The London School of Economics and Political Science

The Revolt of the Generals: President Eisenhower and the United States Army, 1953-1958

Ken Letcher

A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, September 2021

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

I declare that my thesis consists of 96,608 words.

Statement of co-authored work

I confirm that no portion of this work was co-authored with anyone else.

Statement of inclusion of previous work

I can confirm that no part of this work was the result of previous study I undertook at any institution.

Statement of use of third party for editorial help

I can confirm that my thesis was not copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar.

Abstract

United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower served in office during a period of profound importance to the United States, its rise to military pre-eminence in the world, the reorganisation of the Department of Defence, the shift towards the Eisenhower administration's "New Look" national security strategy, and the maturation of the Cold War against the Soviet Union. Through unequalled strategic leadership, Eisenhower avoided a revolt by Army leadership from 1953 to 1958.

The discord exhibited by the Army's uniformed military leadership during this period represented a material breach of professional decorum between the senior uniformed military leadership of the Army and the elected and duly appointed civilian leadership of the Army and the United States. In avoiding this revolt, President Eisenhower side-stepped a crisis in civil-military relations, kept the United States at r0elative peace during his eight years in office, and buttressed the re-organisation of the Department of Defence, stemming from the National Security Act of 1947.

However, the ramifications of this discontent spilled over into the political elections of 1956 and 1958, ending with the defeat of Vice President Richard Nixon to Senator John F. Kennedy in 1960.

This thesis will examine the relationship of President Eisenhower, his "New Look" national strategy, and the uniformed military leadership of the United States Army as personified by Generals Matthew Ridgway, James Gavin, and Maxwell Taylor between 1953 and 1958. This thesis will emphasize three lines of inquiry: (1) the emergent disagreements between President Eisenhower and the U.S. Army, (2) how this dissonance developed, and (3) how the revolt was quelled by President Eisenhower.

This thesis is important because it will correct the historical record regarding the departure of Gavin, Ridgway, and Taylor from military service and explain how these three generals, plus Eisenhower, developed differently throughout their military career to the point of revolt in 1953.

The Revolt of the Generals:

President Eisenhower and the U.S. Army

1953-1958

Table of Contents

Introduction

President Dwight Eisenhower served in office during a period of profound importance to the United States, the country's rise to military pre-eminence in the world, the reorganisation of the Department of Defence, the shift towards Eisenhower's New Look security strategy, and the maturation of the Cold War against the Soviet Union. Through an unequalled strategic leadership, Eisenhower avoided a revolt by the Army leadership from 1953 to 1958.

The discord exhibited by the Army's military leadership during this period represented a material breach of professional decorum between the senior direction of the Army, as represented by the uniformed generals, and the elected and duly-appointed civilian leadership of the Army and the United States. In avoiding this revolt, President Eisenhower sidestepped a crisis in civil-military relations, kept the United States at relative peace during his eight years in office, and buttressed the reorganisation effort of the Department of Defence in 1958. However, the ramifications of this discontent spilled over into the political elections of 1956 and 1958, ending with the defeat of Vice-President Nixon in the presidential election of 1960.

This thesis will examine the relationship of President Eisenhower, his "New Look" national security strategy, and the leadership of the United States Army as personified by Generals Matthew Ridgway, Maxwell Taylor, and James Gavin between 1953 and 1958. It will emphasize three lines of inquiry: what Eisenhower and the Army leadership disagreed on, whether the future of war was nuclear or some type of limited war; why the friction emerged between Eisenhower and his Army; and how the differences were settled.

Nuclear deterrence was the cornerstone of the "New Look" national security strategy that Eisenhower adopted in the summer after his inauguration in January 1953. During his

inaugural address, Eisenhower commented obliquely on the radical scientific advances that, he thought, had changed the very nature of war and conferred on mankind "the power to erase human life on this planet."[1] However, Eisenhower also believed that a balanced budget and economic prosperity was key to the long-term success of the U.S. in its Cold War against the Soviet Union.

To maintain the fiscal solvency of the federal government after years of wartime budgets, Eisenhower understood that he must seek out compromises; the best defence for the best price became this strategic comprise. As a result, the largest ground component—and the least nuclear—lost in the appropriations process. The Army leadership failed to understand the strategic aspects and importance of nuclear deterrence but realized the impacts of losing the budgetary wars in Congress.[2]

Generals must exhibit tactical excellence to get promoted to the rank of general officer. They need to demonstrate this excellence through the leadership at the platoon, company, battalion, brigade, and regimental levels. While all Army officers find or create a different career path for themselves, commanding soldiers is the common denominator in all their experience. However, some leaders have less opportunity for such leadership, especially in combat operations, while others' careers are focused on this level. Often, this depends on the nation's external relations. U.S. officers during the interwar period, for

---

[1] Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. (Presidency.ucsb.edu, 2016) <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9600>, accessed 25 May 2016.

[2] See Iwan W. Morgan's *Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders': The Eisenhower Administration, The Democrats, and the Budget, 1953-1960* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), and Ingo Trauschweizer's *The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence through Limited War* (Lawrence, KS: The University of Kansas Press, 2008). Trauschweizer spends the first two chapters outlining the Army's diminished role in nuclear deterrence under the Eisenhower administration and their response to the nuclear battlefield and budgetary cuts. Morgan's work focuses specifically on the budgetary fights in the administration with Congress, but highlights the impacts on Defence Department's budget, "making cuts of 3.9 percent for fiscal 1954 and 3.6 percent for fiscal 1955." (p. 35).

instance, had far less opportunity for combat leadership at junior levels, and could only lead soldiers in combat after the onset of World War II.

As officers progress to senior levels, they then need to command at the operational levels of war before ascending to the strategic levels. This operational-level leadership invariably means the command of corps and theatre armies, or else in senior staff positions that deal with a wide-array of issues, oftentimes not merely combat- or Army-related. The strategic level involves considering national and international strategic or army-level objectives. For US generals, the key international-strategic positions after World War II involved the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations Forces in Korea, or Army-level billets, specifically the Chief of Staff or Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration.

As leaders promote and ascend the organisational ladder, they must move from personal, direct leadership at the tactical level to organisational or indirect leadership at the operational and strategic level. As leaders move out of the tactical and operational army (brigades, divisions, corps, and theatre army-level), they inhabit the institutional army that recruits, trains, educates, designs, and equips those tactical and operational units. At the institutional level, these leaders drive change across myriad factors, recognised as Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P). This construct enables the Army to ensure that it addresses institutional problems in a holistic manner, much like the tactical army uses mission variables (METT-TC) to address the mission, enemy, troops available, terrain and weather, time available, and civil considerations of a tactical problem set.[3]

[3] See Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, "Officer Personnel Development and Career Management," (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2019). Available online at https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN31964-PAM_600-3-001-WEB-3.pdf, accessed 23 February 2022. While this is the current publication for officer professional development in the U.S. Army, minus the new branches and career fields, the larger arc of a professional career holds true from World War II to now. Additionally, for discussion of Army professional development and officer career education

Each of the four generals discussed in the pages below chose different paths as they advanced through the ranks. While they all performed well at different levels and facets of military service, this thesis shows that Ridgway excelled at tactical and operational leadership, Gavin at tactical leadership and technological understanding, and Taylor in more academic and lower-level political-military venues. Only Eisenhower shone at all levels—tactical, operational, and strategic. Perhaps it was not surprising, therefore, that he also transitioned to the political realm and achieved success there, too.

When General Ridgway assumed his role as the Chief of Staff of the Army in the summer of 1953, after previously succeeding Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, he began his defence of the U.S. Army. This marked the start of the revolt of the Army leadership against President Eisenhower and the "New Look" national security strategy. The Army believed that the country had to be prepared to fight the limited wars that would erupt on the fringes of the Soviet-controlled world. With the United States Air Force now a separate branch of the Department of Defence, and demanding its own resources from Congress, the Army found itself in a fight for appropriations against a new service focused on strategic bombing—and an administration committed to nuclear deterrence as a strategy.

President Eisenhower possessed the unique ability to operate and lead at the strategic and political levels, while these three military professionals failed to succeed at the strategic levels within the global security environment. Each of the three senior leaders in the Army maintained a distinct tactical view of operations and warfare that inhibited their ability to debate successfully and defeat President Eisenhower and his administration's "New Look"

prior to World War II, see Peter Schifferle's *America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2017). Schifferle demonstrated the Army's focus on and the importance of officer education in the inter-war period and the indelible impact on the U.S. Army's performance and victory in World War II.

national security strategy.

From his time as the Commanding General of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force and as the Chief of Staff of the Army after World War II, President Eisenhower continued a pre-existing relationship with the general officers that led the Army during his two terms as President. However. Eisenhower's military education, when compared to the formative experiences of Ridgway, Gavin, and Taylor, could not have been more different. Ridgway, Gavin, and Taylor cut their teeth leading tactical brigades, divisions, and corps during World War II, while Eisenhower led an international coalition, operating within the political and strategic military spheres with the leaders of Europe.

These three leaders also failed to match the bureaucratic mastery of Washington political and Department of Defence processes that President Eisenhower exhibited through his "hidden-hand" leadership.[4] Whether it was in the meeting rooms of the National Security Council, conference hearings of the Congress, press briefings, or the bureaucratic actions of the U.S. Army, each of these three leaders failed—to differing extents—to equal President Eisenhower's expertise in at the strategic and political levels of war and government; quite simply, Eisenhower out-manoeuvred each of these three Army leaders. Their failures drove the three to individual forums to express their discontent with the "New Look" national security strategy: Congressional testimony, press briefings, speeches, and professional articles and books.

This research project provides new understanding of President Eisenhower and the U.S. Army because it delves beneath the surface of the relationships between Eisenhower and key leaders in the U.S. Army, while also elucidating the impact of those relationships on the military and its civilian leadership. These relationships were unlike any that had come

[4] Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency* (New York: Basic Books 1982).

before, partly because of the growth of the military-industry complex over the previous fifteen years, partly because of the international security environment of the 1950s, and partly because of Eisenhower's unprecedented experience of military and alliance command.

The term "revolt" might marshal thoughts of armed insurgency, especially when the topic at hand deals with the United States Army and American national security policy. However, this effort uses the term "revolt," meaning a "refusal to continue to obey or conform."[5] This connotation is not meant to detract from the seriousness of the Army's disobedience in the face of the changing national security strategy from President Eisenhower and his administration, rather this use of the term "revolt" is meant to align the Army's "revolt" in the 1950s with the Navy's Revolt of the Admirals of 1949.[6] This alignment, in turn, helps to place the seriousness of the Army's disagreements with the Eisenhower administration in perspective. While the Revolt of the Admirals spilled over publicly into Congressional hearings and the press, the Revolt of the Generals failed to garner as much publicity as its sister service's revolt.

The revolt of the Army leadership during the first five years of Eisenhower's presidency had various military, Congressional, and political ramifications. First, and foremost, from a military perspective, the discontent of the Army leadership with Eisenhower's strategy from 1953 to 1958 hindered the Army from the standard cycle of doctrinal and internal reviews that usually result from the end of a period of conflict. Additionally, the Army's continued debate over Eisenhower's strategy stiffened his resolve to complete the reorganization of the Department of Defence that he had helped begin after World War II. Lastly, the dissonance between Eisenhower and his Army leadership led to

[5] "Revolt: Meaning and Definition for UK English," *Lexico Dictionaries: English*, Lexico Dictionaires, Available at https://www.lexico.com/defition/revolt, accessed 21 February 2022.
[6] For a detailed discussion of the U.S. Navy's Revolt of the Admirals, see…

political ramifications in the 1956 and 1958 election cycles and helped the Democratic Party defeat Vice President Nixon in his bid to win the presidency in 1960.

This research project utilizes primary source material from three principal sources: the Eisenhower Presidential Library and Archives; the papers of the Chiefs of Staff of the Army during the Eisenhower Administration currently archived and available through the Army Heritage and History Centre in Carlisle, Pennsylvania; official papers of the Pentagon and National Security Council available at the U.S. National Archives; the National Defence University Classified Archives; the Naval Historical Centre Classified Archives; and the United States Military Academy Archives. It is essential to review the primary source materiel germane to the key individuals and leaders responsible for shaping national security and defence decisions in the time and understand the totality of their interactions in order to ensure that proper understanding of decisions, events, and the impacts of those decisions.

These collections were analysed not just for primary source documentation, but for interactions and correspondence with their peers, media, and leaders in both the business and government communities. President Eisenhower famously confided in his good, life-long friend, Swede Hazlett. While not every source has such a confidant, it is essential to understand with whom the principals corresponded, what notes they may have taken on the margins on their documents and speeches. For example, it is interesting to see Admiral Arthur Radford's notes General Ridgway's retirement manifesto to Secretary of Defence Charles Wilson; those notes are found in both the naval classified archives and in the National Archives Record Group 218. Additionally, key individuals, like Andrew Goodpaster provided key colour commentary to factual events through the publication of memorandums which documented meetings, engagements, and key interactions.

There are several related subjects that this study will inevitably touch upon, although

none are central considerations. The first is civil-military relations. These will be discussed at various points, but this project is not a case study of civil-military relations during the Eisenhower presidency. Even so, there will be a necessary discussion of leading civil-military relationship theories, Eisenhower and the Army leadership and its impact on civil-military relations.

Additionally, this project touches on the theory of limited war, insofar as it relates to the national security discussions of the Eisenhower administration. It will also discuss the cease-fire in the Korean War and its effects on national security policy and the U.S. Army. And it has relevance, too, for America's looming participation in Vietnam. To be clear, the pages that follow do not focus on Eisenhower's policy to the land wars in Asia. However, it is impossible to talk about the U.S. Army during Eisenhower's first administration without understanding their concerns and lessons learned from the Korean War. The same is also true in the last two years of Eisenhower's second term on Vietnam.

This project is crucial to the understanding of the Eisenhower presidency and, as such, contributes to the literature by focusing on a previously un-researched focus area. Also, this research develops a better the Eisenhower presidency, the New Look national security strategy and the relationship of Eisenhower to the Army leadership during a period of tremendous disruption. Lastly, this research will be of use to the U.S. Army and military historians, helping them to understand the relationship of the Chief of Staff of the Army to the civilian leadership for which they work.

This research effort demonstrates that the U.S. Army clearly revolted against President Eisenhower and his national security strategy as it called for an increased reliance on nuclear deterrence and a decreased reliance on ground combat troops across the globe. This revolt became manifest during General Matt Ridgway's term as the Army Chief of Staff

and continued through the tenure of General Maxwell Taylor; additionally Lieutenant General James Gavin was central to the revolt and to both of their periods as the Chief of Staff. There have been many myths surrounding all three of these famous generals, but the true that reveals itself is that of an Army in open revolt against its Commander in Chief during the formative stages of the Cold War.

The three main chapters focus separately on Generals Ridgway, Gavin, and Taylor and their revolt against President Eisenhower. Each chapter looks at the background and professional development of each leader, comparing and contrasting it to that of President Eisenhower and his military service. Then the chapters address how the three general officers manifested their differences with the Eisenhower administration and focus on the generals' attempts to strike a final blow at the administration as each moved into retirement.

Historiography

Despite the vast literature on Eisenhower, as soldier and as President, and despite the importance of his "New Look" strategy in understanding the Cold War during the 1950s, there is not a single study that explores Eisenhower's relationship with the army. This project fills this substantial gap. This thesis connects three main bodies of literature: Eisenhower's national security strategy, the writings of and about the Army leadership during this time, and the histories of Eisenhower and how his managerial and leadership abilities shaped the outcome of events during his presidency.

This research project will also use resources developed by and for the United States Army in the 1940s and 1950s in order to better understand the actions of Ridgway, Gavin, and Taylor. These doctrinal publications, focused on ensuring common understanding of concepts, ideas, and definitions were, and still are today in their current form, published and

provided to the force. These publications enable the historian to understand how leaders viewed problems and requirements and the tools and capabilities available to leaders at the time to solve those problems.

Eisenhower's New Look National Security Strategy

The "New Look" national security policy embodied how Eisenhower viewed national security and peace in the international security environment. The majority of the research for this portion of the project comes from the archives, however there are several secondary texts that served as a tremendous resource from which to understand the context of the environment for both Eisenhower and the leadership of the Army.

John Lewis Gaddis is probably the most well-known and authoritative source of Cold War history. Several of his works serve as respected works on the Cold War and the international security environment during the Eisenhower administration and the Cold War: *The Cold War: A New History* and *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*.[7] The key point that Gaddis makes in his chapter on Eisenhower, Dulles, and the New Look, is that the "New Look" national security strategy marked a sharp departure from "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," better known as NSC 68 and presented in 1950 as President Truman's national security strategy. Eisenhower commented on more than one occasion that the United States "cannot be strong enough to go to every spot in the world, where our enemies may use force

[7] John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies Of Containment (Oxford University Press 1982) and John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War (Penguin Press 2005).

or the threat of force, and defend, those nations."[8] Eisenhower viewed the national economy as one aspect of national security, among several; Eisenhower knew that "we must not destroy what we are trying to defend" by spending countless dollars on defence at the peril of other aspects of the nation and economy.[9] The New Look national security strategy, at its essence, portrayed Eisenhower's mental connection of "maintaining the security of the United States and the vitality of it its fundamental values and institutions."[10] This fundamental difference between NSC 68 and the New Look meant that the nation's leaders had to make difficult choices identifying the ways and means of maintaining national security.

While Gaddis was critical of the Eisenhower "New Look," and viewed it as a departure from the theory of containment, security strategies must be viewed through a realistic lens: did the strategy secure United States' national interests? On the whole, the Eisenhower administration policies did keep the United States safe. While the focus on nuclear retaliation at the expense of focus on lower-end armed conflicts may have contributed to the deepening involvement of the United States in the Vietnam conflict in the following two decades, the end result of the Eisenhower strategy was that the Korean War ended and the United States did not engaging in armed conflict after that. While this is a simplistic view of security, no strategy can be viewed or judged by timeless absolutes.

Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman's *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Policy* provides the most comprehensive analysis of U.S. national

[8] Eisenhower to Dulles, March 26, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File: DDE Diary, Box 19, "DDE Dictation Mar. 58).
[9] Eisenhower Press Conference, November 11, 1953, Eisenhower Presidential Papers.
[10] National Security Council Report (NSC) 5707/8, "Basic National Security Policy," June 3, 1957, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955-57, XIX*, p. 509. Also available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d120, accessed on 7 February 2022.

security policy during the Eisenhower presidency.[11] Bowie served as a policy planner in the Eisenhower administration; Immerman is a respected historian. Together they meshed superb research with an insider's knowledge to provide a wide-ranging account of the crafting of National Security Council 162-2, the foundational document of the New Look. However, the literature focusing on his presidential terms fails to address adequately the personal relationships that existed between President Eisenhower and the Army generals who served in the position of Chief of Staff of the Army, and other senior positions, during his administration.

The seminal work that established the efficacy of Eisenhower's leadership during his presidential administration was Fred Greenstein's The Hidden-Hand Presidency, published in 1982. Greenstein's analysis of the Eisenhower presidency ushered in a wave of scrutiny that better understood the masterful, behind-the-scenes leadership that Eisenhower employed. Specifically, Greenstein argues that Eisenhower employed five strategies as he manoeuvred in the political world: "hidden-hand leadership; instrumental use of language; the complementary strategies of refusing in public to 'engage in personalities but nevertheless privately basing actions on personality analyses; and the selective practice of delegation."[12] While Eisenhower's master-strokes of leadership may not have been evident, and definitely did not find their way to the pages of military journals or the public rooms of national security debate, Eisenhower set the national security stage through his public appearances and through his private meetings with his national security staff.

William I. Hitchcock's timely publication, *The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s,* provided a recent opportunity to re-look Eisenhower and his focus on

[11] Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War,* (New York and Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1998). NSC 162/2, "Basic National Security Policy," October 30, 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1952-54, II, p. 589.
[12] Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden Hand Presidency* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), p. 57.

international affairs.[13] Hitchcock presents the picture of Eisenhower of a measured leader, careful in his deliberations, intent on maintaining international order and coalitions, but personable in his relationships with the press and national and international leaders. It is this affable front which belied the steel below the surface, focused on maintaining peace in the world and improving the United States' economic standing. President Eisenhower reacted in stride to events like the Soviet Sputnik launch, the revolt of the Army through the publication of multiple leader memoirs, national events—integration, McCarthyism, etc.—and international events like the Suez crisis, Iran, Vietnam, and Korea.

Mara Oliva's chapter on "The Oratory of Dwight D. Eisenhower" investigates one of the major weapons that Eisenhower used during his presidency "to retain flexibility and manoeuvrability," which enabled the president "to implement what he believed were the right policies without compromising his standing among the American people."[14] Dr. Oliva provides supporting documentation to the works of Greenstein, Ambrose, and others who believed that Eisenhower purposefully displayed a folksy, simple speaking style but engaged in a war of words against the Soviet threat. While Eisenhower was successful in appealing to the American people, ultimately his style of downplaying threats in order not to alarm the public backfired against his Vice President in the presidential election of 1960.

Additionally, *Ike's Bluff*, Evan Thomas' masterful description of Eisenhower's view on nuclear deterrence and strategic leadership, serves as a tremendous resource to understand how Eisenhower implemented the New Look national security strategy and preserved the tenuous peace between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as the Cold War escalated on several fronts. However, *Ike's Bluff* and *Waging Peace* both fail to address the relationship between

[13] William I. Hitchcock, *The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018).
[14] Mara Oliva, "The Oratory of Dwight D. Eisenhower," *Republican Orators from Eisenhower to Trump. Rhetoric, Politics, and Society*. (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), Kindle Edition, p. 27.

Eisenhower and his generals, but that is not the focus of these books. Rather, the authors focused on the national security policy, Eisenhower's administration, and how Eisenhower implemented his strategy. Both *Ike's Bluff* and *Waging Peace* agree on the change in national security strategy; Bowie the policy planner had a front row seat from which he viewed Eisenhower reshape the national security discussion. Thomas takes a different tact, focusing not on the detached discussion of Bowie, but on President Eisenhower's ability to lead the nation through unchartered waters at the start of the Cold War.

Kenneth Osgood provides another modern perspective on the Eisenhower administration; detailing Eisenhower's global propaganda campaign in *Total Cold War: President Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad*.[15] Osgood focuses on depicting American economic and social freedoms juxtaposed against Soviet, Chinese, and other authoritarian regimes. Osgood is part of the literature that depicts Eisenhower as an active president, who indelibly left his mark on American national security issues, rather than the detached figurehead that Eisenhower was thought to be during the 1960s and 70s. Osgood's work is another in the post-revisionist canon concerning the Eisenhower administration.

As part of this post-revisionist Eisenhower canon, Iwan Morgan investigates another perspective, as; *Eisenhower Versus the Spenders* focuses on the Eisenhower administration's efforts to balance the federal budget and reduce expenditures and how those efforts impacted or shaped domestic and foreign policy. Morgan writes, "Defense expenditure was the subject of the longest running partisan dispute over the budget during the Eisenhower era."[16]

---

[15] Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: President Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2006).

[16] Iwan Morgan, *Eisenhower Versus "The Spenders": The Eisenhower Administration, the Democrats and the Budget, 1953-1960* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

Morgan's work points out that the "conduct of national security policy was guided by a sense of the economic limits of American military power."[17] Additionally—and critically, Morgan directly ties the Eisenhower administration's stance on fiscal prudence, Nixon's campaign, and the opportunities posed by the Kennedy campaign, focusing his last chapter on the campaign and the budget.

This research paper had to look at other memoirs, and archival sources, notably the memoirs of Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Eisenhower, *From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam*, which gives testimony to how the New Look was developed within the context of Eisenhower's relationship with the military.[18] His archives, which are still housed in the classified section of the Washington Navy Yard's U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command contain the contents of his daily log and detailed descriptions of meetings and discussions Radford had with military leaders regarding national security matters.

While much of the research for these portions comes from the archives, the two main sources outside of the archives were the historical sets of the *Foreign Relations of the United States*, which detailed National Security Council (NSC) meetings and the Department of Defence's Historical Series.[19] The NSC meetings were the one of the main forums through which Eisenhower and his administration showed their bureaucratic capability; it is through these meetings that one comes to understand the frustrating lack of bureaucratic competence by the Army's leadership. *Strategy, Money, and the New Look (1953-1956)* and *Into the Missile Age (1956-1960)* are the third and fourth volumes of the Department of Defence's

[17] Ibid., p. 51.
[18] Arthur William Radford and Stephen Jurika, *From Pearl Harbor To Vietnam* (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980).
[19] Richard M. Leighton, *Strategy, Money, And The New Look, 1953-1956,* and Robert J. Watson*, Into The Missile Age, 1956-1960*, were the two Department of Defence official histories that were used for context. Additionally, the Foreign Relations of the United States were also used. The FRUS documents are also available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments.

historical series and provided a thorough, and official, account of national security policy and defence planning issues during the Eisenhower administration. Both of these series provide "impartial" history of the national security processes from two different perspectives: the National Security Council and the Pentagon. These were invaluable for the context they provided without ulterior motive.

The Army Leadership, 1953-1958

Historians have not focused on the history of the U.S. Army during the Eisenhower administration for a multitude of reasons. First, and foremost, Eisenhower's strategic emphasis on national and international security issues—specifically nuclear war—of the emerging Cold War burned brighter than any service-specific issue. Eisenhower's military leadership record during World War II overshadowed future relations between Eisenhower and the services. Lastly, the interwar period, or lull, between the Korean and Vietnam Wars turned attention away from the military. However, there are three key texts on this topic and each has a different focus. Andrew Bacevich penned the leading work on this era, *Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army between Korea and Vietnam*. One of the striking characteristics of Pentomic Era is the discussion of the relationship between General Matthew Ridgway and President Eisenhower.[20] The other two works are more recent research efforts. Igor Trauschweizer's *The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War*, which focuses not on the interpersonal issues, but rather gives an extremely detailed rendering of the U.S. Army during the entire Cold War period.[21] Lastly, Brian Linn, *Elvis' Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield*, thoughtfully looked at the Army during this period,

[20] Andrew Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam* (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1986).
[21] Ingo Trauschweizer, *Maxwell Taylor's Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam* (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2019).

focusing on the dilemma of preparing soldiers and leaders for an atomic battlefield, juxtaposed against the changing landscape of a post-World War II Army.[22]

Bacevich's 1997 article, "The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-1955" serves as the basis for this section.[23] The article and this focused portion of Pentomic Era centre on the policy disagreements of Ridgway and Eisenhower in terms of Army involvement and support of the New Look policy. The key positive fact of Bacevich is that he drew from the personal papers of General Ridgway, even though he does cover already trodden ground regarding President Eisenhower and key national security meetings and individuals. Unfortunately, Bacevich stopped short of tying Ridgway to Gavin and Taylor in open revolt to the President, his administration, and his national security policy.

This failure to tie Ridgway together with Gavin and Taylor in open revolt to the New Look, leaves one with questions, especially in light of research regarding Gavin and Taylor during the same period. Jonathan Soffer's biography of Ridgway, *General Matthew B. Ridgway: From Progressivism to Reaganism, 1895-1995*, was published from his dissertation at Columbia University; Dr. Soffer did a quality job of building on Bacevich's discussion of Ridgway and Eisenhower. Soffer researched and published his biography on Ridgway and attempted to articulate a picture of a warrior and leader whose service stretched from World War I to a World War II memorial ceremony in Bitburg, Germany that Ridgway attended with President Reagan in 1985. In fact, one of Bacevich's main criticisms of the literature on Ridgway was that there was no defining biography of Ridgway; Soffer's work

[22] Brian M. Linn, *Elvis' Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2016).
[23] Andrew J. Bacevich, "The Paradox Of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, And The Challenge To Civilian Control, 1953-1955," *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 61, No. 3, 1997, and Andrew J. Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era* (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1986).

rectifies this gap in the literature.[24]

Soffer's biography treats Ridgway in an even-handed manner, but, like, Bacevich, Soffer refused to discuss the revolt of Ridgway, Gavin and Taylor, even though he does focus on Ridgway's dissent to the Eisenhower administration. This failure strikes even more pointedly because Soffer quoted Gavin as writing to Ridgway in response to Ridgway's post-retirement publication in the Saturday Evening Post as "having helped us gather momentum." However, Soffer inaccurately characterized Gavin's retirement as a resignation in protest over policy.

This is a common mistake. Another distinguished military historian, Brigadier General (Retired) John Brown, former director of the U.S. Army's Centre for Military History, also made the inaccurate declaration in his 2006 article, "Revolt of the Generals."[25] In this opinion piece, Brown attempted to locate the military discontent of the Donald Rumsfeld-led U.S. Department of Defence with the discontent or coordinated revolt of the Army leadership against Eisenhower's New Look security policy. What Brown does get right in his opinion piece is that Ridgway, Gavin, and Taylor—after they retired—wrote about their vision of national security policy and the Army's place in it. These books by Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew Ridgway*, Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, and Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, serve as stark examples of their focus in comparison to the strategic thinking of Eisenhower.[26] Unfortunately, Gavin's autobiography was never published, and the manuscript is not available, and has not been available for research for several years, due to a legal battle within the Gavin family.

---

[24] Jonathan M. Soffer, *General Matthew B. Ridgway: From Progressivism to Reaganism, 1895-1993* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Press, 1998). Quotation found on page 186.
[25] John S. Brown, "Revolt of the Generals," *Army*; Sep 2006; 56, 9.
[26] Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew Ridgway* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1956); James Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age* (New York: Harper, 1958); and Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper, 1960).

Dr. George C. Mitchell provides another example of the written history of General Ridgway in the form of his authorized biography, *Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen*.[27] Mitchell focuses his biography on the tactical and operational successes of Ridgway. Indeed, Ridgway was one of the most tactically and operationally successful military leaders of the U.S. Army in the 20th century. However, Mitchell failed to adequately address the strategic shortcomings of Ridgway during his time as the successor to General MacArthur as Commander in Chief-Far East (CINC-FE), the successor to Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and as the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army where he replaced General J. Lawton Collins.

An additional three books that serve as a map to understand Ridgway are Clay Blair's Ridgway's *Paratroopers and The Forgotten War: America in Korea*, Ridgway's *Korean War*, his memoir of his time in Korea, and Roy Appleman's *Ridgway Duels for Korea*.[28] This focus on the tactical-level thought processes and success that Ridgway enjoyed through the last ten years of his military career. However, Ridgway's tactical successes masked his issues at the strategic level.

Several of these issues are brought to light in Rosemary Foot's *A Substitute For Victory*.[29] Foot's analysis begins with the assessment that the Korean War had been forgotten because it came between the "good war" (World War II) and the "bad war" (Vietnam).[30] She provides insights into the American negotiations and the end of the Korean War, challenging assumptions of the Eisenhower administration's coercive diplomacy, and

[27] George C. Mitchell, *Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen* (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2002).
[28] Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War* (New York: Times Books, 1987); Clay Blair, *Ridgway's Paratroopers* (New York: Doubleday, 1985); and Roy Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for* Korea (College Station, Tx.: Texas A&M University Press, 1990).
[29] Rosemary Foot, *A Substitute for Victory*, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1990).
[30] Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," *Diplomatic History*, Summer 1991, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 411-431.

shedding light on the specifics of this forgotten history of the United States.

Two separate sources highlighted these issues: Field-Marshal Bernard Montgomery and Brigadier John Eisenhower. The notable historian and Montgomery biographer, Nigel Hamilton, spent an entire chapter in his comprehensive Montgomery biographical set on the Field-Marshal's tumultuous relationship with Ridgway.[31] Montgomery also related in his memoir, *The Memoirs Of Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery Of Alamein*, that he knew Ridgway would prove to be the wrong man for NATO and warned NATO and British military leadership not to accept Ridgway's appointment: "I knew him well; he had served under me as a Divisional and Corps Commander in the campaign in North-West Europe from Normandy to Berlin. I knew he was not the right man to succeed Eisenhower and I opposed the appointment, both to members of the NATO Council and to the British Chiefs of Staff."[32] Montgomery definitely resented Ridgway, as Hamilton writes, "the relationship between Supreme Commander and his Deputy was bound to be different—with Monty soon resenting the clipping of his wings by a man who had served under him as a Divisional and Corps Commander in World War II."[33] This resentment would not fade through the years, carrying on into Ridgway's tenure as SACEUR.

Montgomery bridled at the tactical focus of Ridgway on the armies of the NATO alliance; Ridgway admonished Montgomery for his outspoken criticism NATO military policies. Known for his brashness and outspoken tendencies, Montgomery did not mince words, as his diarist noted, regarding his thoughts on Ridgway as the SACEUR:

Ridgway had proved himself, though no doubt an excellent commander in

[31] Nigel Hamilton, *Monty: The Final Years of the Field Marshal, 1944-1976* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1986). This is the third volume in a three volume set: *Monty: The Making of a General: 1887-1942* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1981) and *Master of the Battlefield: Monty's War Years 1942-1944* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1984).
[32] Bernard Law Montgomery, *Montgomery of Alamein, The Memoirs Of Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery Of Alamein* (Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing Co, 1958), p. 515.
[33] Hamilton, *Monty*, p. 822

> battle, to be quite incapable of fulfilling his present role. He lacked the touch, and had failed to understand the immensity of the problem which faced us. He was incapable of relating economic possibilities to military requirements. His continuous bleating for more and more forces, without any idea of how they were to be maintained over an indefinite period, was doing immense harm. He was unwilling to listen to advice.[34]

John Eisenhower's *Soldiers and Statesmen: Reflections of Leadership*, published in 2012 just before his death in 2013 looked at case studies of many of the leaders of World War II from the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of the Allied Force.[35] To his credit, Eisenhower admitted that his perspective was decidedly biased and subjective, based on his relationship and ties to his father.[36] John Eisenhower, the son of President Eisenhower, himself a retired brigadier general turned military historian, wrote that "Ridgeway's [sic] tour as SACEUR was less than a howling success. Outside of his forte, combat leadership, he lacked the art of diplomacy, and by many reports was not particularly popular."[37] Unfortunately, this claim by Eisenhower is rather poorly documented; he cited a confidential estimate by British Brigadier Sir James Gault. However, this sentiment seemed to represent the prevailing attitude of military and diplomatic leaders toward Ridgway. While the claim may not be conclusive based on the citations, much like Ambrose' work, these sentiments give one a sense of the man and helps one understand what was thought of Ridgway—his capabilities and his shortfalls.

The additional literature surrounding Ridgway's career either focuses on his tactical and operational successes, as is the case with then-U.S. Army Major Joseph Kurz' monograph for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College's School of Advanced Military Studies Program, "General Matthew Ridgway: A Commander's Maturation of

[34] The Papers of Field-Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, Diary, part 28.
[35] John S.D. Eisenhower, *Soldiers and Statesmen: Reflections on* Leadership (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 2012).
[36] Ibid., p. xix.
[37] Ibid., p. 146.

Operational Art" or are written or co-written by General Ridgway, himself.[38] The most prominent of these histories is his memoir, co-written with Harold H. Martin, which they titled, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*. This work was published in 1956, shortly after Ridgway left office as the Army Chief of Staff. The memoir initially surfaced as a serial in *The Saturday Evening Post* in January of 1956 and brought to public light the major issues between President Eisenhower and the Army, led for the previous two years by Ridgway.[39] Unfortunately, the tactical and operational successes of Ridgway have, through the years, overshadowed his failures at the strategic level.

Lieutenant General James Gavin is another military leader who helped control his own narrative. Gavin's seminal work, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, served as his penultimate voice in the dissonance of the U.S. Army against Eisenhower's "New Look" national security program.[40] Additionally, Gavin, like Ridgway, before him, and Taylor, after him, published several books which helped to define his thoughts on the Army, its role in national security, and the tactical successes which he enjoyed as a senior leader in the Army. Like Ridgway, monographs and articles from the military perspective focus on Gavin's tactical successes, and, like Ridgway there is a mythos in the Army surrounding Gavin. Specifically, the building that houses the 82nd Airborne Division Headquarters in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is named "Gavin Hall," memorializing one of the founding fathers of the 82nd Airborne Division. Unfortunately, the biographies of Gavin are focused on his tactical successes. Bradley Biggs, one the authors, stated as much in his preface when

[38] Joseph R. Kurz, "General Matthew B. Ridgway: Commander's Maturation of Operational Art," The Association of the U.S. Army Land Warfare Papers; Sep 2012; No. 90W. Available at https://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/ilw_pubs/landwarfarepapers/Documents/LWP_90W_web.pdf, accessed 25 May 2016.
[39] Matthew B. Ridgway as told to Harold H. Martin, "My Battles in War and Peace," *Saturday Evening Post*; published in four serials from 21 January 1956 to 25 February 1956. Available in both the Eisenhower Presidential Papers and the Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, Box 90, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Centre, Carlisle, PA.
[40] Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age*.

he remarked that these are not neutral accounts of a beloved military leader.[41]

General Maxwell Taylor ultimately controlled his own narrative, just like Ridgway and Gavin, through the publication of his seminal work, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, which castigated and dismissed the "New Look" national security policy of the Eisenhower administration. Additionally, Taylor published his memoir, *Swords and Plowshares*, which gave prominence to his views on military and political issues over the policies of the Eisenhower administration.[42] Taylor is unique, however, because his son served as his biographer and, like, John Eisenhower's biases, John Taylor's views are tainted, as well.[43]

Unlike Ridgway and Gavin, however, historians recently have criticized Taylor's strategic leadership ability and performance. Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster criticized Taylor's counsel to President Johnson concerning the Vietnam War in his book, *Dereliction of Duty*.[44] Likewise Thomas Ricks, a modern military commentator, criticized Taylor, in his 2010 book, *The Generals*, calling Taylor "politicized and dishonest."[45] While the author does not qualify this statement, based on this and other current works by the author, this statement is meant to be qualified within the context of American military history. There are some recent efforts to look into the military of the 1950s, and, specifically, Maxwell Taylor. Ingo Trauschweizer's recent research on Taylor provides a measured and balanced historical accounting of Taylor, *Maxwell Taylor's Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam.* However Dr. Trauschweizer's work focused on Taylor's prominent career after his time as the Army Chief of Staff and first retirement from the Army, but it does offer a brief synopsis

[41] Michael T. Booth and Duncan Spencer, *Paratrooper: The Life of General James M. Gavin* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994) and Bradley Biggs, *Gavin* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1980).
[42] Maxwell Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, and Maxwell Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1972).
[43] John M. Taylor, *General Maxwell Taylor: The Sword and the Pen* (New York: Bantam Books, 1989).
[44] H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1997).
[45] Thomas E. Ricks, *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to* Today (New York: Penguin Books, 2012).

of Taylor's military service and focused on the disconnect between a military leader advising on strategy and policy.[46]

Eisenhower's Strategic Leadership

As the American people elected Eisenhower to a second term in 1956, the anti-Eisenhower narrative started to gain steam from both academic and political writers. Columbia University historian Richard Hofstadter was one of the first to comment negatively on Eisenhower, describing the President in his book, *Anti- Intellectualism in American Life*, as having a "conventional" mind and "fumbling inarticulateness."[47] During his Eisenhower's second term, the diplomatic historian, Norman Graebner, wrote that the president was returning the United States to a period of "New Isolationism," and concluded shortly before Eisenhower left office that the president's supporters had "measured his success by popularity, not achievements."[48] Samuel Eliot Morison's criticism of President Eisenhower in the *Oxford History of American People*, published in 1965, stands as one of the most retold stories of the criticism of Eisenhower's presidency. Morison wrote, "Peace and order were not restored abroad; violence and faction were not quenched at home." Eisenhower famously responded to this criticism, writing in the copy he received, "The author is not a good historian…In those events with which I am personally familiar he is grossly inaccurate."[49] Lastly, political scientist and noted presidential scholar, Richard Neustadt spent over half of his 1960 book on presidential power, *Presidential Power: the Politics of Leadership*, to discuss the inept tenure of Eisenhower's eight years in office.[50]

President Eisenhower, after he left office, started to stem the tide of the anti-Eisenhower narrative as he published his memoirs, *The White House Years*. Additional memoirs by close associates like White House Chief of Staff Sherman Adams's *Firsthand Report* and Attorney General Herbert Brownell, *Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell*, helped to give credence to the notion

---

[46] Trauschweizer, *Maxwell Taylor's Cold War.*
[47] Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism In American Life* (New York: Knopf, 1963), p. 3.
[48] Norman A Graebner, *The New Isolationism* (New York: Ronald Press, 1956), p. ix.
[49] Samuel E. Morison, *The Oxford History of the American People* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 1079-1106, and note card, "Virginia and Holmes Tuttle to DDE regarding Morison book," dated May 4, 1965, 1965 Principal File, Eisenhower Post Presidential Documents, DDE Library.
[50] Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: Free Press, 1990).

that Eisenhower was firmly in charge of the White House and the United States during his eight years in office, rather than a pawn of political and economic leaders in the country. However, neither historians nor political memoirs effectively countered the narrative of ineptitude until almost twenty years after Eisenhower left office.[51] Indeed, Eisenhower, even though he loved playing golf, and was often chided as being an absent leader who preferred the quiet solitude of the golf course, played excellent chess within the realm of foreign policy strategy.

The Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum opened for research in 1966 and the National Archives began releasing countless administration documents. IN 1972, Herbert Parmet published his study, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades*, based on these newly available documents; scholars note Parmet as one of the first historians to use this new trove of documents to suggest that Eisenhower actually accomplished more during his eight years in office than most had previously given him credit.[52] This trend continued in the early 1980s, as Fred Greenstein published what some consider the landmark work on Eisenhower's leadership during his presidency, *The Hidden-Presidency: Eisenhower as a Leader*. Greenstein wrote that Eisenhower "was once assumed to have been a well-intentioned political innocent, but he emerges from the historical record as a self-consciously oblique political sophisticate with a highly distinctive leadership style."[53] While this research paper assumes that Greenstein is correct in his analysis, Greenstein infuriated presidential historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who commented that Greenstein was "a nice fellow—but his thesis these days— Eisenhower the Activist President—is a lot of bullshit."[54]

---

[51] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961* (New York: Doubleday, 1965); Adams, Sherman, F*irst-Hand Report: the Story of the Eisenhower Administration* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1961); and Herbert Brownell, *Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell* (Lawrence, Ks.: University Press of Kansas, 1993).
[52] Herbert S. Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades* (Milton Park, U.K.: Routledge, 2018).
[53] Greenstein, *Hidden-Hand Presidency*, p. 9.
[54] Arthur M Schlesinger, Andrew Schlesinger and Stephen C Schlesinger, Journals, 1952-2000 (Penguin Press 2007), p. 514.

As the 1980s continued, so did the re-affirmation of Eisenhower as a military leader, president, and strategist. Although his work is spoiled by a scandal of his own making, Stephen Ambrose called Eisenhower "the American of the twentieth century. Of all the men I've studied and written about he is the brightest and the best."[55] This continued re-affirmation of Eisenhower as a tremendous leader and president continues today; scholarly presidential surveys routinely place Eisenhower in the top ten of American presidents in terms of effectiveness. *The Times* published a 2008 ranking of American presidents in terms of greatness; Eisenhower placed sixth of the 42 presidents ranked.[56]

Many diplomatic and military historians have written about President Eisenhower and different facets of his life and military and political careers. Not only have historians and politician scientists written biographies and consuming books of Eisenhower's presidency, a multitude of research efforts exist that discuss singular episodes or issues of his time in office: civil rights, the Suez Crisis, the Cold War, the military industrial complex, and the Space Race. The current literature on Eisenhower focuses mainly on two key areas: his military leadership during World War II and his presidential administration.

The history of his military leadership focuses on his strategic command during World War II, his relationship with his fellow senior leaders of the American Army, and his growth and development as an officer under the tutelage of senior Army leaders. However, no current issue-focused research project on Eisenhower focuses on his time as president and his relationship with the U.S. Army during his tenure in office. It is this hole in the research that this effort fills, correcting the historical record regarding the departure of Gavin,

[55] Stephen E Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), p. 164.
[56] Jeremy Griffin and Nico Hines, ""Who's the greatest? The Times US presidential rankings," The Times (London), October 28, 2008; as cited from <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historical_rankings_of_Presidents_of_the_United_States#cite_note-18>, accessed 25 May 2016.

Ridgway, and Taylor from military service and explaining how these three generals, plus Eisenhower, developed differently throughout their military career, culminating in the revolt of the Army in 1953.

Since Tim Rives exposed Stephen Ambrose's faulty citations in 2010, there has been a resurrection in Eisenhower scholarship.[57] Jean Edward Smith published a new biography of Eisenhower, in 2013, which focused on Eisenhower's 20 years of strategic leadership as the Commanding General of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) through his two terms as president. Smith wrote an excellently researched book, praising Eisenhower:

> Yet with the exception of Franklin Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower was the most successful president of the twentieth century. He ended a three-year, no-win war in Korea with honour and dignity; resisted calls for preventive war with the Soviet Union and China; deployed the Seventh Fleet to protect Formosa from invasion; faced down Khrushchev over Berlin; and restored stability in Lebanon when sectarian violence threatened to pull the country apart.[58]

This research efforts strives not to be a hagiography of Eisenhower, attempting not to praise Eisenhower or bury him. Rather, this effort seeks to understand the interplay between the Army in response to the policies and actions of the Eisenhower administration and discuss Army's insurgency against the Eisenhower administration.

However, Eisenhower, one of the most successful strategic military leaders in modern history, could claim success during his presidency not just within the international arena, although he believed there was "no alternative to peace."[59] Eisenhower firmly shaped the domestic agenda of the United States: he appointed Governor Earl Warren of California to fill the vacancy as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; he successfully enforced critical

[57] Richard Rayner, "Channeling Ike," *The New Yorker*, April 26, 2010; Available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/04/26/channelling-ike, accessed 25 May 2016.
[58] Jean Edward Smith, *Eisenhower* (New York: Random House, 2012), p. xii.
[59] Ibid.

civil rights court decisions by deploying the U.S. Army in Little Rock, Arkansas, he "punctured the Roosevelt coalition, weaned the Republican party from its isolationist past, restored the nation's sanity after the McCarthyite binge of Communist witch-hunting, and proved unbeatable at the polls."[60] Additionally, during his farewell address to the nation, Eisenhower took time to warn the public of the dangers of the military industrial complex. While Eisenhower did not charm the American public as his successor, John F. Kennedy, did, President Eisenhower navigated the United States through a turbulent domestic and international time period that is often overlooked for the decades that both preceded and succeeded it—a decades of war and, for the 1960s, social upheaval that threatened the fabric of American society.[61]

Unfortunately, not all of the contemporary literature on Eisenhower has been of the quality as Smith's. Conservative British historian Paul Johnson published a relatively short biography of Eisenhower in 2014, succinctly named, *Eisenhower*.[62] Irwin Gellman, in his work, *The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952-1961*, criticised Johnson for basing his work entirely on secondary sources.[63] While Johnson does not cover any new information, his work is at once accessible and readable, extolling the perspective of Fred Greenstein that Eisenhower, was a careful, thoughtful leader with exquisite strategic and political inclinations.

It is no secret that Eisenhower was an avid card player; bridge was his game of choice and he was a master at the bluff. Evan Thomas uses this device to bring Eisenhower's ability

---

[60] Ibid.
[61] John Lewis Gaddis, "He Made It Look Easy: 'Eisenhower in War and Peace,' by Jean Edward Smith," *The New York Times*, April 20, 2012; Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/books/review/eisenhower-in-war-andpeace-by-jean-edward-smith.html, accessed 25 May 2016.
[62] Paul Johnson, *Eisenhower* (New York: Penguin Books, 2012).
[63] Irwin F. Gellman, *The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon,1952-1961* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2015), Kindle Edition, Location 77 and Paul Johnson, *Eisenhower*.

to keep America out of war with the Soviet Union during the first years of the Cold War into focus in his book, *Ike's Bluff*. While Thomas does not focus much on domestic matters, he makes clear that Eisenhower, the national leader, was on a level equal with Abraham Lincoln, "Lincoln went to war to save the Union. Eisenhower avoided war to save the world."[64] Thomas postulates that Eisenhower's "ability to save the world from nuclear Armageddon entirely depended on his ability to convince America's enemies—and his own followers—that he was willing to use nuclear weapons. This was a bluff of epic proportions."[65] The bluff, as Thomas calls it, was Eisenhower's key to avoiding World War III with the Soviet Union in a period packed with international crises— Formosa, Hungary, and Suez. Only Eisenhower, through his strategic understanding of domestic and international affairs, could successfully navigate that strategic landscape.

Another secondary source that highlights the bureaucratic and managerial leadership shown by Eisenhower is the compendium of academic essays presented at the Eisenhower Symposium at Gettysburg College in October 1990. These pieces were edited and published by Shirley Anne Warshaw under the title, *Reexamining the Eisenhower Presidency*.[66] Warshaw holds the Harold G. Evans Chair of Eisenhower Leadership Studies at Gettysburg College; as such, she embodies one of the country's foremost authoritative sources on presidential leadership, specifically Eisenhower's presidential leadership skills. Bradley H. Patterson, Jr.'s essay, "Eisenhower's Innovations in White House Staff Structure and Operations," served as a tremendous resource to understand the managerial and bureaucratic leadership and understanding that enabled Eisenhower to revamp the White House

[64] Evan Thomas, *Ike's Bluff : President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World* (Little, Brown and Co 2012), Kindle Edition, Location 5673.
[65] Ibid., location 186.
[66] Shirley Anne Warsahw, ed. *Reexamining the Eisenhower Presidency* (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1993).

organizational structure and succeed where others had stumbled.[67]

Irwin Gellman's recent book, *The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952-1961*, focused on the relationship between Eisenhower and Nixon provided a primer on the historical literature of Eisenhower; Gellman spends considerable time in the preface on Eisenhower before focusing on Nixon.[68] This introduction proved crucial to understanding a tremendous amount secondary source literature on Eisenhower and his presidency and helped serve as a guide to understanding a historical biography of a partnership. This biographical history of the relationship between Eisenhower and Nixon enabled an understanding of the research and source material on Eisenhower and the leaders of the U.S. Army that this paper examines.

Civil-Military Relations

While this research effort provides an historical review of the relationships of Ridgway, Gavin, and Taylor with President Eisenhower and his administration, it is necessary to understand the concept of civil-military relations in order to better understand why the dissonance between the U.S. Army and President Eisenhower created a crisis. There are two hallmarks in the literature: Morris Janowitz and Samuel Huntington. Samuel Huntington published *The Soldier and the State* in 1956; Morris Janowitz published *The Professional Soldier* in 1960.[69] These two scholars have dominated the debate in civil-military relations since academic discussions on civil-military relations in the United States began; that debate in terms of Janowitz and Huntington is a debate of the extent of the

[67] Bradley Patterson, Jr., "Eisenhower's Innovations In The White House Staff Structure And Operations," *Reexamining the Eisenhower Presidency*.
[68] Gellman, *The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952-1961*.
[69] Samuel P Huntington, *The Soldier And The State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957) and Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Free Press, 1960).

connection or disconnect between the military, its civilian leadership and the society which it serves.

While these two serve as seminal American theorists in civil military relations, there exists another, more modern, scholar in civil military relations: Peter Feaver. Although Feaver provides another, decidedly American-centric perspective on civil-military relations, his thesis in *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* uses agency theory to look at the relationship between the military and their civilian leaders. His theory considers how agents (the military) react to the direction of principals to do what the principals (the civilian leadership) wants. As a political scientist, tests his theory by analysing a variable, in this case, the level of monitoring by the civilian (principal).[70] Feaver's work has quickly become a modern classic, offering a critique of Huntington and his own analytic theory of civil military relations.

Eliot Cohen, in his classic, *Supreme Command*, superbly put Janowitz and Huntington's theories together to analyse the four historical case studies in wartime leadership that he offered.[71] While this paper will not provide an in-depth review of the civil-military case studies, in line with Cohen's work, it is necessary to understand the American political system and civil-military relations in order to put Ridgway, Gavin, Taylor and their actions in context vis a vis their revolt against the Eisenhower administration's agenda and stated policy.

[70] Peter Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).
[71] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: Free Press, 2002).

Conclusion

While the canon of Eisenhower literature is long, complicated, and inhabited by multiple eminent scholars, no one has looked specifically at Eisenhower and his army chiefs. This thesis fills this gap. Specifically, it examines the strategic leadership of Generals Ridgway, Gavin, and Taylor, their shortcomings as they led the Army during this period and the impact, in the context of the civil-military relationships of the U.S. defence and political systems.

This research effort positively contributes to the historiography through connection of the actions of Generals Ridgway, Gavin, and Taylor in a concerted effort or revolt against the Eisenhower administration's strategy of nuclear deterrence as articulated in the New Look Strategy. This revolt constitutes a crisis in civil-military relations and highlights the inability of the Army to modernize in the 1950s in the face of a change to the character of war. Additionally, this effort corrects multiple previous misconceptions, namely that Generals Ridgway and Taylor resigned in protest. It is important for the historical record to represent the truth and not be mis-remembered.

Grouping these leaders in revolt, or coordinated dissonance against one of the greatest strategic military leaders in history, providing their actions context, and analysing the impacts of their actions in the latter half of the Eisenhower administration will be of tremendous value to military historians, civil-military relations scholars and diplomatic historians. In addition to using American sources, as has been done before when examining the professional lives of each of these, this research will seek fresh perspectives from America's biggest ally, Great Britain.

While the revolt ultimately failed to dislodge Eisenhower's New Look from its perch as the national military strategy, the revolt did have an impact on national political stage as it

set the conditions for the defeat of Vice-President Nixon as he ran to succeed President Eisenhower. This effort makes this connection through primary source research from the archives of the President Kennedy National Library.

While vast, the canon of literature and research into Eisenhower and his presidency is not complete. Historians must continue to research Eisenhower's military and presidential leadership in order to better understand the post-World War II and early Cold War period as we seek to understand where we are as a nation and as global community.

PART ONE

General Matthew B. Ridgway:

Soldier, Leader, and Strategist?

CHAPTER ONE

Ridgway: Education of a Soldier

As General Matthew Ridgway prepared to leave the headquarters of the Supreme Allied Command in Marlais, France, and take over as the U.S. Army's Chief of Staff, there was no better general officer positioned to be the senior military leader of the U.S. Army. General Ridgway had known tactical and operational successes on the battlefields of Europe during World War II as the Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne Division and, later, the 18th Airborne Corps and, in Korea, as the Commanding General of the 8th Army, turning the tide of dejected U.S. and Korean forces and beating back the North Koreans and Chinese.[72]

In many respects, however, General Ridgway would find the battlegrounds of Washington, D.C., and the Pentagon to be tougher than any battlefield in Europe during World War II, on the frozen tundra of Korea, or the capitals of Europe during the early days of the Cold War. Although accustomed to the tactical and operational rigours of war, he would soon find himself in the middle of strategic conflict for the soul of the United States' defence establishment. Newly elected President Dwight D. Eisenhower intended, "to keep the minimum respectable posture of defence whilst emphasizing this particular [nuclear warfare] offensive capability."[73] In essence, President Eisenhower envisioned a shift in national defence strategy and a savings in defence spending by focusing on nuclear warfare to deter the

[72] For more information on General Ridgway's career and work, specifically in Korea, there are multiple works that focus on his operational leadership during Korea and World War II. Specifically, see Harold Winton, *Corps Commanders of the Bulge: Six American Generals and Victory in the Ardennes* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2007*)* and Roy Appleman*, Ridgway Duels for Korea* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1990*)*. The bottom line with works focused on Ridgway's tactical and operational-level leadership is that he was a soldier and leader with few peers, able to relate to soldiers, and lead units to victory or back from defeat.

[73] Bacevich, A.J., "The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-1955," *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 61, No 2 (Apr 1997), p. 313.

Soviet Union from warfare rather than fielding a wartime Army to deter the Soviets.[74] In his remarks upon his swearing as the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ridgway focused on the "integrity of the military profession" and naively aimed to prevent a pre-ordained defence strategy, urging civilian leadership to "scrupulously respect" the honestly expressed views of responsible officers."[75]

* * *

The tactical and operational successes of General Ridgway's units were legendary. As popular Korean War historian, T.R. Fehrenbach described his command time in Korea, "In 1951, after six months of being battered, the Eighth Army in Korea rose from its own ashes of despair…no man who saw Lieutenant General Matt Ridgway in operation doubts the sometime greatness of men."[76] Fehrenbach continues, "under General Ridgway's hammering, the Eighth Army took the offensive within thirty days. After 25 January it never again lost the initiative."[77] Retired Lieutenant Colonel Roy Appleman, the official military historian of the Korean War, was even more direct, writing, Ridgway "alone made the difference in keeping the American Army in Korea, gradually turning it around to face north once again and to emerge as a strong, motivated fighting force in the Chinese 4th and 5th Phase offensives in the winter and spring of 1951."[78] Whilst the success of Ridgway in combat in Korea was to be expected and solidified the reputation that he established leading the 82nd Airborne Division during World War II, it

[74] For more information on the Eisenhower Administrations' New Look National Security Strategy, see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, specifically Chapters Five, "Eisenhower, Dulles, and the New Look, p. 127-163, and Six, "Implementing the New Look," p. 164-197, (Oxford University Press, Revised Edition, 2005) and Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (Oxford University Press, 2000).
[75] Bachevich, p. 312.
[76] Fehrenbach, T.R., *This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness*, (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 438.
[77] Ibid, p. 440.
[78] Roy E. Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea, p. xiv.*

would be the last time that Ridgway would lead soldiers in combat and the last time that Ridgway would hear the accolades of his military accomplishments.

But the frozen battlefields of Korea were not the site of his first wartime successes. General Ridgway served as the Commanding General of the legendary 82nd Airborne Division and the 18th Airborne Corps during World War II, including the famed airborne operations of Operations Overlord (the D-Day invasion of Normandy) and Market Garden (the Allied attempt to attack through the Netherlands and encircle the industrialized Northern Germany).[79] In February 1942, the Army assigned General Ridgway to the 82nd Airborne Division as General Omar Bradley's Assistant Division Commander, and Ridgway rose to command the division in June, after Bradley's reassignment to the 28th Infantry Division. General Ridgway completed the training and readiness of the division for their operations in Africa, Sicily, Italy, and France. Shortly after Operation Overlord, in August 1944, the Army assigned General Ridgway to command the 18th Airborne Corps.

