. The state had the goal of turning Awajun peoples, subsistence and low-scale farmers, hunters, and gatherers into economic actors (Brown, 2014). As part of the project, Awajun communities in Alto Mayo were granted new public schools, health posts, latrines, water wells, new agricultural technology, and loans. Years of agriculture development projects in Alto Mayo slightly improved the living conditions of Awajun communities. Indeed, many Awajun families experienced generous increased incomes with the boom of rice production thanks to the installation of an irrigation system under the PEAM (Chirif and García, 2007).

However, the PEAM failed among the Awajun. The most dramatic failure of the PEAM with Awajun peoples occurred in Bajo Naranjillo, a non-NPCF affiliated community. During the PEAM, Bajo Naranjillo faced extra expenses for the acquisition of seeds and agrochemicals. This Awajun community rapidly ran out of funds and, with the debt to the Agrarian Bank, *comuneros* had to find a mechanism to pay back this debt. The solution was to rent land for agriculture (Works, 1984). This meant the beginning of land renting to Mestizos, which rapidly spread to the rest of the Awajun communities (Vila, 2015; Greene 2009; Works 1984).

Unfortunately, the Awajun did not design proper rules to control the compliance of rental contracts. As a result, an endless series of conflicts among Awajun *comuneros* and between the Awajun and their Mestizo tenants began, which continues to this day. This is without even mentioning the beginning of intensive deforestation.

Certainly, land renting was and still is the cause for many years of legal and social disputes, increasing the tension with Mestizos in Alto Mayo. The most extreme case occurs in the community of Shimpiyacu (also affiliated to the NPCF). The community of Shimpiyacu was titled in 1975; in 1996, the Regional Agriculture Office of San Martin granted 900 hectares to an agricultural association of more than 100 Mestizo farmers. That same year, the Regional Agrarian Office annulled the resolution it had issued favouring the Mestizo farmers, but these peoples never left Shimpiyacu. Since then, the number of migrants has multiplied and now they claim possession of over 2000 hectares within the community. Local gossip claims that members of the communal board have been bribed by Mestizo encroachers to remain in the community. Today, *comuneros* of Shimpiyacu find themselves faced with the endless process of evicting invaders, without finding assistance from state authorities in resolving their territorial conflicts.

In the 1990s, Alto Mayo became a priority area for coca cultivation for drug traffickers, after the failures of cash crops under PEAM. It also became a targeted area for the violent activities of the armed group MRTA. In that time, the MRTA tried to attract new squads and used the already existing social organizations of peasants and teachers among others in San Martin to consolidate itself on the regional scene (CVR, 2003). Drug trafficking and terrorism in the Alto Mayo led to the decreased presence of state development projects, while causing insecurity

and impoverishment in rural villages, including in Awajun communities. Only after the decline of violence in the late 1990s did state institutions and private investments return to Alto Mayo (Manrique, 2015). Between 1995 and 2000, Awajun communities in Alto Mayo received new development projects. However, this time, after the failures of the PEAM to adapt to the indigenous dynamics of Awajun communities, they chose to negotiate the conditions to accept development projects. To do this, they designed their own bureaucratic agency to act as a broker between the communities and the state and non-profit organisations, and negotiate the terms of the projects (Vila, 2015).

In the mid-2000s Awajun communities started participating in environmental projects, especially due to their location as neighbours of the Protection Forest Alto Mayo (BPAM). The BPAM was created to protect water springs, riverbanks, and fragile soils from erosion (INRENA, 2008). These waters irrigate more than 25,000 hectares of farmland in Alto Mayo. But the increasing deforestation for agriculture since the 1990s started affecting the supply of water. In 2007, *Conservation International* (CI) started working with the communities of Shampuyacu and Alto Mayo, two Awajun communities affiliated to the NPCF, to reduce deforestation in the buffer zone of BPAM.

According to my fieldwork, the experience of CI in Alto Mayo has meant the local appreciation of the benefits of participating in environmental projects in terms of accessing economic income and development opportunities if they commit to conservation. The presence of CI is so strong that, during fieldwork, I noticed that many Awajun *comuneros* mistook the NPCF for CI. I constantly had to remind Awajun *comuneros* that we were talking about the NPCF. The presence of CI and of the NPCF have created a dilemma amongst Awajun families about

whether to continue renting their land with the consequence of high rates of deforestation yet high incomes; or to reduce land renting, thus lowering deforestation and earning less income, but accessing potential development opportunities.

Land renting for agriculture is today the main economic activity for Awajun families in Alto Mayo, and still a very problematic activity within communities. Doing fieldwork, I had the chance to participate in a communal assembly in 2017. Leon, one NPCF specialist, was our translator, as the meeting was held in the Awajun language. It was a long meeting and the topic that concerned participants the most was the conflicts with land tenants, to whom the Awajun refer as *apach* that can be translated to Spanish as *mestizo*. The price of the land for agriculture depends on whether it is distant or close to roads, if the land already had crops, and whether the soil is rested or not. Between 2016 and 2018, if a farmer only grew coffee, the price could range between GBP 390 and 780 per hectare per year, or if it implies the planting of several products, the price can range between GBP 980 to 1,170 per year.

When renting, some families leave a small area for family gardens, while others rent as much as they can. Some have reduced the size of family gardens for local consumption and this has affected the availability and abundance of forest resources to sustain Awajun livelihoods. Today, the Alto Mayo is the main coffee producer in the country and the main area for rice production in San Martin. When the price of the coffee rises, forest clearing increases as well in order for higher profits to be earned. Deforestation in Awajun communities is usually used by local state representatives to shame them and to justify the state's reluctance to solve their land disputes. Likewise, local state agencies prefer not to work with Awajun communities from Alto Mayo, considering them problematic, referring to their alleged unwillingness to follow the rules in state

projects, and for being “lazy” and poorly motivated to participate in projects. Although deforestation in indigenous lands is generally low in the Amazon (Schleicher, 2017; Walker et al., 2014), the case of the Awajun communities of Alto Mayo in San Martin is an exception to this trend, especially the communities on the left bank of the Mayo river, of which two are users of the NPCF. The main cause of deforestation is the commercial agriculture of coffee, cocoa, rice, and papaya through a dynamic of leasing where *comuneros* rent internal plots under annual contracts or through agricultural campaigns with local merchants (Valqui et al 2014). As mentioned previously, forest clearing for farmland started in the 1980s when the state failed to promote agrarian expansion through agrarian loans and use of technology. As a consequence, communities started renting to pay their debts.

The recent history of the Awajun peoples from Alto Mayo is a complex relationship with the state, within a scenario of modernisation of the Amazon, through the construction of the FBT road, colonisation of indigenous lands, failed agricultural projects and difficult relationships with Mestizo farmland renters. However, these events have not removed the expectations of the Awajun that the state is a provider of development initiatives. Still, the Awajun have learnt to negotiate the terms of the presence of the state. As I show later, this is a completely different position from the Kichwas from Lamas and Sisa.

## 6.5. Conclusions

Over time, indigenous peoples have learnt to customise their indigeneity to fit with state demands and resist measures considered as threats to their livelihoods. In this process, indigenous peoples have learnt the importance of literacy to navigate the state bureaucratic apparatus and language. Likewise, indigenous peoples have learnt to deal with Mestizo / urban groups in their attempts to participate in the market economy.

In the history of the Awajun peoples, the public effort to modernise the Alto Mayo valley, the construction of the FBT road, the colonisation of Awajun territories and failed agricultural projects have been important milestones to understand the current tense relationship with the state. In fact, today the Awajun from Alto Mayo are locally considered as illegible interlocutors by the state on account of their reluctance and distrust in accepting the presence of the state development projects within their territories. In the case of Kichwa peoples, their subjugated position by the Mestizo elite and their attempt to erase their indigenous features made their relationship with the state difficult to address. In the specific case of Kichwas from Lamas, they are locally considered as ecological natives and 'permitted Indians' by local state agencies for their willingness to accept the presence of state development projects with the expectation of increasing their wellbeing. In general, in the history of the Awajun and Kichwa peoples' encounters with the state, these relationships cannot be characterised as harmonious.

Despite this tension and various antagonisms, the Awajun and the Kichwa are not against the state per se. They expect the presence of the state in their territories, granting rights and providing development opportunities. They also know that they must customise their indigeneity to interact with the state. In this historical context, the environment agenda, as with the case of the NPCF, provides the opportunity to reconfigure the state-indigeneity relationship, positioning indigenous peoples as legible interlocutors with the state, that is, as public policy users or subjects of forest conservation.

### 7.1. Introduction

The NPCF is a PES scheme that operates through a voluntary agreement between the Peruvian state and Amazonian indigenous communities to conserve communal forests. This novel design requires creating a new environmental governance structure within communities, adapting to new state rules on forest management and new forms of administrating money. The presence of the NPCF as a state-led PES scheme within communities may transform their local rules of natural resources management, as well as their political and social dynamics. In this chapter, I first explain the local use of communal forests to understand how NPCF constraints impact on land use (section 7.2). I then examine the social and political impacts that the implementation of this programme generates within indigenous communities (section 7.3). In particular, I explore how the NPCF affects the dynamics of local political governance structures, the appearance of social conflicts and awareness of the indigenous territory. Finally, I offer some concluding remarks about the impacts the NPCF generate within communities (section 7.4).

### 7.2. The management of forests within communities

Forests within Peruvian Amazonian indigenous communities are common pool resources. As commons, the use of forest resources requires rules and sanctions to guarantee their usufruct for different users over time. The management of forests is based on two normative frameworks: the national set of legal norms and internal governance frameworks, constructed locally within communities. According to the Law of Indigenous Communities, Law N° 22175,

the territory of indigenous communities is broadly divided in three parts: areas for living, agriculture, and ranching; areas for forest management; and areas for conservation and protection. The Peruvian state only titles agricultural land and offers indigenous communities “assignments in use contracts” for forested areas held for conservation and forestry management.

For the assignment in use of forests, the state recognises the exclusive, indefinite, and non-transferable right of indigenous communities on non-agricultural communal lands to secure their traditional uses and livelihoods. It also grants the exclusive possession, access, use, enjoyment and exploitation of the forest production and protection lands, of its forest resources, wildlife, and ecosystem services. In these communities, indigenous families have the right to use forest resources for domestic use, such as extracting timber to build their houses or boats, hunting animals to eat, or extracting medicine plants to heal. The management and commercialisation of forest resources, like timber and non-timber products, require a management plan approved by the state (Law on Forest and Wildlife Management, Law N° 29763). Until 2019, when I completed my fieldwork, only one Kichwa community, Chirik Sacha, had an approved plan for the sustainable extraction of cat's claw (*uncaria tomentosa*) for commercialisation.

Besides these formal rules, communities have their own internal rules on forest management that should not contradict the national law. Yet this is not always the case as in the Alto Mayo landscape. Internal norms are collectively agreed upon by the majority of *comuneros* in a communal assembly. Community members decide the internal ordering and management of their communal land according to their customs, norms, and organisational structure (Law on

Forest and Wildlife Management, Law N° 29763). This set of norms is registered in the communal statutes (*estatutos*) or minutes book, which is also inscribed at the Public Records Office. The statute is the internal communal document that explains the rules that regulate the structure of the community, the rights, obligations, and sanctions to be applied to *comuneros*, the responsibilities of the communal board, its duration and members, the management of its resources and any other decision or activity that affects the community. Forested areas chosen for the NPCF contracts can be located within titled land with agricultural potential or in forested areas given in assignment in use. In these forested areas under conservation agreements, forest clearing is prohibited. Likewise, illegal logging and hunting for commercial goals are forbidden (MINAM, 2018b). Yet, *comuneros* can access these areas to hunt, collect plants or non-timber products for consumption only, after requesting permission from local communal boards, as the principal political authorities within communities. If a *comunero* fails to notify his willingness to extract forest resources, he must pay a fine.

Authorities claim that every *comunero* must notify his intention of “entering” the “forest” for security reasons in case someone gets lost. If a community extracts timber without formal permission from the state, it also receives a fine. In the case of the NPCF, if communities fail to comply with these conditionalities, they risk losing their contracts. During fieldwork, I only knew about one *comunero* that was evicted from his community for clearing forests for agriculture within the area under a conservation agreement, despite the warnings from the communal board in Chirik Sacha. The implementation of the NPCF impacts communities differently, depending on their internal arrangements of forest management and forest availability (Figure 12).

Figure 12: Forest and no-forest cover within NPCF communities. Source: PNGB/Lebasque's, 2020.

Community	Forest cover %	Non-forest cover %	Deforestation %		Water bodies %	% communal area under conservation agreement
			Before 2000	2001 - 2019		
Chirikyacu	89	11	8.4	2.1	0.3	83
Chunchiwi	87	13	10.5	1.4	1.3	86
Copal Sacha	96	4	0.8	2.7	0.3	64
Chirik Sacha	91	9	3.1	6.2	0	73
Alto Mayo	37	63	7.8	52.9	2.2	28
Shampuyacu	13	87.	12.2	74.1	1.2	10
Shimpiyacu	55	45	5.0	40.0	0	31

In communities from the Lamas landscape, Chirikyacu and Chunchiwi, forested areas for conservation are located far from the areas where *comuneros* live. These communities are those that engage the highest percentages of forests in conservation agreements. In Chirikyacu the communal forest cover to 2019 is 89%, while the non-forest cover is 11%; with 8.4% of deforestation occurring before 2000, and 2.1% between 2001 and 2019. Chirikyacu committed 83% of its forests to the NPCF (Figure 13). The forest cover in Chunchiwi is 87%, and the non-forest cover 13%; with 10.5% of deforestation occurring before 2000 and 1.4% occurring between 2001 and 2019. The remaining 1.3% of communal cover is water bodies (GORESAM, 2021). Chunchiwi committed 86% of their forests to the NPCF (Figure 14).

To get to these forested areas, *comuneros* from Chirikyacu and Chunchiwi must walk between 4 to 8 hours. The forest is mainly used to hunt and to collect forest resources. These forests, besides their distance from their areas of habitation, according to *comuneros*, are rocky and steep, neither suitable for living nor for agriculture. The well-preserved state of standing forests also benefits from the low population in these communities and the low pressure that is exercised on forests. Another factor that contributes towards the conservation of these forests is the lack of threats from encroachers and the absence of land rented for agriculture.

These communities are neighbours and adjoin with other indigenous Kichwa communities, with whom they have well-limited boundaries. They also adjoin the Regional Conservation Area *Cordillera Escalera*.

Communities from Lamas are poorly connected with larger villages and cities where they can trade cash crops better. Transport is expensive and, most of the time, *comuneros* must walk approximately three hours from their communities to the city of Lamas, with their products on their backs. In these communities, I suggest that the conservation of communal forests would occur anyway despite the presence of the programme (see Lichtenberg, 2019).

Figure 13: Map of forest/no-forest in Chirikyacu. Developed by Johan Vergaray for this thesis, 2021.





Figure 14: Map of forest/no-forest in Chunchiwi. Developed by Johan Vergaray for this thesis, 2021



In the Sisa landscape, in 2012, *comuneros* from Copal Sacha and Chirik Sacha left their communal territory and moved to nearby non-indigenous villages (*centros poblados*) in the district of San Jose de Sisa, looking for better public services and for better land after the rust plague devastated their coffee crops. After the *comuneros* moved, the communal territory was left for fallow fields, a few farming plots and for the extraction of forest resources. Now, part of their communal land is also committed for conservation with the NPCF.

The forest cover in Copal Sacha is 96% and the non-forest cover is 4%; with 0.8% of deforestation occurring before 2000 and 2.7% between 2001 and 2019. Copal Sacha committed 64% of their forests to the NPCF (Figure 15). The forest cover in Chirik Sacha is 91% and the non-forest cover 8.3%; with 3.1% of deforestation occurring before 2000, while 6.2% occurred between 2001 and 2019. Chirik Sacha committed 73% of its forest cover to the NPCF (Figure 16).

In Copal Sacha and Chirik Sacha, the protected forests under conservation agreements are located approximately 6 hours walking distance from the villages where *comuneros* from Copal Sacha and Chirik Sacha now live. As in the case of communities from the Lamas landscape, these communities do not face significant threats of deforestation. This occurs because most *comuneros* from these communities do not actually live in their communal territory and own private plots that are used for agriculture. Therefore, there is no explicit pressure to clear forests in the communal territory because they have their own plots elsewhere. Still, occasionally, and especially in Copal Sacha, there are encroachers in the communal territory.

In Copal Sacha and Chirik Sacha, the plots of these *comuneros* are well-connected with important roads, allowing better commercialisation of their products. Likewise, in the near city of Sisa there are processing factories, for example, for peeling rice and drying cocoa, that increase the price of their cash crops. The current distance between where the *comuneros* live and the forests under conservation agreements with the NPCF, the fact of owning private plots for farming and the very limited impact of encroachers, all contribute to reducing the pressure to expand the agricultural frontier and therefore the threat of deforestation.

Figure 15: Map of Forest/No-Forest in Copal Sacha. Developed by Johan Vergaray for this thesis, 2021.





Figure 16: Map of forest/No-Forest in Chirik Sacha. Developed by Johan Vergaray for this thesis, 2021.



Kichwa *comuneros*, from the Lamas and Sisa landscapes, recognise the importance of keeping forests as providers of goods on which their livelihoods rely, but also for their ecosystem services that contribute to farming productivity, such as regulating the temperature, the water cycle and protecting the soil. For the Kichwas, keeping healthy forests means healthy shifting of cultivation farming (see Marquardt et al., 2018). The Kichwas transform forests to agricultural fields and then leave them to convert to fallow lands to recover soil fertility. These farming practices lengthen the time the same plot can be used without clearing new forests (Romero and Marquardt, 2015).

In the Alto Mayo landscape, the Awajun communities of Alto Mayo, Shimpiyacu, Shampuyacu and Alto Mayo, internally and illegally have divided the communal land between households including forested areas. Each family has a piece of land for agriculture and forest management. Only the community of Shampuyacu left a forested area for communal management and conservation. Division of land in communities from Alto Mayo is far from being equal. Families that settled in these Awajun communities in the 1970s allocated for themselves the largest areas, reaching between 100 and 150 hectares per family. Families that settled in later years were internally allocated smaller plots by the local authorities. Today, new *comuneros* are allocated between 4 and 8 hectares per family. Each family can decide what to do with its plot.

In contrast with Kichwa communities, Awajun communities from the Alto Mayo landscape have the lowest number of hectares under conservation agreements. This is due also to the low percentages of forests remaining. The forest cover in Shimpiyacu is 55%, and the non-forest cover 45%; with 5% of deforestation occurring before 2000 and 40% between 2001 and

2019 (Figure 17). The forest cover in Shampuyacu is 12.5% and the non-forest cover 87.5%; with 12.2% of deforestation occurring before 2000 and 74.1% between 2001 and 2019. The remaining percentage is water bodies. Shampuyacu committed 10% of their forests to the NPCF (Figure 18). The forest cover in Alto Mayo is 37% and the non-forest cover is 63%; with 7.8% of deforestation occurring before 2001 and 52.9% between 2001 and 2019. Alto Mayo committed 28% of its forests to the NPCF (Figure 19).

In most of the Awajun communities from the Alto Mayo valley, land renting for agriculture is the main economic activity. This activity started in the mid-1980s. It is based on a dynamic of leasing annual contracts or agriculture campaigns to local non-indigenous merchants (Valqui et al., 2014). Land renting has generated negative consequences in terms of land dispossession, access to water and mostly deforestation (Vila, 2017). Today, some families do not even have family orchards to cultivate consumption crops and rely on their rents for subsistence. Land renting has also produced severe conflicts between *comuneros* and Mestizos that rent because they do not want to leave the areas or even claim possession rights. In the community of Shimpiyacu, there is a twenty-year old unresolved conflict with Mestizos that are refusing to leave the area rented for agriculture.

Different studies have shown that Amazonian indigenous communities are one of the most effective territorial categories for the conservation of forests in Peru (Schleicher et al., 2017; Blackman et al., 2017; Walker et al., 2014). Deforestation in the 1351 titled indigenous communities in the Peruvian Amazon represents 17% of the total forest lost between 2001 and 2015 (GIZ and IBC, 2020). In the case of San Martin, and particularly the Awajun communities of Alto Mayo valley, rates of deforestation are higher than average for

indigenous communities in the country. In San Martín, almost 20% of the forest in indigenous communities is deforested. In the other regions of Peru, this percentage is below 8%. The 31 titled communities of San Martin, although hosting only 6% of the forests, have contributed 13% to the total deforestation of the department. Likewise, 3 of the 6 most deforested indigenous communities in San Martin are Awajun communities from Alto Mayo affiliated with the NPCF: Shimpiyacu, Alto Mayo, and Shampuyacu (GIZ and IBC, 2020).

According to *comuneros* from these Awajun communities, the presence of the NPCF and its constraints of land use change in areas under conservation agreement has signified the containment of deforestation in their communities, but not in the rest of the communal forests as land renting for farming is the main economic activity. While I was doing fieldwork, the NPCF received a few early warnings of deforestation in the areas under conservation agreements that the Forest Monitoring Unit conducted. In Alto Mayo landscape, the NPCF proved additionality only in one community, meaning that without its presence, deforestation for agricultural purposes would likely have expanded within these areas.

Figure 17: Map of forest/No-forest in Shimpiyacu. Developed by Johan Vergaray for this thesis, 2021




Figure 18: Map of forest /No-forest in Shampuyacu. Developed by Johan Vergaray for this thesis, 2021.





Figure 19: Map of forest/No-forest in Alto Mayo. Developed by Johan Vergaray for this thesis, 2021.



