



LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND  
POLITICAL SCIENCE

DOCTORAL THESIS

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**PATHS OF INEQUALITY**  
**Migration, inter-relationships and the**  
**gender division of labour**

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## Abstract

International migration and modern means of transportation and communication make it easier for people to meet and form relationships across borders and national origins. The growth of academic interest in marriage migration and family migration has led to greater attention being paid to (im)migrant families and couples and the formation of mixed unions between migrants and natives. While migrant women were long overlooked in migration studies, they are now established subjects of research. However, the (re)production of gender inequalities through migration remains neglected, especially in quantitative research.

This PhD research seeks to address this gap through a comparative study of migrants' couple formation and gendered dynamics in France and the United Kingdom. Starting with a critical, historical and political examination of survey data on mixedness and migration in both countries, it investigates the difficulty and the necessity of considering migration as a gendered experience of mobility. That is, not simply who migrates or how many migrate, but how they migrate, with whom and at what point in their life. Using *Understanding Society* and *Trajectoires et Origines* data, this PhD models and weighs the complex interlocking of migration in the life course through sequences of migration and family formation, which it ultimately connects to patterns of paid and unpaid labour division between partnered women and men.

Through sequence analysis, it constructs a typology of union-migration trajectories which reveals the gendered paths of migration and mixedness. These trajectories, in turn, help make sense of why, for migrant women, both migration and mixing can be associated with heightened gender-specialisation of housework and care work on the one hand, and paid work on the other. By presenting an analysis which emphasizes trajectories and intermarriage (rather than profiles and endogamous unions), this PhD offers a complex analysis of how gender relations frame migration and how migration re-defines but often entrenches gender inequalities.

# Declaration of Authorship

I, Marion LIEUTAUD, declare that this thesis titled, 'Paths of inequality: Migration, Inter-relationships and the Gender Division of Labour' and the work presented in it, presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science, is solely my own. I confirm that:

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# List of Abbreviations

<b>UKLHS</b>	<i>Understanding Society: the UK Longitudinal Household Survey</i> (2009-). University of Essex - ISER.
<b>TeO/TeO1</b>	The first <b>Trajectoires et Origines</b> survey (2008-2009). INED-INSEE
<b>EMB/EMBS</b>	The <b>Ethnic Minority Sample Boost</b> (UKLHS)
<b>IEMB/IEMBS</b>	The <b>Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Sample Boost</b> (UKLHS)
<b>INED</b>	<b>Institut National d'Etudes Démographique</b>
<b>INSEE</b>	<b>Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques</b>
<b>ISER</b>	<b>Institute for Social and Economic Research</b> (UK)
<b>ONS</b>	<b>Office for National Statistics</b> (UK)
<b>MIG</b>	Individuals who were born outside of the current national borders of the country they now reside in. When applied to a couple (MIG-MIG couples), signals that both partners were born abroad. In the French context, refers more specifically to individuals who were 'born abroad and born foreign' ( <i>né étranger à l'étranger</i> ) as per the French official statistical classification.
<b>2G</b>	Individuals who are natives to the country they reside in (natives), and who had at least one migrant parent. Often referred to as descendants of migrants (or, problematically, second-generation migrants). When applied to a couple (2G-2G couples), indicates that both partners fall into this category.
<b>NAT</b>	Individuals who were born in the country they reside in (natives), and whose parents were also born there (current borders). When applied to a couple, indicates that both partners fall into this category.

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# Introduction

In a world increasingly interconnected and globalised, the rise of international migrations and modern means of transportation and communication have made it gradually easier for people to meet, and to form and maintain relationships across borders and national origins. In this context, there has also been a rise in unions and families made up of individuals born in different countries (Breger & Hill, 1998; Heikkilä & Yeoh, 2010; Waldis & Byron, 2006). Meanwhile, the growing attention towards family migration and reunification as the main entryway into Europe has been associated with greater interest in how migrants form families and find and recruit partners. The propensity of migrants to intermarry with the native majority group - those born in the country, as part of the majority group (generally defined in ethnic terms and perceived to be the historical and indigenous occupants of the land<sup>1</sup>) - is a long-standing topic of sociological interest (e.g. Gordon (1964), Kalmijn (1998), and Varro (2003)). Intermarriage rates are commonly interpreted as an indicator of social cohesion or, symmetrically, social fragmentation between groups; at the level of migrant individuals, intermarriage is generally held to denote a high degree of integration and acculturation.

It would not be unfair to state that the question of gender relations – and not simply gendered differences – has been little focused on in quantitative research on intermarriage and migration. While there is no shortage of discussion on the roles that migration and migrants may play in re-shaping societies in immigration countries, the gender consequences and the gendered mechanisms at play have seldom been empirically investigated. This is puzzling when considering that media and political discourse alike seem to routinely associate migrant families with patriarchal gender norms and practices towards women; immigrants, the story goes, bring with them backward and oppressive gender cultures (ranging from somewhat stricter gender roles all the way down to female genital mutilation) from which women – native women especially – must be protected. This understanding of migration as a medium through which patriarchal remnants

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<sup>1</sup>This differs in cases such as the US, Canada or Australia, where the historical populations (native Americans and Aboriginals) are not the majority and certainly not the dominant groups. However, the reasoning applies for more recent immigration waves.)

are imported in (and therefore are alien to) Western societies has been denounced by – some – feminists, who have pointed out the role that this narrative plays into justifying a self-satisfied status quo on gender equality in the majority group, whilst simultaneously patronizing and disempowering migrant and minority women (Delphy, 2008; Hark & Villa, 2020). Despite this prevailing narrative, the fact remains that we have little quantitative empirical scholarship to bring to this discussion. On one hand, the intermarriage scholarship is almost single-mindedly focused on integration, either implied in intermarriage or, more rarely, measured through economic and, more rarely educational performance (e.g. Kalmijn (2010) and Meng and Gregory (2005)) or identity construction (P. J. Aspinall, 2003; Breger & Hill, 1998; Unterreiner, 2012b). On the other hand, migration studies concentrate most of their attention on migrants' economic contribution and performance. Though migrant women, long overlooked in migration studies, have become a subject of research in their own right, largely thanks to the efforts of feminist scholarship since the 1980s (e.g. (Morokvasic, 1983; Pedraza, 1991; Truong, 1996), the (re)production of gender hierarchies and inequalities throughout and as a result of migration and mixing remains very much in the background of quantitative research on intermarriage and on migration.

Part of this is linked to the fact that the scholarship on intermarriage and mixed unions revolve much more often about *rates* of intermarriage across various migrant groups, that is, on what intermarriages *represent*, rather than on what it produces socially (a point also made by e.g. Kalmijn (2010)). To put it differently, mixed unions are more likely to be treated as a dependent variable, rather than as a independent variable. In the main, the scholarship refers to gender relations only to explain gender differences in the propensity to intermarry, that is, to form *exogamous* relationships, outside the group, in contrast to *endogamous* relationships, when the partner is recruited within the group. It is widely acknowledged that, with some exceptions (such as e.g. Chinese or Vietnamese women in the US), minority and migrant men are on the whole more likely to form exogamous relationships than women (Hwang, Saenz, & Aguirre, 1997; Jacobs & Labov, 2002; Qian, 1997), a social fact often explained by patriarchal order within ethnic and migrant communities whereby women's mating and partnerships are more tightly monitored than men's, and women have less independence and power to leverage to impose a mixed union. Yet how this patriarchal order exactly operates, and how this works with regards to migrant-native mixing is much more often assumed than empirically researched.

When it comes to gender relations, research has found that most migrants hold somewhat more patriarchal beliefs than those held in the destination country, although differences between groups and between generations are large (Roeder

& Mühlau, 2014). While migrant women worldwide are more likely to be in paid employment than women who do not migrate (UN statistics - 2019), migrant women to the UK and France have lower rates of labour market engagement than their native counterparts (ONS (2016) and INSEE (2017) reports). The rates, however, vary widely by country of origins, partner characteristics (native or migrant, co-ethnic or not), and by migration category – i.e. mainly articulated as the differences between 'family migrants', 'economic migrants' and (sometimes) 'refugees'. A more complex appreciation of migration trajectories in a perspective informed by life-course theory is much needed. Furthermore, although the growing research stream around global care chains has articulated notions of the gender division of labour (including housework and care work) with regards to international migration and migrant families, it has been mainly through analyses of a global and intersectional gender division of labour (Hochschild, 2000; Kofman, 2014; Mies, 2014; Parreñas, 2005, 2015). Consequently, the gender division of labour at the micro-level of the couple, while a core concept and culprit for gender inequalities in feminist theory (Delphy, 1977; Hartsock, 1983; Kergoat, 1982), has been very rarely analysed empirically with reference to migration and/or intermarriage, and the little scholarship that there is mostly addresses variations in gender relations in couples through the prism of migrants' *origins* (migrant or ethnic group) and gender-acculturation. To different migrant groups are associated more or less patriarchal *gender cultures*, which may be more or less diluted by acculturation processes (e.g. Kan and Laurie (2018) and Roeder and Mühlau (2014)). The acculturation process is indexed on the time spent in the country of immigration, an early age at migration, and presumably also a mixed relationship with a native partner.

Yet we know from qualitative scholarship that the migration paths and modes of recruitment leading to unions between majority natives and migrants are deeply varied, from mail-order brides and marriage migrants (Chiu, 2017; Suksomboon, 2011) to couples who met and fell in love in the country of immigration where the migrant partner had already settled (e.g. Fleischer (2011)) or subsequently decided to stay (e.g. Varro (1984)). Some of these paths overlap with those more commonly analysed in connection to so-called 'transnational' marriages - unions formed between a first-generation migrant and a native-born descendant of migrants from the same country (Beck-Gernsheim, 2007; Charsley, Bolognani, & Spencer, 2017).

I argue that much more attention needs to be paid to the process of migration and couple formation itself. Drawing on feminist theorists of migration, I suggest that the paths that lead to migrants intermarrying (or not) need to be understood in the context of migration experiences which are both *gendered* and *gendering*

(Pedraza, 1991). *Gendered* because men and women do not tread the same journey: there are great gender discrepancies in calendars of migration and family formation, as well as in legal pathways of migration. *Gendering* (in the sense of entrenching or changing gender roles) because these geographical, temporal and legal sequences of migration impact how migrants enter a country, how dependent they are on their partner, how likely they are to get paid and secure employment, and ultimately how couples will distribute housework, childcare and elderly care. In the different ways that migration and couple formation interlock over the life course, gender roles can be further entrenched or renegotiated, and not only as a result of exposure to other gender norms. 'Gendered geographies of power' (Mahler & Pessar, 2009) need to be considered, because they help understand two seemingly contradictory observations: that - firstly - unions with a native Westerner may appear, to women especially, like an option worth uprooting for, even though - secondly - these unions and the migration they entail also lead to acute gender inequalities between partners. Indeed, migration and family formation trajectories influence the balance of power and the distribution of resources between partners - often, though not always, at the disadvantage of women (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1992, 1994).

Greater scrutiny of the varied paths of migration and couple formation reveals unsurprisingly a more complex landscape. Certain trajectories such as marriage migration, have been qualitatively associated with acute dependency (legal, economic, social) of the marriage migrant on the sponsoring partner (Charsley, Storer-Church, Benson, & Van Hear, 2012). In terms of the context in which the couple form and start cohabitation, this can be contrasted with situations where, for example, the migrant partner migrated independently, and only met their native partner when they were already well-established in the country of immigration. These interlocked paths of migration and couple formation can be expected to be deeply gendered: women are much more likely to be already partnered when they migrate; men are much more likely to migrate as single adults. Gender relations both in the country of origin and in the country of destination shape the migration and family formation paths in which men and women are channeled. But legal categories of admission alone can not capture the complexity of these processes (González-Ferrer, 2011), although it is no doubt an important factor. Two of the issues with focusing on the legal mode of entry (beyond its obvious reductionism) are that, firstly, such data is rarely collected, and indeed almost never available in surveys that also include an interest in household and gender dynamics. Secondly, using the legal category of admission as proxy for the interlocking of family formation and migration (as e.g. González-Ferrer (2006, 2011) does) means that one must exclude from the analysis migrants

who are exempt from visa requirements - typically EU migrants. In contrast, using the sequencing of family formation stages and migration applies to all migrants' families. We are here compelled to move beyond making space simply for legal or ethnicised profiles of migrants - even gendered profiles - to consider biographies and trajectories of couples.

### **Considering the UK and France as case studies**

As longstanding countries of immigration, the UK and France (like e.g. the USA or Canada) have long produced research on intermarriage (see notably Berrington (1994), Caballero (2012), Coleman (1994), Edwards (2012), Muttarak and Heath (2010), Rodríguez-García (2006), and Song and Aspinall (2012) for the UK, Barbara (1993), Collet (1993), Girard (1964), Lévi-Strauss (1949), Noiriel (1996), Safi (2008), Santelli and Collet (2003), Todd (1994), and Varro (1995) for France). Yet the definition of what constitutes a *mixed* couple diverge between the two countries. Where family formation within and between ethnic groups has been more researched in the UK, French demographers and sociologists have produced some of the richest European scholarship on migrant-native mixing (Collet, 2015; Collet & Régnard, 2011; Hamel, Lhommeau, Pailhé, & Santelli, 2015), benefiting from a well-established tradition of research on family-related migration and migrant families more broadly (Kofman, 2004). France and the UK have often been contrasted with one another, as opposite models of integration and nationhood (see e.g. Brubaker (2001) and Favell (1998) and on mixedness specifically: Unterreiner (2012a, 2012b). They are also considered to represent different models of welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990), different 'varieties of capitalism' (Soskice & Hall, 2001). Yet their immigration histories have much in common, as do their immigration regime and immigration debates in both countries around migrants, migrant families, and gender. In terms of gender relations and gender inequalities, they can be considered broadly comparable; and importantly, the survey data is there in both countries, with enough overlap to allow for a meaningful comparison and co-analysis.

These two cases serve the research interest in two key ways; in a classic comparative approach, I outline similarities and divergences between and across migrant groups in the two countries. Literature to date has found similarities between Pakistani, Bangladeshi and (some) Indian migrant groups in the UK, and Northern Africans and Turks in France, groups which have been associated with higher rates of endogamy, more patriarchal gender attitudes (Roeder & Mühlau, 2014) and less engagement of women in paid work (Boyle, Cooke, Halfacree, & Smith, 2001; Boyle, Feng, & Gayle, 2009). These groups are contrasted (although not necessarily empirically) with 'Western migrants' (primarily migrants from

the EU, Australia, the U.S., Canada and New Zealand), associated with high rates of female employment and gender views not dissimilar to those of British and French majority natives. By comparing these groups in the British and French context we can also look out how the distinct welfare and integration regimes manifest. I also use the two cases in a complementary rather than strictly comparative fashion. Some key information for the research is only available in the French data (e.g. on visa types), while other information is only available in the British data (e.g. on self-reported ethnic identity). On top of a core analytical framework that can makes use of information available in both data sets, I thus add a patchwork-like analytical layer which takes advantage of the relevant country-specific data.

### **Feminist reflexivity: contextualising and using data critically**

The fact that the available data on migration, family formation and gender differs between France and the UK is a product of particular French and British historic practices of quantification of migration and population diversity. The political focus on measuring and managing population diversity (whether it is defined in explicitly racial terms or not) directly impacts the production of survey data on migrants. Moreover, as I argue, this political focus is particularly relevant in framing migration mainly as producing the category of *immigrant* - that is, in constructing ideal-typical profiles of migrants - rather than as a dynamic experience of mobility - that is, as part of a trajectory. This is admittedly a bias of the statistical lens in general, which lends itself more readily to classifying static profiles of people, rather than biographic trajectories. But it also should be understood in the context of survey design and a - sometimes controversial - political obsession with classifying population diversity to the exclusion of a broader, more comprehensive understanding of migration. Furthermore, through this process, not only is migration quantified as a marker of otherness rather than as an experience of mobility, but the quantification of gender relations also suffers. Indeed, the gender gaps that I have identified in the empirical literature on intermarriage and migration can be attributed in no insignificant part to the lack of data across numerous variables relevant to gender relations and to migration and partnership history. The production of survey data and classifications with regards to migrants is highly complex and technical, but it is by no means politically neutral, nor inconsequential. In a *data feminism* approach to quantitative feminist scholarship (D'Ignazio & Klein, 2020), it is necessary to address the context of survey design, and the powers at play (*Data for whom? Data by whom? Data for what purpose?*) to better understand and posit the data that we use, and the analysis that we can offer.