After the war, General Ridgway served in multiple short-term billets at the strategic level but away from troops: Deputy Supreme Allied Commander-Mediterranean, U.S. Military Representative to the United Nation's Military Staff Committee in London, Commander of U.S. Forces in the Caribbean, and, lastly, as the Deputy Chief of Staff of Administration for the Army's Chief of Staff General Lawton Collins. The unifying threads of these assignments were the lack of direct leadership over U.S. Army soldiers and units, multiple personal and

[79] For more information on Operation Market Garden, please see Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command* (Washington, D.C: Center for Military History, 1989) available online at www.history.army.mil/html/books/007/7-1/CMH_Pub_7-1.pdf; accessed 21 September 2021; Charles Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952); Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe (*New York: Doubleday, 1948); Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, *Normandy to the Baltic* (New York and London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1947), and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "Second World War 60th Anniversary, Operation Market Garden, Netherlands, 17-25 September 1944: The Allies attempt to establish a bridgehead into Germany," Available online at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/attachment_data/file/30056/ww2_market_garden.pdf, accessed on 20 August 2021.

philosophical disagreements with stated U.S. policy, and a disdain for the political realities and requirements of positions in strategic leadership representing the United States. However, the late 1940s/immediate post-war period began to highlight Ridgway's split with civilian and political leadership, although he did begin to understand the dangers of nuclear warfare, the threat posed by the Soviet Union, and the frustrations of the U.S. Army soldier in a peacetime or garrison environment.[80]

Ridgway, as the Deputy Chief of Administration, basically ran the Army daily for General Lawton Collins, the Army's Chief of Staff, and a classmate of Ridgway's at West Point. But he spurned the Pentagon discussions of technology and the "marvels of future combat," focusing, instead on the importance of the American soldier. The American soldier, Ridgway, thought would make the difference in any future war: "We won't win just because we have the best gun. We must also have the best man behind that gun—one far superior to his individual enemy in intelligence, discipline, alertness and toughness of spirit."[81] After just over a year in the Pentagon, Army Chief of Staff, General Lawton Collins, notified Ridgway three days before Christmas in 1950 that General Walton Walker had died in a car crash and that he would immediately become the new 8th Army commander. This was the command that Ridgway had coveted and been waiting for since the end of World War II.[82]

[80] Of note in Ridgway's Memoir is the fact that he sees it necessary to "digress" as he begins Chapter 17, discussing his time on the U.N. Military Staff Committee, lamenting the "shameful dissolution of the American military forces which took place in the years immediately after the war—the precipitous demobilization which robbed us of the strength that would have added power and meaning to our voice in the councils of the UN." This digression sets the stage immediately after Ridgway's successes in World War II to begin his disagreement with the civilian political leadership of the military on myriad issues, unless, as Ridgway states on page 172, that a document he submitted, as confirmed to him years later by Dean Acheson, "became basic guidance in the formulation of U.S. policy, thereafter altered."

[81] "The Role of the Army in the Next War," address to the Armed Forces Staff College, February 15, 1950, delivered as "The Moral as to the Physical," to the Fourth Annual Industry-Army Conference, New Orleans, Louisiana, February 27, 1950, Ridgway MSS, Box 15.

[82] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 193-198.

In fact, General Douglas MacArthur, then the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command-Korea, gave General Ridgway his full support, responding to Ridgway's question about whether MacArthur would support an attack by the United States' Eighth Army rather than continued withdraw, "Do what you think best, Matt. The Eighth Army is yours."[83] This began what many consider to be one of the best displays of wartime leadership, as Ridgway transformed the Eighth Army from a formation that was in retreat to a confident fighting force capable of taking the fight to the enemy.[84] Historian Michael Schaller, wrote of Ridgway:

> they [the Chinese] credit him with identifying their logistic weakness and employing air and artillery attacks in limited counteroffensives that devastated the ranks of the People's Volunteers. By avoiding the grandiloquent rhetoric and strategy of MacArthur, Chinese military historians admit, Ridgway broke their offensive power.[85]

General Omar Bradley remarked that, "it is not often in wartime that a single battlefield commander can make a decisive difference. But in Korea, Ridgway would prove to be the exception. His brilliant, driving, uncompromising leadership would turn the tide of battle like few generals in US military history."[86]

Ridgway's leadership, which changed the course of the Korean War, centred on four key items: care for his soldiers, holding leaders accountable, focusing on the offensive, and setting the personal example in all these for everyone. Roy Appleman relates a description from Corporal Randle Hurst, who was a member of General Ridgway's security element,

---

[83] Ibid., p. 152.
[84] Fleming, Thomas, "The Man Who Saved Korea," History Net, Winter 1993. https://www.historynet.com/man-saved-korea.htm, accessed 15 January 2021.
[85] Schaller, Michael, Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General, (New York: Oxford, 1989), p. 228, citing an unpublished paper by Jonathan Pollack of the RAND Corporation entitled, "The Korean War and Sino-American Relations."
[86] Blair, Clay, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953,* (New York: Times Books, 1987), p. 721. Also, see Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*. Lt. Col. Roy Appleman, the military historian for the Korean War, lays the turnaround of the Eighth Army plainly on Matt Ridgway and his leadership.

"Obviously, the General is a great go-getter. He doesn't smoke and stand the smell of tobacco. He is extremely courteous to enlisted men. He expects the same in return."[87] Ridgway, as he visited the forward headquarters in Seoul, remarked that he was disappointed that only a handful of officers were present in the command post, whilst the majority were in Taegu, over two hundred miles from the front, "a situation I resolve to remedy at once."[88] General Ned Almond, commander of the X Corps, replied back to Ridgway's query as to Almond's attitude, shortly after they met in a hasty conference in December 1950, "Attack on your orders." This was exactly in line with Ridgway's intent and Ridgway told the X Corps commander that, "That's what I want to hear."[89] Lastly, Ridgway chose to set the example for his leaders and formations in everything he did, from carrying a rifle, wearing a helmet, wearing his battle suspenders with grenades affixed, to leading from the front and personally risking his life in leading his soldiers. Ridgway detailed this philosophy in his memoir:

> A commander must have far more concern for the welfare of his men than has for his own safety. After all, the same dignity attaches to the mission given a single soldier as to the duties of the commanding general...All lives are equal on the battlefield, and a dead rifleman is as great a loss, in the sight of God, as a dead general. The dignity which attached to the individual is the basis of Western civilisation, and that fact should be remembered by every commander, platoon or army.[90]

This philosophy, whilst not truly religious, served as the basis for Ridgway's personal leadership and differentiated him from Eisenhower and General Maxwell Taylor. This personal leadership and philosophy served as the core ethos for the change in the Eighth Army's fortunes in Korea.

---

[87] Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea, p. 9. Appleman quotes from Corporal Hurst's letter to his parents, dated 1 January 1951.
[88] Ridgway, *Soldier,* p. 204.
[89] Quoted from Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, p. 12. Appleman used Almond's diary and his interview with General Almond on 23 November 1954 as sources for this conversation.
[90] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 98.

It is not difficult to understand how Ridgway succeeded at the tactical and operational levels in Korea. This fight and this command was tailor made for his skills as a combat leader. General Ridgway's focus, as he made his personal reconnaissance of the front lines, epitomized the basics of the military profession and combat: understanding the terrain and enemy, the use of firepower, supply, and leadership.[91] Another famous anecdote about Ridgway comes from one of these reconnaissance missions along the front lines. As a Marine unit was marching by one of the Marines carrying the unit's radio called out to his fellow Marines to tie his boot for him, as it was untied. Ridgway hesitated for a moment, but then quickly moved to where the Marine was and tied his boot for him. Showmanship or tactical leadership or probably a little of both, this anecdote along with his front-line reconnaissance missions and his history in combat before this show the tactical leadership that made Ridgway one of America's best combat leaders.

Korea was the battle and the command for which Ridgway had spent his adult life preparing for; this fight highlighted his ability to relate to his soldiers and focus on the essence of warfighting. Key to Ridgway's leadership efforts in Korea was re-establishing the morale of the Army in Korea:

> Restoring Eighth Army morale, "a force without a name," was of high priority in Ridgway's objectives. Without it he could accomplish little…It did not come suddenly, in one fell swoop, but was the result finally of a patient, consistent, plan of action aided by the undefined strengths that emanated from his own character.[92]

This change in direction of leadership should have come as no surprise to anyone who knew or had served with General Ridgway previously; he was an uncompromising military leader who did not know how to lose. In fact, one of his first orders was for the Eighth Army to stop

[91] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 204-207.
[92] Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea*, p. 145.

its withdraw south. General Levan Allen, the Eighth Army Chief of Staff "reminded" General Ridgway that the Eighth Army was still operating under a directive from General Walker, "to withdraw south in phase lines until the military situation stabilised." Allen later recounted that Ridgway simply replied to him, "Well, we are going the other way."[93] In *Soldier,* Ridgway also recounts the personal reconnaissance he conducted after meeting General Allen, remarking first, "there is no substitute for personal reconnaissance," and shortly thereafter, "Wars are fought, though, where armies face each other, and it was the will of God that here we should meet our enemy."[94] This personal reconnaissance provides direct contrast to the practice of future commander, Maxwell Taylor, to have leaders brief him after patrol, and it was this personal courage and determination as a leader that drew soldiers to Ridgway as a combat leader.

As Ridgway and the reinvigorated Eighth Army changed the course of the Korean War, President Truman had decided to fire General MacArthur and promote General Ridgway to his fourth star and into the role of theatre commander. General Ridgway immediately struck a tone that separated him from his predecessor.[95] Whilst Ridgway did not spend much time in his memoir on this chapter of his life, the major difference between him and MacArthur was

[93] Appleman, Ibid., p. 8, Appleman quotes from his 15 December 1953 interview with General Allen. In, *Soldier*, Ridgway also recounts that he told President Rhee of South Korea, "I am glad to be here. And I've come to stay." This brevity of strength and determination was a calling card of Ridgway's leadership and determination in command.
[94] Ridgway, *Soldier,* p. 204.
[95] Whilst Ridgway only spends 10 pages in his memoir, p. 221-231, on this command and chapter of his life, he treats his time as the Theatre Commander as a rather dull episode, minus the initial meeting between himself and General MacArthur and his ability to get another paratrooper story into the end of the chapter as he describes his stoic support of the flight crew during a long flight to Hawaii enroute to Europe. Others have described General Ridgway's lackluster performance at the strategic level. See James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume III 1950-1951, The Korean War Part One*, available online at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Policy/Policy_V003_P001.pdf, accessed 21 March 2021; Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and the Fighting Front* (U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1992) available online at https://history.army.mil/html/books/020/20-3/CMH_Pub_20-3.pdf, accessed 21 March 2021; Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea: 1950-1951, They Came from the North* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2010); and Rosemary Foot, *A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks.*

the way they approached their service. "Ridgway," wrote sociologist Morris Janowitz, "epitomized the fighter spirit and sought to keep it alive for organizational ends, rather than for personal honour"—in other words, a complete contrast to the heroic individualist that General MacArthur had become.[96] Ridgway acted in concert with this orders from Washington, D.C. and the Pentagon, a concept that sometimes seemed anathema to General MacArthur.[97]

Whilst much has been written of Ridgway's personal leadership and the change in direction of the Eighth Army, an assessment of his time as Commander in Chief of the Far East is much more difficult to render. In fact, the public persona of Ridgway as the soldier's general, in contrast to General MacArthur, coupled with his quick rise from Commanding General of the Eighth Army to CINC-Far East and short tenure in both jobs (less than 18 months from his arrival in Korea on Christmas Day, 1950, to his arrival in Paris for his next assignment as Supreme Allied Commander-Europe) hinder a qualitative assessment of General Ridgway as the theatre commander in the Far East. Ridgway faced his share of issues whilst negotiating with the Chinese, principally his deep dislike of the Chinese and his failure to adapt to the political world of settlement negotiations. Additionally, there are myriad outside issues intertwined with his time as CINC-FE: failed attempts by the U.S. Department of State and Secretary Marshall to get more troops from more countries, the outsized firing of General

[96] Janowitz, Morris. *The American Soldier*, p. 162. For additional discussion and reading, see James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume III 1950-1951, The Korean War Part One*, available online at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Policy/Policy_V003_P001.pdf, accessed 21 March 2021; Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and the Fighting Front (U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1992) available online at https://history.army.mil/html/books/020/20-3/CMH_Pub_20-3.pdf, accessed 21 March 2021; Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea: 1950-1951, They Came from the North* (University of Kansas Press: Lawrence, KS, 2010); and Rosemary Foot, *A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).

[97] James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume III 1950-1951, The Korean War Part One*, available online at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Policy/Policy_V003_P001.pdf, accessed 21 March 2021. Message, CINCFE (Commander in Chief, Far East), X 60410, "Prevention of World War III," to CG, Eighth Army, et al., 19 April 1951, DA IN 3486.

MacArthur, the relative infancy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff process, and the general cultural ambivalence associated with the U.S. and the war in Korea.[98]

To say the least, General Ridgway's final act as Supreme Commander-Far East did not end as well as his opening act as the Commanding General of the Eighth Army. His leadership during the striking turnaround of the field Army stands in marked difference to the end of his tour--stalled truce talks and a prisoner uprising that took American Brigadier General Francis Dodd hostage. This was the first time that General Ridgway had been thrust into this quasi-political world, and he failed to adapt and grow into the role, acting much like the paratrooper and infantryman that he was, urging his superiors to not surrender and having his work heavily audited by his higher command—the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That said, Ridgway was the soldier and leader that General MacArthur failed to be; Ridgway's military leadership enabled the situation on the ground to lead to the settlement table.[99] However, the calm that Ridgway felt on the battlefield and the success that he encountered in the tactical fight, gave way to the stalemate at the negotiating table and the fury of not completing the negotiations with the Chinese before he left command.

Of note, though, was General Ridgway's stark contrast of right and wrong and his unshakable belief that he, as a warrior of democracy, held the moral high ground. This view started to emerge towards the end of World War II and shortly thereafter, as General Ridgway

---

[98] See Rosemary Foot, *A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks;* Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and the Fighting Front;* James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume III 1951-1953, The Korean War, Part Two; and* Allen E. Goodman, ed., Negotiating While Fighting: *The Diary of Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean Armistice Conference.*

[99] Soffer, Jonathan, *General Matthew B. Ridgway: From Progressivism to Reaganism, 1895-1993*, p. 134-147. Soffer offers a more insightful look at Ridgway's actions during the truce talks. For a more in-depth look, several works provide detailed analysis: Hermes, *Truce Tent*; *Foot, Substitute for Victory*; Allen E. Goodman, ed., Negotiating While Fighting: *The Diary of Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean Armistice Conference* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institute Press, 1978).

dealt with the Soviet Communists, then the Chinese Communists, in an almost religious manner, unwilling to compromise. As he remarked of them in March 1951:

> The average American's objectives, his national characteristics—one of his greatest is impatience for meeting a reached decision. To do something it must be accomplished in a minimum of time, usually by the most direct approach. Not the Oriental, not the Slav at all. There is a timelessness about his objective which makes it difficult just to deal with him. He is willing to change his tactics innumerable times completely reversing his approach, biding his time, which wouldn't make much difference as I see it from Communist China's point of view if she has to sit there months, six months, nine months, one year, if she could ultimately be sure of the destruction of our forces.[100]

Such moral certitude might be required of a warrior, but it did not serve General Ridgway well as he moved from the purely military world to the political realm as the Supreme Commander-Far East. As General Ridgway recounts in his memoir, watching the Korean evacuation of Seoul south of the Han River and instructing the war correspondents the next day, "I told them that what we had seen here was one of the great tragic dramas of our times, a revelation stark and unmistakable of the terror which fills the hearts of men and women when they are faced with life under Communist control."[101] This stark contrast between good and evil, of right and wrong, with General Ridgway firmly in the camp of the good and right would become ever more prevalent as General Ridgway left the tactical and operational battlefields of Europe and Korea behind for the political-military battlefields of the Pentagon and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

After his short time in Korea, characterized by the dichotomy of his unrivalled tactical and operational military leadership in Korea and his unskilful leadership of as the Supreme Commander-Far East, General Ridgway was again on the move, this time back to Europe. General Ridgway replaced General Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Europe; General Ridgway would face the daunting task for developing the North Atlantic

[100] Ridgway press conference tape transcript, March 12, 1951, Ridgway MSS Box 17.
[101] Ridgway, *Soldier,* p. 213.

Treaty Organization (NATO)'s nascent defensive force. In this new position, Ridgway found himself working again with Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, although this time Montgomery would serve as Ridgway's Deputy Commander. Previously, during World War II, Montgomery had served as the Commanding General of the 21st Theatre Army Group, whilst Ridgway served as the division commander of the 82nd Airborne Division during the invasion of Normandy, known as Operation Overlord. Ridgway's short tenure at SHAPE would prove to be complicated, as he focused on ground soldiers and produced mixed results at the operational and strategic calling of NATO's senior military commander in the early stages of the Cold War.

General Ridgway's time in Europe as the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Europe, would be marked by the same tension between the general's penchant for tactical and operational warfighting, disdain for the politico-military aspects of the strategic command, his fervour for being on the side of right and of good against evil, and his inability to strike compromise. Unfortunately, General Ridgway followed General Dwight D. Eisenhower into the position in Paris, when General Eisenhower retired to run for president. Although General Ridgway was General Omar Bradley's choice to succeed Eisenhower, he was not General Eisenhower's choice.[102] Whilst General Ridgway was well-regarded in military circles, and *Newsweek* described him "as a fighting leader that was surpassed, among Army men on active duty, only by Eisenhower and General Omar N. Bradley," the French press was not as

[102] General Bradley had been appointed as the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had a favorable viewpoint of General Ridgway, specifically his military successes in Europe and his past politico-military assignments, although the difficulties during the Korean Truce negotiations weighed on that discussion. General Eisenhower favored General Al Gruenther, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, friend, and bridge partner. For documentation see Ridgway MSS Box 18, Beishline letter to Ridgway, not dated; Beishline to Ridgway, March 29, 1952; New York Times, April 28, 1952; and, Jonathen Soffer interview with General Andrew J. Goodpaster, June 24, 1994. Copy available at the Columbia University Oral History Research Office.

impressed, reporting that even though General Ridgway "mesmerizes listeners with his dagger-like eyes," he was not like Eisenhower or Greunther—an "international type."[103]

During the initial meeting between Generals Eisenhower and Ridgway in Paris, prior to their change of command ceremony, not only did General Eisenhower lay out for General Ridgway upcoming decisions that the new Supreme Commander would have to make, but General Eisenhower also gave General Ridgway an overview of the political environment of NATO, pointing out that the position "required not only military knowledge, but a great amount of diplomacy, a consummate tact in dealing with touch problems that had their roots in Europe's ancient hatreds."[104] General Ridgway recalls that General Eisenhower then went through the military and political leaders of Europe with whom General Ridgway would be dealing, "In a masterly series of vignettes he described the character and the attitudes of each, told me the ones I could trust implicitly, and those whom he felt I could not trust. It was an appraisal of men and their motives which proved invaluable to me in the months that followed."[105] This remark, however, provides a key insight into the difference between General Ridgway and his predecessor, as General Ridgway continues, "In only one case, as I came to know these men, did I feel that his evaluation had been in error. One French statesman whom General Eisenhower felt to be unworthy of trust in all his relationships with me proved forthright, honest, and completely dependable."[106]

[103] *Newsweek*, May 5, 1952 and *Le Monde,* May 23, 1952. Whilst this compliment played well in the American press, it served to create difference between Ridgway and Eisenhower (and Gruenther, who for all intents and purposes was seen as an heir to Eisenhower). Both Eisenhower and Gruenther were internationalists, who listened to America's allies and partners and tried to achieve a political balance in military reality. Ridgway did not care much for that balance, reasoning that his was a military mission. Ridgway was a soldier; Eisenhower and Gruenther were seen in a more political light by the Europeans.
[104] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 237.
[105] Ibid., p. 237.
[106] Ibid., p. 237

Ridgway never felt the political comfort that Eisenhower enjoyed with the leaders of Europe: Truman's status as a lame duck president in 1952 undermined Ridgway's authority with the Europeans and Eisenhower's election elevated General Gruenther's status rather than Ridgway's.[107] Maybe it was General Ridgway's political naiveté, but the French proved to be the most ardent disparagers of General Ridgway's tenure as the Supreme Allied Commander in Paris. A noted journalist, Constantine Brown, reported in March, 1953, "Ridgway is regarded in some influential political quarters in Paris as the man principally responsible for stressing the slowness of the allies' preparedness effort."[108] The French wished to see one of their own as the leader of NATO forces and the nationalist elements in France did much to push this agenda, but Ridgway failed to function at the political and strategic nature of his position.[109] Whilst General Eisenhower easily moved among the capitals in Europe, charming the political elite and press of Europe in peace as he had during World War II, General Ridgway found this task anathema to him, choosing to focus on what he knew—the military aspect of the command.[110]

The choice of Supreme Allied Commander marked a definitive change from General Eisenhower, but the spring and summer of 1952 was also a period of change in both the NATO organizational structure and European politics, increasing the complexity of the changing dynamics in the European military theatre. First, on May 26, 1952, The Bonn-Paris accords were signed, essentially ending the Allied occupation of western Germany, and establishing West Germany as a sovereign nation. Second, on May 27, the Treaty of Paris, although it was

---

[107] Memorandum of conversation between Rene Pleven and General Gruenther, November 15, 1952, Eisenhower Presidential MSS, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 16, Gruenther Files, Eisenhower Library. Rene Pleven, a French politician, asked Gruenther, instead of Ridgway, for President-Elect Eisnenhower to stop in Indochina on his way to visit Korea.

[108] Brown, Constantine. *The Evening Star: Washington, D.C.,* "French Want Ridgway Home: He is Too Tough for Politicians; Not Only that He tells them the Awful Truth," March 18, 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower Archives, Box 30.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Ridgway, *Soldier,* p. 240.

not ratified, called for the creation of a multinational European military force, the European Defence Community (EDC).[111] Whilst these political changes were not well received by the Soviets and many Europeans, because these changes called for the rearmament of West Germany, and the rearmament of West Germany would change the balance of power in Europe for years to come. In May 1952, General Ridgway found himself literally in the middle of Paris, "propagandizing to a hostile French public" about the need for the European Defence Community and a rearmed West Germany.[112]

And the NATO structure was changing as well. The original treaty in1949 called for the twelve signatories to conduct joint military planning, but the organization needed to mature into a full-fledged political and military body, with a civilian-political structure with permanent representatives from the member nations and a Secretary-General who served as the neutral arbitrator between the Allies. Whilst this structure might have initially seemed to favour General Ridgway's strengths, enabling him to focus on the military tasks, rather than the political or social tasks, rather this focus enabled General Ridgway to push aside the inherent political realities of the position and attempt to focus on merely the military duties of improving the collective defence of Europe, attempting to recapture the glory of his tactical and operational successes of Europe during World War II and Korea. Not only did he fail to understand the political realities of his new position, but he failed to understand its impact on United States' diplomacy, having been warned by the U.S. Department of State that "several

[111] The Treaty of Paris, whilst it was not ratified, would have created a European Defence Force, but served as a pre-cursor to Germany's admission to NATO. For further reading on the EDC, please see Fursdon, Edward. *The European Defence Community: A History* (London: Macmillan Press, 1980);
Judt, Tony, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (London: Penguin Press, 2005),* also available online at https://archive.org/details/postwarhistoryof00judt/page/n7/mode/2up, accessed 20 August 2021; and
Ruane, Kevin. *The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defense, 1950–55* (London: Palgrave, 2000).
[112] Pelletier, George Eugene, "Ridgway: Trying to Make Good on the Promises," in R. Jordan, ed., *Generals in International Politics: NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1987), p. 69.

governments have suffered opposition attacks for having been too susceptible to U.S. influence, and these attacks don't come exclusively from Communists."[113] General Ridgway discussed his focus writing, "it was my job to translate promises into deeds, to collect on these I.O.U's, these pledges to provide men and guns, planes and tanks, and money, for a European defence force." However, General Ridgway "was acutely aware…that NATO's military needs caused serious political, economic, financial, and social stresses within the member nations. But if NATO's basic objective, the maintenance of a ready force sufficiently strong to deter aggression, was to be attained, these stresses, would have to be resolved."[114] In essence, General Ridgway viewed the Lisbon Conference Agreement of 1952 as the political agreement to which he was assigned as the military commander, and, much as he did during his time as the Supreme Commander in the Far East, he complained of the political process and slowness of the NATO Council in coming to decision and obstinately held to his view as collector on the agreements made between the Allies in Lisbon. General Ridgway failed to understand or embrace the art of persuasion and his role as military leader in a strategic, political situation that required more than a paratrooper's directness and an infantryman's tenaciousness.

Whilst NATO forces never reached the agreed upon force levels of Lisbon, General Ridgway did improve the collective defence of Europe. In his memoirs, he ticked off the accomplishments in a purely technical, military manner:

> noticeable improvement in the command structure, in planning, and in the combat effectiveness of our troops. Communications had improved. So had the distribution of jet fuel and high-octane gas for planes, and gasoline and other fuels for tanks, vehicles, and self-propelled guns. We could expect that improvement to continue. The growth of land forces had been encouraging, although not satisfactory.[115]

[113] Memo by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Secretary of State (Acheson), May 21, 1952, *Foreign Relations 5 (1952-4),* 298.
[114] Ridgway, *Soldier,* p. 240-243.
[115] Ibid., p. 243.

However, General Ridgway did acknowledge his political challenges, describing the challenge of leading the NATO force, "the purely military considerations became inextricably entangled with political, economic, and psychological factors, some of which were beyond the ken of the soldier."[116] Whilst Ridgway understood the military problem of NATO well from a tactical and operational perspective, he never fully understood the political problems, complaining "the problems here are myriad and more complex than any I have ever encountered. Not only do they have their roots in the governmental institutions of member nations, but those roots draw upward into the problems themselves all the age-old international distrusts, suspicions and aspirations."[117]

General Ridgway faced opposition in Europe on multiple fronts, as he spoke his truth to both military and political leaders. First, and foremost, his bluntness to the Allies in Europe made him few friends and may not have positively contributed to the effort. One vignette General Ridgway recounts deals with the defence or Denmark:

> …the Danes seemed to feel themselves in the most hopeless position. They felt that NATO's troops were too far away to come to their help in the event the Russians should attack from their zone of Germany. Nor were there any natural obstacles to impede their progress…I admitted frankly that their position was exposed. I reiterated my determination to defend…However, I pointed out with equal frankness that the best thing they could do was to make every possible effort to defend their own homes and hearthsides…The philosophy was sound, but I don't think the Danes have yet put it in practice. They would not even permit us to put our air squadron on a Danish base, to help in their defence if needed. And so far as I know we have not yet gotten permission to base planes there.[118]

U.S. News and World Report reported in March 1953 on this break between General Ridgway and the European Allies.

> New troubles are showing up in European defence progress. They are behind the current snipping at General Ridgway. He's caught in a gossip campaign. Complaints are made that he's too blunt, too undiplomatic, in too much of a hurry. Real target is

[116] Ibid., p 246.
[117] Ridgway to General Mack Clark, July 30, 1952, Ridgway MSS, Box 23.
[118] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 248.

> not Ridgway. It's the North Atlantic Alliance. Communists are out to wreck it by any means they can find.[119]

Whilst the authors provided no evidence that the Communists were behind the campaign, the article detailed several reasons for the break with our allies: opposition in France, the paper defence force of NATO, changes in customs, and Soviet failure to make "headway" against NATO in the early 1950s. Whether this campaign was irregular warfare waged by the Soviets in the press and political capitals of Europe cannot be corroborated, but those listed reasons were also detailed in an article by Constantine Brown of the *Evening Star* earlier in that month, "There is no doubt that our French friends—particularly the politicians—would welcome departure of the Supreme Commander, whom they consider too tough."[120] Ridgway would later recount that, even though his problems, as the NATO military commander, were primarily military, all "had strong political overtones."[121] Indeed, Ridgway faced his share of political adversaries in Europe—Soviet communists, the separate and distinct countries that made up NATO each with separate and collective histories—but, he may have also faced political adversaries from within the command. Of note, Field Marshall Montgomery and Ridgway were rivals and teammates, but Ridgway's running of the NATO headquarters, focusing on American officers at the expense of European officers, and discontinuing additional staff practices that President Eisenhower had instituted when he first came to the NATO military command.[122]

However, the Communists and French were not the only ones concerned with the job that General Ridgway was doing in Europe. Secretary of Defence Charles Wilson's initial

---

[119] *U.S. News and World Report*, "Ridgway Target of Communists: They Would Like to Force Him from Europe," March 23, 1953. Dwight D. Eisenhower Archives, Box 30.
[120] Brown, Constantine. *The Evening Star: Washington, D.C.,* "French Want Ridgway Home: He is Too Tough for Politicians; Not Only that He tells them the Awful Truth," March 18, 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower Archives, Box 30.
[121] Ridgway, S*oldier*, p. 246.
[122] *U.S. News and World Report*, "Ridgway Target of Communists: They Would Like to Force Him from Europe," March 23, 1953. Dwight D. Eisenhower Archives, Box 30.

recommendation to President Eisenhower, dated March 19, 1953, did not call for the appointment of General Ridgway as the Army Chief of Staff, in fact, Secretary Wilson wrote, "I have assumed that it is not desirable at the present time to move either Ridgway or Clark."[123] However, President Eisenhower was not satisfied with Ridgway's performance in Europe, and he was resolved to make General Al Gruenther—his friend, bridge partner, and former Chief of Staff—the Supreme Commander in Europe. General Omar Bradley wrote, "the opportunity to kill three birds with one stone…With his prestige, background and energy, Ridgway would be an inspiring Chief of Staff. If he got overzealous, as he tended to, Eisenhower would be right there to restrain him."[124] Thus, as Bradley recalls, "Ridgway was kicked upstairs to the highest uniformed position in the Army.[125] Regardless, Ridgway had proven his inability both in Korea and Europe to excel at the political aspects of the position, but the American people and the Army's soldiers embraced Ridgway's leadership, style, attitude, and history of winning in combat.

After only thirteen months in Europe, General Ridgway was named Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. Whilst he had enjoyed tactical and operational successes on the battlefields of Europe and Korea, his new position serving on the political battlefields of Washington, D.C., in the Pentagon, would prove to be one of the least rewarding jobs for this seasoned officer, culminating close to 38 years of uniformed service in a forceful denunciation of the Eisenhower strategy of nuclear deterrence to the Secretary of Defence Charlie Wilson.[126] General Ridgway looked back on his time in Europe and Chief of Staff of the Army shortly after his retirement in 1956, "the vexations and frustrations I encountered in Europe, though they were many and

[123] Letter dated March 19, 1953, Secretary of Defence Charles Wilson to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Top Military Announcements," DDE Archives, Box 30.
[124] General Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 659.
[125] Ibid., p. 659.
[126] Des Moines Register, Ridgway Archives, Box 96.

great, were in no way comparable to the vexations, the frustrations, the sheer travail of spirit which were my final lot in my two year tour as Chief of Staff."[127]

This criticism should have taken no one by surprise. General Ridgway's entire career, especially his two year-term as the Army's Chief of Staff was marked by his prioritization of the soldier, eschewing technology, air power, artillery, or naval forces. Ridgway believed that he had learned a great lesson in his time after World War II as a military advisor to the United Nations, developing a formula for post-war peace in Europe, "that in the world today there can be no peace that is not based on strength."[128] From his time as the Commander of the Eighth Army in Korea, Ridgway learned:

> Hope of peace rests solidly on strength for war…(Korea) shattered...the dreamy eyed delusion which possessed the minds of many then---that the threat of nuclear weapons alone could keep the peace and…the nebulous faith that war, even a little war, could be won by air and naval power alone."[129]

Just as American military historian, T.R. Fehrenbach wrote, in This Kind of War:

> You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, and wipe it clean of life - but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman Legions did—by putting your soldiers in the mud.[130]

Ridgway felt that these lessons learned on the battlefields of Europe and Korea would serve him well as he rose to the head of America's finest fighting force. However, in reality General Ridgway was as ill-prepared for the battlefields of the Pentagon and Washington, D.C., as the American Army was for the initial stages of the Korean War.

---

[127] *Saturday Evening Post,* January 21, 1956, p. 46.
[128] Ridgway, Matthew B., "My Battles in War and Peace," *The Saturday Evening Post*, 21 January 1956, p. 18.
[129] Ibid., p. 18.
[130] T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: The Classic Military History of the Korean War,* Kindle Edition, Location 6577.

CHAPTER TWO

Ridgway and Eisenhower: The Old Soldier versus the New Look

In the summer of 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower summoned the incoming Chairman and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for a month-long tour and discussion of the future of American National Security Policy.[131] The invitation, sent from outgoing JCS Chairman General Omar Bradley, indicated that the President wanted his new chiefs to visit several installations together. These facilities focused on the nuclear strategy and included Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratories and Strategic Air Command in Omaha, Nebraska.[132] This trip would give the Chiefs the opportunity "to get the feel of the situation on the ground," as General Ridgway believed. It was clearly valuable to the group that would implement a dramatic, strategic shift in U.S. military strategy.[133] This trip, and the following conference with the Joints Chief of Staff aboard the USS Sequoia, should have served to ensure communication and consensus building amongst the military leadership, as was President Eisenhower and Admiral Radford's intent.

In August 1953, Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford attempted to pull a page from President Eisenhower's book as he gathered the national security team, including the Joint Chiefs aboard the USS Sequoia. President Eisenhower had asked Secretary of Defence Wilson to have the newly appointed members of the Joint Chiefs examine five facets of U.S. national security strategy:

a. Our strategic concepts and implementing plans,
b. The roles and missions of the services,
c. The composition and readiness of our present forces,

[131] Records Group 218, Records of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Box 23, Invitation from General Bradley on behalf of President Eisenhower to Admiral Radford, incoming CJCS, and incoming Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Ridgway, *Soldier* (Harper 1956). p. 267.

d. The development of new weapons and weapons systems and resulting new advances in military tactics, and
e. Our military assistance programs.[134]

After the joints chiefs had toured the U.S. in July 1953, Admiral Radford decided that the best way for him to get the chiefs to discuss and agree on a way ahead was to sequester them from the daily tedium that already inundated the newly appointed chiefs in their service leadership positions. Radford asked the Secretary of the Navy if he could borrow the USS Sequoia to take his colleagues to sea, "keeping them there until we could agree upon an answer to the President's memorandum."[135] Radford ordered the Sequoia to be stocked for an indefinite stay on the Potomac River. They set sail on Thursday morning, August 6, 1953.

Unfortunately, not much is known of the Sequoia meetings from Ridgway's point of view. It is apparent from Admiral Radford's memoir and the next National Security Council meeting following the cruise that Ridgway, although he had signed in agreement, was not completely in alliance with the other members of the Joint Chiefs. In fact, Admiral Radford recounted in his memoir that he has "never been sure why agreement was reached on Saturday when Friday had been so difficult, but I suspect that Matt Ridgway, wanting to get home to his young bride for the weekend, began to see traces of merit in certain things he had opposed the day before."[136]

Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, understood President Eisenhower's strategic perspective on national security strategy and national military policy. He served Eisenhower ably as the senior military advisor to the President and helped implement the "New Look" national military strategy that Eisenhower championed. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford was in a unique, non-service-specific oriented

[134] Arthur William Radford and Stephen Jurika, *From Pearl Harbor To Vietnam*, p. 320.
[135] Ibid., p. 321.
[136] Ibid., p. 321.

position. He believed President Eisenhower when he told the new chiefs of staff in the summer of 1953 that America needed a:

> Fully adequate military establishment headed by men of sufficient breadth of view to recognize and sustain appropriate relationships among the moral, intellectual, economic, and military facets of our strength…they should have the capacity to dispose our forces intelligently…to serve peacetime objectives and yet to be of maximum effectiveness in case of attack. They would, of course, have to realize that the diabolical threat of international communism—and our problems in meeting it—would be with us for decades to come.[137]

Ridgway severely tested Admiral Radford's strategic leadership during the first two years of his tenure as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although Admiral Radford did not respond to Ridgway's criticism as it was represented in Ridgway's retirement memorandum to the Secretary of Defence in 1955, Radford's comments on his copy of the letter demonstrate the different levels on which the Chairman and Ridgway operated:

> Conclusion: Ridgway does not agree with present national policy or national military policy. He does not however present any clearly defined alternative. One can only conclude that he would prefer to match Soviet conventional forces – with all that such a course of action implies.[138]

Additionally, it is interesting to note that although Admiral Radford's diary on the June 27, 1955, shows no appointments in the evening, Secretary of Defence Wilson called Admiral Radford to his office at the end of the day, ostensibly to deal with General Ridgway's inflammatory retirement memorandum. Unfortunately, little is known of that meeting, but Admiral Radford's notes on General Ridgway's memorandum clearly shows that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed with the Army's Chief of Staff.[139]

---

[137] Ibid., p. 319.
[138] Arthur Radford, "CJCS Copy of General Ridgway Retirement Memorandum to Secretary of Defence," dated 27 June 1955, U.S. National Archives, Record Group 228, Box 22, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff File,
[139] Washington Navy Yard Classified Archives. Unclassified excerpt from Admiral Radford's daily diary. Record is currently still classified.

When Ridgway took command of the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea, he immediately sought to understand the environment and communicate that understanding and the way forward with his command, meeting within the first 48 hours of assuming command in Korea with all his division and corps commanders and all but one of the Republic of Korea (RoK) commanders.[140] He sought to understand the environment in Korea and then relay that understanding to his formations, communicating, in person, in writing, and through his actions, his utter belief in the American and Korean fighting men and their mission to defeat communism on the Korean peninsula. Additionally, when General Ridgway took command in NATO, he toured the operational area, working to visit key military sites and units, key military leaders, and heads of state after General Eisenhower gave him a detailed account of the situation.

In NATO, General Eisenhower gave General Ridgway a full account of the military and political state in Europe. Whilst it was not the quite open-ended guidance that General MacArthur gave to General Ridgway in Korea, General Eisenhower ably passed the torch in Europe to General Ridgway: "In this long informal session I got General Eisenhower's full views. I gave him mine. I left feeling that the burdens falling on my shoulders were heavy, the problems complex. But at least I knew what was facing me."[141]

As he took over as Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ridgway would get no such guidance from President Eisenhower, Secretary of Defence Charlie Wilson, or Secretary of the Army Robert Stevens. In fact, General Ridgway would find himself as the Chief of Staff of the Army not in the lead role, in which he had served as the Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne Division, the 18th Airborne Corps, and the Eighth U.S. Army during World War II

[140] Fleming, Thomas. "The Man Who Saved Korea," History Net, Winter 1993. https://www.historynet.com/man-saved-korea.htm, accessed 15 January 2021.
[141] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 237.

and the Korean War, but effectively in a supporting role to the new United States Air Force.[142] A.J. Bacevich comments in his study, *Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam*, "In Ike's view of defence in the atomic age the role of his old Service did not loom large."[143]

Unknown to President Eisenhower at the time, the ensuing month's activities would do little to generate cooperation and shared understanding of American national security policy over the four years of his first administration. In fact, it may well have ensured the exact opposite. General Matthew Ridgway, the new army chief, certainly came away with the firm understanding that he was alone in fighting for resources in the shrinking defence budget.[144] Over the next two years of his tenure as the Chief of Staff of the Army, Ridgway's fight would move from an ideological and philosophical disagreement with the administration on the waging of war to a full-blown revolt ending in a scathing diatribe General Ridgway sent Secretary Wilson on the occasion of General Ridgway's retirement and the publication of his memoir, aptly titled, Soldier.

This chapter will explore the evolution of Ridgway's relationship to the duly appointed and elected civilian leadership of the Department of Defence. First, this chapter will examine the clash between President Eisenhower and General Ridgway over the administration's "New Look" national security strategy and its focus on nuclear deterrence. Ridgway believed that war was won or lost by the soldiers on the ground.[145] The administration based its national

---

[142] A.J. Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam*, p. 17. The graph titled, "Department of Defense Expenditures for Military Functions, Fiscal Years 1953-1961," as presented in the "Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1959, to June 30, 1960" shows the decline of funding to the U.S. Army and the rise of funding to the U.S. Air Force, which had primacy in the nuclear strategy. The budgetary figures, which encompasses the Eisenhower presidency shows that by Fiscal Year 1957, half-way through the Eisenhower presidency, that the funding of the Air Force was just $1 billion less than the combined budget of the Army and Navy. Clearly, General Ridgway saw this writing on the wall.
[143] Ibid., p. 16.
[144] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 268-9.
[145] Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: The Classic Military History of the Korean War,* Kindle Edition, Location 6577.

security policy on the strategic belief that the threat of nuclear war would bring combatant nations to the negotiating table and prevented conflict from occurring.[146] Second, this chapter examines the reasons behind the dissonance between Eisenhower and the Chief of Staff of the Army, particularly their different strategic and tactical outlooks on national security policy that stemmed in large part from their different backgrounds.

Next, this chapter examines the effect of the debate, specifically looking within the bureaucracy of Washington politics to understand what happened because of the disagreement and seek to understand why President Eisenhower was successful in fending off Ridgway's critiques. Lastly, this chapter examines Ridgway's coup de grace, his retirement letter to Secretary of Defence, Charlie Wilson.

* * *

The main arena of conflict between Ridgway and Eisenhower encompassed the philosophical difference between the two military professionals on their view of warfare. At its essence, the disagreement focused on the role or prominence of nuclear war, which Eisenhower espoused through his "New Look" national security strategy and limited war, which Ridgway championed. However, the debate incorporated elements of Eisenhower's strategic viewpoint of national security and geopolitics, Ridgway's religious views and fervent beliefs in the superiority of the American Soldier and ground combat. "Perhaps you are convinced that the Infantryman has been researched out of war," he scolded the Army G-3, operations staff. "My answer is the answer of all military history to date. It is this: the man on the ground has not

[146] For more information on the Eisenhower Administrations' New Look National Security Strategy, see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, specifically Chapters Five, "Eisenhower, Dulles, and the New Look, p. 127-163, and Six, "Implementing the New Look," p. 164-197, (Oxford University Press, Revised Edition, 2005) and Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (Oxford University Press, 2000); and Sherman Adams, *Firsthand Report.*

been replaced by the machine nor will he be within any period of time we can yet foresee."[147] This argument over which beloved Army leader was right would spill over into the Kennedy administration after eight years of what the Eisenhower-Nixon administration proudly claimed as America at peace in which there were no combat casualties.

As Eisenhower took office in January 1953, he was dismayed to find that Truman administration had been giving guidance to the Department of Defence to prepare the military for a multitude of operational plans fighting various kinds of conflicts and continuing to budget funds on a wartime spending pace. Eisenhower learned that there was no clear policy on when to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union unless they used them first. Additionally, the Department of Defence was budgeting for the Korean War and planning for new, smaller wars on multiple fronts. For Eisenhower—as for many Americans—Korea simply reinforced the desire not to get dragged into future costly ground wars.[148]

In essence, the Truman administration had one overarching theme—containment as detailed in NSC 68—but multiple strategies or operational approaches to contain the communist threat of the Soviet Union. This method increased the defence budget to near World War II-levels. George Humphrey, Eisenhower's Secretary of the Treasury, and budget deficit hawk, remarked after first reviewing the Truman administration's budget, that "the military planners seemed to be following six plans of strategy simultaneously, two for each branch of the services."[149] However, this might be a skewed perspective, as noted American military historian Russell Weigley wrote, in his seminal work *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*:

[147] Matthew B. Ridgway, "Address to Army G-3 Operations Staff: Help the Army," 18 Feb 1954, Matthew B. Ridgway Files, Box 77, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.
[148] Bowie and Immerman, *Waging Peace*, p. 78.
[149] Sherman Adams, *Firsthand Report*, p. 398.

> …within the rubric of protecting and advancing the national interest, the acknowledged first purpose of American military strategy was now not to use combats but to deter adversaries from initiating combat. The Korean War rescued NSC-68 from oblivion and made it the foundation of American strategy after all.[150]

Regardless of the validity of the strategy of containment and the use of combat forces, change was coming, and this change would bring the U.S. Army's Chief of Staff in direct conflict with one of the U.S. Army's most beloved leaders.

President Eisenhower, through the Solarium Project, provided strategic guidance to the national security team and enabled the Department of Defence to focus planning and budgetary priorities by clearing away non-essential planning and spending.[151] Project Solarium, which has become synonymous in military and national security circles with an attempt to solve complex problems through rigorous development and comparison of multiple courses of action to the problem, began as Eisenhower described, assembling "teams of bright young fellows." Each team would then "tackle" their assigned course of action

> with a real belief in it just the way a good advocate tackles a law case—and then when the teams are prepared, each should put on in some White House room, with maps, charts, all the basic supporting figures and estimates, just what each alternative would mean in terms of goal, risk, cost in money and men and world relations.[152]

National security academics and practitioners today still hold Project Solarium as a model for policy planning and administrative decision-making on foreign policy. Eisenhower did not have the luxury,

---

[150] Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy,* (Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 398.

[151] Adams, *Firsthand Report*, p. 398. The documentation of Project Solarium can be found in the EPP collection at the Library, amongst other locations. Project Solarium was an attempt by President Eisenhower to get the national security establishment to evaluate different courses of action for a new national security strategy. Also, it is important to note that the Republican Party had been led by Senator Robert Taft, who supported fiscal conservatism but endorsed more isolationist perspectives. Whilst Eisenhower viewed nuclear deterrence and global engagement as keys to foreign policy success, Taft viewed a more "garrison state" concept for the U.S., shrinking back from global engagement towards more isolationist tendencies. See, Michael T. Hayes, "The Republican Road Not Take: The Foreign Policy Vision of Robert A. Taft," *The Independent Review*, Vol. 8, No 4 (Spring 2004), p. 509-525. Available online at www.jstor.org/stable/24562194, accessed 20 August 2021.

[152] Ibid., p. 125.

as did Ridgway and Gavin, of addressing the issue from a tactical or technical perspective, rather Project Solarium exemplifies a rather holistic or comprehensive, interagency approach at a problem-solving exercise. Andrew Goodpaster later recalled that, "it's doubtful that Eisenhower was truly educated by the Solarium Project, but it served to get his advisers, and even his potential critics, reading out of the same book."[153] Project Solarium encapsulated the core of Eisenhower and his presidential leadership, drawing on his military roots for foreign policy solutions that addressed diplomatic, informational, military, and economic issues both at home and abroad.

In essence, President Eisenhower asked Secretary of Defence Wilson to provide the best defence and security for the United States for the lowest cost. The strategic assumption that underpinned the "New Look" national security strategy was that if the United States went to war again, it would use nuclear weapons to bring about an end to the conflict. Eisenhower's basic security strategy called for an increase in the deterrent forces of atomic and nuclear weaponry and delivery systems and a decrease in ground combat forces and conventional weapons. The Eisenhower administration's budgetary decisions decremented both the Army and the Navy; the government prioritized defence appropriations to the Air Force and the Strategic Air Command. Critics of the budgetary cuts often fail to look understand that Eisenhower also asked for less money for the Air Force as well, making a cut of close to five billion dollars to their budget.[154]

In addition to finding the best security strategy solution for the best monetary value, President Eisenhower honestly thought that the nature of warfare had changed with the advent of the nuclear weapon and the emergence of the communist state. As Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles described the nuclear capability that government scientists brought to fruition in

[153]Bowie and Immerman, *Waging Peace*, p. 123-138.
[154] Annual Report of the Secretary of Defence, July 1, 1959 to June 30, 1960. As cited in Andrew J. Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era*, p. 17, Figure 1.

late 1952, "a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and at places of our choosing."[155] Eisenhower himself glumly opined in his inaugural address, "Science seems ready to confer on us, as its final gift, the power to erase human life on this planet."[156] However, he was determined to avoid that outcome and ensure that the United States remained at peace and prospered under his administration and leadership. To maintain the peace, Eisenhower thought it was necessary, to avoid war, even though he already believed that the United States was already involved in a long-term confrontation between the free nations of the west and the communist-led east. The key to winning this war was, as Evan Thomas termed it, the "p-factor—psychology, propaganda, persuasion."[157] The "P-factor" helped lead Eisenhower away from his beloved Army, towards a policy that focused on nuclear deterrence as personified by the Air Forces' Strategic Air Command and engaged the covert capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Eisenhower believed that the Central Intelligence Agency could make up through their covert operations in foreign countries some of the operational requirements the military could not do. Eisenhower had come to appreciate the clandestine services through his friendship with Walter Bedell Smith, his former Chief of Staff at the Supreme Headquarters Allied European Forces, and the Director of Central Intelligence from 1947 to 1953. Eisenhower chose Allen Dulles, the brother of his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to succeed Smith. These close relationships and increased confidence in the Central Intelligence Agency led to an increase in covert operations around the globe. These actions were operations that the uniformed military

[155] John F. Dulles, "Test of Dulles' Statement on Foreign Policy of Eisenhower Administration," The New York Times, January 13, 1954, p. 2.
[156] Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. (Presidency.ucsb.edu, 2016) <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9600>, accessed 25 May 2016.
[157] Evan Thomas, *Ike's Bluff*: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World (New York: Little, Brown and Co 2012), p. 144. Also, see Ken Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad*, (University Press of Kansas, 2006).

could never have been involved in without tremendous consequence for the United States: the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, covert actions in Southeast Asia, and the U-2 spy plane. In effect, the CIA became the tactical arm of Eisenhower's "New Look" national security strategy, offering the administration alternatives to conventional tactical military action, whilst enabling Eisenhower to maintain the strategic threat of nuclear deterrence. In fact, NSC 162/2 dictated that the United States would use "all feasible, diplomatic, political, economic and **covert** measures" (emphasis added) to defeat the communist threat of the Soviet Union around the globe.[158]

General Ridgway, although he signed onto the Sequoia agreement, never supported the Eisenhower administration's focus on nuclear war and failed to understand the strategic thoughts of the President.[159] As General Ridgway wrote in his retirement memorandum, "no nation could regard nuclear capabilities alone as sufficient, either to prevent, or to win a war."[160] The Chief of Staff of the Army failed to envision tactical actions taken by the nation that did not involve the uniformed armed services, and, precisely the ground combat forces of the country. General Ridgway ended his retirement missive to Secretary Wilson, "The Army has no wish to scrap its previous experience in favour of unproven doctrine, or in order to accommodate enthusiastic theorists have little or no responsibility for the consequences of following the courses of action they advocate."[161]

---

[158] NSC 162/2, "Basic National Security Policy," October 30, 1953, *Foreign Relations of the United States*: *1952-54, II,* p. 589. Also, see William I. Hitchcock, *The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s*; and Robert R. Bowie and Richards H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy*.

[159] I could not find the Sequoia agreement at the Eisenhower Library, in the Radford Papers as the Washington Navy Yard, or the Ridgway Papers at Carlisle, PA. However, Dr. Zachary Matusheski, Research Fellow at the USAHEC is in possession of a copy he received from Richard Immelman. Dr. Matusheski recently completed his PhD at Brandeis University. He forwarded me a digital copy of the document and it remains in my possession.

[160] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 325.

[161] Ibid., p. 332.

At its very essence, the difference between General Ridgway and President Eisenhower went back to how they viewed war and the experiences that shaped those views. General Ridgway's experiences on the tactical and operational battlefields of Europe and Korea gave him tremendous admiration for the American soldier and a belief that only the American soldier and American ground forces could win wars and deter Soviet aggression. General Ridgway had seen the American paratrooper leap out of airplanes over Europe to seize the initiative and key terrain to defeat Nazis and he had seen American soldiers and Marines fight hill to hill in Korea, pushing North Koreans and Chinese soldiers back. General Ridgway had not seen the nuclear bomb do this; he had not seen Air Force bombers do this; he had not seen naval artillery do this. However, he had seen massive friendly fire casualties during the airborne invasion on Sicily. So, to General Ridgway, any belief other than a belief in the American soldier was misplaced. However, President Eisenhower had not shared those with General Ridgway. Whilst General Ridgway and his paratroopers were jumping out of planes over Normandy, President Eisenhower commanded the operation from Southwick House in Portsmouth, England. President Eisenhower did not command at the company, battalion, brigade, division, or corps-level. Rather, his career arc moved him through staff assignments until assigned to command in Europe. Stephen Ambrose, the tarnished biographer of Eisenhower, noted, "Although never a battlefield commander, Ike was nevertheless a great general, perhaps the best of his century. His breadth of view and strategic vision were unmatched."[162] The intent is not to show one viewpoint as better than another, rather to show that the viewpoints of President Eisenhower and his Army Chief of Staff were different and that the divergence on military strategy was irreconcilable.

[162] Stephen E. Ambrose, "Eisenhower, Dwight David," in *Dictionary of American Military Biography*, edited by Roger J. Spiller, (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood, 1984), p. 304.

Additionally, Ridgway saw the concept of limited war, specifically as ground combat short of nuclear war, as a required capability for the United States. Ridgway believed that limited wars would occur in satellite nations on the fringes of the communist-controlled world. The United States would not, Ridgway postulated, risk World War III in these countries and would need ground forces capable of fighting these limited wars, like Korea. Ridgway advised Eisenhower not to enter another land war in Dien Bien Phu on the side of the French, even though this was the type of war he envisioned the Army as capable of fighting and winning for the nation. However, Ridgway did not see the tactical situation as advantageous to the United States, and he advised Eisenhower to stay out of the conflict. Other members of the national security team supported the United States entering on the side of the French; actually, several recommended nuclear air attacks on Vietnam to aid the French.[163] Eisenhower agreed with Ridgway and initially stayed out of the war in 1954, choosing, instead to offset French military expenditures in Dien Bien Phu with increased foreign aid to France.[164] However, America did not stay out of Vietnam for good, backing the French war effort with economic and military resources; as Dean Acheson, President Eisenhower's Secretary of State, recalled, "Having put our had to the plow, we would not look back."[165] Just as Eisenhower believed the threat of nuclear war kept the Chinese and Soviets at bay during the Korean War, Eisenhower believed that the threat of nuclear war would keep the communists at bay in Vietnam.

Not only was there a philosophical difference on the nature of war and how best America should maintain peace in the world, but, to General Ridgway, there was a

[163] Jean Edward Smith, *Eisenhower* (Random House 2012), Kindle Edition, Location 59.
[164] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate For Change, 1953-1956*, p. 410.
[165] Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), p. 674. For more on Secretary Acheson and America's growing involvement in Vietnam see: Water Esaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986); Mark A. Lawrence, *Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1988); and Frederik Logevall's *Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 2012).

fundamentally moral and religious difference to President Eisenhower's strategy that General Ridgway could not support. Ridgway was a deeply religious man; in the hagiographic biography Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen, George C. Mitchell spends an entire chapter on Ridgway's religion. Religion permeated every aspect of Ridgway's life from the motto on his family crest, "Deo non Fortuna," which means "God not Fortune."[166] During his time as the Commanding General of the Eight U.S. Army in Korea, Ridgway published an article in Look Magazine titled, "Ridgway Writes of a Soldier's Faith," in which he presents his views on the righteousness of the Army's fight against communism:

> To me, the issues are clear. It is not a question of this or that Korean town…It is not restricted to this issue of freedom for our South Korean allies...the real issues are whether the power of Western civilization, as God has permitted it to flower in our own beloved lands, shall defy and defeat communism; whether the rule of men who shoot their prisoners, enslave their citizens and deride the dignity of man shall displace the rule of those to whom the individual and his individual rights are sacred; whether we are to survive with God's hand to guide and lead us, or to perish in the dead existence of a godless world.[167]

Ridgway extended this analogy of the "dead existence of a godless world" to the concept of nuclear war: "It is repugnant to the ideals of a Christian nation," General Ridgway said, "It is not compatible with what should be the basic aim of the United States in war, which is to win a just and durable peace."[168]

In 1954, Ridgway explained to the press that he felt that the "New Look" national strategy's reliance on nuclear deterrence ran counter to America's "deep religious faith," and continued that if the United States conducted a preventative nuclear war, "it would be moral bankruptcy at its worst—a deliberate walk down the road to moral ruin past the moral point of no return."[169] During General Ridgway's initial remarks after his swearing in ceremony, the

[166] George C Mitchell, *Matthew B. Ridgway*, p. 12.
[167] Ridgway, *Soldier,* p. 208.
[168] George C Mitchell, *Matthew B. Ridgway*, p. 169.
[169] Ibid., p. 168-9.

new Chief of Staff of the Army paid particular attention to the "spiritual leadership" of the Army's officer corps.[170] Previously, in Korea in 1951, Ridgway had written to his command, in a memo titled, "Why We Are Here:"

> The real issues are whether the power of Western civilization, as God has permitted it to flower in our own beloved lands, shall defeat Communism; whether the rule of men who shoot their prisoners, enslave their citizens, and deride the dignity of man, shall displace the rule of those to whom the individual and his individual rights are sacred; whether we are to survive with God's hand to guide and lead us, or to perish in the dead existence of a Godless world.[171]

With clear and unambiguous language, General Ridgway cast the war in Korea as a war between good and evil, as the extension of what he had seen in Europe during and after World War II against Nazi Germany and the rise of the Soviet Union and nuclear warfare. These thoughts were not just public sentiment; Ridgway wrote General Lawton Collins in 1951, "the evil genius behind all this is some type of eastern mind Russian or Chinese, we shall inevitably find many of the same methods applied on major scales, if and when we confront the Slav in battle. I would say, let's go! Let's wake up the American people, lest it be too late!"[172] General Ridgway was a true believer in the cause of the American warrior against communism, a warrior for good against evil. General Ridgway also addressed the moral aspects of war in his retirement letter to Secretary Wilson, warning of the consequences of ignoring the moral facets of a way of war designed to obliterate people and places.[173]

---

[170] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 269.
[171] Ridgway, Matthew, "Memo for Corps, Division, Separate Brigade or RCT Commanders and Commanding General 2nd Logistical Command," January 21, 1951, Ridgway MSS, Box 21.
[172] Letter from General Matthew Ridgway to General Lawton Collins, dated 8 January 1951. Dwight D. Eisenhower Archives, Lawton J. Collins Papers, Box 17, "Correspondence."
[173] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 332.

CHAPTER THREE

Ridgway and Eisenhower: The Debate Takes Form

The debate between Ridgway and his belief in the primacy of the American soldier and the requirement for ground combat and the Eisenhower administration "New Look" security strategy came into being based on three factors that embodied who these men were in terms of strategic military leaders. Whilst both Ridgway and Eisenhower proved successful in their careers they differed in their perspectives on the role of the Army and its uniformed leadership, they differed over their inclination to think strategically or tactically over different situations, and they differed in their military backgrounds. Eisenhower held expansive views about what the uniformed leaders of the Armed Services should do in their appointed positions. He also thought strategically about situations and the international security environment. Lastly, Eisenhower's formative experience during World War II consisted of leading a strategic alliance against the Germany and Italy; Ridgway's experience was very tactical, like his thinking, as he led the 82nd Airborne Division and 18th Airborne Corps during the war. Coloured by his experiences in Europe and Korea, he led the Army as its Chief of Staff as he did the 82nd Airborne Division and the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea.

President Eisenhower expected the heads of the services to shirk the bonds of their services and act together in the best interest of national security, leaving the bureaucratic tedium of their services to the Vice Chiefs of Staff.[174] However, in the two years that Ridgway served as the Chief of Staff of the Army, he never rose to the challenge of strategic leadership, focusing instead on the parochial interests of the Army. John Eisenhower described Ridgway's tenure as the Chief of Staff as an "unhappy situation" and believed that Ridgway was basically

[174] John S.D. Eisenhower, *Soldiers and Statesmen: Reflections on Leadership*, p. 147.

"out of his field of competence. With all his soldierly virtues, he was not fully equipped to face his new duties on the Washington scene."[175] In fact, General Ridgway revelled in this difference, writing, in 1956, that as the Chief of Staff, he believed that his advice regarding the Army and the military "should have no reference to the impact my recommendation might have on the nation's economy, on domestic politics, nor on administration policy at any particular time."[176]

This difference is more pronounced when viewed not just in comparison to President Eisenhower, but to other military leaders. As a case in point, Admiral Arthur Radford, who President Eisenhower appointed to serve as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was "that rare combination—a man of tough convictions who would refuse to remain set in his ways. Faced with new facts, he would time and again modify his views to fit them."[177] Whilst General Ridgway did not disparage Admiral Radford in public, he felt no qualms in disparaging the Secretary of Defence, Charles Wilson, a man who General Ridgway felt "was intolerant and prejudiced and wouldn't listen and knew nothing about a military establishment."[178]

General Ridgway made it clear in his initial speech after being sworn in as the Army's Chief of Staff that, even though civilian control of the military is central to the American system, he would be ruthless in speaking is truth to power and that:

> Civilian authorities must scrupulously respect the integrity and intellectual honesty of the officer corps. If the military adviser's unrestricted advice is solicited, he should give a fearless and forthright expression of honest, objective, professional opinion. He should neither be expected nor required to give public endorsement to courses of military action against which he has

[175] Ibid., p. 147
[176] Matthew B. Ridgway, "My Battles in War and Peace," *Saturday Evening Post,* January 21, 1956, p. 19.
[177] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, p. 96.
[178] Bruce Geelhoed, *Charles E. Wilson and the Controversy at the Pentagon, 1953-1957* (Detroit, Mi: Wayne State University Press, 1979), p. 18.