In general terms, the NPCF affects indigenous communities differently depending on their local forms of forest management and their economic and social contexts. Communities from Lamas show no real threat of deforestation, as the area under NPCF agreement was already left for conservation purposes. In the case of Sisa, the fact that *comuneros* have private plots to conduct farming outside the communal territory also minimises the risk of deforestation. In the case of Alto Mayo, the NPCF appears as a real constraint on deforestation, as it lessens the availability of forests for land renting for commercial agricultural purposes.

### 7.3. Political impacts of the NPCF within communities

In this section, I explain the local impacts the NPCF produces within communities in terms of political organisation, social conflicts, and territorial awareness. The selection of these issues responds to a methodologically inductive approach. This means finding out the main concerns that communities have about the NPCF during fieldwork without having a prior hypothesis or specific topics to focus on.

#### 7.3.1. Reflections on indigeneity

A first impact I could witness about the presence of the NPCF in the communities was the collective reflection about the status of the communities and its inhabitants. A discussion about indigeneity itself, questioning who they are as communities and on what attributes, were chosen by the state to participate in the NPCF. An attribute mentioned in the communities to be considered for the NPCF was the fact of being organised communities. For these communities, being well-organised includes having functioning political forms of organisation,

communal boards elected every two years with agency to deal with the state; and having collective agreements over social cooperation and rules. These are considered qualities the state seeks in indigenous communities to work with on development initiatives.

*The state comes here because we are organised. Not as Aviacion (another Kichwa community) that is disorganised. We are happy that they come to help us... The state chose us because we have strong organisations, we are more civilised, we have more training, we respect the decisions made by the community and we support each other (Comunero CHW01, Chunchiwi, March 2018).*

*The state chose Shampuyacu because the community complies with all the rules (Comunero SHA01, Shampuyacu, March 2018).*

An unexpected result from fieldwork was the additional consideration of communities as "civilised", as a quality that makes them adequate and legible users of public policy initiatives like the NPCF. Being civilised means for *comuneros* having a titled territory and an active political form of organisation; as well as other features such as achieving better levels of education and better forms of articulation with external actors, like different state agencies, NGOs or even market actors in urban settings (Gow, 1990). Indigenous communities perceive these features as somehow being granted by the state. Therefore, they evidence the achievement of these milestones as qualities of civilisation that have been somehow imposed by the state but embraced by these communities (not without difficulties). This reveals a gentle sense of stateness, of accepting the state through the institutionalisation of social and political practices (Dargent et al., 2017).

Reflecting and representing communities as civilised resonates with historical attempts and narratives since the presence of the missionaries that arrived in San Martin from the 18<sup>th</sup> century, and then of the Peruvian state in different forms (state civil servants, the military, the

police, teachers, etc.) that aimed to dominate indigenous peoples in order to integrate them into the Peruvian nation (Espinosa, 2014a; Santos, 1992). In recent history, indigenous peoples have learnt that having a land title, being educated, and speaking Spanish are important values to communicate with the state, especially for the possibility of gaining collective rights and obtaining public services, and consequently exercising citizenship. As such, being chosen by the state as eligible communities to participate in the NPCF for being well-organised, promotes a sense of social recognition that impacts on a positive image of the state as the provider of opportunities.

These communities do not frame themselves against the state, but in close communication with it. However, this does not mean this relationship implies a full control or subjugation by the state of the indigenous peoples. Communities while reflecting on been chosen by the state as part of the NPCF, are aware of the possibilities to exercise their citizenship considering a sense of social inclusion and belonging to a broader society. They also recognise that they have been visible to the state and as such should become legible to the state as users of public policy.

### 7.3.2. Political dynamics through the NPCF

In terms of political organisation, an important impact of the implementation of the NPCF within communities is the new administrative burden the indigenous political authorities have to deal with. In Peruvian Amazonian indigenous communities, the communal board (*junta directiva*) is the highest local political authority. This form of political organisation was imposed by the state when indigenous communities were given the possibility of legally gaining

property rights over their traditional land from the 1970s. The communal board is composed of four members: the president, the vice president, treasurer, and the secretary. The communal board is the responsible body of local government, administration, and the vehicle of legal representation of indigenous communities before the state and other external institutions. The communal board is also in charge of leading local development activities and solving local problems. Board members do not receive a salary, and it is expected that all adult male members (between 18 and 65 years old) become part of the communal board at least once in their lives. Communal board members are elected every two years by secret vote. Once elected, the new board members must register as new authorities at the National Superintendence of Public Records. This registration gives them legal status as representatives before the state (SUNARP, 2014).

In the case of the NPCF, the communal board is the formal and legal counterpart of the NPCF. As such, it is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the development plans and managing the economic incentives. While the president has the role of representing the community politically, mediating conflicts and promoting dialogue, he does not make decisions alone. Decisions are made collectively during assembly meetings. The implementation places a heavy burden on the board in terms of dealing with new activities, especially managing money.

When CLBs visit the communities at least once a month, the board members are required to stay with them all day, discussing the conduct of the conditionalities and preparing accountability reports. With the implementation of the NPCF, communal boards have assumed responsibility for administrative duties such as signing cheques, revising Excel

spreadsheets and preparing sworn declarations as managers of their development projects. Communal board members also spend at least one day a week conducting administrative duties that are part of the implementation of the NPCF, like traveling to nearby cities to follow up community legal documents, buying items for the implementation of the investment plans, going to the bank to withdraw money, and requesting account balances. These are challenging activities, as most of these board members have only an incomplete elementary education. The effort of installing bureaucratic procedures and the expectation of *comuneros* of embracing them to better connect with the state also reveals the usefulness of accepting stateness.

Implementing NPCF activities happens in addition to their responsibilities with other external projects, and their internal activities as communal board representatives. The demanding role that communal board authorities have in interacting with the NPCF lessens their time to carry out their own family and economic activities, such as working on their farms. There are cases in which presidents and treasurers of communal boards need to hire workmen to help them with their plots. These actions generate local suspicion from ordinary *comuneros* about elite capture of benefits, such as the economic incentives of the NPCF. In Kichwa communities this is mostly relevant in communities from Sisa. *Comuneros*, especially those less familiar with the NPCF, have suspicions over where the board members get the money to pay for these workers. During fieldwork in Copal Sacha, I noticed that some *comuneros* suspected that board members were benefiting using the economic incentives, toinformally “compensate” the time invested in the communal political duties.

*VB: Have there been complaints from community members about the role of the communal board?*

*President of Community: Comuneros complain all the time. Not in the assembly, but there is always gossip that they don't know how we spend money, when all the activities are there, in the investment plan. People complain the most about the apu (president) and the treasurer (Comunero CHW1, Chunchiwi, September 2017).*

During communal assemblies, sometimes *comuneros* argue that they do not agree with the expenditures of the economic incentives, even if these are executed according to the development plans that have been previously approved by the community. *Comuneros* also request to look over the receipts of expenses linked to the activities that communities must conduct as part of their NPCF investment plans. However, when ordinary *comuneros* are invited to the accountability report meetings, they often do not attend.

*They do not understand that all expenditures are programmed and are already established in the development plan (Comunero CHK 02, Chirikyacu, February 2018).*

According to CLBs, part of the suspicion from *comuneros* about their political authorities is supported by a few real cases of the misuse of funds. At least once in each of the communities of Sisa, Chirik Sacha and Copal Sacha, treasurers misused the NPCF economic incentives, lending money to third parties to gain interest, or buying plots for their personal use. These transactions produced delays in the accountability reporting due to the cash imbalances. One such case of misuse of economic incentives occurred in Copal Sacha in 2017. The treasurer made a personal loan with part of the economic incentives aimed at implementing the conditionalities, and it was never paid off. This treasurer had to sell his own plot to pay the NPCF back. After this incident, he had to look for an off-farm job as he became landless to work on agriculture. He was able to find a job as a security guard in a local bank in the city of San Jose de Sisa.

In the Awajun communities from Alto Mayo, *comuneros* also expressed distrust about communal board members for elite capture of benefits, misusing economic incentives. According to Brown (2014), in these communities, political authorities are traditionally expected to be economically generous with their relatives and community members to consolidate political and economic alliances, as these authorities are in constant contact with development projects and external organisations.

In October 2018, the community of Shampuyacu organised a communal assembly to discuss the possibility of removing the communal board president from his position after he failed to prove expenses he had made for the NPCF but did not have the evidence. He claimed to have bought a photographic camera and a printer but was not able to show the items nor the receipts for the items. He was accused of corruption, of using the NPCF money for personal reasons. *Comuneros* at this communal assembly were very upset and a few requested to substitute the president. In a conciliatory manner, a representative from FERIAAM asked the audience to give the president some time to account for this spending. As mentioned before, communities from Alto Mayo are the ones with most difficulties and delays in presenting their accountability reports and their economic incentive balances. I recorded this incident in my fieldnotes:

*Today, Saturday, I attended a communal assembly in the community of Shampuyacu. The former president, Moises, had to present the accountability report to comuneros about part of the NPCF economic incentive payments that are missing. The meeting was held in Awajun so Lorenzo, who is an Awajun forest bureaucrat, translated for me and to the rest of the CLBs attending the assembly. Moises said he bought a photographic camera and a GPS, but he did not have the receipts nor the items. The current president, Antonio, pressed Moises to return the money. Moises says he will, soon. Then, the secretary of the board speaks very loudly, outraged by the lack of seriousness of Moises. She walked out in the middle of the meeting. Comuneros attending the meeting started talking to each other, there was a lot of fuss and nobody*

*attended to the discussion about the economic incentives anymore. Lorenzo tried to retake the focus of the meeting, without success. A group of comuneros raised their hands to remark that they no longer want to work with the NPCF. Diana, the coordinator of the NPCF in San Martin, told Lorenzo to translate this: That is not possible anymore. We are not here to discuss that (Fieldnotes in Shampuyacu, October 2018).*

The overwhelming responsibilities of communal board members as counterparts of the NPCF, besides the suspicion they suffer for presumed mismanagement of the economic incentives, discourage some of these political authorities from continuing a political career while the NPCF operates, as it is seen as too demanding and stressful. Their heavy political responsibilities and the burden of social suspicion have caused them exhaustion and political dysfunction. In 2017, Copal Sacha had a political crisis in which there were no candidates to run for president of the community.

Amid this crisis a woman offered herself to be candidate and won as there were no other candidates. Her role as the first female community president lasted one month. She felt the pressure to resign due to the harassment she received from men for being a female president. What I was told was that she was criticised for presumably lacking the skills to lead a community, just because she was a woman. She used to receive comments such as her main role was at home, caring for her family. This is the same type of discourse that women that work on traditional handicrafts for the NPCF hear from men, especially their husbands.

Some communal board members, despite attendance being mandatory, do not attend the meetings with the NPCF. Full attendance of communal board members to NPCF meetings only occurred in Chirkyacu and Chunchiwi in the Lamas landscape. In Chirik Sacha, for example, in October 2018 the treasurer demanded to be paid for attending these meetings, because he

was losing working hours on his plot. In the final months of contract of Chirik Sacha, only the president would attend the accountability meetings with the CLBs and would conduct the forest patrols alone.

In line with these criticisms of PES schemes, these results confirm claims that suggest that these schemes can debilitate local political leadership (Rodríguez de Francisco and Boelens, 2014a, 2014b; Vatn, 2010; Corbera et al., 2007; Cleaver, 2002). The structure of the NPCF and the bureaucratic burden for communal boards debilitated their authority in the eyes of *comuneros* due to criticisms over the capture of benefits and mismanagement of funds. These effects of the NPCF may have occurred due to them being the first time that communities have had the chance to administer a significant amount of public funds to implement local projects, and in which they have had the opportunity to decide how to distribute the benefits, albeit with the support of the CLBs. Usually, indigenous communities are passive receptors of development projects in which they are not responsible for managing money nor deciding how these are to be spent.

These results also contrast with one of the NPCF's complementary goals of strengthening local governance skills for better management of natural resources (MINAM/PNCB, 2016). In theory, the NPCF programme aims to provide technical assistance to communities on planning, organisation, leadership, and community participation, as well as to strengthen local capacities and skills to conduct communal development initiatives. CLBs are aware of these expectations but argue that they cannot accomplish them because they must prioritise the bureaucratic skills of indigenous people, as accountability reports are the main input that the NPCF head office in Lima requests from communities. As these duties take so much time and

effort, they are not able to effectively attend to the other objectives of the NPCF.

Despite the weakening of the highest political organisation in the NPCF communities, paradoxically, some board members identify positive aspects from taking on their responsibilities while the NPCF is implemented. They appreciate the opportunity that being part of the NPCF offers them the chance to learn new administrative skills. Board members appreciate the chance to learn about state bureaucracy, accountability, and state documentation. These authorities understand that if they do not participate in these activities, they would likely never “learn” about dealing with the state and other external institutions as an ordinary *comunero*. Additionally, it is hard work for them. During fieldwork, I participated in several exercises on signing cheques and understanding receipts and witnessed the difficulties that *comuneros* encounter in these activities (Figures 20 and 21). They are usually nervous and ashamed of failing.

*We feel like children practicing our signatures over and over (Comunero COP01, Copal Sacha communal board, February 2018).*

*I joined the president and treasurer of the community at the National Bank in the city of Lamas. This was their first experience of going to the bank to withdraw money for the community. I asked them if I could queue with them. It was a busy day, as it was also pay day for beneficiaries from social programmes for other indigenous communities near Lamas. It took us two hours of queuing. When we were close to the helpdesk, I politely said that I would wait for them outside, so they could withdraw their money alone. But they said they felt quite nervous and asked me to stay with them, as I did. Still, they made their transaction correctly, after a few mistakes signing. I could see their stress (Fieldnotes, April 2018, Lamas).*

*We have been gaining trust with the state. They (state authorities) used to say that communities are not going to perform well, they are going to waste the money. In my life, being 34 years old, it is the first time that the indigenous communities have manage money from a programme. It is tremendous progress. They (comuneros) are learning what to spend on, how to pay. As Peruvians we must show the accountability of our expenses; we cannot waste (Member 02 of FEPIKRESAM, May 2018, Lamas).*

Figure 20: Accountability meetings with CLBs in 2017. Source: Valeria Biffi Isla



Figure 21: Practicing with the filling of accountability reports in Chunchiwi, 2018. Source: Valeria Biffi Isla



Studies on Amazonian indigenous peoples' relationship with the state have already suggested the importance of participating in bureaucratic procedures to achieve better forms of communication with the state (Allard and Walker, 2016; Goncalves, 2016; Penfield, 2016). For indigenous peoples, participating in the NPCF contributes towards improving their bureaucratic agency to find more efficient forms of interaction with the state. They understand that the state-indigeneity relationship is mediated with documentation they need to have command over (Allard and Walker, 2016). In that sense, the NPCF, beyond its environmental goals, becomes a platform to become village bureaucrats to access the state. As such, these complex and even contradictory results are also in line with those PES advocates who suggest that these schemes can strengthen local agency and leadership (Pascual et al., 2014; Chan et al., 2012).

*Sometimes, when they tell me to go somewhere, I have to say I can't. I do not have time. When you want to learn something, you give yourself a time and those workshops serve you for yourself. If they do not choose you (in the board) and you never assume a position, you live in fear all the time. When you are on the board, you cannot say: I do not want to, I'm afraid (Comunero CHY02, Chirikyacu, November 2018).*

*Now, what I learn is to ask for receipts. Those things that you did not know before (Comunero COP03, Copal Sacha Chirikyacu, November 2018).*

The learning process on state bureaucratic procedures is also claimed by local indigenous representatives as the opportunity to start managing conservation and development projects without intermediaries. *Comuneros*, in general, recognise their current dependence on CLBs as brokers. Yet their role as managers of economic incentives has given them the chance to think of future development opportunities in which they are their own managers, only if they learn to command administrative skills.

The interest of indigenous peoples to disassociate from intermediaries is not new. It is part of a long-term aspiration, since the 1990s, to find better political spaces to exercise power with the state and mainstream society (Surallés, 2011; Greene, 2009). Indigenous communities tend to be distrustful both of internal intermediaries, such as indigenous federations at the subnational and national levels, as well as external intermediaries, such as state bureaucrats, NGO representatives and timber and agriculture enterprises. For a long time, they have perceived these agents as misappropriating the names of communities to receive personal benefits and funds that should be granted to communities.

The case of indigenous federations as distrusted intermediaries is illustrative. Indigenous federations are the indigenous bureaucracy. Their leaders, usually men, with better education levels than the average for indigenous peoples, are elected every two years by the presidents of indigenous communities they represent. These organisations present themselves as intermediaries of the indigenous communities they represent who aim to centralise development projects in indigenous communities. In the case of the NPCF, local indigenous federations have also demanded to be intermediaries between the NPCF and the communities. With this, they expect communities to share part of the economic incentives with them based on their claimed representation of indigenous communities' interests.

Once doing fieldwork, I was walking with the president of Chirikyacu, and he asked me advice on how to proceed with a request from a leader of the regional Kichwa indigenous federation. He told me that a regional leader had asked him to economically support the organisation with money from the NPCF to contribute to paying the federation's office bills. He felt uncomfortable because he knew he could not do that according to NPCF rules and because he

considered that it was a case of overconfidence from this leader. Besides that, communities do pay monthly fees to their federations. In September 2017, Monica (forest bureaucrat) told me that earlier that same year, the community of Copal Sacha presented a cash imbalance in one of their trimestral accountability reports, but could not track the source of this discrepancy until the president of the community confessed to her that a leader from the regional indigenous federation had asked him for a loan from the NPCF economic incentives that he did not pay back. In these situations of internal conflicts about representation and brokerage between communities and local indigenous federations, the NPCF in San Martin holds a firm position of negotiating directly with the communities without those other brokers. CLBs organise monthly meetings with leaders from the regional federations to present the progress of the programme and promote a friendly relationship with the regional indigenous federation.

The intent of communal boards to remain separate from intermediaries is also found among organised Kichwa women working on handicrafts, who have been funded through the NPCF (Figure 22). Women working on handicrafts see autonomy from the men that control the NPCF locally, to manage their own activities and budgets without requiring men as intermediaries. When handicrafts were first included in the development plans of Kichwa communities in 2016, male board members complained that handicrafts were a “private activity”. They meant that handicrafts had no collective benefit for the community, and therefore should not be included as part of the NPCF investment plans. These men also argued that these handicraft activities would distract women from their domestic housework like looking after their children or cooking for their families. Yet with the support of female CLBs, handicraft activities conducted by women were slowly included in the development plans in Kichwa communities.

Male resistance was demonstrated in delays in the payments, or making women sign blank cheques to use the funds for other activities.

*Figure 22: Meeting of CLBs with artisan women in Chunchiwi, 2017. Source: Valeria Biffi Isla.*



After these sorts of events, female CLBs made the effort to help indigenous women manage their NPCF funds to work in handicrafts. This gave the women the chance to control their own activities, budget, and schedule without relying on men as intermediaries. Meanwhile, men kept claiming that women do not have the expertise to deal with money or that only men should have administrative responsibilities. However, female CLBs used their discretion to promote the participation of women in the NPCF development plans, considering participation as a means of empowerment. With handicraft activities, these women appreciated having the chance to learn bureaucratic skills and even to deal with and confront

male communal boards to defend their rights as policy users in the implementation of the NPCF. In the process, these women also learnt to sign cheques, to understand accountability reports, to request receipts for their products in the cities and to sell their products in spaces outside their communities. In most of the cases of women who participated in the handicraft activities, husbands prohibited them from travelling.

Communal board members recognise the instrumental value of participating in this programme. They perceive that working with the NPCF, beyond the environmental implication of conserving forests, is an opportunity to learn new administrative skills and a chance to increase their agency in dealing with the state. As such, positive results of PES already identified by for example Dhakal et al. (2020); Pascual et al. (2014) and Chan et al. (2012) among others, resonate in this section. The main difference with this literature is that the sense of agency has not yet been used to negotiate better benefits with the state. Still, local indigenous leaders recognise the power of documentation and bureaucracy to access the development world and have created the possibility of avoiding brokers to manage future projects to improve the wellbeing of their communities.

### 7.3.3. Social conflicts around distribution of benefits

In the following paragraphs, I discuss how the implementation of the NPCF affects the scaling of social conflicts within communities. For this section, social conflicts are understood as nonviolent communal disagreements about issues that concern the wellbeing of the communities and their inhabitants, without generating major distress or physical violence. The presence and intensity of social conflicts within communities occurring with the

implementation of the NPCF has been tracked, for this research, considering different features like community population density, the dispersion of households, ethnicity, economic activities, and location of forests under conservation agreements.

The Kichwa communities from Lamas, Chirikyacu and Chunchiwi, have a low population of 117 and 116 inhabitants respectively (INEI, 2018). In Chirikyacu, houses are in a compact area close to a main square, facilitating communication, information exchange and participation in NPCF activities and meetings. In Chunchiwi, houses are dispersed along a main road, but still there are difficulties in summoning the *comuneros* to participate in NPCF activities and meetings. In these small communities only Kichwa indigenous peoples live, whose main activity is agriculture for subsistence. The forested area under conservation agreement is far from the urban centre, between 4 and 8 hours' walking distance, an area that all *comuneros* can access. As mentioned before, in these communities there is no real pressure to expand the agricultural frontier and therefore the threat of deforestation. In that sense, there are no conflicts within the Kichwa indigenous communities of Chirikyacu and Chunchiwi over forest management.

As these communities are of low density (between 30 and 50 families approximately), the economic incentives are enough to include most households in the economic activities of the development plans of the NPCF. For example, extensionists hired to improve cocoa plots can actually provide technical assistance to every household. Only a few elderly families chose not to participate in these activities. In these cases, all households benefit from the agriculture extensionists' technical assistance in which they actively participate.