## Contribution

This PhD contributes to the existing sociological scholarship in several ways. It empirically analyses intermarriage and migration through the lens of gender, a connection rarely made in quantitative research. While the feminist scholarship on migration is flourishing, thus far it has developed overwhelmingly on qualitative and theoretical grounds, and indeed its proponents have often challenged quantitative researchers for engaging only superficially with feminist theories and concerns (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2012). In this research, I draw on feminist epistemology at three stages: 1) I posit gender relations, as manifested through the gender division of domestic labour in couples, as the focus; 2) I approach migration as a fundamentally intersectional experience, where both trajectories and outcomes of migration are expected to reflect asymmetrical social relations around gender, but also ethnicity and class; 3) building on feminist (and socio-historical) approaches to situated knowledge, I associate the quantitative analysis of the data with a critical analysis of the process of data production itself, and notably how the production of survey data on migration constrains and orients the quantification of migration and migrant families, and segregates it from the quantification of gender. Methodologically, the research takes advantage of advanced quantitative methodologies to propose a model template that enables an interrogation of the trajectories of migration and family formation, specifically with regards to how these trajectories intersect and interlock. The data-driven typology of union-migration trajectories, based on sequences of different stages of couple formation around migration, allows us to locate the migration moment in the narrative of couple formation and in the life-course. This research, therefore, contributes to the literature on gender, migration and intermarriage by incorporating a more process-oriented life course perspective, and by conceptualising union-migration trajectories as interlocked processes. This proves enlightening in enabling us to differentiate between gendered paths of migration and intermarriage, and to understand gender relations in couples, post-migration. Theoretically, this research makes a strong case for considering migrants' trajectories *as well as* national, cultural and ethnic background. It thus injects into a conversation on migrants and gender relations which has been dominated by considerations of gender cultures and integration, a discussion about trajectories and power - in that migration can also reshuffle or further polarise resources and dependence within couple partnership. This brings broad-brushed but important empirical elements for critical scholarship that tries to go beyond essentialising understandings of migrant women as subjugated by ethnic patriarchal norms.

## Methods

### Multiple methods

While heavily relying on quantitative methods and data, this thesis therefore also includes a more qualitative dimension, which uses qualitative methods (interview and archival research) to investigate and contextualise the survey design for the survey data later used in the quantitative chapters. This aspect of the research is constructed not as another methodological approach to the same question, but rather as a meta-analysis of the framing of the question itself and a critical assessment of the quantitative data it uses. Although still unusual in quantitative scholarship, such an approach has long been advocated by feminist scholars and, indeed, the absence of data reflexivity has been a key part of the feminist resistance to quantitative methods (e.g. Stanley (1983)).

### Quantitative data

In order to establish the typology of migration-union trajectory, to uncover gendered patterns, and to connect them to the gender division of labour in mixed and non-mixed couples post-migration, this research relies on large-scale, complex survey data. Specifically, the quantitative data sources are the French survey *Trajectoires et Origines* (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009) and the British survey *Understanding Society: the UK Longitudinal Household Survey* (ISER-University of Essex, running since 2009). The data is used cross-sectionally; in the British case, it is extracted primarily from the first two waves of the British survey (2009-2011), meaning that the French and British data are almost perfectly contemporaneous to each other.

### Analytical strategy and life-course approach

The construction of sequences of migration and couple formation relies on retrospective information on partnership history and migration history provided by survey respondents. I use sequence analysis with optimal matching to build a typology of migration-union sequences (for a similar modelling strategy, see e.g. Castro Torres (2020)). The sequences are limited to a 10 year period, ranging from five-years before to five-years after migration; the sequences do not therefore provide a fully-fledged life-course perspective, but nevertheless allow us to interrogate the moment of migration in relation to other key transitions such as the entry into adulthood and couple formation. These sequences can be interpreted as different life course trajectories in which migration and family formation interlock in various ways. These sequences bring fruitful complexity to classifications of 'family migration' or 'independent migration', and they help refine the gendered patterns of migration trajectories, and ultimately the different mode of partner selection associated with mixed (and non-mixed) unions. These

sequences are then incorporated as covariates into survey-weighted regression models in order to estimate the relative effect of migrant *origins*, of *acculturation* and of *migration-union sequences* in the gender division of labour at the micro-level of couples. I use indices of gender-specialisation of labour to analyse gender roles and relations between men and women at the micro-level of couples.

## Definitions and terminology

### Couples

This research revolves around partnered migrants and the couples they form. As will be discussed in more detail in the literature review, this is not a neutral decision: many of those who migrate - men especially - are and remain single, and, in addition, those migrants who form cohabiting relationships in the host country generally tend to be those who are perhaps most 'settled', most established, likely most 'acculturated', also with regards to gender norms and practices. The research also focuses on couples formed by cohabiting men and women. The exclusion of same-sex relationships is dictated by their lack of representation in the quantitative data. The couples under study are flatly identified as 'man-woman couples', rather than e.g. heterosexual couples, since a not insignificant proportion of people who live in a cohabiting man-woman relationship do not actually identify as heterosexual, but as e.g. bisexual or other (see for instance the results of the VIRAGE surveys conducted in France (Debauche et al., 2017)). Therefore heterosexuality cannot be deduced from the fact that a man and a woman cohabit and identify themselves as a couple.

### Mixed couples and intermarriages

Intercultural marriage does not necessarily conceptually involve migrants (e.g. interracial, inter-ethnic or inter-religious marriages). Indeed, the notion of intermarriage and, concomitantly, of 'mixed couples', 'mixing' and 'mixedness' are profoundly context-dependent (Rodríguez-García, 2012; Varro, 2003; Waldis & Byron, 2006). In the context of migration it is generally defined as either unions between a foreigner and a citizen of the country of residence, or increasingly as unions between a primary migrant and a native with native parents. The latter especially are often positively analysed as markers of fast-tracked integration and even 'extreme assimilation'. (J. W. Scott, 2010). I will discuss the definitions of intermarriage and mixed couples more at length in later chapters, but it should be clear that, in this thesis, the term 'mixed couples' will be mostly used to refer to couples that fit the last definition, that is, those that involve a first-generation migrant (born abroad) and a native born to native parents.

### Migrants

Migrants will be the term used to identify somebody who was born in a different

country from the country they identified as their residence. It does not imply that the person either intended to settle when they moved in (as per the International Passenger Survey for instance), or has lived in the country for at least a year (as per the UN definition). I choose to use the term migrant rather than immigrant because the latter carries significant negative connotations, and implies to a certain degree that the only type of migration that merits interest and scrutiny (and certainly the only migration targeted by survey quantification) flows in one direction, *into* Western countries. The term 'migrant' seems to me more process-oriented, still somewhat more open in its meanings, and less pejorative.<sup>2</sup>

### Majority and minority

I will refer to the group formed by the native descendants of two native-born parents (native over two generations) as the majority group, which is meant to emphasize the fact that they are a numerical majority, rather than an un-problematic, neutral or hierarchical baseline or category of reference. Accordingly, I use the term 'minority' and 'minorities' to refer to migrant groups (and in the British case, ethnic groups) which are numerically (much) smaller than the majority group. This 'minority' classification only partially overlaps with ethnicity-based or nationality-based groupings: many 'minority' individuals have British/French citizenship, and many also identify as e.g. white British or French.

### Thesis outline

**PART 1: The political borders of the statistical 'Others'** This part refers to the more qualitative, historical and 'meta' part of the thesis. It critically interrogates and assesses the survey data that forms the empirical material for the latter parts of the PhD analysis, and the context in which this data was designed. The surveys in question are Understanding Society (UKLHS) (ISER, 2009) and Trajectoires et Origines (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).

### Chapter 1: Mobile or racialised 'Others'? Quantifying mixing and migration trajectories in French and British data

In the first chapter, I dissect how statistical categories and sample design worked together to shape migration less as an experience of mobility, and more as a marker of 'otherness', which in the French case is then used for categories of mixedness. Trajectories and biographies are a complicated object for quantitative data, which handles and creates *profiles* of people more readily than life *trajectories*. Concurrently, the problematisation of migration is constructed politically and

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<sup>2</sup>Although it has also become stigmatising and has been rejected as such, for this reason - see discussions by e.g. Schrover and Moloney (2013) and Akoka (2020), who analyses how and why it seems necessary to turn 'migrants' into e.g. 'refugees' in order to legitimise their existence and migration.

statistically as a matter of integration and 'race relations', and that is what is prioritised in the quantification process. It should be noted that official narratives of integration differ between France and the UK, and so too do official statistical classifications of 'otherness' and, subsequently, of mixedness. Furthermore, these two surveys were developed in strikingly different contexts in terms of the political scrutiny and the pressure facing the respective survey designers. Nevertheless, in both cases, the survey design is focused on the slippery question of framing and classifying population diversity, and the dynamic part of migration - migration as a *trajectory* - is overshadowed. Moreover, the conflation of migration with racialised and ethnicized 'otherness' mean that 'migrants' that are over-sampled are simultaneously foreign-born, 'ethnic' and non-white. Survey design thus makes it difficult to avoid conflating inequalities that derive from migration trajectories, experience and immigration regimes (uprooting, immigration status, etc...) and inequalities linked to ethnic and cultural differences and discrimination.

### **Chapter 2: The other 'Others': gender and the family in survey data on migrants**

In this chapter, I highlight the relevance and consequence of survey design choices for gender analyses of migration. Migratory flows, like 'immigration problems', are almost always painted with a gendered face: the male economic migrant or guestworker; the over-fertile female family migrant; more recently - the male terrorist. But beyond (racialised) gender prejudice, and beyond statements of intention, what is the actual centrality and the perimeter of gender in migration survey design? The place given to gender relations has increased slightly in surveys on migration and population diversity, primarily as a result of gender-mainstreaming at the level of European statistics. Subsequently, in and with the surveys under study, an 'intersectional window' has opened, making it possible to study migration as a gendered and racialised process - a process which is both embedded in and can (re)produce inequalities best understood as intersectional. All survey designers and statistical institutions involved would agree that migration is gendered and that therefore gender matters. But through interviews with the survey designers and archival work, as well as analysis of the final questionnaires, I reconstitute the survey design process and show how it reflects, at every step, a sustained segregation between questions of gender and questions of migration, which ultimately may help explain why survey data remains a complicated, often inhospitable source of data for feminist scholarship on migration.

### **PART 2: Couples, mixedness, and gendered migration-union sequences**

Part 2, and part 3 of the thesis form the quantitative analysis per se. Each part is divided into two mirror chapters: one on the French case, one on the British case. Part 2 describes the construction of the typology of union-migration sequences and examines the characteristics of mixed couples, of their patterns of migration and union-formation. The first chapter in this part (chapter 3) covers the French case, while the second (chapter 4) addresses the British case.

These chapters address the timing, ordering and sequencing of migration and couple formation: they reconstruct how migratory and partnership journeys interlock. While the literature, both qualitative and quantitative, has established that women are more likely to be 'trailing spouses' and men are more likely to be 'lead' or 'pioneer' single migrants, the timing and sequencing (and not just the order) of these events and stages of migration and family formation have been more rarely addressed. This is a shortcoming insofar as we know from the sociology of family that the circumstances of partner recruitment are key events and determinants, in women's lives and social trajectories especially. A static focus on a single decision in time - such as 'who followed who?' - cannot adequately capture this sequencing. Using data from the two surveys whose genesis and framing of migration is examined in part 1, these chapters employ sequence analysis and optimal matching in combination with several clustering methods to posit migration in the broader context of family formation. In so doing, I propose a data-driven typology of union-migration sequences which transcends the reductive binary of 'independent' and 'family migrants'. These chapters highlight that for both UK- and France-bound migrants, the timing of migration and the formation of a first relationship are essentially simultaneous for many migrant women, but very few migrant men. Men's migration is largely disjointed from couple formation, which happens either long before or long after. Being in a couple acts as an enabler or an incentive for women's migration, even when controlling for age, country of origin, educational level and children. Moreover, exogamy appear as not simply reflective of migrant groups' varying degrees of 'openness' and integration: I also find that mixed couples are associated with different union-migration sequences, and not simply in the sense that former child migrants are over-represented. These patterns are clearly gendered: depending on who (between the woman and the man) is the migrant and who the native partner, mixed couples' union-migration trajectories can also involve a high proportion of couple-forming migration.

### **PART 3: Chapter 5 6: Couples, from migration-union trajectories to the 'labour of love'**

In the final part of the thesis, I connect sequences of migration to the gender

division of paid and unpaid labour (e.g. unpaid housework and care) in couples. Chapter 5 uses the French data, and chapter 6 uses the British data.

I start by constructing indexes of gender-distribution of employment and housework and care tasks, which are then aggregated into an index of gender-specialisation of labour. With the British data, I also devise a second index of gender-specialisation based on the distribution of hours spent in unpaid and paid labour, between partnered men and women. I show that the degree of gender-specialisation of labour in couples appears to differ depending on the exogamous/endogamous make-up of the couple (partnering 'in' or 'out' of one's group. Here, exogamy refers to cases where migrants partner with majority natives. Migrant couples are assumed endogamous. Couples formed of a primary migrant and a direct descendant of migrant are considered to be a specific form of mixedness, often ethnically endogamous but nevertheless involving partners socialised in different national contexts. (Collet & Santelli, 2012)). Indeed, it depends more specifically on the *gendered* make-up of the couples. In other words, a couple formed of a migrant woman and a native majority man and couples formed of a migrant man and a native majority woman do not express the same gender dynamics: the first case tends to be much more gender-specialised than the second. I then build more complex models to combine migrants' exogamy/endogamy, migrants' country of origin, religiosity, how long they had been in the country, but also the particular migration-union sequence they had followed. I find that, when accounting for other factors, trajectories of migration and couple formation *clearly matter* for migrant women, but not so much for migrant men. In fact, for migrants (especially migrant women), partnering with a majority native partner appears less relevant for gender-specialisation than union-migration trajectories and group effects. This is however less true for migrant men, whose union-migration trajectories matter comparatively less for gender dynamics of labour division in the home, but whose migratory origins (area of birth) and choice of partner are more important. I deduce that though the culturalist argument has some merit to explain variations in gender relations and gender-specialisation in the household between different categories of migrants, attention to trajectories of migration and especially how migration fits into migrants' life-course is necessary to understand (also quantitatively) the relevance of migration for both gendered experiences of mixedness, and the (re)production of gender relations overall.

**Chapter 7: Conclusion and comparison** The final chapter focuses on bringing out the key findings in a comparative perspective. In the main, the analyses are very consistent in France and in the UK, which makes sense considering that the similarities greatly outnumber the differences with respect to French

and British immigration and gender regimes. This consistency across datasets and national contexts is taken as corroborating evidence of the robustness of the analyses. The comparison further highlights similarities between certain migrant groups (notably Turks in France and Pakistani/Bangladeshi in the UK) in enforcing strict gender division of labour within couples. Union-migration sequences are found to be associated with significant variations in gender-specialisation for migrant women's relationships. In both national contexts, couple-forming migration is associated with increased gender-specialisation for migrant women, but the analyses suggest reduced gender-specialisation for migrant men, which supports the hypothesis that certain paths of migration can affect the bargaining power of the migrant in question - and most of the time, these paths are treaded by women. For migrant women, exogamy is not found to have a significant impact once accounting for other factors. The fact that it is associated with a reduced gender-specialisation of labour in the French case only is interpreted as a reflection of the fact that in certain migrant groups in France, mostly Northern Africans, migrant men have intermarried with majority native French women at a higher rate than e.g. South Asians in the UK (the first generation intermarries very little, whether men or women). These groups are otherwise associated with gender-polarisation of labour (much like South Asians in the UK), something which is not as present when the men intermarry. The effects associated with living with children are larger in the UK, which is consistent with greater welfare support and notably affordable childcare services in France. However, in most key aspects, it appears that the gender dynamics at play for migrants in the UK and France are very similar. The chapter also underlines the key limitations of the research design, and suggest trails for further research.

# Literature Review

This literature review is structured into three themes, which overlap in the thesis: the gender division of labour; the intersection of gender and migration; and intermarriage and couple formation. Following the presentation of the relevant literature on these three themes, I introduce the theoretical framework and give a brief account of recent migratory flows into the UK and France.

## 0.1 Gender equality and the gender division of labour

### 0.1.1 Recent changes in the gender division of labour

There have been key changes in the gender division of labour since the mid-20th century. In Europe, this has been most notably marked by the massive entry of women into the labour market, and the growth of the service sector; France and the UK alike have undergone vast socio-demographic changes since the end of the 1950s, which have been referred to as the Second Demographic Transition (Lesthaeghe, 2010; Lesthaeghe & van de Kaa, 1986). This refers to the dramatic rise of women's employment (Tilly and Scott, 1989; OECD 2017; Rindfuss, Choe, and Brauner-Otto 2016); the steady increase in the proportion of dual-earner couples (Bonney, 1988); the drop in fertility which saw more and more couples choose not to have children; and the increase in single-parenthood. At the same time, the time that women spend in unpaid labour has reduced across all Western countries, and across all types of unpaid labour, e.g. routine housework (laundry, tidying, cleaning, cooking), non-routine housework (gardening, diy) and care (for children or adults) (Kan, Sullivan, & Gershuny, 2011). This drop has been particularly strong for women who do paid work; there has also been a slight but steady increase of men's participation to unpaid labour, although it tends to be concentrated on non-routine housework (e.g DIY jobs, gardening, Sunday cooking) (Bittman & Wajcman, 2000; Kan & Gershuny, 2010; Kan & Laurie, 2016). Though gender convergence in the division of labour, including housework and care work, is empirically undeniable (Altintas & Sullivan, 2016; Gershuny & Sullivan, 2003; Sullivan, 2000), the research also finds signs of it stalling or - at least - slowing down. Men still spend about half the time that women spend on physical housework, every week — a gap that has not really shrunk since

the mid-1990s (Bianchi, Sayer, Milkie, & Robinson, 2012). The question as to why women's engagement and performance on the labour market has not been matched by an equivalent increase in men's involvement in housework and care work has produced scores of scholarship.