> previously recommended. Once the decision has been made and announced by proper civilian authorities, he should give his full support to its execution.[179]

This is exactly the opposite of what General Ridgway did, though, both in public and private, in multiple forums: Army doctrine, National Security Council meetings, Congressional testimony, and, even, to the press. Whilst Ridgway spoke truth to the national security establishment, he also spoke truth to Congress, the press, as well as focusing Army doctrine on changes that met his intent as the Chief of Staff, rather than the President's intent for the Army. Whilst General MacArthur's actions and words in Korea loom large over Ridgway's sentiments, Ridgway's comments ring hollow because he did not do what he had promised the President and the Secretary of Defence he would do.

Whilst Ridgway espoused himself to be above the parochial interests of the Army above the joint forces, he actually took pride in his parochialism."[180] Ridgway's congressional testimony in 1954 bears witness to this parochialism and serves as clarion call for the American Soldier's supremacy, "because of the increasing complexity of land warfare and the resultant greater battlefield demands, the individual soldier, far from receding in importance, is emerging ever more clearly as the ultimate key to victory."[181] The budgetary process of the early 1950s, coupled with President Eisenhower's policies to reduce spending and the increased requirements of the Navy and Air Force in support of the New Look strategy, pushed Ridgway to the brink. Bernard Baruch, a noted financier and political consultant in the 1950s gave a speech at West Point in 1954, arguing that "test of what we [the United States] can do is not one of economic power but of will power. It is not the resources which are lacking but the

[179] Robert C. Alberts, "Profile of a Soldier: Matthew B. Ridgway," *American Heritage*, February 1976, p. 80.
[180] MBR Box 97, "Ridgway for Taylor," unattributed news clipping. In the hand written notes in Ridgway's file, Ridgway writes, "I never thought that parochial was meant to be slighting. It is the duty of the parish head to be parochial."
[181] Matthew B. Ridgway Testimony, House Army Appropriations Subcommittee, Hearings for FY 1955, 83d Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, p. 45.

ability to discipline our use of those resources."[182] Then Baruch wrote to Ridgway, urging the Chief of Staff that there is "no justification in reducing our defences below the point through necessary because of the specious argument that our 'economy cannot stand it.'"[183] Ridgway continued his rejection of Eisenhower's "New Look" national security strategy; "No machine can replace the intangible qualities of the human spirit nor the adaptability of the human mind. Man is the master of weapons and not their servant. He is the indispensable element necessary to achieve victory and will remain so in the foreseeable future."[184] The Army Chief of Staff could not envision warfare as President Eisenhower did, fought on multiple levels simultaneously, and not necessarily within the Fulda Gap in Germany.[185]

Although the Army Chief of Staff is the senior uniformed member of the Army, he works directly for the civilian leadership of the Army, The Secretary of the Army. In turn, the Secretary of the Army works for the senior civilian in the Department of Defence—The Secretary of Defence. The Army Chief of Staff presides directly over the Army Staff and is responsible for advising the Secretary of the Army regarding plans and staff recommendations, supervising the execution of the decisions of the Secretary of the Army by the Army staff, and representing the Army as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[186] Whilst General Ridgway acknowledged this absolute in his first remarks as Chief of Staff of the Army and elaborated on this point later in his career, "I said—the subordination of the military to the civilian authority—was so universally accepted throughout the officer corps that it needed no

[182] Bernard Baruch letter to Ridgway, dated March 29, 1954. Baruch Papers, Box 170, Princeton University Archives.
[183] Ibid.
[184] Matthew B. Ridgway Testimony, House Army Appropriations Subcommittee, Hearings for FY 1955, 83d Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, p. 45.
[185] Fulda Gap was the geographic location in Western Germany where U.S. and NATO military planners believed that an attack by the Soviets and Eastern Germany Armies was most likely.
[186] For the statutory duties and requirements of the Army Chief of Staff, see Title 10 of U.S. Code, Sec. 3033. Available online at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/3033. Also, see H.R. McMaster's *Dereliction of Duty* and Aurelie Basha's *"I Made Mistakes": Robert McNamara's Vietnam War Policy, 1960-1968* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

elaboration. Since George Washington's time, no top soldier has forgotten that he is a citizen first and a soldier second."[187] However, General Ridgway then tied himself into knots, acknowledged the primacy of civilian control of the military, acknowledged the military leaders' requirement to assess the civilian policy and lay out costs, and the duty to carry out a decision from the civilian leader: "From the officer corps, I told my civilian superiors, they could expect fearless and forthright expressions of honest, objective professional opinion up to the moment when they themselves, the civilian commanders, announced their decisions. Thereafter they could expect completely loyal and diligent execution of those decisions."[188] However, this promise is not what General Ridgway delivered as the Army's Chief of Staff, testifying in Congress, remarking to the press, and shaping Army doctrine in opposition to civilian leadership decisions, performing actions akin to General MacArthur's overt insubordination of President Truman.

As Ridgway took the reins as the senior uniformed leader of the Army in the Eisenhower administration, his focus could not have been more different from the President's direction. Eisenhower expected the Joint Chiefs of Staff to participate in the national security process, which—to Eisenhower—meant participating in the budgetary processes as well. Eisenhower felt that "national security could not be measured in military strength alone. The relationship, for example, between military and economic strength is intimate and indivisible."[189] Ridgway, in his introductory remarks to his staff after being sworn in as the Chief of Staff, directly conflicts the President's perspective. "Now there are certain simple essentials by which it [the Army] can and will win in war. In simplest terms these are: Men, money and morale. But, since we don't control the acquisition of money, these essentials are:

[187] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 269.
[188] Ibid., p. 270.
[189] Dwight D Eisenhower, *Mandate For Change, 1953-1956*, p. 534.

First, arms and equipment; second, training; third, leadership."[190] From the first day through General Ridgway's retirement, he—and the Army—remained at odds with President Eisenhower on this; the Army Chief of Staff adamantly opposed to including the country's economy and political considerations into his recommendations for the Army and the President's steadfast belief in the requirement to get the best defence for nation at the best value.

This conflict did not stop with the view of the requirement to engage in the budgetary process. Ridgway fundamentally viewed his job as the Commander of the Army instead of the Chief of Staff, working to improve morale, training, and leadership, just as he had done in each of his leadership positions for the past 10 years since he reported to the 82nd Airborne Division in February 1942 to begin training the division for its new missions in support of the Allied effort in World War II. As Ridgway spoke to his G-3, operations staff in February 1954, he addressed his concerns over rifle marksmanship and preparing Soldiers for the arduous rigors of combat. Ridgway failed to lead the Army staff to prepare for the next war as envisioned in the presidential administration's national security strategy. This duty should have been sacrosanct, as he addressed his staff as the new Army Chief of Staff, "finally, he [the professional military man] has the duty, whatever the final decision, to do the utmost with whatever he is furnished."[191] Additionally, Ridgway did voice his disagreement through the staff processes to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defence.[192] Ridgway disagreed with the President almost continuously during Ridgway's time as Army Chief of Staff. And he disagreed with him in public, in National Security Council meetings, in Congressional

[190] Matthew B Ridgway and Harold H Martin, *Soldier* (Harper 1956), p. 347.
[191] Ibid, p. 346
[192] Ridgway Memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Estimate of the Military Posture Throughout the Free World, FY 1956 through FY 1959," RG 218, CJCS Files, Box 38, NARA. This memorandum highlights an attempt by General Ridgway to work through the staff process to voice his concerns over administration policy.

testimony, and to the press (more so during the last year of his tenure as Army Chief of Staff and upon his retirement).

On his retirement, an unattributed newspaper commentary remarked that President Eisenhower had once called Ridgway, "parochial" in his view of warfare and the Army. On the clipped article, Ridgway comments that he "never thought parochial to be slighting. It is the duty of the parish head to be parochial."[193] In fact, Ridgway was intensely parochial and never shrank from that position, boasting in his memoir that he "protested with greatest vehemence against 'economies' which would have placed us in the same relative state of ineffectiveness."[194] President Eisenhower, however, remained discontented with the parochial attitude and the performance of his Army Chief of Staff, noting that the service chiefs should "solve our overall problems," and concern themselves with "where we are going in overall security terms…not in minute details."[195] Later, in May 1956, Colonel Goodpaster detailed the contents of a meeting between President Eisenhower and Secretary Wilson, noting the President's dissatisfaction with the current and former Joint Chiefs:

> The President said he is inclined to think that the Chiefs of Staff system we now have has failed. He had hoped the new Chiefs would do better because he knew they were fine men. Apparently, the system is wrong. He said he is astonished at what "one or two I have known all my life" have done…He said the great need is for Secretary Wilson to find a way of getting disinterested, competent advice, then deciding on a program, and then "setting his teeth" and holding to it.[196]

[193] MSS, box 97. "Taylor for Ridgway" Folder, unattributed, May 1955.
[194] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 191. Ridgway is referring to the post-World War II drawdown of the Army that left the U.S. Army in a state of "inexcusable" unreadiness.
[195] Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster, "Memorandum for Record: Conference of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President," February 10, 1956, Box 4, White House Office Files (Office of the staff Secretary, DOD Subseries), Dwight D. Eisenhower: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
[196] Ibid., "Memorandum of Conference with the President, May 18, 1956, Box 4, White House Office Files (Office of the staff Secretary, DOD Subseries), Dwight D. Eisenhower: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

President Eisenhower's dissatisfaction with General Ridgway would not abate and spilled over into the public forum as General Ridgway retired.

Whilst he never explicitly laid out his feelings to General Ridgway, in April 1956, President Eisenhower detailed his beliefs on the role of the Chiefs of Staff to the Joint Staffs, expounding on his belief that the service chiefs must understand the nation's economy as they make recommendations, "Unless there is someone who brings all of these together, the net effect is to create burdens which could sap the strength of our economic system" and ensure that the military recommendations "permit the economy to remain viable and strong."[197] President Eisenhower further "stressed the need for each Chief to subordinate his position as a champion of a particular Service to his position as one of the overall national military advisors."[198] Whilst President Eisenhower did not dwell on the issues he had with General Ridgway, the Army's dissatisfaction with the New Look national security strategy made its way into the papers, as the *Saturday Evening Post* sponsored advertisements in the *New York Times*, showing General Ridgway in uniform along with the slogan, "Keep the Army Out of Politics," with the advertisement reading, "Why atomic warfare hasn't lessened the need for the foot soldier…and why putting all our eggs in one basket could lead to disaster."[199] This public denouncement of President Eisenhower's strategy played to General Ridgway's strength: his legendary status as a tactical leader of ground forces in combat.

[197] Ibid., "Memorandum of Conference with the President, March 30, 1956, Box 4, White House Office Files (Office of the staff Secretary, DOD Subseries), Dwight D. Eisenhower: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
[198] Ibid.
[199] *New York Times*, January 24, 1956.

CHAPTER FOUR

Ridgway and Eisenhower: Thinking Tactically and Strategically

Ridgway and President Eisenhower both solidified their thought processes on the battlefields of Europe during World War II. For Eisenhower, as the Commander of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, his thought processes were strategic, involving the accomplishment of objectives through sensitive negotiations with U.S. and Allied political and military leaders. General Ridgway's thoughts were primarily tactical; throughout his career as a senior leader, General Ridgway focused on the American soldier regardless of the level of his command. As the Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne Division during the first airborne operations conducted during World War II through his time as the Commanding General of the Eighth U.S. Army during combat operations at the close of the Korean War, General Ridgway never wavered in his focus at the tactical and operational levels of war and his love of the American ground Soldier. Whilst Eisenhower had flourished as a strategic leader and led on the world stage since 1942, Ridgway struggled at the strategic level for the last four years of his prestigious career, from his promotion to Commander in Chief of the Far East (CINC-FE) to his retirement after his two-year tenure as the Chief of Staff of the Army. Simply put, although both President Eisenhower and General Ridgway both grew up in the United States Army and their philosophies and decisions were coloured by their service, their experiences were vastly different. As already detailed, General Ridgway grew up as a combat leader of soldiers at the tactical level; whilst he held multiple staff and politico-military postings, his fervent belief in the primacy of the American soldier never wavered. President Eisenhower's distinguished service was notable for its lack of command, until his appointment as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during World War II. President Eisenhower

understood the political and strategic implications of his decisions and led with that philosophy, rather than an unbending conviction that could not be altered.

As early as 1950, as Ridgway served as the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration after his time as the Commanding General of the Caribbean Theatre, Ridgway began to solidify his thoughts on the primacy of the American soldier in national security strategy. It is important, here, to note that Ridgway's memoirs are simply titled, Soldier, referring to the primacy he gave the soldier in war. Throughout his time as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, Ridgway gave a series of speeches, specifically pointing out that "neither the Hydrogen Bomb, nor biological warfare, nor any other means of attack with abate one jot of the truth of the point I am trying here to drive home."[200] His speeches served as pulpits from which he rebutted what he saw as the coming national security strategy—reliance on nuclear and advanced technological weaponry—and focused on his belief in the primacy of the American Soldier in the future of American warfare. In fact, General Ridgway vehemently disagreed with the Air Force and Navy's contention that the coming complexities of the warfare meant that those two services should have the "cream of the nation's young men because of the greater complexity of their weapons and machines. There is simply no comparison between the operator of a machine, however intricate its mechanism, and the leader of men in ground battle."[201]

His time in the Pentagon made General Ridgway gravely concerned with the direction of American national security strategy, and he scoffed at the concept of a "push-button" war in which the battlefield "is a thing of the past and land armies are obsolete."[202] General Ridgway

[200] MBR, Box 7, "The Role of the Army in the Next War," An address to the Armed Forces Staff College, 15 February1950.
[201] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 270.
[202] Ibid., p. 190.

continued to feel, throughout his tenure as Chief of Staff of the Army, that two factors contributed directly to these sentiments: "the earnest desire of the nation to cut down on its military expenditures, and the erroneous belief that in the atomic missile, delivered by air, we had found the ultimate weapon."[203] Instead of coming to the Pentagon and understanding a wider view of security, Ridgway came to the Pentagon and narrowed his focus, never deviating from his belief in the primacy of the American ground soldier and that the proposed budgetary cuts would jeopardize America's national security around the world.

Although Ridgway did not jump out of an airplane until after he took command of the 82nd Airborne Division, he never felt more comfortable than when he was in the company of and leading soldiers and paratroopers. As he took over the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea in December 1950, after the death of Major General Walton Walker, Ridgway became renowned for his fighting spirit. Morris Janowitz, a well-respected sociologist and civil-military relations expert, observed, "Ridgway epitomized the fighter spirit and sought to keep it alive for organizational ends."[204] Ridgway epitomized the soldier and paratrooper in every aspect; from his days as the Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne through his time commanding troops in Korea, Ridgway never failed to wear a grenade attached to one of his shoulder straps whilst wearing a paratrooper's first aid kit—which contained a morphine syrette—on the other. This dashing uniform set him apart and also built solidarity with the combat troops, thereby displaying his democratic sentiments to both GI and the folks at home."[205] This dashing picture of a general as a fighter, carrying grenades just like the troops he commanded, endeared him to his troops, the press, and the American public, and strikes a stark contrast in pictures with General Ridgway and other leaders: General Eisenhower in his famed "Ike jacket," General

[203] Ibid., p. 190.
[204] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, p. 132.
[205] Jonathan M. Soffer, *General Matthew B. Ridgway: From Progressivism to Reaganism, 1895-1993,* pp. 131-132.

MacArthur in his khakis and pipe, even his successor at the 82nd Airborne Division, General James Gavin. *Time* labelled General Ridgway as the "Airborne Grenadier, and *Newsweek* dubbed General Ridgway the "Pineapple King."[206]

Not only was General Ridgway beloved by his troops and the press, but General Ridgway was truly at home amongst the soldiers. George C. Mitchell, Ridgway's authorized biographer, recounts that Ridgway's first love and focus, as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), was on the combat soldiers of the armies of the alliance. Mitchell relates that in Italy whilst Ridgway was visiting troops in the Brenner Pass, Ridgway lay down in the snow next to an Italian soldier, inquired about the soldier's boots and socks and those of his fellow soldiers.[207] Whilst one can imagine Eisenhower visiting soldiers—in fact, the iconic photograph of Eisenhower visiting the paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division on the eve of Operation Overlord is one of the most well-known photographs in military history—it would be difficult to imagine Eisenhower getting down in a fighting position with a Soldier and asking about his socks and boots. This vignette is not a peculiar incident, either. There are other anecdotes of Ridgway, strategic leader, taking time out of his schedule to focus on the soldiers, but there is no denying his love for the ground soldier; he constantly focused his remarks in many forums to the American soldier: "We must not forget the foot soldier. We must never neglect him."[208]

---

[206] Gertrude Samuels, "Ridgway—Three Views of a Soldier," *New York Times Magazine*, April 22, 1951, 10; *Time*, March 5, 1951; *Newsweek*, February 2, 1951; Blair, *Forgotten War*, 570.
[207] George C Mitchell, *Matthew B. Ridgway*, p. 112.
[208] Matthew B. Ridgway, "Address to Army G-3 Operations Staff: Help the Army," 18 Feb 1954, Matthew B. Ridgway Files, Box 77, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA. Jonathan Soffer offers another story of General Ridgway taking time for ground soldiers in 1951, as General Ridgway was on a tour of the frontlines in Korea, he noticed a Marine "with a heavy radio on his back stumbling along with an untied shoelace. The general [Ridgway] slide down a snowy embankment and tied the soldier's shoe." (Soffer, *General Matthew B. Ridgway: From Progressivism to Reaganism, 1895-1993, p. 131.)*

Not only did Ridgway identify with the ground combat soldiers, but he was also a gifted leader of tactical military units and ground soldiers. Whether it was leading the vaunted 82nd Airborne Division and the 18th Airborne Corps in Europe or the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea, Ridgway proved himself as one of the most distinguished combat leaders in American military history. General Omar Bradley heralded Ridgway's acumen for combat leadership, "It is not often in wartime that a single battlefield commander can make a decisive difference. But in Korea, Ridgway would prove to be the exception. His brilliant, driving, strong leadership would turn the tide of battle like no other general's in our military history."[209] Ridgway's leadership in the Eighth U.S. Army has also been called "a story of disciplined combat leadership, relentlessly but wisely applied…a story of military know-how, of adamant refusal to compromise with adversity, and of a stubborn leader who demanded the absolute best from every man and every weapon. Judgment, unclouded by fear or apprehension, played a part, but above all, utter confidence in his men and in himself wrought what was little short of a military miracle."[210]

Ridgway's successes in Korea as the Commanding General of the Eighth U.S. Army are not difficult to point out, and it is not difficult to understand why Ridgway was the first person identified to replace General Walker after his death. In fact, Ridgway had been rumoured to be on the list to replace General Walker in due course.[211] When Ridgway met with General MacArthur on December 26, 1950, MacArthur's guidance to him displayed the confidence that the rest of the Army's leadership had in one of their most seasoned combat leaders. Ridgway knew that the best way to turn the tide in the war was to restore the warrior

---

[209] Soffer, *General Matthew B. Ridgway: From Progressivism to Reaganism,* p. 117. This is an unsourced quotation from Clay Blair, presumably, citing General Omar Bradley's impression of General Ridgway. Original source unable to be found.
[210] James F. Schnabel, "Ridgway in Korea," Military Review, March 1964, pp. 3-13.
[211] Jonathan M. Soffer, *General Matthew B. Ridgway: From Progressivism to Reaganism,* p. 117. Soffer relays that Ridgway did not know until 1975 that Collins and MacArthur had already selected him to replace Walker, anyway, at the end of Walker's tour. Unattributed in Soffer; original source not yet found.

spirit back into the ground Soldiers who had been turned back by the North Koreans and Chinese armies, "before the Eight Army could return to the offensive it needed to have its fighting spirit restored, to have pride in itself, to feel confidence in its leadership, and have faith in its mission."[212] To do this, Ridgway knew that it would take the presence of his tactical leadership to visit the front lines, assess senior leaders and their formations, and help the Eighth Army recapture its fighting spirit.

Still for all his tactical and operational acumen, General Ridgway struggled when he was appointed to positions of strategic leadership, outside his comfort zone of tactical and operational-level military operations in combat. General Ridgway replaced General MacArthur as the Commander in Chief of the Far East (CINC-FE) following General Douglas Macarthur's removal from command by President Truman in April 1951. General J. Lawton Collins, the Army Chief of Staff at the time, related several concerns he had with several requests Ridgway made as he took over for MacArthur. Ridgway recommended that (1) he be allowed to move forces across the Soviet border if he felt it necessary and that (2) he be allowed to assume command of all U.S. forces in the Far East under his United Nations command.[213] These requests show a basic lack of understanding of the political and strategic implications of military operations and lack of understanding of unity of effort.[214] If General Collins and General Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had acquiesced to General Ridgway's requests, it could have led to World War III, rather than to a politico-military truce

[212] Ibid., p. 85.
[213] J. Lawton Collins, *War In Peacetime* (Houghton Mifflin 1969), p. 302. Additionally, James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy.*
[214] Unity of Effort "requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. During multinational operations and interagency coordination, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort—coordination through cooperation and common interests—is an essential complement to unity of command." U*.S. Military's Joint Publication 1.0, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,* dated 12 July 2017, accessed online, 28 January 2021, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf, p. V-1.

to the conflict. Even so, Ridgway followed the military directives from the White House and the Joint Chiefs of Staff better than his predecessor.

General Ridgway struggled as the CINC-FE during the initial Korean armistice negotiations but was appointed to replace then-General Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) in 1952. Several historians have questioned Ridgway's strategic ability as it relates to his leadership during those negotiations. Clay Blair, a military historian, author of *Forgotten War* and *Ridgway's Paratroopers,* and someone, who was generally approving of General Ridgway's military actions, thought, "Ridgway, like MacArthur, had become a 'third party' who complicated the negotiations."[215] Rosemary Foot, one the authoritative historians of the Korean War, believed General Ridgway lacked the "diplomatic professionalism" to succeed during the negotiations because of General Ridgway's "personal sense of outrage" towards the Korean communist negotiation team.[216] General Ridgway viewed the negotiations process as "tedious, exasperating, dreary, repetitious, and frustrating" and blamed many of the issues regarding the treaty negotiations on Washington rather than accepting responsibility.[217] Whilst no one has doubted General Ridgway's tactical and operational military acumen, his insights and judgment regarding the strategic and political realms would continue to surface over the remaining assignments of his career, even though Presidents Truman and Eisenhower and the Army leadership saw fit to continue to place General Ridgway in positions of increasing strategic and political responsibility.

Despite any issues as the Commander in Chief of the Far East Command, President Truman, Chief of Staff of the Army, Lawton Collins, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

---

[215] Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America In Korea* (New York: Times Books, 1988), p. 939.
[216] Rosemary Foot, *A Substitute For Victory*, pp. 11-12, 59, and 73.
[217] Matthew B Ridgway, *The Korean War: How We Met The Challenge: How All-Out Asian War Was Averted: Why Macarthur Was Dismissed: Why Today's War Objectives Must Be Limited*, pp. 204 and 238.

General Omar Bradley, selected Ridgway to succeed Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe (SACEUR), the senior military commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.[218] As the SACEUR, General Ridgway almost immediately ran into problems, as he focused not on the strategic and political requirements of the command but on the tactical issues with which he felt more comfortable dealing: "Ridgway never seemed comfortable as a military politician and tended at first to cling to a technical 'military' role.[219] General Ridgway believed that he was fully aware of what his dilemma, as the NATO Supreme Commander would be, following Eisenhower:

> General Eisenhower's job had been primarily a political one. Mine was essentially military. His was the task of using his great powers of charm and persuasion to bring together the nations of free Europe into a coalition for mutual defence—to get them to agree on a common plan of action. Mine was to get them to do what they had promised to do. He was the eloquent salesman who persuaded the housewife to subscribe to the pretty magazines. I was the So-and-So with the derby hat and the cigar, who came around to collect at the first of the month.[220]

Unfortunately, General Ridgway's assessment denigrated General Eisenhower's expertise and failed to understand fully the requirements of his new position. General Ridgway was no longer trying to get soldiers to take a hill or jump from an airplane into combat; arguably, the position in NATO may have been tougher, but it required the gifts of the eloquent salesman and not the "So-and-So" who comes to collect.

General Ridgway served as the SACEUR for just over 12 months, however in that time, he never fully engaged the political and military dimensions of his position of strategic leadership. Whilst the research is not clear on whether Ridgway was aware of his limitations

[218] The Supreme Allied Commander is the military leader of the NATO military coalition. He is also the Commander of all U.S. Forces in Europe. General Eisenhower was the first SACEUR. Additional information can be found on the NATO website < http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50110.htm>, accessed 25 May 2016.
[219] Jonathan M. Soffer, *General Matthew B. Ridgway: From Progressivism to Reaganism,* p. 159.
[220] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 239.

regarding strategic command, the evidence shows that Ridgway focused on the technical military problems of the NATO European Defensive force and "remained out of touch with political reality."[221] Ridgway focused his initial efforts on the mechanics of the NATO command structure, revamping the geographic and functional organizational structure to better streamline decision-making and operations. Additionally, instead of focusing on the political aspects of the alliance, as Eisenhower had, Ridgway paid much attention to the tactical nuts and bolts of the military organization: improving training, improving communications, and improving distribution of supplies and equipment.[222] As General Ridgway relayed after his retirement, "it was my job to translate promises into deeds, to collect on these I.O.U.'s, these pledges to provide men and guns, planes and tanks, and money, for a European defensive force."[223] This failure to understand the strategic environment and focus on the tactical and operational military requirements of the theatre foreshadowed General Ridgway's troubles in Europe and as the Chief of Staff of the Army.

It was evident to one of the most heralded, but controversial, military leaders in Europe, Field-Marshal Bernard Montgomery of Alamein that Ridgway should not have been chosen as Eisenhower's successor, and that General Ridgway did not have the strategic leadership skills required for success in the position.[224] John Eisenhower, the son of President Eisenhower, himself a military officer turned military historian, wrote that "Ridgeway's [spelling] tour as SACEUR was less than a howling success. Outside of his forte, combat leadership, he lacked the art of diplomacy, and by many reports was not particularly popular."[225] Unfortunately, this

[221] Jonathan M. Soffer, *General Matthew B. Ridgway: From Progressivism to Reaganism,* p. 167.
[222] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 243.
[223] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 240.
[224] Bernard Law Montgomery, Montgomery of Alamein, *The Memoirs Of Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery Of Alamein*, p. 515.
[224] Nigel Hamilton, *Monty: The Making of a General*, p. 515.
[225] John S.D. Eisenhower, *Soldiers and Statesmen: Reflections on Leadership* (University of Missouri Press 2012), p. 146.

claim by Eisenhower is rather poorly documented; he cites the confidential estimate by British Brigadier Sir James Gault. However, this sentiment does seem to be the prevailing attitude of military and diplomatic leaders toward Ridgway. Ridgway's discomfort of the strategic and political aspects of the position of Supreme Allied Commander of Europe manifested itself in his focus on the tactical aspects of the European Defence Force, visiting soldier and armies when Eisenhower had visited heads of state.

The friction between General Ridgway as the SACEUR and Field-Marshal Montgomery as his Deputy was evident from the first day Ridgway took command. The notable historian and Montgomery biographer, Nigel Hamilton, spends an entire chapter in his comprehensive Montgomery biographical set on the Field-Marshal's fight with Ridgway. Montgomery also relates in his memoir that he knew Ridgway would be the wrong man for NATO, and he warned NATO and British military leadership not to accept Ridgway's appointment: "I knew him well; he had served under me as a Divisional and Corps Commander in the campaign in North-West Europe from Normandy to Berlin. I knew he was not the right man to succeed Eisenhower and I opposed the appointment, both to members of the NATO Council and to the British Chiefs of Staff."[226] Montgomery definitely resented Ridgway, as Hamilton writes, "the relationship between Supreme Commander and his Deputy was bound to be different—with Monty soon resenting the clipping of his wings by a man who had served under him as a Divisional and Corps Commander in World War II."[227] Montgomery bridled at the tactical focus of Ridgway on the armies of the NATO alliance; Ridgway admonished Montgomery for his outspoken criticism of NATO military policies. For Montgomery, a

[226] Montgomery, *Memoirs Of Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery Of Alamein,* p. 515.
[226] Nigel Hamilton, *Monty*, p. 515.
[227] Nigel Hamilton, *Monty*, p. 822.

planned trip to the United States in the spring of 1953 could not come fast enough; Field Marshall Montgomery would have an audience with his "friend" President Eisenhower.

It would be during this springtime trip to the United States that Montgomery, through this "friendship" with President Eisenhower would help usher General Ridgway out of Europe and back to Washington to replace General J. Lawton Collins as the Army Chief of Staff.[228] "I stayed in the White House for a week with Ike and we discussed every problem at length. He is very well. We have got rid of Ridgway; he was a complete failure and had not the brains for the business. He never understood it…Gruenther will be much better."[229] Unfortunately, Secretary of Defence Charles Wilson was not involved in these discussions; his original recommendation to President Eisenhower for Collins' replacement was General Hull, assuming that the President did not want to move Ridgway based on his short tenure in his position as SACEUR.[230] The disconnect between the White House and the Pentagon shows the spectacular divide in the White House providing the strategic guidance for the military leadership and Secretary Wilson; Charles Wilson was never part of the inner circle of Eisenhower. What is even more telling of this divided was this memo was signed one day after an article appeared in the Evening Star Newspaper citing "unnamed but reliable sources" that Ridgway was looking for a transfer back to the United States and the French, among others, wanted Ridgway out as the SACEUR.[231]

---

[228] Montgomery, *The Memoirs Of Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery Of Alamein*, p. 515.
[228] Nigel Hamilton, *Monty*, p. 822.
[229] The Papers of Field-Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, Diary, part 28.
[230] Eisenhower Papers as President, EPP, Box 40, Secretary of Defence Wilson memorandum to DDE, 19 March 1953. This memorandum includes the initial recommendations for senior military leadership positions in the Armed Forces. Based on Ridgway's time at SACEUR, Wilson recommended leaving him there and moving General Greunther to the position as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
[231] Records Group 218, Records of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Box 23, Memorandum from General Bradley to General Collins discussing Bradley's meeting with Ridgway and the issues of Ridgway's relationship with European leaders and NATO. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

Whilst the actual story of how Ridgway became the Chief of Staff of the Army may never be uncovered, the truth seems to lie in the middle of several points of intersection of people who offered advice to President Eisenhower: Field-Marshal Montgomery, General Bradley, other prominent European diplomats, and military leaders. What is known is that President Eisenhower had supported his former Chief of Staff, General Al Greunther, as Eisenhower's replacement in 1952.[232] The opportunity to appoint General Greunther as the Supreme Commander in NATO became an option again as President Eisenhower looked to reshape his national security team in the personage of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Lawton Collins' term as the Army Chief of Staff expired; General John Hull the current Vice Chief of Staff of the Army preferred field command as the Commander in Chief-Far East (CINC-FE); General Omar Bradley recommended Ridgway for the position, knowing Eisenhower's discontent with Ridgway's performance in Europe; and, Field-Marshal Montgomery visited the White House in April 1953 and recommended this move as an opportunity to right the wrong in Europe with Gruenther's appointment.[233]

Ridgway and Eisenhower: Leaders Defined by their Different Experiences

Whilst General Ridgway never evolved into a strategic leader, struggled as the Commander in Chief of the Far East during the Korean armistice negotiations, struggled as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and struggled as the Chief of Staff of the Army, President Eisenhower excelled on the world stage as a strategic leader for close to 20 years as the Commander of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe, Military Governor of the U.S. Occupation Zone in Germany, Army Chief of Staff, President of Columbia University, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, advisor to the first Secretary of Defence James

[232] Dwight D Eisenhower, *Mandate For Change, 1953-1956*, p. 537.
[233]Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 659.

Forrestal on the creation of the Defence Department, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and, finally, as President of the United States. Eisenhower's ability to manage strategic alliances became the hallmark of his tenure in each of those positions. During World War II, he gave Field-Marshal Montgomery command of General Omar Bradley's First Army in December 1944. This decision was necessitated by the tactical actions of the German Army on the ground, but the strategic sense of Eisenhower to disregard personalities and place an American fighting force under the mission command of the British was a strategic decision that enabled the alliance and helped ensure victory.

General Eisenhower's tenure as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe highlighted his strategic acumen. Field-Marshal Montgomery describes Eisenhower's strategic leadership, writing, "from the start Eisenhower was determined that all staff officers at SHAPE must forget they belonged to a particular nation or Service. All were to be international and inter-Service."[234] Another goal of Eisenhower's was to make the headquarters bilingual—English and French—however, that objective was never reached. Although the American contingent was the majority of the force of the allied headquarters, Eisenhower's leadership ensured that the alliance was maintained through a strategic parity amongst the allied partners within the staff. Unfortunately, Montgomery continues, this allied-first perspective fell by the wayside as Ridgway took command of headquarters in 1952. Unlike Ridgway, who focused on the tactical forces of the alliance, Eisenhower identified early on that the "real substance of the problem" was the "national attitudes, industrial capacities, military programs and present strength" of the allied nations.[235] The contrast between Eisenhower's strategic leadership and thinking could not stand in starker terms from Ridgway's tactical focus. In fact, during General

[234] Montgomery, *The Memoirs Of Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery Of Alamein*, p. 514.
[235] Nigel Hamilton, *Mont*y, p. 781. Nigel Hamilton cites from *The Eisenhower Diaries*, memorandum dated 3.1.51, ed. R. Ferrell.

Ridgway's tenure in Europe there existed the perception that General Ridgway supported a "shadow cabinet" of American officers, freezing out staff officers from other countries.[236]

[236] U.S. News & World Report, "Ridgway-Target of Communists," p. 19, 27 March 1953, DDE Papers as President, Box 31. Ann Whitman File, DDEL.

CHAPTER FIVE

Ridgway and Eisenhower: How their Differences Played Out

The disagreement between Ridgway and Eisenhower's "New Look" national security manifested itself in myriad ways through the bureaucratic halls of Washington, congressional testimony, national security meetings, the press, and in publications. President Eisenhower deftly handled the bureaucratic idiosyncrasies of the national security establishment relationships between the President, the appointed civilian leadership of the Department of Defence and the uniformed military leadership. One of his first acts involving the Joint Chiefs was to appoint new military leadership to the heads of the Armed Services as and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Eisenhower expected the uniformed military leaders of the services to be part of the holistic process of determining the national military strategy, including the ubiquitous "ends, ways and means" of strategic direction. To jump start the new chiefs in their policy making roles, Eisenhower asked them all to report to Washington, D.C. a month before they would be sworn into their respective offices. The intent was for them to take a month-long tour together to get, as Ridgway described it, "a feel," for their services, the nuclear capability of the United States, and to get to know each other better.[237] Not only did Eisenhower understand how to build and nurture strategic partnerships and alliances, but also, he deftly managed the intricate processes of bringing the Joint Chiefs together in the newly formed Department of Defence. Additionally, during the presidential campaign, Eisenhower had promised to travel to Korea, "only in that way…[can] I learn in the cause of peace."[238]

---

[237] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 267.

[238] Eisenhower, Dwight D. Speech given on 24 October 1952, Korea Speech Folder, Box 1, Emmet John Hughes Papers, Princeton University. As quoted in Steven Casey, Selling the Korean War: Propoganda, Politics, and Public Opinion 1950-1953 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008) Kindle Edition, p. 335. See also Hughes, Emmet John, *Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), p. 33. See also, Divine, Robert A., *Foreign Policy and Presidential Elections* (New York:

In the summer of 1953, President Eisenhower took the opportunity, as he was bringing in a new national security team on the Joint Chiefs, to convene a special working group to examine courses of action for a new national security strategy—Project Solarium. In the U.S. Army, the Military Decision-Making Process outlines the organizational procedures used to make decisions at all levels.[239] The examination of different courses of action based on guidance from the commander is a common occurrence; at the national level, this type of analysis and formal development of options was almost unheard of, but allowed the President to bring the military, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other national security experts together. Although the three working groups formed to look at specific courses of action came out with different recommendations, the administration coalesced these views into their overarching National Security Strategy and published NSC 162/2, the foundational document of the Eisenhower "New Look" national security strategy.[240]

Whilst the President did not include the Joint Chiefs in this process in the actual working groups, the robust Defence Department representation, along with the representatives from the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency, ensured that this process would, in effect, be "binding" as a means of establishing the administration's national security strategy. One of the foundational tenets of building teams, at any level, is giving members an opportunity to weigh into the pending decision. Members are then more likely to buy into or

---

Franklin Watts, 1974), p. 76. Eisenhower's announcement to visit Korea enabled him to look strong on Korea without committing to further warfare or withdrawal.

[239] *The Military Decision-Making Process is outlined in Field Manual 100-5-1, Staff Operations and Planning. MDMP is an eight-step process that allows the commander and his staff to move from the receipt of a mission, through developing and analyzing courses of action into a decision by the commander.* http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/fm101-5_mdmp.pdf, accessed 25 May 2016.

[240] See William B. Pickett, Editor, *George F. Kennan and the Origins of Eisenhower's New Look: An Oral History of Project Solarium* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Institute for International and Regional Studies), available online at https://web.archive.org/web/20131029210208/http://www.rose-hulman.edu/~pickett/Solarium.pdf, accessed 21 August 2021. Project Solarium was the national security planning exercise convened by President Eisenhower in the summer of 1953. Ultimately, the Project Solarium findings were turned into NSC 162/2, which served as the basis for the New Look National Security Strategy.

support the decision because they have been given an opportunity to shape that decision and express their views. President Eisenhower understood this from his foundational experiences in the Army, playing and coaching football, and forming and maintaining the Allied Headquarters in Europe. Unfortunately, Fred Greenstein failed to capture the bureaucratic masterstrokes in his capstone analysis of Eisenhower's presidential leadership, The Hidden Hand Presidency. Greenstein focused on the political manoeuvres of Eisenhower, his dealings with McCarthy, the Republican Party and Congress, and the other national security forums, mainly the NSC Planning Board.

In contrast to General Ridgway's yet to be published retirement memorandum, the 1954 Presidential State of the Union Address and the budgetary drawdown of the U.S. Army illustrated President Eisenhower's strategic vision and bureaucratic brilliance. Eisenhower tied in the Joint Chiefs to his "New Look" national strategy and gave them opportunity for input; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff got them to agree in principle to a budgetary drawdown in support of the President's agenda; President Eisenhower told the nation about the military agreement in one of the most powerful forums available to the President of the United States—his State of the Union Address to Congress. All this left Ridgway holding the bag, touting his best professional military advice in whatever individual settings that were available to him: press opportunities, speeches, National Security Council meetings, and his Congressional testimony.

In 1954, Colonel Andrew Goodpaster, President Eisenhower's Staff Secretary, informed the members of the Department of Defence that the President had decided to reduce the department's attendance at National Security Council meetings. In effect, each President can fashion the National Security Council meetings and the national security process in ways in which best fit their decision-making preferences. Whilst this process was still new, President

Eisenhower was the first president to move decisions through the National Security Council, and President Eisenhower reduced the Department of Defence's presence at National Security Council meetings by 75%, eliminating the civilian and military leadership of the different armed services. The Secretary of Defence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were the only remaining members of the National Security Council from the Department of Defence. Whilst this policy change did nothing more than bring the Department of Defence into line with other members of the National Security Council, Ridgway chafed at this reduction in military advisement.

However, the change to the National Security Council Meeting attendance policy did nothing to prohibit the uniformed and civilian leadership from meetings that required their presence. General Ridgway certainly fumed at this decision, viewing his role as military advisor to the civilian leadership of the Armed Forces, to include the President, as one of his most vital roles as the Army's Chief of Staff. However, the President did not view General Ridgway's insight as particularly valuable, believing that he, not General Ridgway, was operating under the correct strategic assumptions, leading the United States through a tremendously difficult time, and balancing national security with domestic issues. President Eisenhower saw this as a problem with which only he was qualified to deal; as he exclaimed about General Ridgway, "He's talking theory—I'm trying to talk sense. He did the same thing at SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe]. I was there before Ridgway went over and he tried to ruin it with the same sort of talk. We have to have a sound base here at home."[241]

[241] James C. Hagerty and Robert H. Ferrell, *The Diary of James C. Hagerty* (Bloomington, In.: Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 182.

General Ridgway, in December 1954, made another attempt to register the Army's—his objections—to the president's national security policies, requesting through the Secretary of Defence a special National Security Council meeting through. The basic premise of General Ridgway's argument and presentation to the National Security Council meeting, in which President Eisenhower participated, was for the National Security Council "to reject emphatically any policy of preventive war" because that policy was "devoid of moral principle" and balancing and maintaining ready forces considering the Soviet threat, arguing that the American people would support the expense if properly justified.[242] After General Ridgway made his argument to the National Security Council, President Eisenhower dismissed General Ridgway and the discussion began in earnest.[243]

Secretary of Wilson rejected General Ridgway's arguments out of hand as "justification for a much larger Army." Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey maintained that the United States could not afford "all kinds of forces designed to fight all kinds of wars at all times," continuing that General Ridgway went astray "beginning with the one-sided premise that the whole [national security] effort should be directed to maintaining the US military posture, with little or no regard for the maintenance of the US economy." The Mutual Security Director, Harold Stassen, doubted General Ridgway's "thesis that we would draw down upon ourselves the hatred of most of mankind if we resorted to atomic warfare." President Eisenhower even weighed into the discussion, remarking, "the United States could not afford to prepare to fight all kinds of wars and still preserve its free economy and its basic institutions…Since we cannot keep the United States an armed camp or a garrison state, we

[242] Matthew B. Ridgway, "Memorandum to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Subject: Review of Basic National Security Policy, November 22, 1954. Ridgway Papers, Box 30.
[243] "Memorandum of Discussion at the 227th Meeting of the National Security Council," December 3, 1954, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1952-1954, pp. 804-806. Also, A.J. Bacevich details this meeting of the National Security Council in *The Pentomic Era*, pp. 37-39.

must make plans to use atomic bombs if we become involved in a war."[244] Less than three weeks later, and only days before Christmas, President Eisenhower brought Secretary of Defence Wilson and the Joint Chiefs back to this offer to give them his decision, concluding his decision to prioritize Strategic Air Command and nuclear deterrence and decrease the size and role of the Army was his final decision and "as Commander in Chief is entitled to the loyal support of subordinates of the official position he has adopted, and expects to have it."[245]

Outmanoeuvred by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Eisenhower in the bureaucratic arena during his new tenure as Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ridgway took his fight out of the bureaucracy, engaging directly with the American people and Congress through the press and congressional testimony. By December of 1953, the *Washington Post* reported that the "Army Chiefs" felt that there was no way for the Army to meet the military requirements with the proposed 10 percent reduction in force structure through the end of 1955.[246] Unfortunately, General Ridgway's inability to skilfully manoeuvre the bureaucratic halls of the Pentagon rendered him unable to defend the Army's requirements in any meaningful manner with the Joint Chiefs or the National Security Council.

Shortly after the New Year, in preparation for congressional testimony in February, General Ridgway wrote to General of the Army George C. Marshall for advice, sending General Marshall a copy of his proposed statement. General Marshall responded that the statement "invited an intense showdown fight on the Hill. If that is what you want, then I guess the statement is okay."[247] General Ridgway did not significantly alter his remarks after the

---

[244] Ibid.
[245] Goodpaster, "Memorandum of Conference with the President," December 22, 1954, Box 3, Ann Whitman File (Ann Whitman Diary), Eisenhower Papers.
[246] Anthony Leviero, "Ridgway Assails U.S. Policy Stress On Air and Atom / Sees Soviet Peril in a Letter To Wilson / He Deplores Slash In Ground Forces / Ridgway Assails Military Policy," New York Times, July 15, 1955.
[247] General Marshall to General Ridgway, January 28, 1955, George C. Marshall MSS, Marshall Foundation Library, Lexington, Virginia.

feedback from General Marshall, relating to the House Defence Appropriations Subcommittee that "the budget provided substantially less than what I regarded was the minimum," claiming that the budget request had been a "directed verdict," but claiming that "there is not the slightest criticism implied in this."[248] In February of 1955, Ridgway's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee seemed to indicate that he supported aspects of the strategy of nuclear deterrence but tries to walk a delicate balance between pontificating on national security matters involving atomic warfare and his role providing quality, professional military advice involving the Army.[249]

Ridgway took his role of providing his quality, professional military advice as his most sacred duty as the Army Chief of Staff. In his memoir, he clearly articulates this requirement he felt honour-bound to maintain, even quoting then-Army Chief of Staff General Eisenhower in his 1947 Congressional testimony, grounding his testimony in his "soldier's advice regarding the national defence."[250] A White House note from the spring of 1953 noted that in an executive session of the Senate Armed Services Committee, on February 28, 1953, "General Ridgway was asked if the proposed army reduction goes through 'could the U.S. fulfil its NATO commitment.' His answer was in the negative. Senators Symington and Jackson appeared highly pleased with this reply and Stevens expects a leak on it."[251] Clearly, whilst

[248] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Subcommittee on Defence Appropriations Hearings*, 84th Congress, 1st session, February 7, 1955, pp. 44, 78.
[249] MBR Papers, Box 16, Senate Armed Services Committee testimony, February 4, 1954. Surely, Ridgway found a sympathetic ear in Senator Richard Russell, the chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who had led the Senate hearings into the presidential firing of General Douglas MacArthur. See United States Senate, "Constitutional Crisis Averted," Historical Highlights, 3 May 1951, United States Senate (website), https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Constitutional_Crisis_Averted.htm and Crane, Conrad C., "Matthew Ridgway and the Value of Persistent Dissent," P*arameter*s, Volume 51, Number 2, 18 May 2021, available online at https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss2/3. Whilst Crane views Ridgway's dissent as appropriate, Ridgway's dissent, when coupled with the dissent of Gavin and Taylor, serves as the basis for a military quasi-coup against the stated intentions of the President and his National Security Council.
[250] Ridgway, *Soldier* (Harper 1956), p. 288
[251] "P.C. Note," ref. Ridgway testimony. Undated.White House Office Files, Office of the Staff Secretary, Box 2.

Ridgway felt compelled to give his best military advice, he failed to understand the political implications of the answers he gave.

Shortly after that congressional testimony, General Ridgway found himself in the press for disagreeing with the President's national security strategy. The *Washington News* reported that General Ridgway "was himself yesterday when he told a Congressional committee that manpower cuts ordered by his old West Point schoolmate, Dwight Eisenhower, 'jeopardize' national security 'to a degree." Jim Lucas reported that "Matthew Bunker Ridgway is too much the career soldier to relish a public airing of differences with his chief. It has long been an open secret that he regards the Defence Department's 'new look' with deep misgivings. But he has kept tight rein on his temper."[252] Whilst the reporter tends towards General Ridgway's perspective, this article highlights how General Ridgway attempted to use the press to reinforce the arguments that failed to produce any headway or additional dollars in the discussions with the National Security Council. Ridgway surely upset the White House, but played into the sympathies of Democrats, as they started to set the stage for the elections, running against the Eisenhower agenda.

Not only did General Ridgway see his military advice to the civilian leadership of Army and Department of Defence as his moral responsibility, he saw his advice during this new era of peace, after the Korean War, as one of the biggest tests for national security in his lifetime, writing in his *Saturday Evening Post* series after retirement, "It is not the dangerous days of battle which most strongly test the soldier's resolution, but the years of peace, when many voices, offering many counsels, bewilder and confound him."[253] This perspective did not

[252] Jim G. Lucas, "Ridgway's Rule is 'Be Yourself,'" *Washington News*, February 1, 1955. Eisenhower Papers, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President (Ann Whitman File), Administration Series, Box 31.
[253] Matthew B. Ridgway as told to Harold H. Martin, "My Battles in War and Peace," Saturday Evening Post; published in four serials from 21 January 1956 to 25 February 1956. Available in both the Eisenhower Presidential Papers and the Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, Box 90, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

occur to him as he retired; rather General Ridgway's character and essence were the embodiment of the professional soldier. As he entered into his time as the Army Chief of Staff, General Ridgway told his civilian leaders, "they could expect fearless and forthright expressions of honest, objective professional opinion up to the moment when they themselves, the civilian commanders, announced their decisions. Thereafter they could expect completely loyal and diligent execution of those decisions."[254] However, General Ridgway's actions as the Chief of Staff are not as clean cut as his statements lead one to believe.

General Ridgway's testimony in February of 1954 served as a striking example of this contrast. On one hand he tried to stay in line with the administration's position, asking to read from a statement rather than answer questions initially from Democratic Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia. However, General Ridgway soon faltered in his follow-on questioning from Senator Byrd after reading his introductory statement. Republican Senator, and, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts, attempted to get Ridgway to clarify his position as it related to assertions in President Eisenhower's 1954 State of the Union address that the Joint Chiefs had supported the budgetary levels of the Armed Forces put forth in administration's budget proposal. General Ridgway responded that he did, in fact, agree to those budget reductions, but held serious reservations about those funding levels. However, General Ridgway went beyond his answer to the budget question, also responding that the Army would be unable to fulfil its missions around the world with the cuts to force structure necessitated by the proposed budget.[255]

In fact, General Ridgway's Congressional testimony, across the span of his tenure as Army Chief of Staff, had no real coherent theme other than his general disagreement with the

[254] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 270
[255] MBR Papers, Box 16, Senate Armed Services Committee testimony, February 4, 1954.

administration's strategy—with which he had, at least in August 1953, agreed. In the Senate, General Ridgway stopped short of condemning the administration's "New Look" national security strategy, calling the program "sound," but refusing to support the primacy of nuclear deterrence further.[256] In his testimony before the House of Representatives, Ridgway was somewhat more forthcoming but still failed to repute openly refute the administration's strategy. Rather, he tried to repudiate the technological assumptions of the "New Look" strategy but relied on the Congressmen to draw their own conclusions as to whether the administration's budget proposals would wreck the Army and lead to disaster.[257] Failing to make his point clearly in Congress not only left congressional representatives to draw their conclusions; it has also brought some military historians into drawing their own, and often inaccurate, conclusions.

In addition to his congressional testimony, General Ridgway also used the pulpit he had at his disposal—the publication of Army doctrine. As Chief of Staff, Ridgway presided over the publication of two fundamental documents for the Army and how it would operate in the "New Look" national security strategy, or, rather, how it should operate given this new strategic direction. In fact, neither document, Department of the *Army Pamphlet No. 21-70, The Role of the Army*, nor *Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations,* reflected much of shift in strategic guidance on the tactical mission of the Army in combat. FM 100-5 is commonly referred to as the Army's "bible" and contains the basic tenets of how it should conduct operations in combat. DA Pamphlet 21-70 is the precursor to today's Army Doctrinal Publication 1.0, The Army, which Army leadership means to serve as a foundational document for the ethos of the Army.

---

[256] Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Hearings for FY 1955, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954, p. 55 & 73.
[257] House Army Appropriations Subcommittee, Hearings for FY 1955, March 15, 1954, p. 43.

Army Doctrinal Publication 1.0 sets the strategic stage or narrative for the Army's service to the United States. It positions the Army firmly in the forefront of the historical fight to gain America's independence and maintain its national security: discussing the ethos of the American Soldier, defining what the uniform represents, defining the military profession of the Army, placing the Army's role in the joint fight along with the other services of the United States, and the current Army's continuing duty to the profession.[258]

General Ridgway's publication of "The Role of the Army" focused on the tactical level of Army operations stating, "we work best when we can base our plans and operations on a statement of mission that gives us objectives to reach or tasks to accomplish."[259] The document specifically focused on the smallest element of an Army operation, the patrol, in the second paragraph, grounding this document in the tactical formations of the Army, offering as the tactical fight as the strategic narrative for the Army. The pamphlet commented on the Army's role in the national policies that they support; however, it leaves much to the reader's imagination, offering "the Army and the other Armed Services have functions that are so obvious as to be self-explanatory. We don't have to ask why there is a policeman on the corner; we know why."[260] However, the brochure then offers, contrary to the "New Look" national security policy that "there are those who believe that we need an even larger Army *in being* than we now have, and one with a high degree of strategic mobility and combat readiness.[261] It goes even further, under the graphic of a presumed nuclear mushroom cloud, the leaflet boldly highlights that "We need more men, not less."[262] Whilst it is almost assured that

[258] "Army Doctrinal Publication 1.0, The Army," Washington, D.C., September 17, 2012.
[259] "Department of the Army Pamphlet 21-70: The Role of the Army," Washington, D.C., 29 June 1955, p. 3.
[260] Ibid., p. 6.
[261] Ibid., p. 6. These sentiments are reflective of discussions of Lieutenant General James Gavin, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development. The following chapter will discuss Gavin, his initiatives within the U.S. Army, his disagreements with the "New Look" national security strategy, his early retirement from the Army, and his work in the Kennedy administration and private business.
[262] Ibid. p. 14.

President Eisenhower never saw this pamphlet, this document represents nothing more than General Ridgway attempting to focus the discussion of national security on the tactical requirements and the parochial interests of the Army.

The second document the Army published during his tenure as the Chief of Staff that flew in the face of the "New Look" national security strategy was the *Field Manual 100-5*. *Field Manual 100-5* served, and still serves today in its most recent incarnation as *Army Doctrinal Publication 3.0: Operations*, as the basis for ground warfighting and Army operations in combat. Major Charles Doughty wrote, in a 1979 U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute publication, *Leavenworth Papers No. 1: The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1949-1976*, that the publication made no major tactical deviations to support the "New Look" national security strategy of nuclear deterrence.[263] This failure highlights General Ridgway's inability to operate successfully within the strategic or bureaucratic circles; he failed to understand the Army's place in the "New Look" national security strategy and published doctrine that helped the Army fight the war we had just completed rather than the war for which our national leadership was trying to prepare the nation.

Andrew Bacevich rightly concludes that the release of FM 100-5 and by Ridgway and the Army amounted to a rejection of the thesis and strategy adopted by Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "that nuclear weapons had revolutionized the nature of warfare."[264] In the final analysis of the Army in FM 100-5, Ridgway used the tactical assertion that the Army continued to be the pre-eminent as "decisive component of the military structure."[265] Once again, General Ridgway is focusing on the tactical arguments to drive a change in national

[263] Robert A. Doughty, "The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976," *Leavenworth Paper No. 1* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1979) p. 14.
[264] A. J. Bacevich, 'The Paradox Of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, And The Challenge To Civilian Control, 1953-1955' (1997) 61, *The Journal of Military History*.
[265] "Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations," Washington, D.C., September 1954, p. 4-7.

security strategy, arguing that the Army instead of nuclear warfare is the only way to defeat "an enemy by application of military power directly or indirectly against the armed forces which support his political structure."[266] Unfortunately for General Ridgway, the time for discussion and debate on U.S. national military strategy had come and gone with his debarkation from the USS Sequoia. The debate on this strategy in the penultimate Army doctrinal publication demonstrates a complete focus on the tactical fight and an inability, as this chapter will discuss later, to capably fight the administration in the bureaucratic arena. Ridgway allowed his contempt for the government's security policy to take root in what he told the Army how it should do the job of accomplishing that stated strategy.

* * *

General Ridgway's resignation letter serves as the final tactical disagreement that he fought with Secretary Wilson and the administration. General Ridgway felt this letter served as a defining point for his retirement and the differences between himself, the Army, the Secretary of Defence, and President Eisenhower. General Ridgway felt that "there was a woeful lack of comprehension of the role the foot soldier must play in ensuring the safety of this country. Nor did I believe that any genuine effort was made to remedy this lack of understanding."[267] This remark portrays one of the most benign slights of Secretary Charles Wilson, a man who General Ridgway later described as, "intolerant and prejudiced and wouldn't listen and knew nothing about the military establishment."[268] The resignation letter showed a remarkable inability for General Ridgway to prosecute his insurgency against the "New Look" national security strategy within the bureaucratic halls of the Pentagon, rather taking his fight individually to the Secretary of Defence. The memorandum found its way, even after the Secretary of Defence

[266] Ibid., p. 4-7.
[267] Ridgway, *Soldier,* p. 311.
[268] E. Bruce Geelhoed, *Charles E. Wilson And Controversy At The Pentagon, 1953 To 1957*, p. 18.

classified it as "Confidential," to the *New York Times* shortly after General Ridgway's retirement.[269]

The retirement letter represents for General Ridgway a devolution from the strategic level or mind-set at which he should have been functioning to a tactical level of personal dispute or conflict. At its essence, this act by General Ridgway displays an act discussed by noted military strategist Carl von Clausewitz as a contest of wills.[270] War, as Clausewitz defined it, is essentially a contest of wills between two factions; the relationship of General Ridgway and Secretary Wilson and the administration's "New Look" national security strategy regressed at the time of General Ridgway's retirement to that tactical level of war manifested in the retirement memorandum to Secretary Wilson. In this memorandum, General Ridgway frames the discord at the tactical level of his responsibility as the Chief of Staff of the Army and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to offer unbiased military opinion to the civilian leadership, even using President Eisenhower's previous congressional testimony as the Army Chief of Staff after World War II in his argument.[271] However, Ridgway deviated from this stated requirement merging outside the bounds of military advice when he continued his dissent with the administration into the public, political and moral arenas with the writing and publication of the disagreement.

One of the last opportunities for General Ridgway to disagree with the administration whilst in uniform presented itself in the final days before his retirement. General Ridgway penned a resignation letter to the Secretary of Defence that reads like a diatribe against the

[269] Anthony Leviero, "Ridgway Assails U.S. Policy Stress On Air and Atom / Sees Soviet Peril in a Letter To Wilson / He Deplores Slash In Ground Forces / Ridgway Assails Military Policy," New York Times, July 15, 1955.
[270] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 75. Full quote, "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."
[271] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 331.

"New Look," asserting, "since national objectives could not be realized solely by the possession of nuclear capabilities, no nation could regard nuclear capabilities alone as sufficient, either to prevent, or to win a war."[272] Later in the letter to Secretary Wilson, General Ridgway boldly declares, "IN MY VIEW, THE PRESENT UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES ARE INADEQUATE IN STRENGTH AND IMPROPERLY PROPORTIONED TO MEET THE ABOVE COMMITMENTS."[273] [Original emphasis by General Ridgway] General Ridgway makes these statements in his letter, but also states, in his illogical fashion, that the military advisor—the role he took seriously as the Chief of Staff—should be "that of loyal vigorous execution of decisions by proper authority."[274] This disconnect between General Ridgway's roles as military advisor and policy implementer prohibits him from publicly and coherently executing the decisions of the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defence.