*Comuneros* from these communities also demonstrate social cooperation, for example, attending all NPCF meetings and complying with NPCF conditionalities. Gossip and suspicion about mismanagement of economic incentives are present but not strong enough to produce social conflicts that affect the conduct of the NPCF. *Comuneros* from Chirikyacu and Chunchiwi state that they are always open to receive new development initiatives and are committed to fulfilling the relevant responsibilities. In fact, these are communities that commonly receive many state and non-state development initiatives, mostly due to their reputation as responsible actors in their dealings with the state. Here, social conflicts are not observed.

Cooperation in communities from the Lamas landscape is expressed in settled and traditional forms of joint work, commonly known in Kichwa as *choba choba*. *Choba choba* refers to local forms of reciprocity among Kichwa families' work. *Choba choba* has different levels of joint work. It can be conducted among families to cultivate the land, among friends and neighbours to build a house, for example, and among all community members to clean trails, creeks, and streets, to build a communal house or a road. In this system, no payments are involved, but all the members of the group commit to work together in cultivating the plots of all the members involved, dividing tasks according to age and strength. *Choba choba* also exists in communities from Sisa, but as I explain in the following paragraphs, this local feature has not necessarily translated to the cooperation needed to fulfil the NPCF conditionalities.

The situation for *comuneros* from the Sisa landscape, Copal Sacha and Chirik Sacha in the Sisa landscape is different. The population of Copal Sacha is 1,423 inhabitants and 282 in Chirik Sacha (INEI, 2018). As mentioned before, members from these communities do not live in their communal territory but in nearby non-indigenous villages. Official demographic data

only expresses the number of *comuneros* that are part of the indigenous community in which they actually do not live anymore. *Comuneros* from Copal Sacha live dispersed in different villages, Miraflores, Santa Cruz and Centro America; while *comuneros* from Chirik Sacha live in the village of Nauta. Both are located in the district of San Jose de Sisa. Inhabitants of these villages are from a mixed ethnic background, meaning that Kichwa indigenous *comuneros* live with Mestizo villagers, in contrast with communities from the Lamas landscape, who are exclusively Kichwa members.

For communal board members, the territorial dispersion of households makes it harder to diffuse communication about NPCF activities and meetings as well as following up the work of extensionists. For *comuneros*, territorial dispersion makes it easier to lose track of the progress of the development plans, increasing their suspicion among the management of the NPCF activities and especially of the use of economic incentives. As mentioned before, since *comuneros* hold private plots, the communal territory does not face threats of deforestation from *comuneros*, thus there are no significant conflicts over forest management either. In the case of Copal Sacha, *comuneros* sometimes face attempts by encroachers to move into their communal territory.

In communities from the Sisa landscape, the amount of economic incentives received are not enough to include all the *comuneros* that would like to participate in NPCF activities. If we divide the annual cash amount per number of inhabitants, the figure would be 30 GBP per person in Copal Sacha and 64 GBP per person in Chirk Sacha per year. Therefore, extensionists can only work with a few *comuneros* in each case. This situation leads to disputes and complaints about elite capture, especially from non-users of the NPCF. Likewise, as the

meetings with CLBs are conducted in these mixed villages, the non-indigenous inhabitants of these villages also demand the benefits of agricultural technical assistance and the use of the economic incentives to cover the social needs of the villages.

*Comuneros* from the Sisa landscape also show poor interest in fulfilling NPCF responsibilities, in contrast to communities from Lamas. They do not attend communal meetings arranged by the CLBs. The case of Chirik Sacha is emblematic. In the last year of implementation of the NPCF in this community (2017), before finishing its contract, communal board members stopped participating in meetings, *comuneros* stopped attending agricultural technical assistance events and forest patrol brigades were only conducted by the president of the community, as nobody else wanted to join him, but he did not want to fail the community conditionalities of the NPCF. The treasurer of Chirik Sacha complained that he was tired of filling in cheques and of working for hours for NPCF administrative chores without receiving remuneration for these NPCF demands. In the first year on implementation of the programme, as part of the social component of the contract, the community began a communal orchard with fruit trees for all community members to enjoy. Nobody took care of the orchard. The first time I visited the orchard it was full of fruit eaten by animals. We managed to take a few papayas, coconuts, and tomatoes with us.

The most common reasons given by *comuneros* from the Sisa landscape for their lack of interest in the NPCF activities run by men was the perception of no benefits from the programme. This was because the economic incentives were not direct payments for households but were to be invested in improving agricultural practices. In Chirik Sacha, *comuneros* had developed a tense relationship with the agriculture extensionist, responsible

for enhancing local agricultural productivity, because his work was not what *comuneros* expected. It was claimed that they were taught farming techniques they had already learnt from other cocoa enterprises for whom they sell their crops. The case of Copal Sacha was not very different either. In the final months of fieldwork, the treasurer of the communal board disappeared. Nobody from the community knew where he was. This situation directly affected the NPCF. For example, cheques could not be withdrawn without the legal signature of the treasurer, thereby delaying all of the activities.

*According to Albino (the agriculture extensionist for the Sisa landscape), in Copal Sacha there is distrust from comuneros about the management of funds, and especially of the role of treasurer, Nicanor, who no one knows where he is now. They say Nicanor does whatever he wants with the money (Fieldnotes, Copal Sacha, September 2017).*

As the forests under conservation agreements are located elsewhere from where *comuneros* from Copal Sacha and Chirik Sacha live, there are no direct constraints on *comuneros* to conduct activities in the forested areas that are now forbidden. In general terms, in the cases of Copal Sacha and Chirik Sacha, there was a modest level of social cooperation to comply with NPCF responsibilities. This was largely affected by the households' dispersion and mixed ethnic backgrounds in the villages where the meetings are held. These features complicate communication and participation in NPCF activities, provoking high levels of complaint and misunderstanding of the NPCF.

In the case of Awajun communities from the Alto Mayo landscape, Shampuyacu, Shimpiyacu and Alto Mayo, the scenario is also different. These communities have a population of 557,652 and 674 inhabitants respectively (INEI, 2018). If we divide the number of inhabitants by the total cash the community receives per year, each individual would receive 8.74, and 46 GBP respectively, per year. There is almost nothing that can be done with a budget of 8 GBP per

person per year. In Shampuyacu, by 2019, as part of the NPCF conditionalities, a small group of 10 *comuneros* received technical assistance to improve the production of coffee crops.

In these communities, non-indigenous peoples, *Mestizos or Colonos*, also live, who rent land for commercial agriculture (Figure 23). Therefore, the official data on the demographics of these communities does not show the real amount of people living there, as Mestizos are not formal inhabitants. In these three Awajun communities, the main economic activity is renting land for agriculture to non-indigenous farmers. The presence of non-indigenous residents, who are the renters of farmland, produces tensions within these communities due to discussions around land tenure, prices of the farmland, forest clearing and the use of forbidden pesticides. Tensions are greatest in the community of Shimpiyacu, which has a severe problem of land invasion. This community has a 20-year conflict with non-indigenous encroachers who claim possession rights over 900 hectares and are not willing to leave the community. Shimpiyacu leaders have used part of NPCF funds to pursue legal actions against the encroachers. During fieldwork, I noticed that local authorities were more concerned about this problem than the NPCF, as they faced losing their communal property.

Figure 23: Rice fields in Alto Mayo landscape. Source: Valeria Biff Isla.



In these Awajun communities, groups of indigenous households are widely dispersed across sectors that operate as internal and informal geopolitical units. The population in Shimpiyacu for example, is organised into seven subdivisions (*sectores*) with their own political representatives, besides the official communal board. Some subdivisions were established by *colono* renters. Some of them married Awajun women and slowly they also started claiming some rights as residents to the point of requesting legal possession of the land within the territories of indigenous communities. The territorial dispersion of households makes it harder for the communal board and for CLBs to share information about the NPCF, to call for workshops and meetings and to promote communal decision-making regarding the NPCF, such as the design and implementation of the development plans and the forest patrols. As revealed in this research, *comuneros* in the sectors where the members of the communal

board live in each of the Alto Mayo communities usually have a better understanding of the rules and conditionalities of the NPCF. By contrast, the furthest ones and those without members of the communal board tend to have more uncertainties, fears, and more competing claims about, for example, how to distribute the economic incentives of the NPCF.

The forested areas under conservation agreements in the cases of Shimpiyacu and Alto Mayo are not composed of a single polygon, but by different patches located in different sectors of the communities. This is the result of the high rates of deforestation and the poor process of land planning within the communities. The dispersed location of the forested areas under conservation agreement with the NPCF generates internal conflicts in these communities. *Comuneros* from the subdivisions where the conservation areas are located demand the economic benefits for them, as those responsible for conserving the forests. They claim that while other sectors rent for agriculture, producing deforestation, they protect the forests and deserve compensation. During the first year of Shimpiyacu's enrolment, *comuneros* from one of the subdivisions where the forest under conservation agreement is located, threatened to forbid the entrance of forest patrol brigades, demanding payment from the NPCF. It took around one year for the CLB responsible for this area and for the regional leaders of the FERIAAM to convince residents from this subdivision to allow the forest patrols to conduct their expeditions.

The case of the community of Shampuyacu is also complex. Their forested area under conservation agreement is less than 500 hectares. As a consequence, economic incentives can only fund economic activities to improve coffee plots for fewer than 15 *comuneros*, amongst a population of 577 inhabitants (INEI, 2018). This scenario created disappointment amongst

the rest of the *comuneros*, who did not enjoy any NPCF benefits but still faced forest use constraints. For Awajun communities in the Alto Mayo landscape, the new arrangements to conserve forests with the NPCF were a real constraint for their main economic activity of land renting, involving forest clearing. This became a source of internal conflict.

Complaints about the NPCF from *comuneros* in the Alto Mayo landscape has led to widespread disinterest in the programme, creating very poor cooperation to pursue NPCF conditionalities and attend meetings with CLBs. This has also been evident in the lack of *comuneros'* engagement with the accountability reporting, their participation in meetings with the NPCF and the delays in organising forest patrol brigades. The NPCF in Alto Mayo has exacerbated local tensions about land renting and conservation.

In these Awajun communities, the NPCF has crowded out previous pro-environmental behaviours such as voluntary forest patrols (see Clements et al., 2010). Since the implementation of the NPCF, *comuneros* have demanded compensation for conducting forest patrols, even though these actions were already part of their communal responsibilities before the existence of the programme. These Awajun indigenous communities organise, on average, two patrols per year, to clean their trails and monitor the potential presence of encroachers in their territories. These expeditions usually take between one or two days. In these forest patrols, *comuneros* pay for their own expenses as these patrols are their responsibilities as *comuneros*.

Forest patrols are the duties that all male *comuneros* between 18 and 65 years old must undertake. With the presence of the NPCF, now *comuneros* request that the NPCF pay them

for conducting forest patrols, as they claim that they are spending too many days away from their households and farms. The NPCF provides a budget for food, boots, flashlights, batteries, medicine for the conduct of the patrols, but not a salary. The difference with the traditional patrols is that NPCF conditions require four patrols per year, lasting between 3 and 7 days, to include monitoring the boundaries of the forest conservation areas using GPS and writing reports. Finally, in July 2018, after at least six months following enrolment, the Awajun communities agreed to organise forest patrol brigades. These responsibilities were assumed by the existing “indigenous police” (*policía nativa*), a local guard composed mostly of young men, responsible for the safety of the community, including penalising cases of adultery and robbery.

The situation in the communities from the Alto Mayo landscape reveals a significant level of conflict in contrast with the other NPCF landscapes of Lamas and Sisa. The dispersed location of households and of the forested areas under the conservation agreements, the high dependence on land renting and the low economic incentives, combine to produce internal tension and low cooperation to comply with NPCF conditionalities. The case of Awajun communities coincides with the findings of Kosoy et al. (2007) and Corbera et al. (2007), who suggest that PES providers of ecosystem services who were not previously committed to forest conservation are those who are less willing to participate in these schemes, like the Awajun in contrast to the behaviours of the Kichwa people from Lamas and Sisa.

Social conflicts in each landscape are affected by different factors such as demographics, housing dispersion, ethnic composition, economic activities, and location of forested areas under conservation agreements. However, they are also influenced by the level of knowledge,

communication shared and participation of *comuneros* in the NPCF rules and conditionalities. In the face of these social tensions, CLBs assume a passive role, arguing that these local disagreements are issues that communities must solve themselves, even though one of the side goals of the NPCF is to improve community governance over the management of communal resources. This is an important outcome to mention, as other studies on PES in rural settings have suggested that the participation of state representatives (like the CLBs), through answering questions and clarifying information about the initiatives, can increase local understanding and participation (Krause and Loft, 2013).

The results in this section confirm evidence about the negative impacts of PES schemes in rural settings producing social conflicts (Rodríguez de Francisco and Boelens, 2014a, 2014b; Alpízar et al., 2012; Clements et al., 2010). On the one hand, in Kichwa communities from Sisa, the NPCF has weakened social cooperation due to disagreements over the management of the economic incentives and the constant suspicion of *comuneros* about the elite capture of economic benefits. On the other hand, the constraints on forest management in the three Awajun communities from the Alto Mayo landscape have produced communal disagreements and the disruption of social relations, affecting social cooperation and therefore the fulfilment of the NPCF conditionalities. Similarly, in these same Awajun communities, the presence of the NPCF has produced perverse payment incentives to perform environmental actions like the forest patrols, when they are already part of the ordinary responsibilities of *comuneros* (Grieg- Gran et al., 2005). In Lamas, the conflicts remain in the realm of gossip and suspicion without further scaling up (Figure 24).

These outcomes also reflect the complexity of depicting indigenous communities as policy users, instead of for example individuals, because the focus of the NPCF on these geopolitical units has tended to dismiss internal social, political, and territorial dynamics and divisions. This is a concern that has already been discussed in other Latin American settings (von Hedemann and Osborne, 2016). Simplifying communities as homogenous and cohesive entities, as the NPCF does, and therefore establishing rules and protocols assuming internal social cooperation, impacts on the way communities respond as policy users and affects their political structure, their social relationships and their commitments to the state. Indeed, the way of understanding communities by NPCF bureaucrats hides their internal complexities, which then affects the fulfilment of the NPCF conditionalities (Milne and Adams, 2012; Felipe-Lucía et al., 2015). The intention to profile communities as policy users and thus hiding internal controversies also reflects the state's forms of assessment and accountability that do not include the non-environmental impacts, even if these affect the environmental results of this conservation programme.

*Figure 24: Characteristics of communities that impact on social conflicts. Self-elaboration.*

LAMAS: Chirikyacu and Chunchiwi	SISA: Copal Sacha and Chirik Sacha	ALTO MAYO: Shampuyacu, Shimpiyacu and Alto Mayo
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Low density</li> <li>• Compact communities</li> <li>• Only indigenous peoples</li> <li>• Economic incentives enough to include all households in farming activities</li> <li>• No relevant conflicts</li> <li>• Social cooperation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mid density</li> <li>• Territorial dispersion</li> <li>• Ethnically combined.</li> <li>• Non users and non indigenous demand NPCF benefits and direct payments</li> <li>• Mid level conflicts</li> <li>• Mild cooperation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High demographic density</li> <li>• Household dispersion</li> <li>• Ethnically combined</li> <li>• Land renting</li> <li>• Forested areas in different patches.</li> <li>• High <u>conflicts</u></li> <li>• Poor <u>cooperation</u></li> </ul>

#### 7.3.4. Territorial awareness from forest patrols

The NPCF only works with legally titled communities as a mandatory requirement to enroll. The premise for this is that a lack of property rights discourages conservation for forest users and promotes the appearance of free riders extracting natural resources from areas with no formal owners (Monterroso et al., 2017). In San Martin, as of 2020, there were around 30 titled communities and another 90 still awaiting to be titled. The NPCF works with 13 titled communities. As part of the formal procedure to enroll, a community must prepare its legal documentation including their land title, which includes the specific spatial extent and the geo-referenced boundaries of the communal territory.

Usually, most indigenous communities in Peru do not have this data updated due to the high information costs, a lack of willingness from political authorities to address indigenous title claims and the difficulties in the coordination between state agencies responsible for land titling (Cronkleton et al., 2019). Due to these information gaps about the community land titling process, the NPCF supports titled communities to accomplish all the legal documentation needed to enroll in the programme. This includes collecting geo-referenced data in situ and building communal maps, to then choose the forested area to conserve within the NPCF scheme.

Reworking, updating, and completing bureaucratic procedures to obtain legal documentation on their land rights has increased the awareness of *comuneros* about the importance of having the legal documentation to defend their territorial rights as indigenous communities. They recognise that having the title with geo-referenced data about the boundaries entitles them

to demand state arbitration in the case of conflicts with neighbours and to demand state enforcement action against encroachers in their territory. For indigenous communities, their land titles are the best sources of legal protection they have received from the state against trespassers on their land.

*With the NPCF we got to know our rights and to order our territory (ComuneroCOP06, Chirik Sacha, September 2017).*

*Rebeca: Why is it important to have a titled territory?*

*Diego: To secure territory legally, so that we have more respect from other people in the face of any invasion.*

*Arturo: With a title, others cannot enter. The title gives us more respect.*

*Diego: With a title we have the right to claim. The territory is the market of the community. We get water, fish, animals, mountain fruits, that are the best: sinami, pijuayo, ungurahi, chonta (Fieldnotes in workshop with communal board members in Shimpiyacu, August 2018).*

The production of community maps by the NPCF to identify and choose the forested areas under the conservation agreement is a valued tool for *comuneros* to improve their territorial awareness. During affiliation processes to the NPCF, *comuneros* use maps provided by the NPCF to discuss and select the forested area to be conserved. This usually means that, for the first time, *comuneros* can visualise the spatial extent of their community on a map, including its boundaries, rivers, creeks, mountains, trails, and caves. They identify areas where they fish, hunt, collect plants, extract timber and other areas of cultural and historical value.

For *comuneros*, using maps of their communal territory also offers them the opportunity of reflecting and recognising, on a different visual scale, the location and extent of deforestation. Knowing accurate facts on deforestation in their communities encourages *comuneros* to discuss their responsibility in this process, including proposing new rules on forest management to maintain their standing forests. Maps, as alternative tools of knowledge,

allow communities to better understand their territories and make them more aware of the risks and mechanisms that lead to their deterioration.

The composition of maps during the affiliation process and the correct delimitation of the forested areas under agreements contribute not only to *comuneros* strengthening their recognition of their communities' internal land division for the management and conservation of forests and areas for agriculture, but also an awareness of the new state rules and sanctions imposed through the NPCF. Breaking these new rules comes with penalties that threaten the validity of their conservation contracts and thus their receipt of economic incentives. Communal concern about the possibility of losing the NPCF economic incentives have made communities from Lamas and Sisa landscapes restrict their forest management use, even beyond the NPCF requirements, in the forested areas under conservation agreements.

In Lamas and Sisa, for example, hunting is now forbidden in the areas under NPCF schemes, even when these are not formal restrictions of the programme. In Alto Mayo communities, the process is more complex. Land renting in forested areas has been banned, yet this does not mean these new restrictions are properly followed. The ban on land renting is partially connected not only to the intention of recovering forest, but also to the possibilities of attracting development opportunities.

On the other hand, for most *comuneros* who participate in forest patrol expeditions, these are often the first times that they get to know their community boundaries. As they walk, cleaning up the communal trails and erecting warning signs to discourage encroachers, they get to know the real spatial extent of their community and its main resources. This physical

recognition makes *comuneros* more aware of the territory they have to defend and to understand potential areas where encroachers may settle. As mentioned before, this is a male activity.

These results also resonate with existing literature about the positive impact of PES schemes in securing land rights (Kollmair and Rasul, 2010; Wunder et al., 2008; Grieg-Gran et al., 2005). The bureaucratic land titling procedure required for enrolling in the NPCF and the forest patrols have impacted on improving communities' territorial awareness, particularly in terms of a better understanding of communities' boundaries, extent and connectivity (e.g., trails). Most Amazonian communities, not only the ones enrolled in the NPCF, tend to have boundary areas that are not completely identified as legal parts of the communities. Usually, land titles describe the coordinates where communities are located and their boundaries, but this does not mean that *comuneros* know exactly where these boundaries are located, especially if these are far away from their households and plots.

Unfortunately, territorial awareness is not equally present in all *comuneros*. This knowledge is controlled mainly by men, and those linked to the NPCF, as members of the communal board or of the forest patrol brigades. The lack of equal knowledge of the new forest management rules is particularly important in the case of Awajun communities, where the population is very dispersed, and not all *comuneros* are involved in NPCF activities, nor might they be aware of the new state rules. For example, in March 2018 the community of Alto Mayo received twice an early warning, from the Forests Satellite Monitoring Unit in the head office in Lima, of deforestation within the area under the conservation agreement. The individual responsible for the forest clearing to plant 0.2 hectares of pineapple argued that he did not

know that the area was restricted for conservation purposes. While doing fieldwork, there were a few times in which CLBs told *comuneros* there is a “satellite in space” that can take pictures of the land and alert the NPCF on cases of forest clearing within areas under conservation agreement. Some *comuneros*, usually the youngest, understand this, while the elders do not.

The implementation of the NPCF within communities has strengthened the political gap between titled and non-titled indigenous communities concerning the presence of the state. Most state and non-state development projects in Peruvian Amazonian communities choose titled communities as a mandatory requirement for intervention. This situation makes non-titled communities remain marginalised from state development interventions. Indeed, the presence of the NPCF in San Martin has increased the demand of indigenous communities to be titled, due to the opportunity of enrolling in the NPCF, receiving the economic incentives and improving the prospect of state and other development interventions.