### **0.1.2 Theories for the gender division of labour**

#### **Economic theories of gendered labour**

Among the theories offered to explain why paid labour and unpaid labour tend to be distributed along gendered lines, two theories have emphasized the role of economic resources. The first one, rooted in human capital theory, suggests that it is economically sensible for a couple to divide the labour, and for the partner with the strongest advantages on the labour market and the highest expected earnings to specialise in paid labour (G. S. Becker, 1981, 1985). Typically, it was expected that it would be the man, in most man-woman relationships. Subsequently, the other partner (the woman, in the example), will specialise in unpaid labour and take over most of the housework and care work. Consistent with the theory of specialisation is the idea that part of men's advantage on the labour market is because women may be discriminated against (and therefore paid less). The gender specialisation of labour is therefore a sound economic strategy to maximize the couple's potential, but theoretically only in a context where they have less earning potential. Thus 'specialisation' is often presented as conceptually gender-blind - although Becker also considered that women have a 'biological advantage' in unpaid labour, making them better suited for reproductive and care labour.

In the second theory, economic interests are also the determinant factors, but partners are not one harmonious unit jointly maximising their collective interests: they compete and bargain with each other, using their respective resources to negotiate - or impose - their preferred outcome. It is generally presumed that the preferred outcome for each is to spend less time on unpaid labour. The partner with less resources and less bargaining power is therefore left with more of the undesirable tasks; this perspective is referred to as intra-household bargaining or relative resource theory, which in its original formulation considers only economic resources, namely economic assets and earnings (Blood & Wolfe, 1960). It also removes the blanket assumption of equity inherent in the Becker's specialisation (Bittman & Wajcman, 2000), by suggesting that partners do not necessarily choose their specialisation, that in the main, nobody enjoys housework and that those who do it are essentially forced or pressured into it. Accordingly, taking on most of the housework reveals that one is at a disadvantage in the balance of resources or power.

Even in situations where labour is little-specialised, equity is not at all a given. For instance, if one partner does 70% of the paid labour and the other does 70% of the unpaid labour, this may seem 'fair' in terms of share, but not 'equitable' if paid labour represents 40h a week and unpaid labour 20h a week. Conversely, a highly-specialised gender division of labour (the woman does almost all of the unpaid labour, the man does all or almost all of the paid labour) can be considered 'equitable' in the sense that both partners spend the same total amount of time in work, either paid or unpaid, but inequitable if we consider that the woman is mostly doing work she does not enjoy, is little valued and not associated with direct economic retributions and independence. Non-specialised divisions of paid labour - for instance in dual-earner couples, when both partners work full-time - can also be associated with high inequity if the woman then takes on most of the unpaid work: the women's 'second-shift' (Hochschild, 2012). There is a wide range of variations in how different degrees of gender-specialisation of labour can match different degrees of 'equity' in the distribution of total hours of work (Kalmijn & Monden, 2012) - not to mention the fact that an hour of housework may weigh heavier (i.e. feel like a greater sacrifice and a bigger contribution) than an hour of paid work in the eyes of both partners. Couples, including dual-earner couples, in which the woman is responsible for most of the housework and care are often labelled traditional (S. S. Hall & Macdermid, 2009) - more so, in a way, than when women have a smaller share of the paid labour, but men contribute more to unpaid labour. The more even sharing of household labour in particular is considered in bargaining approaches to reflect stronger bargaining power on the side of women. It is also a terrain where gender ideology and norms are key.

### **Gender norms and gender performativity**

Indeed, while these first two theoretical streams focused on economic determinants and explanations, the next emphasises gender socialisation, ideology and norms. Often referred to as 'doing gender', it theorises that men and women try to abide by gender roles which they have been socialised into, even when it goes against the rational maximisation of time or economic interests of the couple. Thus man-woman couples that function on a female main or sole breadwinner model may still perform expected gender roles in unpaid labour distribution, and an unemployed man may still leave the housework and childcare to his wife. The relative earnings and bargaining power of each partner are considered less relevant than the capacity of gender norms to label certain tasks as 'masculine' and others as 'feminine', to make it difficult for partners to cross over (S. F. Berk, 1985; Robinson & Milkie, 1998; West & Zimmerman, 1987) Notably,

representations of parenthood imply different gender roles for fathers and mothers, rewarding different traits and tasks. Schematically: a good husband and father is one who can provide for his family; a good wife and mother is one who can care for them on an emotional and daily-logistic level, and professional achievements and careers are secondary to the needs of children (Garey 1999; Hays 1996; Mercer 2004). This also means that both the institution of the couple and of parenthood imply a different attitude and cost towards paid work for men and women: while it would encourage men to advance their career, it may deter or sanction women for doing so. The doing gender approach is useful in understanding why, even when men contribute more to unpaid labour, they tend to concentrate their contribution in specific types of housework, deemed more 'masculine' (like fixing things around the house, gardening or shopping), and appear much more resistant to take on more archetypal 'feminine' tasks such as childcare and - most of all - the routine housework of cleaning, tidying and doing the laundry (Kan et al., 2011).

'Doing gender' and gender socialisation perspectives are thus heavily reliant on the notion of pre-existing gender expectations, gender 'assessments', which men and women have already integrated and reproduce in their intimate arrangements. It derives that, if the gender norms were to change, so would the gender division of labour. Examples of social norms changing towards more gender equality and less gender-specialisation are taken from changes in fertility behaviour. Gender-specialised divisions of labour were considered conducive to parenthood in Becker's approach; conversely, the rise of dual-earner couples and of women's autonomy and career interests were considered a key factor in the drop in fertility levels in Western countries (G. S. Becker, 1976, 1981); yet in recent years, dual-earner couples and couples with egalitarian distribution of labour more generally have been found to have similar levels of fertility to more gender-specialised couples (Muzhi Zhou & Kan, 2019). However, in cases where women face a 'double burden', when they work full-time and take on most/all of the housework, fertility is in fact reduced (Raybould & Sear, 2020). This is part of the 'uneven and stalled' state of the 'Gender revolution' (England, 2010).

All three approaches (specialisation, relative resource and gender) consider and generally find that doing less of the unpaid labour also means doing a greater share of the paid labour and vice-versa (see e.g. Gershuny and Sullivan (2003) and Sullivan and Gershuny (2016), as per *time-availability constraints*, which posits that the distribution of time spent on housework and care is a function of how much time each partner has available (i.e. freed from paid work) for it. Time availability typically explains part of the division of housework - but not all. In practice, most social scientists use some combination of time availability, relative

resource and doing gender (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson, 2000; Bianchi et al., 2012; Coltrane, 2000, 2010; Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010).

### **The question of power: why the gender division of labour matter**

The key reason to study housework as well as paid work is that it reflects power relations in the intimate sphere, which is a key place to understand the production and re-production of gender relations as power relations (S. N. Davis & Greenstein, 2013). The individualised construction of the couple is in Western societies generally assumed to be companionate. But second-wave feminism emphasized that this companionate appearance of 'Love' could be used to convince women to accept their unfair deal (De Beauvoir, 1949). Many sociologists comprehend gender as a social structure, institution, or system inscribed in individual, interactional, and institutional dynamics (e.g. Risman (2004)). Accordingly, gender is part of the power struggle: not only can it give men an stronger footing, it can frame the assessment of capitals and resources. In the case of migration, it can imply for instance that women's professional resources are valued less highly, in the decision of when or where to migrate, than her ability to look after the children. The gender division of labour cannot therefore be considered through a neutral lens of specialisation and efficiency. When women and men 'specialise' in housework and paid work respectively, the roles they undertake are not simply separated but hierarchised (Kergoat, 2004),<sup>3</sup> and part of a system that undermines women's autonomy, devalues women's time and exploits their labour (Kergoat, 2004, 2017). Accordingly, the gender division of labour a central concept in mechanism in feminist intellectual traditions, especially those with Marxist roots (e.g. Bhattacharya (2017), A. Y. Davis (1981), Delphy (1998), and Federici (1975))

Gender relations and gender (in)equality have many dimensions and play out on many different stages. The gender division of labour is arguably one of the most important ways to address and capture how couples (re)produce gender roles and inequalities, both in the intimate sphere of unpaid domestic and care labour, and in the more formal, outward distribution of paid employment. In particular, the couple-level gendered division of labour between men and women in man-woman couples is a key terrain to understand and represent gender relations and inequalities in practice (Muzhi Zhou & Kan, 2019). Indeed, micro-level empirical studies often refer to the division of labour, or sometimes

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<sup>3</sup>It is disputable whether there can be a separation of tasks and roles without a hierarchy between said tasks and roles, whether the distribution is organised by gender, class, race or other. The feminism that advocates against the gender division of labour is thus at odds with notions of 'separate but equal' and complementarity between men and women which anchored e.g. Durkheim's defence of gender specialisation and indeed those of many 19th century feminists

specifically housework, to represent the level of gender equality within couples. In this thesis, I will refer more specifically to gender-specialisation. For women, gender-specialisation in the couple implies the combination of economic dependence or subordination with the provision of most or all of the unpaid housework and childcare.

### 0.1.3 Variations across countries and groups

As approvingly noted in both of Coltrane (2000, 2010)'s reviews on empirical scholarship on household labour, there has been an increase in cross-national comparative work on the gender division of labour. Empirical research has found that in spite of the convergence trend overall, patterns of gender division of labour are still very much in place, but there are also non-trivial differences between countries and between clusters of countries (Rosmary Crompton & Feuvre, 2000; Geist & Cohen, 2011; Kan et al., 2011). This applies to the gender division of unpaid labour as well as paid labour.

As Cunha and Atalaia (2019) note, there are four points that the literature widely agrees on. Firstly, that the welfare states, in the post-war period especially, promoted gender roles in labour division by entrenching the male breadwinner/female homemaker model; secondly, that the relative decline of this model was linked to the empowerment of women through increased labour market participation - hence notably financial independence and equality of rights, all parts of the 'female revolution' (Esping-Andersen, 1990); thirdly, the dual-earner couple model has also been associated to a point with a dual-carer model, meaning that the division of labour in these couples has become less gendered - even when they have young children (Gornick and Meyers, 2003). There are however country-specific variations, especially on the matter of childcare. Finally, and fourthly, all points to the fact that the time that men and women spend on paid and unpaid labour continues to reflect considerable (if relatively smaller) differences: the gender-specialisation of labour, with women taking on more of the unpaid labour, and men more of the paid labour, remains very much a reality of the present (Vagni, 2020)

Most of the existing comparative studies focus however on one of the two dimensions, either paid or unpaid labour distribution (Mandel, Lazarus, & Shaby, 2020), which presents something of a limitation (Coltrane, 2010). State policies and welfare provisions appear to affect paid work distribution in couples more than the distribution of housework and childcare, which tends to remain staunchly gendered (Cunha & Atalaia, 2019; Gershuny & Sullivan, 2003; Vagni & Cornwell, 2018). Paternal leave policies have been associated with a positive

effect for gender equality in the sharing of housework, along with other institutional frameworks like a large public sector and changes like the abolition of discriminatory regulations (Fuwa and Cohen, 2007). However, long maternity leave and public childcare provisions were not found to foster more equal divisions of unpaid labour, with even in some cases a negative effect (Jan Windebank, 2001). In general, the division of unpaid labour appears more strongly associated with individual traits - such as education and gender attitude - than with state policies and institutional context (Gershuny & Sullivan, 2003). However, the scheduling of work is an area where policies can make a difference (Vagni, 2020). An example is provided by the research undertaken by Pailhé, Solaz, and Souletie (2019), who studied the change in housework allocation following the partial implementation of the 35-hour workweek reform in France in the early 2000s. They showed that the way couples used the time freed from paid work was both gendered and dependent on the day of the week. Men contributed more to housework (albeit non-routine housework) during the week but did less at the weekend, while women spent more time on childcare overall, both during the week and at the weekend. Thus the reforms was associated with an increased specialisation of unpaid labour tasks (though not of unpaid labour overall), and the weekend appeared like a moment where both partners, being in the presence of one another, were more likely to 'do gender'. Pailhé et al. (2019) also interpreted this change as a case in point demonstrating that time allocation (to housework or different types of housework) is not simply a matter of time availability.

Building on comparative frameworks in the tradition of Soskice and Hall (2001), and more specifically on Esping-Andersen (1990)'s work and clustering, the literature often classifies Western countries into policy clusters that reflect different public and social policy contexts based on levels of redistribution and social equity, the range and involvement of the welfare state, and gender attitudes (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999; Gauthier, 1996; Goodin et al., 1999; Lewis, 1993; O'Connoret al., 1999; Sainsbury, 1999), more recently, Kan et al. (2011) . The linking of these clusters with the gender division of labour is derived from the assumption that the distribution of both paid and unpaid labour is affected by, firstly, the structure of employment and the labour market; and secondly by the welfare provision or subsidisation of services that allow couples and families to combine paid employment with notably childcare (as well as elderly care, although this is less often tackled) (e.g. Fraser, 1994; Gershuny and Sullivan, 2003; Gornick et al., 1997; Hobson, 1990; Lewis, 1992; O'Brien et al., 2007; O'Connor et al., 1999; Pfau-Effinger, 2004; Sullivan et al., 2009)). Policy clusters are typically divided into four categories: (1) a non-interventionist liberal cluster (e.g. the UK

as well as the USA and Australia); (2) a corporatist or social capitalist cluster (e.g. France and Germany); (3) a southern/Mediterranean cluster (e.g. Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece); and (4) a social-democratic 'egalitarian' nordic cluster (e.g. Sweden and Denmark).<sup>4</sup>

I concentrate here on the first two clusters, because they encompass the British and French cases. These clusters can be roughly characterised as follows: non-interventionist/liberal countries are generally associated with a low level of welfare support. Specific measures are put in place to support those most in need, but the underlying state approach to welfare is that the market is better suited to and more efficient at promoting social progress than the welfare state. Therefore, social services (e.g. childcare, elderly care, medical care) are largely privatised, the level of total welfare expenditure and redistribution is low and societies tend to be deeply and widely stratified. For instance, in the UK, parental leave is much more limited than in most other European countries (Daly Ferragina, 2018, Gauthier, 2002, Thévenon 2011), and the cost of childcare (and, more broadly, of having children) is significantly higher for British families. Hence, the rate of children in formal childcare is lower, as is the rate of full-time employment among mothers (Boeckmann, Misra, Budig, 2014). In contrast, in the second cluster, the corporatist/social capitalist or 'managed' capitalism cluster to which France is assigned, the welfare state is less anemic and state-organised social services are much more extensive (Schmidt, 2002, 2003). They function primarily through the medium of social insurance programs, themselves often linked to occupational groups, with therefore wide social variations between groups. Maternity and parental leave policies are more generous, the labour market is much more regulated and facilitates parental leave and (some) flexibility for parents. There is also a high level of employment protection and a high level of welfare expenditure overall.

With respect to gender ideology, however, the assumption in both clusters is that women will take time off work to look after children (and other unpaid labour). While the state takes on a more actively subsidiary role in supporting women/parents during this time, or in making it easier to combine paid work and childcare. In practice, time-use research has found little difference in the gender division of housework and leisure time between the UK and France (Vagni & Cornwell, 2018). The main differences seem to be with regards to the

<sup>4</sup>Although the premises on which Esping-Andersen (1990) had built his clustering were criticized for not making enough room for considerations of gender and family, subsequent alternative cluster calculations which were more mindful of gender (and focused more on welfare provisions of e.g. childcare and maternity leave) ended up with clusters that largely overlapped with Esping-Andersen (1990)'s (e.g. Gauthier, 1996). As Kan et al. (2011) point out, this is likely because even though welfare state provisions do not exactly mirror gender ideologies, they may be expected to be at least related to and thus broadly consistent with them.

gender division of paid labour, especially once couples become parents. Cunha and Atalaia (2019) thus noted that the French model of childcare allows women to return to full-time employment shortly after the birth of children (see however Jan Windebank (2001), but with qualitative data). In contrast, in the UK, the prohibitive costs of childcare likely play a part in the fact that the dominant model of gender division of paid labour is not two partners working full-time, but a man working full-time and a woman working part-time. Thus while more couples involve two partners in paid employment in the UK, compared to France, the importance of women's part time employment is such that the proportion of equal-employment couples is much lower than in France.

## **0.2 Migration and gender: acculturation and/or trajectories**

There has been very little empirical work on time-use and the gender division of labour among migrants and migrant families. Part of this is linked to the lack of data, as I discuss in chapter 2. Time-use surveys almost never over-sample migrants and, symmetrically, surveys that over-sample migrants are not necessarily interested in time-use, or in gender relations for that matter. This means that in most cases, migrants are not present in the sample in numbers large enough to be analysed separately. The same observation applies to a large extent to ethnic minorities, and the empirical evidence on the gender division of labour (especially unpaid labour) among ethnic minority couples is extremely scarce. Kan and Laurie (2018) provide a noteworthy exception and show variations in the gender division of domestic labour by ethnicity in the UK, even while controlling for employment and education of both partners. Much more commonly addressed are rates of employment among migrants (and ethnic minorities), and to a certain extent migrant women, but these rarely consider micro-level distributions of labour in couples. Overall, there has seldom been quantitative investigations of the links between gender relations and migration. The literature that has tackled this empirically has mostly done so - whether implicitly or explicitly - through the lens of gender ideologies and acculturation.