General Ridgway's invective for Secretary of Defence Charlie Wilson was not limited to the retirement memorandum; General Ridgway also felt very personally that Secretary Wilson was not fit as a leader to manage the Department of Defence and American national military policy. Although it was evident during his tenure as the Army's Chief of Staff, Ridgway did not publicly disrespect Secretary Wilson until the publication of his memoir, "I felt there was a woeful lack of comprehension of the role the foot soldier must play in ensuring the safety of this country. Nor did I feel that any genuine effort was made to remedy this lack of understanding."[275] In a later oral history interview for the Department of Defence, Ridgway was more blunt, "My opinion of Mr. Wilson—his abilities, his personality—is very low."[276]

---

[272] Ibid., p. 323-332. Ridgway letter to Secretary of Defence Charlie Wilson, dated 27 June 1955, published as appendix 1 to Soldier; available as well in Ridgway files at USAHEC as well.
[273]Ibid., p. 327.
[274] Ibid., p. 331
[275] Ibid., p. 311.
[276] U.S. Department of Defence, Office of the Historian, Oral History Transcript of Interview with General Matthew B. Ridgway, April 18-19, 1984, p. 35. <

General Ridgway continued his tirade against Secretary Wilson, "we had, in my opinion, a thoroughly incompetent Secretary of Defence who was intolerant and prejudiced and wouldn't listen and knew nothing about the military establishment."[277] General Ridgway failed to comprehend why President Eisenhower chose the former Chief Executive Officer of General Motors, one of the largest corporations in America at the time, who had led the defence production efforts of General Motors during World War II. Again, General Ridgway failed to understand the strategic and bureaucratic requirements incumbent upon success at the level to which he had risen.

After Ridgway's retirement memorandum to the Secretary of Defence and his retirement from the Army after 38 years of service in June 1955, he was free to provide the American public his unvarnished military opinion on the national military strategy adopted by the Eisenhower administration. In January 1956, as President Eisenhower finished his recovery from a heart attack suffered in the fall of 1955, General (Retired) Ridgway published a series of articles in the *Saturday Evening Post*. This four-part publication became the genesis for his memoir, *Soldier*, which was released later that year with the help of writer Harold Martin. Interestingly, *The Saturday Evening Post* broke down the four-part publication, focusing the first two parts on the "Conflict in the Pentagon" and "Keep the Army Out of Politics," whilst the last two parts of the serial focus on the tactical and operational successes Ridgway enjoyed as a combat leader in World War II and Korea.[278] Once again, Ridgway sought to fight his battles at the tactical rather than the strategic level, in the individual realm versus the bureaucratic arena of politics.

---

http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_RidgwayMatthew4-18-1984.pdf>, accessed 25 May 2016.

[277] Ibid, p. 28.

[278] Ridgway, as told to Harold T. Martin, My Battles in War and Peace. In four parts published by the *Saturday Evening Post*, January 21 – February 25, 1956.

However, as General Ridgway decried the political and bureaucratic arenas, he received advice from Bernard Baruch, a well-known political and economic advisor of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. As he left his post as the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, Baruch urged General Ridgway "go right down the line telling people the truth. Don't ever yield to political pressure to do otherwise."[279] General Ridgway saw this as his clarion call for truth, and he never failed to offer his unvarnished military and professional opinions regardless of the impact. In a letter written in 1974, almost 20 years after his retirement from the Army, Hamilton Fish, another politician and political advisor, quotes President Abraham Lincoln as he writes to Ridgway, "to sin by silence when you should protest, makes cowards of men."[280] Ridgway took these words to heart as he served as the Army Chief of Staff, whether he knew them at the time.

As the *Saturday Evening Post* published multiple articles in January 1956 that were not kind to the administration, Presidential Press Secretary James Hagerty readied President Dwight Eisenhower for the first presidential press conference after Eisenhower's recovery from the heart attack he suffered in the fall of 1955 whilst vacationing in Denver, Colorado. Hagerty energetically prepared President Eisenhower for perhaps the most important press conference of his first term with the added stress of the beginning of election-year politics, the President's health, and the publication of two articles that were causing negative reaction to the administration. The first article, written by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, alarmingly referred to the administration bringing the U.S. to the "brink of war" on three separate occasions during President Eisenhower's first term. The second article, published in the

[279] MBR papers, Box 75, Telephone Conversation with Baruch, March 23, 1956.
[280] MBR papers, Box 47, "Letter from Hamilton Fish on Women in Service Academies, dated 10/10/1974.

Saturday Evening Post, was General (Retired) Matthew Ridgway's precursor to his memoir, which was to be published later in the year.

In the preparation for the press conference, Hagerty noted that the President will refer any questions on General Ridgway's comments back to the Department of Defence but will refer to his years of military decision-making and advice received regarding those decisions.[281] What happened was a deft deflection of General Ridgway's criticism on the size of the U.S. Army and the reliance of the administration's national security policy on nuclear deterrence. The two most important points that President Eisenhower made in response to the question on General Ridgway's disparagement are emblematic of the president's ability to handle criticism and manage issues at the strategic level using the press conference as his method to cut through the bureaucracy of Washington politics. His nimble remarks left it plain for all to see General Ridgway's inability to move his dialogue and expertise above the tactical and operational levels onto the strategic plane.

President Eisenhower parried the first line of attack of General Ridgway, chiefly that the Army did not agree to the budgetary limits on the size of the Army, as had been stated by the President in his State of the Union address less than two weeks prior to the press conference. The president deflected these comments by referring them back to the Department of Defence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Then, to put an end to the discussion, President Eisenhower remarked that if he had followed all the military advice he was given in the spring of 1944, there would have been no attack across the English Channel to Normandy.[282]

* * *

[281] James Hagerty Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Boxes 59-68, Press Conference Preparation and Notes for Presidential Press Conference on January 19, 1956.
[282] Ibid.

Retired U.S. Army Brigadier General John Brown, former director of the U.S. Army Centre for Military History, opined, in a 2006 editorial about disputes between military and civilian leaders of the Armed Forces, that Ridgway's "revolt" and his "resignation" were teaching points for current military leaders on how to take decisive action when faced with a professional and philosophical disagreement. Unfortunately, General Brown inaccurately characterized General Ridgway's departure from service; General Ridgway retired at the end of his only two-year term as the Army Chief of Staff.[283] General Ridgway did not resign, and it is not clear if he retired in protest over the administration's strategy. In fact, General Ridgway wrote, on multiple occasions, that his retirement in 1955 was an act that he had long been considering, and that one of the reasons he took the appointment as the Army Chief of Staff was to return his family back to the United States in order to set the initial conditions for his retirement.[284] General Ridgway clarified this with historian Clay Blair in 1984 whilst Blair was researching his military histories involving Ridgway, writing that the general and his wife decided in early 1953 to retire in 1955, even though he knew he was under consideration for appointment as the Army Chief of Staff.[285] Understanding the history of the Eisenhower administration and its relationship with the Army leaders who revolted against the "New Look" national security policy is important. If the military profession does not learn the truth our history has for us, then these key lessons will be lost to time.

General Matthew Ridgway's revolt against President Eisenhower and his administration's "New Look" national security strategy of nuclear deterrence focused on

[283] John S. Brown, "Revolt of the Generals," Army; Sep 2006; 56, 9.
[284] Ridgway, *Soldier,* p. 260. Additionally, Ridgway wrote Lawrence Korb on 12 October 1986, and insisted in that letter that he retired voluntarily. Ridgway MSS, Box 34, AHEC. However, there still exists some debate: Ridgway did not resign, he retired, but President Eisenhower did not have plans to re-appoint Ridgway to his position as the Army Chief of Staff, a two-year appointment.
[285] MBR papers, Box 34, "Letter from Ridgway to Clay Blair," dated 13 March 1984.

General Ridgway's philosophical and moral problems with nuclear war and his belief in the primacy of the American soldier. This dissonance with the President and his administration's national security strategy arose for several reasons. Eisenhower viewed General Ridgway's appointment and responsibilities as Chief of Staff of the Army differently than General Ridgway, himself, did; General Ridgway saw his role as a parochial leader of the Army, whilst Eisenhower understood an additional, broad-minded responsibility of participation in a more expansive national security process. General Ridgway's focus and inclination as a leader was less expensive than the President's intent; President Eisenhower understood complex, strategic problems and thought in ways to address them. Unfortunately, General Ridgway's inability to grow and mature into a strategic leader did not magically fade as he took the reins of the Army as the Chief of Staff, and he continued to focus on the tactical aspects of problems as he had throughout his successful Army career. This difference goes back to the formative experience of both military leaders during World War II. President Eisenhower led the strategic alliance that toppled the Nazis in Europe; General Ridgway led tactical forces that executed some of the most daring attacks against German defences as part of that Allied force. Ridgway's tactical and operational excellence did not translate into success at the strategic levels, as the CINC-Far East, Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, and as the Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

Their differences on national security played out across the bureaucracy of Washington, in the press, and, later, in books. President Eisenhower skilfully mastered the bureaucratic politics of Washington and proved adept at outmanoeuvring the Army Chief of Staff in myriad ways during the first two years of his administration. Whether it was changing the attendance policy at National Security Council meetings to ensuring tacit agreement on downsizing the Pentagon budget, President Eisenhower outflanked General Ridgway. President Eisenhower's

Vice-President Richard Nixon remarked that the President "was a far more complex and devious man than most people realized," adding "in the best sense of those words."[286] This skill and cunning drove General Ridgway to debate the President individually in the media and Congress. Whilst General Ridgway initiated and continued the discussion through his term as the Army's Chief of Staff, President Eisenhower's administration "won" the debate and maintained a policy of nuclear deterrence, which enabled eight years of peace and prosperity for the United States as it entered the formative years of the Cold War.

General Ridgway's revolt was both parochial and idealistic; he felt that that he, as the senior uniformed Army office, should defend the Army's budget and improve its operations within his guidance. Additionally, he felt that the president's strategy was both strategically unsound, incapable of containing the Sino-Soviet Bloc and stopping the spread of communism, and immoral, antithetical to the American way of war. President Eisenhower's budget increased the Air Force, from 114 to 137 wings, and reduced U.S. Army manpower by over 500,000 from 1953 to 1956. Ridgway fought his revolt in the pages of Army doctrine, in the meeting rooms of the National Security Council, in the press, and with the American Congress. However, the revolt that Ridgway began, and which would be carried on by General Jim Gavin and Ridgway's successor, General Maxwell Taylor, would prove to be unsuccessful ultimately due to the political and strategic leadership of President Eisenhower.

Unfortunately, for Ridgway, Eisenhower deftly manoeuvred through the bureaucracies of the Pentagon and the White House and handled the press in a manner that left little doubt as to the winner of their disagreement. General Ridgway brought his focus on tactical matters and his religious zeal for the American soldier to the halls of the Pentagon and the U.S. Congress, but this fervour merely served to highlight the inability of Ridgway to succeed

[286] Richard M Nixon, *Six Crises* (New York: Doubleday, 1962), p. 161.

against the bureaucratic capability that President Eisenhower displayed. General Bradley commented on the appointment, "With his prestige, background, and energy, Ridgway would be an inspiring Chief of Staff. If he got overzealous, as he tended to, Eisenhower would be right there to restrain him. Thus, Ridgway was kicked upstairs to the highest uniformed position in the Army."[287] This would not be the first nor would it be the last round in strategic and bureaucratic manoeuvres in which Eisenhower showed his expertise. It may not be fair to describe Ridgway as stumbling into the position as Army Chief of Staff, but, as he later wrote, he took the position with the intent to retire in 1955 and wanted to ensure he had a position back in the United States which made it easier for him and his family to start their life after the military.[288]

Eight years of peace and prosperity for the American people served as the real hallmark of the Eisenhower presidency. In 1961, as Eisenhower watched President Kennedy deliver a stirring inaugural address on a cold January day, the leader who had spent 20 years on the global strategic stage worried about the ability of his successor to do a job that eight years ago, he had thought only himself capable of doing. President Eisenhower faithfully served and led the United States in war and peace for close to 20 years, as a military leader, private citizen, and as a politician. Unfortunately, for the first two years of his presidency, he had to deal with the Chief of Staff of the Army—of his beloved Army—who tried to wage a war of words with him on the strategic stage. General Ridgway, a soldier's soldier and an almost, unparalleled combat leader, decided to wage this revolt against what he considered to be an immorality—nuclear war. He tried and failed. General Ridgway could not outmanoeuvre President

[287] Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life*, p. 659.
[288] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 259-260. Ridgway also reiterated this point of view in a letter dated 13 March 1984 to historian Clay Blair.

Eisenhower much the same as Nazi Germany found they could not outdo General Eisenhower and his Allied Forces in World War II.

PART TWO

General James M. Gavin:

Paratrooper and Military Intellectual?

CHAPTER SIX

Gavin and Eisenhower: A Strategic Debate on Warfare

While General Matthew Ridgway rose to be Chief of Staff of the Army, perhaps no soldier or officer is more readily identified with the American Army's airborne community than Lieutenant General James M. "Jumping Jim" Gavin—indeed, the 82nd Airborne Division headquarters bears his name. Gavin was the only general officer to participate in the four combat airborne operations of World War Two, having climbed the ranks from the Provisional Parachute Group, through the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, to command of the division during Operation Market Garden. However, the mythos surrounding Gavin, much as those surrounding Ridgway, requires critical re-evaluation. Specifically, historians must re-assess his time spent serving on the Army staff between 1954 and 1958 and his support to the insurrection against the Eisenhower's national security strategy, since Gavin was the senior uniformed officer to serve during both Ridgway and Taylor's reigns as the Chief of Staff.[289]

This chapter will explore the evolution of Gavin's relationship with the study of land warfare and his collision course with the Eisenhower administration's national security strategy. It starts with Gavin's return to West Point as a tactics instructor in 1940 and continues through the end of the Eisenhower administration. Gavin found himself in direct conflict with the Eisenhower administration's national security strategy as he served two separate Army Chiefs of Staff. Although Gavin retired in 1957, his revolt against the Eisenhower administration continued as he transitioned into private life,

[289] James Gavin letter to Brigadier General (Ret.) Lyal Metheny, September 8, 1977. Gavin Papers, U.S. Army War College Archives, Box 20. While the Revolt of the Colonels was written about in the late 1950s and 1960s, this episode in the history of the Army staff has not been well researched or written about in military history. To give this episode the mantle of "revolt" is to give it more credence than it might merit, however, it was an attempt by the U.S. Army staff to circumvent the policy initiatives of President. While each service circumvented the executive branch to some degree, interacting with Congress and the press to ensure their service-specific perspective saw the light of day, the revolt of the Army's colonels is notable because it was a revolt against one of their own, President Eisenhower and served the needs of Generals Ridgway and Taylor. General James Gavin had a major role in orchestrating the actions of the colonels from his position as the Army's Director of Operations and Planning (G3).

serving as a national security advisor to then-Senator John F. Kennedy and, later, serving as President Kennedy's Ambassador to France.

While examining Gavin's revolt against the Eisenhower administration's focus on nuclear deterrence, this chapter/part will highlight Gavin's views on warfare: how those views were formed, how they evolved over time, and several of the constants inherent in those views. It will also consider the reasons behind the policy disagreements between the Eisenhower administration and Gavin—one of the most influential Army intellectuals of the 1950s. Gavin's differences centred around three key factors: a different military background, differing inclinations towards strategic and tactical (and operational) outlooks on national security policy, and dissimilar perspectives on the nature of warfare.

It is necessary to understand the biography of James Gavin—who he was, where he came from, his experiences in the Army, his relationships with key leaders in the administration and the Army, and the academic attitude Gavin exuded through his writings—in order to understand his part in the revolt against the Eisenhower Administration. Gavin was a pivotal figure in the revolt, directly tied to the inner workings of the Coordination Group, central to the work of both the Ridgway and Taylor administrations, and directly tied to the Kennedy campaign after his retirement.

Next, this chapter examines the impact of this debate, specifically looking within the political landscape of Washington politics to understand what happened while Gavin served as one of the highest-ranking Army officers in the United States during the Eisenhower administration. Finally, this section follows Gavin as he retired from the Army and began life in the private sector—although, in practice, he never fully retreated from public service, providing national security counsel to Senator John F. Kennedy, as the young senator began his presidential bid. Kennedy's election would ultimately provide the strongest rebuke of the Eisenhower administration, and marked the move to a new policy of Flexible Response.

* * *

While the story of the youngest division commander in World War II entices the military historian, this popular narrative is incomplete. However, the longer view of the tale of Gavin seduces the military historian, as well. Throughout his career, Gavin constantly sought to better the Army's capability to conduct land warfare, writing numerous articles and books on the future of warfare and working at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of doctrine and policy formulation.[290] From his time at the Airborne Warfare Test Group prior to the formation of the 82nd Airborne Division, through his time on the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group after World War Two, and during his time as the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army for Plans, Lieutenant General Gavin focused his professional efforts on improving the ability of the army to conduct land warfare in support of the national security aims of the United States.

While Gavin's work spent the time in the airborne community from 1941 until his retirement in 1958 focusing on improvements at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, he felt that his work had treated each problem or solution he offered singularly. In his 1958 book *War and Peace in the Space Age*, Gavin conceded that his previous achievements have been inadequate, observing that "each treated with a separate problem in national defence but the over-all problem has never been considered as a whole."[291] With this understanding, Gavin stated that the purpose of War and Peace in the Space Age is "to treat the national problem as an entirety, in terms of space, of the earth, and of the role of all services and the defence establishment that controls them."[292] Whilst Gavin saw the need for reviewing the entirety of the defence establishment and the roles of the services, his work on the Army staff brought him into direct conflict with his President and the President's stated national security strategy.

---

[290] James M. Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, p. ix. Gavin expounds on his bona fides, "During the past ten years I have been closely associated with the development of national defence policy, as a member of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Department of the Army staff, and in the search for tactical innovations in field commands. I have written a number of books and articles during that time, *Airborne Warfare*, "Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons," "Cavalry and I Don't Mean Horses," "Pushbutton Warfare," "Why Missiles," etc."
[291] Ibid., p. ix.
[292] Ibid., p. ix.

Gavin's conflict with the Eisenhower administration's national security program, in contrast to the tactical focus of General Ridgway, highlighted the operational level issues of disagreement between Gavin and the Eisenhower program. While Ridgway's conflict focused on the role of the soldier and the Army's diminished role in the national security strategy of the Eisenhower administration that looked to nuclear deterrence, Gavin's disagreement focused on the operational level of warfare and the role in mobile forces and deep-ranging artillery to provide commanders on the battlefield with an unsurpassed capability to defeat the enemy.

Oddly enough, Gavin's ideas on mobility and the role of the cavalry was not too dissimilar to the work of young Major Eisenhower. Thirty-five years earlier, Eisenhower had formed a relationship with Colonel George Patton when they were next door neighbours, worked together and commanded tank battalions at the training post, and developed tactics, techniques, and procedures for tank formations to fight alongside the infantry. Gavin focused on tactical mobility for the Army and the manoeuvre commander, not just of the airborne forces:

> Cavalry is supposed to be the arm of mobility. It exists and serves a useful purpose because of its mobility differential—the contrast between its mobility and that of other land forces. Without the differential, it is not cavalry. Cavalry is the arm of shock and firepower: it is the screen of time and information. It denies the enemy that talisman of success–surprise–while it provides our own forces with the means to achieve that very thing, surprise, and with it destruction of the enemy.[293]

In this article, however, Gavin implored the reader to look to the past for the future of warfare: "What we now need, as a nation, is an understanding of the past that can be converted into tactics and battle hardware, and give its soul back to the Cavalry."[294] It is intriguing to think that this argument might have swayed a younger Eisenhower. But Gavin's focus on materiel solutions, and especially on re-

[293] James M. Gavin, "Cavalry and I Don't Mean Horses," *Harper's Magazine*, April, 1954. Available online at https://sobchak.wordpress.com/2015/04/23/article-cavalry-and-i-dont-mean-horses-by-major-general-james-m-gavin/ Accessed on 17 February 2021.
[294] Ibid.

capturing the former glory of manoeuvre warfare, could not alter President Eisenhower's focus on nuclear deterrence.

While both officers had their differences, their early service was marked by certain similarities. During his military career, Gavin wrote prolifically, focusing on improvements for the army's ability to fight and win land warfare. As the Operations Officer for the Army's Provisional Parachute Group, in charge of operations, training, and planning, then Major Gavin undertook the lead for the effort to write the army's first doctrinal manual on the operations and employment of airborne forces in combat.[295] Eisenhower, too, spent time, during his assignment to Fort Meade and focused on tactical improvements for the Army's ability to fight its nation's battles. Eisenhower historian, Stephen Ambrose, relates details of the meeting between Patton, Eisenhower, and General Fox Conner (who would later serve as mentor to Eisenhower):

> After dinner, Conner asked Patton and Eisenhower to show him their tanks and explain to him their ideas about the future of their weapon. This was the first—and was to be the only—encouragement they had from a superior officer, and they spent a long afternoon with him, showing him around Camp Meade, explaining to him their ideas.[296]

However, Eisenhower did not inhabit this domain in the way that Gavin truly did. In contrast to Gavin's prolific writing, Eisenhower did not publish and stimulate discussion within the military community.

---

[295] Bradley Biggs, *Gavin*, p. 31. One of only a handful of biographies on James Gavin. While Biggs' work tells a compelling story of General Gavin, the author readily admits that he enjoyed a close relationship with Gavin both in and out of service. As a result of that bias, I have endeavoured to use Biggs work as merely a timeline and corroborating source for other topics.

[296] Stephen Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier and President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), p. 38. Given Ambrose's now-complicated history, I hesitate to use this. However, this small passage is grounded in truth. Patton and Eisenhower served together at Camp Meade; they both commanded tank battalions and worked on the future of tank warfare; and, General Fox Conner did visit, interviewing—and later selecting—Eisenhower to be his aide-de-camp in Panama. This passage is illustrative of their work on the future of tactical warfare involving the tank and shows a difference between Eisenhower and Gavin. Eisenhower wrote but did not focus on publishing; Gavin published his thoughts to stimulate discussion and dialogue within the Army. For additional information, specifically on General Patton, see Carlo d'Este, Patton: *A Genius for War* (New York: Perennial, 1996), Part V and *Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life* (New York: Hold and Co., 2002). Other sources for review include Benjamin Runkle's *Generals in the Making: How Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton and their Peers Became the Commanders Who Won World War II* (Guilford, Ct.: Stackpole Books, 2019), Chapter Three, "The Innovator's Dilemma: Ike, Patton, and Billy Mitchell After the War;" Dwight D. Eisenhower, "A Tank Discussion," *Infantry Journal 17* (November 1920), p. 454-458; and Eisenhower, *At Ease: Stories I Tell My Friends* (New York: Doubleday, 1967).

In fact, Gavin had a disdain for Eisenhower's attitude, as Gavin wrote years later in his notes as he prepared his memoir:

> The problem was that Eisenhower, on one hand, had learned nothing new about military affairs since his younger days, while on the other had everybody in Washington took his word as being gospel. When it was said, "President Eisenhower thinks that this is correct," that was it. You were to genuflect and back off.[297]

While Gavin's clear animus towards Eisenhower remained in place nearly 25 years after his retirement, it was by no means the first time that he had felt this way. Gavin's disdain for Eisenhower emanated from the fundamental disagreements that the younger, former paratrooper turned technologist had with the President's military philosophies and showed clearly throughout the Eisenhower administration.

Gavin's focus on improving himself and his profession dated back to his early childhood as the adopted son of a coal miner brought up in the Pennsylvania coal country, unsure of who he was and where he came from. This uncertainty fuelled his desire to learn, specifically from history, but later, in his retirement, led him to an exhaustive search for his real mother and father.[298] Gavin traces his fondness for military history back to an eighth-grade history class when his teacher taught the children about the Civil War:

> I couldn't understand how a general could control that many men—thousands! I remembered how difficult it was to handle a half-dozen on a hike. To control in battle one hundred thousand, as Grant and Sherman did, was pure magic. Magic, I decided was taught at West Point. I had just read a biography of General Pershing, who had gone to West Point, and I thought how wonderful that would be.[299]

[297] James Gavin, "Notes on DDE," June 23, 1981. Gavin Papers, Box 27.
[298] Gavin Papers, Box 34, "Personal Correspondence and Documents: Search for Mother, U.S. Army History and Education Center (AHEC). This search is detailed in a section of his "unpublished" autobiography, xx. This autobiography and the documents supporting its publication are not currently available in the Gavin Papers at the U.S. Army War College, although previous scholarly works from the 1980s and early-1990s have referenced both the existence and publication of the manuscript. The draft section and research on Gavin's search for his birth mother are available in the papers and have been used for research.
[299] Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, p. 28.

Unfortunately, Gavin realized that his adoptive parents did not support his education past the eighth grade, nor did they support his visions of military service. For a hard-working boy from coal country, Gavin decided that working in the coalmines was not for him. He graduated from working on newspaper routes as a boy to working in a barbershop then to a local gas station by the time he was seventeen. However, Gavin sensed that there was more to life, and he understood that an education would be central to any real advancement or success in life.[300] On his seventeenth birthday, Gavin left his hometown in rural Pennsylvania for New York City.

In New York City, without an education, Gavin found that he could not find decent work other than menial labour, and he quickly realized that no one would hire him and send him to school. Then he found the Army recruiter, promising educational opportunities for "bright and deserving young men, to earn while you learn" and he began his great adventure and career.[301] When his company first sergeant in Panama found out that the young Gavin could read and write, the experienced non-commissioned officer moved the younger Gavin to work in the company orderly room. That same first sergeant would soon change the teenager Gavin's life, pointing out to Gavin the opportunity for soldiers to earn appointments to West Point. Gavin worked and studied hard for the opportunity. He was admitted to West Point as a cadet in the summer of 1925, a little over a year from the day that young Gavin left his adopted family and struck out on his own for New York City.[302]

While Dwight Eisenhower did not rise from the exact hard-scrabble upbringing that Gavin did, there are some parallels between Gavin and Eisenhower: specifically, how both Gavin and Eisenhower came to attend the United States Military Academy at West Point. Eisenhower did not harbour an initial intent to attend West Point, rather hoping to go to college and play football and baseball, instead. But Eisenhower took the entrance exam at the urging of his life-long friend, Swede Hazlett, who hoped that he and Eisenhower could be classmates at the Naval Academy. Both Gavin and Eisenhower owed their attendance at West Point to not only their hard work and study but also to a friend who encouraged

[300] Ibid., p. 29.
[301] Ibid., p. 30.
[302] Ibid., p. 31.

them. Gavin's path to West Point was different than Eisenhower's, but Gavin also owed his attendance at the military academy to someone who encouraged young Gavin to take the entrance exam. A lieutenant in Panama encouraged the young soldier to apply for admission and, with his help, study for the exam. Additionally, both men enjoyed the study of military history, a topic that would serve them well as they began their journeys as military professionals.

Cadet Gavin embraced his time at West Point, enjoying the academic challenges presented by the college; the sense of history that comes from walking in the same footprints as military greats like Generals Lee, Grant, Pershing, and MacArthur; and the commitment to honour and honesty that the Corps of Cadets demands.[303] The main difference between Eisenhower and Gavin (and Ridgway and Taylor) is that Eisenhower never returned to faculty at West Point, spending his time in the operational Army. While Gavin's first several years of military service after graduation from West Point, were not remarkable, Gavin returned to the military academy in 1940 as a tactics instructor. It was a marvellous time for the young officer to focus on the study of military tactics, with the German blitzkrieg and the ground war in Europe foremost in both military and civilian minds in the United States. Gavin remarked years later that he had "hoped for duty at West Point for some years, and so I was delighted with the assignment. It was an opportunity to discuss new tactical ideas and to study and learn through teaching."[304]

Gavin's tenure at West Point, and his search for improvements in warfare, were less academic than Ridgway or Taylor's. Gavin's attention centred squarely on how to improve warfighting tactics for the U.S. Army. Specifically, Gavin found in the Battle of Eben-Emael the method of warfare that he thought would be critical to the U.S. war effort in Europe. "The more I studied the combat of World War II, the more I became convinced that the innovation we needed to perfect in order to achieve a

[303] Ibid., p. 34.
[304] Ibid., p. 38.

margin of advantage in the war would be found in airborne operations."[305] Gavin had found his military calling—the airborne Army—through his first love: the study of tactics and warfare.

During the interwar period before America's entry into World War II, the American Army was wrestling with the advent and evolution of air warfare, the possibility of warfare in the Pacific, the impact of industrialisation on the character of war, and the impact of peacetime budget impacts on the standing Army. However, "military institutions *were* able to innovate in the 1920s and 1930s with considerable success. And these innovations *were not on the margin*."[306] Each service innovated, learning lessons from the technological advancements of the first quarter of the 20th century and from the combat of World War I. Gavin was to be part of this innovation, along with the great names of the Navy and Air Force.

Although General Billy Mitchell was court-martialled in 1925, he is generally considered to be the father of the United States Air Force, even though the Air Force was not separated from the Army until after World War II. Mitchell felt that "the advent of air power, which can go straight to the vital centres and either neutralise or destroy them, has put a completely new complexion on the old system of making war. It is now realized that the hostile main army in the field is a false objective, and the real objectives are the vital centres."[307] Air power could, Mitchell thought, change the character of war by enabling the American military to bypass armoured manoeuvre forces on the front lines and strike military, government, and industrial targets in the enemy's rear. Essentially, "strategic air power is a

---

[305] Ibid., p. 45.

[306] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, ed., *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 2.

[307] William Mitchell, *Skyways: A Book on Modern Aeronautics* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1930), p. 255-256. For more about air power and the impacts on American warfighting see Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*, Chapter 11, "A Strategy of Air Power: Billy Mitchell." Additional insights can be found in General Mitchell's *Memoirs of World War I: From Start to Finish our Greatest War* (New York: Random House, 1960) and *Winged Defense: The Development and the Possibilities of Modern Air Power, Economic and Military* (New York: Putnam, 1925); B.H. Liddell Hart, *Paris: Or the Future of War* (New York: Dutton, 1925); Giulio Douhet, as translated by Dino Ferrari, "Command of the Air," Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, available at https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0160_DOUHET_THE_COMMAND_OF_THE_AIR.PDF; accessed 2 September 2021; Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission, (New York: Harper, 1949); Thomas H. Greer, *The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Corps, 1917-1941* (Montgomery, Al.: Air University, 1955); and Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

war-winning weapon in its own right, and is capable of striking decisive blows far behind the battle line, thereby destroying the enemy's capacity to wage war."[308]

Likewise, the Navy focused its efforts after World War I on understanding how America could use its Navy to project power around the globe, using the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, as the intellectual centre for this discussion. The discussion quickly came to war in the Pacific, known as War Plan Orange, because the Navy considered that the "most probable. It is by far the most difficult, for the Navy. It will require the greatest maritime effort yet made by any nation."[309] The U.S. Navy and the Department of War put tremendous intellectual rigour that into its war plans in the Pacific which drove the Navy to understand and improve its logistical supply chain and capabilities in the Pacific, to look at the capabilities of its ships, and, ultimately, to drive towards a nuclear navy.

Each of these different service efforts amounted to an intellectual renaissance.[310] It was this to this intellectual renaissance that Gavin found himself drawn, focusing his military intellect on the nascent concept of airborne warfare. While Gavin focused his intellectual efforts on airborne warfare, his future would not be left spent in a classroom. Gavin chose to focus his military future on the airborne concept, and the Army, after initially balking, supported the young officer's efforts.

While serving at West Point in the tactics department, Gavin applied for service with the only parachute battalion on active duty in the Army, but the War Department initially disapproved his request.[311] However, Gavin persisted, just as he had when he joined the Army and studied for an

---

[308] Henry H. Arnold, "Air Strategy for Victory," *Flying*, XXXIII, NO. 4 (October 1943), p. 50.
[309] "The Navy War Plans Division: Naval Plans and Planning," U.S. Army War College, War Plans Division Course No 10., March 11, 1924, p. 6, copy in the Tasker H. Bliss Papers, Library of Congress, Box 280. For additional reading see, Russell Weigley's *The American Way of War*, Chapter 12, "A Strategy for Pacific Ocean War: Naval Strategists of the 1920s and 1930s" and Chapter 13, "The Strategic Tradition of A.T. Mahan: Strategists of the Pacific War;" Edward S. Miller, *War Plan Orange: The U.S Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991); and, John T. Kuehn, *Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet that Defeated the Japanese Navy* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008).
[310] I equate the Air Force as a service, even though the Air Force was not actually a service but a component of the Army, the U.S. Army Air Corps, at that time. The U.S. Congress established the U.S. Air Force in September 1947 as part of the National Security Act of 1947. Additionally, the Marine Corps is part of the U.S. Navy; Orange Planning encompassed Marine Corps requirements in the Pacific.
[311] Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, p. 45.

appointment to West Point. He worked with a friend of his in the personnel office of the Chief of Infantry, looking to find replacements for his position at West Point. After several months, the War Department approved Gavin's re-assignment, and he reported for duty as the company commander of Charlie Company, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment. Before the fall of 1941 Gavin was promoted to major and reassigned to the Provisional Parachute Group as the operations officer and given the task of writing the first doctrinal manual for the airborne Army forces, *The Tactics and Techniques of Air-borne Troops*.[312] This assignment would join two main professional interests for Gavin—the study of future warfare and airborne operations.

Gavin served for the next seven years in the Army's airborne community, rising to the rank of Major General and commanding the 82nd Airborne Division during the latter part of World War Two. In fact, "Jumping Jim" Gavin was the youngest division commander in the Army, reaching that position at the age of 37; additionally, Gavin would be the only general officer that completed four combat airborne operations, jumping into battle in Sicily, Salerno, Normandy, and Operation Market Garden in the Netherlands. Initially, Gavin commanded the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, deployed the unit to Northern Africa and trained them prior to the invasion of Europe. Contemporary biographer, Harold Martin, quoted an 82nd Airborne Division veteran, "I don't know what kind of desk general he's made since the war…But I do know this: In combat, he was one hell of a man. He could jump higher, shout louder, spit farther, and fight harder than any man I ever saw. He was always up there where it was hottest, toting an M-1 like any rifleman."[313] In line with those sentiments, a prominent biography of Gavin, *Paratrooper*, focuses on Gavin's time as a paratrooper and leader with the 82nd Airborne Division during World War Two. Although that story is, in and of itself, worth telling, it is not the focus of this research effort.

[312] U.S. War Department, "Field Manual 31-30: Tactics and Technique of Air-borne Troops" (Washington, D.C.: United States Government, 1942). Available online at https://www.ablecompany502pir.org/files/FM_31-30_May_1942.pdf. Accessed on 11 September 2021.
[313] Harold Martin, *Saturday Evening Post*, "Paratrooper in the Pentagon," September 28, 1954. Gavin Papers, Box 20.

Not much surpassed the thrill of leading paratroopers in combat, as Gavin would discuss before he retired:

> God knows I don't like war and fighting…and particularly I don't like jumping out of planes. I never stood in the door for a combat jump that I didn't feel a terrible apprehension—the uglier word is fear. But I never hit the ground with my troopers dropping around me that I didn't feel a tremendous exultation, a surge of pride that my country could produce such fighting men, and that I had the privilege of leading them.[314]

While one can hardly imagine the intensity of commanding paratroopers at the tactical level (brigade and division-level) during airborne combat operations in World War Two, certainly a major thrill for the youngest division commander in the U.S. Army would have been leading his division down the streets of New York City during the historic victory parade in January 1946. However, shortly after the division's return from the European Theatre of Operations, Gavin would find the division short of men and engaged in the Army's eternal peacetime struggle for relevancy. As he looked back on the lessons of World War II, after returning to Fort Bragg, North Carolina with his beloved division, Gavin continued his introspective look at the American way of war, writing a professional article on the growing need for air transport capability. But this article was returned by the Department of Defence and not allowed to be published. Clearly, Gavin's sentiments ran afoul of the predominant materiel solution in the Air Force at the time—the strategic bomber. This topic of tactical and strategic mobility would prove to be the prevailing theme of Gavin's military intellectualism.

During this post-war period, he published his book, *Airborne Warfare*, focusing on the future of airborne operations. For years, Gavin's tome was considered by many to be the "bible," or definitive accounting of U.S. Army airborne operations. This work shifted the perception of Gavin from that of young fighter to military theorist and would bring him onto a future collision path with one of the most respected military men of his time, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, as they both saw the future of warfare from different perspectives. In 1947 Gavin mused, "never in the history of mankind, certainly,

[314] Ibid., p. 83.

has anything affected the man's thinking and his probably military behaviour so drastically as the atomic bomb. It changes—must greatly change—our whole military thinking, organization, and tactics."[315]

This focus on the airborne forces stems not just from Gavin's fondness of airborne warfare, rather it is a by-product of the true motivation of his career—the improvement of the Army's capability to conduct successful land warfare. Since the focus in 1940 on the German parachute forces, Gavin's attention on how to improve the Army became his raison d'etre. He followed up his book, *Airborne Warfare*, with a series of articles published by the Army's professional journal, *Military Review*. In December 1947, he authored an article, "The Future of Airborne Operations," taking the lessons learned from his World War II experience and postulating that the bombers would be replaced in primacy by missiles, this transition would increase the role for transport aircraft delivering paratroopers and soldiers to battle.[316] His next article would expound on this theory.

In January of 1948, Gavin published "The Future of Armour" in the *Infantry Journal*, another professional journal of the American Army, and expanded on his thoughts for cargo aircraft. This article focused on the need for lighter armoured vehicles that were transportable to the forward edge of battle, thereby increasing operational mobility.[317] He went even further in this article, advocating the adoption of the airborne armoured cavalry, "striking at high speed by air, and entering ground combat that requires mobility and the retention of the initiative until the decision is gained, the armoured cavalry will play the decisive role in the future airborne combat."[318] While several of his views would seem prophetic given importance of the airborne capability to the Army, "the nation that in the future has the best trained and equipped airborne forces has the best chance of survival…The knowledge of a well-trained airborne army, capable of moving anywhere on the globe on short notice, available to an international body such as the United Nations, is our best guarantee of a lasting peace."[319] However,

---

[315] James M. Gavin, *Airborne Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), p. 140
[316] James M. Gavin, "The Future of Airborne Operations," *Military Review* XXVII, no. 9 (December 1947), p. 3-8.
[317] James, M. Gavin, "The Future of Armor," *Infantry Journal* LXII, no 1. (January 1948), p. 7-11.
[318] Ibid., p. 11. In fact, GEN Westmoreland wrote LTG (ret.) Gavin a note when the Army adopted the concept of the air cavalry. The air cavalry became famous during the Vietnam War, using helicopters to move units, supplies, and casualties around the battlefield in a manner consistent with the previous writings of Gavin.
[319] Gavin, *Airborne Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), p. 170.

Gavin failed to understand the strategic setting in which the Army operated. As Eisenhower retired from the military and won election to the presidency, his entire focus would be on the strategic level of war; Eisenhower's lessons from Europe, coupled with the changing landscape of strategy in the atomic, would feature prominently in the administration's New Look national security strategy.

Gavin and Eisenhower agreed on this basic premise—that the atomic bomb would change the future of warfare. President Eisenhower believed that the power of the atom bomb brought unmatched devastation and combat power to bear on the modern battlefield. Eisenhower laid out this argument at his "Atoms for Peace" speech at the United Nations on December 8, 1953:

> Today, the United States stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of course, Increases daily, exceeds by many times the total [explosive] equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and every gun in every theatre of war in all the years of World War II. A single air group, whether afloat or land based, can now deliver to any reachable target a destructive cargo exceeding in power all the bombs that fell on Britain in all of World War II. In size and variety, the development of atomic weapons has been no less remarkable. The development has been such that atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services. In the United States, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps are all capable of putting this weapon to military use. But the dread secret and the fearful engines of atomic might are not ours alone.[320]

While both Gavin and Eisenhower expressed the opinion that the atomic bomb had changed warfare, they differed greatly in their estimation on how it had changed the nature of war and this difference was rooted in how they approached war. Eisenhower approached warfare from a political-coalition perspective; Gavin from the ground up in terms of fire and manoeuvre against an enemy.

[320] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Atoms for Peace," Speech given at the United Nations, December 8, 1953. Available online at https://www.atomicheritage.org/key-documents/eisenhowers-atoms-peace-speech, accessed on 11 February 2021.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Gavin and Eisenhower: The Debate Takes Form

As with Ridgway, this airborne experience galvanized Gavin's belief in the primacy of the U.S. Army, its soldiers, and the tenets of land warfare, specifically, firepower, mobility, and control. Gavin's forged these viewpoints during those four combat jumps in Europe and strengthened them in the subsequent years during several "intellectual" posts within the Army's bureaucracy. This section will not restate the development of Eisenhower's viewpoint; instead, it will focus on the development of Gavin's position and how his perspectives differed from those of the former Commanding General of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force and President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Gavin, looking back on his jump into Salerno, in *Airborne Warfare*, acknowledged what he first theorized at West Point and then came to believe in during his experiences in World War II.

> The airborne troops had a decisive influence on the outcome of the Salerno operation. At a moment when the scales of defeat and victory were in balance, the weight of the airborne reserves tipped them to the side of victory…The airborne troops had a mobility and a striking power that no high commander could overlook in the future. Correct and timely commitment and exploitation of such forces could turn the tide of battle."[321]

Gavin believed that the decisive influence is not just the ability of young paratroopers to jump out of planes and shock the opposing enemy. Rather, the decisive capability is the mobility and striking power that an airborne force gives to the commander in the field, capable of seizing key terrain and initiative on the battlefield. In World War II and shortly thereafter, as Gavin wrote:

> Airborne troops are our best national security and the worlds' most promising hope for international security.
>
> The knowledge of the existence of a well trained [sic] airborne army, capable of moving anywhere on the globe on short notice, available to an international security body such

[321] Gavin, *Airborne Warfare*, p. 31.

> as the United Nations is our best guarantee of lasting peace. And the nation or nations that control the air will control the peace.[322]

However, as Gavin pointed out, as technology improved, that mobility could be achieved through helicopters and other modern equipment. A colleague of General Gavin's commented, "What Jim seems to have in mind…is some sort of big steel grasshopper that can hop about in the enemy's rear, spilling out men and cannon and armoured cars, and picking them up and bringing them home again after they've shot up everything in sight. The trouble is, we haven't yet got the grasshopper."[323] Although Gavin never stopped thinking about the future of war and improving how the Army fought in conjunction with the other services, he could not leave the past behind. For him the future was not revolutionary, rather it was simply an updated form of manoeuvre with more modern equipment. In place of the horse cavalry of the United States Civil War, he saw mounted tank cavalry; and in place of the forced march on foot over terrain to the rear of an enemy's force, he saw transport aircraft or helicopters moving paratroopers to seize terrain.

For Eisenhower, the primacy did not reside with the service or form of manoeuvre, rather the coalition formed by those participating in the conflict and the entirety of the power those countries could muster. At its essence, Eisenhower's belief in military operations was mirrored in his time at the White House, (1) developing an organisation or coalition, (2) developing a system or process for operations, and (3) providing leadership.

As he had done with the military and political leaders of Europe, Eisenhower as president focused on NATO, the U.N., and specific allies, like the United Kingdom. As with his military leadership, during his time in the White House, President Eisenhower established the organisation or coalition at echelon, instituting "a systematic process closely bound to the organizational structures. At his own level he gave emphasis to the developing policy and foresighted planning, delegating operations and implementation, insofar as possible."[324] This White House organisation drew its lineage back to

---

[322] Ibid., p. 175.
[323] Martin, "Paratrooper in the Pentagon," p. 81.
[324] Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immelman, *Waging Peace,* p. vii. Foreword by General (Retired) Andrew Goodpaster, who served as Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower.

Eisenhower's military service, specifically his time as Supreme Commander in Europe, ensuring that his cabinet secretaries, just like he did with his subordinate Army and corps commanders, handled their business at the appropriate level. Goodpaster quotes President Eisenhower as having said on multiple occasions, "Organization cannot make a genius out of a dunce. But it can provide its head with the facts he needs, and help him avoid misinformed mistakes."[325] Additionally, Eisenhower drew upon the wisdom of von Moltke the Elder, holding forth that "plans are nothing, but the planning is everything."[326] President Eisenhower would personally engage in high level planning sessions, much like a strategic military commander, weighing options and recommendations before making a decision.

Eisenhower, "himself would address those issues that he deemed to be of major importance, or that had not been fully foreseen, with the full participation of his responsible subordinates in Oval Office meetings wherein the particulars of these complex questions could be thoroughly aired, and the courses of action thoroughly deliberated."[327] At the essence of Eisenhower's reorganisation of the National Security Council was the campaign promise he made to "transform this agency [the National Security Council] from shadow to substance."[328] The Eisenhower administration, at the newly elected President's request, attempted to address the failings of the Truman White House and National Security Council, as articulated by Eisenhower mentor, former Army Chief of Staff and Secretary of Defence and State, George C. Marshall. The true weaknesses of the Truman NSC centred on three key aspects: (1) the meetings consisted "of busy men who had no time to pay to the business before them, and not being prepared, therefore took refuge in non-participation or in protecting their own departments," (2) the policy papers of the NSC "never presented alternatives to decide upon," and (3) that President Truman "was not a leader, a force at the table to bring out discussion."[329] President Eisenhower used

[325] Ibid, p. vi.
[326] Ibid., p. vii.
[327] Ibid., p. vi.
[328] Eisenhower speech in Baltimore, Maryland, 25 September 1952, "Sept 15, 1952-Sept 25, 1952," Speech Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL.
[329] George C. Marshall testimony to the National Security Council Study, December 27, 1952, "Cutler, Robert A., 1952-1954 (5)," Cabinet Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. For an overview of the National Security Council, it's history and purpose, see Christopher C. Shoemaker, "The National Security Council Staff: Structure and Formations," *The Land Warfare Papers*, Association of the United States Army, No. 3, December 1989, available at www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/LWP-3-The-National-Security-Council-Staff-Structure-and-Funcions.pdf. Accessed on 2 September 2021. For additional reading see Robert Cutler, "The Development of

the National Security and Cabinet to shape decisions and foster healthy debate on specific topics of note, ensuring that the president and his key leaders fully understood the issues and that the president was prepared to make a decision when required.[330]

The President relayed these aspects to the joint chiefs in 1956, as the Army's revolt against the administration's national security policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreement with staffing and functions of the joint staff were hitting a fevered pitch. While Eisenhower disagreed with the sentiments of his service chiefs, he felt dismayed with their inability to work together and rise above service parochialism. Throughout his presidency, Eisenhower never felt completely comfortable with the service chiefs and with the joint staff.

Eisenhower's discomfort with the service chiefs emanated from their inability to rise above the parochial leadership of their service and embrace the joint-ness of the Department of Defence. However, the President did not publicly share this view with many, venting only to his friend Swede Hazlett, "my most frustrating domestic problem is that of attempting to achieve any real coordination among the Services."[331] While this discomfort had been building since he first took office, General Ridgway's retirement and his public indignation at the administration's national security strategy, combined with the continued barrage of complaints, both public and private from the Army, served merely to fuel this irritation. As Eisenhower continued in his letter to Hazlett, the "Armed Services are to defend a 'way

---

the National Security Council," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 34, No. 3 (April 1956), pp. 441-458; and see memorandum available in the DDEL, specifically, W.Y. Elliott memorandum for Arthur S. Flemming, December 23, 1952, "NSC—Organization and Functions [1949-1953], NSC Series, Administration Subseries, White House Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (WHOSANSA); Milton S. Eisenhower to Robert Cutler, "NSC—Organization and Functions [1949-1953], Ibid.

[330] Eisenhower, "The Central Role of the President in the Conduct of Security Affairs," Amos A. Jordan, Jr., ed., *Issues in National Security in the 1970s* (New York: Praeger Books, 1967), p. 214. Eisenhower writes, "To my mind, the secret of a sound, satisfactory decision made on an emergency basis has always been that the responsible official has been 'living with the problem' before it becomes acute…Failure to use, on a continuing basis, the National Security Council entails losing the capacity to make emergency decisions based on depth of understanding and perspective—that is, on a clear comprehension of the issues involved, the risks, the advantages to be gained, and the effects of this particular action." Also, see Fred I. Greenstein and Richard H. Immerman, "Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 115, No. 3, Autumn, 200, pp. 225-345; and Paul D. Miller, "The Contemporary Presidency: Organizing the National Security Council: I Like Ike's," Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 43, Issue 3., September 2013, pp. 592-606.

[331] Eisenhower to Swede Hazlett, August 20, 1956. Hazlett, Edward E. "Swede" Papers, 1941-1965. DDEL.

of life,' not merely land, property or lives."[332] It was this way of life that Eisenhower focused on—or, as Secretary of Defence put it to the service chiefs, "a sound U.S. economy continues to be a necessary part of the fundamental values and institutions we seek to protect."[333]

In early 1956, the President asked the Wilson to convene the joint chiefs and re-consider the defence strategy for his second term. This meeting at Ramey Air Base in Puerto Rico, would be reminiscent of the Joint Chiefs' initial gathering in 1953 aboard the USS *Sequoia*.[334] The basic premises that Secretary Wilson gave the chiefs were (1) that a "sound U.S. economy continues to be a necessary part of the fundamental values and institutions we seek to protect," and (2) that the U.S. would employ nuclear weapons within their strategy of war.[335] While Wilson knew that the Defence Department would be asking for increased resources, both he and Eisenhower hoped the service chiefs could put aside parochialism and make informed recommendations based on the administration's strategy and importance of balancing defence with the national economy.

However, in March the service chiefs came back to the Secretary and the administration with additional resource requirement totalling between three and five billion dollars for the 1958-1960 timeframe.[336] This request frustrated the president, wrote to Wilson in late March:

> There is one disappointing feature about my three years experience dealing with the Defence Problem. It is that every recommendation made by military authorities increase in strength or money or in both. It seems odd that recommendations are so

---

[332] Ibid., p. 2.
[333] Memorandum from the Secretary of Defence to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Military Strategy and Posture," 27 January 1956, JCS 2101/225, CCS 381, Sec. 61.
[334] In addition to the bureaucratic wrangling over the budget, in September 1955, President Eisenhower suffered a heart attack that would, later in November 1957, be the cause of a stroke the President suffered. While these health issues were serious, the President felt the burden of the presidency and believed that he alone could maintain peace and security in the world. While he fought with his military leaders and political foes, President Eisenhower won re-election in 1956 and continued to focus on a platform of peace and continued economic prosperity for the American people.
[335] Memorandum from the Secretary of Defence to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Military Strategy and Posture," January 27, 1956, JCS 2101/225, CCS, Sec. 61. Additionally, a history of the joint chiefs of staff by Kenneth Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume VI, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1955-1956*, available at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Policy/Policy_V006.pdf. Accessed 27 February 2021. This is an official history of the joint staff and provides illumination and highlighting of issues that the joint staff and service chiefs dealt with during the Eisenhower administration.
[336] Condit, Kenneth, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume VI, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1955-1956,* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, the Joint Staff, 1992), p. 51-52, available online at http://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA323797.pdf; accessed 21 September 2021.

> rarely accompanied by a suggestion that money could be saved in some of our great and complex administrative operations.[337]

In a similar vein, Eisenhower wrote to Hazlett in 1956 and 1958, complaining of the failure of the services to agree, lamenting, "I have made little or no progress in developing real corporate thinking."[338] Eisenhower's irritation was evident in almost every meeting with the Secretary of Defence, with or without the service chiefs, and Eisenhower counselled Secretary Wilson to understand the difference "between a respectable posture of defence, and an all-out military build-up."[339] This intractable difference between Eisenhower and his service chiefs, and their leadership, was the result of a failure for the services to understand Eisenhower's strategic vision and place their service priorities behind the corporate good of national defence.

Gavin and Eisenhower: Thinking Tactically and Strategically

The relationship between Gavin and Eisenhower remains something of a mystery, although Gavin's papers provide some insights. The two worked together briefly when Gavin, as the Assistant Division Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, served as the senior U.S. airborne planner during the initial planning for Operation Overlord, the airborne and amphibious invasion of Normandy. Gavin's encounters with Eisenhower continued through the war, as Gavin went on to lead the 82nd Airborne Division during Operation Market Garden and the Battle of Bastogne. Although Gavin may have showed public respect to Eisenhower, he came to view him as a grandfatherly figure that was overly concerned with the political nature of his job as the SHAEF Commander and of his political future.

In the winter of 1947, General S. LeRoy (Red) Erwin, a classmate of Eisenhower's at West Point, and friend of Gavin's warned him that Eisenhower would not be good for the Army, if he was elected to the presidency. Gavin was sceptical. But Erwin was insistent. "Just mark my words," he

[337] Eisenhower, Dwight. "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense," dated March 20, 1956, DDE Papers, Papers of the Office of the White House Staff Secretary, Box 6, DDEL.
[338] Eisenhower, Dwight D., *At Ease: Stories I Tell My Friends,* (Doubleday: New York, 1967), p. 168.
[339] Goodpaster, "Memorandum of Conference with the President," dated May 18, 1956, DDE Papers, Papers of the Office of the White House Staff Secretary, Box 5 DDEL.

replied, "and remember what I tell you. He will not be good for the Army in that position." Gavin editorialized as he was making those notes that "those words often came back to me, for he was absolutely right."[340] Erwin was a particularly credible critic, he believed, because of his tactical exploits at the Battle of Kasserine Pass, when he had moved his heavy artillery command to provide fire support for the units fighting there, ultimately forcing German General Erwin Rommel to withdraw his forces. Kasserine had not been Eisenhower's finest moment.

For Gavin, the problem was that, on the one hand, Eisenhower had learned nothing new about military affairs since his younger days, while on

> the other hand everybody in Washington took his word as being gospel. When it was said, 'President Eisenhower thinks that this is correct.' that [sic] was it. You were to genuflect and back off. Not only did this apply to people in the Pentagon, but to many members of Congress and when Eisenhower took to his bosom the doctrine of massive retaliation, that was the end for the Army. He read very little, and this was disastrous at a time when technology was exploding, and the fruits of research were becoming devastating in their implication.[341]

The notion that the President read little but western novels was particularly galling to a man like Gavin who prided himself on academic improvement. In fact, Jean Gavin, his second wife later remarked that he "was profoundly interested in his work. He had five or six books open at a time, he read everything he could get his hands on."[342] This trait of continued improvement, education and self-development was part of who Gavin was and what had driven him since the day he left Pennsylvania coal country for a better future in New York City.

Gavin's views on the nature of warfare in the 1950s, and beyond, was shaped by his tactical and technological intellectual curiosity. Even as his heart remained with the airborne concept and leading soldiers, his mind was being developed by his post-war jobs. In 1949, Gavin was assigned to Weapon Systems Evaluation Group at Fort Monroe, Virginia, an assignment that would complete his

---

[340] Gavin Papers, Box 27. Notes dated, 23 June 1981. Written in preparation for the writing and publication of Gavin's autobiography. p. 4.
[341] Ibid, 4-5.
[342] T. Michael Booth and Duncan Spencer, *Paratrooper: The Life of Gen. James M. Gavin,* p. 330. From interviews with Jean Gavin. I could not find the documentation for this quote in the Gavin Papers at USAHEC nor is the source of the interview identified in the book itself.

transition from a leader of men to an intellectual. Gavin continued his academic pursuit of improved U.S. land power as he moved from his position in Chicago as the Commanding General of the Fifth Army to Washington, D.C., as part of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG). This new position seemed a perfect fit, as he was already making a name for himself a rising intellectual in the Army. During his time at the WSEG, Gavin learned the theoretical principles of nuclear fission and saw first-hand the devastating potential of nuclear weapons. In 1951, Gavin observed, from 10 miles, a 50-kiloton nuclear explosion on the island of Eniwetok in the North Pacific Ocean. Gavin would use the knowledge gained at the WSEG in his future role, serving as the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Training (G-3), a role that he was uniquely suited for given both his tactical and academic experiences. As Gavin moved into the position, he was well-positioned to have a prominent place to help affect the changes that he thought necessary to improve the Army's war-fighting capability; his former division and corps commander during World War II, Ridgway was the Army's Chief of Staff, and a fellow Army general officer had been elected President of the United States in 1952.

Unfortunately, the Army valued bravery and leadership over intellectualism. While Gavin would return to command of troops in Stuttgart, Germany as the Army's VII Corps Commander, many in the U.S. and NATO saw Gavin as an expert in the development and employment of nuclear weapons. While this was not necessarily a mis-perception, the perception in the Army is that you must be a war-fighter to command troops. As a result of his experiences in the 82nd Airborne Division, Gavin was most definitely a war-fighter, but his predilection towards the intellectual increased during this time. There is no documentation of anyone speaking ill of Gavin's intellectual leanings, but his penchant for the intellectual work—the research and development—drove him to accept what amounted to a demotion later in his career to become the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development when he had hoped for a promotion and field command.

During Gavin's time in Europe, with both NATO and the Army's VIII Corps, his reputation as an intellectual and expert on nuclear tactics and weapons earned him a constant set of invitations to

conferences and war games hosted by the Deputy Commander to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)—Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. As well as attending these sessions, Gavin also called on Eisenhower on arriving in Europe, just before Eisenhower left to run for president. He urged the soon-to-depart Supreme Allied Commander to add a technologist on his staff—advice that Eisenhower followed with his appointment Dr. H.P. Robertson, who had served on the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group with Gavin.

While Gavin served in Europe during the critical years of combat in Korea, his thoughts on tactical warfare were shaped by the events he saw unfolding in Korea. Additionally, Gavin saw the challenges and potential of the future battlefields of Europe, specifically as it relates to the atomic battlefield and the future impacts of technology on the plains of Western Europe. During a specific exchange at one of Field Marshal Montgomery's seminars, Gavin spoke up in contradiction to an Air Force general's response to Montgomery's question of whether the use of tactical nuclear weapons was possible on a future battlefield. The Air Force general had answered that nuclear weapons were only to be employed by the Air Force's Strategic Air Command. Gavin, thinking that he was provoking good discussion, said that he thought it was perfectly feasible to use tactical nuclear weapons on the modern battlefield against tactical targets; Gavin's Air Force colleague was not pleased because Gavin, the Army (land) general had challenged the Air Force (strategic) general on the employment of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. In December 1954, after one of these spirited conferences, Montgomery invited Gavin to his chateau; here, the discussion, which also included Dr. Vannevar Bush and British Major General Sir Richard Gale, centred on tactics in a nuclear battlefield, with Gavin arguing that troops "must be dispersed at all times with adequate communications and weapons." After talking about nuclear weapons, tactics, communication, and manoeuvre, Gavin came away less than satisfied. "They seemed to be trying to rationalize slight modifications of old tactics," he remarked later, "to meet this new phenomenon without understanding the phenomenon itself."[343]

[343] Ibid., p. 344.

In 1954 Gavin returned to the Pentagon to serve as the Army's G3, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Research. Gavin was enthusiastic about his new assignment in the Pentagon, even though it took him away from soldiers. "To come back to G-3 (plans and training) once again," he remarked, "was a stimulating prospect, and I looked forward to it very much indeed. All my years of troop duty, the nuclear weapons school, my work with the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, and my service with NATO would bear fruit…the functioning of the Army staff pivots about G-3."[344] The Army G-3 was critical during this period, because Gavin bridged the transition between Ridgway and Taylor and piloted the revolt against the Eisenhower administration's New Look through a group of intellectually minded colonels to whom Gavin provided mentorship. Gavin's experience on the Weapon Systems Evaluation Group and in Europe during the early 1950s gave him a unique perspective that he brought to this key position on the Army staff.