Once again, this scenario informs the complex and contradictory profile of the state's presence at the margins, where on the one hand there is a programme promoting participation in a conservation programme only for titled communities; while on the other, state agencies responsible for facilitating the basic requirements to participate, like land titling, are not covering the demand that would make communities eligible to participate in the NPCF. Of course, the NPCF is not the only incentive to title indigenous communities. Land rights have historically been the main claim of indigenous peoples against the state since the late 1970s (Chirif and García, 2007). In San Martin, between 2006 and 2016, the Land Registry Office only titled one Kichwa community (Nuevo Lamas). The reasons behind this poor

progress in titling indigenous communities are the lack of budget and personnel and the unwillingness of the Land Registry Office to title indigenous communities that have territorial conflicts with other forest users, claiming rights over the same areas (personal interview with representative from *ProTierras*, GIZ Programme, 2018). In San Martin, in 2016, 95% of communities that were demanding titling or were in the process of being titled had conflicts relating to overlapping uses (GIZ, 2016).

#### 7.4. Conclusions

The analysis of this chapter suggests mixed results regarding the socio-environmental impacts of the NPCF within enrolled communities. These findings are important to address because they contribute to shaping the way indigenous communities perform as public policy users, and therefore how they assume their role in fulfilling the NPCF conditionalities.

In terms of impacts on leadership and agency, the heavy administrative burden on the communal boards weakens local political structures due to the overwhelming responsibilities of running the programme and because of the suspicion and distrust that ordinary *comuneros* perceived against their authorities for potential misuse of the economic incentives and elite capture of benefits. However, the NPCF has also generated positive outcomes. The presence of the NPCF in these communities, and particularly the substantial administrative duties, has increased indigenous leaders' sense of improved abilities to negotiate with the state, as they learn to use administrative skills as managers of NPCF payments and conditionalities. This is especially relevant for Kichwa communities from Lamas and Sisa. In this case, indigenous leaders recognise that the power of bureaucratic competencies regarding documentation and

accountability enable them to become legible interlocutors with the state. Here, they perceive their legibility as useful to gaining better rights and obtaining public services, which are precarious and uneven on the margins.

Social unrest varies according to each landscape and the different characteristics that communities have, such as demographics, ethnic background, household dispersion, economic activities, and location of forests to protect. Yet in any case, social conflicts were not serious enough to negatively affect the implementation of the NPCF and they remained more as internal social tensions. Communities from the Alto Mayo landscape evinced the highest levels of conflict. This is also the only landscape in which the programme implied real constraints regarding forest management, which in this case were related to forest clearing for land renting for cash crops to mestizos or colonos. In this case, conflicts are correlated to high levels of deforestation.

In other words, communities that previously allocated areas for forest conservation, for different reasons unconnected to the NPCF, have lower levels of conflict over forest management. These reasons include unsuitability for agriculture, low pressure to expand the agricultural frontier, and the need to keep forested areas to obtain forest resources such as timber and non-timber products and animals for hunting. Yet in areas with low levels of deforestation, like the landscapes of Sisa and Lamas, conflicts arose due to suspicions about elite capture of benefits for communal board members and their families. These outcomes coincide with other studies of PES schemes that suggest that social cooperation within communities, as providers of the ecosystem services, is fundamental to successful implementations (Corbera et al., 2009; Muñoz Piña et al., 2008; Corbera et al., 2007).

Such cooperation was the case with the Kichwa communities in Lamas and Sisa, in contrast with Awajun communities in the Alto Mayo landscape, where poor cooperation makes the conduct of the NPCF more difficult. At the same time, poor cooperation is related to household dispersion that affects proper communication and, in some cases, as with the communities from Sisa and Alto Mayo, to the mixed (indigenous and non-indigenous) ethnic constitution of the villages.

The allocation of the forests under conservation agreements in different patches, as in the case of the Alto Mayo landscape, motivates the residents where the remaining forests are located to demand the economic incentives of the NPCF only for themselves, as those responsible for protecting the forest, in contrast to their neighbours who chose to rent forested land for agriculture. Despite these tensions, it is important to recall that the NPCF does not provide economic incentives to individuals but to the community as whole. Collectively, *comuneros* in a general assembly decide how to invest the funds according to the NPCF conditionality of implementing a local development project.

My findings also show that the implementation of the NPCF in communities in which economic incentives can provide benefits for all community members, due to low demographics and large areas under conservation agreements, reduces the perception of elite capture of benefits. This is the case of communities from the Lamas landscape. The outcome shared across the communities that were studied is the increased sense of territorial awareness. The required conduct of forest patrols as one of the main conditionalities of the programme has reconfigured the geographical imagination of these communities about their communal territory. Many *comuneros* that participate in these surveillance journeys had trips for the first

time into unknown territorial borders, recognising their extension and resources that were not known prior to the NPCF. Unfortunately, this territorial awareness is a skill only gained by men as women never join the forest patrols. For the indigenous communities, the consolidation of documentation on land titling and the forest patrols contributes towards a better understanding of their territory and resources, and an appreciation of the NPCF's rules regarding forest management.

This mixed evidence on the socio-environmental impacts of the NPCF strengthens the need to look at them as state effects. This means understanding how these impacts affect the way the state is understood and experienced locally, where the presence of the state has been historically uneven and precarious. This also allows us to question how these impacts reconfigure indigenous-state relationships as part of NPCF efforts to regulate indigenous forests in Amazonian communities.

### 8.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I investigate the performance of the NPCF front line workers who interact directly with indigenous peoples as public policy users. My interest in bureaucrats working at the local level responds to a broader theoretical and methodological concern to explore the means of the everyday state at the margins. Following Michael Lipsky's study (2010) on street level bureaucrats (SLBs), I examine the low-ranking bureaucrats who implement the NPCF. SLBs are the front-line public employees that interact in daily life with citizens to turn public policy into specific actions. I explore how the most significant features of SLBs, such as distance from the centre of power, discretion, and constraints as well as their relationship with documentation and their performance of statehood, affect their performance in achieving the conservation of forests. However, I chose to adapt the profile of SLB that work for the NPCF, considering them as community level bureaucrats (CLBs). I explore how CLBs conduct, adapt and reshape the NPCF to fit into the dynamics of Amazonian indigenous communities and how their role enacting statehood contributes to shaping indigenous peoples' sense of citizenship.

In the next section (section 8.2), I describe the profile of CLBs within communities. In the third section, I explore the field and off-field routines of CLBs in the everyday conduct of the NPCF. In the third section (section 8.3), I show how CLBs use discretion to under-emphasise the environmental goals of the NPCF in communications about it to indigenous communities. I then analyse in section 8.4, the use of discretion by CLBs when managing the accountability reporting on NPCF activities within communities; I also examine the constraints on CLBs in

assessing the state of conserved forest areas (section 8.5). Finally (section 8.6), I discuss the extent to which CLBs work as brokers between the state and indigeneity before making concluding comments (section 8.7) about the performance of CLBs at the margins of the state.

## 8.2. The CLBs working at the margins

Rephrasing Lipsky's (2010) model of SLBs, I am applying the concept of community level bureaucrats (CLBs) to refer to the front-line and field-level state employees working for the NPCF (Figure 25). The CLBs are responsible for turning the conservation goals and environmental regulations of the NPCF into specific activities, discouraging forest clearing and regulating indigenous peoples' land use behaviours. They are also in charge of systematising, organising, and preparing the administrative paperwork with the community to check the progress of implementation of the programme. This is the reason why I highlight the term "bureaucrat" in their position. These bureaucrats are the only state agents of the NPCF that interact with Amazonian indigenous peoples on a daily basis. They visit NPCF communities once a month to assist them in undertaking their conditionalities, implementing local development projects, conducting forest patrols, and preparing the community's accountability reporting as users of the NPCF.

During the time I conducted fieldwork at the NPCF office in San Martin, three women and three men worked there. Their ages were between 30 and 40 years old. They had all completed their academic studies in Peruvian public universities. One had a Master's degree and two others were studying for a master's degree online. These CLBs were a forester, a geographer, two environmental engineers, one agronomist and one communications

professional. They all had previous experience on environment and development projects, in national NGOs and public agencies, but only three had worked before with indigenous peoples.

For young professionals from Peruvian Amazonian departments, the state is one of the main sources of employment. These CLBs in San Martin, but also professionals from other state agencies in Amazonian cities, are not only motivated to making some commitment to public service, but also to the limited possibilities of getting a qualified job in Amazonian cities. This is an important issue to better understand not only how they engage with the programme, but how they engage with indigenous peoples as public policy users and, additionally, how they engage with the state.

In terms of ethnicity, three CLBs were Amazonian Mestizos, one was andean mestizo and one was an Awajun indigenous professional. The NPCF in San Martin office expressly looked for an indigenous professional to facilitate communication in Awajun communities who, by speaking the local language Awajun, could facilitate the socialisation of the NPCF's goals and activities. Belonging to the same ethnic group, contrary to these expectations, actually contributed to a tense relationship between the NPCF indigenous worker, named here as William, with the Awajun communities from the Alto Mayo landscape. Although William is from the same ethnic background, he comes from another department in the northern part of the Peruvian Amazon, named Amazonas. He moved to Alto Mayo in 2007, looking for better living opportunities.

William and his family do not belong to the influential clans that are usually connected to the communities' political authorities and local elites in the Alto Mayo landscape. This situation


put him in a politically difficult situation regarding community respect and fulfilment of the rules and conditionalities of the NPCF. William explained to me that the local authorities from communal board members expected him to be less strict with the management and to let them misuse the economic incentives justifying that he is “one of them”. It was also hard for him to ensure that communal board members restricted economic incentives to activities prescribed by programme conditionalities.

Despite the definition of NPCF front line workers as CLBs in this dissertation, their formal role, specified in their contracts is defined as “specialists”. Formally, in San Martin, there are social specialists to supervise the conduct of the social component of the NPCF contracts, economic specialists to oversee the agriculture activities, and then capacity building specialists to strengthen communities’ governance and administrative skills. However, on the daily basis, CLBs do all the activities as they split their work amongst multiple communities. For example, each CLB is responsible for all topics in 3 or 4 communities each.

To do so, CLBs must demonstrate a command of academic knowledge in environment and development studies to conduct NPCF duties, to supervise conservation goals and to transfer the public policy processes to the communities. Above all, they must perform strategies of statehood for indigenous peoples to recognize the authority of the state in environmental issues. CLBs should also hold strong social and intercultural communication abilities to deal with indigenous peoples as public policy users and also demonstrate administrative and countable skills to respond to expenses and accountability procedures as evidence of public policy effectiveness at the margins of the state.

CLBs use their discretion to make decisions to progress the programme, but do not have the power to make formal changes in the structure or design of it. Every decision they make requires consultation with the coordinator in San Martin and then the coordinator must request permission from the head office in Lima. These CLBs have a relatively fluid relationship with the head office, regularly communicating by phone and email. Yet there is a subtle tension between the head office intermediate authorities and CLBs from San Martin. For CLBs, the head office imposes instructions that appear illegible for indigenous communities. They then take advantage of their geographical and political distance between the head office in Lima and San Martin to use their discretion to organise their own intervention protocols and procedures for better NPCF implementation without head office consent.

Figure 25: CLBs in Copal Sacha, 2018. Source: Valeria Biffi Isla



CLBs' "field" and "off field" duties are mediated by paperwork. Contracts, letters, budgets and planning and quarterly reports are constantly updated and exchanged with the communities, and between these bureaucrats and higher authorities in the head office. The formal (legal) relationship between the state and the indigenous communities as counterparts in the conservation agreements is sealed in documents. The production of documents makes the indigenous peoples, as NPCF users, and their forests visible and legible to the state and indigenous peoples are aware of this. Indeed, documents are the main evidence of NPCF progress and the evidence of the intervention of the state within indigenous communities.

The production of documents by CLBs is divided in two types: those produced in their office, considered procedural documentation, like applying for travel allowances, permissions for fieldwork and monthly performance reports. The field documents, on the other hand, are mostly accountability reports and narrative reports of the activities conducted according to the contracts and the development plans. In their off-field routines, CLBs spend most of their time writing performance reports about their field trips, filling in indicator tables, travel allowances and other bureaucratic forms. Likewise, to properly report on the progress of the development plans and conditionalities to the head office in Lima, every month CLBs submit their performance reports to the regional coordinator in which they express their main activities, their challenges, goals, and recommendations for improvements in the performance of the programme.

Paradoxically, for CLBs procedural paperwork is their main constraint in fulfilling their duties. They claim that the administrative tasks to organise fieldtrips and to manage and submit information to the head office are a limitation due to the lack of flexibility in NPCF administrative demands. To cope with these constraints, on some occasions CLBs conduct field trips, which have already been arranged with the communities in advance, without the formal permissions or travel allowances required under the NPCF rules. This is to avoid failing the communities.

CLBs understand that too much time (more than a month) without visiting the communities, impacts negatively on their relationships. For indigenous communities, the intermittent and uneven presence of state representatives that supervise the conduct of projects or other public services is regarded with suspicion. Irregular visits of state workers are seen as

reflecting the disinterest of the state in working on behalf of communities. At the margins, the main representation of the state in indigenous society is through its representatives, and NPCF CLBs are very aware of that.

*I had an accident returning from a community and I was not officially on duty. If something else had happened to me, according to the documents, I was travelling on my own. Administrative procedures have so many bottlenecks. Another restriction is the timing of the travel allowances. It is a very bad practice. Not only for what can happen to us physically, but for the legal processes which we can incur. The thing is, we are not going to stop making commitments in the field. But it bothers us greatly, the fact that the head office believes that things flow as they want to, and it is because we do things that sometimes we should not. One day, we will need to say, I am sorry, but I am not going to. Otherwise, Lima will never understand how things work and will continue thinking that everything flows. (Fieldnotes of Diana's intervention in NPCF workshop, Moyobamba, NPCF office, September 2018).*

The overall monitoring of the effectiveness of NPCF activities in the communities varies depending on the accessibility of the communities. In San Martin, communities are quite accessible. CLBs have the possibility to reach most of the communities by car, motorcycle, or a three-wheeler. In this department, there are only three communities, not included in this research, that demand between 6 and 10 hours' walk to access them. This contrasts with larger departments, like Loreto and Ucayali in the upper and central part of the Peruvian Amazon, where to access the farthest communities in these departments can take up to one-week, single journey only.

As part of their NPCF field routines, CLBs conduct at least one field trip per month to each community, which lasts between 2 and 4 days, depending on the distance. In the communities, they usually eat, sleep over, and hang out after working hours. Field trips have nearly the same patterns. In the morning, CLBs organise a meeting with the communal board and forest patrol members to supervise the progress of development plans and the management of the

economic incentives. The main activity of these meetings is to prepare the accountability reports to submit every three months. Accountability reports are descriptions of the physical and financial execution of communal development plans, according to schedules, indicators, and budgets agreed upon in communal assemblies during the affiliation process and which are approved by the NPCF head office. These documents are prepared and submitted to the head office every three months as evidence of progress of the NPCF. In theory, these documents are the responsibility of communities, but they do not have the appropriate administrative skills to prepare them. The CLBs therefore prepare them.

At these meetings, before preparing the accountability reports, CLBs check the community receipts for expenses related to the development plans and their cash balances and classify the documents to prepare the accountability reports. The treasurer, and usually one or two other members of the communal board, dictate to the CLB information from each receipt associated with the development plans' expenses to fill in the Excel formats of accountability reports. They dictate the date, address, receipt number, taxpayer registration number, reason for the payment and amount of each receipt. Sometimes they get confused and fail to provide accurate information. In fact, these tasks are not easy for community members and they usually have trouble differentiating the parts of the receipts.

CLBs pay special attention to sworn declarations because they are prone to easy manipulation, inflating costs and hiding cash mismanagement. Other bureaucrats oversee sworn declarations when communities fail to ask for receipts for items and services needed for the implementation of the development plans. Indeed, many sworn declarations in accountability reports are usually seen as suspicious and are rejected by the head office. During the rest of

the meetings attendants watch, chat, and sometimes fall asleep. These meetings last all morning. These are also events in which questions, expectations and challenges are shared regarding the implementation of development plans, as well as any topic that concerns the community in relation to their territory or communal life.

When CLBs and communal board members finish revising receipts and sworn declarations and reviewing expenses and balances, CLBs prepare the accountability reports. Once they finish this paperwork, they show the final version formats to communal representatives using a projector against the wall to display the Excel sheets of tables with the activities achieved, the expenses and cash balances. Sometimes, they only use a stuck paper on the walls (Figure 26). CLBs present this data to the communal board to make the NPCF implementation as transparent as possible, as board members themselves must present the accountability reports to the rest of the community in their traditional communal assemblies every three months. Usually, communal board members barely understand the Excel sheets and trust what they are told by the CLBs. Doing fieldwork, it was always difficult for me too to understand the graphs and the Excel sheets. I can only imagine the challenge for the communal board members when they are not used to computers. None of them even has a computer.

Accountability is a key element in proving the NPCF's progress and the state expects NPCF communities, as managers of their development plans, to use the same vocabulary and tools as the state bureaucratic apparatus to mediate their relationship (Figures 27, 28 and 29). Being an NPCF user demands strong administrative skills that the indigenous peoples do not have, and that the state, formally, is not willing to develop. The NPCF authorities considered that developing these administrative skills was not part of their responsibilities but of communities

themselves.

In the afternoons, CLBs conduct the same accountability reports ritual with women that work on handicrafts as part of the NPCF development projects. CLBs and handicraft women check expenses, balances, and the progress of the handicraft production. The next day, CLBs meet up with the agriculture extensionists to supervise the progress on relevant activities. Sometimes, CLBs stay a few more hours in the communities in case the communal board has to submit additional documentation for their accountability reports. For example, if *comuneros* submit receipts with the wrong information, they must submit new ones. Nobody asks how they produce these new receipts so quickly.

These everyday routines of the NPCF in the communities reveal the mainly bureaucratic profile of the daily interactions between CLBs and indigenous peoples in this conservation intervention. In practice, the relationship between communities and the state is mediated through documents that remain illegible to indigenous peoples, but are legible for the state, regardless of any consideration of whether these templates are appropriate for use in the communities. The importance of documentation for the state is that it follows state norms of accountability and transparency. Every other month, CLBs organise open workshops with *comuneros* to refresh them on the meaning of the NPCF and to discuss the importance of conserving forests.

Figure 26: Balances and expenses during an accountability meeting in Copal Sacha. Source: Valeria Biffi Isla



Figure 27: Excel sheets as part of the accountability reports. Source: NPCF San Martin.

COMUNIDAD NATIVA CHUNCHIWI METAS FINANCIERAS PLAN DE INVERSIÓN (5 AÑOS)									
Item	Descripción	PRESUPUESTO ANUAL					PRESUPUESTO TOTAL (5 AÑOS)		
		AÑOS							
		1	2	3	4	5			
		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01		
10	<b>COMPONENTE AMBIENTAL</b>	18,412.00	12,371.00	13,553.00	13,118.00	15,309.00	72,763.00		
11	<b>1.1 VIGILANCIA Y MONITOREO DE BOSQUES</b>	18,412.00	10,196.00	13,228.00	10,468.00	11,684.00	63,988.00		
12	<b>1.1.1 Equipoamiento para 2 brigadas de 6 comuneros c/u (4 veces al año)</b>	7,832.00	1,516.00	4,276.00	1,516.00	1,516.00	16,656.00		
13	1.1.1.1 GPS	3,000.00	-	-	-	-	3,000.00		
14	1.1.1.2 Cámara fotográfica	700.00	-	-	-	-	700.00		
15	1.1.1.3 Cargador individual	960.00	-	1,020.00	-	-	1,980.00		
16	1.1.1.4 Poncho para agua	480.00	-	480.00	-	-	960.00		
17	1.1.1.5 Mochila	960.00	-	960.00	-	-	1,920.00		
18	1.1.1.6 Linterna	216.00	-	300.00	-	-	516.00		
19	1.1.1.7 Pilas para linterna (grande)	1,120.00	1,120.00	1,120.00	1,120.00	1,120.00	5,600.00		
20	1.1.1.8 Pilas AA para GPS	96.00	96.00	96.00	96.00	96.00	480.00		
21	1.1.1.9 Botiquín básico para campo	300.00	300.00	300.00	300.00	300.00	1,500.00		
22	<b>1.1.2 Desarrollo de capacitaciones (para 24 personas)</b>	312.00	312.00	312.00	312.00	260.00	1,508.00		
23	1.1.2.1 Capacitación en cartografía, GPS y briujas	120.00	120.00	120.00	120.00	100.00	580.00		
24	1.1.2.2 Capacitación en legislación, delitos e infracciones.	120.00	120.00	120.00	120.00	100.00	580.00		
25	1.1.2.3 Capacitación en primeros auxilios	72.00	72.00	72.00	72.00	60.00	348.00		
26	<b>1.1.3 Demarcación y señalización</b>	3,068.00	1,168.00	-	-	1,268.00	5,504.00		
27	Letreros Informativos límitros (2), Letreros informativos del Bosque Comunal (3), Paneles Informativos límitros (2)	3,068.00	1,168.00	-	-	1,268.00	5,504.00		
28	<b>1.1.4 Patrullaje</b>	7,200.00	7,200.00	8,640.00	8,640.00	8,640.00	40,320.00		
29	1.1.4.1 Mano de obra para vigilancia	-	-	-	-	-	0.00		
30	1.1.4.2 Viveros varios	7,200.00	7,200.00	8,640.00	8,640.00	8,640.00	40,320.00		
31	<b>1.2 MANEJO DE RESIDUOS SÓLIDOS</b>	-	2,175.00	325.00	2,650.00	3,625.00	8,775.00		
32	<b>1.2.1 Desarrollo de capacitaciones (para 25 personas)</b>	-	175.00	325.00	2,650.00	625.00	3,775.00		
33	1.2.1.1 Capacitación en manejo de Residuos sólidos, alternativas de aprovechamiento	-	175.00	-	-	175.00	350.00		
34	1.2.1.2 Capacitación en elaboración de Compost	-	-	325.00	350.00	-	675.00		
35	1.2.1.3 Capacitación en reciclaje	-	-	-	650	450	1,100.00		
36	1.2.1.4 Pasantía a experiencia exitosa Jepelacio-Moyobamba (10 Personas)	-	-	-	1,650.00	-	1,650.00		
37	<b>1.2.2 Instalación de contenedores por colores</b>	-	2,000.00	-	-	3,000.00	5,000.00		
38	1.2.2.1 Instalación de contenedores	-	2,000.00	-	-	3,000.00	5,000.00		
39	<b>2 COMPONENTE ECONÓMICO</b>	22,545.00	11,600.00	29,430.00	26,960.00	24,170.00	114,705.00		

Figure 28: Parts of trimestral reports from communities to the NPCF. Source NPCF San Martin

Figure 29: Communities' forest patrol reporting. Source: NPCF San Martin

### 8.3. Under-emphasising the environmental narratives about the NPCF

In the communities, CLBs use their discretion to adapt policy to their own needs and responsibilities as state representatives. The discretion that CLBs exercise in working at the margins of the state is possible due to their geographical and political distance from the head office of the NPCF in the city of Lima. Acknowledging this double distance from the centre of power, CLBs create coping strategies to deal with concepts and procedures they consider illegible for the Amazonian indigenous audience: the objective of the NPCF as a payment for the ecosystem services scheme and the process of accountability reporting. Following Lipsky's (2010, 1980) idea that public policy is negotiated in the field, CLBs adapt, reshape, and ignore formal administrative procedures and protocols to make the work easier.