### **0.2.1 Migrants, gender egalitarianism and acculturation**

The literature on migrants' gender attitudes, and especially gender roles, is mostly qualitative, and mostly focused on one specific migrant group at a time, in one country: for instance, Moroccan and Turks in the Netherlands (De Valk 2006), Turks in Germany (Diehl, Koenig, & Ruckdeschel, 2009). A common feature is that the migrant groups under study tend to come from countries

that are less gender-egalitarian both in measures of gender norms and women's empowerment. These groups are frequently found to have less egalitarian gender attitudes compared to the native population, but as Roeder and Mühlau (2014) note, the effect of country-of-origin cannot be rigorously investigated with such approaches. In contrast, Roeder and Mühlau (2014) comparison of different migrant groups' gender ideologies across Europe using European Social Survey data allowed them to justify that there were indeed variegated effects associated with different countries/areas of origin, with less egalitarian countries being associated with less egalitarian attitudes among migrants. This association, however, reduced over time and generation, leading the authors to diagnose an acculturation of migrant to mainstream norms of gender division of labour in their host country. They also found gendered patterns, with migrant women appearing to transition quicker to more egalitarian views, closer to those of the majority native population.

Acculturation is considered a dimension of assimilation (Gordon, 1964), with the latter involving more broadly and more structurally the decline of ethnic differences (Alba & Nee, 2003). There is a rich tradition of studies on migrants' assimilation, ranging back to the early 20th century (Alba & Nee, 1997). The scholarship has covered many aspects of assimilation processes, from social status (Hirschmann and Wong 1981; Neidert and Farley 1985) to residential segregation (Massey and Mullan 1984) and fertility (Ford 1990, more recently Wilson (2019)) and - more importantly for this research, intermarriage (Blau, Blum, and Schwartz 1982; Gordon 1964). In Gordon's theory, acculturation is automatic, inevitable and indeed largely unconscious (see also Gans (2007) and while it was generally understood that acculturation would result from socio-economic integration and mobility, the more recent scholarship suggests that the two may well be quite disconnected (e.g. Alba and Nee (2003)). The general understanding is that culture, including values and norms around gender roles, is mostly stable in adults but much more prone to change, influence and 'hybridisation' in children. Thus if we consider the gender division of labour to be mainly affected by gender ideologies or *habitus* (Bourdieu, 1984), it would derive that children who are socialised and, importantly, educated in a different country from their parents are likely to develop cultural traits and practices different from them, influenced at least in part by the culture of the immigration country. Acculturation applies also to migrants who arrived as children and spend (at least some of) their formative school years in the host society - the so-called '1.5 generation' as labelled by Rumbaut (1994). Indeed, Roeder and Mühlau (2014) find that compared to their migrant parents, both child migrants and direct descendants of migrants identify with gender norms that are closer to those of majority natives (i.e. with

native parents) in their country of residence. Thus their more gender-egalitarian attitudes cannot be simply attributable to cohort-replacement effect, which is also a driving mechanism in changes in gender ideologies (and practices) in the majority population (see e.g. Bolzendahl and Myers (2004)).

Kan and Laurie (2018) reach interesting conclusions using not gender attitudes but the gender division of household labour as dependent variable. Although focused on ethnic differences, they also note variations within and across ethnic groups between first-generation migrants who migrated as children, those who migrated after the age of 12, and their UK-born co-ethnics. These variations are mainly between women: thus adult migrant women contribute significantly more housework hours compared to co-ethnic 1.5 generation women, co-ethnic native women and to the majority white British native population. In France, the work of Collet and Santelli (2012) on descendants of migrants also suggested this convergence, although their enquiry did not bear specifically on questions of gender or domestic labour.

There is also evidence of a within-generation effect, post-migration: consistent with the acculturation hypothesis, Roeder and Mühlau (2014) find that migrants' gender norms tend to shift towards those of the host society over time also over the course of individuals' lifetime, following migration. They find a significant effect of the length of time spent in the country of migration, not limited to those who migrated as children. This within-generation change (as distinguished from the inter-generation change) is similarly interpreted as a function of the exposure to the different beliefs and gender norms in the country of immigration (in line with e.g Cunningham 2008)

### 0.2.2 Segmented and gendered assimilation

This literature also finds consistent evidence of variations in patterns of gender ideologies and practices, and gender acculturation by migrant/ethnic group. The first are usually explained by reference to differences in the gender culture of the country of origin, while the second is interpreted via processes of 'segmented assimilation' (Portes & Zhou, 1993). The concept refers to the different paths and pace of assimilation followed by different groups, which are a product of several factors: the 'modes of incorporation' are a function, notably, of the immigration regime and the attitude of the state towards the migrant group at hand; the degree of prejudice that the majority population holds towards them; the presence and size of a co-ethnic community in the country of immigration. Different migrant groups, thus faced with different ecologies in the immigration country, may resort to different strategies. Importantly, acculturation is to a certain extent dissociated from economic integration and social mobility:

some groups may find their access to - and success in - the mainstream society mostly obstructed by prejudice and discrimination, in spite of a high degree of acculturation. For other migrants with well-established and cohesive co-ethnic communities, a better strategy for socio-economic integration may be a 'paced, selective assimilation' (Portes & Zhou, 1993, p. 96). In this case, socio-economic integration can co-exist with a comparatively high degree of ethnic and cultural distinction on other grounds - for instance fertility behaviours and gender norms. Work inspired by segmented assimilation emphasises the interplay between the societal context of the immigration country and the migrant/ethnic groups and its own characteristics - which may include gender beliefs and practices distinct from the majority native population. However, in the case of the UK and - to a point - France, weaker rather than stronger segmented assimilation models may be best suited. For instance, working on the propensity to intermarry in Britain, Muttarak and Heath (2010, p. 298) judges that though different ethnic groups have 'different starting points' and differ upon arrival in the UK in their propensity to intermarry, they all follow the same process and convergence afterwards. A. Heath and Demireva (2014) reach the same conclusion, as does Safi (2008) for the French case.

Importantly, patterns of acculturation to the gender norms of the majority native group are not only segmented by migrant group (based on country of origin), but can also be segmented by gender (Curran, Shafer, Donato, & Garip, 2006). The literature include assumptions that migrant and ethnic communities may be more protective and less forgiving of violations to deviations from ascribed gender roles when it comes to women and daughters compared to men and sons. Indeed it has been documented that girls may be more strictly monitored (e.g. Idema and Phalet (2007)) and that their exposure to the mainstream gender norms in the country of immigration may thus be comparatively more constrained. This is likely culturally specific: for instance, it is conceivable that in certain patrilineal cultures where sons represent and bear most of the family aspirations, their behaviours and whereabouts may be more tightly controlled than those of daughters, whose potential straying is of less consequence. Regardless of whether families and communities attach greater effort and concern to shelter migrant and minority women, Roeder and Mühlau (2014) found that the gender attitudes of migrant women and native-born women with migrant parents shifted more towards egalitarian beliefs than those of their male counterparts, post-migration (also: Güngör and Bornstein (2009), Dasgupta (1998)). This suggests that changes in gender norms are not simply a function of passive exposure to more different gender norms. Instead, agency, interests and power are (also) involved. Namely, migrant women may have a stronger interest in

embracing gender egalitarian values and practices than migrant men (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004). But the main mechanism - especially for the first generation - seems to be that migration can instigate or coincide with changes in the gender distribution of resources and power, and thus also a change in the family power structure and organisation (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Pedraza, 1991; Pessar, 1984). This change can lead to women having a greater degree of financial independence and control over economic and social resources, without that being necessarily associated with a change in professed gender attitudes or endorsement of gender roles of male-main-breadwinner and women-caregiver (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2000). The role of migration experience *per se* and of gendered migration trajectories in reorganising gender relations, also at the level of couples, is the topic of the next section.

### 0.2.3 Trajectories, partnering and the role of the migration experience

It has become commonplace to state that migration studies were long deeply androcentric (e.g. [kofman\\_gender\\_2005-1](#); Nawyn (2010)). Dominant theories of migration (whether based on classical economists or neo-Marxist political economy), overtly gender-neutral, mostly did not acknowledge gender relations - at best assuming that the framework they set up with migrant men in mind would apply to migrant women (Truong, 1996).<sup>5</sup> Subsequently, large sections of migration studies have ignored migrant women. If the specificity of women's migration trajectories was acknowledged, it was to assign them a strictly passive or stabilising role as trailing family migrants (see for instance Noiriel (1988, 1991)). Yet Morokvasic (1984) were already showing that women were part of the ranks of temporary, economically-driven migrants - the so-called 'birds of passage' (Piore, 1979).

From the 1980s and 1990s onward, the emerging feminist sociological scholarship on migration noted that women also migrated, in ways that could not be stereo-typically reduced to family migration. Ever-growing since, feminist research has emphasized how gender relations inform and differently constrain men's and women's migration at all stages of migration experiences: from the motivation to migrate, the resources and organisation provided by the family and the community to enable migration, the legal channels, and the outcomes.

Migration experience, feminist scholarship argued, follows different paths for men and women, but it also holds different rewards for men and women (Kats, 1982). Research focused on specific groups such as the Irish migrant women in the

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<sup>5</sup>This is not entirely fair towards some of the Marxist-inspired account who did discuss the gender division of labour (e.g. Castles and Kosack (1973)), even if the research stream they are associated with typically did not.

USA (Jackson, 1984), or Jamaican migrants in London (Foner, 1979), found that '[...] difficult as the experience of immigration was, it was often far more positive for women than for men, as it allowed women to break with traditional roles and patterns of dependence and assert a new-found (if meager) freedom.' (Pedraza, 1991, p. 314). Through migration, gender roles and power relations in couples could be suspended, and potentially renegotiated (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1992) or alternatively, entrenched. This paved the way for a theorization of migration that saw migration processes and trajectories as both *gendered and gendering* (Pedraza, 1991). The particularity of this literature is that it does not simply treat gender as an extra co-variate (the 'add women and stir' approach); it handles gender relations as a key dependent variable as well as a theoretical lens that needs to inform all aspects of model specification - since it informs all aspects of the migration experience.

Seminal studies, such as those of Pessar (1984) and Hondagneu-Sotelo (1992) emphasised migrant women's experiences of paid employment following migration as an important change, which linked migration with women's empowerment. It was found that women's financial contribution to the household increased with migration, as did their involvement in decision-making and their self-esteem. For some migrant women, the post-migration period is the first time that they enter the labour market (Fernández-Kelly and Garcia 1990). While men often undergo downward mobility, the experience of migrant women post-migration can be economically and socially empowering, especially if it means that women get more distance from patriarchal family and community controls. Indeed, this can be a motivation for their migration in the first place (Morokvasic 1983). The important thing here, noted in much of the theoretical and qualitative literature of gender and migration, is that not only do gender relations in the country of origin shape migration opportunities (and potentially motivations), the experience and process of migration itself may open up possibilities for a practical and pragmatic reorganisation of gender roles.

The economic constraints post-migration may make a dual-earner system necessary and in some cases women may even take on the role of sole or main-breadwinner while their partner looks for work or sets up their business (Ferree, 1979). Gender roles in the household can be transformed to some extent, although as Pessar noted, that does not necessarily imply that gender roles (women as primarily mothers and wives) were contested, but rather that women found more agency through and post- migration to redefine them in a way that suited them better (Pessar, 1984, 1999). Approaches that focus on changes in gender ideologies may miss this reconfiguration of resources and roles: material changes in the gender division of labour are not necessarily associated with changes in

gender ideologies - (Ferree (1979, p. 48) spoke of 'employment without liberation' to refer to Cuban women in the USA), at least not in the short term. Conversely, in other cases, migration to Western countries may be invested with hopes of independence and empowerment by migrant women, hopes which can be bitterly disappointed. This is the case, for instance, of the Thai marriage migrants who appear in Suksomboon (2011)'s research, and who, having followed their Dutch partner to Europe, find themselves locked in (gendered and racialised) expectations that they will be submissive, domestic wives.

Theoretically, the experience of migration can improve women's social positions and thereby enhance gender equality if it leads to greater balance in migrant women's and men's relative status and power in the country of immigration. In Pessar's theorisation (1984), this occurs mainly when migration results in a greater participation of women in paid employment, which has a domino effect on their autonomy and bargaining power relative to that of their husband's. Alternatively, migration may modify certain aspects of gender roles, but leave women and men's relative power and status mostly untouched (Curtis 1986). With respect to migration's impact on gender relations and inequalities, the jury is still out. The existing literature has found contradictory outcomes, depending both on the particular migration flows, and on the social consequences the studies considered. Often the conclusion is that while migration may improve the social standing of migrant women in certain ways, it simultaneously undermines it in others (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Morokvasic, 1984)

#### **0.2.4 Male lead and female trail: migration trajectories as a gendering process**

Empirical evidence shows that on the whole migration appears negative for migrant women's paid labour performance and engagement (be it from the point of view of paid work time, earnings and attitudes (Boyle et al., 1999, 2001; Lee and Roseman, 1999; Lichter, 1980, 1983; Maxwell, 1988; Morrison and Lichter, 1988). This is true for partnered women especially, with migrating married women being associated with lower odds of employment than any other migrant sub-group (Boyle et al., 1999, 2002). The opposite applies to migrant men, for whom empirical research finds a net positive impact of migration on paid labour participation (Bartel, 1979; Yankow, 2003; Böheim and Taylor, 2007). The understanding is that these gender discrepancies have to do with gender norms, which dictate that migration be organised in a way that is driven by and maximises men's and husbands' career prospects over those of women, pushed into supportive and 'trailing spouse' migration and family journeys.

Indeed, the 'gendering' potential of migration trajectories has been raised mostly with regards to the specific kind of migration trajectories represented by 'tied migrations', namely migrants who follow or join a partner (or a relative) in the country of immigration. 'Family-stage migration' is one configuration which forms the focus of Hondagneu-Sotelo (1992, 1994)'s case studies. It refers to migrant couples, who were already formed before migration, but who migrated in stages, so that one partner (the 'lead migrant') went first, and was later joined by the second partner (the 'trailing' or 'reunified' migrant). 'Marriage migration' is another category of 'tied migration', which refer to union-migration trajectory where one partner was already long established in the country (or a native of that country), and the other partner migrated to join them shortly after marriage, as their dependent.

For marriage migrant women, this may involve a confinement into a very domestic and care-taker role, driven by gender expectations that can in fact be more gender-conservative than the ones they were accustomed to in their country of origin (see for instance Charsley, Storer-Church, Benson, and Van Hear (2012) on Indian marriage migrant women, or Suksomboon (2011) as mentioned above). For marriage migrant men also, marriage migration can be associated with economic and legal dependency on their sponsor partner, creating situations of female-main/sole breadwinner which reverse the gender division of paid labour. This gender reversal can be experienced very painfully by men, who may perceive it as a loss of status and as undermining their capacity to fulfil their gender expectation of male-breadwinner, as in the case documented by Charsley (2005) of Pakistani marriage migrant men in the UK. In a 'doing gender' or even potentially compensation perspective, they may refuse to contribute to any form of domestic or care labour, which would further entrench the role reversal. We can draw from this qualitative literature that tied migrants, and perhaps especially marriage migrants (when the formation of the couple comes at the same time or shortly before migration) are associated with a relative loss of agency and power on the side of the marriage migrants. Importantly, this literature has posited how marriage migration means being uprooted and distanced from kin and family.

The case of family-stage migration is more complex: while the Mexican women analysed by Hondagneu-Sotelo (1992) were initially left-behind to look after the children while their husbands went abroad for work, this period could also promote their independence and autonomy. In addition, when they themselves emigrated to join their partner, the greater distance from the family and its patriarchal demands, as well as the economic needs of the moment, could push them into paid employment. This had long-reaching consequences, as it gave them access to autonomous income but also to their own, new social networks in

the country of immigration. This could thus result in a more egalitarian division of labour - at least relative to the context of the area of origin -, with some men also contributing more to domestic tasks and childcare. But this change could be nullified if the family moved back, which is also what led some migrant women to develop strategies to delay or prevent return migration.

The quantitative literature on this is scarce. The data lend itself poorly to account for a gendering effect of various migration trajectories, for a rigorous approach would require data for the same individuals and families collected both before and after migration. Such data is largely non-existent for international migration, and the best one can do is rely on migrants' retrospective accounts of employment - when they are collected. One can also draw from the literature on family relocation within national borders, for which there is better data.

This literature on intra-national relocation informs us that partnered women appear disadvantaged by migration on many accounts: family relocations have positive consequences for partnered men and negative consequences for partnered women in regard to employment rates, paid work hours, wages, and occupational status (Cooke, 2003; Boyle, Cooke, Halfacree, and Smith, 1999; Boyle, Cullis, Flowerdew, and Gayle, 2003; Pailhé Solaz, 2008). They explain this effect in large part through the gender allocation of migration roles within couples, with a male lead mover and a female tied mover, roles which have remained surprisingly stable in Western countries (Tenn, 2010; T. J. Cooke, 2011). Building on Becker's theory, these gender roles in family migration theory used to be explained gender-blindly through household specialisation, and the maximisation of the employment and career prospects of the partner specialised in paid work - the male partner (Mincer, 1978). But there again, gender-blind explanations perform poorly when we consider the substantial achievements in educational attainment and career shifts by women (England, 2010). People may be 'doing gender' mostly and most consequentially when they decide how to migrate (Bielby Bielby, 1992; Halfacree, 1995; Shihadeh, 1991): Will they agree to follow their partner, or to go with them? Will they go alone, unchaperoned? Are those even available options? The research done by Vidal and Lersch (2019) and Vidal, Perales, and Baxter (2016) on couple relocations and the division of domestic labour concluded that couple relocation was indeed associated with a widening in the gender gap in housework hours; however, this was chiefly driven by the gendered hierarchy inherent in the migration decision, and to other changes happening at the same time as relocation, namely the arrival of children. Because the migration itself was gendered and focused on maximising men's careers, it therefore had the effect of gendering the division of paid work (women often stopped working), and this in turn heightened the division of unpaid work.