Both Gavin and Eisenhower understood that the adoption of nuclear weaponry engendered another change in warfare and strategy. However this is where their philosophies started to diverge, with Gavin ahead of his time and ahead of Eisenhower in his intellectual understanding of the future of warfare: "The very nature of strategy will change, leaving the realm of physical combat and going into full-scale psychological warfare, and leaving the earth's environment and going into space."[345] Luckily, his position in leading the Army's research efforts into new weapons and tactics would allow him to live in the theoretical world.

As Gavin led the revolt against the New Look, continuing in his standing as a leading military intellectual, Gavin failed to understand the strategic level of war and overstated the importance of land power. Gavin's strengths were his ability to blend the intellectual and technological with tactical and operational manoeuvre; this enabled Gavin to understand problem sets and opportunities on the battlefield from different perspective than most. For instance, Gavin believed that the air cavalry could be a phenomenal development for the U.S. Army and the Army's ability to improve the firepower,

[344] Ibid., p.347
[345] Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, p. 19.

mobility, and control of forces on the ground. Gavin focused on the tactical and operational aspects of land warfare, but he failed to understand the strategic context in which the army operated. That strategic context had changed tremendously from the first time that Gavin exited an aircraft as a paratrooper in combat.

Eisenhower understood the limitations of American might and understood the value of strategic partnerships, especially with the countries in Europe aligned against the Soviet Union. In his "Atoms for Peace" speech, Eisenhower emphasised his belief in the power of alliances and the shared risk and reward inherent in those alliances: "I know that the American people share my deep belief that if a danger exists in the world, it is a danger shared by all; and equally, that if hope exists in the mind of one nation, that hope should be shared by all."[346] Eisenhower believed that the only hope for peace lay in cooperation with the spirit of the United Nations, "to prohibit strife, to relieve tensions, to banish fears."[347] The United Nations offered the nations of the world a forum for personal interaction between leaders. This congregation of leaders offered opportunities for personal interaction that could lead towards mutual understanding and the foundations of peace in the world.[348]

Eisenhower also remained deeply committed to the future and safety of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); unlike Gavin, Eisenhower did not believe that the future of warfare was to be found in technology, but in the value of personal, national, and international relationships. In 1957, at the first NATO meeting attended by heads of the government of the member nations, Eisenhower implored his fellow leaders:

---

[346] Eisenhower, "Atoms for Peace," Speech given at the United Nations General Assembly, 8 December 1953, Available online at https://www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech. Accessed 1 March 2017.
[347] Eisenhower, "The Chance for Peace," Speech given at the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, D.C., 16 April 1953. Available at www.edchange.org/multicultural/speeches/ike_chance_for_peace.html. Accessed 2 September 2021.
[348] Stephen Ambrose, in *Eisenhower: Soldier and President*, p. 216, provides a glimpse into Eisenhower's philosophy on peace and human understanding when he quotes from a letter to Henry Wallace, form the summer of 1945, "I am convinced that friendship—which means an honest desire on both sides to strive for mutual understanding between Russia and the United States—is absolutely essential to world tranquility." Ambrose adds a response to a reporter, "the peace lies, when you get down to it, with all the peoples of the world…not just some political leader…If all the peoples are friendly, we are going to have peace." Ambrose cites, *Letters to Mamie*, (New York: Doubleday, 1978), p. 253, and the letter to Henry Wallace, dated 28 August 1945, from the Eisenhower Papers, DDEL.

> Let us glance at our resources. The 15 NATO countries comprise nearly 500 million people. These people have a per capita productivity about three times that of the Soviet Union. Our scientists and technicians were the inventors of what now revolutionizes the arts both of war and of peace. We possess what is, today, the most powerful military establishment in the world.[349]

Eisenhower firmly believed in the value of the alliance and in the United States' commitment to its European friends. This relationship was more powerful to him than any tactical or operational method of employment of American land power on the continent. Much in the way that Ridgway's demands for more ground troops in Europe, when Ridgway served as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Gavin's intellectual pursuits of improving American land power would find no successful outlet in the Eisenhower administration.

Gavin and Eisenhower: Leaders Defined by their Different Experiences

The debate between the Army, under Gavin and Ridgway, and their belief in the primacy of American land power, specifically for improvements in mobility, firepower, and control, and the Eisenhower administration's "New Look" strategy coalesced around three dynamics. Gavin believed that Eisenhower failed to understand new concepts and grasp the Army's role within the changing nature of warfare. Just like General Ridgway, Gavin thought tactically, focusing on the American soldier, the Army, and the tenets which he focused on throughout his career: mobility, firepower, and control. Lastly, Gavin, just like General Ridgway, differed from Eisenhower in his military background.

General Gavin prided himself on his close relationship with soldiers and paratroopers under his command, choosing to concentrate on the tactical aspects of leading soldiers in combat. He highlighted this difference with Eisenhower years later, noting that "Unlike Bradley, Patton, and even Montgomery, he [Eis] did not spend much time with the front line troops."[350] This was a stinging rebuke of Eisenhower, given that Gavin saw his relationship with his paratroopers and soldiers as one of the

[349] Eisenhower, "Remarks at the Opening of the NATO Meetings in Paris," 16 December 1957, Available online at www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-opening-the-nato-meetings-paris. Accessed 1 March 2021.
[350] Gavin Papers, Box 27. Notes dated, 23 June 1981. Written in preparation for the writing and publication of Gavin's autobiography. p. 4.

hallmarks of successful command. General Gavin considered General Eisenhower to have been a military leader that focused on the diplomatic side of leadership, on building relationships and deciding strategic issues, rather than working with the soldiers under his command. In the notes Gavin prepared for his memoir, he spent six pages on Eisenhower, excoriating his leadership, his failure to focus on learning the profession, his relationship to Kay Summersby, and his political nature.[351] Although this autobiography was never published, and remains embroiled in legal battles with the Gavin family, these passages confirm that there was no love lost between Gavin and Eisenhower, either as a senior leader in the U.S. Army or as President.[352]

Gavin felt that, "the problem was that Eisenhower, on one hand, had learned [nothing] new about military affairs since his younger days, while on the other hand everybody in Washington took his word as being gospel."[353] Gavin, meanwhile, was seen as a brilliant military thinker by many in the Army, committed to improving the Army's ability to fight and win the wars of the United States.[354] After Gavin took over as the Army's G3 (the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans) he was the first among equals of Army three-star generals, "charged with keeping our land forces in a state of combat readiness around the world, he is now in even better position to mould the kind of fighting force he thinks we must have before we can fight and win an atomic war."[355] In comparison to Generals Ridgway and Taylor, Gavin was a prolific writer, authoring numerous articles and books on the future of warfare and the Army's role in combat. Additionally, Gavin also led those around him to think and

[351] Ibid.
[352] Ibid. In the notes Gavin prepared for his memoir, he compiled six pages of notes on President Eisenhower, excoriating Eisenhower for a number of issues: leadership, failure to focus on learning the profession, Eisenhower's relationship to Kay Summersby, the political nature of Eisenhower, and others.
[353] Ibid, p. 4.
[354] Martin, "Paratrooper in the Pentagon," p. 85.
[355] Martin, "Paratrooper in the Pentagon," p. 22. The Army's military hierarchy consists of a Chief of Staff of the Army and a Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. The Chief of Staff is the senior four-star general and responsible to the Secretary of the Army for the Army's senior leadership. The Vice Chief of Staff runs the Army on a day-to-day basis for the Chief. The senior staff of the Army consists of a G-3, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations; a G-1, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; a G-2, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence; and a G-4, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. While the Army staff has grown through the years, the G-3 is the senior three-star staff member, and first among equals on the Army staff. The Army G3 is responsible for the training of the Army and planning and execution of operations world-wide. During the 1950s, the G3 was also responsible research, however that responsibility has been diverted into other elements.

write about the future of warfare, specifically supporting a group of colonels on the Army staff to write and voice advocacy for the Army against the other services.

Unfortunately, for the Army, President Eisenhower's views on the future of warfare were markedly different from that of the Army leadership. Gavin viewed Eisenhower with nothing short of contempt for the President's seemingly single-minded devotion to nuclear deterrence. In Gavin's notes, he juxtaposes the vacuous leadership of Eisenhower to that of General MacArthur. This is a curious comparison as MacArthur was fired from his post as Supreme Commander in the Far East and was a possible candidate for President of the United States in 1952, nonetheless Gavin recounts an episode in 1950, when he was speaking with General MacArthur in Tokyo, before MacArthur's firing.

> You must remember that our mission in life is to make the infantry independent in its own environment." He was right. That very much came to mind when I approved of a surface-to-air missile, shoulder-fired Red-eye...and when we finally developed extremely powerful antitank weapons for the infantry, I knew once again that MacArthur was on the fight [sic] track. Eisenhower never took an interest in these things.[356]

This episode demonstrated the level of disdain General Gavin had for President Eisenhower and his military and strategic views. However, it should be noted that "Eisenhower never took an interest in these things" and one should question whether Eisenhower should have had to take an interest in those things as his positions, since the United States' entrance into World War II, had been at the strategic and diplomatic levels. While it might be comfortable for an old general to wax back into the comfort of infantry tactics, that is not what they get paid to do.[357]

Eisenhower, while he may have looked from the outside to be an affable old man, understood the strategic environment better than most. Eisenhower was one of the few members of government during this time who was able to rise above the parochial interests of whatever organization to which

[356] Ibid, p. 5.
[357] This is a common occurrence, even today. Many senior leaders in the Army fall back towards their comfort level of leadership at the tactical level, failing to drive change at the strategic or enterprise levels.

he had ties or allegiances and act within the best interests of the United States.[358] Eisenhower's military experience was vastly different from Gavin's. While Gavin's experience focused on tactical experience with airborne warfare and then, intellectual positions and writings, relationships and strategic partnerships shaped Eisenhower's experience from his earliest days working for MacArthur, Fox Conner, Marshall, and working with Patton, Montgomery, and the other senior leaders of World War II.

Remarkably, Gavin notes that, during his time in the Pentagon in the mid-1950s that Eisenhower was:

> far behind the times in his thinking on military affairs and the evil of this was compounded by the fact that it was assumed that he was right in every opinion he had about military affairs, and he expected and accepted the loyalty of his subordinates and felt no obligation to return it. It was a most unfortunate combination."[359]

Unfortunately, Gavin, it seems, was blinded by his own tactical and academic arrogance. He felt that Eisenhower failed to maintain contact with military affairs and was blinded by the political requirements and prospects of his leadership during and after World War II. As Eisenhower had told his Joint Chiefs of Staff on multiple occasions that he viewed the senior military leaderships' job is to "form the union between the military establishment and our country as a whole, its public, its government, etc. One of their great tasks is the development of doctrine—military doctrine in its over-all terms, its entirety, <u>not</u> in minute details of tactics and operational procedures."[360] Of note, Eisenhower gives the Joint Chiefs the exact opposite of what General Gavin wanted and expected from a senior leader; Eisenhower told his military leaders not to focus on the tactical details, rather focus on the strategic environment.

Eisenhower did not keep his comments confined to the senior leaders of the national security apparatus, throughout his lifetime he confided in a lifelong friend. Eisenhower complained to Swede Hazlett, a friend and classmate of his at Abilene High School:

---

[358] Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader*, p. 22.
[359] Ibid., p. 6-7.
[360] Andrew Goodpaster, "Memorandum for Record. Conference of Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President," dated 10 February 1956. DDE Papers. Papers of the Office of the White House Staff Secretary, Box 5, DDEL.

> Some day there is going to be a man sitting in my present chair who has not been raised in the military services and who will have little understanding of where the slashes in their estimates can be made with little or no damage. If that should happen while we still have the state of tension that now exists in the world, I shudder to think of what could happen in this country.[361]

This concern of Eisenhower's was not confined to the Joint Chiefs or to the military leadership of the services. This concern extended throughout his presidency, culminating in his farewell speech in 1961, warning of the "military-industrial complex." This apprehension clearly shows the level of thought that Eisenhower placed on what he considered his craft—the strategic, political-military realm of national and international affairs. However, Eisenhower believed that his senior military leadership was merely focused on their craft—the tactical realm of military combat. While it is not difficult to see the difference of perspective, it is disconcerting to see this level of discord within the President's national security team at the initial stages of the Cold War.

Further galling to Gavin was his initial excitement on returning to the Army Staff as the G-3:

> To come back to G-3 (plans and training) once again was a stimulating prospect, and I looked forward to it very much indeed…All of my years of troop duty, the nuclear weapons school, my work with the Weapons System Evaluations Group, and my service with NATO would bear fruit…The functioning of the Army staff pivots around the G-3.[362]

Gavin thought that working for General Matthew Ridgway, again, would provide him sufficient support within the Army and Joint communities to further his ideas of improving land power. Gavin had worked for Ridgway during General Ridgway's time as the Commanding General of both the 82nd Airborne Division and the 18th Airborne Corps during World War II. Additionally, even though Gavin knew of Eisenhower's pledge to finish the war in Korea and of Eisenhower's transition to the strategic belief in massive retaliation, Gavin still felt that Eisenhower would be good for the Army and not bad, as his friend "Red" Erwin had predicted several years earlier.

---

[361] Letter, "Dear Swede," Personal and Confidential, 20 August 1956, DDE Diary, Box 17, DDEL.
[362] Ibid., p. 347.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Gavin and Eisenhower: How Their Differences Played Out

Throughout his time as the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, Gavin used his position to sharpen the arguments of his boss, General Matthew Ridgway, who focused on the size of the Army and the budgetary resources necessary to maintain a force capable of providing defence for America and fighting its wars. Gavin implemented several intellectual changes within the Army staff structure, but the most important of these was the formation of a strategic initiatives group that he began and put under the control of Brigadier General Metheny. This coordinating group of young colonels and intellectuals would mark an important step in the revolt against the Eisenhower administration's national security strategy.

These men would become infamous during General Maxwell Taylor's tenure as Chief of Staff of the Army after they launched the "Revolt of the Colonels." But even before Gavin and Taylor transitioned this group out from under the control of the Army G-3 and into the Chief of Staff's supervision, it launched nothing short of an information war against the Eisenhower administration's "New Look" national security strategy. As Gavin later related to Admiral (Ret.) Arleigh Burke in the early 1980s:

> It was a fascinating experience for me. Our sole object, in retrospect was to convince people that Massive retaliation at a time and place of our choosing would not solve our problems. There would still be wars and the bomb would not be used and we had better be ready for them.[363]

This initiatives group was a proud accomplishment of Gavin's and, in preparation for writing his autobiography, he spent much time and effort trying to ensure the accuracy of the events of the time, countering much of the narrative of the Colonels which David Halberstam detailed in his book, *The*

[363] Gavin, Correspondence with ADM Burke, dated 21 July 1982, Gavin Papers, Box 20, AHEC.

Best and the Brightest.[364] Almost 30 years later, Gavin felt such a sense of ownership and pride in the intellectual work that these younger officers accomplished,

> In my opinion, the idea for forming a group of that sort began when I was Chief of Plans. We were becoming very uncomfortable with the actions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Radford…I used to work on Saturday mornings, and very often young army staff officers would stop in to talk to me about their concerns about what was happening to the Army. It was clear that the Army had to think through an alternative to "massive retaliation."[365]

Gavin remembered that he based this initiatives group on a similar group which Admirals Radford and Burke had participated in during the late 1940s, as the Department of Defence was formed and budgetary battles between the services began in earnest.

> There was a precedent for this sort of thing, also, in that shortly after the war, when the Navy was going through a difficult time, a group was formed known as "Operations 23."…It was the purpose of the navy to have that group think through strategy for the navy's future that would provide an alternative to what the Air Force was selling Congress.[366]

This Navy group led, eventually to the "Revolt of the Admirals." This revolt questioned the civilian control of the military, as embodied in the new Department of Defence. As the U.S. transitioned from World War II and sought to incorporate savings in the budget and bureaucracy, the National Security act of 1947 established the Department of Defence, combining the Departments of War and the Navy into a single organization with a presidentially appointed leader.[367] The first Secretary of Defence was

---

[364] David Halberstam, *Best and Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1972). Halberstam provided an accounting of the decisions by the military and political leaders that led to the Vietnam War, while the "revolt of the colonels" and Gavin's relationship with Taylor precedes most of the reporting, it is a key highlight into the relationships within the senior leaders of the Army and the Department of Defence at that time.
[365] Gavin, "Letter to BG (Ret.) Lyal C. Metheny, 8 September 1977, Gavin Papers, Box 20, AHEC.
[366] Gavin, Correspondence with ADM Burke, dated 21 July 1982, Gavin Papers, Box 20, AHEC.
[367] The National Security Act of 1947 is one of the landmark pieces of legislation in the history of the United States defence and national security communities. Not only did it establish the Department of Defence under a presidentially appointed cabinet-level secretary, but the new law also established the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and separated the Air Force from the Army as a separate branch of service under the Department of Defence. For key readings on the National Security Act of 1947 see the Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, "National Security Act of 1947," available online at www.history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/national-security-act. Accessed on 11 September 2021; also see Kinnard, Douglas, The Secretary of Defence in Retrospect (Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1980); and Stevenson, Charles A., "The Story Behind the National Security Act of 1947," *Military Review* 88.3 (2008), available online at https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1P3-1496115061/the-story-behind-the-national-security-act-of-1947, accessed on 11 September 2021.

James Forrestal, who had hitherto been Secretary of the Navy. Truman replaced Forrestal with Louis A. Johnson, when Forrestal seemed unwilling to make the required cuts in the Defence Department's budget. The revolt came about as the separate departments (Navy, Army, and Air Force) battled for reduced budgetary resources in 1949.

The Secretary of the Navy, John L. Sullivan, resigned in protest and President Truman, on the recommendation of Secretary Johnson appointed Francis P. Matthews as the Secretary of the Navy. Johnson directed cuts within the Defence and Navy's budget; at that time, the Navy's intellectual leadership, as personified by the members of the Operations Group-23 task force and aided by several civilian members of the Navy department and friendly congressman, sought to undo directives of the President and the Secretary of Defence. Ultimately, public perception turned against the Navy, ""The Navy brass can contribute to national safety by dropping their guerrilla warfare against the other services and endeavour by forthright, constructive criticism to improve on defence strategy."[368]

It was this same type of "covert" group of intellectuals that Gavin thought could help sway public opinion and Congressional support. However, in May 1956, less than a year after General Maxwell Taylor assumed the duties as Chief of Staff of the Army from General Ridgway, the work of this coordination group came to be public knowledge. The Secretary of Defence, Charles Wilson was forced to conduct a press conference with the military chiefs to assure the media and the public that there was nothing to the reports of inter-service rivalry and dissent to the "New Look" national security strategy, where he attributed the inter-service squabbling to several eager beavers that were "gnawing down some of the wrong trees."[369]. After this press conference, the army leadership disbanded this group of colonels, telling them not to come into the office, sealing their files, and reassigning them to other duties across the Army.[370] For those officers, General Taylor disavowed the group in public, even

[368] "Policies for Defence Criticized by the Navy," *Army Navy Journal* 87, no. 7 (15 October 1949), p. 166.
[369] Secretary Charles Wilson, Press Conference, 22 May 1956, as detailed in *Time*, "Armed Forces: Charlie's Hurricane," 4 June 1956, available at www.content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,866924-6,00.html. Accessed 2 September 2021. Also, available via *The New York Times*, "Transcript of News Conference Held by Wilson and Civilian Aides," 22 May 1956, Sec. A, p. 14.
[370] See General Westmoreland's Oral History with the Military History Institute; Barney Forsythe's Oral History with the Military History Institute; and, Halberstam's *Best and Brightest*. Also, Gavin's papers, Box 27, AHEC.

as his Secretary of the General Staff, Brigadier General William Westmoreland, reassigned those officers throughout the Army.

It should be noted that as Gavin collected his thoughts and researched his autobiography, he spent considerable attention to this "Revolt of the Colonels," which had been an insurrection started by him in the casual atmosphere of Saturday morning discussions in his office. Gavin even encouraged the group, acknowledging the same frustrations within the political-military environment that this group of colonels—named the Coordination Group—was articulating and actively working on behalf of the Army with Congress, reporters, and other friends of the Army in society.[371]

While Gavin's academic credentials inclined him towards supporting the Revolt of the Colonels, he also agreed with several theoretical points of the Eisenhower security strategy, especially that the invention of nuclear weapons and missile technology had changed the geography of the battlefield and the nature of warfare. "In World War II, for example," he wrote in 1958,

> a tactical theatre was usually thought of as a continent, or a major segment of a continent. By 1965 missiles and satellites will have shrunk the world to such a small size that the earth itself will be a tactical theatre. We will truly live a hair-trigger existence in a "balance of terror." Everyone will be faced with the threat of immediate death and destruction, if means of guaranteeing peace are not found.[372]

Gavin's discussions tended to be more academic and intellectual based on his time in the Weapon Systems Evaluation Group, his work as the lead planner and researcher for the Army, and his years of writing. Very little separates this initial sentiment of Gavin and Eisenhower's belief that in the perils of nuclear warfare:

> I feel impelled to speak today in a language that in a sense is new--one which I, who have spent so much of my life in the military profession, would have preferred never

[371] See David Halberstam, The Best and Brightest, Kindle Edition, 2001. Originally published in 1972. Halberstam gives an accounting of Gavin's support to the Colonels in the Coordination Group. Most of Gavin's recollections on the colonels line up with Halberstam's, however there is disagreement as to what happened when the Coordination Group was disbanded. It is key to note that the formation of the Department of Defence in 1947, merging the Departments of War and the Navy, to create a unified cabinet position, coupled with President Eisenhower's relegation of the service secretaries and uniformed chiefs off the National Security Council constructed the true beginnings of this revolt. The Army basically felt that there was no outlet for their best military advice, even though that is what the Army leadership believed it be giving.

[372] Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, p. 19.

> to use. That new language is the language of atomic warfare. The atomic age has moved forward at such a pace that every citizen of the world should have some comprehension, at least in comparative terms, of the extent of this development of the utmost significance to every one of us.[373]

Both Gavin and Eisenhower understood that the nature of warfare had fundamentally changed with the discovery of the nuclear weapon. Their shared understanding of this change also extended to the global implications of this new form of warfare, both referring not only to the western world but to the Soviet world or global community as well.

While Gavin paid much attention to these colonels when he was trying to reconstruct his intellectual past in preparation for writing his autobiography, he paid similar attention to the theoretical underpinnings of tactical nuclear weapons during his 1958 work, *War and Peace in the Space Age*. By this time, with four years as the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, responsible for plans, training, and research, and additional time with the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Lieutenant General Gavin was the unabashed subject matter expert in the Army on missiles and nuclear weapons. As Gavin languished in the Army G3, eventually transitioning from the position as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Planning, to a more specific role as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development, his consternation with the Army Chief of Staff, Maxwell Taylor grew. While Gavin's resentment grew, he even created a rudimentary spreadsheet that compared the timelines of the group with significant events from the President's "New Look" policy, the cloud of limited war in Southeast Asia, and the Sputnik controversy of 1957.[374]

[373] Eisenhower, "Atoms for Peace," Speech given at the United Nations General Assembly, 8 December 1953, Available online at https://www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech. Accessed 1 March 2017.
[374] In October 1957, the Soviet Union successfully launched the Sputnik 1 satellite into orbit, becoming the first nation to launch a successful artificial satellite. Of note, General Gavin was eating at the Redstone Arsenal's officer club with Werner von Braun when word of the Soviet success reached him. This launch precipitated the space race as part of the Cold War. For more on Sputnik and its repercussions, please see Matthew Brzezinski, *Red Moon Rising: Sputnik and the Hidden Rivalries That Ignited the Space Age* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2007); and Walter A. McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

In fact, in 1958, then-Senator John F. Kennedy reviewed Gavin's post-retirement book, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, astutely taking advantage of the distance between President Eisenhower and his Army and military leadership and praising Gavin.

> It is a common error of the military mind to fight the next war with the theories and weapons of the last, General Gavin is hardly open to this indictment. His mind is imaginative, probing, and sensitive to the imperatives of the missile age. The earth, he points out, has shrunk to a "small tactical theatre" in which the "very nature of strategy will change, leaving the realm of physical combat and going into full-scale psychological warfare, and leaving the earth's environment and going into space.[375]

Gavin was firmly committed to advances in technology as the Army G3, however, it must be noted that Eisenhower was firmly committed to a national strategy built upon scientific advances. However, Eisenhower's strategy disadvantaged the Army as it shifted resources and missions from the Army to Air Force.

Eisenhower, nevertheless, was very much a prisoner of the physical world and had to ensure that the country held real answers to the stark questions concerning U.S. and global security during the Cold War. This was a task he was suited for, having been at the centre of many critical junctures in the world since his time as the Commander of SHAEF during World War II. In fact, Eisenhower was looking for a way to win the Cold War without having to fight a physical war with the Soviet Union. This desire placed him firmly in the sphere of what Carl von Clausewitz defined as strategy, as war as the extension of political policy by other means.[376] These other means led Eisenhower to psychological warfare, just as Gavin discussed.[377] In fact, Eisenhower was an early proponent of aspects of psychological warfare; Eisenhower supported Radio Free Europe in its early days of broadcasting to the Soviet states. In 1950 he started the "Crusade for Freedom" drive that was an early attempt to raise

---

[375] John F. Kennedy, "Gavin Sounds the Alarm," *The Reporter*, October 30, 1958, Gavin Papers, "Personal Correspondence: Kennedy Family, Box 26.

[376] Clausewitz, Carl von; Howard, Michael and Peter Paret (ed.), *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[377] For more on this see Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: President Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2006). Osgood details Eisenhower's global propaganda campaign, focusing on depicting American economic and social freedoms juxtaposed against Soviet, Chinese, and other authoritarian regimes. Osgood is part of the literature that depicts Eisenhower as an active president, who indelibly left his mark on American national security issues, rather than the detached figurehead that Eisenhower was thought to be during the 1960s and 70s.

funds to support Radio Free Europe and the march to freedom for those behind the Iron Curtain. In a speech on Labour Day in 1950, Eisenhower criticized the Soviet regime and their use of numerous tactics at their disposal to fight freedom around the world:

> To destroy human liberty and to control the world, the Communists use every conceivable weapon—subversion, bribery, corruption, military attack! Of all these, none is more insidious than propaganda. Spurred by this threat to our very existence, I speak tonight—as another private citizen, not as an officer of the Army—about the Crusade of freedom. This crusade is a campaign sponsored by private American citizens to fight the big lie with the big truth.[378]

While both Eisenhower and Gavin were ahead of their time, Gavin was firmly rooted in the tenets of manoeuvre warfare, while Eisenhower had moved on from this grounded reality many years prior to this, existing—by necessity—in the reality of coalitions and political dealings.

During the presidential campaign of 1952, Eisenhower gave a speech in October in San Francisco that has been called one of his "most comprehensive and revealing speech on foreign policy".[379] Eisenhower told the American people to not "be afraid of that term just because it's a five-dollar, five-syllable word. 'Psychological warfare' is the struggle for the minds and wills of men."[380] The concept of psychological warfare was instrumental to Eisenhower in his aim to bring all of the elements of national power together against the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Eisenhower thought that by bringing all these elements together he could, in effect, win the Cold War, without fighting a fight or losing a soldier.

During his presidency, Eisenhower did not shy away from the use of psychological warfare, either. His administration used the Psychological Strategy Board to find opportunities to inform the

---

[378] Cummings, Richard H. (31 August 2012). "Labor Day, Crusade for Freedom, and Radio Free Europe". *Cold War Radios*. Retrieved 20 September 2012. And Malcolm, Andrew (6 September 2010). "A Labor Day speech from many years ago by a non-president named Dwight Eisenhower". *Los Angeles Times*. Retrieved 20 September 2012.
[379] Bowie and Immerman, *Waging Peace*, p. 77.
[380] Eisenhower, speech in San Francisco, California, 8 October 1952, "September 26, 1952," Speech Series, Box 2, Ann Whitman File, DDEL.

American and global public about the dangers of the Soviet way of life and nuclear warfare.[381] As Eisenhower would later argue in the beginning months of his presidency that the people of the world must "see freedom and communism in their true lights," but that it "will take time, but it must be done." To which Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in a meeting with Eisenhower and other members of the National Security Council, replied, "talk about 'liberty' doesn't stop people from becoming communist." Eisenhower, understanding the importance of the psychological aspects of war, countered, "It's men's minds and hearts that must be won."[382]

In addition to using the Psychological Strategy Board as a coordinating element in the Cold War, President Eisenhower convened Project Solarium in early 1953, shortly after he took office. Eisenhower intended for Project Solarium to provide him as the Commander in Chief with valid recommendations and a clear understanding of how to proceed with American national security policy regarding the Cold War. This philosophy of study of the Soviet problem led, shortly to Project Solarium during the spring of 1953. In the May 13, National Security Council meeting, Vice President Nixon "asked what the administration's policy would be once the Soviets had 'amassed a sufficient stockpile of atomic weapons to deal us a critical blow and to rob us of the initiative in the area of foreign policy.'"[383] Eisenhower answered him, "that Project Solarium was being initiated with this precise problem in mind."[384] Unlike other planning and intellectual exercises heretofore performed, Project

[381] The Psychological Strategy Board was an executive level committee stood up during the Truman administration focused on United States government information and psychological warfare programs. Archives are available in the Truman Presidential Archives and the Eisenhower Library; in the Eisenhower Library, the Jackson (William Harding Jackson) Committee Records, U.S. President's Committee on International Information Activities, Records, 1950-53; also, see Edward P. Lilly, "The Psychological Strategy Board and its Predecessors: Foreign Policy Coordination, 1938-1953," in Gaetano L. Vincitorio (ed.), Studies in Modern History (New York: St. John's Press, 1968), p. 337-382; Kenneth Osgood, "Hearts and Minds: The Unconventional Cold War," Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol 4., No. 2., Spring 2002; available online at www.direct.mit.edu/jcws/article/4/2/85/12503/Hearts-and-Minds-The-Unconventional-Cold-War; accessed 2 September 2021; and Gregory Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000). The committee was replaced by the Operations Coordinating Board by Executive Order 10483, September 2, 1953.

[382] Robert Cutler, *No Time for Rest* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1966), p. 308. Bowie and Immerman comment that their discussions on the Solarium Exercise mainly rely on the recollections of Cutler and a memo, dated 8 May 1953. Also, see "Project Solarium: A Collective Oral History with General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Robert R. Bowie, and Ambassador George F. Kennan," February 27, 1988, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.

[383] Memorandum of National Security Council Meeting, 13 & 14 May 1953, "144th NSC Meeting," National Security Council Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL.

[384] Ibid.

Solarium would, just like the vigorous military war games with which Eisenhower had been involved before and during World War II, "turn the debate into an exercise that would analyse competing national strategies for dealing with the Soviet Union."[385] The administration shrouded Project Solarium in almost complete secrecy and conducted the exercise at the National War College in Washington, D.C.

While the national security apparatus was unfamiliar with this approach, which mirrored the Army's Military Decision Making Process, Eisenhower felt very comfortable with it—he had, after all, excelled at military planning during his military days. As Brigadier General Edward L. King, the Commandant of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, commented during the graduation ceremony of then-Major Eisenhower's class, "At the completion of your school here, the foundation has been laid, and the framework of your future life erected."[386] Throughout the academic year, Eisenhower demonstrated the mastery of staff work and the development of orders. It may have been a surprise to most that Eisenhower achieved the highest standing in his class, however, to General Fox Conner, Eisenhower's mentor over the previous three years, it was expected.[387] Eisenhower would use this framework and these lessons throughout his military career, whether it was in service of General MacArthur, General Conner, General Marshall, in the War Plans Department, as the IX Corps Chief of Staff during the Louisiana Manoeuvres, or as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

Gavin and Eisenhower both truly believed in the Soviet threat to world peace, but their agreement ended with the identification of the enemy. How to defeat that enemy given the elements of national power created a divide. Eisenhower understood all too well that the American way of "life is

[385] Ibid.
[386] Brigadier Edward L. King, Commandant of the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff Course, 1926, during commencement exercises, quoted in the *Leavenworth Times*, "Hold Exercises on Main Parade for Army Grads," 18 June 1926. Quotation found in the Major Mark Bender, "Watershed at Fort Leavenworth: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Command and General Staff School," Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1990.
[387] Ibid., p. 55. General Fox Conner, Eisenhower's mentor had lobbied for Eisenhower to attend the Command and General Staff Course.

threated by the Communistic dictatorship."[388] Gavin felt the same way about the Soviet threat, but constantly framed his thoughts and arguments in a manner which distorted the discussion, as he talked about the decade after World War II, "It was the time of the rape of Budapest and frustrations of Suez, the time when the Soviets showed the meaning of an imbalance of power in their favour through rather heavy-handed rocket diplomacy."[389] However biased to show an apparent American weakness in foreign and military policy, Eisenhower and Gavin were of the same opinion on the threat of the Soviet Union. They also differed strongly in their opinions about how to oppose this foe.

While the Soviet Union remained the major threat on the global stage, myriad foreign affairs and national security matters required presidential action and attention: the battle of Dien Bien Phu, the Suez crisis, the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the successful Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite, and the Gaither Committee to name a few. Adding to the complications of these serious international matters and the dysfunctions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Eisenhower suffered a heart attack in 1955, and then, after he won re-election in 1956, Eisenhower suffered a stroke in late 1957. While the president was dealing with both personal health issues and issues of strategic consequence on the international stage his Army leadership was usurping Eisenhower's presidential leadership through a variety of means, the president was focused on preserving the fragile peace of the Cold War, ensuring that the U.S. did not go to war with the Soviets, and trying to positively influence the nations within the Soviet sphere of influence.[390]

That Gavin and Eisenhower divided deeply on the tactics of the Cold War should not be surprising given their backgrounds and how they came to understand the new war with the Soviet Union. Gavin admits as much during the introduction to *War and Peace in the Space Age*, "I have spent over thirty years in the United States Army, twenty of them in a search for tactical innovations and in the

[388] Chandler, Alfred D., Jr., and Louis Galambos, Jr., eds., *The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970).
[389] Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, p. 3. There was much going on in the mid-1950s that influenced the Eisenhower presidency and its national security and foreign relations programme.
[390] See Bowie and Immerman, *Waging Peace*, specifically, Chapter Seven, "A Chance for Peace?" and C.D. Jackson's notes, as already cited on engaging the Soviet empire but maintaining the peace.

development of tactical doctrine, I would like to draw upon that experience."[391] Gavin fails, though, to move beyond his experiential bias and seek to understand the strategic and political perspectives, inherent within the national security process of the United States. Gavin based his beliefs firmly within this experiential bias, focusing on the tactical capabilities of the United States Army and an incomplete view of the capabilities resident within the Soviet Union's missile and defence programs, "We *are* in mortal danger and the 'missile lag' does portend trouble—trouble of a perilous nature."[392]

Gavin's answer for the Army lay in three seemingly disparate programs: the capability to conduct limited warfare, an Army-led missile program, and an Army-centric tactical nuclear weapon program. The first twenty years of Gavin's Army career led him to the first belief: a tactical Army built on mobility, firepower, and control. This capability included his beloved airborne forces, air cavalry forces, and armoured forces capable of being "applied with restraint, quickly, and accurately."[393] However, the Eisenhower administration, focused on the belief in nuclear deterrence as articulated in the "New Look" national security strategy and believed in neither the philosophy of limited war nor the budgetary resources necessary for increased troop strength. Deputy Secretary of Defence Donald Quarles held this belief, "if we have the strength required for global war, we could certainly meet the any threat of lesser magnitude."[394] Gavin vigorously disagreed with this line of thought, "This is not true, for limited war in its own way is a highly specialized form of combat, more specialized than general combat, more specialized than general global war."[395]

Gavin's discontent was manifested in military writing and theorizing, participating in multiple different military and international relations forums, spreading the Army's criticism of the Eisenhower administration policy on nuclear deterrence. Gavin's time on the Weapons Systems Evaluations Group had endowed him with one of the best understandings in the Army regarding missile technology and nuclear capabilities. In 1955, based on his considerable experience in Europe and with nuclear weapons

[391] Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, p. 2
[392] Ibid., p. 11.
[393] Ibid., p. 12.
[394] Ibid., p. 12. Gavin's quotes Deputy Secretary of Defence Donald Quarles, however he does not reference the origin of the quote in his notes.
[395] Ibid., p. 12.

and technology, the Council on Foreign Relations asked Gavin to participate in a study group. While Paul Nitze and Arnold Wolfers discussed appropriate targets in Europe for U.S. missiles, Gavin warned the assembly that "the Red Army would still be rolling," even if the U.S. "atomized" the majority of the Soviet Union.[396] Gavin continued that the U.S. would still require conventional land warfare capability to defeat the Soviet armed forces, and that it was necessary to maintain a military capability "to attack the USSR without reducing the allies to ashes."[397] The key, Gavin added, was not that nuclear weapons were not required, rather the U.S. still required an established land force to fight the war against the Soviets, putting his argument into an analogy of the neighbourhood police, "The patrolman may have a tommy gun back at the station house as his ultimate weapon, but he uses his night stick to subdue the criminal without punching holes in the local populace," concluding, "the United States has got to demonstrate that it has the power and the discretion to win local scraps without destroying European civilization."[398] Whether it was in military articles or intellectual circles, Gavin fervently fought the elected administrations' defence policy and budgetary initiatives to wrench the priority of America's defence from the Army and place it in the hands of nuclear deterrence.

Gavin felt discouraged at the retrospective nature of the discussion on the nature of war during the 1950s. In fact, the reflection of the failures of the Korean War irritated Gavin, rather than offering comfort in the confirmation of his views. He had spent most of his intellectual effort after World War II arguing for capabilities that would have served the Army well during the Korean War. "Much of our talk about limited war is retroactive in nature. Ten years too late we have come to realize that we should have had a limited war capability at the time of Korea—which we lacked."[399] Gavin agreed with both Ridgway and Taylor in that the United States needed a credible Army to fight the type of wars that would grow out of the shadow of nuclear deterrence; these limited wars would pit client states of the

[396] "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," Council of Foreign Relations, 4 May 1955, Vol. 60, Records of Groups, Council of Foreign Relations, Princeton University Archives, Box 446.
[397] Ibid.
[398] Ibid.
[399] Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, p. 12

Soviet Union against democratic forces of the United States in countries around the world, rather than on the plains of Europe in World War III.

Gavin's work in the later years of his time as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development had him in charge of the Army's missile and space program. However, Eisenhower's defence policy directly contradicted Gavin's long-held belief and the administration rebuked Gavin and the Army in May 1956, directing that the, "the Redstone and Jupiter missiles [Army Missiles] will *not* be used to launch a satellite."[400] Gavin later described feeling like the young radar operator on Pearl Harbour who first saw inbound Japanese aircraft on his radar on the morning of December 7, 1941, but was told by his superior officer to "forget about it."[401] Oddly enough, on the night of the Sputnik launch, a successful businessman asked Gavin about the news; Gavin replied, "Oh, it's nothing at all, nothing at all. It doesn't amount to a thing."[402] Gavin, however, understood the strategic significance of the launch and was supported in his beliefs by others in the military and scientific communities. Dr. Edward Teller, a Hungarian-born theoretical physicist who was an early member of the Manhattan Project, testified before Senator Lyndon Johnson's Preparedness Subcommittee in November 1957:

> It [the Sputnik satellite launch] has great military significance because, among other things, it shows that the Russians are far along, very far along, in rocket development. But it has also some intrinsic military significance. In addition, it has all kinds of scientific developments, because it allows us to find out a great number of things about outer space, looking back on earth, some of the properties on our own globe. It has great significance in both these directions.[403]

Unfortunately, the Eisenhower administration and the Department of Defence did not publicly echo these sentiments, but the space race had begun. However, for the U.S., just like during the ground war in Korea, the U.S. was late to the fight again.

---

[400] Ibid., p. 15.
[401] Ibid., p. 16.
[402] Ibid., p. 17. After World War II, the nucleus of the German missile scientific team, led by Dr. Wehrner von Braun, had come to work for the Army at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. And, on October 4, 1957, Gavin would again become frustrated with an Army and Department of Defence that did not look forward. That evening, as Gavin sat in the officer's mess at Redstone Arsenal with a group of scientists, military, and business leaders, he learned of the successful Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite.[402]

[403] Ibid., p. 18.

Gavin understood that the geometry of the modern battlefield had changed yet again, and he was not afraid to speak out with his convictions. Gavin believed deeply in the military ethic ingrained in his as a cadet at West Point, and he could not remain silent. Gavin later wrote,

> One must either be straightforward and honest, speaking from personal conviction based upon study and understanding of the problems, or one must decide to become a military chameleon, an individual who changes his point of view according to the mood of the moment and the apparent pleasures of Congress or the prevailing civilian superior in the Department of Defence.[404]

Gavin did not remain silent, speaking out both in Congressional testimony and in his intellectual work regarding military theory. Gavin remained as the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, responsible for the training, planning, and research for the U.S. Army for over five years, serving two Army Chiefs of Staff. Under the second Chief of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, Gavin took a larger role in planning and research than he did in training, and, during this time, Gavin's view became even more pointed and intellectual. Unfortunately, Gavin may have become too academic to influence the military debate, quoting noted French historian and diplomat, Alexis de Tocqueville, and providing mathematical and formulaic illustrations regarding modern warfare in his critique of American military policy, *War and Peace in the Space Age*.

This critique of the Eisenhower military policy would serve as a one of multiple points of contention for Senator Kennedy with the Eisenhower administration and Vice-President Richard Nixon as he ran for President in 1960. Kennedy makes it clear in his review that:

> General Gavin leaves no doubt that there was a direct causal relationship between the budget theories of Secretaries Wilson and Humphrey and our reduced capacity to meet flexibly the variety of military situations for which we must be prepared…General Gavin is especially effective in showing that, even on its own terms, this theory fails to take into account the degree to which the Communists derive diplomatic and political advantages from American threats to use nuclear weapons.[405]

Senator Kennedy seized upon the distance between the administration and the military leadership to stake a claim as a Democrat who was tough on defence, painting the Eisenhower administration as weak

[404] Ibid., p. 173.
[405] John F. Kennedy, "Gavin Sounds the Alarm," The Reporter, October 30, 1958, Gavin Papers, "Personal Correspondence: Kennedy Family, Box 26.

on military issues. Oddly enough, one of the letters Senator Kennedy received prior to the election asked if there was [had been?] a conspiracy at the top of the military, forcing General Gavin to quit.

> Senator, is it possible that there is a conspiracy at the top of our military planning? Why should a man of General Gavin's calibre, courage, and ability be compelled to take off the uniform in which he risked his life defending our country in so many battles? Who has tied his hands? Who is so stupid or disloyal, and yet has the power to step on men who have proven their loyalty to our country? Who is holding back our country's progress?[406]

In hindsight, Taylor drove Gavin to retire, although without that perspective it is easy to see the frustration of the American people and what they saw as the fate of the military of the United States. Kennedy capitalized on the divide within the military and the American peoples' fear of the Soviets.

Kennedy exploited this fear during the election campaign, focusing his defence initiatives and issues on the missile gap, with his advisors urging him to deal in quantifiable specifics.[407] This focus on the quantifiable, enabled the Democratic Party to focus their attacks on the seriousness of the missile gap with the Soviet and the laissez faire attitude and reaction by the Republican Party to the issue. Democratic campaign literature caricatured President Eisenhower and Secretary Wilson, talking about how little they saw in the launch of the Sputnik and the Soviet missile threat:

> President Eisenhower: Now so far as the satellite itself is concerned, that does not raise my apprehensions, not one iota. I see nothing at this moment, at this stage of development, that is significant in that development as far as security is concerned…

> Secretary Wilson: "A nice scientific trick' was the way Mr. Wilson [former Secretary of Defence Charles Wilson] characterized the Russian feat in launching the first satellite, but he added: 'Nobody is going to drop anything down on you from a satellite while you are asleep, so don't worry about it.'[408]

[406] Frank D. Griffin, Jr., "Letter to Senator John F. Kennedy," January 18, 1958, Kennedy Archives, Box 689.
[407] "Undated Defence Policy Speech notes re. quantifiable missile gap," Kennedy Archives, Box 770.
[408] Democratic Party Fact Sheet, "Republican Attempts to Brush Off Seriousness of Sputnik," October 24, 1957, Kennedy Archives, Box 771.

The Democratic Party seized upon the revolt of Ridgway and Gavin to paint the Eisenhower administration as weak on defence and out of touch with the Soviet threat. This unique line of attack against the Eisenhower presidency, their ending of the Korean Conflict and the reduction of military spending, framed the administration as weak on defence and disinterested in the Soviet threat. There was no disinterest, however, Eisenhower and his administration disdained from talking specifics to ensure the enemy had less situational awareness on our intelligence and operations than we wanted.

* * *

While Eisenhower may not have written as prodigiously as Gavin it is disingenuous to believe that he was not, as Gavin lamented, as smart as Gavin. Vice-President Richard Nixon, in his 1962 memoir, *Six Crises*, wrote that President Eisenhower, "was a far more complex and devious man than most people realized," later clarifying that he meant that, "in the best sense of those words."[409] Eisenhower understood the military impacts but knew that he had to stop the spread of Soviet communism without forcing America into bankruptcy or turning it into what he called the "garrison state," with the economy focused on military spending, much as the American economy had been during the past 12 years. At the essence of the disagreement, emerges a trite comparison: Eisenhower was playing chess; Gavin—for all his tactical and technical knowledge—was playing checkers.

Gavin positioned himself as the Army's leading intellectual of the era, championing changes in force structure to take advantage of developments in technology in the realm of tactical mobility, missile technology, and nuclear weapons, while Eisenhower remained one of the most advanced strategic thinkers and political operators of the modern era. Two of his most defining contributions within these arenas were his support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and his belief in the holistic nature of American power, specifically the incorporation of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means to achieve the foreign policy goals of the administration. Not only was Eisenhower a tremendously talented strategist, but he also understood the necessary bureaucratic and political

[409] Richard M. Nixon, *Six Crises*, p. 160-163.

machinations required to achieve his desired end state. George Kennan, the father of containment and former ambassador to the Soviet Union, who worked on Project Solarium, recalled that Eisenhower, "showed his intellectual ascendancy over every man in the room" during the Solarium exercise.[410]

In April 1953, less than six weeks after the death of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, Eisenhower delivered his "Chance for Peace" speech before American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, D.C. C.D. Jackson, a special assistant to President Eisenhower and an expert of the day on psychological warfare, explained the strategic purpose of the speech:

> 1) to create dissension within the new Soviet regime by forcing it to make difficult decisions, 2) to present a "vision" of U.S. purposes designed to inspire the Eastern bloc and neutral peoples to identify their aspirations with America's, 3) to foster greater unity throughout the free world, and 4) to rally Americans behind Eisenhower's leadership and programs.[411]

While the speech went through multiple revisions and authors in the month-long process of drafting and approving the text, the speech skilfully lays out the president's beliefs in the peril of continued warfare and military spending and its effect on the global community.

> Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone.
>
> It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.
>
> The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities.
>
> It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population.
>
> It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It is some 50 miles of concrete highway.
>
> We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat.
>
> We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people.

---

[410] Kennan as quote in Bowie and Immerman, *Waging Peace*, p. 123-138. See alos, Meena Bose, *Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1998).
[411] C.D. Jackson, "Draft for NSC: Proposed Plan for Psychological Warfare Offensive," March 1953. Also, see letter from Jackson to Dulles, 10 March 1953, Jackson Committee Records, DDEL.

> This, I repeat, is the best way of life to be found on the road. the world has been taking.
>
> This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.[412]

Eisenhower ably discussed the hazards of continuing down this path but apprised the global community that there was another way forward, a path not towards warfare but towards peace.

> These plain and cruel truths define the peril and point the hope that come with this spring of 1953.
>
> This is one of those times in the affairs of nations when the gravest choices must be made if there is to be a turning toward a just and lasting peace.[413]

Eisenhower felt that there would be a way forward for the Soviet Union and the United States regarding arms control and that the two countries could work together on some measures regardless of their aggressive attitudes towards each other.[414] Additionally, Eisenhower made plain to his National Security Council that "it behoved us to study the problem constantly."[415]

Eisenhower understood that no matter how sound America's strategy, the U.S. could not act alone within the global community. This was the lesson he learned during his time as the Commanding General of SHAEF during World War II and later as the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR), a position to which President Truman recalled him to active duty in 1952 when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established the position. Eisenhower believed that NATO was and could remain "an agency of peace."[416] During his speech at first NATO meeting of government leaders, he addressed the assembly, arguing fervently,

> We are moving into an era in which vast physical forces cast a pall over our world. I believe our NATO governments stand ready to concert our efforts with each other--and with other nations including, of course, the Soviet Union if it were willing-to bring

[412] Eisenhower, "The Change for Peace," April 16, 1953, Washington, D.C., available at www.edchange.org/multicultural/speeches/ike_chance_for_peace.html, accessed 11 September 2021.
[413] Ibid.
[414] Memorandum of NSC discussion, 8 & 9 April 1953, "139th meeting of the NSC," NSCS, Ann Whitman File, DDEL; Memorandum of NSC discussion, 28 & 28 April 1953, "141th meeting of the NSC," NSCS, Ann Whitman File, DDEL
[415] Bowie and Immerman, *Waging Peace*, p. 122.
[416] Eisenhower, "Remarks at the Opening of the NATO Meetings in Paris," 16 December 1957, Available online at www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-opening-the-nato-meetings-paris. Accessed 1 March 2021.

> these forces under rational control in the common interest of all humanity. Until that can be done, we must continue to create and sustain within the free world the necessary strength to make certain of the common security. And all of us must have the assurance that that strength will be used to sustain peace and freedom.
>
> We are in a fast-running current of the great stream of history. Heroic efforts will long be needed to steer the world toward true peace.
>
> This is a high endeavour. But it is one which the free nations of the world can accomplish.[417]

Not only did Eisenhower view American foreign policy as holistic within the structure of the American government, but President Eisenhower also viewed it as holistic within the global community.

[417] Ibid, accessed 1 March 2021.

CHAPTER NINE

Gavin's Coup de Grace: Retirement and Politics

Many military historians have inaccurately described Gavin's retirement as a resignation due solely to Gavin's disagreements with Eisenhower administration and his "New Look" strategy.[418] Bradley Biggs, one of the first black paratroopers assigned to the 555th Parachute Infantry Regiment, later wrote a biography of Gavin, boasting that his biography of Gavin "is the story of the collision between an outspoken man with an abiding faith in democratic processes, and the Washington brass. The collision led Gavin to leave the military at the peak of a brilliant career, and may have contributed to America's national tragedy in Vietnam."[419] No one doubts the admiration that Biggs felt for Gavin; Gavin, as the commanding general of the 82nd Airborne Division incorporated the all-black unit into the division after World War II, and did so with little fanfare amidst the backdrop of the racially segregated environment of Fort Bragg and Fayetteville, North Carolina, home to the 82nd Airborne Division. But on Gavin's resignation he was wrong—and this wrong refrain was echoed by many in America and continues to cast a shadow even today.

Gavin countered this unfortunate narrative of man against the machine in his own correspondence shortly after his retirement and then again as he settled into writing his autobiography in the early 1980s. Although Gavin disagreed at tactical and operational levels with the Eisenhower administration, that disagreement was not the sole reason for Gavin's retirement. Unfortunately, the popularly accepted narrative bases the retirement on that disagreement. Gavin, himself, did little to challenge that perspective in the years after his retirement. Given a chance to correct the narrative on the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) news show, "Meet the Press," on Sunday, May 4, 1958,

[418] Many military historians incorrectly report that Gavin, along with Matt Ridgway and Maxwell Taylor, resigned in protest from the Army. In fact, all three retired at the culmination of their service. While it can be argued that all three wanted to continue to serve in positions of increased responsibility, other than Gavin, that cannot be proven. Gavin details his conversations with General Taylor and the submission of his retirement upon word that he was being asked to stay on the Army staff for another year rather than promotion and command.

[419] Biggs, *Gavin*. p. 8.

less than two months after his retirement, Gavin demurred. The moderator, Ned Brooks, introduced Gavin by stating:

> His decision to retire focused the attention of Congress and the country on the controversy over the conduct of our defence program, especially the development of missiles and satellites. General Gavin had protested what he felt was a down-grading of the Army's mission in the overall defence plan. He concluded that he could do more for the defence effort by laying aside the uniform, so after 30 years of service he retired.[420]

However, if we are to believe what Gavin wrote in the thirty years after his retirement, that disagreement was not even the main reason for the retirement.

Gavin's main reason for retiring from the Army was his contentious relationship with General Maxwell Taylor, the Army Chief of Staff, and a man that Gavin had known and been in competition with since the younger Gavin was a cadet at West Point. This enmity between the two ran deep, surfacing again after General Taylor took over as the Army's Chief of Staff after the retirement of General Matthew Ridgway in 1956. In an Army Senior Officers Debriefing Oral History in 1975, Gavin explains the old and complicated relationship between himself and General Taylor that "goes back thirty years. It does. When I was a cadet at West Point and when I was a first classman." Gavin attended West Point after serving as an enlisted soldier for almost a year in Panama, helping the company first sergeant for almost half that time as the company clerk. Gavin prided himself throughout his career on this and his ability to empathize with the soldiers in his command. During the summer of 1925, then-cadet Gavin was serving as the cadet company first sergeant and was standing in the company orderly room,

> And in walks this very trim, smart looking officer, resplendent, and clothes well pressed, sabre at his side, which they wore in those days. And he comes over around me to the desk. And he was he was [sic] Lieutenant Maxwell Taylor; he was normally one of the instructors in the language departments and hew was put in charge, for the summer, of a company. And he wanted to know if things were going well, and I said, "Yes." And he said, "You are not having any problems, now?" I said, "No." And he

[420] "Meet the Press," 4 May 1958, General James Gavin, Gavin Papers, Box 40, AHEC.

> said, "Okay, everybody is getting their work done?" And I said, "Yes." And he walks off and that is the last that I saw him.[421]

Some might consider this a minor interaction, but for Gavin, this encounter, and the perceptions he would form lasted over fifty years, etched indelibly in his mind, even though the two men had served together during the toughest days of World War II as senior leaders within the airborne community for close to four years. Gavin, continued his recollection,

> It was a bit like that company commander in "From Here to Eternity." He showed not the slightest interest in the troops; he didn't give a damn about them. He didn't ask how many we had, whether they were sick or they were well, any breakdowns, any in the hospital. And the thought crossed my mind at that moment, "Gosh, I never want to serve under this officer." He was absolutely cold and impersonal. He wasn't interested in the troops at all. He was just interested in in himself, in being protected. So, from that time on, I've always had the most personally interesting relationship with Maxwell Taylor.[422]

Oddly enough, the Army would bring Gavin and Taylor together again in the 82nd Airborne Division before World War II, with Gavin commanding the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment and Taylor commanding the Division Artillery. Taylor would go on to take command of the 101st Airborne Division before the massive airborne operation of D-Day, with Gavin taking command of his beloved 82nd Airborne Division in August of 1944. While it would be easy to assume that Taylor and Gavin, along with Ridgway, formed a "band of brothers," that assumption would be an over-simplification of their complex relationship.[423]

Unfortunately, for Gavin and for the Army—in Gavin's estimation—Taylor came to the Pentagon to replace General Ridgway as the Chief of Staff at a time of tremendous importance in terms of national security and the future of the Army, even though he thought that Taylor was "a brilliant

---

[421] U.S. Army Military History Institute, "Senior Officers Debriefing Program: Conversations Between Lieutenant General James M. Gavin, USA (Ret.) and Lieutenant Colonel Donald G. Andrews, USA, and Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Ferguson, USA," 1975. Conducted at Carlisle Barracks, PA, p. 43-44, Gavin Papers, Box 1, AHEC.

[422] Ibid., p. 44.

[423] Gavin's biographers, T. Michael Booth and Duncan Spencer, summarized the difference between Gavin and Taylor succinctly in *Paratrooper: The Life of Gen. James M. Gavin*, "Gavin had instinctively disliked Taylor from the moment he first laid eyes on him at West Point. While Taylor was cool and distant with his men, Gavin believed in total immersion…Taylor was the new man, the political careerist, the peacetime political soldier, while Gavin was a throwback to a warrior mould now discarded." P. 371.

man, very intelligent."[424] Taylor was absolutely the wrong man to serve as the Chief of Staff of the Army during this time.

> Ambitious, terribly ambitious; so ambitious that he is almost ruthless in trying to satisfy that ambition. He has a very interesting intelligence. It's sort of…sort of superficial and brittle. I've never known General Taylor to ever think through a new concept and a new thing and say, "This I believe, and this is the way it's going to be next year, from what I've studied." He isn't that kind of a thinker at all. It's an unusual sort of a thing. He's almost the…drawing board soldier. He comes up to all specifications, except the capacity for creative thinking, thinking through new concepts. I was shaken in the Pentagon when he first came back to the Chief of Staff.[425]

Nevertheless, Gavin still gave General Taylor and the Army his best efforts as on the Army staff, believing that his hard work would be rewarded, after the completion of a short assignment in the Pentagon.

In what can on be described as a swipe at the Army's Chief of Staff after he retired, Gavin wrote, "One must either be straightforward and honest, speaking from personal convictions based upon study and understanding of the problems, or one must decide to become a military chameleon."[426] While Gavin was dreadfully disappointed in the political nature of service in the Pentagon, he continued to follow his personal and academic convictions, giving his best military advice on the future of the Army and land warfare to his superiors in and out of uniform and to Congress.

One of the major complications of Gavin's assignment in the Pentagon came in the first six months of Taylor's tenure as Chief of Staff, as the Secretary of the Army created a new position for an Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Development, a political appointment that supported the Secretary of the Army's civilian political-appointed leadership that provides the senior leadership of the civilian-led Department of Defence. This creation of that position essentially split the duties of the G3 in two: first, operations and plans, and, secondly, research and development. Gavin chose to

[424] Ibid., p. 44.
[425] Ibid., p. 45.
[426] Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, p. 173

take the position as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Research and Development, choosing a position that more closely aligned to his interests and his belief on how it could impact the Army.

This perceived—if not actual—demotion was the source of questioning and speculation from Senator Johnson in a closed hearing on the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Preparedness in January 1958.[427] Johnson pressed Gavin on his demotion from Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, Research and Development to Assistant Chief of Staff for Research and Development. While Johnson continued to press, seemingly not satisfied with Gavin's responses, implying that Gavin had been demoted for his previous outspoken Congressional testimony and that Gavin was retiring because he was not being promoted. Gavin denied these assertions, clearly articulating that he was nearing 30 years of service and that he disagreed with the next year's Army budget. *Life* Magazine reported later that month, amplifying Gavin's testimony:

> Out of this commotion came one distressing development: The decision of Lieut. General James Gavin, the Army's brilliant chief of research and development, to retire. The famous general announced he would quit "because I feel I can do more on the outside for national defense than on the inside."[428]

Additionally, Gavin was asked about his feelings on the need to reorganize the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While these hearings might have been little more than political theatre, setting the stage for the Democratic party assault on the Eisenhower administration, and bringing Gavin and Taylor to an almost irreconcilable moment in their tenuous professional relationship.

As Gavin came to the Army staff and the Pentagon in 1954, he thought he was initially supposed to be serving a short two-year assignment on the Army staff, then promotion to a fourth star and a return to command of soldiers. However, this assignment became a longer three, then four years in Washington, D.C. Gavin relayed this to another retired general officer, General (Retired) Lyman

---

[427] U.S. Congress, Senate, Preparedness Investigating Sub-committee of the Committee on Armed Forces, Inquiry into Satellite and Missiles Program, 80th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, 25 November 1957 through 23 January 1958, p. 481.