CLBs use discretion in explaining to indigenous communities the functions and goals of the NPCF. The accounts that CLBs give to the communities of the NPCF do *not* include descriptions of the programme as an environmental conditional cash transfer, nor as a payment for ecosystem services scheme, as they consider these classifications to be abstract and difficult to understand for an indigenous audience. Instead, CLBs prefer to use narratives outside of the PES framework, building traditional conservationist narratives about the importance of keeping standing forests, and about the benefits they provide for their livelihoods in terms of goods and services. They do not include the benefits of conservation beyond the local scale, for example, referring to national environmental regulation or the current statistics about deforestation rates.

According to CLBs, during the first years of implementation of the NPCF in 2016, they did not even talk about conservation in the communities, they merely explained the offer of economic incentives and the conditionalities of conducting communal development plans and forest patrols. With this strategy, the communities did not even know why they were receiving the money, so CLBs changed the strategy of describing the functions and goals of the NPCF. Now, CLBs explain to communities that they receive the cash as an incentive to improve their livelihoods, while protecting the forests and keeping encroachers away.

*We considered that explaining payment for ecosystem services was going to be complicated. Some people were confused. In some cases, this produced a lot of expectation, while in others, communities rejected it. We mention that the programme has chosen this community because they are already committed to conserving their forests and, therefore, the state decided to support them (interview with Rebeca, August 2017). I do not explain anything about the state's interest in protecting the forest, nor that there are 54 million hectares of forest to conserve in the whole country, or about climate change. I focus on the benefits of their titled land for them (interview with Ignacio, March 2018).*

CLBs define the economic incentives to improve local households' economic activities and, as compensation for acting responsibly, keeping their forests standing. They also like to explain what these economic incentives are not. They are not gifts, loans, or payments because they do not have to give anything back to the state. For the CLBs, the discourse of giving 2 GBP (PEN 10) per hectare of forest generates suspicion and confusion and they try to avoid narratives that might generate complaints about this flat tariff.

*Yes, those 10 soles were interpreted as a sale, and they complain, but my forest does not cost that, you have to renegotiate, you'd better offer 15 soles. So, I try to underline that they are not selling the forest, the forest costs more. This is funding from the state to conserve, and it is voluntary. We always try to emphasise that the incentive is not a payment, it is a way to support you, to encourage you, to give you the conditions so you can keep protecting the forest (interview with William, September 2017).*

CLBs also use their discretion in offering an alternative narrative about the NPCF to cope with the lack of engagement and capabilities of some communities in fulfilling their responsibilities and conditionalities. CLBs frame the conservation of forests as a chance to become involved in other development projects. They remark to communities that if they keep protecting their forests, future public and private organisations will bring new investments into their territories. CLBs actually use this discourse as an engaging mechanism to encourage NPCF communities to follow the rules, even when they do not have any certainty about the possibility of other development projects reaching these communities in the future.

*If you keep protecting forests and learning about administration, then other projects can support you. What happens if there is another project in the region? They would like to work with you because you protect your forests. The communities that have forests are the ones to be chosen, because projects cannot work with all of the communities, but with the ones that have forests. The forest is like the most beautiful girl, everyone wants to be with her. If you keep the forest, new projects will come (interview with CLB Ignacio, Moyobamba, February 2018).*

The previous examination of the local meanings of the NPCF goals reveals the important role of discretion in conducting environmental policy at the margins, in which CLBs use the mechanisms they consider more suitable and that fit better with their own knowledge and interpretation of the programme, even if that means diverting attention from the conservation implications of the policy being conducted. These results resonate with a key feature of SLBs of establishing informal mechanisms to cope with illegible norms and work demands (Lipsky, 2010; Hupe and Hill, 2007).

When CLBs adapt the goals, rules and narratives of the NPCF for their indigenous audience they are also performing strategies of statehood. By doing this, outside PES and climate change discussions they are distracting the attention from building the image of the state as

an environmental ruling institution and provider of conservation benefits for indigenous peoples. Similarly, they also affect the form indigenous peoples configure themselves as citizens and public policy users, by engaging and deluding them about future but uncertain development projects in their communities if they fulfil their bureaucratic skills. In these scenarios, CLBs regard bureaucratic abilities as crucial to exercise citizenship and to bring the state closer to the margins.

#### 8.4. The backstage for accountability reporting

Another important area in which CLBs use discretion is in the process of managing the state bureaucratic apparatus at the margins. According to CLBs, in their early experience of working for the NPCF in 2016 when the first communities were enrolled, they expected that communities would produce their accountability reports, as stipulated in their conservation contracts. However, this strategy failed. None of the communities enrolled in the NPCF were able to prepare the paperwork. Indeed, writing, signing, doing the maths for budgets and balances were and still are complex duties for many indigenous adults. In 2017, CLBs in San Martin made the decision to elaborate the accountability reporting without the express authorisation of the head office, essentially to facilitate their delivery.

Accountability is the key element of providing evidence for the NPCF's progress in Amazonian indigenous communities. As managers of their economic incentives and of their development projects, indigenous communities are expected to use the same vocabulary of accountability and transparency as the state bureaucratic apparatus, as demonstrated in documents. Indeed, being an NPCF user demands strong administrative skills that the indigenous peoples are not

familiar with and that the state is not willing to provide. The NPCF accountability reporting demands mid-level literacy skills and unfortunately, in San Martin, the average educational level among indigenous peoples is unfinished elementary education (INEI, 2018). This makes challenging the NPCF requirement that Amazonian indigenous communities are responsible for managing communal development projects and accounting for the economic incentives received.

Despite several decades of indigenous peoples' participation in development projects, the NPCF programme is the first time that they are made responsible for the direct management of economic incentives and the supervision, implementation, and accountability of community development plans. In previous and traditional development initiatives conducted within indigenous communities, *comuneros* were usually passive receivers or grantees of, mostly, capacity building workshops, agricultural training and infrastructure works, which are usually supervised and conducted by someone else. This means that communities are barely familiar with the audit culture of document-based accountability required by the state.

To cope with the indigenous bureaucratic gap of the NPCF in the production of accountability reports, every other month CLBs organise informal workshops to improve indigenous leaders' administrative skills. In these sessions, CLBs teach basic financial education and informatics. In terms of basic financial education, CLBs teach them how to use a debit card to withdraw cash from an ATM, to understand bank statements, and even to note down large amounts of money, such as thousands of soles. With regard to informatics, CLBs explain how to turn on a computer, how to use the mouse, how to open a Word document, write on it and print it. They also help indigenous leaders to practice their signatures, to fill in cheques for the reports

they must submit and to learn how to request information at the bank.

According to CLBs, despite the many attempts to teach communal board members to write their own accountability reports, they have not succeeded yet. In this scenario, CLBs have assumed the responsibility of turning the complexity of the NPCF procedures and documents into legible forms of action for indigenous peoples, which means elaborating these documents themselves. CLBs have embraced as their responsibility the need to turn the illegibility of the state's bureaucratic demands, materialised in Excel sheets and formulas, into legible forms for indigenous peoples. While conducting fieldwork, I participated in a few of these workshops and witnessed the struggle it could be for an indigenous leader to write a letter or to sign a cheque.

*We have not been able to make the community prepare the reports by itself. That's a lie. Our goal is that the community at least knows what the formats are. We explain them to them cell by cell. Today, they are able to sort their receipts by dates and items (interview with Monica, Moyobamba, August 2017).*

*There is no way they will fill in the reports on the computer. Head office considers they should handwrite the reports. But handwriting can be tiresome. So, I ask myself, what shall I do? Should they handwrite? Of course not! So, we consider it convenient, and we have been doing this for some years, to give them computer classes. Because if they do not know how the computer works, how can I demand computer report filling? We know this is not our business, but we do it anyway. It is difficult when they have never touched a mouse before. Their hands are hard. It is exasperating. They look like three-year-old kids. They joke, look, I am not suitable for this mouse, bring me my machete (interview with Monica, August 2017).*

The emphasis of CLBs on strengthening bureaucratic skills among indigenous peoples appears for them as a pre-condition to conduct a public policy at the margins of the state, where they need to turn indigenous peoples into legible interlocutors with the state. What remains as the most significant action of the NPCF in the daily life of communities is to pursue and submit proper accountability reports, asserting the NPCF's progress in terms of physical and financial

advancements, budgets, balances, and indicators of achievement. The problem is that at the margins, neither CLBs nor communities as public policy users are ready to cope with these forms of state reporting. The discretion of CLBs is not based on their capacity to choose whether or not to submit accountability reports, because they cannot decide this, but on how these reports are elaborated and made legible to fit with the state bureaucratic forms (Hupe, 2013).

In their quotidian performance in the communities, CLBs differentiate what elements of the NPCF rules, procedures and practices are legible and illegible for the communities. Sometimes, CLBs also fall into illegible processes of documentation themselves. During fieldwork, after three bureaucrats stopped working for the NPCF (for personal reasons and a contract ending), I witnessed how the remaining CLB worked hard to fix the accountability reports of the two communities that those ex-CLBs were responsible for supervising in the implementation of the programme. These reports contained inaccurate numbers, expenses, and balances. In the everyday performance of CLBs, the emphasis on accountability is so strong that what counts as most important practice is to provide on-time reports with numbers, even if that means a lack of veracity when, paradoxically, this paperwork has been implemented precisely to strengthen transparency and the quality of public expenditure as public values. Despite the restrictions, bureaucrats and communities can play the game of sworn statements, false receipts, and other forms of forgery to fit the balance of expenses that do not match the budgets.

The lack of meticulous attention paid to presenting documents with accurate data responds to the consideration of the NPCF documents as artifacts of impersonal responsibility, in which

it is possible to put unclear data that seems to be the truth but is not (Mathur, 2015). When bureaucrats neglect their authorship, because in theory these documents are produced by communities, they are more likely to show less precise data, because they do not hold direct responsibility if they are wrong. Therefore, although documents, specifically accountability reports, are crucial to show the progress of the NPCF and demand most of the bureaucrats' time and energy, some of these CLBs do not take responsibility for producing legible documents for the state's lens.

Regarding the efforts and failures around accountability reporting, CLBs also claim that accountability reports are not sufficient documentation to express the real progress of the NPCF. They argue that NPCF documentation with already defined formats "to tick the box" does not provide the opportunity to include explanations about the challenges needed for better implementation of the programme. CLBs are aware of the role of documentation creating both legibility and illegibility, which implies recognising what the state chooses to know and what to ignore, even if that means hiding relevant data about the implementation of the NPCF.

To fulfil the gap on the real state of the implementation of the NPCF in the field, some CLBs use their monthly performance reports to express their opinions and recommendations to improve the NPCF. Paradoxically, the recommendations of CLBs are focused on the skills and procedures needed to strengthen indigenous communities' role as state bureaucratic interlocutors. They miss the social implications of the implementation of this policy initiative, such as the scaling up of social conflicts, the weakening of local political authorities, and new forms of experiences of the indigenous territory under this state-led PES scheme. After

analysing two years of performance reports, I found that there were no recommendations on how indigenous peoples could increase their commitment to the conservation of forests.

*I found many deficiencies in the order and issuance of receipts; for example, adulterated tickets, wrongly issued receipts, etc. Recommendations: insist on strengthening the use of basic documents of women working with handicrafts to contribute to the good governance of communities and the inclusive and respectful participation of men and women (Performance Report Nº 002 2017-MINAM/PNCB/UICB/AZSM/).*

Recommendations from performance reports were barely applied in the NPCF. Sometimes, not even the regional coordinator reads them. There is no formal mechanism to follow up CLBs' inclusion of their own recommendations in their daily activities. Regardless of the richness of the fieldwork insights from performance reports, these are no formal sources of data. They represent a formality and an evocation of bureaucratic reproduction. Their materiality as documents, beyond their content, contributes to building an archive of bureaucratic performance for future accountability and transparency.

In general, the emphasis of CLBs on strengthening the bureaucratic skills of the communities, before dealing with conservation awareness, responds to their understanding that accountability reporting and management of administrative skills are the pre-condition for the conduct of this public policy initiative, making NPCF users legible interlocutors with the state (Mosse, 2005). In a broader sense, accountability reports on the NPCF's progress, as conducted informally by CLBs, reproduce the state bureaucratic culture using numbers as indicators of effective implementation and internal management. In other words, in the everyday implementation of the NPCF, conservation narratives and actions are hidden behind accountability reporting efforts, limiting interactions with communities to the bureaucratic

and procedural focus on the documentation of the NPCF's progress. These topics are followed up in the next chapter when addressing the state effects of the NPCF.

### 8.5. The constraints on CLBs to reduce deforestation

CLBs are responsible for overall monitoring of the economic activities that are the core element of the communal development plans. In San Martin, NPCF communities chose to improve their production of cash crops, such as cocoa (*Theobroma cacao*) in the Kichwa communities and coffee (*coffea arabica*) in the Awajun communities. In Lamas and Sisa, each household that voluntarily enrolled to participate in these agricultural activities sponsored by the NPCF cultivate, on average, between  $\frac{1}{4}$  and  $\frac{1}{2}$  hectare of cocoa in their family plot, which is combined with other cash and subsistence crops such as beans and plantain. While doing fieldwork, *comuneros* were in the phase of growing the crops, so it was very difficult to predict how much their production would increase.

The daily supervision of agricultural activities is the responsibility of extensionists who are hired directly by the communities and paid with funds from the economic incentives. The role of extensionists is to promote intensive agricultural practices to boost productivity. Extensionists visit communities once a week to check on the progress of the cash crops. Every other month, they prepare workshops on pruning, fertilising, and imbedding. CLBs met with the extensionists once a month to check on their progress reports. Despite the relevance of agriculture in San Martin as the core activity of the development plans to avoid deforestation, until December 2017, CLBs did not have any formal mechanism to follow up on the agriculture extensionists' work. For example, they did not even collect data about the location of the

plots, nor did they know if farmers undertook forest clearing to plant their crops under the NPCF scheme.

Some *comuneros* complained that extensionists did not visit their plots or that they do not work with them in fertilising and pruning. These complaints were the result of two circumstances. First, the weak role of CLBs in supervising the work of extensionists left the latter with the choice to work at their own pace, which on some occasions meant not going to communities as often as they should, or prioritising other activities, such as staying in the communities, and talking to farmers. Second, there were local misunderstandings about the role of the extensionists, which is agricultural training and not necessarily working on the plots. In most of the communities, it has been particularly difficult for CLBs to convince community members to hire extensionists and pay them with funds from the economic incentives.

This second complaint relates to previous experiences of development programmes in which communities have participated. One important case is the PDA for the eradication of coca cultivation in the mid-2000s, which provided technical assistance for free and even paid farmers to plant alternative crops such as coffee and cocoa. Now, *comuneros* expect the same treatment. Finally, there are always some farmers who reject the extensionists' technical assistance because this advice is considered too overwhelming and time-consuming, or because they have already learnt those same techniques elsewhere, especially in communities from Sisa with longer experience in cocoa farming with advice that is available from intermediary companies and cooperatives.

In early 2018, CLBs in San Martin started preparing their own templates to follow up on the agriculture extensionists' work, even with the head office's disapproval (NPCF Head office capacity building representative, personal communication, May 2018). Before this initiative, the role of the agriculture extensionists was somehow illegible for CLBs, who did not have the formal tools to link these activities with the main goals of the NPCF to avoid deforestation, in which the expansion of agriculture is actually considered the main driver. With this exercise, CLBs also identified that extensionists had no interest in integrating their agricultural training with the goals of the NPCF, arguing that this was not their job.

The other key conditionality of the NPCF that CLBs must oversee is communities' commitment to conduct forest patrol journeys. To improve the effectiveness of these activities, every other month CLBs organised capacity building workshops on cartography and GPS. Every three months, communities organised brigades to monitor the conservation status of the areas under NPCF agreements. These journeys were carried out by brigades of between 8 and 10 men. Women were never allowed to participate as it was considered that women were not strong enough.

Only one female CLB, Rebecca (geographer) liked to join these brigades, to the surprise of local men. Forest patrols usually lasted between 3 and 7 days, depending on the distance and weather conditions. These brigades had to georeference their journey, key milestones, and cases of environmental crimes. After each journey, the patrol brigades also had to fill in a form about the expedition including the georeferenced coordinates and details of potential or real cases of deforestation, the presence of encroachers, or any other type of environmental crime. These reports were handed to the CLB every three months to attach to accountability

reports as evidence of the conduct of this conditionality. Here again, CLBs must trust communities in the accomplishment of forest patrols.

However, forest patrol reports may also provide inaccurate data on the state of forest conservation. In some cases, forest patrol brigades tended to neglect reporting minor environmental crimes, such as selected illegal logging or forest clearing for small plots, to avoid the risk of losing their NPCF contracts. They would rather solve these cases under their local communal regulations, which include penalties and even physical punishment. For example, in communities from the Alto Mayo landscape, traditional regulations state that it is an offense to report a crime to the ordinary justice system (like the police or prosecution) before the indigenous justice authorities (Gálvez, 2003).

There are poor options for CLBs to control the conserved state of forests, as they do not hold direct responsibilities for these duties. They do not join the brigades and merely receive the information about the state of forests under conservation agreements from the forest patrol reports. Yet major environmental crimes such as forest clearing can be identified by *Geobosques*, the NPCF Satellite Monitoring Unit located in Lima. *Geobosques* carries out continuous monitoring of changes in the forest cover of the forested areas under conservation agreements, using free Landsat satellite images from the NASA platform. During fieldwork, there was only one case of early warning from *Geobosques* about deforestation of 0.2 hectares within a forested area under conservation agreement in the community of Alto Mayo. The community claimed that the man who cleared a forest area to plant pineapple was not aware of the new rules of the NPCF.

The role of CLBs in agriculture and forest patrol monitoring reveals a contradictory scenario. In the field, CLBs have secondary responsibilities to ensure that communities change their behaviours on land use to engage with conservation practices. They must oversee the modernisation of community land management through modern agricultural techniques and the use of GPS for better monitoring of the forests, but they have no formal tools or skills to operate these mechanisms by themselves. However, they do report them. In these cases, the relevance and complexity of the documentation as proof of the state's penetration into the social realm and as evidence of the NPCF's progress contrasts with the incompleteness of data regarding the conservation of forests. This lack of comprehensive and accurate information about the conservation state of the forests under the NPCF agreements is a gap between what the NPCF commands and what the CLBs can do to encourage change in their environmental behaviours supportive of forest conservation.

#### 8.6. CLBs, brokerage and the state

The discretion of CLBs to adapt the goals and procedures of the NPCF is also manifested in their attempt of ignoring certain explanations. By ignorance, I specifically refer to intentional and unintentional practices to hide policy knowledge considered illegible, but which should be intheory relevant for the implementation of public policy (Hull 2012; Matthews, 2004). Based on their expertise in working with Amazonian communities, CLBs consider the design and instructions of the NPCF illegible for the local contexts of indigenous communities. By ignoring policy and procedures, and proposing alternative narratives, CLBs stress their sense of local power, contesting the head office's and the mid- and high-level bureaucrats' decision-making and design of the programme. While doing this, they choose the best way to perform statehood and therefore, constructing an image of the state at the margins. But also,

impacting on the way indigenous peoples expect to perform as citizens, when they provide information about what indigenous peoples can and cannot do.

For CLBs, the formal design of the NPCF demonstrates poor understanding of indigenous people's social lives and performance and capabilities as public policy users. For them, the state employs a theoretical model for the NPCF structure that does not fit with the social dynamics operating at the margins. With these considerations, CLBs contrast their low-level rank in the hierarchy and their distance from the decision makers, while highlighting their alleged *knowhow* regarding indigeneity and state relations, which is built on their empirical experience of working for the state.

When CLBs reinforce the lack of empirical knowledge of the head office, they are also reproducing a traditional tension in the Peruvian society between centre (Lima) and periphery (the rest of the country) about designing public policy from the centre without considering the local contexts and dynamics. Indeed, in Peru, state centralism has been established by replicating its colonial heritage, organising Peruvian society, politics, and economy from the central state, settled in Lima, the capital of Peru (Gonzales de Olarte, 2004). Despite important decentralisation reforms since the 2000s, the centralist state authorities have weak capacity to interact with the periphery, and to direct public policy, including regional and rural development, at the periphery. Far from being victimized regarding the neglected and oversighted presence of the state in rural Amazon, CLBs use this gap to empower themselves locally.