Thus *gendered* organisation of couples' relocation had *gendering* consequences on both paid and unpaid levels.

Subsequently, it becomes crucial to understand why migration would almost systematically be organised in a way that prioritises men's projects and employment prospects. One of the explanations is that economic potential is evaluated in biased, gendered ways in the migration decision, with men's resources being attributed more value than women's: it derives that economic resources will not have linear but rather gender-asymmetrical effects on the propensity for male and female spouses to lead moves. The employment outcomes resulting from such moves is therefore gender-asymmetrical, and so is the impact on unpaid labour (T. J. Cooke, 2008; Perales Vidal, 2013). Ultimately, this leads to greater gender-specialisation. To transpose this at the international or transnational scale, the notion of 'gendered geographies of power' (Mahler & Pessar, 2009) is useful: gender relations and hierarchies in the society of emigration and in the society of immigration frame the mode of migration and of partner selection. The merits and opportunity (the 'push' and 'pull') of international migration, both for the individual and the household, are likely to be evaluated and gauged in gendered ways. For instance, women may be tempted to emigrate if they feel like the society they live in is too gender-conservative and constrains them (Suksomboon, 2011); but the family or the couple may also find it more difficult to send a woman abroad alone, compared to a man - even if they have the same prospects - unless they are perhaps already married, in which case they can be trusted to take their place in the care chains (Hochschild, 2000; Palenga-Möllenbeck, 2013; Parreñas, 2015).

The literature on tied migration - including international migrants - is unequivocal on the fact that men are much more likely to be lead migrants (first of the couple to migrate) or pioneer migrants (migrating before couple formation, and later bringing a partner from the country of origin), whereas women are more likely to be tied (second-movers) or joint migrants (González-Ferrer, 2011; Taylor, 2007). Lead and pioneer migrants are associated with higher labour performance, which does not apply to tied migrants. This is also found to be true for international family-stage migration (González-Ferrer, 2011). In addition, González-Ferrer (2011) found that in family-stage migration, the length of time that separates the migration of the lead partner and family unification also matters for the employment of both. Amongst tied migrants, women are much more likely to join after a year or more, and men much more likely to go at the same time. However, as precious as it is, this scholarship has three limits: it has been entirely focused on paid labour, understood as individual labour performance (especially women's employment rates), which leaves mostly unaddressed the

question of gender dynamics in the couple; it has considered almost exclusively migrant couples (not mixed unions); it relies either on very basic dichotomies (who migrated first?) or on legal category of admission (family reunification / labour migration etc), which only very imperfectly posit migration in the life course.

### **0.3 The partner matters: intermarriage and the interlocking of migration and couple formation**

Whether we consider connections between couples' gender division of labour and migration to be linked to different gender norms (the *gender culture* argument) and/or to the agency gained (or the economic and social power lost) during the migration process, a common feature of the literature is that in all scenarios, the choice and status of the partner matters. Accordingly, the literature on migrants' acculturation to gender egalitarianism, like the literature that engages with the gender consequences of specific migration trajectories ('tied migrants', marriage migrants etc), identifies different scenarios depending on whether migrants are partnered with another migrant, a co-ethnic descendant of a migrant, or a majority native individual (with no migrant parent). The last scenario is generally considered 'mixed' and treated as 'intermarriage'. Other mixed scenarios involve mixed minority-minority partnering, but these are much rarer, and almost never researched.

If the recruitment of the partner can be considered a key element to understand how we may go from migration to gender relations, it is because it is understood to (1) set the ground in terms of gender norms and culture, and (2) inform and heavily influence the migration journey as well as the power relation.

#### **0.3.1 Intermarriage and assimilation**

The view that intermarriage can be considered both a marker and a benchmark of migrant or ethnic assimilation is largely represented in sociological scholarship (Birrell and Healy, 2000: 38; Schinkel, 2011: 101). In classic assimilation theory, intermarriage is considered a key indicator and vector of structural assimilation (Gordon, 1964). In part, this is because intimate partner choice presupposes the absence of prejudice between groups (Alba & Nee, 2003; Gordon, 1964); At an individual level, intermarrying with the majority group can reward a high degree of integration (which allows exposure, encounter, attraction and social acceptability) but it also gives access to resources and social networks that may otherwise be out of reach. It has been found in some countries that migrants who marry other migrants tend to 'lag behind' in terms of social and human

capital, as does their labour performance - compared to migrants who marry natives (Meng & Gregory, 2005; Nielsen, Smith, & Çelikaksoy, 2009)

Indeed, there is a wealth of research on intermarriage rates and what influences them, from residential segregation, migrant/ethnic group sizes and other opportunity structures (Kalmijn, 1998) to minority groups' different degrees of acceptability in the eyes of the majority group, and varied degrees of preference for intra-group unions. Subsequently, this scholarship finds that there are many obstacles for migrants to intermarry (see reviews by Rodríguez-García (2012) and Waters and Gerstein Pineau (2016), as well as Choi and Tienda (2018)), and that certain group boundaries are harder to cross - for men more than women and vice-versa. There have been important descriptive studies of intermarriage in Britain (Berrington, 1994, 1996; Coleman, 1985; Collet, 1993; Muttarak & Heath, 2010), and in France (Collet & Santelli, 2013; Munoz-Perez & Tribalat, 1984; Safi, 2008; Tribalat, 2009; Tribalat & Munoz-Pérez, 1996). Yet as Kalmijn (2010, p. 272) argues, there is comparatively much more research on what intermarriage *represents* than on its social consequences and what it *produces*. This absence is almost complete when it comes to gender relations.

From the perspective of gender acculturation, for a migrant to intermarry with a majority native should be associated with particularly intense and sustained exposure to mainstream gender norms, and thus much convergence over time towards the 'mainstream' gender attitudes in the country of immigration; indeed, not only are the children of mixed couples more socially integrated overall (Kalmijn, 2010), they may also be more egalitarian than those of two migrant parents (see Goldscheider, Goldscheider, and Bernhardt(2011) on Turks and Poles in Sweden). Children of migrants who partnered with majority native couples appear to hold even more egalitarian views, in fact, than the children of two majority native parents (Roeder & Mühlau, 2014). This suggests that on top of acculturation and integrative processes, those engaged in such relationships may be self-selected among those with more gender-egalitarian views and, and/or that the formation of inter-relationships may foster reflexive disengagement from mainstream gender beliefs on both sides - including the majority native's. Conversely, the acculturation approach would imply that migrants in relationship with a native descendant of migrant (even if co-ethnic) are likely to see their gender ideology and gender arrangements edge over time closer to those of the descendants of migrants, which are themselves quite close to those of the native majority group (Roeder & Mühlau, 2014). Intermarriage could be expected to promote noticeably more gender-egalitarian roles when the migrant partner's country-of-origin context is particularly gender-conservative. Nottmeyer (2014) thus found that migrant-native couples involving a majority native are less likely

to specialise in Becker's term. This is connected to the fact that these couples are both highly educated and educationally homogamous, but it is relative: for couples formed by native women and migrant men, these unions are less specialised. But for couples formed between a native man and a migrant woman, they are more specialised compared to other native men's couples - though still less specialised compared to other migrant women's couples. This gender asymmetry is also noted by Basu (2017).

### **0.3.2 Intermarriage, migration and power: exchanges and bargains**

In fact the qualitative scholarship suggests that these couples can also be very un-egalitarian, specifically when they involve a native man and a migrant woman from a third-world country. Rather than European native men's (presumably more gender-equal) norms permeating the relationship, the situation these studies describe are better characterised as very asymmetrical power relations, which allow the native men to impose highly gendered divisions of labour. The asymmetry of the power relation is particularly acute when the migrant partner's rights to reside in the country of immigration are legally tied to the continuation of their relationship with the native partner, as is the case with partner and spouse visas. Such situations of legal dependencies have been associated with higher risks of other expressions of patriarchal power - such as intimate partner violence (Chiu, 2017; Masson & Roux, 2011). The unions formed by migrants and their outcomes in term of gender relations and the division of labour, cannot be only tackled through the lens of integration or acculturation. It also involves thinking about power and the bargaining capacity of the migrant relative to that of their native partner.

This also make it possible to conceptualise situations of gender-reversal of the roles in migration - when men follow - and their possible consequences for gender relations; for instance, marriage migrant Pakistani men who migrated to the UK to join their UK-born or resident wife are in a position of 'ghar-damad' (house son-in-law), dependent on their wives and wives' relatives, which is perceived as shameful. But as pointed out by Lievens (1999), this has the positive consequence for their wives that through this transnational union, they escape the tradition of patrilocality which would have otherwise required them to move to their husbands' family. The 'Lievens hypothesis' thus posits that a transnational union is not necessarily a 'traditional' or oppressed choice of partner: through the combination of migration and couple formation, it can have emancipating consequences for women.

However, this gender-reversal of migration trajectories and gender roles is often socially and emotionally costly for the men involved, and challenging

for the couple. These conjugal scenarios have been associated therefore with intense discomfort which can lead to marital conflict (Beck-Gernsheim, 2007; Qureshi, Charsley, & Shaw, 2014). In parallel, marriage migrant wives may find themselves acutely isolated and vulnerable towards their husband and in-laws (Charsley, 2008), especially during the probationary two years (five since 2012) before they can apply for independent leave to remain. And as Wray (2015) noted, it is not the case that such migration only concern transnational unions - indeed they also involve majority native British individuals.

### **Intercultural marriage and the marriage market, cross-border unions, gender asymmetries and bargaining power**

In Merton (1941)'s exchange theory, intermarriage is understood as a bargain struck between a minority partner and a majority partner. It presupposes a majority 'premium', which forced minority partners to 'bargain' their way into an interrelationship with the majority group (see also Kingsley Davis (1941)). Thus educational hypogamy (marrying 'down' in terms of educational attainment) could be the cost for intermarriage - that is, marrying 'up' from the point of view of group hierarchies. When applied to cross-border and international unions, this reasoning often relies on an assumption of gender asymmetry (Weiss, Yi, & Zhang, 2013): that men and women's capitals are not assessed in the same way, but through the lens of gender (hence age and beauty may matter more for women to be seen as attractive partner, whereas men's income or wealth may be more important). Thus the capitals that women can bargain with on the marriage market are not the same as men's.

Variants of exchange theory have been used to explain some of the gender arrangements and migration patterns. Suksomboon (2011) thus coined the term of 'geographical hypergamy' to describe the process by which educated and autonomous Thai women chose to marry European men with little education and to follow them to Europe. On the international marriage market, access to wealthier and more in-demand parts of the world may constitute a significant bargaining ticket. Similar observations have been made on unions formed by migrants and descendants of migrants, for instance among Indian families living in the UK, who can negotiate advantageous unions with India-born higher-class partners for their UK-born children (Charsley, Bolognani, Ersanilli, & Spencer, 2020).

Such bargaining can thus take place at the level of partner recruitment, but as we have seen in the section on the gender division of labour, there is evidence that the distribution of resources and power between partners also influences the terms of their bargaining and ultimately how they share paid and unpaid

labour. The equation and the bargaining does not simply dissipate once the union is tied. In addition, the native 'premium' which may grant natives of the country of immigration an extra card on the marriage market, also comes with real advantages, notably in the form of social networks. The asymmetry between migrant and native (or more established migrant) partner is not merely symbolic. For the migrant partner, it can mean that their right to remain in the country, as well as their social network and their economic survival are mediated to no insignificant extent by their relationship. Even if the most asymmetrical terms may be temporary - for instance when migrants move from a partner visa to their independent right to remain (or citizenship), they may set the tone (Nicollet, 1992; Zehraoui, 2003).

This also reflects, on the side of men, an aspiration and propensity for 'traditional' and polarised gender roles, in societies sometimes perceived as (too) emancipatory for women. These gender expectations and ideologies of gender complementarity and specialisation have been found to be more present among certain migrant groups in Europe (Roeder & Mühlau, 2014), notably Turks (Diehl et al., 2009) and Moroccans (Arends-Tóth & Vijver, 2009). But such representations of gender roles and hierarchies also remain widespread in Western societies of immigration, where women's engagement in paid work (mothers, especially) is seen as a couple's decision much more than men's paid labour activity (Kellerhals, Perrin, & Steinauer-Cresson, 1982). In contrast, men and masculinity continue to be legitimised by the role of male breadwinner (Henchoz, 2008). Transformations of the traditional family and gender model are underway, as denoted by the surge of cohabitating couples and civil unions (PACS) (de Singly, 2007; Lesthaeghe, 2010; Lesthaeghe & van de Kaa, 1986) - although these are still limited to populations selected among those with higher cultural and economic capitals and with more egalitarian views on gender roles (Rault & Letrait, 2010).

### 0.3.3 The interlocking of partnering and migration trajectories

Migration trajectories play a key role here in setting the terms of these power relations, at least initially. In the cases just described, it is not simply that *migrants*, or even *migrant women* are at a social disadvantage on the marriage market compared to *natives*. It is also the mode and timing of their migration and couple formation that contributes to creating an asymmetrical power relation. I have already discussed the gendering capacity of tied migration and marriage migration especially. It may well be that it is this mode of migration-union interlocking, more than partner recruitment or indeed the gender cultures associated with

different migrant groups, which sets the stage for gender relations in the couple, post-migration.

For example, Baker and Benjamin (1997), and more recently Meng and Gregory (2005) noted that being partnered with a native significantly improves migrant women's labour participation and/or earnings, although the effect is not as clear for migrant men. But when González-Ferrer (2011) introduced a typology of union-migration trajectories in her modelling, thus controlling for different migration-union sequences, she found no effect anymore of having a native partner for migrant women's employment. This contributes to making the case that to understand the gender relations post-migration, we need to consider the different interlocking and implications of union formation and migration in the life-course as well as what Choi and Tienda (2018) call the lifecycle timing of migration.

The timing of migration is key for integration and acculturation: people who migrate young and who migrated long ago are more likely to be integrated, more likely to intermarry (Choi & Tienda, 2018), more likely to have gender beliefs that are closer to those of the host society (Roeder & Mühlau, 2014). But the timing of migration matters also *in relation to* the timing of couple formation. For women, the moment of couple formation is strongly associated with an increase in time on domestic work,<sup>6</sup> an effect which could be amplified or sustained if couple formation also coincides with migration and joining a more established partner. The social consequences of the interlocking of migration and family formation processes are little addressed and poorly understood, but they can be expected to be highly relevant to the shaping of gender relations and gender roles.

From the literature we can safely expect that patterns of migration-union trajectories are both heavily gendered, and vary by migrant group. Although there has been a diversification of women's migration and a certain degree of gender convergence over the past decades (see e.g. Beauchemin, Borrel, Régnard, and Santelli (2015)), it remains true that women form the majority of marriage migrants and family migrants more broadly, while men numerically dominate among labour migrants in France (Algava & Bèque, 2008; Ministère de l'Intérieur, 2021), as in the UK (Home Office, 2019). In addition, EU migrants in Europe are much more likely to be independent, labour migrants than non-EU migrants - something easily explained by the fact that the ever-stricter immigration regulations do not apply to them. Therefore and in contrast, non-EU migrants are much more likely to enter the country as family migrants. This applies especially to those arrived since the clamping down on labour migration in the 1960s (for the

<sup>6</sup>For men it is relationship dissolution that is associated with increases in time spent on domestic tasks (Gupta, 1999; Hewitt et al., 2013)

UK) and the 1970s-1980s for the rest of Europe. Within the category of non-EU migrants, however, there is still a large degree of variation in migration-union trajectories between groups. Thus 'marriage migration' appears to be more common among certain migrant groups, e.g. Turks and Pakistani, and marriage migration is more likely to be co-ethnic than other kinds of migration. While the two dimensions (co-ethnic partnering and marriage migration) are thus connected, they should not be conflated in the reasoning. Nielsen et al. (2009) for instance, analyse the causal effect of a legislation on marriage migrants, but suggests that the interpretation of the effect apply to all situations in which migrants marry other migrants rather than natives; in short, as an effect of the choice of partner, rather than the migration trajectory itself.

## 0.4 Theoretical framework

Building on this discussion of the literature and the theoretical contributions it offers, this research will follow a broad feminist perspective, linking an understanding that migration trajectories are *gendered* and *gendering* (Pedraza, 1991). This means that trajectories not only differ by gender, but are also shaped by gender relations, both in the country and context of origin, and in the country of immigration. In turn, these paths of migration, some of which are more likely to be walked by men and some by women, can also have *gendering* effects, either in further locking people and notably women into rigid gender roles; or on the contrary in giving them opportunities to re-negotiate gender roles and specialisation.