[428] *Life*, "Watchful, Challenging Moves from a Power Democrat: Lyndon Johnson Has the Ball," Vol 44, No. 3, January 20, 1958, Gavin Archives, Box 40.

Lemnitzer in the late spring of 1975, writing "to try to straighten out some of the confusion attendant my retirement."[429]

> To begin with, I had discussed with General Taylor leaving Washington over a period of two years. He and I had reached several understandings about my leaving after three years, and certainly after four. We also discussed a specific assignment, CG of CONARC, which he felt was a good idea, and while it did not come as a surprise, I found it deeply disturbing to be told by him on December 21, 1957, that he was going to ask for an exception to the usual practice and keep my [sic] in Washington beyond my fourth year. In view of several discussions with him over the preceding two years, I told him that if this were his decision, I would retire without delay.[430]

While Gavin did not correct the record immediately after his retirement, might be important, but it does fit with standing as a leader in the Army, however, Gavin seeking to correct the record years later, writing other Army senior leaders at the time (Westmoreland, Lemnitzer, etc.) to find out what happened with his application and to correct the record regarding the colonels shows his deviation from Taylor and the distance between them.

As Gavin's future in the Army came to a head with the Chief of Staff, in November 1957, the Soviets successfully launched Sputnik II into orbit, and Gavin was called to testify early in January 1958, in front of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Preparedness. Gavin understood the hearings to be closed to the public; while the questioning focused on the state of the U.S. Army missile program, questions quickly came to the organizational nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While these questions may have been outside of his area of expertise, he gave his best military advice and recommended a reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[431] Throughout his time as the Army G3, Gavin testified before numerous Congressional committees on the inadequacies of the American national security strategy and the failure of the administration to understand the role of the Army in the

---

[429] Gavin, "Letter to General (Ret.) Lyman Lemnitzer," dated 16 June 1975, Gavin Papers, Box 29, AHEC. The Continental Army Command (CONARC) was established in 1955 and was responsible for all Army activities located in the Continental United States: training bases, active units, etc. CONARC was later dissolved into U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, in charge of all training of soldiers and development of doctrine, and U.S. Army Forces Command, in charge of all active units in the Continental United States.
[430] Ibid.
[431] U.S. Congress, Senate, Preparedness Investigating Sub-committee of the Committee on Armed Forces, Inquiry into Satellite and Missiles Program, 80th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, 25 November 1957 through 23 January 1958, p. 481. Additionally, Gavin would later give similar testimony in 1968 that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be re-organised.

future of American warfare. While Gavin fervently believed in the intellectual primacy of his arguments, his testimony played into the political hands of the Democratic Party.

Myriad Democratic senators and representatives, focusing on national security issues, saw Gavin's testimony as a rebuke to President Eisenhower and his administration. These included Senators Kennedy, Johnson, Symington, Russell, Stennis, and Jackson—all interested in national security issues and looking to counter the Republican administration.

> So, I told them just the way we felt about it. And Eisenhower was very upset about it, and called the Joint Chiefs and said, "There will be no more recommendations to the Congress that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be reorganized." He was very proud of the Joint Chiefs. He was the first Chief of Staff of the Army when they had the Joint Chiefs and all this and that. So Taylor switched positions right away and dressed me down a bit for recommending this, and that's the way it went.[432]

Gavin would not play the military chameleon, bending his best military advice to the whims of the administration or his military and civilian superiors in the Army and Department of Defence.

However, Gavin's best military advice differed from Ridgway's. Rather than focusing on the primacy of the American soldier in combat, Gavin's focus was on the ability of technology, whether it rockets, missiles, troop transport aircraft, or helicopters, to provide the Army and its formations the ability to defeat the enemy on the battlefield through improved fire and manoeuvre. This advice emanated from his academic focus on research and development and took shape in his testimony before Congress, starting in the spring of 1956, when he testified before a hearing of Senator Symington's Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on the Air Force. Stewart Symington was the first Secretary of the Air Force and later served as a United States Senator from the Missouri. While Gavin was not a member of the Air Force, in his academic endeavours on the future of the Army and land power, he came to believe that there was a symbiotic relationship between the Army and the operational and strategic mobility the Air Force could provide to support combat missions.

---

[432] U.S. Army Military History Institute, "Senior Officers Debriefing Program: Conversations Between Lieutenant General James M. Gavin, USA (Ret.) and Lieutenant Colonel Donald G. Andrews, USA, and Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Ferguson, USA," 1975. Conducted at Carlisle Barracks, PA, p. 43-44, Gavin Papers, Box 1, AHEC.

While Gavin's motives may not have been completely innocent, his relationship with Senator Symington offered an opportunity for Gavin to offer and express his academic military views in a manner that should have been acceptable. However, in this hearing, Senator James Duff asked Gavin asked about the "number of lives that would be lost" during a nuclear attack on Russia by the Strategic Air Command, who maintained the nuclear arsenal.[433] Although this was outside of Gavin's specific portfolio in Army Research and Development, Gavin answered the question based on a recent study he had seen by the Army Corps of Engineers that "anticipated casualties on the order of 425 million" people throughout Europe, Asia, and Pacific based on radioactive fallout.[434] Although this was a closed hearing and Gavin believed that his testimony would not be made public knowledge, the *Congressional Record* soon released redacted testimony to the public and the *New York Times* picked up the story on June 19th, reporting that "hundreds of millions of people, including a great many in friendly countries, would be killed in the event of an all-out Air Force nuclear attack on the Soviet Union."[435]

This testimony, and the ensuing falling out with senior military and civilian leaders of the Department of Defence, continued through the end of the year, with continued remarks from Taylor and the Army's secretary about protecting him from Secretary of Defence Wilson. Whether Gavin had schemed with Senator Symington is unknown, however the die was cast and Gavin's fate with Taylor seemed to be sealed.

This time, though, Gavin criticized General Taylor in a professional forum outside of the U.S. Army, insulting the "superficial and brittle" leadership of the Army's Chief of Staff, and Gavin realized command was no longer in his future.

> We also discussed a specific assignment, CG [Commanding General] of CONARC [Continental Army Command], which he felt was a good idea, and while it did not come as a surprise, I found it deeply disturbing to be told by him on December 21, 1957, that he was going

[433] Study of Air Power, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Armed Services, United States Senate, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, April 16-June 1, 1956, Parts I-XI, Vol. 1., p. 860.
[434] Ibid., p. 860-862.
[435] *New York Times,* "Army Fails to Ban Bomb Testimony," June 19, 1956, p. 1.

> to ask for an exception to the usual practice and keep my [sic] in Washington beyond my fourth year.[436]

Gavin considered this to be a selfish act by Taylor, and this caused Gavin to do something that was, if not selfish, one of the few times in his career that Gavin chose not to act in accordance with the needs of the Army.

> I told him that if that if this were his decision, I would retire without delay. I went back to my office and wrote and application for retirement and sent it to the Secretary of the Army. Colonel Jock Sutherland sent it to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Westmoreland, without delay that afternoon.[437]

Gavin, in his letter to Lemnitzer, then detailed one of the most interesting anecdotes, and shed light on Gavin's testimony, his retirement, and the post-testimony discussions he had with Taylor and Secretary of the Army Brucker.

What happened next was somewhat of a mystery that Gavin spent years trying to unravel. At some point, years after his retirement, Gavin discovered that then-Brigadier General William Westmoreland had placed Gavin's retirement paperwork in his office safe, forwarding to General Taylor only after two weeks had passed.

> I just learned that Westmoreland put it in his safe and kept it there for a period that must have been close to two weeks. He has so written to a mutual friend of ours and told him so. This, of course, was grossly unfair to me and certainly must have been bewildering to Brucker, because he thought he was negotiating with me and I couldn't understand why he didn't act on my retirement request.[438]

Not only could Gavin not bring himself to support the administration's call for decreased funding and a decreased role for the Army in the national security strategy, but he could not bring himself to selflessly serve the nation in uniform anymore, feeling that he could better serve the nation out of uniform, rather than in uniform.[439]

---

[436] Gavin, "Letter to General (Ret.) Lyman Lemnitzer," dated 16 June 1975, Gavin Papers, Box 29, AHEC.
[437] Ibid.
[438] Ibid.
[439] "Watchful, Challenging Moves from a Power Democrat: Lyndon Johnson Has the Ball," *Life*, Vol 44, No. 3., January 20, 1958, Gavin Archives, Box 40.

While one the best tacticians and thinkers in the Army, Gavin was not able to play the strategic and political "games" that Taylor seemed adept at. President Eisenhower had been working in the strategic and political realm for over a decade in military uniform and in elected office. Gavin disagreed with the executive branch's budgetary recommendations, as he recalled years later in an oral history project:

> There was a very severe limitation on money. The defense budget was around 40-45 million dollars. And the catchy term was strategic, the Strategic Air Command. Now we went through the B-29s, the B50s, B36s, and so on, all of which are obsolete now, and they were never used in combat. And a lot of us were really concerned about that, but the strategic weapons were being oversold, really. And the Navy got on to it very quickly and began to think of strategic missiles and so on. And there were having a hard struggle for survival. The poor Army had nothing but its Infantry to talk about, and divisions.[440]

While disparaging the budgetary decisions was a major issue and discussing the future of warfare and weaponry another, disagreeing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President was a more personal affront to President Eisenhower and his military and civilian service to the United States. Gavin's testimony in front of Johnson's committee played into the Texas senator's hands challenging the organization and structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[441] Gavin had criticized a personal accomplishment of Eisenhower's—the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This criticism ran directly counter to Eisenhower's involvement with the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with how the President chose to run his national security team, demanding that the service chiefs rise about service parochialism to a level of self-less jointness that the Army leadership failed to achieve throughout the Eisenhower administration.

While Gavin may not have been adept at the political machinations that he saw or perceived from his senior military and political leaders, he was operating in that sphere, testifying multiple times in front of Congressional committees and publishing. His publications moved from pure treatises on technology and military tactical and operational art towards the political as he retired and continued to

---

[440] Gavin Oral History Project, dated 1975, p. 9, Box 1, AHEC.
[441] Gavin Oral History Project, dated 1975, Recollections of testimony on December 1957, p. 35, Box 1.Cross-referenced to the U.S. Congress. Senate. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on the Armed Forces. *Inquiry into Satellite and Missiles Program*. 80th Congress, 1st and 2nd Session, November 25, 1957 through January 23, 1958.

write and testify. Shortly after retiring from the Army, Gavin began writing *War and Peace in the Space Age* and became the Vice President of A.D. Little, Inc., headquartered in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

After Gavin moved to Cambridge, he came within the sphere of Senator John F. Kennedy as Kennedy began his successful campaign for the presidency. Gavin's insights into the national security issues, which both he and Kennedy believed America faced, ingratiated him with the young senator. Kennedy used the counsel of national security experts like Gavin in the election of 1960 to defeat Eisenhower's vice president, Richard Nixon, and then, in 1961, Kennedy appointed Gavin as the Ambassador to France. Gavin served in France for two years, returning to Boston and A.D. Little.

However, Gavin maintained his connection to national security issues serving as on multiple boards, including the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, writing, maintaining his criticism of the joint chiefs, and testifying in Congress. In 1968, Gavin published *Crisis Now: Crisis in the Cities, Crisis in Vietnam, A Commitment to Change,* which focused on the retired general's criticism of the Vietnam War.[442] Oddly enough the issues surrounding the Vietnam and Gavin's feelings on the disintegration of American urban life were portended by then-Senator Lyndon Johnson in that January 1958 congressional hearing, when Johnson commented to Gavin that Gavin's retirement and departure from military "would leave 'second raters' in charge of the Army."[443] Gavin relayed these same fears years later, laying bear his true feelings for Taylor and Westmoreland during his participation in the Army's oral history project:

> But you see people were lying an awful lot then. And I can't help but feel that this was the beginning of some of the things that led to things that happened in Vietnam. Falsifying cable back to the White House, falsifying body counts, falsifying intelligence summaries; it became a way of life, and I find it profoundly disturbing. As I say, I wrote a chapter about my own personal part of it and decided not to put it in

[442] James Gavin, *Crisis Now: Crisis in the Cities, Crisis in Vietnam, A Commitment to Change* (New York: Random House, 1968).
[443] H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,* p. 52-53. McMaster quotes Rowland Evans and Robert Novak's biography, *Lyndon Johnson: The Exercise of Power, A Political Biography* (New York: New American Library, 1966), p. 55-58. This feeling of "contempt," as McMaster describes it portends the issues that Johnson will have with the military and Gavin's discussion and future testimony on Vietnam, leading to the publication of *Crisis Now.*

> that book, because it would have been self-serving. A lot of people still wonder why I didn't defend myself more vigorously; because defending myself would have been attacking General Taylor and Admiral Radford and a lot of people, for doing things that were absolutely wrong. But, it's all coming out now.[444]

Throughout the mid- to late-1960s Gavin served as critic of the joint chiefs and the United States' involvement and strategy, focusing not just on the personal issues he had with Taylor and Westmoreland but the war itself, and the administration's handling of the war and national security issues. Gavin's testimony and discussions with key civilian and military leaders within the administration focused on this disagreement. In 1967, Gavin testified in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

> Our intellectual, physical, and economic resources should be applied as a matter of first priority to the problems of our American society. It must be a society that uses its tremendous technology and physical resources, and its national wealth, to rid the country of poverty, to raise the standard of living of its citizens, to provide a healthful environment, to provide educational opportunities for all our people…and finally, a domestic security for its citizens.[445]

These comments sound like the words of a politician running for office, rather than a retired Army general speaking out on the perils of military action. In fact, it was later reported that Gavin had been asked to run for President in the 1968 election as part of the anti-war movement of the Democratic Party.[446]

* * *

Many military historians have mischaracterized Gavin's retirement as a resignation in defiance of the Eisenhower administration's "New Look" national security strategy. Maybe this was done to enhance the image of Gavin as a national hero, as if being the only general officer in the U.S. Army with four combat parachute jumps during World War II while leading a the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and later the 82nd Airborne Division during its operations in in multiple campaigns across Europe, was not enough. However, there was, and is, no need to polish his image. There is a need,

---

[444] Gavin Oral History Project, dated 1975, p. 39, Box 1, AHEC.
[445] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations: *Conflicts Between United States Capabilities and Foreign Commitments,* 90th Congress, February 21, 1967.
[446] Ward, Geoffrey C. and Burns, Ken (2017-09-05). *The Vietnam War: An Intimate History*. (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, New York), p. 234.

however, to correct the narrative and understand the man, his successes, his limitations, and the impacts of his service on the Army, the Eisenhower administration's "New Look" national security strategy, and—later—the Kennedy administration's strategy. It is important to correct the record of our history because an incorrect understanding of the past will further this flawed narrative of Gavin, his thoughts, and his impacts on the Eisenhower administration and American national security.

Gavin was a brilliant leader of soldiers, military tactician, and intellectual. He understood the specifics of manoeuvre warfare, both airborne and air cavalry operations, better than anyone of his time. Additionally, Gavin was the uniformed Army expert in nuclear warfare and missile technology. However, he failed to understand the strategic setting in which the Army of the 1950s operated and the necessary context within the Eisenhower administration's New Look national security strategy. This failure was due to his military background and the experiential bias that came from his time as a paratrooper and intellectual, Gavin's focus on the tactical and operational function of the Army in the conduct of land warfare, and Gavin's fundamental difference with Eisenhower on the nature of warfare. He failed to understand that Eisenhower's strategy was not just a strategy to avoid war, but also the best strategy for peace at that time. Gavin summarized his 1958 book with the following:

> It is past time that we revamped our strategy, from a strategy to avoid war to a Strategy for Peace. Since the object of strategy is to make physical combat unnecessary, we as a free people should be able to develop such a strategy. Our democracy has been for peace and for freedom since the Republic was founded and we should be assertively for them now.[447]

However, Gavin failed to realize that the Eisenhower administration strategy kept America out of war for eight years, and the policies and tactical and technical advances that Gavin championed would soon bring America into a war it would not win. Gavin failed to understand the strategic implications of the Eisenhower administration's New Look policy—to make the world safe and peaceful in the atomic era. Gavin mis-understood that the technical advances that he proposed would improve the U.S. Army's ability to fight and win its nation's wars, but would not and could not bring peace.

[447] Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, p. 288.

Post-Script: A Reconciliation?

Regardless of the divide on military theory, Gavin seemed to have reconciled, at least mentally with the Eisenhower and the "New Look" national security policy later in his life, writing to Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower's biographer:

> I am glad that you are doing a biography of Eisenhower. As you may know, I knew him quite well. I was somewhat unhappy with him over the Berlin business and how he handled the military situation in Europe from August 1944 onward. The more I learned about the political aspects of the job, however, the more I realized that he was a superb militarist/diplomat.[448]

Oddly enough this was not the first time that Gavin had complimented Eisenhower to Ambrose, commenting earlier that year, "As time goes on, I have increasing respect for General Eisenhower's ability to handle the exceedingly complex political problems that were thrown at him, not the least of which was to get along with Winston Churchill."[449]

Never one to mince his words, this "reconciliation" is interesting, especially given his criticism of Eisenhower as late as 1976. Gavin, in a letter to his literary agent, Sterling Lord, criticized Eisenhower sharply. He disparaged Eisenhower not only for his military leadership but also for his personal conduct concerning Eisenhower's "relationship" with Kay Summersby, referring to Eisenhower's leadership as "remote generalship":

> It struck me, time and again, that he simply wasn't paying attention to the war nor running it. There were four critical occasions: the escape of the Germans and Italians from Sicily, the escape of the two German armies at Falaise; the escape of the Germany [sic] army from Calais by barge; and finally, doing nothing about Berlin or Prague. On all these occasions, he should have been acting aggressively and decisively, but for some reason or other he just simply wasn't there. I do not know to what extent Summersby was responsible for this, but she, no doubt, had a very significant role to play. His generalship was really one of absentee general or, in the critical moments, non-existent.[450]

---

[448] Gavin, Letter from Gavin to Dr. Stephen Ambrose, while Ambrose was writing a biography of Eisenhower, dated 28 July 1981, Box 28, AHEC. The letter is a response from Gavin to initial correspondence from Ambrose regarding a World War II-focused tour of Europe.
[449] Gavin, Letter from Gavin to Dr. Stephen Ambrose, dated 9 March 1981, Box 28, AHEC. Letter was written in response to Ambrose's gift of a copy of *Ike's Spies*.
[450] Gavin, Letter to Sterling Lord, dated 6 December 1976, Box 8, AHEC.

These comments do not reveal someone who has changed his mind about a former leader or is parsing his thoughts. Gavin, over 30 years later, still felt enmity for Eisenhower as a leader. Unfortunately, for the historian no documentation exists of that mental reconciliation with the leadership of Eisenhower to explain the difference just five years later.[451]

While one could interpret Gavin's comments, relating only to Eisenhower's military service, and not his tenure as president, Gavin's correspondence indicated that he was direct and not afraid to criticize, even as he aged. In fact, Gavin even criticized his long-time boss, General Matthew Ridgway several times about Ridgway's conduct as the XVIII Airborne Corps Commanding General during World War II, specifically, his penchant for firing subordinate commanders, "It was a very interesting difference in command. Ridgway would have relieved him; Montgomery commended him."[452] Ten years later, he wrote to a fellow retired general, Dewitt C. Smith, Jr., in 1985,

> I know that General Ridgway had a sizable list of people relieved for cause. If every corps commander had approximately the same number, we would not have much of a command chain left, and certainly many officers would shirk their responsibility to high command in the face of such attrition…I was present at one or two of his reliefs and I felt very sorry for the victims.[453]

No such mental reconciliation between Gavin and Ridgway took place because both men seemed to be closer professionally than Gavin and Eisenhower. Although Gavin seemed to mentally reconcile with Eisenhower over 15 years after the former President's death, Gavin failed to understand fully the Eisenhower administration's New Look national security strategy during Gavin's time on the Army staff and during his time advising Senator Kennedy on national security issues.

---

[451] No correspondence exists explaining this change in sentiment; however, this change coincides with two factors: the increase in popularity in Eisenhower, his leadership, and policies that came about in the 1980s after the publication of several works supportive of Eisenhower (Ambrose and Greenstein being the two most prominent); and the pending publication of Gavin's own autobiography. It seems too coincidental, but, without access to Gavin's autobiography and notes, it remains just that.

[452] Gavin Papers. Box 1. Gavin Oral History Project dated 1975. There is additional correspondence between Gavin and Ridgway in both collections about this topic, with Ridgway's remembrances differing from Gavin's.

[453] Gavin, Letter to Lieutenant General (Ret.) DeWitt C. Smith, Jr., regarding problems with junior officers in the Army, dated 28 August 1985, Box 32, AHEC.

It would be safe to conclude that there was no intellectual reconciliation, even though Gavin's political comments tended towards those of President Eisenhower, talking about holistic peace and security, rather than focusing on specific methods of warfare. Eisenhower masterfully employed his hidden-hand leadership against the service parochialism of the United States Army and its leadership on technical issues, specifically as personified by James Gavin. While Gavin may not have been even on President Eisenhower's radar during the administration, Gavin's initiatives in technology and his intellectual views on the role of the Army in land warfare were defeated by the President. It is important to note that while General Ridgway chose his retirement to field his most forceful argument to date against the administration's perspective, Gavin chose to use, or attempt to use, the power of the press, Congress, and the Army Chief of Staff against the President's national security agenda. And Gavin's agenda continued in retirement, almost coming back to mirror the Eisenhower administration focus on the economy, acknowledging the relationship between the two crises he saw in America in 1968—the Vietnam War and the disintegration of the American city. While the difference between Eisenhower and Gavin remained Gavin's (and the Army's) belief that because nuclear war had destroyed the idea of victory, war then would ever remain limited in scope. Gavin focused on this notion of limited war, and General Maxwell Taylor, the Army Chief of Staff after Ridgway, continued to focus on this notion as they continued their fight against the Eisenhower administration and its national security strategy.

Part Three

General Maxwell Taylor:

Soldier, Politician, and Strategist?

Few incoming army chiefs of staff had a stronger track record than Gen Maxwell Taylor. Taylor was one of the original senior leaders of the 82nd Airborne Division. He later commanded the 101st Airborne Division during the parachute jump into Normandy. He then served as the Superintendent of the United States Military Academy after World War II and commanded Allied forces in Berlin from 1949 to 1951 and Korea from 1953 to 1955, before he was promoted to four star general and assumed the position as the Chief of Staff of the Army. Yet Taylor's tenure as chief of staff was not a happy one. He led an ill-fated re-design of the Army in support of Eisenhower's New Look national-security policy, before he retired and published *The Uncertain Trumpet*, a sharp-elbowed critique of the Eisenhower administration. Then, as the Kennedy administration floundered after the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion, Taylor returned to government service, first as leader of the task force charged to investigate the invasion, and thereafter as the Military Representative to the President and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Despite such a prodigious resume, Taylor remains one of the most enigmatic military leaders of the modern era. Ingo Trauschweizer, in his recent historical review, *Maxwell Taylor's Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam*, hails him as "one of the most influential American soldiers, strategists, and diplomats of the twentieth century."[454] However, in his 2010 book, *The Generals*, Thomas Ricks savagely criticized Taylor, calling him the "most destructive general in military history."[455] Where does the truth lie? This chapter will attempt to re-examine General Maxwell Taylor's legacy from the perspective of his fight against the Eisenhower administration's national security strategy and show how his dissent was nested within the Army's effort to undermine the New Look National Security strategy in an attempt to maintain the budgetary levels that supported the Army's role in national security. This

[454] Trauschweizer, *Maxwell Taylor's Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam,* p. 1.
[455] Thomas E Ricks, *The Generals* (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), Kindle Edition, Location, 6443.

chapter will attempt to show that General Maxwell Taylor was at once influential and destructive to the Army and the country he loved.

Throughout his career and into his retirement Maxwell Taylor effectively controlled the narrative surrounding his service and legacy as a soldier, strategist, and politician; Taylor's speeches, memoirs and biographies, and his actions all served to control tightly the narrative that Taylor, himself, created, crafted, and preserved By contrast, this chapter will re-examine Taylor's legacy through the lens of his forty-odd years in uniform, cutting through that crafted narrated, and compare his experiences and attitudes to Generals Matthew Ridgway and James Gavin as well as President Eisenhower.[456] By concentrating on his role in the Eisenhower administration, it will also fill a major gap. The balance of existing scholarship on Taylor focuses on his war service, his time in the White House and his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Taylor's own writings, as well as those of his son, also concentrate on these periods and only briefly touch on his efforts as Army Chief of Staff. The pages that follow will begin with his service at the United States Military Academy as a language instructor, where he first met young cadet James Gavin. They then follow his career in the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division, service in Korea, showing how these formative experiences cast a long shadow over his time as Chief of Staff.

In that position, Maxwell Taylor would prove himself to be a better politician of than his predecessor, Matthew Ridgway, and his Deputy for Research and Development, James

[456] Trauschweizer's recent book adds to the literature of Maxwell Taylor. Not much has been truly revealed as Taylor controlled the narrative with the publication of his son's biography of the father shortly after the elder Taylor passed away in 1987, *General Maxwell Taylor: The Sword and the Pen*. Additionally, Taylor's *Uncertain Trumpet* lambasted the Eisenhower administration's nuclear strategy and marked his first retirement from the Army, only to be recalled to active duty by President Kennedy, serving as a Special Assistant to President Kennedy and then as Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff. Additionally, Brian Linn's *Elvis' Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield* also provides current literature on the 1950s Army. Most of the literature surrounding Taylor has focused on his service in the Kennedy administration and the Vietnam War, failing to properly analyse the 1950s Taylor and his attacks on the Eisenhower administration.

Gavin. While three men had joined forces in 82nd Airborne Division at the outset of World War II, their paths subsequently diverged. By the time they reached leadership roles in the Pentagon, the three generals had developed distinct strengths: Ridgway—the soldier's soldier; Gavin—the military intellectual; and Taylor—the politician. As these three leaders grew up in the Army, their experiences coloured the strategic leaders they would grow to become.

This chapter will explore Maxwell Taylor's growth as a political military leader and his rebellion against the Eisenhower administration's national security strategy. It starts with Taylor's transition from an Engineer officer to the Field Artillery after his first assignment in Hawaii and continues through the end of the Eisenhower administration, extending into his work with the Kennedy administration both out of and back in uniform. Taylor found himself in direct conflict with the Eisenhower administration from the opening, even though he assured them that he was willing "to accept and carry out the orders of civilian superiors."[457] Although Taylor retired in 1958, his revolt against the Eisenhower administration continued as he transitioned into private life and carried him into a post-Chief of Staff of the Army, serving as a special advisor to President Kennedy and then, coming out of retirement, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for President Kennedy.

While examining Taylor's revolt against the Eisenhower administration's focus on nuclear deterrence, this chapter will highlight Taylor's views on warfare: how those views were formed, how they evolved over time, and several of the constants inherent in those views. It will also consider the reasons behind the policy disagreements between the Eisenhower administration and Taylor—one of the most contentious military leaders of the twentieth century. Taylor's differences centred around three key factors: a different military background, differing inclinations towards strategic and tactical (and operational) outlooks on national security policy, and Taylor's political schemes.

It is necessary to understand the biography of Maxwell Taylor—who he was, where he came from, his experiences in the Army, his relationships with key leaders in the administration and the

[457] Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 156.

Army, and the his political undertakings—in order to understand his part in the revolt against the Eisenhower Administration. Taylor was a key figure in the revolt, reorganizing the Army to focus on tactical nuclear operations, supportive of the Coordination Group and their dealings, and outspoken as in his revolt as he retired (initially) from his military career and published his own diatribe against the Eisenhower administration, *Swords and Plowshares: A Memoir*, in 1959.

Next, this chapter examines the impact of this debate, specifically looking within the political landscape of Washington politics to understand what happened while Taylor succeeded Ridgway as Chief of Staff of the Army. Finally, this section follows Taylor as he retired from the Army and began life in the private sector—although, in practice, he never fully retreated from public service, returning to public service, first as a special advisor to President Kennedy and then, back in uniform, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for President Kennedy. Taylor's memoir would serve as a clarion call for the Kennedy presidential campaign, cementing Taylor's legacy in revolt against the Eisenhower administration's New Look National Security Strategy.

CHAPTER TEN

The Education of a Soldier and a Politician

Maxwell Taylor was educated at the United States Military Academy, just like Matthew Ridgway and James Gavin. As a cadet, Taylor showed a remarkable academic capacity, especially in foreign languages. In fact, Maxwell, much like General Ridgway, would come back to West Point to teach in the Department of Foreign Languages. He finished his time at West Point with a ranking in the top 10 of his class and was commissioned as a Lieutenant in the Engineer Corps, following in the footsteps of a fellow West Point graduate that Taylor had come to idolize at an early age, General Robert E. Lee.[458]

Taylor came to his affection of Lee through his grandfather, who had served as a Confederate cavalry and infantryman in Missouri and Arkansas during the American Civil War. As a child, Taylor would spend time with his grandfather during the summers, listening to the former Confederate soldier recount stories of the war and regale the young Taylor with stories of his heroes—Generals Lee and Stonewall Jackson. In these summer sessions with his grandfather is where Maxwell Taylor first heard of West Point, as Lee and Jackson had gone to the military academy before they served in the American Mexican and Civil Wars. Taylor recounts, "On a sixth grade form, I recorded a commitment to the military life by listing as my future profession, major general."[459] Taylor continued on in his memoir that this early

[458] John M. Taylor, *General Maxwell Taylor: The Sword and the Pen* (New York: Bantam Books, 1991). General Taylor's son, John, was the first and most prominent biographer of his father until Dr. Ingo Trauschweizer revisited General Taylor in 2019. While much has been written of General Taylor's involvement in the Kennedy administration and the Vietnam War, little has been heretofore written of Maxwell Taylor's early career that shaped the leader he would become. John Taylor quotes from an oration written by a teenage Maxwell Taylor on General Robert E. Lee, "In righteousness did he judge and make war." (p. 16) While there is no direct evidence that Taylor would maintain his reverence of Lee as he grew and developed as a strategic leader in the U.S. Army, it is safe to assume that the deep respect Taylor showed towards Lee in this early writing led to the young Taylor choosing to branch into the Engineer Corps as Robert E. Lee had done almost 100 years previously.

[459] Maxwell *Taylor, Swords and Plowshares*, p. 23.

recognition of what he wanted to do and be when he grew up was a great advantage to a young man, however this early declaration, could have been nothing more than a child's admiration for his grandfather and a reclamation of his grandfather's heroes from the Confederacy.

After completing Engineer School, the Army assigned Taylor to Hawaii. This posting would prove integral to his future Army career in two respects. First, Taylor quickly concluded that he did not want to end up like his Engineer Regimental Commander. Although Colonel [first name] Schultz had graduated first in his class from West Point, he had spent most of his career in civil engineering posts and barely knew how to mount and ride his horse or wear his uniform and spurs. Taylor, wanting to be a more accomplished and multifaceted army officer, soon decided to change his branch and future in the Army.[460] Second, before leaving Hawaii to a faculty position at West Point, Taylor was involved in an accident that would leave him with significant hearing loss for the rest of his life. This affected how he interacted with people. From this point forward, he would use written correspondence more frequently, while in meetings he would lean closely in to hear what others were saying.[461] These awkward traits would result in a measure of distance between Taylor and his soldiers as he rose through the ranks—a distance that would mark him out as aloof, and so different from the other great leaders of his time, Generals Eisenhower, Ridgway, and Gavin.

After his second stint at West Point, Taylor completed the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. The Army then assigned him to Japan as an assistant Military Attaché. Taylor's capacity for languages proved invaluable as he quickly learned Japanese and found himself serving as his assistant and Japanese translator to Colonel Joseph Stillwell, who

[460] U.S. Army Senior Debriefing Program, Sec. I, p. 9.
[461] John M. Taylor, *General Maxwell Taylor: The Sword and the Pen*, p. 25.

was the senior military person remaining as the U.S. evacuated most of its personnel from the embassy in Peking.

Prior to completing the Army War College, Taylor frequently had crossed paths with Ridgway, both men having spent time at the West Point foreign language department, and at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, at the Command and General Staff College. In 1940 General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the Army as the United States prepared to enter World War II, pulled Taylor out of the Army War College early to support Ridgway in the War Plans Department for the new Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall. Ridgway, who was tasked with initiating "a series of missions in Latin America aimed at ascertaining what our allies there might require to meet a military threat from Nazi Germany," had personally asked for Taylor because of his proficiency in Spanish.[462]

Taylor's mission to Latin America would serve as a harbinger of things to come, as he would return to Washington after a short tour in command of the 12th Field Artillery Battalion. The year in command of the tactical unit would serve Taylor well in the future as he focused on tactical field training and the "basic facts of soldiering."[463] When Taylor came back to the Army staff in 1941, he served on the military secretariat to the Chief of Staff, General Marshall. In essence, Maxwell Taylor served as an administrative action officer, but his provided him with multiple key advantages. First, he found himself in a unique position to show off his intelligence and administrative prowess in the direct presence of the one of, if not, the most influential Army leaders at that time. Second, less than a year into this job, Pearl Harbor

[462] Maxwell D. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares: A Memoir*, p. 37. General Taylor wrote that it was "an indication of the low ebb of language instruction in the Armed Forces that Ridgway had to raid the War College class to fill out a slate of some ten officers qualified to do serious business in Spanish." This mission, however, and his relationship with Ridgway, although the two officers differed tremendously in their outlook on and style of warfare, would bode well for Taylor as he would find himself assigned to the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, pausing to work there before he left the Army staff to work for Matthew Ridgway yet again in the 82nd Airborne Division.
[463] Ibid., p. 38.

brought the United States fully into World War II. Lastly, the people with whom Taylor was able to associate with on the Army staff set the stage for future success: Matthew Ridgway, Dwight Eisenhower, and Walter Bedell Smith, to name a few.

As the United States prepared for war in the Pacific, Taylor thought himself well positioned to serve on the staff of General Joe Stillwell, with whom he had worked for several years previously in China. Taylor's focus, much like "most of the officers of my period were all eager to get out into the field and get away from Washington."[464] In 1942, as the war in the Pacific was taking shape, General Stilwell came to Washington, tasked to organise a headquarters for service in the China-India-Burma Theatre, working with Chinese General Chiang Kai-shek, and overseeing the United States' lend-lease activities to support the Chinese military. Based on Taylor's past service with Stillwell, and the other years that he had spent in Japan and Hawaii, Taylor thought himself a prime candidate to serve in the Pacific theatre. Stillwell and Taylor met for dinner, asked him to serve with in Stillwell's nascent headquarters in the Far East, and submitted Taylor's name to General Marshall for assignment to Stilwell's new headquarters. However, Taylor's fate was not to be cast with General Stillwell and the Far East, rather it would lay with Matthew Ridgway and the war in Europe. As Taylor later recounted during an Army Senior Leader Debriefing years later:

> when Stillwell put in his list of officers to General Marshall, my name was scratched off for reasons not explained at the time. It was a very critical decision because it resulted in my fighting the war in Europe, the critical theatre, the decisive theatre, and not being involved in the very frustrating experience which an assignment to China turned out to be in the case of most officers.[465]

While General Marshall declined to assign the young Taylor to Stilwell's headquarters, and Taylor was initially disappointed because he thought this meant that he would spend more time

[464] U.S. Army Senior Debriefing Program, Sec. II, p. 8.
[465] Ibid., p. 8.

during the war in Washington, D.C., rather than in a war-fighting theatre. However, this event would soon turn to be a blessing for Maxwell Taylor and provide him with ample opportunity and shape him into the leader he would become.

Days later, another list went into General Marshall's office, also with Taylor's name on it. General Matthew Ridgway had asked the Army Chief of Staff for Taylor to serve as the Division Chief of Staff of the newly formed 82nd Airborne Division. Taylor would later say about Matthew Ridgway, "we had a very close association…So, in that sense, I was always following him around and learning a hell of a lot from that Ridgway."[466] While Taylor eagerly grasped the opportunity to serve in the newly formed 82nd Airborne Division under Ridgway's leadership, he would later recognize the importance of his service on the Army staff and the ability to relate service to the highest levels of national security. In this context, he would allude to another, un-named four-star general, "who always bragged that he had never served in Washington. 'I wouldn't be in that place,' he said. 'I believe in being out with the troops.'"[467] Taylor believed that this person:

> never reached his whole capability. He always had blinders on when they started to talk about national security at the level of government. Until you've lived in this city and worked in it in some relatively high, moderately high at least, position to see how it works, you can't believe it in the first place and hence you're not guided by that experience when you are in the field with heavy responsibility related to what takes place in Washington.[468]

This verdict spotlights a key difference between Taylor on the one hand and Ridgway and Gavin on the other. The latter two also prized service at the tactical level over service in D.C., while Taylor seemed to prioritize Washington experience over assignments with soldiers.

[466] Ibid., Sec. I, p. 29.
[467] Ibid., Sec II, p. 16.
[468] Ibid., p. 16.

* * *

Taylor literally jumped into his assignment as the Chief of Staff of the 82nd Airborne Division in the summer of 1942. Normally new personnel assigned to an airborne division had to complete parachute training over the course of several weeks. Taylor, by contrast, decided to make his first jump after lunch one day having merely monitored the instruction during the morning. Although such an action should have endeared him to the airborne soldiers, Taylor would never truly buy into the airborne form of warfare--unlike Gavin or Ridgway. As he wrote years later, "far from getting jump-happy as some did, I viewed the parachute strictly as a vehicle to ride to the battlefield, to be used only when a better ride was not available."[469] In his senior leader de-briefing, General Taylor doubled down on this sentiment, "I've often said the parachute is the worst vehicle in the world to arrive in on the battlefield. The only thing worse that this is the glider. Well, we got rid of the glider, but we still have the parachute."[470]

His reluctance to jump notwithstanding, Taylor's early time at the 82nd Airborne Division was marked by several key milestones. First, Taylor served as the Chief of Staff as the airborne division split into two, forming both the 82nd Airborne and the 101st Airborne Divisions and re-located the 82nd Airborne Division from Camp Claiborne, Louisiana to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Then in the fall of 1942, Taylor supervised the deployment of the division from the east coast of the United States to Northern Africa to participate in in operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean.

The division's first combat mission was "Operation Husky," the assault on Sicily. Although now-Brigadier General Taylor had taken command of the 82nd Airborne Division Artillery Brigade, he led the division in planning this first Allied airborne operation in the war.

---

[469] Maxwell Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 45.
[470] U.S. Army Senior Debriefing Program, Sec II, p. 29.

In July 1943, not everything went to plan; indeed, more than twenty U.S. planes that to returned North Africa after receiving heavy friendly fire from Allied ground weapons. Nevertheless, the airborne and follow-on amphibious forces gained a sufficient toehold to enable the Allies to take Sicily and establish a jumping-off point for the invasion of Italy.

After the Allies took Sicily, General Taylor and leadership of the 82nd Airborne Division would begin the planning for the airborne invasion of Rome, Codenamed Operation Giant II. While General Ridgway and other senior leaders had misgivings about the planned operation, General Taylor would soon find himself in one of the most daring missions of the war, as he and Colonel William Gardiner were ferried ashore to mainland Italy and then taken by multiple Italian military vehicles to meet with Italian General Giacomo Carboni, the Italian Army Corps Commander assigned to the defence of Rome, and eventually the Italian Prime Minister Marshal Pietro Badoglio. After realising that the situation on the ground had changed from initial reports and that the Italians would not be capable of supporting the Allied airborne operation, Taylor and Gardiner set about to signal the dire situation to General Eisenhower and the Allied staff, finally sent off the famous note, "Situation Innocuous." As Taylor wrote in *Swords and Plowshares*, "prior to leaving Algiers I had worked out an arrangement with the Allied Staff that any message which I might send from Rome which contained the word 'innocuous' should be considered an urgent request to cancel Giant II." This daring behind enemy lines diplomatic and reconnaissance mission required considerable personal courage and diplomatic aplomb. While many criticized Taylor for being too quick to cancel the operation, his actions undoubtedly saved lives and ensured the Allied force of the capability to conduct Operation Overlord the following spring, because the Allies avoided a serious defeat to their airborne forces Taylor's foray into the political-military efforts in Europe, reinforced

for senior leaders Taylor's diplomatic ability and displayed his ability to make timely decisions.[471]

While Taylor was not immediately given the troop command that he desired, after his service with the 82nd Airborne Division, he was appointed the chief of staff to the Italian government in Brindisi. Taylor had displayed his diplomatic, decision making, and his linguistic skills during the daring mission to Rome, earning respect from many, but, seemingly, not from those that mattered: most notably, Ridgway, his division commander, and Eisenhower. While Taylor had earned a measure of respect from Eisenhower and the senior Allied leaders as a result of the daring mission to Italy, he never earned the love and devotion of his men as a combat leader. In this respect, Taylor differed from Gavin, Ridgway, and, even, Eisenhower. Taylor was seen by his peers and several senior leaders as a political officer, rather than a soldier's soldier. From the first days of Taylor's time as a cadet at West Point through his second retirement form the Army, Taylor was seen as a political careerist, who carefully managed his assignments and experiences in order to maximize his opportunities for promotion. This perspective is personified in the Battle of Bastogne, where Taylor was noticeably absent from his command. Many think he had returned to Washington, D.C. to lobby General Marshall for his next assignment; in reality, Ridgway had tasked Taylor to attend a series of meetings in Washington regarding the future of the airborne forces in the Army.[472] Regardless of the reason for Taylor's absence on the battlefield or the lengths to which he went to re-join the 101st Airborne Division, this perception remained affixed to Taylor.

Taylor did not embrace this politico-military posting, but his tour in Brindisi did not last long; the 101st Airborne Division needed a commander after its first commanding general,

[471] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 77-83.
[472] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 114.

General William Lee, suffered a heart attack. General Lee was famous as the first commander of the 101st for telling his men that, "the 101st has no history, but it has a rendezvous with destiny." Eisenhower had cabled General Marshall on February 9, merely four months before the D-Day invasion, "my present thought is to Brigadier General Max Taylor form the 82d Airborne Division to replace Lee…it occurs to me that you might prefer to send an airborne division commander from the States…If not, I am sure Taylor will make a good division commander, he has the advantage of combat experience."[473] Marshall responded back to Eisenhower, "If you prefer Taylor to Miley or Chapman assign him accordingly."[474] Hardly a ringing endorsement from either Eisenhower or Marshall. However, at last, Maxwell Taylor had his troop command, leading the 101st into airborne operations in Normandy and in Belgium and Holland and in ground combat operations against the Nazis in Germany.

What is missing from the record, unlike the resources from Ridgway and Gavin are the Taylor's remarks about soldiers and soldiers' stories about him. For Taylor command of troops, even of an airborne division during World War II, seemed to be more of a clinical exercise or something required for him to move to the next assignment and the next rank. In comparison, news articles and accounts from soldiers and peers of Gavin and Ridgway show the reciprocal love and respect of the troops for the generals. As a matter of fact, John Taylor, Maxwell Taylor's son, writes that Taylor thought the secret to his success "was his attention to detail."[475] Ridgway controlled his image and narrative, focused on his war fighting ability, his love of soldiers, and ensured that he always looked like he was ready to fight—combat suspenders with grenades and a rifle. Gavin, much the same as Ridgway, always carried a rifle and always led from the front. Taylor, however, was different from the soldiers (and from

[473] Eisenhower to Marshall, 9 February 1944, Marshall Foundation National Archives Project, Item 2900, Reel 120.
[474] Ibid.
[475] John M. Taylor, *The Sword and the Pen,* p. 78.

Ridgway and Gavin), his son writes about the combat load that soldiers of the 101st jumped with:

> In all, a paratrooper carried between 125 and 150 pounds of gear into battle. The forty-two year old Taylor had a few breaks. He carried an officer's .32 caliber pistol in lieu of a rifle, and he dispensed with the antitank mine and a few other accoutrements. In place of a shovel he carried a bottle of Irish whiskey."[476]

That packing list is not the packing list of a paratrooper that is ready to fight, rather it is the packing list of a leader not prepared to fight. It is telling that that Taylor, himself, recounts that he landed, separate from his division, and "pistol in one hand and identification cricket in the other, to find my troops— a lonely division commander who had lost or at least mislaid his division."[477] Taylor was not ready for the fight, until he linked up with a fellow paratrooper, "rifle in hand, bayonet fixed, and apparently ready for anything."[478]

The 101st also participated in Operation Market Garden, the airborne assault into the Netherlands in September 1944 in order to secure an invasion route into Northern Germany. This operation was made famous by the movie "A Bridge Too Far;" literally the Allies sought to secure multiple bridges over canals and rivers from Eindhoven to Arnhem and failed to secure the last bridge in Arnhem over the Rhine River. The 101st performed heroically, but Taylor shares one vignette involving Ridgway—who was serving as the XVIII Airborne Corps Commander, although the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions were tasked to another corps—that highlights the difference between the two generals. Ridgway and Taylor climbed into a belfry, and Ridgway asked for the sergeant to fire at an enemy-held area across a river. The

[476] Ibid., p. 83.
[477] Maxwell Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 79. John Taylor writes in his biography of his father that the identification crickets were Taylor's idea after the mission rehearsal exercise in England revealed the need for paratroopers to carry a means to identify friendly troops in the hedgerows and between little groups of paratroopers. It is interesting that Maxwell Taylor specifically mentions the crickets; I think this gives more credence to John Taylor's assertion that they were Taylor's idea, and it proves that Taylor thought about the details.
[478] Ibid., p. 79.

sergeant calls for fire, using a dead horse as an aiming point (definitely not the standard doctrinal solution). Although the soldiers were successful in their fire mission, Taylor was not pleased:

> I was far from happy about the way my sergeant had shortcut the standards methods of adjusting fire as prescribed in the mortar manual. Although an artilleryman and not the expert on infantry weapons which Ridgway was, I was sure the "dead-horse" method of adjustment was not in the book.[479]

Taylor was more concerned about form over function, whereas Ridgway was pleased with the mortarmens' accuracy and ability to send rounds towards the enemy in a quick fashion. Taylor, ever the man for details, returned to that position several days later, determined to correct the deficiencies that he had seen on the battlefield with Ridgway: "I returned alone to the church tower and chided the sergeant a bit for not abiding by standard techniques of fire in the presence of the Corps Commander."[480] Taylor asked his mortar team to fire at another target, even though the soldiers protested because German guns had been seen on the other side of the river earlier in the day. Taylor reported that the Germans did, indeed, return fire to the tower, however Taylor was more focused on ensuring his men executed the doctrinal standards of the indirect fire mission.

> When the sergeant had finally got his rounds on target and I had commended to him a thorough review of the mortar manual, I climbed down the ladder and into the courtyard just in time to rendezvous with a small German shell which exploded a few yards away, raising a cloud of dust and sending me rolling with a small fragment lodged in the *sitzplatz*.[481]

Not only is Taylor more concerned about the procedures of firing the mortar, the form over the function, but he put the lives of his soldiers and himself when he disregarded the sergeant's warning about the Germans actively patrolling on the other side of the river. A

[479] Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 94.
[480] Ibid., p. 94.
[481] Ibid., p. 94.

fighting general (Ridgway) is more concerned about putting rounds down range, while the staff general (Taylor) is more concerned about following the correct procedures. Sadly, the main reason that Taylor had to include this vignette was that it was the story of how he was wounded in combat.

However, one of the crucial moments of battle with the 101st happened without Taylor in command. Taylor had flown to Washington, D.C. at the request of General Ridgway to talk the future of the airborne forces with the Army staff when the 101st was surrounded by the German Army at Bastogne in Belgium. The German commander, General von Luttwitz asked for the surrender of the 101st Airborne; to which the acting division commander, Brigadier General Anthony McAuliffe, famously replied, "NUTS!" Even though Taylor was sent to Washington, D.C., at the request of General Ridgway, many believe that Taylor was seeking advancement and a future command during his trip.[482] Taylor's two biggest disappointments in World War II were the cancelled operation in Rome and missing the action in the Battle of the Bulge.[483] Taylor's actions in Rome should have improved his bona fides relating to tactical operations, especially after he successfully executed covert action behind enemy lines in a foreign country and successfully averted a potentially disastrous airborne operation. However, others saw the other side of these actions: overly diplomatic, bureaucratic, and cautious decision in combat. And, while Ridgway had sent Taylor back to Washington for a series of meetings, many merely saw Taylor's absence from combat at the Battle of the Bulge and his

[482] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, *A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press, 2001), p. 468. Even though Maxwell Taylor had jumped into combat with his division on two occasions (Normandy and Market Garden), conducted an undercover mission behind enemy lines in Rome, and jumped out of his first airplane after less than a day of training, the public opinion of Taylor was that of a political officer, looking for his next, higher command or assignment. It was this sentiment that put Taylor in direct difference between Gavin and Ridgway, two generals that held the admiration of their troops and airborne community.

[483] Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 102. Taylor discusses his two biggest disappointments were the missed action in Rome and Bastogne.

desire "for a more prestigious command."[484] The opposition between the reality of Taylor's actions and motivations and others' perceptions of Taylor would become a re-occurring theme in Taylor's career.

Taylor's memoir starts the discussion on the Battle of the Bulge, detailing the fact that he was ordered back to Washington and outlining the important meetings that he had to attend.[485] Taylor tried to use his memoir to set the record straight, from his perspective, to control the narrative about why he was not on the battlefield in Bastogne and the lengths that Taylor went through to get to his division headquarters. Although Ridgway confirms in his memoir that he had sent Taylor to the states "at my request, to confer with General Marshall on certain matters pertaining to the airborne."[486] However, there are two key items from this passage: first, Ridgway does not express remorse over Taylor not being in combat, rather he states that he "felt keen regret" not for sending Taylor away but for having to order the 82nd and 101st to separate on different missions; and second, Ridgway's recounting of his movements during this time period juxtapose with Taylor's recounting and shows the tactical aspects of Ridgway's leadership—ordering an attack, taking the wheel and driving his jeep in dense fog, and sleeping on the ground. Taylor's journey was filled with an office call at Eisenhower's headquarters, driving by sedan; Taylor's journey, and the recounting of it, failed to have the same tactical edge that Ridgway's account had detailed.

After the Nazis surrendered, the Army sent several of its general officers home to the U.S. for some well-deserved leave. While Taylor was home on leave, meeting his wife at the Waldorf Hotel in New York City, no less, he learned that the Pentagon was planning on sending

[484] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, *A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 468.
[485] Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares,* p. 97.
[486] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 114.

the 101st to the Pacific to continue fighting in that theatre. For a general officer who had spent his formative years in the pacific, Taylor was excited about this opportunity. However, when he returned to Bavaria and began talking to his troops, the tone deaf Taylor talked with one of the regiments of the 101st, "We've licked the best that Hitler had in France and Holland and Germany. Now where do we want to go?" Taylor hoped the troops would have responded back with a loud and thunderous "Japan," however he got the answer that soldiers give—the exact same place from which he had just returned, "Home!" [487] Taylor tried to dismiss this episode in his memoir, writing that "their discomfited commander who should have known better than to ask such a question." However, these vignettes merely serve to highlight the difference between Taylor and his soldiers, while Ridgway and Gavin were of their soldiers.

Taylor adds to this difference when he recounted the division change of command in August. Taylor describes a full affair of pomp and circumstance, once again delineating himself from his soldiers, "Standing bareheaded at the foot of the reviewing stand, I received the last salute of these gallant soldiers, their ribbons and streamers recalling our battles together. They had put stars on my shoulders and medals on my chest. I owed my future to them, and I was grateful." [488] Not only did Taylor jump into Normandy without the same equipment and combat gear of his soldiers, but he left Europe different from them on the parade field. To offer a quick juxtaposition, Ridgway did not talk about parades and formalities when he described leaving the corps headquarters. First of all, Ridgway recounted that he was not slated to move to the Pacific and continue fighting, rather he was slated to take command of the occupation effort in Berlin, but that position was "a job I didn't look forward to win with any great eagerness." [489] For a fighting general, that assignment would not do; Ridgway

[487] Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 110.
[488] Ibid., p. 111.
[489] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 150.

received a reprieve from the General Marshall and returned the corps headquarters to the states and prepared to deploy them to the Pacific. Ridgway, ever the soldier's soldier, recounted that as he flew west towards the Pacific he learned about the Japanese surrender and responded like a soldier, "I didn't greatly care. The fighting was over. The world was at last at peace. I leaned back in my seat and went to sleep."[490] While both generals closely curated their narratives, their narratives were for different audiences: Ridgway's narrative was for the soldier and those in the United States that identified with America's greatest generation; Taylor's narrative was written for the national security establishment rather than the soldier.

In contrast, Eisenhower's end of the war was filled with ceremony, actually a multitude of ceremonies across Europe, which one would have expected out of a victorious coalition commander. However, Eisenhower did not relish the trappings of the ceremonies and quickly got back to work, maintaining the peace, even though he may have preferred to retire: "Eisenhower's personal desire was for a quiet retirement with perhaps a bit of writing and lecturing. But fulfilment of that desire had to wait another sixteen years, because the nation continued to call him to service, on the grounds that he was the 'only man' who could do the job and it was therefore his 'duty' to accept.[491] Unlike Taylor, Eisenhower did not relish in the pomp and circumstance, rather Eisenhower, throughout his career, found comfort in the fact that he was "just a Kansas farmer boy who did his duty."[492] After touring the United States, where he feared becoming a "garrulous general," Eisenhower came back to Europe to maintain the peace, meeting with the political leaders of Europe to support and defend the fragile peace in Europe, with a defeated Germany and a rising Soviet Union.[493]

---

[490] Ibid., p. 151.
[491] Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 204.
[492] Ibid., p. 207. Also found in *New York Times* article, 20 June 1945, "Texts of Speeches by Gen. Eisenhower, Mayor La Guardia, and Judge Lehman. The theme of Eisenhower speech of a simple Kansan doing his duty to his country.
[493] Eisenhower letter to letter to Lewis Douglas, 11 September 1945, EP, Pre-Presidential, DDEL.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

The Debate Takes Form

After Taylor's service in the decorated 101st Airborne Division, he was given orders, once again, to report before the end of the summer to the United States Military Academy. This time, Taylor would be assigned as the Superintendent of West Point, returning to the military institute on the Hudson River at a time of profound introspection, as World War II moved into its final months. Taylor saw both professional and personal gains to be had while at West Point, transforming the future officers and leaders of the U.S. Army through their college education and, personally, taking advantage of the professional network available to him through West Point's proximity to New York City and the Council of Foreign Relations; Taylor's new found pulpit would enable him to establish the themes of his narrative for the next two decades: the need for a unified national command structure, the belief in "whole of government" approaches to national security affairs, and a belief in the future of limited and conventional warfare capabilities in the atomic age.[494]

While Taylor received little guidance from senior Army leadership prior to assuming his new position at the head of the military academy, Taylor knew that he had General Marshall to thank for the assignment to West Point, General Marshall visited Taylor's headquarters at Berchtesgaden in late July 1945, after the Potsdam Conference.[495] Eisenhower gave Taylor little guidance "other than an expression of strong interest…in the maintenance of the Honour System and the improvement of teaching of military leadership."[496] Although, given his

[494] Trauschweizer, *Maxwell Taylor's Cold War*, p. 35-36.
[495] Marshall to MacArthur, 2 August 1945, in The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 5, "The Finest Soldier," January 1, 1945-January 7, 1947, ed., Larry I. Bland (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2003), 256-257. Taylor to Marshall, 4 September 1947, Marshall Papers, Box 138, Folder 5, George C. Marshall Library, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA (GCML).
[496] Maxwell Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 112.

experience in Japan and the Far East, Taylor would have been a natural selection to lead Army forces for General MacArthur in the Far East. Both Gavin and Ridgway remained in command of forces, in Europe and the Pacific, respectively, but Taylor was different from these two warfighters. He was better suited for the ivory tower of West Point. For the cadets of the academy, Taylor cut a striking figure: a war hero, commander of the 101st during the daring Normandy invasion. Taylor was of West Point; he was part of the institution. West Point was to be the perfect assignment for Taylor after the war; the position of Superintendent of West Point played to the academic, intellectual, and diplomatic strengths of Taylor. Taylor was free to create his narrative and West Point's narrative, and would come to serve as spokesman for the academy around the country and refining his intellectual foundations for the future.

The new Superintendent's agenda of change at West Point focused on four key efforts: (1) returning the corps of cadets to a four-year education, (2) transitioning the focus of the engineering curriculum to a course of study that better incorporated the humanities, (3) "expanding and improving the quality of the faculty," and (4) "presenting a long-term plan for the academy's infrastructure."[497] The first effort had actually been decided on by Taylor's predecessor, Major General Francis Wilby. Taylor credited Wilby with setting the change in curriculum into motion and convened a panel of consultants, headed by Dr. Karl Compton, the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Their review supported Taylor's advancements as articulated in a West Point publication in 1946, "West Point Looks Ahead," where Taylor pointed out that the War Department did not "make the Academy a mill for producing second lieutenants for any arm of the service. All the emphasis is placed on giving

[497] Ingo Trauschweizer, *Maxwell Taylor's Cold War,* p 15.

a broad foundation of culture, affording the graduate a base upon which to erect a rich and full life of service."[498]

Although Taylor credited his predecessor with starting these changes, they changes were in line with his own thinking, which had been evolving since he started his academic journey as a cadet at West Point. Based on Taylor's academic, tactical, operational, and politico-military experience, Taylor had come to espouse a threefold focus of the Army and the joint force, towards the national security of the United States. Taylor believed that there was a role for the Army, in a limited or conventional role, in the atomic age; he believed that there should be a unified joint command authority at the national level, similar to how Eisenhower had commanded in Europe; and that all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) must be brought to bear by the United States on the international stage. While these views obviously surpassed his role as the Commandant of West Point, they were emblematic of Taylor's consistent focus at the national and international levels. This focus at the strategic would be both a consistent theme and a consistent criticism of Taylor in the years to come.

These views and this perspective is emblematic of Taylor's view and shows the differences between him, Ridgway, Gavin, and Eisenhower. Taylor consistently looked up and out, busying himself with the strategic and politico-military aspects of his service, even when that might not have been his assigned role and responsibility. When Taylor focused down and in, on the tactical, he did so with a microscopic lens on the details. Ridgway, while he was focused down and in at the tactical level, did not focus on the details, so much as he focused on the tactical aspects of military operations. The mortar vignette, previously discussed, during Market Garden illustrates this dichotomy perfectly; Ridgway focused on the tactical operation

[498] Maxwell Taylor, "West Point Looks Ahead," (West Point, NY: U.S. Military Academy, 1946).

and the military outcome, while Taylor focused on the details of how the mortar team executed their mission, without regard to the tactical situation. Gavin focused on the tactical but always thought about the operational concepts, always thinking about how to optimize technology or concepts to improve the tactical outcome. Eisenhower was much more practical, much like Gavin, but less of a technocrat, focusing on how to improve operations at the strategic level, how to improve the coalition (during World War II), trying to optimize the equities of the leaders, staffs, and militaries of the coalition.[499] After World War II, Eisenhower turned inward towards the joint force, even though he was the Army's Chief of Staff, focusing on improving the cooperation of the joint staff. Eisenhower's experience as the Army's Chief of Staff, after World War II, had frustrated him, with "personal hatreds, political and partisan prejudices, ignorance, opposing ideologies."[500]

Taylor's time at West Point also marked a departure from his short-lived tactical leadership in the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. The short tenures of his tactical leadership, at least in the minds of his peers and subordinate soldiers, place him in direct contradiction with others of the time: Ridgway, Gavin, and Patton, to name a few. In reality, this short tactical tenure more closely matched Eisenhower's military resume. However, Taylor was not beloved by his soldiers, cadets, or peers like Eisenhower was. This lack of personal connection in leadership focused Taylor to the intellectual, political, and diplomatic environments, where he excelled. Taylor excelled in these low-level politico-military and diplomatic skills during World War II, as exemplified with his time in Italy on the special mission to Rome and in Brindisi before he assumed command of the 101st. This departure from tactical leadership was not a loss felt by the Army, in fact, Taylor's assignment as the Commandant at West Point enabled him to fulfil the role for which Taylor was ready: an intellectual an academic focused,

[499] Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier and President*, p. 87.
[500] Ferrell, Robert. H., *The Eisenhower Diaries*, p. 137.

not on operational improvement—like Gavin—but on politico-military change. Unfortunately for Eisenhower and the Army, Taylor would grow into this role and become a disruptive, negative influence on the Army and the joint community as her served as the Chief of Staff and, then, later in the Kennedy White House.