*The reference to San Martin staff is that it questions everything, that everything seems wrong. I believe that there are staff in Lima who understand the dynamics in the communities, but who make the decision not to understand it. Who decides at the end*

*is a person who thinks that we can have the time with indigenous communities to fulfil the commitments of the programme. The other thing is that the programme assumes commitments without understanding the real time that the process requires (interview with CLB Rebecca, Moyobamba, August 2017).*

*If the head office authorities never go to the field, how can they understand the local dynamics? Instead, they keep inventing things that do not work (interview with Monica, Moyobamba, May 2018).*

CLBs constantly evoke this political, social, and territorial distance from Lima as the centre of power to support their local practices of rejecting and adapting policy instructions when they consider it convenient. The reasons for CLBs to use their discretion in explaining the NPCF in their own terms to indigenous communities, ignoring official knowledge and organising events outside the conservation field, are not related to a new scheme of implementing public policy, but are an attempt to find better ways to make their work easier, with or without the consent of the head office.

CLBs also complain that the head office expects communities to be 100% available for their demands. Sometimes CLBs, while commuting to a community, receive phone calls from the head office demanding that they print and make a community sign a new accountability document that day, even when there is neither electricity nor printer. On one occasion, I found a couple of bureaucrats laughing about a comment they received from an administrative agent from the head office in Lima, expressing with suspicion why the president and treasurer of a community had the same surname, as if this could be a case of nepotism or corruption. In small indigenous communities, where people are usually endogamous with extended family members, they all tend to have the same five or six common surnames in the province.

On another occasion, CLBs complained that the head office administrative staff expect them to provide formal receipts when they eat in the communities, even when they buy a chicken and manioc from a local *comunero*. Regularly, due to head office demands, CLBs make communal members sign the same documents many times, generating suspicion about the need for signing the same documents over and over again. For CLBs, the head office in Lima is only focused on generating the data that proves the physical and financial advancement of the programme.

*I am the visible face of the programme. And since they do not know better than me, whenever there is a problem, I start charging that responsibility to our head office... that sometimes is a disaster. I will not be responsible for their weakness (interview with Rebeca, Moyobamba, September 2017).*

*In the case of the native communities, I feel that they distrust the Peruvian State. What happened to them, they did not tell us. They fear corruption. At the beginning, they told us that we were surely going to collect our salary from their money (interview with Monica, Moyobamba, April 2018).*

Following Lipsky's model of SLB, the distance from the centre of power and their own recognition as experts in indigeneity- state relations have enabled CLBs to operate as brokers rather than as gatekeepers. A gatekeeper has the power to allocate benefits and sanctions linked to public services. In the case of CLBs, they cannot actually choose who participates in the NPCF, but they can decide to shape indigenous peoples' experience of being public policy users. As brokers, CLBs gain some sort of local political support, building relationships with the indigenous population to gain trust and facilitate the work. As brokers, CLBs claim to be the "hinge" between indigenous peoples and the state as an institution that remains important but illegible for them as users of public policy.

Brokers are actors that trade on social, political, and economic gaps, allowing actors and groups with poor capital access to institutions and other actors from whom they may gain benefits. Brokers trade mostly with flows of information, opportunities, and knowledge (Burt, 2000). In the case of the NPCF, as brokers CLBs have the chance to regulate the flows of information from the state to indigenous peoples and vice versa. The role of CLBs as brokers is also to shorten the bureaucratic gap between the state bureaucracy of public policy and the reality of indigenous peoples as public policy users without compromising the main deliveries around accountability reporting. Common scholarship on brokerage highlights that brokers benefit economically and politically from enabling vulnerable people's access to resources, services, and entities they cannot reach themselves (James, 2011). In the case of the NPCF, CLBs gain some sort of political support, building relationships with the indigenous population to facilitate the work.

As brokers, CLBs choose when to follow the rules of the NPCF, while on other occasions they choose to be more flexible in their interpretation of the rules to fit with local needs and culture (Bartholdson and Porro, 2018; Mosse and Lewis, 2005). As such, they help communities' access to the state apparatus, paperwork, and legal vocabulary, as these communities do not have the abilities to manage these skills themselves. In this relationship, the state is willing to connect with citizens at the margins only if they are able to perform as legible public policy users. Without the discretion of CLBs to perform as brokers, the NPCF would not have succeeded in transferring economic incentives for conservation because of the illegibility of indigenous communities in compiling their accountability reports.

When CLBs adapt regulations to the local context, they also ensure that these adaptations

enter into the state's bureaucratic system. The CLBs take the time to do the accounting work themselves and to support indigenous leaders in the process of learning the conventions of filling out these documentation forms. Nevertheless, these documents are submitted to the head office "as if" they had been filled out by the indigenous leaders themselves. In other words, CLBs enact not only a work of adaptation, but also of fixing documents, which strengthens their position as mediators / brokers in the relationship between indigenous peoples and the needs of the conventions and regulations of the central state.

The role of CLBs as brokers and their perception of the NPCF as poorly designed let them maintain an ambiguous relationship with the state, depicting it as a third party whenever they interact with community members. They even name it separately as "the state", as if they do not belong to it or represent it. They do so as they do not agree with the administrative procedures that the head office expects them to conduct within communities, and therefore, they do not always consider themselves as representatives of the state apparatus

*I know you see this as a waste of time, you do not earn from this. What the NPCF gives you is not much, but it is going to help you. We have to see it that way. You have a contract with the state. To make this programme work, I need your help, otherwise, I cannot report your progress. You know, sometimes I use money from my pocket to buy things for you, and I do it because I care about you. (Fieldnotes, Monica intervention in accountability reporting meeting in Copal Sacha, March 2018).*

Positioning the state as a third party and making their role as state representatives ambiguous helps CLBs to cope with the latent, subtle, and constant distrust that communities hold towards the state, caused by historical cases of corruption, failed past development projects and unkept promises from different levels of public servants. To cope with distrust and to shift that suspicion towards greater trust, CLBs do not attempt to represent the state as a modernising or development benefactor for indigenous communities. Instead, they appeal to

their professional ethics, their honour and their personal responsibility as individuals.

## 8.7. Conclusions

The model of SLBs works as a precise analytical framework to obtain a detailed understanding of CLBs working at the margins of the state, in this case among Amazonian indigenous peoples. CLBs widely use their discretion to transform the formal goals of the NPCF programme into what they consider to be legible forms of state interventions, even if this means diverting from key environmental goals to cope with the burden of state bureaucratic demands for accountability. CLBs also use their discretion to adapt environmental policy at the margins, reshaping and ignoring the overall aims of the programme in order to achieve a suitable level of comprehension about the importance of conservation of forests for an indigenous audience. CLBs revealed to me that the PES conceptualisation is an abstract concept and is difficult to understand for an indigenous audience.

Therefore, PES scheme explanations are neglected in favour of traditional narratives regarding the conservation of forests, such as providing ecosystem services and goods supportive of indigenous livelihoods. In doing so, CLBs do not refer to national regulations, statistics, or facts about the impacts of deforestation. In these dynamics of enacting statehood, CLBs contribute to shaping local forms understanding the state, even if that means diverting the attention of the state as an environmental institution, that is, as a provider of economic incentives for conservation. These outcomes also support scholarship that suggests that front line state workers have the discretion to shape the way public policy is conducted at the margins. Similarly, while enacting statehood, CLBs also contribute to shaping the way indigenous

peoples expect to exercise their citizenship, founded on the importance of bureaucratic skills in bringing the state closer to the margins.

In their effort to make their work easier, CLBs also opt to train *comuneros* as legible public policy actors. This means promoting bureaucratic literacy skills among indigenous peoples to facilitate the accountability reporting they must submit to the head office. As such, CLBs organise workshops not linked to conservation issues, but to the possibilities of empowering indigenous peoples' profiles as bureaucratically legible public policy users. With these efforts, CLBs focus the strategies of statehood on bureaucratic skills and procedures so that communities can become legible public policy users.

CLBs also perform as brokers to NPCF communities. They facilitate the formal but otherwise illegible administrative procedures of the NPCF to the indigenous audience. As brokers, they help communities mediate their relationship with the state, writing the accountability reports they should be preparing and controlling the flows of documents. Following the social life of bureaucratic documents enables a better understanding of the efforts of CLBs to cope with their work, confronting, ignoring, adapting, and reshaping the considered illegibility of the formal policy design to turn it into legible vocabulary for an indigenous audience. As brokers, CLBs operate under the assumption that there are two asymmetrical parties (state and indigeneity) that must engage, but which both lack the skills to adequately materialise this articulation.

CLBs highlight the possibilities that their field level position provides them to become "experts" on the state-indigeneity relationship. This sense of expertise empowers them to

disagree with the NPCF's design that arrives from the headquarters in Lima for not suiting the local dynamics of indigenous communities. Yet, their defiance of the operation of the NPCF is not because of their incapacity to follow the rules, but of their perception about what they consider illegible to translate to the local ground. They perform the unstable gap between the challenges of everyday policy implementation in indigenous communities and the abstract work of public rule (Mathur, 2015).

Lipsky's (2010) model of street level bureaucrats, including its framing of discretion and constraints, is a relevant analytical tool to understand CLBs' everyday performance and interaction with policy users. CLBs use their discretion to fill in forms that are supposed to be prepared by policy users. Discretion is also used by female bureaucrats to advocate for policy users that are perceived to be in a situation of social vulnerability within the communities, such as the case of indigenous women and the encouragement to produce traditional handicrafts.

In terms of constraints, NPCF CLBs are constrained by the constant production of documentation; in particular, accountability reports that express the financial and physical progress of the NPCF's implementation, but not local conservation goals. In terms of informal policy shapers, NPCF bureaucrats are framed as administrative and bureaucratic intermediaries between the state and the indigenous peoples and as legible interlocutors and managers of an environment and development programme, in which the state expects the use of bureaucratic skills that people at the margins do not command.

Yet a better understanding of NPCF CLBs through the SLB lens requires a focus on the relationship of CLBs with documentation and the bureaucratic apparatus. According to this model, CLBs' everyday interactions with policy users account for the lack of practices directly enacting environmental statehood, such as the conservation of forests. The research on the NPCF has shown that the logic of PES schemes exchanging economic incentives for the promotion of conservation behaviours has become a secondary concern in the daily practice of CLBs. Despite documentation being at the centre of state interventions of the NPCF, this documentation records more procedural than substantive outcomes. Indeed, NPCF documentation is assessed primarily by its capacity to show numerical transactions rather than the actual substance of these transactions (Hetherington, 2011; Strathearn 2000).

### 9.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I explore the state effects of the implementation of the NPCF within indigenous communities. State effects are the traces of state rule in the everyday life of citizens (Trouillot, 2001; Mitchell 1991). They are produced as the results of social actors' interaction with state subjects, such as public representatives, but also other elements such as infrastructure and public artifacts such as written documents (Hull, 2012; Corbridge et al., 2005). In the case of the NPCF, the interactions between the indigenous population, CLBs, and the production and exchange of bureaucratic documents, are the elements that consolidate the effects of the state and make it apparent in its materiality.

The suitability of applying the state effects approach in this research is based on its capacity to focus on the micropolitics of public interventions and interactions, and on its usefulness to understand the state through territorialised, quotidian practices, rather than as a coherent apparatus that operates from a top-down approach. In section 9.2, I examine indigenous interpretations of the state as an environmental authority, and then in section 9.3, I discuss indigenous understandings of the NPCF itself and of the economic incentives for conservation. This is followed in section 9.4 by a discussion about the impact of the NPCF in the performance of citizenship and the bureaucratisation of communities as the main effect of the implementation of the programme; followed by concluding comments in section 9.5 about the production of state effects within communities through the implementation of the NPCF.

## 9.2. The state as environmental authority

Exploring the state-indigeneity relationship within Amazonian indigenous communities is a challenging task. For indigenous peoples, as public policy users, it can be difficult to differentiate state hierarchies, state agencies and divisions. The state can even be a separate entity from the state agents that arrive in indigenous communities to conduct public policy. It can be perceived as an apparatus that works somewhere else, for other targeted populations, and represents the interests of others. Likewise, indigenous peoples may have divergent understandings of the state, as the entity that contributes to accessing development opportunities to improve their wellbeing, but at the same time, as the apparatus that fails to respect their rights, like territorial rights, and that fails to build an indigenous public institutionality. In the following paragraphs, when I refer to the state and its role in conducting development and environment initiatives, I do not formally distinguish the hierarchy of state institutions, except for specific references to the sub-national government of San Martin. I mention the state in a declarative manner, which means how the state is literally referred to by informants during fieldwork.

For Amazonian indigenous populations, environmental initiatives such as the NPCF are also opportunities to encounter politically the state at the margins. These political engagements start with the ideas and images they construct about the state through the public programmes in which they participate, such as the NPCF. These experiences provide indigenous peoples with the opportunities to learn about the state apparatus, the language of public obligations, and how to deal with state bureaucratic procedures (Cerna et al., 2017).

The Amazonian indigenous communities enrolled in the NPCF hold a broad understanding of the programme as a public initiative to conserve communal forests. Ordinary *comuneros* obtain information about the NPCF firstly during the socialisation and affiliation processes; before signing the contracts; during monthly meetings with CLBs; and in the internal communal assemblies every three months. The level of NPCF understanding also depends on gender. As mainly men participate in NPCF activities, women have fewer opportunities to learn about it. This is another reason why female bureaucrats make efforts to include local women in economic activities, such as handicrafts, to be active participants in this programme.

Indigenous *comuneros* affiliated to the NPCF recognise that this programme implies a new set of rules to avoid deforestation, including the accomplishment of conditionalities for receiving economic incentives, such as conducting forest patrols and implementing sustainable economic activities. From my fieldwork interviews, it was clear that *comuneros* hold different levels of understanding about the programme. As expected, the more accurate understandings come from *comuneros* that have a higher level of participation in NPCF activities, such as communal board members, especially the president and treasurer, as the main actors responsible for the local implementation of the NPCF.

*The NPCF is mostly about taking care of forests, mountains, right? Not to cut trees, not to open new farms, to care for animals* (Comunero CHW02, Chunchiwi, September 2017).

*With the NPCF, our duty is to avoid cutting more trees and taking care of the environment and do the patrols. If there are strangers who want to open farms, well, we don't let them* (Comunero CHY01, Chirikyacu, September 2017).

*We have mountains. Other countries care that we do not cut down, so that there is no drought. We know there are no virgin forests in other places like we have here in Chirik Sacha. That is why. We have this virgin forest that we are protecting* (Comunero CHS02, Chirik Sacha, September 2018).

After the communal board, participants in forest patrol brigades and sustainable agriculture activities also hold an accurate understanding of the NPCF as a conservation and development initiative. The level of information then starts decreasing amongst other members of the community. I also noticed that the better level of information and familiarity with the programme occurs in small communities, like Chirikyacu and Chunchiwi, where only 30 or 40 families live. The contrary occurs in Awajun communities of the Alto Mayo landscape, like Shimpiyacu, in which the population is divided into seven different sectors. The most distant residents from the community centre, where the NPCF meetings are usually conducted, are not aware of the activities.

According to my findings, in the non-NPCF communities studied for this research, the understanding of the NPCF is very limited. In Aviación, Kawana Sisa and Morroyacu, the non-affiliated communities to the NPCF, only some men have heard about state money given to communities, but they do not know what this is for. In just a few cases, *comuneros* recognised the NPCF as a programme to conserve forests in exchange for economic incentives. In these communities, women that were interviewed could not define what the NPCF was about.

Despite the conditionalities and the restrictions on the use of communal forests, the NPCF has not been able to generate a strong connection of the state as an environmental authority, based on responsibilities and sanctions. The conduct of the NPCF has not increased demand for local conservation actions. Such actions include, for example, conservation measures to keep standing forests, demands for better technology to improve agricultural practices that do not require forest clearing, or the development of business plans to commercialise forestry products or local conservation areas.

However, the NPCF, through the performance of CLBs in the communities, has generated alternative interpretations about the importance of keeping standing forests. For *comuneros*, standing forests also become assets that attract development organisations and projects for their communities. They perceive that the protection of large, forested areas is a requirement that the state, and other non-profit organisations, can use to conduct development initiatives. Forests have thus turned into capital that can contribute to improved livelihoods and wellbeing. The notion of development that the studied population expects from the state supposes collective well-being, mainly related to infrastructure, roads, water and sanitation, education, and health. In fact, NPCF communities would prefer to invest the NPCF's economic incentives in these types of improvements, rather than the conditionalities that they must achieve.

*We will continue to conserve forests. Sooner or later suddenly will come another institution that would like to work with us. We conserved before, even having problems with other neighbouring communities because of that. Before, our vision was to conserve to work with tourism. There were many villagers from other communities who wanted to sell our territory, but we did not allow them (Comunero CHK04 Chirik Sacha, October 2018).*

*We did not know there were doubts. But finally, when the agreement was signed, reality was different. Through this project, many opportunities are opening up. Some institutions arrive from other parts that want to work with the community. That has been one of the best opportunities the project has given (Comunero CHW07, Chunchiwi, January 2018).*

*Maybe another institution wants to work with us because we have forests (Comunero CHI03, Chiric Sacha, January 2018).*

### 9.3. Local interpretations of the economic incentives for conservation

Besides the local understandings of the NPCF and the state, *comuneros*, the users of the NPCF, have different interpretations of the economic incentives they receive. It is even possible to differentiate these interpretations according to the indigenous group, which also impacts on

the way that the Kichwa and Awajun communities in each landscape perform as public policy users of the programme. These interpretations reveal interesting aspects about how Amazonian indigenous peoples reconfigure their relationship with the state.

According to my fieldwork findings, for Kichwa indigenous peoples from the Lamas and Sisa landscapes, the economic incentives of the NPCF are considered the first economic rewards for their historical tradition of conserving forests. Yet, they also understand that this reward is not for free. The state's payments must be reciprocated with their compliance as policy users of the formal NPCF conditionalities such as writing accountability reports, conducting forest patrols, and implementing sustainable economic activities. These communities realise that they should also meet the other administrative demands of the CLBs, especially through meetings once a month. This occurs especially in the communities from the Lamas landscape. In these meetings, between CLBs and board members, some *comuneros* get bored, do not understand what is being discussed, while others fall asleep.

To guarantee the presence of the highest number of *comuneros* in these meetings, the communal board imposes an economic fine on those *comuneros* that do not participate. It is true that these admonitions do not only occur for NPCF meetings, but also for "important" communal assemblies unless there are reasonable excuses. These obligations affect *comuneros*, especially men who lose workdays on their farm and off-farm jobs to attend the NPCF meetings. They risk losing their jobs by attending these meetings just to listen to the accountability reporting.

With their reinterpretation of the NPCF and the economic incentives, Kichwa communities build their relationship with the state, situating themselves in a civic position of reciprocity. For the Kichwa, the need to pay back the state is not considered in monetary terms, but through their responsible participation and compliance with NPCF rules. Reciprocity here is based on the fulfilment of their responsibilities as users of the NPCF. In return, communities expect the state to strengthen their presence and deliver more development projects because of their “good, civic behaviour”.

This local reinterpretation of the NPCF in terms of reciprocity recalls the classical anthropological definition of the gift coined by Mauss (2002). For Mauss, mechanisms to exchange goods and services between individuals and groups are based on a logic of gift and counter-gift, meaning giving, receiving, and giving back. In the case of Kichwa communities, their active and instrumental involvement in the NPCF has the major goal of building a social and political relationship between the state and indigeneity through a mechanism of mutual exchange. The compliance with conditionalities is then about reconnecting with the state, expanding its legitimacy within their communities, rather than being purely a contractual transaction.

In this scenario, the Kichwa peoples situate themselves as subjects of benefits, accepting the support that the state is willing to provide. The logic of subjects of benefits accepts that state interventions are justified because the “aid” that these subjects receive is not seen as a right. As such, NPCF Kichwa communities are passive users of the state, behaving as recipients of gifts. Kichwa efforts to accomplish the conditionalities are about building the scenario for an active exercise of citizenship, understood as the traditional set of responsibilities and rights

granted by the state. Kichwa *comuneros*, in their position as subjects of benefits, welcome the developments projects that arrive in their communities with the expectation of improving their livelihoods and looking to build an active and dynamic relationship with the state. This sense of *earning the state* may not add to the environmental reciprocity in the logic of a PES scheme, but it does create a sense of political and social inclusion and acknowledgement about the presence of the state at the margins and exercise of citizenship.

*This morning, I visited a local carpentry entrepreneurship in the community of Chirikyacu that won a small grant from the Public Cooperation Fund for Social Development (FONCODES, from its acronym in Spanish). The holder of the entrepreneurship was thankful for being subsidised but mentioned that the tools given were useless to work with. He ended with the expression “Don't look a gift horse in the mouth”* (Fieldnotes in Chirikyacu, September 2017).

*Board members were worried about another grant given by the local municipality of San Roque to implement a snake farm, to sell the snakes (*Bothrops atrox*). Authorities were questioning who is going to feed and take care of the snakes. Nobody wants to. When I asked why they accepted to have the snake farm, they said they cannot say no* (Fieldnotes in Chirikyacu, September 2017).

Kichwa communities from Lamas are usually “the favourite” candidates from state agencies and non-profit organisations to implement projects because of their usual enthusiasm and willingness to participate. Being the favourites for their docility as public policy users not only enables them to build a civic relationship with the state, but also allows them the possibility of having their demands heard and kept visible because they keep a dynamic flow of communication with the state. As I explain later, these outcomes contrast with the poor cooperation in the communities from the Alto Mayo landscape and their attempts to defy the state by not fulfilling their responsibilities and conditionalities.