The first theoretical strand, drawn from the theory of assimilation and acculturation, suggests that the more exposure the migrant gets to the majority group in the society of immigration, the more likely they are to shift both practices and views of gender roles towards those of the majority group. It derives that, compared to migrants who partner with other migrants, migrants who intermarry with a native, and especially a majority native, should see their couple adopting modes of labour division that are closer to those of the majority native group. The process is not expected to be uniform across migrant groups, because the *starting points* (in Kalmijn (2010)'s terms) may differ. Some migrants may arrive with gender views and expectations that are very similar to those of the majority British or French native groups. This would be the expectation for most European migrants, for instance (as per e.g. Roeder and Mühlau (2014)'s findings). Other groups, in contrast, may arrive with more distinctive *gender cultures*, for instance when they come from countries with much lower levels of gender equality and women's empowerment. In addition, and in accordance with theories of

segmented assimilation, acculturation may work at a slower pace for certain groups, especially those who more frequently deploy strategies of endogamy - for instance through transnational marriages between children of migrants and primary migrants. The central explanatory factor here remains the idea of more or less different *gender cultures* and of processes of acculturation. Across migrant groups, one would therefore expect that both intermarriage and the length of time in the country will be associated with modes of gender division of labour that are closer to those of the native majority group. The migration trajectory should only matter insofar as it may condition how early migrants start being exposed to the gender norms of the country of immigration. Thus one would expect that individuals who migrated as children will be more likely to divide labour with their partner in a manner that is more similar to the majority native group, compared to migrants who arrived as adults. A further possibility is that migrants who migrate as independent adults, and prior to couple formation, may experience a form of migration trajectories that grants them much independence and distance from their community of origin, thus making them more likely to mingle with the majority group.

The second theoretical mechanism invokes not culture but power, namely power relations between partners. It builds on theories that consider the gender division of labour as rooted in the division of power between partners. I posit that the relative power and resources that migrants bring to the bargaining table of their relationship is likely to be affected by their migration trajectories, and notably its interlocking with the life-course and the key life-cycle event of couple formation. Migrants who migrated prior to couple formation are less likely to be - economically, socially, legally - dependent on their partner; by contrast, migrants whose timing of family formation coincide with the timing of migration may be in the worst position to bargain on the sharing of paid and unpaid labour, at the key transitional moment when the couple starts their cohabiting life. This could apply especially to migrants who entered on a partner visa, but the broader reasoning remains plausible even if the asymmetry plays out solely on social (and possibly economic) terms without involving legal dependency. It is not expected that only migration trajectories impact the power relation between partners. Indeed, the choice of partner also should: in intermarried couples, a native partner can be expected to be on much firmer ground than their migrant partner, in the sense that they may remain for a long time more competent with the language, more familiar with the institutions, and they may benefit from more extensive networks, especially in the majority group. Subsequently, they may be in a position to mediate and condition their migrant partner's access to certain resources, services and social circles, and they may leverage this 'native' premium

in the division of paid and unpaid labour. This power is likely to diminish over time, as migrant partners get more settled in the country of immigration, but it may durably impact the gender division of labour. However, and contrary to classic bargaining theory, I do not expect these negotiations to work on a gender-neutral basis. In societies which are still marked by patriarchal relations (and here I include British and French societies of immigration, as well as countries of origin), one should not assume that men and women negotiate on a level-playing field, including in the intimacy of the home and the couple. In her analysis of 'conjugal mixedness' - how migrant-native couples experience their cultural differences and how they find compromises -, Collet (2012) noted that women seemed less able than men to impose their preferences (on, e.g. the language spoken at home) - or that men were less conciliatory than women, which amounts to the same thing. Thus, one could expect that there is also a 'male premium', which favours men in the negotiations, and can blunt asymmetries that work against them, and sharpen those that are to their advantage.

This research's theoretical framework thus invokes theories of gender norms and 'doing gender', and theories of power and relative resources (broadly defined) to investigate connections between migration trajectories and the gender division of labour in couples. It will combine and test both explanatory threads of gender cultures and migration-union trajectories. Indeed, feminist theories of migration insist that gender relations both in the context of emigration and that of immigration shape migration trajectories as well as its outcomes. Explanations of gender cultures and migration-union trajectories are not mutually exclusive; the case I make does not pit ideologies against power relations; in the context of migration and gender, the two are at any rate undeniably enmeshed: the gender culture in the context of origin, like the gender assumptions inherent to both British and French immigration regimes, both play important roles in channeling men and women into different migration paths. But it is also true that, as little as connections between migrants and gender have been analysed quantitatively, differences across groups (and across couple types) have generally been explained by resorting to arguments of gender cultures and integration. The actual role of migration trajectories and experiences - their *gendering* potential, and not only their *gendered* profiles - has been very little addressed.

In this thesis, I do not look only at women's employment, or only at the gender division of housework/care in couples. I look at both together, through notion of *gender-specialisation*. The concept (and the measure) does not allow to appropriately capture degrees of 'equity' or 'inequity' (Kalmijn & Monden, 2012) and possible cases of compensation. That is because the concept is designed on the theoretical assumption that the gender-specialisation of labour is by definition

inequitable and that the gender-specialisation of labour, even if it is 'fair' from the point of view of time-allocation, is still fundamentally a relation of power and of domination (Kergoat, 2017). As such, the project is rooted in feminist critical theory. Furthermore, it is constructed as a fundamentally intersectional endeavour (I expand on this in chapter 2): it starts from the premise that the connection between trajectories of migration and social consequences of migration are intersectional. I follows an intra-categorical approach (McCall, 2005), segregating models between migrant women and migrant men, to understand not only gendered dynamics at how they are mediated by other characteristics and inequalities (e.g. ethnicity and educational level).

## 0.5 Two histories of migration: France and the UK

### Immigration flows

Both former colonial empires and industrial powers, the UK and France share a history of old and diversified mass immigration. Until the second world war, most migrants to France came from Europe, either Eastern Europe (notably Poland) or Southern Europe (especially Portugal, Spain and Italy). The post-war period of reconstruction which turned to economic prosperity saw a rising need for manpower. This led to a steep rise in labour migration. Until the late 1970s, most labour migrants came from Southern European countries, and from Northern Africa (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia). From 1974 and the closure of the borders to (most) labour migration, the migration flows shifted, with growing proportions of family reunification and (though in much smaller numbers) students and political refugees. Migrants from Southern Europe and North Africa continued to come, with rising proportions of migrant women among them. Migration from other parts of the world are on the whole more recent than the groups just mentioned, and the post-1974 era is associated with a greater diversity - including gender diversity - of migration origins and profiles of migrants (Beauchemin, Borrel, Régnard, & Santelli, 2015). Migrants from Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey, and European countries other than Spain, Portugal and Italy, mostly came after 1974, and in smaller numbers. Exile migration, notably from former Indochina and Central Africa also increased in the same period. Immigration from Southeast Asia is very concentrated around the times of the political crisis in the Indochinese peninsula (1975-1983), while Turkish immigration followed shortly after (one in two Turkish-born migrants arrived after 1989). Sub-Saharan immigration (like Chinese immigration) is more recent still, with most migrants arriving after 1984. Part of this migration, notably from the Sahel region, is labour migration, later followed by family reunification. Most of the migrants born

South of the Sahel, however, came as refugees and asylum-seekers.

The UK has also been the destination of many migrants. The Irish were there in large numbers already before the second world war. In contrast, most migrants came after 1950, initially in response to postwar labour shortages, but in differentiated waves for each group. Most Caribbean migrants arrived during the years 1955 to 1965, whereas migrants from SubSaharan Africa (from Nigeria, for most of them), from India and from Pakistan arrived in the 1970s, and even later in the case of the Pakistanis. Most of Bangladeshi and Chinese migrants arrived after 1980 (Owen, 2003; Lessard-Phillips, 2009; Dustmann Theodoropoulos, 2010). In the 1970s British subjects of South Asian origin came from Africa in response to the Ugandan and Kenyan governments' Africanization policies - the 'twice migrant' population described by Bhachu (1985). As in France, since the 1970s, the legal entry of unskilled, non-white (non-EU) people has been restricted to the family or partners of these earlier immigrants, brought through family reunification provisions and partner visa. In consequence, Britain's contemporary immigrant-origin population mainly consists of these very specific groups of postwar immigrants and their descendants.

These descriptions are detailed further in the French and British chapters. Finally, I want to set the legal stage for family reunifications and migrant-native unions in France and the UK.

### **Regulations and restrictions: family migration and mixed couples**

The British and French immigration regimes have followed very similar evolutions and are very comparable in effect (although they have differed in justification and narratives of integration (Favell, 1998). During the recruitment period they wanted only temporary workers, so family reunification was little developed but also little regulated. Rules were underdeveloped and often informally. The UK was one of the first European states to introduce a sophisticated policy framework on family-related migration. In the 1960-70s, many measures were specifically designed to prevent and contain marriage and family migration. This was when the 'primary purpose' rule was brought in, which required of all foreign nationals married to British citizens to be able to prove that the primary purpose of their marriage was not the acquisition of British citizenship. It prevented thousands of individuals married to British citizens to enter the UK until it was dropped in 1997.

Although the stated objective in the UK was to curb immigration, this motive was not present as such in the rest of Europe's policies until the 1990s. The European Convention of Human Rights and the European Court of Human

Rights were often referred to in family-related migration cases (Lahav 1997). However, while family reunification policies in France were perhaps not – at least in the beginning – expressly motivated by immigration restrictions, the definition of family that it relied on and enforced was certainly restrictive. As in the UK, the framing of family-related migration drew on heavily gendered tropes and made no room for family forms and relations outside of spouses and children within a nuclear model (Kofman, 2004), as marriage (or civil partnership) is mandatory for a couple's eligibility to family reunification, of which only spouses and children can benefit.

The fact is that women constitute the bulk of family-related migration, on which European states have been clamping down (Boyle, Feng, & Gayle, 2009; Charsley et al., 2012). Though family reunification and formation is a human right enshrined in international human rights legislation<sup>7</sup>, there are many restrictions in the UK and France on who can enjoy this right. Visas allowing family reunion and the settlement of spouses are subject to strict economic criteria and potential migrants are commonly tested for language skills and may be prevented from migrating to join partners because of their age (Williams, 2010). This has also justified the introduction of further requirements and tests (Wray, 2011). Under the current immigration regulations, a partner visa allows migrants to the UK to stay for two and a half years in the UK, following which partners can apply to extend their partner/family visa. It is only after five years of continuous residency in the UK that migrants who first entered the country on a partner visa can apply for independent leave to remain. If their application is successful, it ends the period during which their right to live in the UK is dependent on their sponsor partner and on the continuation of their relationship and cohabitation. As of the 2012 reform to the family migration visa, there is now an English language test, as well as a requirement for the couple and more specifically the sponsor partner to prove that they meet an income (or savings) threshold which guarantees that they will be able to support the couple financially. This income threshold conditions eligibility for family reunification in the UK. Though introduced in 2012, this reform was foregrounded in 1999, 2002 and 2010 (Charsley et al., 2012; Turner, 2015). It is disputed whether the introduction of these provisions has had any impact at all, apart from bringing in further restriction on immigration at large, and especially women's immigration (Van Walsum & Spijkerboer, 2007).

From the point of the view of immigration laws, at any point in time, couples formed between a migrant and a native partner may fall into three main configurations. The first one is binational couples (Riaño 2011; Unterreiner 2012),

<sup>7</sup>see Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

typically when one partner is a national of the country of residence and the other is not. The second case is identified as mixed-immigration status couples (Griffiths and Morgan 2017): when the two partners do not have the same residency rights. It often overlaps with the first category. The final configuration is when both members of the migrant-native couples are citizen of the country where they reside, either because the migrant partner acquired citizenship at some stage, or got it from birth through one of their parents (*jus sanguini* provisions). Of course, these categories move, as couples can shift from one to the next through citizenship acquisition (or loss, potentially). But it is also self-evident that couples in these three categories do not fall under the same regulations, and that being in the first category is likely to come with a lot more trouble.

The British and French immigration regime has long paid close attention to family and spouse migration. It has justified its interest in connection to the prevention of 'non-genuine' and 'sham' marriages to bypass British immigration restrictions. This political concern was already explicit in the discourse surrounding primary purpose (Yuval-Davis, Anthias, & Kofman, 2005), and refreshed by the 2012 reform. Thus since 2012, applicants for partner visa who are already residing in the UK at the time when they apply are put into a different category than applicants from 'outside', with stricter eligibility criteria being applied to the latter category. Certain migration trajectories, in combination with the mixed-nationality or mixed-immigration status of partner, have been particularly targeted by immigration restrictions, who cast doubt of the authenticity of all such mixed couples, suspected of being cynical enterprise to bypass immigration control. Marriage migration is especially suspect in the eyes of the Home Office (Home Office, 2013), while French ministers have been known to treat all French-foreigner unions as potential scams to obtain French citizenship (E. Fassin, Ferran, & Slama, 2009). The suspicion of sham wedding is linked to the possibility that marriage migrants would be deceiving both sponsor partner and/or immigration control in order to be able to migrate and settle in the UK or France. It is because on this suspicion that immigration control both in France and in the UK justifies the policing of the intimacy of these couples. Until very recently, EU foreign citizens were free to move, settle, form attachments and untie them in France and in the UK as they please. Brexit has changed the game for EU residents in England, potentially bringing their choice of partner and the 'authenticity' of their relationships and of their ties to the UK under the scrutiny of immigration control.

## **Part 1**

The political borders of the statistical 'Others'



## Chapter 1

# Mobile and racialised 'Others. Quantifying migration trajectories and mixed couples in France and in the UK

It is difficult to think simultaneously that the objects being measured do exist, and that this is only a convention.

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Desrosières (1998, p. 1)

Statistical data ought to always be considered in (political, institutional, historical) context and as part of power relations. D'Ignazio and Klein start their book *Data Feminism* (2020) with this: their first chapter calls for *examining power* behind and within the structures and institution of statistical production and the people who produce them. This part is dedicated to presenting the two surveys that form the focus and provide the material for this chapter and this research: the French survey *Trajectoires et Origines*<sup>1</sup> and the UK Household Longitudinal survey, also known as *Understanding Society*<sup>2</sup>. In line with what has become a fundamental of feminist epistemology of situated knowledge (Haraway, 1988), particular attention will be drawn to the producers of these sources and to the political, institutional and micro-sociological contexts of their genesis. Notably,

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<sup>1</sup>Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques, & Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques. (2008). *Trajectoires et origines. enquête sur la diversité des populations*. ADISP. Paris. Retrieved from <http://www.progedo-adisp.fr/enquetes/XML/lil.php?lil=lil-0494>.

<sup>2</sup>University of Essex, & Institute for Social and Economic Research. (2019). *Understanding society: Waves 1-8, 2009-2018 and harmonised BHPS: Waves 1-18, 1991-2009. [data collection]. special licence*. UK data service. SN 6614. Retrieved from <http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6614-14..>

I will historicize the survey structure, recruitment and categories, mapping out the statistical continuities and key inflexions which drove the survey design process, especially on the topic of migration and population diversity. I will further discuss the process, the resistances and compromises that were found, which ultimately allowed for data that is innovative and crucial but not neutral for the research questions I investigate in this thesis.

The two surveys are unique in the French and British statistical landscapes because of a combination of features: they record information on the mode and timing of international mobility; they include measures of population diversity; they over-sample migrants *and* their questionnaires comprises questions on partner, family formation including timing and mixing, and on gender and relations in the household. Such co-occurrence of data and themes in large-scale surveys is rare, recent, and indispensable for studies such as this one. It is important to contextualise this encounter, because it conditions both the quantitative analysis and the possibility of a comparison between the two countries. But it is also important because the context in which this co-occurrence of data and research questions emerged in the surveys still informs the data, the analysis, as well as what remains unaddressed.

The first chapter focuses on the categories of mixedness and migration and their representation in both surveys. The second chapter extend this conversation to the intersectional articulation between gender and migration in survey data.

## Chapter introduction

This first chapter has three aims. The first is to introduce and briefly historicise the two surveys used in this research, *Trajectoires et Origines* and *Understanding Society*, and explain why they fit the purpose of the study as well as the context of their coming about. The second aim is to discuss the extent to which statistics on mixedness, migration and migration-related inequalities differ between France and the UK, and to situate my specific objects - migrant-native couples and union-migration trajectories - in British and French statistical landscapes. As I will discuss, the survey quantification of mixedness and migration are tightly connected to the quantification of population diversity. The French and British cases have often been pitted against one another as opposite models when it comes to understanding and managing diversity, integration (Favell, 1998), social cohesion, national identity and mixedness (Unterreiner, 2012a). They have also been constructed as exceptions in the relevant fields of statistical production: France, because of what is often referred to as a constitutional ban on ethnic statistics and its regime of Republican colour-blindness; and the UK, for the

opposite reason that it is the only country in Western Europe to routinely collect statistics that use an explicitly ethnic (or rather ethno-racial) framework.