In these years after World War II, Taylor turned towards the intellectual, political, and diplomatic environments; his service at West Point and his subsequent posting, to Berlin, would serve to make him more comfortable and experienced in public speaking and politicking. In his memoir, Taylor commented on General Eisenhower's foray to Columbia University:

> I always felt that he took over that position with sincere enthusiasm, expecting to have the opportunity to exercise his remarkable qualities of leadership on the student body of Columbia. I am afraid that he was largely unaware of the nature of the primary duties of a university president with the emphasis on money-raising and administration, or perhaps he hoped to change their nature into something more congenial.[501]

However, these duties were exactly what Maxwell Taylor excelled at, and improving West Point after the end of World War II, increasing his political visibility through contacts at the Council of Foreign Relations and his military visibility through his work as the Superintendent. At the same time that he enhanced his public profile, Taylor fought vigorously against the academic department heads, out-manoeuvring them and instituting multiple changes to the curriculum. This resulted in widespread resentment at not just the substance of the change, but also the style and method he employed to affect these reforms. Nevertheless, T stuck to his view that West Point "succeeds or fails in the future to the degree to which it continues to produce broad men of character, capable of leading other men to victory in battle."[502]

[501] Maxwell Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 116.
[502] Maxwell Taylor, "West Point Looks Ahead."

At the same time, Taylor fended off legislative attacks on West Point and the other military academies, working alongside the Army's Chief of Legislative Liaison, Major General Wilton Persons. Taylor testified before Congressional committee that the institutions should not be transitioned to two-year post-graduate academies because "we must have these young men in their formative years if we are to implant the principles in them which we try to implant."[503] Congress accepted this claim. Taylor then successfully parried Eisenhower's suggestion to streamline the curricula at West Point and the Naval Academy in order to better support cadets and mid-shipmen taking a year at their rival academy. He also wanted to reduce inter-service rivalry and improve coordination at the joint level. Taylor dismissed this proposition, however, concluding that the two academies had different philosophies, would require an additional academic year not to dilute the military education and quality of commissioned officer.[504]

During Taylor's time at West Point, his thinking about military leadership focused on the tactical requirements of cadets and their transition to junior officer, but Taylor also reflected on his experiences in the Far East, in South America, and during World War II as he led the military academy in its post-war evolution. He came to new understandings about the strategic role of the Army and the military in the post-World War II world. His thoughts turned back to the military academic environment of Fort Leavenworth's Command and General Staff College and the Army War College, reconciling his military experience at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels with what he had been taught and what he saw now as the Cold War began after the end of military hostilities. In his notes, Taylor credited General Eisenhower with

[503] Taylor quoted in Jon W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ Press, 1957), p. 108.
[504] Ingo Trauschweizer, *Maxwell Taylor's Cold War,* p 25. Of note, now, the service academies each offer robust exchange programs today that allow cadets to complete an academic year at another academy, thereby fulfilling General Eisenhower's intent of inter-service cooperation at the academic level.

understanding the application of military force and national might integrated together against the enemy and their national capabilities, concluding that Eisenhower was "like Caesar in Gaul."[505] Taylor was mentally moving past his appreciation of the tactical and operational levels of war towards an understanding of what Eisenhower had done in Europe during World War II, employing "all sources of power with unified effect, in short, a total integrated strategy on the part of the Allied coalition bent on bringing Hitler down."[506] While Ridgway focused on the tactical and operational employment of forces and leadership in combat, Gavin focused on operational manoeuvre and technology, Taylor started to come close to Eisenhower's understanding of the strategic level of warfare.

In 1949, before he departed West Point for his next assignment, General Taylor delivered the annual Kermit Roosevelt Lecture at the Imperial Defence College in London, defining strategy as "the course of action taken by a nation to apply its national power to obtain its national objective."[507] Taylor's discussion of strategy and broader view of full-scale mobilisation of a nation's resources dovetailed nicely with General Eisenhower's work in the War Department in 1940 on national mobilisation. Yet Taylor's understanding of mobilisation and national aims and strategy focused on the enemy, minimising the implications of national politics and economics. The stage was thus set for the clash between the two men in the 1950s.

Taylor succeeded in most of his agenda and reforms at West Point. Taylor believed that "cadets should not live in a mental cloister; their interests must be catholic. As future officers in the Army, cadets should avoid the limited horizons which often hemmed in military minds...in our concern to give the cadets the scientific tools needed in the new age, we must

[505] Maxwell D. Taylor, "Personal, World War II, " 90-92, Taylor Papers, Box 1, folder: "World War II Operations: Lessons of World War II, NDU," p. 90.
[506] Ibid., p. 90.
[507] Maxwell D. Taylor, "Postwar Trends in American Strategy," 27 May 1948, talk at the Imperial Defence College, p. 3-4, Taylor Papers, Box 2, Folder: "Speeches 1947-1949, NDU.

not forget that West Point is essentially a school for leaders."[508] The first reform, return to a four-year curriculum after the cadets had been moved to a three-year wartime programme, had already been initiated by Taylor's predecessor at West Point, Major General Francis Wilby.[509] The second, altering the curriculum from a focus on engineering to a broader liberal arts education based with a military leadership focus, he achieved to a great degree, although this reform is where Taylor had his largest issues with the faculty. Taylor used bureaucratic manoeuvres, like moving classes from one department to another in order to influence the subject matter. Additionally, he sparred with other academic leaders at West Point over these tactics and others, specifically as it related to the how and why Taylor leveraged his changes. Colonel George Lincoln, who was part of the Social Sciences Department and ended up running the department from 1954 to 1969, relayed that Taylor's staff had the faculty "in a lather" because the National War College had not renewed two lecture invitations to the Commandant. Lincoln believed that Taylor, the micromanager, desired access to the policy channels in Washington, D.C.; when the invitations were not renewed, Taylor was extremely displeased.[510] Taylor was successful in improving the teaching faculty for two main reasons: first, he co-opted an outside assessment and used that Compton review to represent an outside, unbiased report on which to base reforms, and, second, he embraced the review and established the positons of Academic Dean, promoting one of the department heads into that position. Lastly, Taylor was partly successful in getting Congress to fund physical improvements at West Point. However, these improvements were not completely successful, as they did not address infrastructure requirements completely. Taylor was skilled at the political demands of the position, working Congress for funding, but he failed to follow through with the detailed

[508] Maxwell D. Taylor, "West Point Looks Ahead," (West Point, N.Y.: U.S. Military Academy, 1946), p. 6. Taylor published this pamphlet to describe his plan for West Point's modernization efforts.
[509] Ibid., p. 5.
[510] Colonel George Lincoln to Colonel Paul Caraway, National War College, 11 March 1948, George A. Lincoln Papers, Box 8, Folder: Correspondence Files, Jan-Oct 1947, USMA.

planning required for full-scale infrastructure upgrades, based on Taylor's prioritisation of what was important—reforms or detailed base planning. Even for a detail-oriented micro-manager, the minutiae of garrison and infrastructure planning did not warrant his full attention, when he could be working the halls of Congress, touting the reforms of West Point to policy makers.[511]

In Berlin, Taylor became acutely aware of the Soviet threat. He saw at first-hand the Soviet use of psychological operations to bolster Soviet strength and influence in Berlin, as well as the Soviet use of economic pressures to reach their strategic aims vis-à-vis Berlin and East Germany. It was this strategy that General Taylor lectured about in London in 1949. Taylor had acquired an academic understanding of this change in strategy during his time at West Point; in Berlin he gained a real-world understanding—although he failed to remember this lesson as he moved forward into strategic leadership positions.

Taylor now understood strategy to be "course of action taken by a nation to apply its national power to obtain its national objectives."[512] The United States, Taylor felt, could agree on the broad brush strokes, but the specifics, as it related to budgetary resources was a knife fight, with each service fighting for resources to maintain or grow capabilities it best thought supported the national security strategy.[513] Eisenhower complained about this feeding frenzy and failed to understand why the service chiefs could not or would not put their parochial, service interests second to the national security interests and requirements of the nation.[514]

---

[511] Ingo Trauschweizer, *Maxwell Taylor's Cold War*, p. 20-27. Also, see Brian Linn, *Elvis' Army*, p. 23-26.
[512] Taylor, "Postwar Trends in American Strategy," 27 May 1948, talk at Imperial Defence College, 3-4, Taylor Papers, Box 2, Folder: Speeches, 1947-1949, NDU.
[513] Eisenhower Letter to Swede Hazlett, dated 26 February, 1958. Found in DDEL and in Griffith, ed., *Ike's Letters to a Friend,* p. 198.
[514] "Taylor to Ridgway," not dated, Box 97, Folder: "News Clippings-'Taylor for Ridgway," ca. May 1955, MBR Papers, AHEC. Ridgway writes in the margin, "I never thought that "parochial" was meant to be slighting. It is the duty of the parish head to be parochial." Statement is indicative of the attitude of Ridgway, Gavin, and Taylor towards the President, regarding the Army.

Eisenhower understood the interplay of national and service requirements in a way no other uniformed military leader of Army could. During his initial service in the War Department Plans Division, young-Brigadier General Eisenhower planned the industrial mobilisation for the United States. This experience gave Eisenhower a keen understanding of the national strategic level and requirements of war; his experience as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe completed that strategic understanding, bringing the national strategic means to the international fight. This enabled Eisenhower to operate better with the coalition partners, and gave Eisenhower an experience based unequalled by anyone in the military.

Taylor had an understanding of these concepts, but he failed to put them together in his career like Eisenhower was able to do. Taylor understood that the future of war required "employment of all sources of power with unified effect, in short, a total integration strategy on the part of Allied coalition."[515] However, Taylor would forget this years later as he took the reins of the Army as the Chief of Staff, arguing for additional resources the Army and in favour of his parochial interests of the Army. Taylor forgot that "all sources of power" included the American economy; Eisenhower was all too aware of the impacts of wartime spending on the budgets and the economy of the United States.

In the summer of 1951, Maxwell Taylor moved his wife and family back to Washington, D.C., as he reported to the Pentagon to serve as the Deputy Chief of Staff for and Administration, a position that saw him effectively running the Army daily for General Lawton Collins, the Chief of Staff. In 1951, the Army was feeling the stress of a post-war demobilisation from the end of World War II, ongoing combat operations in the Korean peninsula, the unsettled shifting of the national security establishment after the National

[515] Maxwell Taylor, not dated, "Personal, World War II," p. 90, Taylor Papers, Box 1, Folder: World War II Operations: Lessons of World War II, NDU.

Security Act of 1947, the increasing tension of the Cold War, and the advent of the nuclear arsenal which left the Army unsure of its role in future wars. Although NSC-68, completed in 1950, gave the United States a focus—the "hostile design" of the Soviet Union—and called for a military build-up in response to the to the Soviet threat, the Army was still working through the whole of government response to the Soviet threat, when the United States Army deployed an unprepared force to Korea and suffered a humiliating set-back. Brian Linn warns that "however instructive, this convenient narrative of the Korean War has a number of flaws. The army that fought in June 1950 must be understood both in broad context of U.S. military policy and the specific problems that emerged after the end of World War II."[516]

Taylor was comfortable in the socio-political climate of Washington, believing that service in the headquarters of both the Army and the nation's capital allowed an officer to "reach his whole capacity," understanding the entirety of the complex problem set from the strategic level down to the tactical, rather than merely the tactical-level problem set that many Army officers were comfortable with.[517] This complex strategic setting offered Taylor challenges and opportunities, which he relished, relaying to Army War College students that "many of these problems far transcend the area of competence or experience to be expected of soldiers"…including giving advice to General Lawton Collins and Army Secretary Frank Pace "on the rate of exchange for the won [currency] of Korea, the desirability of exploitation of Saudi Arabian oil or for the effect and influence of the Voice of America in the cold war."[518] While Taylor may have been overly presumptuous in the duties and scope of his position, he

[516] Brian Linn, *Elvis' Army*, p. 11.
[517] U.S. Army Senior Leader Debriefing, Section II, p. 16.
[518] Maxwell D. Taylor, remarks at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 27 October 1952, p. 3-4, Taylor Papers, box 3, folder: Miscellaneous Messages and Speeches, 1951-1954, NDU.

was by this time one of the senior leaders within the small circle of the Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army.

During 1951, these leaders addressed the racial integration of combat forces. The pious Ridgway, now in command of UN forces in Korea after Mac's relief, viewed integration from a moral, "human and military" perspective.[519] Taylor took a more calculating professional perspective, noting that most people he talked to in the Far Eastern Theatre supported racial integration and that a positive reaction to integration would point the way forward for integration within the rest of the Army.[520] He also saw this issue in terms of the Army's budget. Morris MacGregor, noted military historian who specialized in the history of racial integration in the military, discussed the requests from Generals Mack Clark, serving as the Army Field Force Commander, and Anthony McAuliffe, serving as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel. MacGregor wrote the Army was receiving an increase of African American enlistees during this time, more recruits than could be assigned to existing segregated units. Clark and McAuliffe requested that the Army approve more segregated units, but that approval would strain the Army's budget and ran counter to current Army policies.[521] Taylor's decision did not flow from any moral centre or cause, but was based on the economic and political realities of the day. The tension inherent between the military and the Congressional leadership involved civil rights. The armed services committee leadership, and much of the power based of Congress at the time, were Southern Democrats; these politicians were opposed to civil rights, some, actually maintained a deep-seated hostility towards civil rights. Taylor saw the issue in more intellectual terms, focusing on opportunities to maintain force structure on the

[519] Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), p. 192-913.
[520] Maxwell D. Taylor, "Notes from Far East Trip," 10 May 1951, Henry S. Aurand Papers, Box 45, "General Correspondence: 1951, T-Z," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
[521] Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940*-1965 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1981), p. 432-433. Also, see Ingo Trauschweizer, *Maxwell Taylor's Cold War,* p. 53.

peninsula. However, as Taylor reflected on the integration in Korea, after he had taken over command in Korea, the Army "obtained much better results from their polyglot units than we had a right to expect."[522]

As Taylor took command in Korea from General James Van Fleet, "the war had long settled into a bloody stalemate."[523] It was into this "stalemate" that Taylor arrived from the Pentagon, not in a position to lead a dramatic operation, like MacArthur, or a dramatic turnaround of troops, like Ridgway. However, Taylor needed to differentiate himself from the previous commander, and General Van Fleet offered Taylor an opening early as Van Fleet publicly complained about inadequate artillery ammunition supplies. As Taylor came from the Pentagon, he was aware of issue that Van Fleet raised. Van Fleet voiced his concerns in public, in Senate hearings and in a two-part article in *Life*, on 11 and 18 May 1953. Van Fleet complained that the United States squandered opportunities by focusing on limited warfare, the political leadership in Washington, D.C, constrained the war fighters in the Far East, and focused on defensive warfare.[524]

Taylor disagreed with Van Fleet on the issue of ammunition shortage and believed that Van Fleet's criticism of the Army and administration on this issue touched a nerve with the new commander:

> Van was ill-advised in allowing his criticisms of the ammunition to get mixed up in politics…getting it into the press…was most embarrassing to the hard-working people in the Pentagon who were doing everything

[522] Taylor to Ridgway, 4 February 1954, "The Preponderant Role of the Infantry," p. 2, Taylor Papers, Box 2, Folder: Korea, NDU.
[523] Ingo Trauschweizer, p. 54.
[524] U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, 83d Congress, 1st Session, General James A. Van Fleet, Testimony, 5, 6, and 10 March 1953; James Van Fleet, "The Truth about Korea, Part I: From a Man Now Free to Speak," *Life*, 11 May 1953, 126-142; James Van Fleet, "The Truth about Korea, Part II: How We Can Win with What We Have," *Life*, 18 May 1953, 156-172. For additional information on the issues surrounding the Korean War in the early 1950s, see Matthew Ridgway's *Korean War*, Lawton Collins' *War in Peacetime*, Dean Acheson's *Korea War,* Steve Casey's *The Korean War at Sixty: New Approaches to the Study of the Korean War,* and Allan Millett's "The War for Korea, 1950-1951, They Came from the North."

> under the sun to be sure that the Eighth Army had lacked nothing in the battlefield.[525]

Taylor's criticism of Van Fleet is ironic given Taylor's future criticism of the Eisenhower administration; however, Van Fleet's criticism pointed directly at Taylor as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration.

Taylor would counter Van Fleet's complaints in Taylor's Army Senior Leader debriefing years later, saying that, "Van prided himself on the size of the consumption of ammunition. The rumour was that Artillery officers got, if not decorated and promoted, at least commended for the number of rounds they fired."[526] Taylor, a school trained artillery officer who had transferred to the Field Artillery after his initial service as an Engineer Officer and commanded a field artillery brigade previously in his career, did not view ammunition as an issue within the theatre, writing to General Samuel Williams, Commander of the 25th Infantry Division, of his belief that there was enough artillery in the theatre to "allow any reasonable expenditure of ammunition."[527] Not only did Taylor castigate Van Fleet for his concerns, Taylor continued, after Van Fleet's departure to fire artillery at an astonishing rate. The issue may have been the type of ammunition that Van Fleet was trying to fire, however Taylor would not bring the issue back to Washington, D.C. Instead Taylor and General Mack Clark, reporting "the relatively high ration of our artillery and mortar fire to the enemy's is fully justified by the reduced casualties and our success in repelling the recent attacks with heavy Communist casualties."[528] This focus on the tactical level again shows Taylor's focus on the details, on

[525] U.S. Army Senior Leader Debriefing, Section III, p. 25-26
[526] Ibid., p. 26.
[527] Taylor to Williams, 27 May 1953, Samuel T. Williams Papers, Box 4, Folder 18, Hoover Institute Archives.
[528] Enclosure to Gen. Clark to President Eisenhower, 19 January 1953, "Statement on Ammunition Situation in Far East Command," Eisenhower Papers as President (Ann Whitman File), Administration Series, Box 10, Folder: Clark, Gen. Mack, DDEL.

function over form. As the operational commander, Taylor did not want to raise the issue ammunition back to the Army staff, back to the office from which he had just left.

Taylor's issues were not with the administration or his senior leadership; rather he focused on tactical operations, "showing his penchant for micromanagement."[529] Unlike General Ridgway, who would fly to key terrain and visit units in Korea, Taylor had junior leaders brief him and his staff in order to provide, "first-hand information on the techniques and tactics peculiar to ground action in Korea."[530] The difference between Ridgway and Taylor could not be starker. Ridgway was at heart a tactician and leader of soldiers in combat; Taylor was a bureaucrat who excelled at the more political aspects senior military leadership. Taylor was not comfortable with the requirements and challenges he found as the operational commander in Korea; he dealt with them in his manner of micromanagement. Taylor and Ridgway's leadership styles were on public display in Korea, and showed the difference between the two leaders. Ridgway was the war-fighter whose personal leadership was seen on the battlefield at the point where he could influence the situation; Taylor was the bureaucratic micromanager who fancied himself a politico-military expert. As the armistice came close, Maxwell Taylor should have shined.

Taylor's staff noted, "at the end of the month [July 1953], in a rapid transition from the violence of the battle which had been raging in central Korea, the entire Eighth Army front was quiet as friendly and enemy troops withdrew from their respective MLR's to new positions two kilometres to the rear of the former front lines."[531] As the armistice took hold, Taylor used his

[529] Ingo Trauschweizer, *Maxwell Taylor's Cold War*, p. 57.
[530] Colonel Hugh P. Harris, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Staff Section Report for the Period 1-31 March 1953, Records of Eighth U.S. Army, 1946-1956, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Command Reports 1952-1953, March 1953, Box 98, Folder: Book VII G3 Section for March 1953, RG 338, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
[531] Headquarters, U.S. Eighth Army, Command Report, July 1953, p. 1, Records of the Army Adjutant General, Box 1478, July 1953, RG 407, NARA. MLR is the Main Line of Resistance. This term is not used anymore but describes the Front Line of Troops.

experience in post-war Berlin to his advantage, working closely with U.S. economic advisors and seeking to improve the economic situation of the Korean people. In August and September 1953, American soldiers provided close to $1.4 million in labour and materiel to the Korean economy. Taylor sought to better "the overall economic situation in Korea through construction, allocation of supplies and materiel and by direct troop aid to the Korean people."[532] In August, Taylor briefed this program to John Hannah, the Assistant Secretary of Defence, calling it a "community type welfare program;" this program gained the endorsement of President Eisenhower and came to be called the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK).[533]

Just as Taylor had centralised control of combat operations under his command, so too, he centralised the administration and control of the AFAK. However, Taylor's focus on AFAK operations were not embraced by everyone in the command, as evidenced by an anonymous letter to the *Chicago Tribune* that led to an inspector general investigation that reported, "many men do not understand the meaning and significance of the AFAK program." Taylor felt that this lack of understanding could be remedied by better informing the troops, and he instructed General Sam Williams, commander of the IX Corps, to create a troop information program to ensure all soldiers understood the importance of the AFAK program.[534] Programs of this nature are onerous endeavours for Armies to undertake, requiring them to ensure they maintain security in a foreign country, maintain readiness for battle, and keep their focus while performing duties different from what they were sent to war to do.

[532] Headquarters, U.S. Eighth Army, Command Report, August 1953, p. 1-3, Records of the Army Adjutant General, Box 1479, August 1953, RG 407,
[533] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defence, the Mutual Security Administrator, 31 July 1953, "Assistance to Korea," Eisenhower Papers as President (Ann Whitman File), Box 36, Folder: Dulles/Korea/Security Policy, Dwight David Eisenhower Library (DDEL).
[534] Taylor to Williams, 17 July 1954, Samuel T. Williams Papers, Box 7, Folder 12, HIA.

As the peace settled across Korea, Taylor and his staff needed to plan for the eventuality of a drawdown of troops, especially as troops desired to return home to the United States after the war had ended and their duties turned from combat to defence and nation-building. The issue that confronted Taylor and his staff was how to maintain the defensive capability of the U.S. forces and continue to grow and develop the Army of the Republic of Korea (ROK) while reducing the forces on the peninsula. Taylor began to think about how to maintain that capability with decreased troop presence, a conceptual exercise that would serve as the intellectual underpinnings for Taylor's future thoughts on organisational force structure.

Taylor sought to use the ROK forces as the test for a new force design centred on modularity and lighter, more mobile formations, adaptable to a nuclear or conventional battlefield, and on divisions composed of five combat formations instead of three. Taylor believed that the American Army in Korea "had been too heavy in terms of the equipment carried for the kind of fighting which developed…weighted down with tanks, heavy trucks, and amphibious equipment which diverted manpower from combat to their maintenance and repair."[535] This type of lighter, more mobile organisation had become an option because of the improvements in communications equipment. These improvements enabled senior division commanders to command and control more than current standard of three regiments or brigades; Taylor's "Korean tests indicated that the optimum number of subordinate units was about five, a fact which led us to consider a pentagonal rather than a triangular structure for the new division."[536] Although the idea for the pentagonal unit may have originated in Korea, the idea would continue to carry on in Taylor's mind as he moved on to the Pentagon as the Army's next Chief of Staff.

[535] Maxwell D. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 153.
[536] Ibid., p. 153.

However, the Korean generals spurned Taylor's modernisation plans for the Korea division, opting instead to continue with their triangular division. Although the Korean generals were younger than their American counterparts, and, theoretically, should have been more open to radical change in force structure, they opted to stay with the formations they knew and understood:

> In the first place, they saw that a light division would have less organic armour and artillery and feared that they would receive fewer of these highly valued weapons from the American military aid program if their division tables of organisation did not call for them. In the second place, although the Korean commanders were generals in their thirties who should have been receptive to innovation, they were reluctant to put aside what they had learned about the old triangular division and readjust their tactical thinking to new formations.[537]

Taylor's lack of humility is evident in his memoir, when he remarks, "I warned them that what I was advocating would probably influence the structure of the new American division, which was sure to be adopted after the Korean War, and that they would be left behind with an outmoded organisation."[538] While the Korean Army may have been left behind in Taylor's mind, the re-organisation he had planned for the U.S. Army would find some tactical support, but would ultimately fail.

Taylor was unable to get his reforms accepted by the Koreans.[539] Even though Taylor tried to convince his Korean colleagues that his ideas in Korea were certain to influence the future of the U.S. Army's force structure, the Korean's declined. There were several reasons for this decision and the Korean's determination not to side with Taylor's initiatives. First, and foremost, the transition to lighter divisions were seen as less than optimal in opposition to their

[537] Ibid., p. 153.
[538] Ibid., p. 153.
[539] Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 153; Glen R. Hawkins, *United States Army Force Structure and Force Design Initiatives, 1939-1989* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1991), p. 27-28; John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: the Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1998), p. 271.

North Korean and Chinese adversaries. Additionally, the lack of heavy equipment would mean less foreign assistance from the United States. Lastly, Taylor, in all his humility believed that the generals "who should have been receptive to innovation," were not ready to transition to this new concept; a new concept, one might add that had yet to be tried or accepted by the U.S. Army.[540] Taylor ultimately failed because he could not politick the Koreans into a decision to support him, much the way he had been able to lobby Congress to support his reforms at West Point.

That tactical support for his re-design thoughts came from both Generals Ridgway and Gavin, both from their different perspectives on the future of war. Gavin, as discussed previously, focused on the impact of missiles and other weapons technology on the breadth and depth of a future battlefield, insisting that future formations needed to be more mobile, more capable, and operate on a more dispersed battlefield.[541] Ridgway saw the utility in this type of force as well, focusing on "small formations, quick decisions and improved communications, and the ability to disperse and assemble rapidly."[542] Although many envisioned that firepower, either in the form of artillery, air power, or strategic missiles could be decisive on the future battlefield, the ability of a commander to command and manoeuvre his formation on the battlefield remained critical to the battlefield of the future.

In early 1955, Taylor succeeded General John Hull as the Commander of the Far East Forces, taking over strategic responsibility for the combined area of Korea and Japan.[543] At

---

[540] Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares,* p. 153.
[541] James M. Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age*; "New Divisional Organisation," Army-Navy-Air Force Register 76, no. 3923 (12 February 1955), p. 1-2; "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses," *Harper's Magazine* 208, no. 1247, (April 1954), p. 54-60.
[542] SGM-1-55, North Atlantic Military Committee, Standing Group, 10 January 1955, *Memorandum for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, the Channel Committee, the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group,* Annex A to Appendix B to Enclosure J, p. 38-41, NATO Archive, International Military Staff, Brussels, Belgium.
[543] For more on this, see the U.S. Department of Defence, Joint History Office, *History of the Unified Command Plan.* General Douglas MacArthur stood this command up at the command of the War Department to coordinate operations in the theatre.

this time, Taylor was considered for various other strategic posts, specifically in Vietnam, as the replacement to former Army Chief of Staff, Lawton Collins.[544] However, Matthew Ridgway retired from the Army that summer, leaving a significant gap to be filled in the Pentagon. Taylor wrote to Ridgway in the spring of 1954, looking for counsel from the Army Chief of Staff on his next positions. "I am certainly not restless in my present assignment. Apart from the inevitable separation from the family while I like no better than any other soldier in Korea, the command of the Eighth Army has been and is a most satisfying professional experience for which I am most grateful."[545] While the Taylors had previously discussed with General Ridgway whether to keep their house in Washington, D.C., Maxwell Taylor would be coming back to D.C. and to the world of strategy and policy.

Although President Eisenhower and Secretary Wilson ultimately selected Taylor as the next Army Chief of Staff, he was not the first choice of the Secretary of the Army, Robert Stevens. Secretary Wilson had written to President Eisenhower in March 1953, recommending Al Gruenther for the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Staff, a newly created position, at the time, that would see the President's former chief of staff serving in the number two position in the United States military.[546] However, at that time, and then again in 1955, President Eisenhower felt that Gruenther was too central to success in Europe. This decision cleared the way for Ridgway, and then Taylor to serve as the Army Chief of Staff, and, effectively deprived Gruenther of the ability to lead the Army. Eisenhower felt that the NATO command in Europe was more important than the Army Chief of Staff position.

[544] John Foster Dulles to Herbert Hoover, 14 February 1955, John Foster Dulles Papers, Personnel Series, Box 10, Folder: T (1), DDEL.
[545] Taylor to Ridgway, 2 May 1954, Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, Series 2, Box 18, Folder: Correspondence (Army Chief of Staff), T, Army Historical and Education Center (AHEC).
[546] Charles Wilson to President Eisenhower, March 19, 1953, Ann Whitman File, Box 39, Folder: Wilson, Charles E. [Secretary of Defence, Jan. 1953-Oct. 1957], DDEL.

Taylor agreed with Ridgway's opposition to President Eisenhower's New Look National Security Strategy and the administration's focus on nuclear deterrence, admired Ridgway's "staunch opposition to the strategic fallacy" and doubted that Taylor's "attitude would be significantly different from his."[547] When Taylor arrived in Washington for in February, senior officials "were not interested in my views on world strategy but wished to be assured of my willingness to accept and carry out the orders of civilian superiors—something that about which I would not have expected to be questioned."[548] Regardless of what Taylor told the administration, his views as he transitioned into the role of the Army Chief of Staff would be clear, remarking in 1956, "the atomic weapon has existed since 1945, and during this period several wars have been fought, but no atomic weapons have been used at all, anywhere."[549]

[547] Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 156.
[548] Ibid., p. 156.
[549] "And Now—The Atomic Army: Exclusive Interview with Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army," *U.S. News and World Report*, 3 February 1956, p. 64.

CHAPTER TWELVE

How Their Differences Played Out

Taylor was arguably more suited to the role of the Army's Chief of Staff than his predecessor; Taylor had spent several assignments in his career focused on politico-military affairs, and, after his time as the Commandant at West Point, years earlier, seemingly had a better initial relationship with Congress. But, despite his tremendous resume and his past accomplishments, he did not face a friendly environment as he moved back to the Pentagon and the political climate of Washington, D.C.

First, President Eisenhower's National Security Strategy was not a new idea or document, the administration had now been moving towards the policy and reality of nuclear deterrence for the last two years. Additionally, the President held a deeply personal belief in the joint nature of future warfare, stating as much in a Special Statement to Congress in 1958, "Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort."[550] Taylor's headstrong advance into the role as the Chief of Staff would not be an easy transition.[551]

Taylor's academic background provided an early glimpse into his belief and concurrence with Ridgway that nuclear weapons, alone, would not deter war. In 1948, Taylor, as the Commandant of West Point, delivered remarks at the annual Kermit Roosevelt Lecture

[550] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Special Message to the Congress on Reorganisation of the Defence Establishment," 3 April 1958, available online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the -congress-reorganization-the-defense-establishment (accessed 19 August 2021).

[551] Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 164. Taylor remarks that "at least no one could say that the new Chief of Staff did not know where he thought he wanted to go." This shows the confidence that Taylor had in himself and his abilities to succeed where Ridgway had failed.

in London; this speech would mark the beginning of the coalescence of his views on the future of warfare, and highlight the importance of his time at West Point after the war and his participation in the national security and foreign relations forums in New York City. While some feel that military professionals like to plan for or re-fight the last war they fought, Taylor outlined the possibility of limited war, warning, "In providing for United States security, our planners will have to make provisions for meeting an enemy who comes in strange and unconventional forums."[552] Taylor full-heartedly believed that nuclear weapons, alone, could not deter war and "were not sufficient to assure the security of the United States and its friends."[553] This position would put General Taylor, the new Chief of Staff of the Army, in direct conflict with the military strategy of the Eisenhower administration.

Taylor and Eisenhower: The Debate Takes Form

As Taylor took over the reins as the Chief of Staff of the Army in 1955, the Army was at a crossroads, losing resources due to the Eisenhower administration's focus on nuclear deterrence, decreasing readiness due to the forward deployment of Army divisions and units in foreign garrisons, a pending decrease in the end strength of the Army—as Congress had budgeted a cut of over 300,000 troops in 1954, and the leadership of Secretary Charles Wilson as the Secretary of Defence. The Eisenhower administration's New Look National Security Strategy focused on nuclear deterrence of the Soviet Union and communism had two full years to shape Congressional sentiment and resources in line with the President's administration and budget requests.

[552] Taylor, "Postwar Trends in American Strategy," 27 May 1948, talk at Imperial Defence College, p. 3-4, Taylor Papers, Box 2, Folder: Speeches 1947-1949, NDU.
[553] Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 28.

Taylor's view of military strategy focused on limited wars, which would be fought on the fringes of the Cold War due to reluctance of both the Soviet Union and the United States to fight a full-blown nuclear war. Such wars might be fought by distant proxies, requiring US military aid to fight and win them, but falling short of the threshold of nuclear war. Taylor believed that nuclear deterrence was mis-guided and had "reached a dead end…many world events have occurred which cast doubt on its validity and exposed its fallacious character."[554] In fact, one only had to look at the war in Korea as a shining example of the failure of nuclear deterrence.

Taylor's belief that nuclear weapons were not "sufficient to assure the security of the United States and its friends" put him in direct conflict with Secretary Wilson.[555] Eisenhower's Secretary of Defence fully supported the Eisenhower strategy, believing that the United States "can't afford to fight limited wars. We can only afford to fight a big war, and if there is one that is the kind it will be."[556] Unfortunately, for both Ridgway and Taylor, both chiefs of staff found themselves arguing on deaf ears. James Gavin recalled, that "Mr. Wilson [who had led General Motors during World War II] tended to deal with his chiefs of staff as though they were recalcitrant union bosses."[557] With no friendly shoulder in the administration, Taylor focused inward on the Army.

Taylor understood his role as the Chief of Staff of the Army differently to Ridgway. "The Chief of Staff,' he believed, '…is the senior military officer of the Army during his appointment. He does not command the Army; indeed, he has direct command authority only over the immediate staff around him."[558] While Ridgway disliked the position because he did

[554] Ibid., p. 5.
[555] Ibid., p. 4.
[556] James Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 173.
[557] Ibid., p. 155.
[558] Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 168.

not command the Army, which had units in Europe and Korea, Taylor seemed well suited to it, since he would be spending "much of his time keeping his Secretary informed, in providing him with advice and recommendations, in supporting him in his conferences with the Secretary of Defence and before Congress, and in promulgating and carrying out his orders and decisions after they have been formulated. Implicit in this latter function is the follow-up."[559] Taylor's duties did not require him to be the commander of the Army, rather, merely the chief of staff; it is this function that had been the focus of the Eisenhower administration interview with Taylor before offering him the position.[560] While he seemed incredulous that the administration would focus on this characteristic, it would prove to be one area of the position where he could not help himself.[561]

Within the first 60 days of his tenure as the chief of staff, Taylor published a memorandum describing the principles he expected the Army to live by:

- The Army is openminded and progressive, seeking qualified advice and looking constantly forward
- In its interservice relationships, the Army is a loyal member of the Defence Team, quick to defend its own legitimate interests but scrupulous in not trespassing on those of other services
- The Army respects the dignity of the individual and provides for the moral and physical well-being of its men. It is a decent, clean-living society which does not tolerate vice, dissipation, or flabbiness.[562]

While this guidance to the force would be considered completely appropriate for the commander to send his forces, these principles amount to commander's intent, which the U.S.

[559] Ibid., p. 168.
[560] Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, p. 28.
[561] This failure is nothing new. In terms of both this dissertation and the U.S. Army, the friction may have started with Matthew Ridgway, but the relationship between the civilian and military leadership has had and continues to have complications with senior leaders. For more on this relationship, see *Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: Free Press, 2012); Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Boston, MA: Belknap Press, 1957). After the reorganization of the Department of Defence, this friction first reared itself in the "Revolt of the Admirals" in 1947 and appeared again during the Eisenhower Administration with the Army. Also, see A.J. Bacevich's "The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-1955," *The Journal Military History*, Vol. 6., No 2 (April 1997), pp. 303-333.
[562] Maxwell Taylor, "Memorandum to the Vice Chief of Staff," July 25, 1955. Taylor Papers, NDU.

military currently defines as a "clear and concise expression of what the force must do and the conditions the force must establish to accomplish the mission."[563] This guidance is clearly within the portfolio of the senior leader of the Army, but, beginning with Matthew Ridgway, this type of guidance became the provenance of the Chief of Staff of the Army. While Eisenhower consistently stressed the need for service chiefs to provide their best military advice to their civilian leadership, the President also stressed the joint aspects of their duties and responsibilities of the position of service chief. Taylor, much like his predecessor, focused on the Army, rather than the joint force, and the organisational changes he had in mind would, in his mind, ensure that the Army was organised in such a way to fight and win on the future battlefield.

As Eisenhower served as the Army Chief of Staff after World War II, he found the burdens of the job to be painful, writing in December 1945, "This job (chief of staff) is as bad as I always thought it would be."[564] The administrative burdens of the job of chief of staff weighed on him, as he related in November 1946, "I have been back from Europe exactly a year. It has been difficult period for me, with far more frustrations than progress."[565] This administrative burden and pain would be nothing compared to what Eisenhower would experience upon his retirement and acceptance of the position of president of Columbia University in New York City.

While Dwight Eisenhower served as the president of Columbia University after his initial retirement from the Army, before President Truman and General Marshall called him back to service as the Supreme Commander for the NATO, his engagement with the school did

[563] U.S. Joint Publication 3.0, *Joint Operations*, available at www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_0.pdf, p. 47, accessed 20 August 2021.
[564] Robert H. Ferrell, *The Eisenhower Diaries* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1981), "December 15, 1945," p. 146.
[565] Ibid., "November 12, 1946," p. 137.

not fulfil him the way that Taylor's tour as the West Point Commandant did for Taylor. John Krout served as the dean of the graduate faculty at Columbia, during Eisenhower's tenure, and believed that Eisenhower felt that the faculty meetings were a special form of hell. "The thought they could be deadly dull…He felt, well, here we spent an hour and a half to two hours, we haven't done a single thing. We've done a lot of talking, didn't amount to much; we haven't advanced one inch so far as doing anything for the university is concerned."[566] The difference between West Point and Columbia could not have been starker. The West Point Commandant was the senior military commander with an entire student body of cadets to mould and shape for the future Army, while Eisenhower was stymied in his attempts to mould the student body and faculty at Columbia, extolling that every student that came to study at Columbia, should leave the university a better citizen, first, then a better student.[567]

Eisenhower had visited Taylor and West Point before he retired and accepted the position at West Point, telling Taylor of the offer. While Taylor recounts in his memoir that the bulk of their conversation centred on the perils of "big-time football," he insinuated that Eisenhower did not understand the focus of the position of a university president.

> I always felt that he took over that position with sincere enthusiasm, expecting to have the opportunity to exercise his remarkable qualities of leadership on the student body of Columbia. I am afraid that he was largely unaware of the nature of the primary duties of a university president with the emphasis on money-raising and administration, or perhaps he hoped to change their nature into something more congenial."[568]

Taylor also remarked that he was trying to ensure that, "Don't make West Point impossible for a young man with only the background of Abilene High School."[569] Taylor could have only

[566] John Krout interview, from the Eisenhower Library, as quoted in Stephen Ambrose, *Eisenhower* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), p. 241.
[567] Steve Neal, *The Eisenhowers: Reluctant Dynasty* (New York: Doubleday, 1978), p. 251.
[568] Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 116.
[569] Ibid., p. 120.

used this pointed barb to differentiate himself from Eisenhower; Taylor operated smoothly in the academic environment, whether it be in the classroom, in the administrative offices, or in the meeting rooms of national security forums.

Eisenhower did not fare as well during his tenure as president of Columbia because he did not relish the opportunities; the opportunity serving as the president of Columbia was not the same opportunity as serving as the Commandant at West Point, and definitely not the same as serving as the Chief of Staff of the Army. However, Eisenhower thought he was leaving the pain of administration and bureaucracy behind him as he joined the world of academia; he was sorely mistaken, recounting that "one of the major surprises…is the paperwork…I thought I was leaving those mountainous white piles forever."[570] Stephen Ambrose elegantly synopsizes Eisenhower's frustrations:

> After seven years at the center of world events, accustomed to seeing the latest top-secret intelligence every morning, to making decisions involving millions of men, to dealing on a daily basis with men like Churchill and de Gaulle, Eisenhower felt left out at Columbia. He could only comment on, not shape, events; his decisions affected only a few thousand people; his contacts were social ones with his millionaire friends, not business meetings with heads of government. The worst part of it was that he seemed to be working as hard as ever, but had little to show for it.[571]

It was this discontentment and the pull from Washington that had not dimmed, that drew him back into strategic leadership roles in the military, first as an advisor to Secretary of Defence James Forrestal, and then, later, as the Supreme Commander of NATO. While Eisenhower did not enjoy the academic world, he did become more entrenched with a multitude of businessmen and political actors, and Eisenhower did contribute to national security forums at this time. Of note, Blanche Wiesen Cooke reported that "whatever General Eisenhower knows about

[570] Neal, *The Eisenhowers: Reluctant Dynasty*, p. 249.
[571] Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, p. 242.

economics, he has learned at the study group meetings [Council of Foreign Relations]."[572] This focus on economics would become one of the pillars of national security strategy as Eisenhower's strategic viewpoints sharpened.

While Taylor focused on other issues such as the uniform and the esprit de corps of the soldiers, he spent much of his time on the administrative requirements of the Army. As he sought to change the Army, he focused on organisational reforms that he had first discussed as the Commander of the Eighth Army in Korea. As previously discussed, leaders in the Army drive change across myriad factors, recognised as Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P). As was discussed earlier, Ridgway focused on doctrine and shaping how the Army would fight; Gavin focused on Materiel during his time as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Research; Taylor would focus on organisation, updating the basic building block of the Army, forcing it to update materiel and doctrine alongside of this change.

Eisenhower had decided the matter of the New Look security strategy for good in December 1954, when the National Security Council accommodated Ridgway by a special meeting to hear his objections. Here, the Army had one last chance to make its case against the use of nuclear weapons. A.J. Bacevich writes in his seminal work, *The Pentomic Era*:

> Ridgway's presentation contained little that the Army had not already said at one time or another. He challenged the thesis that "massive retaliatory power" could be "the major deterrent to aggression."…He called on the NSC "to reject emphatically any policy of preventative war" as "devoid of moral principle."[573]

The National Security Council derided Ridgway's presentation as a plea for force structure growth for the Army. The NSC felt that Ridgway, and the Army, lacked an appreciation for

[572] Blance Weisen Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy* (New York: Doubleday, 1981), p. 79.
[573] A.J. Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era*: *The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986, p. 37.

the economic realities of the day, and, in Eisenhower's view, also failed to understand the Soviet commitment to nuclear weapons and national aversion to the deployment of additional troops so soon after the armistice in Korea.[574] Based on the hard work of the Army, driven by James Gavin and others, the Army had new equipment in the acquisition pipeline, but it was not in the Army, yet. This new equipment was focused on the Army on the nuclear battlefield.

As Taylor succeeded Ridgway, he took up the mantle of revolt against the Eisenhower administration's New Look strategy, fighting for the parochial interests of the Army against the joint vision of President Eisenhower. Eisenhower provided a compelling case to Congress in 1958: "Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort."[575] Eisenhower felt that the needs of the joint fight, specifically joint procurement, planning, and command and control, should take priority over service-specific interests. Taylor, although he had previously envisioned a joint staff capable of what Eisenhower espoused, forged the Army's argument, supporting General Bradley's cautioning that, "providing for United States security, our planners will have to make provisions for meeting an enemy who comes in strange and unconventional forms."[576] Taylor felt that Eisenhower's assumption of the use of atomic weapons was false; he did not have a religious aversion to nuclear weapons, like Ridgway. Rather, Taylor felt that "atomic weapons were not sufficient to assure the security of the United States and its friends."[577] The Korean War had shown the world, Taylor believed, the fallacy of this argument. The United States had atomic weapons,

---

[574] Ibid, p. 38. Also, see "Memorandum of Discussion at the 227th Meeting of the National Security Council," 3 December 1954, FURS, 1952-1954, p. 804-806.
[575] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Special Message to Congress on Reorganisation of the Defence Establishment," 3 April 1958, available online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11340, accessed 21 September 2021.
[576] Notes for use by General Omar Bradley in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 25 March 1948, Lincoln Papers, Box 37, Folder: Gen Omar Bradley Lecture, 1948, United States Military Academy.
[577] Maxwell Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, p. 4.

but still the North Koreans and the Chinese attacked. The United States' nuclear arsenal did not deter this action or bring it to a close.

* * *

Although previously discussed, the Revolt of the Colonels, which came to a head during Taylor's tenure as Army Chief of Staff, provides a stark example of both Taylor's approval of the revolt and his instincts of political survival as he denied knowledge of the colonels activities, while simultaneously re-assigning them across the Army and dissolving the Coordination Group. Taylor's support of the group started upon his assumption as the Chief of Staff and continued until the Army was caught red-handed and scolded by the Secretary of Defence. However, this revolt was not an isolated incident, rather, the revolt merely stood as another in the line of continuing skirmishes between the services; these skirmishes had grown out of the re-organisation of the Department of Defence in 1947, the first such skirmish being the revolt of the Admirals in 1949. Unfortunately for the colonels, once they had served their usefulness Taylor cast them off, much like what happened with the retirement of James Gavin.

1n 1954, As Taylor departed Japan enroute to Washington, D.C. and his new position as the Army Chief of Staff. In his papers on the trip, Taylor had a draft issue paper he had written in the final days of his tour. He relays this in his memoir, writing,

> When Diddy and I departed from Tokyo *en route* for Washington, I carried a heavy dispatch case of 'think pieces' bearing upon y new assignment as Army Chief of Staff. They included an evaluation of the Eisenhower New Look and its supporting strategy of Massive Retaliation; an analysis of the 1955 text of the 'Basic national Security Policy'; a draft 'National Military Program,' which set forth my own ideas of a defence program consistent with the needs of the national security; and a long list of Army objectives and programs which I hoped to carry out upon my return.[578]

[578] Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares,* p. 164.

As Taylor arrived in D.C. and assumed the reins as the Chief of Staff, he passed his paper to the Coordination Group, this group of colonels that had formed through the influence and mentorship of Gavin under Ridgway's leadership as Chief of Staff. This group of young, intellectually minded colonels would be weaponised by Gavin and Taylor in revolt against the Eisenhower administration's New Look and the accompanying budgetary cuts. In reaction to both, the colonels posited the theory of limited war and sounded the alarm of the Soviet Communist threat in limited wars around the globe, if the Army was not resourced to fight and win these wars for the United States.

* * *

Ultimately, the Army struggled with the question of what was the role of the Army on a nuclear battlefield? The key consideration for the Army as it looked at the future of the nuclear battlefield was the size and flexibility of the unit to manoeuvre. James Gavin distilled the problem of Army units on a nuclear battlefield, to its very essence, identifying the problem as "to dissolve the [existing] organisation down to the size of units you are not afraid of losing to one [nuclear] blast."[579] In order to do this the Army had to adjust the basic building block with which it created its warfighting divisions. In order to ensure that that basic building block had enough capability to fight on its own but still small enough to be manoeuvrable and expendable, the Army created a new organisation and named it the battle group. Harkening back to Taylor's Pentomic design in Korea, these battle group was made of five companies, each company consisting of five platoons.[580] This would give the battle group commander

[579] Theodore H. White, "An Interview with General Gavin…Tomorrow's Battlefield," *The Army Combat Forces Journal* 5, (March 1955), p. 22.
[580] Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era,* p. 107, Figure 2. Diagram of the Pentomic Division.

more individual units to manoeuvre on the battlefield but enable the commander to withstand the loss of a unit. Another key element of the Pentomic design was the elimination of an entire echelon of command; the design combined the battalion and brigade or regimental headquarters to create the battle group headquarters.

This new force design needed a test bed; Taylor selected his 101st Airborne Division to adjust to this new organization first. In addition, equipment changes accompanied the updates in organisation. In order to ensure that this new organisation met the Army's requirements for strategic mobility, "it sacrificed tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and cannon artillery heavier than 105-mm."[581] This lack of firepower had to be compensated for somehow; the Army added the Honest John rocket system, which provided nuclear fire support capability, and unarmoured 90- and 106-mm antitank weapons. Additionally, the 101st gained helicopters, increasing its ability to move its formations, offsetting the loss of wheeled vehicles. Lastly, the division lost most of the logistical support capabilities; "the Army downplayed" this issue by promising "new logistical support systems and procedures."[582]

Although many issues existed in this force design concept, including lack of sustainment, increased command and control, decreased fire power, and decreased armoured and force protection capability, General Taylor forced the Army stayed the course during his tenure. However, as Taylor retired from the Army in 1959, critics of the Pentomic Division design started to make their objections known; now the Pentomic design is derisively ridiculed as one of the most egregious organisational changes in U.S. Army history. Lieutenant General Arthur Collins, recalled that "the Army hadn't thought through the use of nuclear weapons; there was tremendous emphasis just to get some nuclear capability, without regard to how it

[581] Ibid., p. 108.
[582] Ibid., p. 108. Also, see Maxwell Taylor, remarks at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 22 August 1955, Box 9, Taylor Papers.

might be used…the Army never related the weapon to the battlefield, and how you were going to fight under the conditions that a nuclear war would create in a forward area."[583] Looking back on the Army's experimentation with this nuclear battlefield and pentomic design, the basic tenet of tying experimentation to realistic conditions was completely disregarded in the Army's series of Desert Rock experiments. These unique, nuclear battlefield-focused experiments used administrative, rather than tactical controls, with all signal radios turned off prior to the blast, formations huddled in tight formation with weapons sights taped over and all hatches secured. After the blast, the formations used a single radio channel, kept a tight formation, and used lights. However, when the formations reached less than one kilometre from the blast sight, they had to turn away from their intended objective due to high levels of radiation. The Desert Rock experiments showed that the Army had limited capability to operate on a nuclear battlefield and should not tie organisational structure and materiel requirements to the nuclear battlefield.

In essence, Taylor, as the Chief of Staff, had made eloquent academic and strategic arguments in favour of preparing for limited war. In fact, his arguments may have held more merit than Ridgway's impassioned plea against the immorality of atomic warfare. In order to garner resources from Congress, the Army acquiesced to the notion of tactical nuclear warfare, rather than reducing their footprint and focusing on manoeuvre warfare. As the Army re-organized to the Pentomic Division, the new force structure created more problems for the commanders in the field than it offered to solve on the nuclear battlefield: insufficient sustainment capability caused commanders to task combat units for logistics functions which decreased combat power and the difficulty in tasking or trying to manage the decentralised capabilities overwhelmed the commanders and staffs. Although many did not criticise the

[583] Arthur S. Collins, Jr. Senior Officers Oral History Project, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (1982), p. 239-243.

construct during Taylor's terms as the chief of staff, many senior leaders later spoke out in almost unanimous opposition to the construct: "ridiculous…too redolent of Hollywood or Madison Avenue...I shudder…Thank God we never had to go to war with it."[584]

Eisenhower wanted the Army to adapt and left it to the Army leadership to design the force that could adapt, fight, and win on a nuclear battlefield. While Taylor's answer was not the right one, Eisenhower felt that modernisation of the Army's equipment, concepts, and organisations could reduce the manpower requirement of the land component.[585] Initially, Eisenhower thought he had agreement with Taylor, but they had talked past one another and did not share that common understanding.[586] Taylor had to determine how to design a force that could provide credible defence in Europe and Korea, while providing the ability to win what he termed limited wars elsewhere in the world; he had to find a way to pay for the Army that he thought the U.S. needed in the face of shrinking budgetary resources due to the growth in budgetary requirements for nuclear deterrence. The United States had to "be capable of deterring war, both general and local, and winning local war quickly. In relying on deterrence we must bear in mind that Communist advances in technology and preparedness may render today's deterrents inadequate to restrain the Soviet Bloc tomorrow."[587] Not only did Taylor raise the ire of Eisenhower, he also frustrated Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, one of the few military men during this time to win the approval of Eisenhower at the national level. Although Radford had been part of the "Revolt of the Admirals" in 1949, Eisenhower was impressed by Radford's ability to think and operate at the joint level, his

[584] Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era*, p. 135. Drawn from multiple Senior Officer Debriefing Program Interviews: General Hamilton Howze, General Donald Bennett, General Paul Freeman, and General George Decker.
[585] Eisenhower to Gruenther, 26 September 1951, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers, Principle File, Box 48, Folder: Gruenther, Alfred M. (1), DDEL.
[586] Goodpaster, 6 July 1955, Memorandum of conference with the President on 29 June 1955, Eisenhower Papers as President (Ann Whitman File), Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 6, Folder: ACW Diary, July 1955, DDEL.
[587] Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, p. 32-34.

"intelligence, dedication, tenacity, and courage to speak his mind."[588] Eisenhower lamented that his senior military leaders failed to think at the joint or strategic level, slipping back towards parochial, service interests that languished like anchors around their legs, "this whole business of inter-service rivalries has been greatly distressing to me, and to all of us. I am sure you are as sick as I am of public debates among Generals and Secretaries of the various services."[589] This was not the first letter that Eisenhower wrote to Swede Hazlett, nor was it the last time that he would express his dismay with his uniformed military leadership.

Radford was the exception for Eisenhower, not committed to service parochialism; rather, tenaciously looking to jointness for the President. Taylor would find himself in Radford's cross-hairs; in early 1956, Radford marked up Taylor's proposed testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, using red pin and question and exclamation marks. Taylor suggested to Congress, "Only after allocating the national resources necessary for those 3 purposes—of deterring general and local war and winning local war—should we proceed to satisfy the residual requirements for fighting a general war."[590] Taylor had revolted with the press, in private, and through personal engagements with Congress, however those previous comments to Congress had come in response to questions from members friendly to Taylor's efforts. This comments for the record were a direction shot fired at the Eisenhower administration's New Look; Radford would not stand for this and let Taylor know.

---

[588] Eisenhower comments on the feud between the Navy and the Air Force, dated 27 January 1949, in *The Eisenhower Diaries*, Ferrell, Robert H., ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1981), p. 154-6. Also, see Douglas Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1977), p. 21.

[589] Robert W. Griffith, ed., Ike's Letters to a Friend, 1941-1958 (Lawrence, Ks.: University of Kansas Press, 1984), p. 199.

[590] Statement of General Maxwell D. Taylor before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 20 February 1956, 8 Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman's File, Admiral Radford, 1953-1957, Box 22, Folder: 111 (1956), Records Group 218, National Archives and Records Administration.

In addition to testifying to Congress to spread his insurgency, Taylor made his thoughts known within the national security intellectual community and with the press. Taylor communicated with the Council on Foreign Relations, the National Press Club, and others, capitalising on relationships that he had built through the years, beginning after his return from World War II, while serving as the Commandant of the United States Military Academy, becoming "an active member of the Council of Foreign Relations, which afforded him a professional network he could put to use in his later career in policy and diplomacy."[591] However, almost as important as what Taylor said in these forums is what he failed to say, many times stepping up to the line of insubordination, but not stepping over that line, rather, dealing in innuendo and half-truths. An example of this is found during the National Press Club event in December 1957. Taylor was asked about Gavin's testimony and responded with half-truths and evasion, but Taylor's words allowed him "to register faint critique without sounding prepared to challenge the president or defence secretary."[592] Taylor was a master at working the press, almost the equal of Eisenhower. However, Taylor's mastery came from years of work, cultivating relationships; Eisenhower's mastery was born out of his personality and plain-spokenness.

Another issue on which Taylor and Eisenhower shared common ground, yet differed was the inclusion and use of economics as an element of national power. Eisenhower explicitly stated that economics was key to the national power of the United States; the economy underpinned the strategic direction of the United States toward nuclear deterrence. President Eisenhower knew that the United States could not maintain the course, with respect to the military budget. Eisenhower, as previously noted, desired the best defence for the United States at the best price, understanding that "every gun that is made, every warship launched, every

[591] Trauschweizer, *Maxwell Taylor's Cold War*, p. 5.
[592] Ibid., p. 99.

rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed."[593] Taylor, too, understood the importance of economics as an instrument of national power, successful military and defence strategy and policy required the "employment of all sources of power with unified effect, in short, a total integrated strategy."[594] However, Taylor subjugated his strategic thoughts to the needs of the Army during his time as chief of staff, blaming the bureaucracy of the defence establishment on not properly reconciling the resources of national power with the requirements. What Taylor could not reconcile with his professional thoughts, was the fact that Eisenhower had not shifted from his strategy of nuclear deterrence, regardless of what Taylor felt the Pentagon had drifted towards.

It must be noted, however, that Eisenhower did not think all ill of Taylor and his performance as the Army Chief of Staff, most of his ill feelings grew out of the publication of *The Uncertain Trumpet*. In fact, Secretary Wilson's successor, Neil McElroy, in March 1959, offered Taylor command of the NATO military forces; Taylor turned down the offer and decided to retire.[595] Taylor was not eligible for a third two-year tour as the Army Chief of Staff, even though he writes that McElroy offered an extension, and the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was, seemingly, not available due to the appointment of General Nathan Twining to the position in 1957.[596] In fact, Eisenhower commented in 1960, after visiting an Army weapons development program in Fort Benning, Georgia, "I felt this oneness, this unity, of America producing these tremendous and wonderful weapons, with a great

[593] Eisenhower, "The Change for Peace," April 16, 1953, Washington, D.C., available at www.edchange.org/multicultural/speeches/ike_chance_for_peace.html, accessed 11 September 2021
[594] Maxwell Taylor, Not Dated, ""Personal, World War II," p. 90, Taylor Papers, Box 1, Folder: World War II Operations: Lessons of World War II, NDU.
[595] Goodpaster, 10 March 1959, "Memorandum of Conference with the President, March 6, 1959," White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary. Subject Series, Department of Defence Subseries, box 1, Folder: Department of Defence, Vol. III, DDEL.
[596] Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 174.

organisation taking them from the producers and the scientists and learning to use them so expertly."[597] Additionally, Eisenhower even offered Taylor the opportunity to lead a disarmament study group in 1959.[598] Taylor concluded that he:

> was loath to leave the military service which had treated me well beyond my deserts for over forty years but there were only two positions in which I might have been interested, Chairman JCS and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. However, both As of these posts were filled by highly qualified officers who had no apparent intention of retiring. Indeed, with my dissenting views on the strategy of Massive Retaliation, I would have been a most unhappy choice for the Chairmanship which should always be occupied by an officer generally sympathetic to the military policy of the Administration.[599]

Taylor retired from the military and accepted a position as the Chairman of the Board of the Mexican Light and Power Company in Mexico City, moving to Mexico while he finished his memoir. In 1960, after The Uncertain Trumpet was published, Taylor accepted the position as the President of the Lincoln Centre for the Performing Arts, which was under construction in New York City at that time. Moving back to New York City enabled Taylor to re-connect with the Council of Foreign Relations, working to network back into the national security discussion, this time with the Kennedy administration.