Awajun communities in Alto Mayo frame the economic incentives of the NPCF as favours and tips. They consider that these payments do not need to be reciprocated in economic or

political terms. Awajun authorities have fewer incentives to comply with the NPCF rules. Indeed, Alto Mayo is the landscape with the most difficulties in meeting NPCF conditionalities. For example, meetings between CLBs and board members are constantly cancelled because local authorities do not arrive, arrive late or are drunk. In these communities, *comuneros* also resist conducting forest patrols because they want to be paid and are constantly struggling with accountability reporting due to the misuse of economic incentives by communal board members. Awajun communities do not appear to mind failing as users of state interventions, even when they acknowledge that this could mean losing their contracts.

The perception of the NPCF economic incentives as tips and favours reflects a broader form of relating with the state. Awajun *comuneros*, especially leaders, understand the state as a precarious entity, with an uneven capacity for delivering public services at the margins, an entity with weak capacity to respect the rights and to offer an appropriate scenario for the exercise of their citizenship. For Awajun *comuneros*, the state must implement development initiatives because it has responsibility to meet the needs of vulnerable citizens like Amazonian indigenous peoples, who have been historically relegated. In contrast to the Kichwa communities, the Awajun have a non-reciprocal relationship with the state as they treat NPCF payments as an entitlement because of past injustices and development failures. This does not mean that the Kichwas have not been victims of past injustices.

The Awajun are aware that initiatives such as the NPCF are founded on global concern about the state of tropical forests and therefore demand better access to external resources due to their role as holders of extensive forest areas that provide goods and services for Peruvian society and beyond. Yet these complaints have never escalated into real conflicts over the

NPCF.

*Before, the state has forgotten us, but now the state is present. It has come in this way to be able to help. We have always asked the state to help us to take care of our forest now. With the money they give us, we will be able to strengthen our activities so that it contributes to improving our lives (Comunero SHA02, Shampuyacu, October 2018).*

*If the state does not support us, then who? The NPCF must continue forever. The lung of humanity does not wait for deadlines (FERIAAM Leader FER01, August 2018).*

*The Awajun are tired of attending meetings with the state. They have been ripped off in every process. The state no longer has credibility. The Awajun have sought their own solutions to the problems in which the state has put them through bad projects and bad civil servants (FERIAM Leader FER02, August 2018).*

With the implementation of the NPCF, discussions within Awajun communities about the contrast between forest clearing for agriculture and development benefits and economic incentives linked to conservation, increased. These preoccupations include debates about forms of accessing the state for benefits and support to control the expansion of land renting. According to my interviewees, Awajun communities that rented land for agriculture have felt the effect of having fewer forests in terms of access to food, medicine, fuel, fibers, but also less land for new plots. In that sense, the Awajun peoples are aware and accept the opportunity to build better relationships with the state, which is seen as a key ally to obtain resources to protect their forests.

When NPCF Awajun communities consider the economic incentives as favours or tips, they underline their articulation of the state as a source of development. They are inclined to accept and reject projects, building a fragile relationship with the state, and willing to break and then resume it if necessary. NPCF Awajun communities expect the presence of the state, not as something they can earn, but as something they can demand because it is the state's responsibility and follows from their rights. What the Awajun are doing here is demanding the

presence of the state and recognising the state as having authority.

However, and in contrast to Kichwa communities, these Awajun communities do not welcome any project that arrives and usually assess the benefits and constraints of development schemes in terms of what they are expected to offer and what are the responsibilities they must engage with. Indeed, during the period 2012 - 2016, the Alto Mayo was, from the three landscapes studied, the one with the highest number of rejections from indigenous communities of invitations to participate in the NPCF.

In this context, Awajun *comuneros* perform politically and frame their citizenship as subjects of rights demanding the presence of the state in their communities, alluding to their vulnerability as relegated populations at the margins of the state. This delicate relationship that the Awajun peoples from Alto Mayo expect to build with the state is reinforced by local state authorities. Local state agencies and municipalities prefer not to work with Awajun communities from Alto Mayo as they consider them problematic, referring to their alleged unwillingness to follow the rules in state projects and to their being “lazy” with poor motivation to participate in state projects.

*A project that enters Awajun communities is a project that remains unfinished. We don't like to work with Awajun people because they are stubborn, they are lazy, even though they have good land. They have destroyed their own forests. I have bad experiences with them. They take everything for granted. What we gave them, they sold it, they didn't care. No one is interested in learning technical management. They complain why they don't get more money if that money comes from the state. They say they deserve it because they have been forgotten. They are not reliable people. They have an idea that the state has to give them everything* (Manager at the Department of Economic and Social Development, Municipality of Rioja, September 2018).

The condition of subjects of rights of the Awajun of Alto Mayo must be understood considering past and failed experiences of state interventions to modernise the Alto Mayo Valley. Important schemes since the 1970s, such as the construction of the Fernando Belaunde highway and the Alto Mayo Special Project, contributed to defining the tense relationship that these communities have with the state today. Indeed, in the state - Awajun indigeneity relationship another feature not to dismiss is the early creation of the Awajun indigenous movement, in contrast with the Kichwa experience. The Awajun political organisation began to consolidate since the 1970s to influence the titling of communities in Alto Mayo, to stop the presence of invaders and for the indigenous leaders to serve as intermediaries with project agents to modernise the valley through agricultural development projects (Brown, 2014; Greene, 2009). Today, the Alto Mayo Regional Indigenous Federation (FERIAAM) is the organization that represents the Awajun communities from the Alto Mayo valley.

*We did not know there were doubts. But finally, when the agreement was signed, reality was different. Through this project, many opportunities are opening up. Some institutions arrive from other parts that want to work with the community. That has been one of the best opportunities the project has given (Comunero CHW03, Chunchiwi, January 2018).*

Both indigenous groups agree on interpreting the NPCF economic incentives outside of environmental concerns. NPCF communities do not understand the economic incentives as conditionalities and trade-offs for conservation, which differentiates this initiative from other conservation strategies. In theory, as a PES-like scheme, the NPCF seeks to modify the perception and behaviour of forest users so that they can find it profitable to manage these ecosystems against potential land use changes that cause or encourage deforestation (Pagiola and Platais, 2012).

However, in NPCF communities, the economic incentives received are far from profitable, but still a symbolic form of connecting with the state. In the case of the Kichwa peoples, even if considered as a reward for protecting the forest, communities complain about the low rate of their payments, arguing that the value of their forests is higher than GBP 2 per hectare. CLBs never explain the total amount that communities will receive over the length of their contracts, but only the price per hectare of conserved forest, which in real terms is the price of two small beers. In these terms, the amount that communities receive for protecting forests and accomplishing the NPCF conditionalities seems insignificant.

Comparing this flat rate with the market price of their land, the NPCF payments are still of relatively low value. In Awajun communities, this complaint is even stronger, when they compare the NPCF flat rate with the amount they receive from land renting, which is about GBP 585 per hectare on average. However, these Awajun communities have communally agreed to stop the conversion of forest into agricultural land because, according to the interviews, they have felt the impact of deforestation in terms of limited forest resources on which their livelihoods rely. Then, communities accept the payments instead of receiving nothing at all. As such, they accept with resignation these state interventions, but do so mostly with the expectation of further and greater benefits in the future.

*10 soles per hectare, I can rent one hectare for 1000 soles (Comunero SHA03, Shampuyacu, December 2018).*

*So, if I have 3 hectares, I receive 30 PEN? That is nothing (Comunero SHI01 (Nonuser of the NPCF) in Shimpiyacu, December 2018).*

*10 soles are not enough to keep the lung of the earth. There should be a prior consultation, so communities can decide the payments. Can the payment be readjusted? 10 soles per hectare? You spend that on a beer. We are defending humanity. And three-year contracts are not enough. We are not ungrateful, but we*

*know that after the NPCF ends, people will start renting again. The Awajun are no longer living in the past time of anthropologists (FERIAAM Leader 1).*

NPCF communities hold a powerless position to negotiate better rates and different investments of the NPCF economic incentives, as they are flat rates for all communities and the uses of the economic incentives are standardised according to the rules of the programme. They assume that the state is unresponsive to their claims and adjust their expectations. In addition to the complaints and this sense of resignation, within these communities there is also suspicion about the real interests of the state in giving them money. They fear dispossession and losing one of their most valued assets: their territory (Correa and Roopnaraine, 2014). Some *comuneros* suspect that they are being paid through the NPCF to sell their land to foreign enterprises or for the creation of protected areas. Fear of expropriation is exacerbated during the enrolment process, as communities are asked to submit their land titles to create their legal records, which is a requirement to enroll in the NPCF.

Fears about PES schemes also occur in other countries in Latin America, like Ecuador and Guatemala (von Hedemann and Osorne, 2016; Bremer et al., 2014; Balvanera et al., 2012; Holland et al., 2011). These concerns about potential hidden reasons for the state providing economic incentives resonates with results from other qualitative studies on conditional cash transfers in rural areas of Peru. In these other cases, the economic incentives are thought to be premature payments for the future extraction of natural resources (mostly hydrocarbons) and/or timber. These interpretations, as well as the findings of this research, need to be understood within the framework of the historical experiences of abuse and discrimination that has marked the relationship between Amazonian indigenous peoples with external actors

(Correa and Roopnaraine 2013; Huber et al., 2009).

Indigenous reflections about low tariffs are kept in the quotidian life of communities as well as other ambivalent feelings about the state. The implementation of the NPCF does produce subtle forms of distrust, suspicion, and resignation, that can be considered as what J. Scott (1990) defines as infrapolitics. Infrapolitics refers to the ordinary strategies of resistance of oppressed groups that remain unseen by their dominators. Local complaints expose ambiguous consent about the imposed rules, despite formal acceptance of them. In the case of the NPCF, infrapolitics are the local forms of contestation within communities about the norms and conditionalities of the NPCF, particularly regarding the real value of conservation and alternative uses of the payments beyond the NPCF conditionalities.

These forms of contestation are not about breaking their relationship with the state, but an attempt to find better ways to fit state regulation with Amazonian indigenous needs and expectations (Rubenstein, 2004). The lack of overt criticism at higher levels is justified by the economic incentives that NPCF communities receive, when they argue that these payments are “better than nothing” (Comunero COP01, Copal Sacha, August 2017). These NPCF users perceive those complaints about the NPCF may put them at risk of not receiving payments at all. These results say more about the role of indigenous peoples within society and their relation to the state. While doing fieldwork, whenever I finished interviews, I asked the interviewees if they had questions for me. Common questions were: “Why does the state pay us for our territory?” and “What will happen to the forest that we take care of?” These concerns about the goals of the NPCF reinforce distrust and suspicion about the state’s interest in Amazonian indigenous lands.

*At the beginning there was distrust, fear of the state taking over their territory and we thought, brothers wait, we must take it as a football match, we win or lose. We must take risks; we can evaluate because the contracts are renewed every year (Leader 2 from Awajun local federation).*

*We were already tired of being told how the programme worked. We thought that they (CLBs) were cheating us, but we always said yes to everything. Until we saw the money in their bank account, and we saw that it was true (Comunero COP02, Copal Sacha, December 2018).*

The implementation of the NPCF shows the complex and contradictory effect of the state within Amazonian indigenous communities. On one hand, communities are grateful for being chosen for this programme and for receiving economic incentives. Yet, on the other hand, communities conduct NPCF activities with resignation, suspicion, and fear of dispossession. In this situation, the instrumental motivation of Amazonian indigenous communities to engage with the NPCF is based on the understanding of the role of the state as a provider of benefits. More than a commitment on the conservation of forests, what is at stake with the NPCF is the possibility of bringing the state to the margins. However, to bring the state to the margins means communities must have key assets like standing forests and managing administrative skills to reproduce the state vocabulary of accountability.

#### 9.4. Citizenship and the effect of bureaucracy within indigenous communities

When the Kichwa refer to economic incentives as rewards from the state that must be compensated in the form of diligent compliance with the rules of the NPCF; and the Awajun as favours or tips that do not need to be returned or require compliance with the rules of the NPCF, they are shaping differently their relationships with the state and the form that they exercise their citizenship. On one hand, Kichwas frame themselves as *subjects of benefits*, trying to keep a constant and dynamic relationship with the state. On the other, Awajun frame

themselves as *subjects of rights*, questioning the authority of the state, but still trying to build a working relationship with it, even if that means sometimes breaking off relations.

This configuration of types of “subjects” reveals an invocation of citizenship, constituting an alliance rather than a claim to self-determination in the state indigeneity relationship (Tsing, 2007). The configuration of this citizenship is founded on claims of social inclusion into a broader political community and public recognition of the state that allows indigenous peoples a better connection with it for the enjoyment of certain rights like public services and development opportunities. (Schiller, 2005). Citizenship among indigenous users of the NPCF is more about a dynamic space of symbolic exchange and articulation in which certain demands can be obtained, instead of rigid and defined rights and responsibilities (Gilbert and Phillips, 2003).

Indigenous claims of the state as source or development are also forms of invoking its public authority and governing capacity. Still, the form of citizenship at the margins indigenous peoples expect to exercise is not necessarily about actively participating in the implementation of public policy, but from subordination to the will, time, and procedures, especially the administrative ones, of the state (Auyero, 2012). Thus, NPCF users accept state control over their communities and forests, in exchange for receiving public services and access to development programmes. The presence of the state in these communities is enough to enhance the political recognition of Amazonian indigenous users as interlocutors of the state, and to accept development initiatives as a relational practice to strengthen the relationship between the state and indigenous peoples.

With indigenous peoples' interest of social recognition, they build a double "contract" with the state. Through the NPCF, indigenous communities sign a formal, legal contract in which the state provides economic incentives to indigenous communities for their agreement in the conservation of forests and fulfilment of other conditionalities. However, in the midst of the implementation of the NPCF, indigenous communities expect to constitute another (social) contract with the state. They expect to perform the social form of citizenship, claiming other rights related to development, understood as the presence of public services and infrastructure. To achieve this, indigenous peoples are aware of the need for the customisation of indigeneity, learning and embracing bureaucratic skills with the prospect of projecting an improved presence of the state in their communities. Indeed, both ethnic groups understand the relevance of navigating through bureaucratic procedures to become legible public policy users and auditable subjects and communities.

Through the lens of the state effects approach, it is clear that for indigenous peoples the presence of the state at the margins is mostly materialised through state representatives like the CLBs but also through bureaucratic procedures and paperwork. Therefore, the idea of the state and the form of experiencing and understanding it is as a bureaucratic institution. In this scenario, indigenous peoples understand the importance of commanding bureaucratic skills to access the state and its services. As mentioned before, despite historical efforts of Amazonian indigenous peoples to deal with state bureaucracy to claim rights, this is the first time they have been delegated the responsibility for the accountability of the management of economic incentives and accomplishment of conditionalities.

Despite indigenous peoples' willingness to customise their indigeneity to become political actors, embracing bureaucracy as a technique of citizenship and development, there is a considerable gap in their ability to champion bureaucratic skills. Moreover, the state avoids customising itself for these specific public policy users at the margins, even when the NPCF was designed to be implemented specifically within indigenous communities. These outcomes reveal the poor efforts of the state to penetrate the social life as an environmental institution, thereby, showing its precariousness at the margins.

Instead, the most important effect of the implementation of the NPCF is the bureaucratisation of indigenous communities. This refers to the attempts of the state to install and reproduce state bureaucratic forms within these communities, to organise and conduct public actions and manage their relationship with the indigenous population based on the production and circulation of documents and administrative procedures. This also implies the state effort to promote the usage of the state bureaucratic language so that indigenous peoples can function as active and legible users of public policy and auditable subjects.

The connection between indigenous peoples with state bureaucratic procedures is not a new scenario introduced by the NPCF. Local authorities from communal board members are constantly travelling to nearby cities to accomplish state bureaucratic procedures related to communal affairs, such as updating identity cards, legalising documents, presenting applications to improve their local school, filling in forms to update the communal statutes, and requesting the improvement of roads, amongst others. Within communities, interactions with bureaucratic procedures from different state agencies are also part of their everyday lives.

While undertaking participant observation of a meeting between a forest bureaucrat (Diana) and handicraft women in Copal Sacha, suddenly a man interrupted the meeting without greeting, demanding copies of the women's identity cards. Women attending the meeting very quickly ran to their houses and brought copies of their identity cards without complaining. They said they always receive sporadic visits from bureaucrats of local state agencies, who ask for their IDs and other community documentation on development projects. Therefore, they are always prepared, keeping several copies of their IDs. Yet they also mentioned that in most of the cases, the promised community development projects never occurred.

For Amazonian indigenous communities, conducting bureaucratic procedures and mastering the techniques of bureaucracy may create development opportunities. In NPCF communities, *comuneros* are eager to access development schemes but without bureaucratic brokers. To do so, they need to dominate and even imitate state bureaucratic procedures in their own governance structures. Thus, they accept the bureaucratisation of their communities as a necessary condition to connect with the state and the world of development aid. Communal board members are expected to become village bureaucrats with the appropriate skills to install accountability and transparency as common goods in the local governance structure of communities that facilitate their interaction with the state. While doing so, they are open to customise their indigeneity, mastering bureaucratic skills to increase their political agency before the state and better exercise their citizenship.

The difference of the NPCF in terms of bureaucratisation with other public programmes is that communities become responsible for managing their own development activities, their

economic incentives and, consequently, their own accountability. The final effect of the NPCF, that in its quotidian life operates through highly bureaucratised practices, is the introduction of accountability dynamics to create an audit culture in the state-indigeneity relationship. The complex process of accountability that Amazonian indigenous peoples have to go through is costly in terms of time and energy. The bureaucratic procedures of the NPCF formally starts with the enrolment of communities, when they must gather administrative documentation such as the community title, the constitution of their political boards and the community statute. Once communities are enrolled, the effect of bureaucratisation continues with the everyday interactions with CLBs to perform their “rituals of verification” (Power, 1997). Local authorities in indigenous communities must demonstrate their ability to administer economic incentives and be accountable to the state.

During the implementation of the programme, in the everyday actions to implement the development projects and the conduction of forest patrols, communal leaders must be aware of being transparent in their economic transactions, alert to requests for receipts with legible and precise contents. They have to sign cheques, write sworn declarations and minutes, revise balances and prepare attendance lists from the communal assemblies in which they explain the NPCF accountability to the rest of the community. The systematisation of all these actions and documents must be included in trimestral reports in spreadsheets, showing the correct expenses and balances, in addition to presenting other management documents, such as sworn statements of expenses and activity reports, amongst others.

For indigenous communities, the NPCF administrative documents and procedures are key actions to generate skills that allow them to learn to write “requests” to access the state, skills

that also reinforce the collective expectations of being able to access development opportunities (Allard and Walker, 2016).

The bureaucratisation of communities is about proving accountability and transparency, in other words of shaping auditable subjects. Within the audit culture of the NPCF, it is important that communities demonstrate with papers the implementation of their conditionalities required in their conservation contracts. Communities must also show that they are willing to participate in this audit culture, accepting the control of the state not only over their forests but also over their behaviour. The audit culture installed in communities allows the state to obtain evidence of their social relationship and of the progress of its interventions at the margins, sealed in legal procedures and documents (Bear and Mathur, 2015).

Amazonian indigenous peoples recognise the powerful role of documents and assume their subordination to state procedures. However, the effect of bureaucratising communities, in the context of the implementation of the NPCF, still faces substantial challenges. It remains difficult for local authorities to command the bureaucratic procedures and write documents. In fact, most of the problems in the progress of the programme in these communities are linked to bureaucratic failures, rather than failures in preventing deforestation.

During field work, in a meeting with NPCF specialists, in which cheques had to be signed, I was surprised by the difficulties faced by the members of the board of directors and some economic activities committees in filling them. Some of them could not fit words and numbers on the spaces established in the cheques; they either placed them too high or too low. They

took their time practicing writing amounts of money, especially amounts in thousands of soles.

They also practiced their signatures so that they would come out the same on the documents they had to send to the programme office.

*Lorenzo explains the different types of receipts. Then he explains how to fill them and what information they should have. Comuneros practice filling in cheques. Lorenzo tells them, “remember never sign a blank cheque” (Fieldnotes in Chunchiwi, February 2018).*

*The president of the board does not want to sign the cheques. He cannot write the same signature on different cheques. He says he will do it tomorrow. Monica wants him to sign the cheques right now (Fieldnotes in Copal Sacha, March 2018).*

*I am seated next to the president of the community of Copal Sacha during the exercise of filling cheques. He takes his time before grabbing the pen. He stares at the cheque. He asks where to put the date and how to write six thousand soles. I show him. He does not write this information above the lines or within the boxes in the cheque. He complains he is doing it wrong. Then he signs not above the line and says it does not look like his signature. He stands up and leaves the room (Fieldnotes, March 2018).*

The NPCF in representation of the state underestimates the understanding of writing as a neutral and transparent capacity to access the state, without considering it as a cultural practice, loaded with symbolic value, embedded in relations of textual domination (Messick, 1992). This is especially true in the indigenous population, who tend to be below average in indicators of quality of life and access to public services, including education. Among the indigenous population, the average educational level reached is incomplete elementary.

During fieldwork, I also became conscious that the state, through the NPCF, takes for granted practices of (hand)writing and bureaucratic procedures that allow Amazonian indigenous peoples to report the implementation of their responsibilities as users. Nevertheless, the state expects communities to respond to the bureaucratisation process as policy users but is not willing to contribute to building these skills because, according to head office representatives,

this is not the responsibility of the programme, but to improve the condition of communal forests.

*Diana (Forest bureaucrat): Please (to comuneros) take care of your documents, make an archive of your documents. Who knows? Sometime the programme might want to audit you and you are not prepared* (Fieldnotes in Chirikyacu, October 2018).

The difficulty in producing documents stems not only from a lack of administrative skills but also from the illegibility of state procedures. Here, illegibility is a consequence of the state's inability to translate its regulations, legal documents, and bureaucratic procedures in a way that is understandable to indigenous communities. This illegibility is not necessarily based on indigenous ignorance of the regulations, but on the inability of the state to translate its norms into the daily life of the margins and their social and territorial dynamics.