The scale of this difference between the two cases bears consequences for the comparability of the data, both in terms of overlap (is the same data on migrants and migration collected in both countries? Are the same migrant groups focused on?) and in terms of meaning and interpretation (does the data and the categories mean the same thing and weigh the same weight in both countries?). As we will see, the political response to the two surveys were very different: where Understanding Society was and remains largely uncontentious, TeO became the object of intense political scrutiny and a nation-wide polemic known as the French controversy on ethnic statistics. The final aim of this chapter will be to assess how migrants and their conjugal and geographic trajectories are constructed in both surveys. I argue that though the two surveys overtly differ in structure and aims, they problematise migration along the same lines, through the prism of discrimination and inequalities (mainly on the academic side) and integration and diversity management (or race relations) on the government side. This help explain why the quantification of migration as trajectory (in geographic, legal and conjugal terms) is a much more secondary dimension. Subsequently, it helps make sens of the surveys' focus, in both countries, on specific - racialised - categories of migrants, hence also on specific categories of mixing.

**Why survey data? Why these surveys?** Much of the literature on the statistical construction of categories of 'others' (migrant, racial, ethnic, deviant, etc...) has focused on census data and politics - for good reasons (P. Aspinall & Song, 2014; Ballard, 1996; Bulmer, 1986; Owen, 2007; Thompson, 2015). The census holds a particular space and a direct connection to the state, conferring census classifications a unique potency and a status. As the controversies around the 2020 edition of the British census illustrated again, changes in census classifications are often heavily debated, because they condition politics of recognition at the same time as they draw boundaries of national belonging (Thompson, 2016). More and more, however, states have been turning away from classic census taking, spacing out or splitting census waves, a process motivated in no small part by the exorbitant cost of exhaustive censuses. This has gone concomitantly with the development of large-scale data surveys that are mostly publicly-funded without necessarily being fully locked in the constraints of public statistics. Historically, this has also meant a greater reliance on statistical tools of extrapolation and significance-testing, rather than on the exhaustive quality of the data which was allowed by censuses (Desrosières, 1985). Representative surveys, if undercut in some ways by booming methods of computational methods of data extraction

('Big Data')<sup>3</sup>, continue to represent a pillar of academic social knowledge, and to benefit from a legitimacy and an aura of scientific credibility seldom granted to other data sources for social analysis. Surveys also hold much creative potential in moulding statistically-inspired representations of society: who is the majority; how is it defined; who is at the margins; what puts them there. Quantitative surveys, according to Sarah Igo's *Averaged American*, played a major role in shaping the understanding of modern nation states, and notably: who was part of them (Igo, 2007, p. 283).

Importantly, surveys like the ones under study in this thesis have come to combine detailed data on migration trajectories with broader data on household compositions, family life, living conditions, labour distribution, and sometimes even - gender roles and relations. These aspects of life *post-migration* could not be studied with flow data on migration (e.g. the International Passenger survey in the UK (IPS)<sup>4</sup>). Indeed, such a combination of data is found in so few large-scale surveys that the choice imposed itself.<sup>5</sup>

**Sources** The chapter analyses the design of the French survey *Trajectoires et Origines* (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009), and the British survey *Understanding Society* (UKLHS; ISER 2009 and running). Like in the empirical analysis later in the thesis, the analysis focuses on the first two waves of *Understanding Society* (2009-2011). The period of data collection is therefore contemporary with that of TeO (2008-2009). For the purpose of this discussion on survey design, it is sometimes also useful to take into consideration survey changes that were brought in later, notably the introduction of the Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Sample Boost (IEMB) at Wave 6 of *Understanding Society*. In the main, this chapter relies on two sources of data: archives, primarily technical documentation and the various proposals and working reports that were issued by the survey teams during the process of the survey design; and semi-structured interviews with the survey designers themselves (see table 1.1). Not all members of either of the two survey teams could be interviewed, but the participants included most of the survey leads. The recruitment also focused on those survey designers who had been most involved on questions of migration and ethnicity, and those who had been involved over a long period of time and therefore had a 'long view' of the project and the survey design process. Interviews were carried out between 2017 and

<sup>3</sup>Burrows and Savage (2014) and Savage and Burrows (2007) have problematised the receding position of large-scale surveys and the rise of 'Big data' in the production and claim of social knowledge, especially with regards to the commercial and transactional nature of much computational data sources and agents; and the loss of ground of social scientists in the field of social analysis.

<sup>4</sup>The IPS is the source of the data for the ONS estimates of long-term international migration

<sup>5</sup>The Labour Force Survey in the UK could have been a contender, but it does not include sufficient information on migration trajectories and timing.

2019, participants were recruited through a mix of direct contact-taking and snowball-sampling. All interviews lasted between 45 min and 1h30.

TABLE 1.1: Expert interviewees:  
UKHLS and TeO survey designers

Interview number	Interview year	Interview mode	Understanding Society	TeO
#1	2018	Face-to-face	Survey designer, Ethnicity Strand	
#2	2019	Video-call	Survey lead	
#3	2019	Video-call	Survey designer, Ethnicity Strand	
#4	2019	Video-call	Survey designer	
#5	2017	Video-call		Survey team
#6	2017	Face-to-face		Survey lead
#7	2017	Face-to-face		Survey lead

**Chapter outline** The chapter unfolds in three parts. First, it problematises the ways in which mixed couples and mixedness have been constructed historically and statistically in both countries, and how these definitions connect to classification of migration. Second, the chapter turns its attention to the two surveys at hand, notably to the political, economic, and institutional context of their coming into existence, from the initial idea to the final design and data collection. The third part dives into the more technical matter of the (over)sample design and of the questions on migration that were ultimately retained in the surveys. More micro-sociological, this section follows the hesitations and ambiguities, the influences both internal and external, and the decision-making process within the survey design team, in an effort to unpack the particular frames within which migration and indirectly mixedness were constructed in the survey data.

### Theoretical lens: sociology of quantification and *data feminism*

Quantification practices and statistics tend to be analysed as methods, as useful tools to provide relevant results. The sociology of quantification shifts the researcher's gaze, inviting us to look at quantification as its own research object. The word 'quantification' is here distinguished from that of 'measure' (Desrosières & Kott, 2005). Whereas the act of 'measure' is attached to a realist understanding of the world, in which there would be 'real' things simply waiting to be objectively counted, the sociology of 'quantification' (and related streams like the economics of conventions (Thévenot, 2016)) underline the extent to which statistics rely on conventions. It implies, in a broad sense, the process of actively manufacturing numbers, a process made of negotiations, compromises, translations, encoding, agreements... a process therefore deeply contextual and political, imbued with power relations as well as technical considerations. Certainly, in the spaces and the moments where we trade stories in words for

stories in numbers (quantification), and stories in numbers for stories in words (interpretation), neither the data nor the ways data is understood and used are completely predictable. Conventions of equivalence and meanings are not inherently nor necessarily the best or the most accurate: they are those that were invested in, with money and with meaning and sometimes with no small degree of contingency. Nevertheless, they have the power to produce norms and categories that hold and that matter (Bloor, 1982; Latour, 1989) and can durably shape the statistical forms and the debates of the present (Desrosières, 1985; MacKenzie, 1981). Classification and statistics, we expect, describe certain kinds of people which are identified as having distinct properties, properties that call for being controlled, helped, altered or (more rarely) emulated. But the process by which certain groups are identified as warranting counting, and delineated in statistical categories and constructs, also changes them, how they experience their social reality, and the social reality itself. This is what Ian Hacking (2006) named the 'looping effect' (Hacking, 2006, p. 1). This is reflected in the ways in which 'mixed couples' and 'migration' are quantified in survey data.

Adopting a reflexive approach on the ways in which statistical categories and statistical actors are anchored in the society that they attempt to describe is therefore important to understand and interpret the statistical material they produce - especially so when it touches onto topics as sensitive and contested as migration. Yet this reflexive stance cannot be assimilated to a criticism or an attack against quantitative methods. Alain Desrosières himself was a public statistician with no intention of disqualifying his own field or expertise. Behind the study of the social, historical and political process of quantification, the aim is to inform the practice and, in this sense, to improve and to rehabilitate quantitative methods, especially for critical aims.<sup>6</sup> The efforts that I have deployed here to contextualise and scrutinize the survey categories and the survey data are motivated by the logic of statactivism, aimed at 'reappropriating statistics' power of denunciation and emancipation' (Bruno, Didier, & Vitale, 2014, p. 199). It stems from the belief that statistics are part of the vocabulary of critic and contention. Though statactivism often refers to the production of original statistical data, the use of qualitative and historical data with which to inform and illuminate statistical praxis is a key part of the toolbox.

<sup>6</sup>Qualitative methods of sociological enquiries are expressions of social relations to no lesser degree than quantitative methods, and they require the same reflexivity. Categorisation and the manufacturing process of conventions are in no way specific to quantitative methods and the statistical reasoning, but truly a feature of all knowledge production on society, indeed of all cognitive activity (Berger & Luckman, 1966)

## 1.1 Mixed couples, migration and ethnicity in statistics

### 1.1.1 Categorising and quantifying mixed couples in France

The notions of 'mixed couple' and mixing are highly polysemous and contextual. There are no global definitions of what a 'mixed couple' is (Edwards, 2012; Filhon & Varro, 2005; Varro, 2003). Which difference matters enough to identify a couple as 'mixed' depends on the differences considered structuring in any given society, and the statistical construction of mixedness reflects these national, official narratives of difference-that-matter. It is fundamentally bound to identifications of 'otherness', which are by definition 'floating', in Hall's terms (S. Hall, 1997), and which statistics 'fix' into classifications. The particular classification and statistics used to describe the phenomenon of mixedness reflect society's history and construction, but also the power struggles and institutional, academic, administrative and political rationales that participate in the characterisation and representation - statistical or otherwise - of the national 'Others'. Accordingly, perhaps especially when talking about mixing, it is necessary to clearly posit a social, temporal and geographic frame.

For a long time, in France, mixedness - *la mixité* - is mainly religious; for inter-religious couples, mixedness can be simply frowned upon, or downright dangerous, for instance in the case of Jewish-Christian unions, in-between racial and religious mixing (Bensimon & Lautman, 1977). In the 19th century, and especially at the beginning of the 20th century, the narrative of mixedness shifts: *mixité* then mostly designate gender-mixed spaces, such as 'mixed' schools that teach boys and girls together. Ultimately the notion of social mixing (*mixité sociale*) prevails, focused on the intermingling between social classes. Class identities and class struggles together with the influence of Marxist and then Bourdieusian theories in France have durably structured representations of social cleavages in French society. Accordingly, there is a long tradition of sociological and statistical studies of couple formation, which have constructed 'mixed' couples on the basis of unions across social classes (heterogamy/homogamy). In this stream, Alain Girard (1964), François de Singly de Singly (1987), Michel Bozon and François Héran (2006) are pioneering figures. This focus on social class continues to be particularly strong in French scholarship, to the point where it has been argued that it blinds French scholars and society to other social cleavages - notably ethnic and racial inequalities (Mazouz, 2020; Safi, 2013).

Indeed, the French colonial empire operated with different categories of 'otherness' and 'mixedness' than those most commonly studied in mainland France. There the cleavage and the hierarchies were clearly racial, as reflected in

colonial classifications (Renard, 2019; Saada, 2002). Mixed couples in the colonies involved a French or European partner and an *indigène* (native), but the gendered layout was almost always the same: the *indigène* was generally a woman (see also Stoler (2010), in which case mixedness could be perceived as a civilising and emancipating opportunity for them (Ruscio, 2002). In contrast, reversed gender configuration (when the French partner is a woman and the *indigène* a man) were never even remotely tolerated (MacMaster, 2011). This emphasizes the relevance of gender relations for opportunity structures (there were very few female settlers), and the importance of patriarchy in defining acceptable and non-acceptable forms of mixing. This last point is also reflected in the history of European national law used to regulate mixed marriages in colonial empires, which often stripped European women of their nationality if they married an indigenous partner (De Hart, 2015).

Colonial history is a crucial element of the construction of figures of mixedness in France, and it is in or with reference to the colonial context that many of the representations - including gendered representations - of mixed couples were forged. With the successive waves of immigration, the question of racial mixedness was transported from the colonies to mainland France. Indeed, the introduction of family reunification programs for Algerian guest-workers were linked in part to concerns about their mixing with French women (MacMaster, 1997, 2011). The question of migration, family and mixedness meet here. In the French context, the emphasis on Republican universalism and the fact that French colonial and slaver history in which racial hierarchies were rooted mostly took place outside of mainland France (contrary to, e.g. in the United States) has often been invoked to justify how and why 'otherness' in France can be defined and debated in largely colour-blind terms.<sup>7</sup> Yet there is no question that the racial hierarchies implemented in the colonies permeated mainland France early on,<sup>8</sup> and marked representations of mixedness there as well.

Although social mixing and gender-mixing continue to dominate the semantic and statistical field of French *mixité*, the omnipresence of categories of 'immigrés' and 'étrangers' contribute to creating another figure of the 'Other'. Though fuzzily defined, this 'Other' is presumed to be 'visibly different', and the nonofficial avatar of mixedness that comes with them is that of 'visible' (understand: visibly mixed-race) mixedness, the white/black, white/'beur'.<sup>9</sup> These

<sup>7</sup>See e.g. Le Bras (1998) and Le Bras, Blum, and Guérin-Pace (2007). The next subsection engages with these debates as they informed the controversy of ethnic statistics in France. For further details see appendix 7.3.3 to chapter 1.

<sup>8</sup>It is little known, for instance, that interracial (black-white) marriages were discreetly but effectively banned under Napoleon (Heuer, 2009).

<sup>9</sup>The term 'beur' (or the feminine 'beurette') is sometimes used to refer to populations linked to North African immigration, notably French children of Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian migrants.

mixed couples are abundantly staged in French cultural production, and immediately identified as 'mixed' in French society, though in statistical terms they only appear through the (distorted) medium of binational mixing (French-foreigner) or mixed-migration background. Until the end of the 1980s, the only official statistical definition of 'mixed couples' was binational unions. Since then, the term 'immigré', initially a layman term, was pushed politically and ultimately promoted to statistical category. Accordingly, the dominant statistical paradigm for mixed couples focuses on conjugal situations in which partners are expected to have been socialised in different national environments to the extent that they were born in different countries: one partner in France, and one partner abroad, to non-French parents. These are therefore tied to migration experience, although in practice also interwoven and invested with ethnic and racial interpretations and assumptions (Simon, 1998, 2010).

### 1.1.2 Mixed couples and mixed identities in the UK

In the UK, statistics have been concerned with mixing and mixed couples since the very early days, due to the discipline's initial links with eugenics. The measurement of correlation between personal characteristics, as an example, was developed in response to the Eugenic Society's concern about inter-unions (MacKenzie, 1981). Perceiving social disadvantage to be the reflection of genetic inferiority, eugenicist projects were anxious to prevent the interbreeding and dilution of what they saw as superior European stock. As in France, mixed unions have been characterised in different ways at different times, and in different parts of the UK. Inter-religious unions were an important figure of mixedness, and continue to be the main one in Northern Ireland, where unions between Catholic and Protestant still constitute the greatest border-crossing (Marranci, 2006).

Historically nationality seems not to have been a major criterion in identifying difference, hence mixing. As in France, categories and perceptions of mixedness were strongly influenced by the British Empire, but in contrast to the French Empire, the racial categories used in the British Empire were not restricted to the colonies, and were imported to the UK (Favell, 1998, p. 119). The idea of the 'English race' and its superiority was developed since the seventeenth century (Banton, 1977), and underpinned this classification. The 1948 British Nationality Act confirmed the status of British subject to colonial subjects without reference to nationality. 'In absence of a meaningful concept of citizenship, British immigration policy had to operate on a proxy[:] ... race' (Joppke, 1999, p. 101). The evolution of the contours of British nationality since the 1960s are drawn through reactions to waves of non-white immigration from the New Commonwealth (Hansen, 1999, 2000). Thus the British national 'Others' were

constructed fairly straight-forwardly around race rather than nationality or migratory background. According to Favell (1998), the emphasis put on race rather than nationality was the reason why a much stronger distinction and segregation of concerns was implemented in Britain between issues of immigration control and population diversity, namely 'race relations'. Where the French model of integration posited the acquisition of French nationality as the end goal and culmination of the integration process, the British 'pact' was to associate active anti-discrimination policies (fostering good 'race relations' within) with extreme stringency in immigration restrictions.

Accordingly, mixed unions have been mainly operationalised as inter-ethnic (Berrington, 1996; Coleman, 1985; ONS, 2014). In addition, the statistical operationalisation of mixedness in British statistics in the last 30 years has largely been aimed at individual mixed identities perhaps more so than mixed couples. The 'mixed' ethnic options were introduced in the census in 2001. The use of 'mixed' categories was also justified from the multicultural camp as reflecting new cultural identities and the positive 'hybridisation' of British society. In effect, the three specific 'mixed' categories are interracial (rather than inter-ethnic), reflecting the focus on mixing between white and non-white groups.<sup>10</sup> Accordingly there is also a - mainly qualitative - scholarship in the UK that explicitly studies 'mixed-race' individuals and experiences (e.g. Ali (2003, 2011), Peter J. Aspinall (2009), and McKenzie (2012)), while the term and the topic of 'mixed-race' is almost entirely absent from French scholarship on mixing in contemporary French society.<sup>11</sup> This genealogy of French and British categories of 'mixedness' sheds some light on how distant the question of 'mixing' and 'migration' are from one another in politics and statistics. In the French case, mixed unions have been tightly connected to questions of immigration control and their conjugal trajectories have been largely understood to be intertwined with migration experience. This is not the case in the UK, where migration trajectories, especially in relation to couple formation, have only relatively recently become the subject of (qualitative) sociological scholarship, and almost exclusively in the context of endogamous, 'transnational' unions among South Asians communities (Charsley, Bolognani, Ersanilli, & Spencer, 2020; Charsley, Storer-Church, Benson, & Van Hear, 2012).