Conclusion

It is difficult to assess Taylor's career independently of his recall to active duty with the Kennedy administration, but, before talking about that return to the military and the White House, this effort will attempt to do just that. Taylor was an officer of immense potential: a graduate of West Point, multi-lingual, smart, and a good staff officer with service in the Far

[597] Eisenhower, Remarks at Fort Benning, Georgia, after viewing an Army Weapons Development Demonstration, 3 May 1960, American Presidency Project, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-fort-benning-georgia-after-watching-demonstration-new-army-equipment, accessed 21 September 2021.
[598] Phone Conversation, Herter and Taylor, 1 July 1959, Christian Herter Papers, Box 12, Folder, CAH Telephone Calls 5/4/1959 to 12/31/1959, DDEL.
[599] Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 175.

East and Washington, D.C. before the start of World War II. Army Chief of Staff George Marshall selected Taylor to join the 82nd Airborne Division along with Matt Ridgway and James Gavin. Taylor performed one of the most daring missions in World War II, sneaking into Italy to confer with Prime Minister Marshall Badoglio. Taylor executed two combat parachute jumps, during Normandy and Operation Market Garden. He then served as the Commandant of the United States Military Academy before returning Germany to serve in post-war Berlin. After Berlin, Taylor returned to Washington, D.C. as the Army G-3 for two years, before returning to the Far East to command Eighth Army and, then U.S. Forces Far East. In 1955, he returned to Washington, D.C. to serve as the Chief of Staff of the Army.

Almost without exception, an Army officer with the resume of Taylor would be considered on a short list of best generals of all time. In contrast to Eisenhower's resume, which included no command at the general officer level before his allied command in Europe, Taylor's experience would be accepted by almost any Army officer. However, Taylor was no ordinary officer; woven into the very fabric of Taylor as a military officer, was a seemingly insatiable drive towards the political side of the military. Taylor excelled as an officer at the politico-military positions in which he found himself, first in the Far East, and then during World War II and post-war Berlin. Taylor turned his tour as Commandant at West Point into a political position, lobbying Congress for resources and forming relationships with Congress and the foreign policy intelligentsia in Washington, D.C. and New York City. While Gavin and Ridgway found soldiers and the Army to be a self-fulfilling career, frustrated with the political nature of their positions during their final tours, Taylor relished the political side of his service.

As Taylor flew from the Far East to Washington, D.C., he had visions of changing the national military strategy of the Eisenhower administration, but he went about this differently

from Ridgway and Gavin. Ridgway focused on stressing the basics of the American soldier, and Gavin stressed the advent of new technologies and concepts. Taylor leaned into the Madison Avenue stereotype for which he criticised the Air Force and the Eisenhower, updating the Army's dress uniforms, eschewing the Army khakis of World War II fame for a leaner, more updated green look. Additionally, he pushed an organizational re-design for the Army and labelled it the "Pentomic Division," not just because of the number of battle groups in a division, but as an homage to the atomic battlefield. This Madison Avenue name seemed to give the United States Army a modern look, but, ultimately became one of the most disastrous re-designs of the Army in its history.

Taylor is not remembered as a warrior, like Ridgway, or a technologist, like Gavin. Rather, Taylor is remembered as a political opportunist, who squandered a career because he felt that he knew better than the President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the rest of the national security leadership. Taylor was not a selfless servant, serving in the nation's military, leading America's soldiers in battle. Taylor turned down the Secretary of Defence in 1959, when Secretary McElroy offered Taylor the position of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. He turned the position down because he was not in line to serve as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Much like Ridgway, Taylor used his last months in office to prepare his parting shot to his commander in chief. Taylor's *Uncertain Trumpet* disparaged the Eisenhower administration and may have led to the defeat of Eisenhower's Vice President to Senator Kennedy, who praised and thanked Taylor for his work.[600]

[600] John F. Kennedy, Letter to General Maxwell Taylor, dated 9 April, 1960, Box 471, JFK Presidential Library.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Taylor's Coup de Grace: Retirement and Politics

Along with Ridgway and Gavin, the core of the leadership of the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II and three dynamic leaders that drove change for the Army in the 1940s and 50s, Taylor was not done with his retirement. Rather, for Maxwell Taylor, his retirement merely served as a brief interlude until he returned to government service in the Kennedy White House, his bona fides established with President Kennedy and his advisors through the publication of *The Uncertain Trumpet* in January 1960 and a timely placed article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1961, "Security Will Not Wait."[601] Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the editor of *Foreign Affairs* decided to publish Taylor's article in order to "put his [Taylor's] case up to the new administration."[602] The timely publication of this article, as Kennedy and his team were looking to put together their national security team. The Kennedy team needed leaders who were experts on national defence but differed in their opinion from the Eisenhower policies; Taylor presented them with an option.

The Uncertain Trumpet served as Taylor's response to the Eisenhower administration New Look national security strategy that relied on nuclear deterrence, writing that the New Look "was little more than the old air power dogma set forth in Madison Avenue trappings and now buttressed upon Massive Retaliation as the central strategic concept."[603] Additionally, Taylor excoriated the system of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and national security policy and decision-making. Key to this criticism was the bureaucracy of the joint chiefs, which had, actually, drifted from dogmatic acceptance of nuclear retaliation and deterrence into practical acceptance

[601] Maxwell D. Taylor, "Security Will Not Wait," Foreign Affairs 39, no. 2 (1961), p. 174-184.
[602] Armstrong to Phil Quigg, 15 October 1960, Armstrong Papers, Box 61, Folder 28, Pubic Policy Papers, Princeton University Library.
[603] Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, p. 17.

of limited war capabilities. Of course, Taylor offered the Army, a renewed focus on ground forces, and the ability of the military to provide a flexible response to military requirements around the world.

While *The Uncertain Trumpet* was truly a deep criticism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the national security process of the Eisenhower administration, to many Taylor's diatribe represented much more than that. Lucius Clay, a military and personal friend of Eisenhower, felt that Taylor had crossed a line between the uniformed military and the elected and appointed civilian leadership. While, Clay's denigration of Taylor's book and articles was almost certainly influenced by his personal and professional relationship with Eisenhower, Clay felt that Taylor had crossed this line and knowingly influenced the political process and then returned to government service in a political capacity for the party and administration which his words and actions had helped.[604] Additional senior military leaders castigated Taylor. Admiral Arleigh Burke felt that Taylor had abused his aces sot the White House, "some of the materiel in the book, was derived from a very informal conversation, where the President wasn't thinking of how that could be used…The President never intended what Max thought he implied or intended.[605]

Eisenhower felt personally and professionally betrayed by the Taylor's words, responding to a reporter's question on 13 January:

> Q. Frank van der Linden, Nashville Banner: Sir, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, in his new book, is proposing a single Chief of Staff for all the services, and a much larger defense budget of something like $50 to $55 billion a year. Could you give us your views with regard to both those points?

[604] Oral History Interview with General Lucius D. Clay, 2 of 2, by Ed Edwin, 16 March 1967, p. 98, DDEL.
[605] Oral History Interview with Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, 4 of 4, by John T. Mason, Jr., 12 January 1973, p. 233, DDEL.

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I should think he has the right to his own opinion.[606]

Although the president's answer, in and of itself, does not betray his animosity towards Taylor, a review of the entire press event, especially when compared to other Eisenhower press events, reveals a definite curtness from Eisenhower. In the rest of the interview, his responses are free-flowing and his interactions with the press represent his good-natured relationship with the press.

In private, Eisenhower discussed with Goodpaster and Gordon Gray that he wanted to take disciplinary action against the retired general. Gray reported back to the president that the Department of Defence's legal assessment concluded that retired officers were accountable to the Uniformed Code of Military Justice, just like if there were still on active duty. However, the administration ultimately deemed the political implications of pursuing administrative action against Taylor to outweigh the benefits of such action.[607]

However, it is not readily thought by everyone that Taylor crossed this line, dividing best military advice from overt political criticism. Morris Janowitz, an American sociologist who contributed to the scholarship on civil-military relations believed that Taylor "had resisted urging members of congressional subcommittees to continue opposition in public debate" while he served as the Army Chief of Staff.[608] Simply put, Taylor had waited until after he retired to criticise the president openly; in 1957, Taylor, at a National Press Club event, had been asked about Gavin's controversial Senate testimony. Taylor artfully evaded

[606] President Eisenhower News Conference, 13 January 1960, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-219, accessed 21 September 2021.
[607] Gordon Gray, Memorandum of Meeting with the President, 17 February 1960, Nuclear History Collection, DNSA, available at http://nsaarchive.chadwyck.com.proxy.library.ohiou.edu/nsa/documents/NH/00225/all.pdf, accessed 21 September 2021.
[608] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press, 1960), p. 359.

the question then, responded that Gavin's ideas should get a fair hearing and that he, himself, had supported the need for a more empowered Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before he became the Army Chief of Staff, however, "whether it's growing conservatism or whether perhaps experience leads one to be slow in reaching conclusions, I am not nearly as sure now as I was then."[609] While Taylor's dodge may have been artful, it may not have been entirely truthful.

After a little over one year, Taylor found himself answering the trumpet's call to serve, again. This time, the Kennedy administration, beset by national security crises early in his administration—Cuba, Congo, Berlin, and Vietnam—needed a trusted agent to deal with the military and the intelligence establishments after the failure of Central Intelligence Agency in the Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba in April 1961. The planning for the operation had been ongoing since early 1960, under the Eisenhower administration; this may have led to the Kennedy administration to feeling that the military and intelligence communities had boxed him into an untenable position. Regardless, Kennedy needed someone to lead the national security establishment through an after action review and understand what had occurred and gone wrong within the national security team. Taylor parlayed this position into positions of greater influence with Kennedy; Kennedy appointed Taylor as the military representative to the president, then, in 1962, Kennedy appointed as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, charged with the leadership of the very institution against which Taylor had criticised less than three years prior.

Taylor's time as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff became synonymous with the start of the Vietnam War and the "dereliction of duty," as H.R. McMaster termed it with

[609] Question and Answer Period, National Press Club Address, 19 December 1957, p. 1, Taylor Papers, Box 7, Folder: C/S Speeches, File No. 3, 1957, NDU.

respect to Taylor's mis-representation of the joint chiefs' best military advice as the administration decided on a policy of methodically increasing pressure on the North Vietnamese. This led, as McMaster concludes, to the United States ultimate defeat in Vietnam:

> The war in Vietnam was not lost in the field, nor was it lost on the front pages of the New York Times or on the college campuses. It was lost in Washington, D.C., even before Americans assumed sole responsibility for the fighting in 1965 and before they realized the country was at war; indeed, even before the first American units were deployed.[610]

Taylor was a key player in this defeat. Taylor had argued for limited wars since he had taken that plane with Diddy in 1955. As Kennedy's Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, then, as President Johnson's Ambassador to Vietnam, Taylor had set the table for limited war, to prove out his theory of war. This setting was complete with a hand-picked military commander in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, with whom he had worked closely with years prior. Additionally, Ambassador Taylor had the President's directive giving him control over the American military effort in South Vietnam:

> As you take charge of the American effort in South Vietnam, I want you to have this formal expression not only of my confidence, but my desire that you have and exercise full responsibility…Specifically, I want it clearly understood that this overall responsibility includes the whole military effort in South Vietnam and authorizes the degree of command and control that you consider appropriate…At your convenience, I should be glad to know of the arrangements which you propose for meeting the terms of this instruction, so that appropriate action can be taken in the Defence Department and elsewhere as necessary.[611]

Further examination of Taylor's early career through his time as Army Chief of Staff is warranted. As this research effort has reviewed Taylor's career, it has become apparent that Maxwell Taylor was an above average, maybe excellent, staff officer, however, he failed or was perceived to have failed to achieve greatness when in charge or command: 101st

[610] H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, p. 333-4.
[611] President Lyndon B. Johnson Letter to Taylor, 2 July 1964, Box 51, Folder 161-69C, Taylor Papers.

Airborne Division—combat jumps in Normandy and Market Garden juxtaposed against his absence during the Battle of the Bulge; West Point—academic changes after World War II were almost guaranteed because of the changes required to support the war effort; Korea—Taylor struggled at the operational and strategic levels, even though he was in command of the Eighth Army when the armistice was signed in Korea; Army Chief of Staff—Pentomic Division re-design and the revolt of the colonels. While historians have focused on Taylor's post retirement service and the impact of his leadership on American failures in Vietnam, those historians merely have to look to his military record prior to his first retirement to understand the issues that Maxwell Taylor brought to the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Conclusion

From 1953 through 1958 the U.S. Army led a revolt against President Eisenhower and his administration's New Look national security strategy. As President Eisenhower was finishing his first year as the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe in charge of NATO military forces, a bevy of friends and hopeful political allies entreated him to run for President of the United States. No American enjoyed the broad appeal with the American public and with the influential political caste of America.

The 1950s in the United States was defined by many things—McCarthyism, Communism and the start of the Cold War, to name just a few—however, for President Eisenhower, the 1950s were defined by just one thing—peace. Eisenhower thought it was his duty to keep the fragile peace in the world that existed after World War II and Korea. In order to do this, Eisenhower had to keep the growing Iron Curtain at bay, even as they gained atomic weapons: "Eisenhower, before, during and after his Presidency, put the pursuit of peace at the top of his agenda, and at the top of his agenda for peace he put nuclear danger."[612] To Eisenhower, peace was primary, even if it meant that his beloved Army would end up on the short end of the resourcing fight. Unfortunately, key senior leaders of the army—Ridgway, Gavin, and Taylor—felt to maintain the peace you had to prepare for war, but not just nuclear war; the nation needed to prepare for limited war as well, and to do that, the nation needs the soldiers and the capabilities that the Army brings to a fight.

As Eisenhower surveyed the political landscape, he detected multiple landmines: the war in Korea, the American economy, the debate in the Republican Party over a withdrawal from the geo-political stage. However, Eisenhower failed to understand that one of his core constituencies might not remain with him, regardless of his politics. That core constituency was the U.S. Army. The Army had given Eisenhower an opportunity to rise from the small town of Abilene, Kansas, attend the United

[612] McGeorge, Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 287.

States Military Academy, and serve to protect and defend the United States. It had also given Eisenhower the opportunity to command the largest coalition in world history during World War II, strategically managing theatre armies across Europe and Africa and the political landscape of the allied coalition. But the Army's senior levels turned on Eisenhower when he looked across the joint services and sought to defeat the Soviet empire with a strategy of nuclear deterrence.

Eisenhower's strategic belief in the power of the alliance in Europe against the Soviet Union was buoyed by his companion resolve in the power of nuclear deterrence. When Eisenhower spoke before the United Nations in 1957, he beseeched the international community, "Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United States does not wish merely to present strength, but also the desire and the hope for peace."[613] Eisenhower's strategic vision, coupled with the American fear of the Iron Curtain of the Soviet Union helped to enable the U.S. to disengage from combat operations in Korea, grow NATO membership and improve its military capability, decrease the national budget deficit, and successfully "fight" the Cold War with the Soviet Union. For these, and other reasons, Eisenhower has steadily climbed up the rankings of former U.S. presidents, according to a C-SPAN poll of over 90 presidential historians.[614]

Eisenhower knew the direction that he wanted to take American military policy as he assumed office. Eisenhower firmly believed in the transformative aspect of the nuclear bomb and its relation to war. In every forum he spoke, publicly or in private, Eisenhower focused on the ability of the United States to use nuclear weapons to deter, and if necessary, fight and win American war. "Eisenhower managed, by cleverness, indirection, subtlety, and downright deviousness—and by embracing the very weapon he could never use—to safeguard his country and possibly the rest of mankind from annihilation."[615] While the services would argue over forms of manoeuvre, Eisenhower fretted over

[613] Eisenhower, "Atoms for Peace Speech," Available at https://www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech. Accessed 1 March 2017.
[614] Jackie Bischof, "The Best US presidents, According to Presidential Historians," *Quartz*,1 March 2017, available at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/03/the-best-us-presidents-according-to-presidential-historians?utm_content=bufferfd396&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer Accessed 1 March 2021.
[615] Thomas, *Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World*, Kindle Edition, p. 15.

keeping the United States out of war, period. Gavin concludes his notes on President Eisenhower, relegating him to the lower echelons of presidential history:

> one comes to the clear conclusion that a soldier in the White House is not as good as an intelligent, smart politician who knows where to turn for military advice. Abraham Lincoln and Harry Truman both had some military service as more junior officers and it was enough to temper their military decisions. And they both made far greater presidents than Eisenhower. There were others as well.[616]

While more recent presidential polls of historians have been kinder to Eisenhower, it is illustrative to see Gavin's thoughts on Eisenhower, specifically compared to MacArthur and Truman. MacArthur, a tremendously capable Army general who was fired by his president—Truman—for invading North Korean and attacking north of the 38th parallel. As President Truman is quoted as saying, "I fired him because he wouldn't respect the authority of the President. I didn't fire him because he was a dumb son of a bitch, although he was, but that's not against the law for generals. If it was, half to three-quarters of them would be in jail."[617]

The revolt against the New Look began once Ridgway assumed the position of the Chief of Staff of the Army and it continued through the tenure of Maxwell Taylor, and beyond. General James Gavin contributed to the revolt, serving as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training, the senior staff general supporting the Army Chief of Staff. Then, after a re-organisation of the Army staff, Gavin served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development, a position that satiated his proclivity for technology as the missile and space age came into shape.

Truman must have known something that Eisenhower initially failed to grasp. Eisenhower expected the Army to follow his lead and for the uniformed leader of the Army to provide more than "parochial" advice to the Secretary of the Army and Defence. However, Matt Ridgway disappointed the new President, beginning a revolt against the Eisenhower administration's New Look shortly after taking office.

---

[616] "Note on General Eisenhower," dated 23 June 1981, Gavin Papers, Box 27, AHEC.
[617] *Time*, "Historical Notes: Giving Them Hell," 3 December 1973. Available at www.content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,908217,00.html, accessed on 1 September 2021.

Arguably, no American general can lay claim to the tactical and operational war-fighting exploits that Matt Ridgway accomplished. However, this leader of soldiers without peer served only two years as the Army Chief of Staff and started the revolt against one of the most famed American generals in the Army's history. Matt Ridgway turned the course of history in Korea as the commander of the U.S. Eighth Army, taking over for General Walker who had been killed in a jeep accident, and stopping the Army's retreat. Ridgway's personal leadership changed the tide of the war, and it was this personal and tactical focus that Ridgway brought to his successive assignments in Europe and as the Chief of Staff of the Army.

However, his last two assignments were at the strategic level of war and within the political bureaucracy of the Pentagon, and Ridgway faltered. Ridgway digressed to what had brought him success in war—personal leadership and war-fighting tactics. In Europe Ridgway focused on the NATO divisions and its plan to counter Soviet aggression; Eisenhower, his successor, had focused on the political capitals, and improving relationships amongst the nascent NATO countries. Ridgway was not comfortable with the political glad-handing required of a senior officer in his position and it was evident. Field Marshal Montgomery, who had served as Ridgway's corps commander during World War II, was apoplectic at Ridgway's nomination to serve as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). Instead, Montgomery worked throughout Ridgway's tenure to get "his friend" President Eisenhower to replace Ridgway with Eisenhower's former deputy, General Al Gruenther.

Eisenhower, and Secretary of Defence Charles Wilson, decided to replace Ridgway with Gruenther, but also decided to move Ridgway up to top position in the Army. The Chief of Staff of the Army is the senior military officer in the Army and provides the civilian Secretary of the Army with his "best military advice," but the Secretary is actually in charge of the Army. This is the United States' system of civilian control of the military. The Chief of Staff of the service works for the Secretary of that service, who in turn works for the Secretary of Defence. The National Security Act of 1947 brought about this change, as well as many others, in the national security community.

As Ridgway assumed the role of Chief of Staff of the Army, he promised to give "fearless and forthright expressions of honest, objective professional opinion up to the moment when they, themselves, the civilian commanders announced those decisions. Thereafter they could expect completely loyal and diligent execution of these decisions."[618] However, this promise was short-lived; Ridgway began pushing back on the New Look strategy from the outset, on the USS Sequoia conference with the other chiefs of the joint staff in August 1953 through his retirement diatribe to the Secretary of Defence and the publication of his memoir. Ridgway pushed back through the bureaucracy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council; Ridgway pushed back through the press—publicly and privately; Ridgway pushed back through his testimony and relations with Congress; and Ridgway pushed back through doctrine development inside of the Army, the main lever within his control of the Army.

Throughout the two years of Ridgway's tenure, Eisenhower thwarted Ridgway's efforts to counter the administration's strategy of nuclear deterrence. Eisenhower shaped his National Security Council to provide more cogent and regimented discussion of issues and decreased the military and service membership of the council, allowing only the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defence as regular members of the National Security Council. This change in membership decreased the influence that the Army Chief of Staff had within the national security process. Even when Ridgway was able to plead his case before the council, his views were acknowledged but minimized.

As the Eisenhower administration marginalized Ridgway, he took his arguments to the American people through the press and in his public appearances. Ridgway cultivated the warrior ethos and persona from his early days in command of the 82nd Airborne Division to his time in command of the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea, always wearing his combat suspenders with attached grenades. Ridgway maximized his public persona as a combat leader of soldiers, however as he transitioned to strategic command in the Far East, in Europe, and finally as the Army Chief of Staff this personal

[618] Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 270.

leadership failed to win the day, as a strategic leadership was required. Regardless of the forum, Ridgway continuously raged against nuclear deterrence and the budgetary decrements that came as a result of a change in strategic military focus from land wars in Europe and Korea to strategic nuclear missiles and bombing. The coup de grace of Ridgway's public revolt against the Eisenhower administration was his retirement memorandum to the Secretary of Defence, where Ridgway declared, "IN MY VIEW, THE PRESENT UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES ARE INADEQUATE IN STRENGTH AND IMPROPERLY PROPORTIONED TO MEET THE ABOVE COMMITMENTS."[619] Regardless of the comments made by Ridgway, the Eisenhower administration found ways to lessen the impact of his words, as Eisenhower and his administration had the ear of the American people.

One of the factions, though, that was intent on piercing the armour of the Eisenhower administration was the Democratic Party. Specifically, Democrats from the South were tough on defence and keen to listen to military leaders who thought the President, his administration, and his policies were weak on defence. Ridgway testified multiple times in Congress before House and Senate Armed Services Committees, finding a sympathetic ear in the Senators Lyndon Johnson, Richard Russell, Stuart Symington, and Henry Jackson. Although his testimony found friendly ears in Congress, the Eisenhower administration was able to accomplish their policy aims. However, the true cost of the Army's revolt was not paid until Vice President Nixon lost his campaign for president in 1960; due to multiple factors, the Democrats were able to portray Nixon and the Eisenhower Republican Party as losing the atomic missile race to the Soviets.

Ridgway did have the ability to enact changes within the Army, and he did so by focusing on the role of the Army that he saw for the Army to play in American national security. In 1954 Ridgway published the "Role of the Army," writing that the Army was the decisive element of national military

[619] Ridgway, Soldier, p. 323-332. Ridgway letter to Secretary of Defence Charlie Wilson, dated 27 June 1955, published as appendix 1 to Soldier; available as well in Ridgway files at USAHEC as well. This quote is found on p. 327.

policy and that the Army needed more men to successfully accomplish this mission.[620] While this was in direct contradiction to the national military strategy, Ridgway was free to provide his personal leadership to the Army, directing and providing guidance on missions, organizations and structure, doctrine, and leadership in order to re-fashion the Army in the Ridgway mould.

While Ridgway's revolt would smoulder into his retirement, the Eisenhower administration effectively shut down Ridgway by supporting his retirement in 1955 and remarking in the press that if had followed all the advice he received during World War II, "we would not have crossed the Channel. Indeed, I think we wouldn't have crossed the Atlantic Ocean…there come places where people in authority must make decisions based upon the best advice they get."[621] Regardless of the forum, the bureaucratic halls of the Pentagon and the White House or the personal jousting with reporters, Eisenhower bested Ridgway's attempt to revolt because he firmly understood the strategic and political landscape and operated with a deftness of a master politician.

Ridgway's successor at the 82nd Airborne Division during World War II supported the Army's revolt through his own actions and words, focusing on the character of manoeuvre warfare and the maturation of technology on the modern battlefield. Gavin would also take his revolt to Congress, however his testimony would earn him the ire of the new Army Chief of Staff, Maxwell Taylor. An avid military intellectual and writer, Gavin initially focused his writings on airborne operations, but moved further into tactical mobility and manoeuvre warfare as his thoughts matured, advancing into the space age and the missile race after his retirement from the Army.

While Gavin never advanced as far as Ridgway or Taylor in his career, his focus on technology and the advancements in the character of manoeuvre warfare separated him from Ridgway and Taylor. While Ridgway focused, militarily, on the doctrinal environment of the Army during the New Look, Gavin focused on the materiel domain, through his role as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and

[620] Department of the Army, *Officer's Call*, "The Role of the Army," 1954, Number 3.
[621] Transcript from President Eisenhower Press Conference, 19 January 1956, Public Papers of the President (Ann Whitman File), "Press Conference Series," Box 4, DDEL.

Development. Gavin was tightly linked with the Army's missile program, so tightly that he was at dinner with Werner von Braun at Redstone Arsenal on the night that the United States learned of the successful Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite.

Gavin attempted to revolt against the New Look by embracing new technologies and the Army's theoretical or conceptual use of them. When Gavin wrote in 1954 about the cavalry, he posited the use of aerial reconnaissance assets (helicopters) to assist the manoeuvre commander in supporting his reconnaissance efforts against enemy forces. Additionally, Gavin wrote about using helicopters to move manoeuvre forces quickly across the battlefield; these concepts were the forebears of the doctrine of air mobility and air cavalry. Lastly, after Gavin's retirement he wrote War and Peace in the Space Age, demonstrating the necessity of the Army and the U.S. military to move into the space age, focusing on the bureaucracy of the Department of Defence and the failure of our national security strategy to adapt to changes in technology in order to manage successfully different types of warfare that the U.S. may find itself engaged in.

In 1954-1955, Gavin was central to the "revolt of the colonels," as he served as the Army's G3, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. Gavin supported, and even encouraged, the group of younger colonels with ties to academic and national security professionals to revolt against the New Look. This revolt took place in the press and in Congress as the colonels used their relationships in Washington, D.C., to spread the Army's message, focusing on their role as Ridgway, Taylor, and Gavin saw it, providing land forces to manoeuvre in both limited and full-scale wars to fight and win as the decisive element in war.

Ultimately, Gavin's revolt, while he remained in uniform, would be unsuccessful, but he continued the fight against the Eisenhower administration's policies and strategy on entering private life after his tumultuous retirement during Taylor's tenure as Chief of Staff. Gavin found a role as an advisor to Senator Kennedy, moving in political circles in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Eventually, Gavin would find himself back in France, this time serving as President Kennedy's ambassador to France based on the history of Gavin's relationship during the war with General Charles de Gaulle.

While Gavin's revolt was not successful, it is worth future study and review of whether he was "right" in the end and, whether or not being "right" mattered. Gavin's intellectual underpinnings helped pave the way for the air mobile operations of Vietnam and the modern U.S. Army. However, he was not effective in disproving Eisenhower's New Look strategy. Furthermore, his actions, when combined with those of Maxwell Taylor, may have moved the U.S. closer to limited war in Vietnam and the issues associated with the military and government as a result.

Maxwell Taylor is one of the most difficult military leaders to research properly because he tightly controlled his narrative; from his early days as a military professional Taylor chose his assignment opportunities and the narrative surrounding him. Taylor did this with his interaction with other general officers, his public speaking engagements, his engagements with the press, his written correspondence, and, ultimately, after his death, with his biographer—his son.

As Ridgway exercised his personal leadership and influenced the doctrinal domain of the Army and Gavin took the role of technologist working within the materiel domain, Taylor utilized his academic background working within the national security and foreign relations communities to focus on the concepts and organisational structures of the Army. Taylor knew that he must work both within the constraints of the Eisenhower administration's New Look and outside of those bounds. As Taylor worked within those constraints, he started to re-organise the Army to the Pentomic division in preparation for the nuclear battlefield in order to secure funding for the Army. Taylor's initiative focused on flattened command and control headquarters elements, increased span of control based on technological improvements in communications equipment, and operating in a dispersed, nuclear battlefield. There were myriad issues surrounding the Pentomic re-design, but Taylor began thinking about structural re-design as he commanded in Korea in 1954, trying to solve the problem of maintaining defensive military capability while decreasing the strain and demand signal for combat units as the Korea armistice began. Most military historians, and many leaders of the era consider the Pentomic division re-design to be one of the most disastrous organisational constructs considered by the Army.

As Taylor's strategic framework developed as a result of his tactical, operational, academic, and political-military assignments, he came to understand strategy more completely than Ridgway or Gavin, but he still fell short in revolting against Eisenhower's New Look strategy. Taylor understood that any successful strategy must include the whole of government, all the elements of national power: Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics. However, Taylor's revolt centred on two key issues: the administration's focus on the military, specifically, which branch of the military was best to carry out the nuclear deterrence mission, and the president's belief that the American economy needed relief from the previous decade of wartime spending in order to best the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Taylor understood the administration's strategy but still felt that there was a role for the Army in fighting limited wars and in providing ground forces that could manoeuvre in an atomic battlefield. Taylor used the colonels in the Coordinating Committee to make these arguments behind the scenes to Congress, the press, and to certain academic and national security audiences in the early days of his tenure as Chief of Staff. Taylor inherited this group from Ridgway, under the supervision of the Army G3, Jim Gavin; however, shortly after Taylor assumed the duties as Chief of Staff of the Army, the work of this coordination group came to be public knowledge. Secretary Wilson was forced to conduct a press conference with the military chiefs to assure the media and the public that there was nothing to the reports of inter-service rivalry and dissent to the "New Look" national security strategy..[622] Unfortunately for those officers, General Taylor disavowed their actions even as his Brigadier General William Westmoreland, reassigned those officers throughout the Army.

While Taylor was attempting to be political, working the press and Congress to his advantage, he was found out and forced to renounce those officers with whom he had shared an academic and intellectual union. Taylor could not operate as the hidden hand and influence actions behind the scenes, like Eisenhower could. This would be brought to further light by H.R. McMaster's Dereliction of Duty

[622] Secretary Charles Wilson, Press Conference, 22 May 1956, as detailed in *Time*, "Armed Forces: Charlie's Hurricane," 4 June 1956, available at www.content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,866924-6,00.html. Accessed 2 September 2021. Also, available via *The New York Times*, "Transcript of News Conference Held by Wilson and Civilian Aides," 22 May 1956, Sec. A, p. 14.

that shined a light on Taylor's actions in the Kennedy White House and the Johnson administration, taking his "Machiavellian actions" to further heights.[623]

The Army felt the push and pull of the revolt in reaction to the Eisenhower administration's budgetary cuts, but the true cost of the revolt was three-fold: the failure and setbacks of the Pentomic Division re-design, the distrust sewn between the civilian leadership of the administration and the services and their uniformed general officers, and the loss in the trust and confidence of Army leadership in their general officers, specifically Maxwell Taylor as he disavowed actions he had asked them to take. The failure of the Pentomic Division re-design is well-known and has been previously covered, but suffice to say, the Army was not ready to fight a war at the end of the 1950s.[624] While the concept of civilian leadership had already proven problematic from the formation of the Department of Defence in the late 1940s, the Army's issues intensified this concern, and the problems between the civilian leadership of the Army and the uniformed senior general officers has continued to present day, with myriad examples. Lastly, a generation of senior officers lost faith and confidence in Taylor, ultimately leading towards some of the issues brought forth by McMaster and faced by the Army in the aftermath of Vietnam.

While each of the three senior leaders of the Army revolted against the Eisenhower administration, their justifications for the revolt were mixed and can be tied back to their military assignments and experiences. The genesis of Ridgway's revolt focused on professional parochialism and the religious zealotry he felt against nuclear warfare. He revolted against the Eisenhower administration by focusing Army doctrine on tactical ground warfare and by trying to appeal to Democratic political leaders seemingly sympathetic to his cause. Gavin's revolt centred on his academic vocation for the profession, focusing on manoeuvre warfare. He, too, appealed to Congress, but was unsuccessful as he found issue with Maxwell Taylor. General Taylor focused his revolt on the

[623] H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, p. 110-1.
[624] Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era*, p. 129-155.

political and strategic basis that had been the cornerstone of his public engagements since his time as the Superintendent at West Point.

All three senior Army leaders continued their politico-military revolt against the Eisenhower administration and President Eisenhower's national security strategy into the 1960 presidential campaign. While the Army's revolt had failed to dislodge President Eisenhower, both Gavin and Taylor were influential in shaping at the least the ideas of Senator Kennedy's national security platform. Additionally, Ridgway continued to believe in the strength of the Army as he served as the Chairman of the Mellon Institute, continuing to advocate forcefully for ground combat troops to defeat the Soviet threat in Europe.

While it is unwise to try to calculate the impact of Ridgway, Gavin, and Taylor on the 1960 election and Kennedy's defeat of Vice-President Nixon, it is clear that the revolt had an impact. First, Kennedy read Taylor and Ridgway's memoirs and Gavin served as an advisor to the campaign; clearly the ideas of the revolt impacted Kennedy's thinking on security. In fact, Kennedy wrote to Taylor in June, 1960: "I was more than happy to give your book [Uncertain Trumpet] my endorsement, since I am convinced that its central arguments are most persuasive. I feel quite sure that your book has radiated considerable influence, and it has certainly helped to shape my own thinking."[625] Second, the Democratic Party continually pointed out the missile gap that Gavin and Taylor had portrayed, while Nixon (and Eisenhower) stayed silent because of the security implications of that knowledge. And, third, both Gavin and Taylor found themselves in the administration after the election. While the revolt impacted the election and the Kennedy administration, it is unclear if the revolt had any recognisable impact on President Eisenhower, himself, other than the disdain he felt while in office towards his Army's leadership.

The revolt ultimately failed to dislodge Eisenhower's New Look from its perch as the national military strategy, however the revolt did have an impact on national political stage as it set the

[625] John F. Kennedy, "Letter to General Maxwell Taylor," dated April 9, 1960, Kennedy Papers, Box 471.

conditions for the defeat of Vice-President Nixon as he ran to succeed President Eisenhower. Both Taylor and Gavin had retired and moved on to advise and support Kennedy's election campaign. Additionally, the Army ended up divesting of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency into the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1958.

This thesis confronted a surprisingly neglected topic—the troubled relationship between the U.S. Army and President Eisenhower and his administration. This is clearly an important subject in terms of understanding U.S. national security policy, civil-military relations, and the position of the armed forces within the context of American presidential policy. This research effort's original contribution to the field of both the literature of the Eisenhower administration and the Army in the 1950s is that this research ties the actions of Ridgway, Gavin, and Taylor together in a revolt by the Army against the Eisenhower administration and the "New Look" national security strategy. This research sets the record straight regarding the characterization of Ridgway, Gavin, and Taylor's retirements, setting aside the popular myth of resignations in protest.

While this research effort did not delve too deeply into the issues of civil-military relations as depicted in the revolt, that problem would lend itself to future study and research, specifically as it relates to the civilian leadership. Some scholarship has already looked at the primary military leaders involved in the revolt, but little scholarship exists on the civilian Army Secretaries, Robert Stevens and Wilber Brucker. The civil-military relations aspect is less a history effort than a political science or security studies effort, but is key to understanding how the American Department of Defence works and supports and defends American democracy. One might think that these issues were resolved after the Eisenhower presidency, or after America's involvement in Vietnam, but even today after America has fought the Global War on Terror for the last twenty years issues between the civilian and military leadership still arise and need resolution. We need to understand why and how Ridgway, Gavin, and Taylor revolted against the Eisenhower in order to ensure that the American Department of Defence can avoid future revolts and harm the American military.

Bibliography

Archives Consulted

Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas

Dwight D. Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers

Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President (Ann Whitman File)

Edward E. "Swede" Hazlett Papers

Gordon Gray Papers

Alfred M. Gruenther Papers

Christian Herter Papers

Lauris Norstad Papers

Oral History Collection

White House Central Files

White House Official Files

Post Presidential Documents

George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, Virginia

Lucius D. Clay Papers

Andrew Goodpaster Papers

George C. Marshall Papers

James Van Fleet Papers

John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts

Appointment Books of President Kennedy

Digital Collections

Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, National Security Files

Papers of John F. Kennedy, President Office's Files

Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas

Oral History Collection

Papers of McGeorge Bundy

Papers of Lyndon Johnson, U.S. Senate

Papers of Lyndon Johnson, Presidential Papers

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Digital Collection: The Pentagon Papers

Records Group 218: Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Records Group 319: Records of the U.S. Army Staff

Records Group 330: Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defence Files

Records Group 338: Records of U.S. Army Commands

Records Group 466: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany

Records Group 546: Records of the U.S. Continental Army Command

National Defence University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.

Digital Collections

Maxwell D. Taylor Papers

Princeton University Library, Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton, New Jersey

Hamilton Fish Armstrong Papers

Bernard M. Baruch Papers

Robert R. Bowie Papers

Council on Foreign Relations Records

John Foster Dulles Papers

Oral History Collection

George Kennan Papers

U.S. Army Heritage and Education Centre, Carlisle, Pennsylvania

J. Lawton Collins Papers

James M. Gavin Papers

Andrew Goodpaster Papers

John E. Hull Papers

Harold K. Johnson Papers

Matthew B. Ridgway Papers

Maxwell D. Taylor Papers

Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, California

Samuel T. Williams Papers

United States Military Academy Library, Special Collections and Archives, West Point, NY

Digital Collections

George A. Lincoln Papers

Records Group 404: Records of the U.S. Military Academy

Special Collections: Maxwell Taylor Letters

Naval Historical Centre, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.

Arthur W. Radford Papers

Digital Resources

The American Presidency Project.

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu. Retrieved 21 September 2021.

Defence Technical Information Centre.

http://dtic.mil/dtic. Retrieved 21 September 2021.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.

http://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov. Retrieved 21 September 2021.

John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.

http://www.jfklibrary.org. Retrieved 21 September 2021.

Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library.

http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu. Retrieved 21 September 2021.

Miller Centre, University of Virginia.

http://millercenter.org/. Retrieved 21 September 2021.

U.S. Army Centre of Military History.

http://www.history.army.mil/ Retrieved 21 September 2021.

U.S. Congressional Hearings Digital Collection Historical Archive, 1824-2003

http://congressional.proquest.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/congressional/search/basic/basicsearch. Retrieved 18 April 2016.

U.S. Department of Defence

http://www.dod.mil.pubs/foi/. Retried 21 September 2021.

U.S. Department of Defence, Historical Office

http://history.defense.gov. Retrieved 21 September 2021.

Published Primary Material

Acheson, Dean, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969).

Adams, Sherman, F*irst-Hand Report: the Story of the Eisenhower Administration* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1961).

"And Now—the Atomic Army: Exclusive Interview with Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army." U.S. News and World Report (3 February, 1956), 64-73.

Arnold, Henry A., *Global Mission*, (New York: Harper, 1949).
-------, "Air Strategy for Victory," *Flying*, XXXIII, NO. 4 (October 1943), p. 50.

Bland, Larry, I., ed., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*. Vol. 5, "The Finest Soldier," January 1, 1945-January 7, 1947 (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

Bradley, General Omar N. and Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983).

Brownell, Herbert, *Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell* (Lawrence, Ks.: University Press of Kansas, 1993).

Bundy, McGeorge, *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988).

Chandler, Alfred D., Jr., and Louis Galambos, eds. *The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower*. *Vol. 6, Occupation, 1945* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
---------, eds. *The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Vol. 7, The Chief of Staff*, 1945 (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

---------, eds. *The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Vol. 8, The Chief of Staff*, 1945 (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

---------, eds. *The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Vol. 9, The Chief of Staff*, 1945 (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

Collins, J. Lawton, *War In Peacetime* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1969).

Cutler, Robert, "The Development of the National Security Council," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 34, No. 3 (April 1956), pp. 441-458.

Cutler, Robert, *No Time for Rest* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1966).

Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. Multiple volumes for 1949-1968. Washington, D.C.,: Government Printing Office, 1975-2003.

Eisenhower, Dwight D., *Crusade in Europe (*New York: Doubleday, 1948).

-------, *Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (New York: Doubleday, 1965).
-------, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961* (New York: Doubleday, 1965).
-------, "A Tank Discussion," *Infantry Journal 17* (November 1920), p. 454-458.
-------, *At Ease: Stories I Tell My Friends* (New York: Doubleday, 1967).
-------, "The Central Role of the President in the Conduct of Security Affairs," Amos A. Jordan, Jr., ed., *Issues in National Security in the 1970s* (New York: Praeger Books, 1967).

Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1981).

Gavin, James, *Airborne Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947).

--------, "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses," *Harper's Magazine* 208, no. 1247 (April 1954), p. 54-60.
--------, "New Divisional Organization," *Army-Navy-Air Force Register* 76, no. 3923 (12 February 1955), p. 1-2.
--------, *War and Peace in the Space Age* (New York: Harper, 1958).
--------, "The Future of Airborne Operations," *Military Review* XXVII, no. 9 (December 1947), p. 3.
--------, "The Future of Armor," *Infantry Journal* LXII, no 1. (January 1948).
--------, *Crisis Now: Crisis in the Cities, Crisis in Vietnam, A Commitment to Change* (New York: Random House, 1968).

Goodman, Allen E., ed., Negotiating While Fighting: *The Diary of Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean Armistice Conference* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institute Press, 1978).

Griffith, Robert, ed. *Ike's Letters to a Friend, 1941-1958* (Lawrence, Ks.: University Press of Kansas, 1984).

Hughes, Emmet John, *Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975).

Krulak, Victor S., *Organization for National Security: A Study* (Cambridge, Mass. U.S. Strategic Institute Publishing Office, 1983).

Mitchell Billy, *Memoirs of World War I: From Start to Finish our Greatest War* (New York: Random House, 1960).
-------, W*inged Defense: The Development and the Possibilities of Modern Air Power, Economic and Military* (New York: Putnam, 1925).

Montgomery, Bernard Law, of Alamein, *The Memoirs Of Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery Of Alamein* (Cleveland, Oh.: World Pub Co, 1958).
--------, *Normandy to the Baltic* (New York and London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1947).

New York Times, "Army Fails to Ban Bomb Testimony," June 19, 1956, p. 1.

Patterson, Jr., Bradley, "Teams and Staff: Dwight Eisenhower's Innovations in Structure and Operations in the Modern White House," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 2, (Spring 1994), p. 277-298.

Pickett, William B., ed., "George F. Kennan and the Origins of Eisenhower's New Look: An Oral History of Project Solarium," (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Institute for International and Regional Studies Monograph Series, 2004). Available online at https://web.archive.org/web/20131029210208/http://www.rose-hulman.edu/~pickett/Solarium.pdf, accessed 21 August 2021.

Radford, Arthur W. and Stephen Jurika, *From Pearl Harbor To Vietnam* (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980).

Ridgway, Matthew B., *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew Ridgway* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1956).
--------., *The Korean War.* (Boston, Mass.: Da Capo Press, 1986).
-------., *The Korean War: How We Met The Challenge: How All-Out Asian War Was Averted: Why Macarthur Was Dismissed: Why Today's War Objectives Must Be Limited* (New York: Doubleday, 1967).
-------, "My Battles in War and Peace," *Saturday Evening Post,* January 21, 1956, p. 19.

Taylor, Maxwell D., "Military Leadership: What Is It? Can It Be Taught?" *Distinguished Lecture Series*, 84-93. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Spring 1977.

---------. *West Point: Its Objectives and Methods*. West Point, N.Y.: U.S. Military Academy, 1947.

---------. *West Point Looks Ahead.* Pamphlet. West Point, N.Y.: U.S. Military Academy, 1947.

---------. "Changing Military Priorities. *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review* 1. No. 3 (1979), p. 2-13.
---------. "How We Can Survive." *Look*, 19 January 1960, p. 56-63.
---------. "Our Critical Military Need: One Defense Chief." *Look*, 22 December 1959, p. 111-121.
---------. "Our Great Military Fallacy. *Look*, 24 November 1959, p. 27-31.
---------. *Responsibility and Response*. (New York: Harper and Row, 1967).
---------. "Security Will Not Wait." *Foreign Affairs* 39, no. 2 (1961), p. 174-184.
---------. *Swords and Plowshares*. (New York: Norton, 1972).
---------. *The Uncertain Trumpet.* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960).
---------. "The United States—A Military Power Second to None?" *International Security* 1, no. 1 (1976), p. 49-55.
---------. "The World-Wide Role and Capability of the Army." *Army Combat Forces Journal* 6, no. 2 (1955), p. 24-26.

Twining, Nathan F., Neither Liberty nor Safety: A Hard Look at U.S. Military Strategy. (New York: Hold, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966).

Van Fleet, James. "The Truth About Korea, Part I: From a Man Now Free to Speak," *Life*, May 11, 1953, p. 126-142.
---------. "The Truth About Korea, Part II: How Can We Win with What We Have," *Life*, May 18, 1953, p. 156-172.

Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Johns Hopkins University. *Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy*. (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1959).

White, Theodore H., "An Interview with General Gavin…Tomorrow's Battlefield," *The Army Combat Forces Journal* 5, (March 1955), p. 22.

Secondary Sources

Ambrose, Stephen E., *Eisenhower: The* President *(1952-1969)* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984).

--------, Eisenhower: Soldier, *General of the Army, President-Elect (1893-1952)* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983).

-------, "Eisenhower, Dwight David," in *Dictionary of American Military Biography*, edited by Roger J. Spiller, (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood, 1984).

-------, *The Supreme Commander: The War Years of Dwight D. Eisenhower* (New York: Doubleday, 1970).

-------, *The Victors: Eisenhower and His Boys: The Men Of World War II* (Simon & Schuster, 1998).

Appleman, Roy, *Ridgway Duels for* Korea (College Station, TX.: Texas A&M University Press, 1990).

Bacevich, Andrew, *The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam* (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1986).

-------. 'The Paradox Of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, And The Challenge To Civilian Control, 1953-1955' (1997) 61 The Journal of Military History and Andrew J Bacevich, The Pentomic Era (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986).

Basha, Aurelie,*"I Made Mistakes": Robert McNamara's Vietnam War Policy, 1960-1968* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

Bender, Mark, "Watershed at Fort Leavenworth: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Command and General Staff School," Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1990.

Biggs, Bradley, *Gavin* (Hamden, Ct.: Archon Books, 1980).

Bischof, Jackie, "The Best US presidents, According to Presidential Historians," *Quartz*,1 March 2017, available at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/03/the-best-us-presidents-according-to-presidential-historians?utm_content=bufferfd396&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer Accessed 1 March 2021.

Blair, Clay, *The Forgotten War* (New York: Times Books, 1987).

--------, *Ridgway's Paratroopers* (New York: Doubleday, 1985).

Booth, Michael T., and Duncan Spencer. *Paratrooper: The Life of General James M. Gavin.* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

Bose, Meena, *Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy.* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1998).

Bowie, Robert R. and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped and Enduring Cold War Strategy.* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1998).

Brzezinski Matthew, *Red Moon Rising: Sputnik and the Hidden Rivalries That Ignited the Space Age* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2007).

Brown, John S., "Revolt of the Generals," *Army;* Sep 2006; 56, 9.

Casey, Steven, *Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion 1950-1953* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008).

Casey, Steven, ed., *The Korean War at Sixty: New Approaches to the Study of the Korean War* (Milton Park: Routledge, 2014).

Clausewitz, Carl von; Howard, Michael and Peter Paret (ed.), *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Cohen, Eliot A., *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: Free Press, 2002).

Condit, Kenneth, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume VI, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1955-1956,* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, the Joint Staff, 1992).

Cook, Blance W., *The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy* (New York: Doubleday, 1981).

Correll, John T., "The Revolt of the Admirals," Air Force Magazine, May 29, 2018, available online at http://www.airforcemag.com/article/the-revolt-of-the-admirals/, accessed on 21 September 2021.

Crane, Conrad C., "Matthew Ridgway and the Value of Persistent Dissent," P*arameter*s, Volume 51, Number 2, 18 May 2021, available online at https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss2/3.

Crines, A.S. and Hatzisavvidou, S. (eds.) Republican Orators from Eisenhower to Trump. Rhetoric, Politics, and Society. (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), Kindle Edition.

Divine, Robert A., *Foreign Policy and Presidential Elections* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1974).

Doughty, Robert A., "The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976," *Leavenworth Paper No. 1* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1979).

Douhet, Giulio, as translated by Dino Ferrari, "Command of the Air," Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, available at https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0160_DOUHET_THE_COMMAND_OF_THE_AIR.PDF; accessed 2 September 2021

Eisenhower, John S.D., *Soldiers and Statesmen: Reflections on* Leadership (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 2012).

d'Este, Carlo, *Patton: A Genius for War* (New York: Perennial, 1996).

-------, *Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life* (New York: Hold and Co., 2002).

Evans, Rowland and Robert Novak's, *Lyndon Johnson: The Exercise of Power, A Political Biography* (New York: New American Library, 1966).

Feaver, Peter, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).

Fehrenbach, T.R., *This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness*, (New York: Macmillan, 1963).

Fleming, Thomas, "The Man Who Saved Korea," *History Net*, Winter 1993. https://www.historynet.com/man-saved-korea.htm, accessed 15 January 2021.

Foot, Rosemary, *A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks*, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1990).
-------. "Making Known the Unknown: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," Diplomatic History, Summer 1991, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 411-431.

Fursdon, Edward. *The European Defence Community: A History* (London: Macmillan Press, 1980).

Gaddis, John Lewis, *Strategies Of Containment* (Oxford University Press 1982).

Gaddis, John Lewis, *The Cold War* (Penguin Press 2005).
--------, "He Made It Look Easy: 'Eisenhower in War and Peace,' by Jean Edward Smith," *The New York Times*, April 20, 2012; Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/books/review/eisenhower-in-war-andpeace-by-jean-edward-smith.html, accessed 25 May 2016.

Geelhoed, Bruce, *Charles E. Wilson and the Controversy at the Pentagon, 1953-1957* (Detroit, Mi: Wayne State University Press, 1979).

Gellman, Irwin F., *The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952-1961* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2015), Kindle Edition.

Graebner, Norman A., *The New Isolationism* (New York: Ronald Press, 1956).

Greenstein, Fred I., *The Hidden-Hand Presidency* (New York: Basic Books 1982).

Greenstein, Fred I. and Richard H. Immerman, "Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 115, No. 3, Autumn, 200, pp. 225-345.

Greer, Thomas H., *The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Corps, 1917-1941* (Montgomery, Al.: Air University, 1955).

Griffin, Jeremy and Nico Hines, ""Who's the greatest? The Times US presidential rankings," The Times (London), October 28, 2008; as cited from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historical_rankings_of_Presidents_of_the_United_States#cite_note-18, accessed 25 May 2016.

Hagerty, James C. and Robert H. Ferrell, *The Diary of James C. Hagerty* (Bloomington, In.: Indiana University Press, 1983).

Halberstam, David, *Best and Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1972).

Hamilton, Nigel, *Monty: The Making of a General: 1887-1942* (New York, McGraw-Hill,

1981).

----------, *Master of the Battlefield: Monty's War Years 1942-1944* (New York, McGraw Hill, 1984).

----------, *Monty: The Final Years of the Field Marshal, 1944-1976* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1986).

Hart, B.H. Liddell, *Paris: Or the Future of War* (New York: Dutton, 1925).

Hawkins, Glen R., *United States Army Force Structure and Force Design Initiatives, 1939-1989* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1991).

Hitchcock, William I., *The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018).

Hermes, Walter G., *Truce Tent and the Fighting Front* (U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1992) available online at https://history.army.mil/html/books/020/20-3/CMH_Pub_20-3.pdf, accessed 21 March 2021

Hofstadter, Richard, *Anti-Intellectualism In American Life* (New York: Knopf, 1963).

Huntington, Samuel P., *The Soldier And The State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957).

Isaacson, Walter, and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).

Janiewski, Dolores E., "Eisenhower's Paradoxical Relationship with the 'Military-Industrial Complex,'" *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, December 2011, p. 667-692.

Janowitz, Morris, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Free Press, 1960).

Johnson, Paul, *Eisenhower* (New York, Penguin Books, 2012).

Jordan, R., ed., *Generals in International Politics: NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1987).

Judt, Tony, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (London: Penguin Press, 2005).*

Kinnard, Douglas *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1977).

Kuehn, John T, *Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet that Defeated the Japanese Navy* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008).

Kurz, Joseph R, "General Matthew B. Ridgway: Commander's Maturation of Operational Art," The Association of the U.S. Army Land Warfare Papers; Sep 2012; No. 90W. Available at https://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/ilw_pubs/landwarfarepapers/Documents/LWP_90W_web.pdf, accessed 25 May 2016.

Lawrence, Mark A., *Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005)

Leighton, Richard M., *Strategy, Money, And The New Look*, 1953-1956 (Office of the Secretary of Defence, Washington, D.C., 2001).

Linn, Brian M., *Elvis' Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2016).

Logevall, Frederik, *Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 2012).

MacGregor, Jr., Morris J., *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940*-1965 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1981).

Masland, Jon W. and Laurence I. Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957).

McDougall, Walter A., *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

McFarland, Keith D., "The 1949 Revolt of the Admirals," *Parameters* 11, no. 1 (1981), available at https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol11/iss1/22, accessed 21 September 2021.

McMaster, H.R., *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1997).

Miller, Edward S., *War Plan Orange: The U.S Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991).

Miller, Paul D., "The Contemporary Presidency: Organizing the National Security Council: I Like Ike's," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 43, Issue 3, September 2013, pp. 592-606.

Millett, Allan R., *The War for Korea: 1950-1951, They Came from the North* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2010).

Mitchell, George C., *Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen* (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2002).

Mitrovich, Gregory, *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).

Morgan, Iwan, *Eisenhower Versus the Spenders* (London, UK: Pinter Publishers, 1990).

Morison, Samuel E., *The Oxford History of the American* People (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965).

Murray, Williamson and Allan R. Millet, ed., *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Murray, Williamson and Allan R. Millett, *A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press, 2001).

Neal, Steve, *The Eisenhowers: Reluctant Dynasty* (New York: Doubleday, 1978).

Neustadt, Richard, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: Free Press, 1990).

Nixon, Richard M., *Six Crises* (New York: Doubleday, 1962).

Oliva, Mara, *Eisenhower and American Public Opinion on China*, (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

-------, "The Oratory of Dwight D. Eisenhower, in Crines, A.S. and Hatzisavvidou, S. (eds.) Republican Orators from Eisenhower to Trump. Rhetoric, Politics, and Society. (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), Kindle Edition, p. 27.

Osgood, Ken, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad*, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006).

-------, "Hearts and Minds: The Unconventional Cold War," Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol 4., No. 2., Spring 2002; available online at www.direct.mit.edu/jcws/article/4/2/85/12503/Hearts-and-Minds-The-Unconventional-Cold-War; accessed 2 September 2021.

Pape, Robert A., *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

Parmet, Herbert S., *Eisenhower and the American Crusades* (New York: MacMillan Co, 1972).

Pierpaoli, Jr., Paul G., *Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War* (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1999).

Pogue, Forrest C., *The Supreme Command* (Washington, D.C: Center for Military History, 1989).

Rayner, Richard, "Channeling Ike," *The New Yorker*, April 26, 2010; Available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/04/26/channelling-ike, accessed 25 May 2016.

Ricks, Thomas E., *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to* Today (New York: Penguin Books, 2012).

Ruane, Kevin. *The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defense, 1950–55* (London: Palgrave, 2000).

Runkle, Benjamin, *Generals in the Making: How Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton and their Peers Became the Commanders Who Won World War II* (Guilford, Ct.: Stackpole Books, 2019).

Schaller, Michael, Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General, (New York: Oxford, 1989).

Schifferle, Peter, *America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2017).

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Andrew Schlesinger and Stephen C. Schlesinger, *Journals, 1952-2000* (London: Penguin Press, 2007).

Schnabel, James F., and Robert J. Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume III 1950-1951, The Korean War Part One*, available online at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Policy/Policy_V003_P001.pdf, accessed 21 March 2021.

Schnabel, James F., "Ridgway in Korea," Military Review, March 1964, pp. 3-13.

Sheehan, Neil, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1988).

Shoemaker, Christopher C., "The National Security Council Staff: Structure and Formations," *The Land Warfare Papers*, Association of the United States Army, No. 3, December 1989, available at www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/LWP-3-The-

National-Security-Council-Staff-Structure-and-Funcions.pdf. Accessed on 2 September 2021.

Smith, Jean Edward, *Eisenhower* (New York: Random House, 2012).

Soffer, Jonathan M., *General Matthew B. Ridgway: From Progressivism to Reaganism, 1895-1993* (Westport, Ct.: Praeger Press, 1998).

Taylor, John M., *General Maxwell Taylor: The Sword and the Pen* (New York: Bantam Books, 1989).

Thomas, Evan, *Ike's Bluff : President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World* (Little, Brown and Co 2012), Kindle Edition.

Time, "Historical Notes: Giving Them Hell," 3 December 1973. Available at www.content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,908217,00.html, accessed on 1 September 2021.

Trauschweizer, *The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War*. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008).

--------, *Maxwell Taylor's Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam* (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2019).

United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "Second World War 60th Anniversary, Operation Market Garden, Netherlands, 17-25 September 1944: The Allies attempt to establish a bridgehead into Germany," Available online at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/attachment_data/file/30056/ww2_market_garden.pdf, accessed on 20 August 2021.

Ward, Geoffrey C. and Ken Burns, T*he Vietnam War: An Intimate History*. (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2010).

Warshaw, Shirley Anne, ed. *Re-examining the Eisenhower Presidency* (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1993).

Weigley, Russell F., *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy,* (Indiana University Press, 1973).

Wilmot, Charles, *The Struggle for Europe* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952).

Wilson, John B., *Maneuver and Firepower: the Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1998).

Winton, Harold, *Corps Commanders of the Bulge: Six American Generals and Victory in the Ardennes (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, KS, 2007).*

Academic Papers

Parker, Jay M., "The Colonel's The Colonel's Revolt: Eisenhower, The Army, and the Politics of National Security, (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1994).

Pierpaoli, Paul G., "The Price of Peace: The Korean War Mobilization and Cold War Rearmament, 1950-1953," (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 1995).

Military Doctrinal Publications

United States Army, *Field Manual 100-5-1,* Staff Operations and Planning, Washington, D.C.

United States Army, *Doctrinal Publication 1.0*, "The Army," Washington, D.C., Washington, D.,C, 17 September 2012.

Department of the Army *Pamphlet 21-70*, "The Role of the Army," Washington, D.C., 29 June 1955.

U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-5*, "Field Service Regulations: Operations," Washington, D.C., September 1954.

U.*S.* Department of Defense *Joint Publication 1.0,* "Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States," dated 12 July 2017, accessed online, 28 January 2021, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3.0*, "Joint Operations," Washington, D.C., available at www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_0.pdf, p. 47, accessed 20 August 2021.

U.S. War Department, *Field Manual 31-30*, "Tactics and Technique of Air-borne Troops" (Washington, D.C.: United States Government, 1942). Available online at https://www.ablecompany502pir.org/files/FM_31-30_May_1942.pdf. Accessed on 11 September 2021.