The NPCF accountability within communities fails because *comuneros* provide inaccurate data to CLBs. The difficulty in producing documents among *comuneros* with poor literacy skills often creates fake, mistaken and incomplete documents due to the illegibility of state forms for indigenous communities. Thus, the pressure of the NPCF to implement illegible bureaucratic procedures and technologies of writing within communities impacts on the possibility of forgery in documentation. Therefore, it is through documents that "the state can penetrate the life of the community and yet remain elusive" (Das, 2004: 245).

*Monica (forest bureaucrat) screens an Excel chart on the wall of the communal building about the economic incentives budget for the following months and the money spent to date. There are several Excel sheets with small numbers. While Monica explains, comuneros remain in silence. Monica asks if they understand and they say yes. When the meeting ends, I tell the treasurer that I had not understood the Excel sheets. I ask him if he had understood, he said no. Then, I ask the president, and he says no, because he had not worn his glasses and saw nothing* (Fieldnotes in Copal Sacha, March 2018).

In this scenario, some communities opt for “informal” strategies to meet the delivery dates of the accountability documentation, even if this means sacrificing the transparency of the administrative processes. On some occasions, in field work, I have witnessed complaints from community members about requests from the board of directors to sign for their attendance in minutes of community assemblies that were not carried out. When the NPCF specialists confronted the members of the board for faking communal assemblies, they affirmed that they had no other option because the date of the communal assembly did not fit with the deadline to submit the quarterly documentation, including the evidence of the conditionalities’ fulfilment and could not risk losing their contracts for not delivering their paperwork on time. At another accountability meeting, the board members submitted incorrect affidavits and had to rewrite them. But the community members who had to sign the declarations were not in the community at that time. The community members who were at the meeting forged signatures and fingerprints, as if they were those of their absent neighbours.

In February 2019, in the head office of the NPCF in Lima, one interviewee alerted me that some communities in San Martin may lose their contracts due to the presentation of incomplete and fake documents in their accountability reports. Specifically, communities in trouble had used repeated sworn declarations for expenses that could be purchased with legal receipts. On another occasion, while undertaking participant observation in Copal Sacha, some *comuneros* complained that board members made them sign and/or fingerprint attendance sheets from an assembly session they did not attend. When CLBs confronted the board members about this practice, they affirmed they had no choice because the date of the communal assembly did not fit with the deadline for which the CLBs had pressed them to

submit the accountability reports and so they had to fake the assembly. In another accountability meeting with CLBs in Chunchiwi, board members presented incorrect sworn declarations and had to write them again. However, the *comuneros* that had to sign them were not in town. *Comuneros* attending the meeting faked the signatures and fingerprints. They even asked me to lend my fingerprint.

The lack of transparency in accountability goes beyond the case of the NPCF and its instillation in the quotidian and internal practices of these communities as they interact with the state. While revising the Book of Minutes in the community of Alto Mayo for the year 2017, I read an internal accountability report of incomes for selling timber and their expenses which did not show what the board did with the money. I could not find evidence of concerns or complaints about this apparent lack of transparency of the board members, even though the transactions in this case had not occurred within the NPCF. *Comuneros* are continuously gossiping and complaining that they do not know how board members invest the economic incentives, even though they are always invited to the accountability meetings.

This example provides evidence to show that the accountability processes of the NPCF within the indigenous communities are tense and produce illegibility between the communities and the state. Communal boards cannot cope with the production and gathering of documentation that the state expects them to provide. These documents, which include the signatures and stamps of the board members, remain illegible to their formal and legally responsible persons, unable to control their production, consumption, and circulation. The NPCF reproduces the illegibility of the state bureaucratic apparatus at the margins that distances NPCF users and CLBs from the purposes of the programme.

These findings also show that the daily life of this environmental programme is the reproduction of overwhelming bureaucratic practices. Furthermore, this state intervention is designed to adapt to the state's audit culture and to reproduce its bureaucratic procedures, but not to recognise the dynamics and structure of the indigenous communities in question as users of public policies. Thus, the NPCF reproduces the illegibility that the state bureaucratic apparatus means for the communities, which makes it impossible to operate without brokers like the CLBs. This illegibility distances NPCF users from the environmental purpose of the programme but brings them closer to the language of bureaucratic accountability. Despite this complexity, communities are willing to keep trying to deal with bureaucracy and state documentation. When communities submit their accountability reports, they expect their legal contracts to remain valid; but in a more symbolic sense, they also expect their social contracts with the state to be maintained with the expectation of accessing more benefits and development opportunities in the future.

## 9.5. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have explored how the implementation of the NPCF programme produces state effects through the (incomplete) production of the state as environmental authority, local interpretations of economic incentives for conservation and, finally, the bureaucratisation of communities, which impacts on the customatisation of indigeneity, embracing bureaucratic skills to improve indigenous peoples' political agency for a better exercise of citizenship.

Despite the conditionalities of the NPCF that limit the use of communal forests, within participating indigenous communities there is a weak connection of the state as an environmental institution. The NPCF has not been able to increase local requests for

environmental measures, for example, by strengthening conservation measures to maintain standing forests or by demands for better technology to focus on agricultural practices that do not cause forest clearing. Still, with this programme, the indigenous population has adopted alternative interpretations of forest conservation as an asset that attracts future development opportunities.

For these communities, the management of large areas of forests is now a condition that the state requires, broadly understood as a concern for the protection of nature. For Kichwa and Awajun *comuneros*, the relevance of the NPCF is not necessarily about reducing deforestation, but about keeping standing forests and learning bureaucratic procedures as the chance to connect with external actors and access their financial resources, establishinga political and economic rationale for forest conservation. In that sense, the state is not irrelevant for communities. There is a constant demand for the presence of the state in the communities that were studied, not as an environmental ruling institution but as a source of development opportunities. Even as an environmental programme, the NPCF can bring the state to the margins and build a relationship of exchange with it, albeit a transactional one.

Regarding the economic incentives, there are significant differences between the Kichwa and Awajun populations in the interpretations ofthese payments, which impact on the way they perform as public policy users. Both groups interpret the NPCF economic incentives outside their nominal environmental concerns. For the Kichwa, economic incentives are rewards from the state that need to be paid back, in a civic sense in the form of their diligent compliance with NPCF rules. In contrast, for the Awajun, the economic incentives are favours or tips, and as such, they do not need to be paid back.

These two different forms of approaching the payments reveal the contrasting ways these Amazonian indigenous groups relate to the state. On one hand, the Kichwa try to maintain an enduring and dynamic relationship with the state. On the other, the Awajun also want to accept the presence of the state at the margins, but they do not mind periodically breaking and rebuilding their relationship with the state if they do not agree with its terms. The Kichwas frame themselves as *subjects of benefits* accepting state interventions to accept the presence of the state. The Awajun frame themselves as *subjects of rights*, sometimes defying the authority of the state but still accepting its presence as a source of payments because it is seen as bearing responsibility for making good on past wrongs. Indeed, to understand these contrasting forms of engaging with the state, it is crucial to also acknowledge the recent history of development in San Martin as forms of statehood. As mentioned, since the 1970s, the Awajun experienced a failed initiative of the state and other development agencies for becoming economic actors, while the Kichwas kept their market agency in low profile.

These deviations from the environmental awareness should also be understood in the context of the strong component of accountability that the communities must present to the state for managing the economic incentives for conservation, which these communities have embraced as skills necessary to interact effectively with the state. Indeed, the main state effect of the programme is the bureaucratisation of the communities, which aims at installing an audit culture within indigenous communities to prove evidence of state interventions at the margins and construct indigenous peoples as auditable subjects. In the process of bureaucratising communities, dealing with documentation is the main transaction with the state in order to build an audit culture.

The attempt to reconfigure this social relationship, in which these communities are unable to effectively manage the NPCF, reproduces the illegibility of the state at the margins, as well as the power the state holds over Amazonian indigenous peoples (Allan and Walker, 2016; Das and Poole, 2004). The state interacts and negotiates the implementation of this conservation initiative in terms of legible documentation and an audit culture but misses the opportunity to work with the indigenous communities on conservation awareness skills and environmental education to avoid deforestation.

Beyond its environmental goals, the NPCF reveals a new complex and tense form of engagement in the state-indigeneity relationship, one that operates between acceptance and resistance, legibility, and illegibility. The NPCF is a platform for communities to articulate politically with the state to access public services, exercising citizenship and creating future development opportunities. At the same time, the participation of indigenous communities in the NPCF indicates an *instrumental* involvement which requires them to leverage their bureaucratic skills and increase their agency to present their political legibility to the state.

## Chapter 10: Final remarks

This thesis has ethnographically examined the implementation of a state-led payment for ecosystem services scheme for the conservation of Amazonian forests. In undertaking a case study, I have analysed the conduct of the National Programme for the Conservation of Forests for the Mitigation of Climate Change (NPCF), within Kichwa and Awajun indigenous communities in the department of San Martin, located in the north-eastern region of Peru. I conducted fieldwork in seven communities that I divided into three landscapes for their geographical, ethnic, and historical connections: the landscape of Lamas composed of the Kichwa communities of Chirikyacu and Chunchiwi; the landscape of Sisa, composed of the Kichwa communities of Copal Sacha and Chirik Sacha; and the landscape of Alto Mayo, composed of the Awajun communities of Shimpiyacu, Shampuyacu and Alto Mayo.

The thesis has three main research questions: i) What are the socio-environmental implications of the implementation of PES schemes within Amazonian indigenous communities?; ii) How do community-level bureaucrats turn environmental policy into specifications to conserve indigenous forests?; and iii) What are the state effects of a state-led PES in Amazonian indigenous communities and how do these influence the reconfiguration of the state indigeneity relationship?

The discussion of my findings has enabled me to explore the state indigeneity relationship through the quotidian implementation of a conservation scheme at the margins. I have addressed not only the social and political impacts of a conservation scheme, but also the role of state representatives performing statehood. I have shown the key relevance of bureaucracy

and bureaucratic practices for the exercise of citizenship and the customisation of indigeneity. Ultimately, my findings demonstrate that, in the case of the NPCF, the state attempted to penetrate the social life of the margins by implementing a programme that fits the public good of accountability and expands the bureaucratic apparatus, yet failed to understand and to listen to its citizens. As a consequence, the state remains somehow illegible for indigenous peoples, who still depend on brokers to mediate their connection and miss the chance to improve the state-indigeneity relationship. Indigenous communities seek a form of citizenship that is more about better development opportunities than environmental measures in the Amazonian region.

To analyse these issues, I engaged with three principal critical theoretical discussions: the political and social impacts of state-led PES schemes, state bureaucracy and state effects. These aspects of statehood have been key to examine what happens in the NPCF, despite whether the conservation of forests is achieved. They highlight the roles of the most important actors in these operations, as CLBs turn policy into specific implementation actions and treat indigenous peoples as public policy users. To capture the detailed interactions of these stakeholders, I chose to analyse the NPCF by employing an ethnographic approach of the everyday state. This means following the micropolitics of ordinary actions, not only the interactions between community level bureaucrats with the indigenous population, but also including the interactions of these actors with other state artifacts, particularly state documents.

I suggest that even with the programme's objective of preserving indigenous forests, the everyday work of the NPCF is more about dealing with bureaucratic procedures and

paperwork. Yet, indigenous peoples have learnt to customise their indigeneity to fit with new forms of relating with the state as mediated by documents and mediated by their shaping of citizenship claims as members of a political community that recognised the state. As my research progressed, it became evident that the public good of accountability as proof of the advancement of public policy at the margins was the key state priority in these communities, controlling forests through paperwork and turning indigenous peoples into responsible and auditable subjects.

In terms of research question i), regarding the socio-environmental implications of the implementation of PES within indigenous communities, the analysis of the NPCF showed that the heavy administrative burden on the communal boards weakens local political structures. This occurs because of their overwhelming responsibilities of running the programme and because of the subtle suspicion and distrust that ordinary *comuneros* have of their authorities for potential misuse of the economic incentives and elite capture of benefits. Yet the NPCF also generates positive political outcomes. The presence of the NPCF, and particularly the vast administrative chores required of communal board members, have enabled some leaders to acquire new abilities to negotiate with the state. Indigenous leaders recognise the power of bureaucratic competencies regarding documentation and accountability as enabling them to become legible interlocutors with the state, reducing their long-term dependence on brokers to access external funds and resources.

Social conflict as a result of the implementation of the NPCF varies according to each landscape and according to different community characteristics, such as demographics, ethnic background, household dispersion, economic activities and the location of protected forests.

Yet, in any case, social conflict was not serious enough to affect the implementation of the NPCF. Any differences over the programme were expressed mainly as internal social tensions. Communities from the Alto Mayo landscape evidenced higher levels of conflict. This is also the only landscape in which the programme faced real constraints regarding forest management, due to regular practices of forest clearing for land renting for agriculture. Communities enrolled in the NPCF that already conserved forests have lower levels of conflict over forest management. Yet in these areas, such as the landscapes of Sisa and Lamas, there are still suspicions about the elite capture of benefits for communal board members and their families.

In terms of cooperation, Awajun communities in the Alto Mayo landscape show poor cooperation to fulfil the conduct of the NPCF. I posit that poor cooperation over NPCF practices is related to household dispersion that affects proper communication and, in some cases as in the communities from Sisa and Alto Mayo, the ethnic constitution of the villages, in which indigenous and non-indigenous peoples reside in the same area, also generates tensions about who should receive the benefits of the NPCF. Results also show that the implementation of the NPCF is more effective in communities in which economic incentives can cover benefits for most community members, due to low demographics and large areas being under conservation agreements, which can reduce the perception of elite capture of benefits. This is the case for communities from the Lamas landscape.

The outcome shared across all communities regarding perceptions of the NPCF is the increased sense of territorial awareness. The requirement to conduct forest patrols, as one of the main conditionalities of the programme, helps to reconfigure their geographical imagination about the communal territories. Many *comuneros* that participate in these

surveillance journeys to their territorial borders discover these forests and resources as being part of their communal lands. Unfortunately, territorial awareness is a competence only gained by men, as women never join the forest patrols.

Regarding research question ii) on how community level bureaucrats turn environmental policy into specific actions to conserve indigenous forests, the model of SLBs works as a useful analytical framework to obtain a detailed understanding of CLBs working in indigenous communities. CLBs use their discretion to transform the formal goals of the NPCF into what they consider to be legible forms for an indigenous audience. CLBs also adapt the NPCF's environmental content, reshaping and ignoring the PES aims of the programme in order to achieve a local comprehension about the importance of forest conservation. CLBs suggest that the PES conceptualisation is abstract and difficult to understand for an indigenous audience.

Therefore, official PES scheme explanations are neglected in favour of traditional narratives regarding the conservation of forests, as they keep providing ecosystem services and goods that benefit indigenous livelihoods. Indeed, in their effort to make their work easier and meet state bureaucratic demands for accountability-based reporting, CLBs opt for training *comuneros* in administrative skills. As such, CLBs organise workshops not linked to conservation issues, but to the possibilities of improving indigenous peoples' profiles as proper public policy users, such as using a computer, signing cheques, writing sworn declarations and narrative progress reports, amongst others.

The different forms of discretion that CLBs employ to shape the NPCF are possible due to their double distance from the centre of administrative power. The physical distance between CLBs

in Moyobamba, the communities themselves and the head office in Lima makes it difficult to establish a consistent flow of communication, documents, and ideas. The political distance between CLBs and the centre of power enables CLBs, on the one hand, to use discretion to reshape their responsibilities and the programme's norms; but on the other, limits their chance of connecting with decision makers and understanding and accepting the rationality behind the rules and instructions. That is to say, to connect the rules of the NPCF with broader national policies. This increases the historical sense of alienation between the centre of the country, represented by Lima city where the head office is situated, and the Amazonian periphery as the margins where the NPCF offices and indigenous communities are located.

Considering the above, CLBs perform as brokers. They translate the formal but considered as illegible procedures of the NPCF to indigenous peoples. As brokers, they help communities mediate their relationship with the state, assisting with the accountability reports that they should be preparing. Considering CLBs as brokers highlights that the production and circulation of state documentation is more about creating evidence of state presence in rural Amazon, rather than assisting indigenous peoples as public policy users.

Being brokers, instead of gatekeepers, CLBs use their "field level position" to differentiate themselves from the headoffice in terms of their community-level expertise and knowledge on the state-indigeneity relationship. This sense of expertise informs their assessment that NPCF design is not suited to the local dynamics of indigenous communities. Thus, their resistance to the operation of the NPCF is not because of their incapacity to follow the rules, but because of their awareness of what they consider to be legible and illegible locally. In this way, the official PES logic of conservation as a trade for economic incentives and the

promotion of behavioural exchange, become secondary concerns in the daily practice of CLBs.

Regarding research question iii) about the state effects of the NPCF, I explored various state effects produced by the implementation of the NPCF programme, the state as environmental authority and the economic incentives.

Nonetheless of the conditionalities of the NPCF limiting the use of communal forests, it generates, for indigenous communities, a weak identification of the state as an environmental institution. The NPCF has not created increased local requests from indigenous communities to the state to strengthen the protection of their forests; for example, through demanding agricultural practices that reduce the extension of forest clearing. Still, with this programme, the indigenous population has adopted alternative interpretations of forest conservation as an asset that attracts future development opportunities. For these communities, the management of large areas of forests is now a condition that the state, and other external aid sources, requires in order to work with communities.

For Kichwa and Awajun *comuneros*, the relevance of the NPCF is not necessarily about reducing deforestation, but about keeping standing forests and learning bureaucratic procedures as the chance to connect with external actors, and potentially access their financial resources, establishing a political and economic rationale for forest conservation. In that sense, the state is not irrelevant for communities. There is a constant demand for the presence of the state in the communities that were studied, not as an environmental governance institution but as a source of development. As a conservation programme, the NPCF can still bring the state to the margins and create a relationship with communities based on new types of change.

Regarding the economic incentives, there are significant differences in the interpretations given to these payments, between the Kichwa and Awajun populations, that impact on the way that they perform as public policy users. Both groups interpret the NPCF's economic incentives outside their nominal environmental concerns. For the Kichwa, economic incentives are rewards from the state that need to be paid back, producing civic effects of reciprocity in the form of their diligent compliance with NPCF rules. Although of course there is a legal contract that mediates their relationship, their rights and responsibilities, the Kichwa make the effort for an adequate compliance of their duties.

In contrast, for the Awajun, the economic incentives are favours or tips, and as such, they do not need to be paid back. These two different forms of approaching the payments reveal the contrasting ways these Amazonian indigenous groups relate to the state. On one hand, the Kichwa try to maintain an enduring and dynamic relationship with the state. On the other, the Awajun also want to accept the presence of the state at the margins, but they do not mind periodically breaking and rebuilding their relationship with the state if they do not agree with its terms. The Kichwa frame themselves as *subjects of benefits* accepting state interventions to accept the presence of the state. The Awajun perform as *subjects of rights* sometimes defying the authority of the state but still accepting its presence as a source of payments because it is seen as bearing responsibility for making good on past wrongs.

These types of subjects reveal different ways of performing citizenship in which the customisation of indigeneity, commanding bureaucratic skills, is an opportunity to access the state. Indeed, the deviations from environmental awareness should be understood in the context of the strong component of accountability that the communities must present to the

state for managing the economic incentives for conservation and which these communities have embraced as needed skills. Indeed, the main state effect of the programme is the bureaucratisation of the communities, which aims at instilling an audit culture within indigenous communities to provide evidence of state interventions at the margins and turning indigenous peoples into auditable subjects. The state expects Amazonian indigenous peoples to perform as proper public policy users learning about the state bureaucratic apparatus and mastering administrative skills they do not have, but on which the state is not formally willing to instruct. The complexity of NPCF accountability reporting within communities is aligned to higher state bureaucratic procedures but fails to adapt to indigenous communities' structures and local skills. However, bureaucratisation is also accepted by *comuneros* as the transmission of necessary administrative skills to allow indigenous peoples to connect to the state.

The promotion of bureaucracy that the NPCF has reinforced in these communities implies a local sense of customising indigeneity to gain access to development opportunities. This means that indigenous peoples who command paperwork expect to better exercise their citizenship and enroll and implement development initiatives, even with the expectation of not depending on brokers. As such, further research could focus on expanding the idea of state bureaucracy as a technique of development and citizenship for indigenous peoples. The relevance of the bureaucracy is only learnt in constant interaction with the state and not outside of it. Likewise, these results also suggest the importance of exploring the efforts that indigenous peoples are making to customise their indigeneity to fit into state procedures.

The attempt to reconfigure this social relationship, in which these communities are unable to effectively manage the NPCF, is still reproducing the illegibility of the state at the margins and

the power that the state holds over Amazonian indigenous peoples (Allan and Walker, 2016; Das and Poole, 2004). The state interacts and negotiates the implementation of this conservation initiative in terms of legible documentation and an audit culture but misses the opportunity to work with the indigenous communities on conservation awareness skills and environmental education to prevent deforestation.

Beyond its environmental goals, the NPCF reveals a complex and tense form of engagement in the state-indigeneity relationship, one that operates between acceptance and resistance, legibility and illegibility. The participation of indigenous communities in the NPCF indicates an *instrumental* involvement which requires them to leverage their bureaucratic skills and increase their agency to present their political legibility to the state. They understand that environment (and development) initiatives promote bureaucracy or, in other words, that bureaucracy is a technique of development (Bakonyi, 2018; Ferguson, 1994).

Finally, the participation of indigenous peoples in bureaucracy means a subtle form of self-empowerment and increased political agency that can contribute towards the reconfiguration of indigeneity and citizenship as intertwined categories. Although the processes of appropriation of state bureaucracy by indigenous peoples may clash with their own language and social dynamics, they have shown their resilience and ability to adapt to bureaucratic demands to become legible subjects to the state, customising their indigeneity to exercise citizenship.

## Chapter 11: References

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