<sup>10</sup>The census 'mixed' ethnic options are the following since 2001: 'Mixed White and Black Caribbean'; 'Mixed White and Black African', 'Mixed White and Asian', and 'any other mixed background'.

<sup>11</sup>Mixed-race children (*métis*) in the French colonial empire are however the focus of Saada (2007)'s historical scholarship.

### 1.1.3 Measuring diversity or measuring mobility? Categories or trajectories of migrants and couples

Though the connection between mixing and migration is more often made in France than in the UK, this does not actually imply that the definition of migration involved is focused on migration trajectories and experience. When it comes to statistical operationalisations of migration, there are in fact two paradigms: migration as an experience of *mobility*, and migration as a marker of *otherness* (Renard, 2019). Naturally, in migrants' lives, the two often overlap, because many migrants will go through the process of international migration and experience its consequences, but they will also be identified as 'others', possibly discriminated and so on.

In 1998, Alain Blum had criticised the introduction of 'ethnic belonging' and 'ethnic origins' in the survey MGIS<sup>12</sup> on the ground of the volatility, heterogeneity and historical usage of these ethnic criteria. But the main issue Blum saw with 'this postulate of aggregation and especially of the methodological introduction of a "new concept" to group together and designate immigrant populations, is that it puts in the background what is supposed to the object of study: immigration. [...] Nothing is done to estimate what mobility itself brings about' (Blum, 1998, p. 577). As Renard (2019, pp. 480–481) pointed, the focus on ethnic categorisation meant that the study of the processes and dynamics of geographic mobility were forgotten, even though 'geographic mobility' was in the very name of the study. 'It would have been interesting', had added Blum, 'to hierarchise the fact of movement, of crossing a border, of staying in one place for a certain length of time, and finally the fact of migrating from one country or the other. By shifting the analytical reasoning from the length of immigration to ethnicity, the fundamental point that makes an immigrant population - the fact of migration - risks being forgotten.' (Blum, 1998, p. 578). The risk is that the superimposition of measures of 'otherness' on top or instead of measures of mobility leads to shadowing if not forgetting the relevance of the second for inequalities. Renard (2019) in her socio-history of the statistical categories of 'migrants' and 'descendants of migrants' in France and Germany, followed the same thread. Is migration problematised in the surveys as an experience of cross-border mobility or merely as a marker of otherness? The question extends beyond categorisation and it has expressions and consequences in sample design.

The British and the French states differentiate explicitly between categories of migrants (e.g., economic, family, refugee..). They also focus on certain categories of migrants, which are deemed more problematic and less beneficial

<sup>12</sup>Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques, & Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques. (1992). *Mobilités géographiques et insertion sociale*. Paris.

for the host country. Point systems instigate categorisations of migrants best defined as ordinal - nominal classifications which are associated with judgements and rankings of essential worth (Fourcade, 2016). Yet the classifications and quantification of migrants used by the state are not necessarily those that appear in surveys. Information on immigration status (beyond citizenship) are almost never requested in survey questionnaire, be they British or French, and migrants are not explicitly ranked. Yet the 'ranking' of migrants plays a role in what migrants and which kind of migration require specific quantification, i.e. dedicated categories and sampling - usually those at the bottom of the ranking. This ordinalization of migrants and migration relies on creating more or less desirable profiles of migrants. It pays very little attention and leaves very little space for understanding migration as a trajectory, part of a biography and the life course of migrants - admittedly a tougher statistical endeavour (Bowker, 1999).

## 1.2 Two surveys in context

### 1.2.1 British survey: Understanding Society (2009-)

The project for Understanding Society (or UKLHS - UK Longitudinal Household Survey) is developed at the University of Essex by researchers in ISER (Institute for Social and Economic Research), working jointly with the ESRC UK Longitudinal Studies Centre (ULSC). The ambition is to develop large-scale, quality longitudinal survey data for the UK. The only important household panel survey at that point was the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which had been running since 1991. The initial proposal behind Understanding Society was to make a much bigger version of the BHPS.<sup>13</sup> The project also incorporated a strong focus on ethnicity, embodied in the Ethnicity Strand – one of three research strands around which the survey design was to be organised.

The projected sample size made Understanding Society a very expensive project, and the team needed to secure grants from various sources to cover the initial cost of the study. Most of the funding came from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), for whom it represents the single biggest investment ever. Several government departments contributed as well.<sup>14</sup> The project thus absorbed much of the available funding for social sciences: this happens at the detriment of other projects, including the re-edition of the National Survey on Ethnic Minorities, a series of surveys which had been running since the 1960s. The next survey in the series was to be a separate longitudinal survey on ethnic

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<sup>13</sup>The survey team jokingly calls Understanding Society the BigHPS

<sup>14</sup>Substantial funding came in from the department of Business, Innovation and skills. Other government departments contribute at various stages of the survey, among which the Department for Work and Pensions, the Department of Health and the Department for Education.

minorities. That project, however, was eventually shelved in favour of the project for Understanding Society. The project lead, Richard Berthoud, specialist of ethnicity and, to a lesser extent, of migration, was recruited for Understanding Society's Ethnicity Strand.

So that's why, that's one of the main reasons why [ethnicity] was such a strong emphasis from the start, they had abandoned that one, that separate longitudinal study, but they were incorporating it into this new, they were incorporating this strong ethnicity strand.

(Interviewee #3 – UKLHS survey designer, Ethnicity branch)

Regardless of its perhaps somewhat opportunistic roots, the Ethnicity Strand became a flagship of the survey as a whole, and was responsible for setting up a number of survey features of great relevance to the present project. The survey team wanted to cater and appeal to all sorts of users in order to broaden its audience and justify its cost, and the Ethnicity Strand team set up an extensive consultation process to that aim. Led in this by Lucinda Platt and Alita Nandi, they involved a wide variety of potential survey users, from academics to government departments and the ONS, as well as survey design teams from other countries. The introduction of the ethnic question in the census in the 1980s and 1990s (Ballard, 1996; Bulmer, 1986) and 10 years later the amendments brought to the census grid for the 2001 census wave (Peter J Aspinall, 2012) had given rise to lively academic and - to a point - public debate. The new 'mixed' ethnic options had been a topic of particular discussion in the 2001 census (the last at the point where Understanding Society was designed) (Peter J. Aspinall, 2009), along with the inclusion of the Irish as a distinct ethnic group - the result of intense lobbying (Thompson, 2015). Prompted by the consultation, the Ethnicity Strand team also pushes for the inclusion in the Understanding Society questionnaire of questions which had seldom been asked before in the British context. Notably, questions on parents' (and even grandparents') country of birth, associated with more continental approaches to population diversity, such as in France (through the focus on *origins* and descendants of migrants since the 1990s) and in Germany since 2005 (through the category of *Person with Migrationshintergrund*).

The Ethnicity Strand's key objective was to fill the gap that had been pinpointed in the abandoned proposal for the longitudinal survey on Ethnic minorities: namely, the absence of representative longitudinal data on ethnic minorities. Ethnic minority individuals represent a relatively small minority for randomised sampling: in the 2001 Census, under 15% of the population identified as something other than 'white British'. Sample size shrinks quickly, especially once we start breaking them down by different ethnic identifications. 'Other white', which was the largest ethnic minority group, amounted to 5% of the population living in

the UK in 2001; 'Indian' was the second largest, with 2% of the population. Ethnic minority individuals also tend to be concentrated in certain urban areas, are more likely to refuse to participate in surveys, have higher attrition rates and are more likely to move often, making them harder to follow and track between different stages of the process (something noted by various survey designers (Beauchemin, Algava, & Lhommeau, 2015; Berthoud, Fumagalli, Lynn, & Platt, 2009)). Therefore, the Understanding Society survey team decided to over-represent ethnic minority households (households with at least one ethnic minority member) by means of a sample boost: The Ethnic Minority Boost sample (EMB or EMBS) was built into the initial survey sample design at wave 1: it added about 1,000 respondents from 5 selected ethnic groups (5,000 in total), and a further 1000 from other targeted groups (Nandi & Platt, 2009). At wave 1, this represented about 4,000 households.

Initially the UKLHS sampling design registers no explicit interest in migration. The survey questionnaire includes some questions on migration trajectories (for a list, see table 2.1 in the first section of the next chapter) as well as, notably, languages, citizenship, bi-nationality. Most of these questions are grouped into a questionnaire module - the 'extra 5 minutes' questions -, which changes from waves to waves. The extra 5 minutes questions, however, are only asked of certain categories of target respondents. This changes over time, however: the target audience for the 'extra 5 minutes' questions is gradually extended from EMBS respondents<sup>15</sup> to also include foreign-born individuals; and then at wave 6 (2015-2016), the survey incorporates a new sample boost, the Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Boost Sample (IEMB).

At wave 1, Understanding Society thus comprised individuals in 40,000 households in the UK, making it the largest annual household panel survey. At wave 2, the survey merged with the BHPS sample. Individuals aged 16 and over in sampled households were to respond to a questionnaire each year, and would be providing over different waves a wide range of information.

### 1.2.2 French survey: *Trajectoires et Origines* (2008-2009)

The French National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED) and the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) launched the project for the survey *Trajectoires et Origines* (TeO) at the end of 2004. The two institutions represent two spheres of statistical production and research: on the side of the INSEE, official statistics; on the side of the INED, publicly-funded academic research. The cooperation between the INED and the INSEE is behind the main

<sup>15</sup>As well as respondents from the Comparison sample.

surveys of reference on migration and minorities in France, but they still remain distinct entities with distinct statuses, not to mention distinct research priorities and preferences.<sup>16</sup> Funded and supported by several ministries and public institutions<sup>17</sup>, the project is co-organised by both the INED and the INSEE and involves a committee of 15 researchers from various disciplinary backgrounds and institutions. The aim of the project was to:

seek to assess to what extent *origin*<sup>18</sup> is, of its own right, a factor of inequality or difference as regards access to different social resources (housing, language and education, employment, leisure, public service and social aid, contraception, health, nationality, social and relational networks, matrimonial market...). The survey will focus on the articulation between origin and other categories of distinction in French society (gender, class, phenotype, age, neighborhood...) in order to analyse processes of integration, discrimination and identity construction in French society as a whole.<sup>19</sup>

In the 1990s and the 2000s, integration was at the heart of French political debates around migration. The previous survey, MGIS (1992, also co-developed by the INED and the INSEE), reflected the theoretical and political enmeshment of migration and integration. The first French large-scale survey to distinguish between foreign-born and foreigners, MGIS included retrospective questions on migration and migrants' trajectories. Although the survey report initially concluded on the success of the French Republican model of integration (Tribalat, 1995), Michèle Tribalat later insisted more on what she analysed as integration failures (e.g. the more withdrawn position of Turkish migrants living in France) or disguises - specifically how migrant-native couples could 'hide' co-ethnic unions between migrants and descendants of migrants (Tribalat, 2009). The TeO survey was initially pitched in continuity with the MGIS survey: same focus

<sup>16</sup>A quick word on the INED and the INSEE. The INSEE, the French equivalent of the ONS, is much, much larger, and is under the authority of the Ministry of Economy and Finances. It has branches in all parts of France. The INED, in contrast, is a fraction of the size of the INSEE, has only one location in Paris, and is a public but independent research institution. The INED's academic independence is guaranteed by its status of public institution with scientific and technological vocation (EPST: Etablissement public à caractère scientifique et technique technologique), status created in the 1980s which also applies to e.g. the CNRS. Revolving doors and sharing of expertise are not uncommon between the two institutions. Notably François Héran and Patrick Simon, key INED actors in the development of the TeO survey (respectively as INED director and TeO survey coordinator), were both former INSEE researchers. It was in fact during his years at the INSEE that Héran forged his ability to negotiate with the two institutions in charge of controlling the aptness and ethical compliance of surveys in France, the CNIS and the CNIL - an ability which was to be heavily relied on in the case of TeO (Héran, 2017, p. 127).

<sup>17</sup>Notably the Drees and the Dares (respectively Ministry of Health and Solidarity, and Ministry of Work), Acsé (National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equality of Opportunities), the Halde (High Authority against Discrimination and for Equality), ANR (National Research Agency), IAU-ÎdF (Institute of Planning and Urbanism for the greater parisian area) and ONZUS (Observatory of Sensitive Urban Zones).

<sup>18</sup>Emphasis added.

<sup>19</sup>TeO manuscript [unpublished draft], 2014, p.5.

on immigrants and descendants of immigrants, same institutional cooperation between the INED and the INSEE. But the TeO team pushed towards a different route, that of the study of discrimination, notably those faced by racialised immigrants and their descendants. The French scholarship on discrimination, on the rise in the 2000s (Garner, Foroni, & Cédiey, 2008), had started switching the angle from the conceptual approach in terms of integration, turning the question of the responsibility for social cohesion back towards French society and its institutions (Fassin, 2002; De Rudder et al.; 2000).

This renewed interest in the diverse experiences and inequalities faced by minorities coincided with keen interest for data specifically on immigrants and on integration among policymakers, an interest which some of the survey designers linked to the 2005 urban riots. The unrest had 'raised questions ... and there was a political interest in getting more information, from the observation that we hadn't known... enough elements to understand what was happening'.<sup>20</sup> François Héran, then director of the INED, connects the political emphasis and demand notably to Nicolas Sarkozy's 'obsession' with immigration (Héran, 2017). *Ministre de l'Intérieur* (Home Secretary) from 2002-2004 and from 2005-2007, and then President of France from 2007-2012, Nicolas Sarkozy was in charge of immigration policies for almost the entirety of the period which corresponds to TeO's design and data collection. Around 2005-2006, a convergence emerged between the academic interests in the INED, and an explicit political demand made of the INSEE. Although these interests converged insofar as all concurred on a need for more data on migrants and descendants of migrants living in France, they differed quite substantially on the purpose they attributed to this data and by extension to the survey. This contributed to the confusion which fed into the heated debates and institutional back-and-forths that came to surround the TeO survey. Like MGIS, which had stirred the 'controversy of demographers' (Fordant, 2014), TeO became highly contentious. The contention this time reached the wider non-academic audience, and turned into a national polemic played out in the mainstream media. (I return to this episode in the next section).

The data collection for TeO was eventually conducted between 2008-2009. Subtitled 'Survey on the diversity of the French population', the final TeO survey comprises 21,800 respondents, and over-represents immigrants, descendants of immigrants, as well as natives from overseas departments and their descendants. It also includes a comparison sample made to represent the 'majority population', so labelled because it is constituted of native French born to native-French parents, who are numerically the majority of those living in France. The cost of the study is estimated to have been well around €4.5 million in total (Pietri-Bessy & Ménard,

<sup>20</sup>Interviewee #7 - TeO survey lead.

2009). The survey remains a 'lone star' in the French landscape of research and public statistics, remaining to this day the only survey (with its predecessor MGIS and its re-edition currently underway)<sup>21</sup>, to have explored in depth the lives and experiences of immigrants and their descendants in France, their integration in French society, and the successes and obstacles that have marked their trajectories (Héran, 2019, p. xi).

### 1.2.3 Statistics of discord

The controversy that surrounded the design of the TeO survey has been analysed by Fordant (2014), and by some of its key actors and survey designers (see notably Héran (2010, 2019) and Simon (2015) and Appendix 7.3.3 for more details). What is important to know is that the first TeO questionnaire presented for approval to the CNIS<sup>22</sup> in May 2006 included questions on migration trajectories, nationality, country of birth, parents' country of birth, first visa obtained in France, as well as questions on religion and respondents' self-identified and socially perceived skin-colour.<sup>23</sup> The questions on religion and skin colour were particularly innovative in the context of a national survey in France. After a series of extraordinary and extraordinarily heated meetings dedicated to the question of TeO (Héran, 2010, p. 18), the CNIS finally approved the questionnaire<sup>24</sup>, only requiring that access to 'sensitive data' should necessitate a special licence delivered by the CNIS only.

In spite of the CNIS' green light, the 'ethnic questions' on skin colour as well as the questions on religion soon became the topic of a national debate. The pressure rose to such levels that the questions on skin colour were eventually revoked by a decision of the Constitutional Council, mid-November 2007. The INED and the INSEE were thus forced to cut these questions out of the questionnaire, replacing them with a broader question on origins: '*When you think about your family history, what would you say your origin is?*' (Héran, 2010). The questions on discrimination retained a skin colour category, so that it was possible for respondents to state that they have been victims of discrimination because of their skin colour, but not what their skin colour might be. The questions on

<sup>21</sup>The data collection for the second Trajectoires et Origines survey (TeO2) is currently underway and the data is due to be made available by 2022.

<sup>22</sup>CNIS: National Council of Statistical Information, the official body that regulates the production and use of public statistics in France.

<sup>23</sup>The questions on skin colour were in succession: *When people meet you, how do you think they see you in terms of [skin] colour(s)?* (open answer, no predefined categories); *And what colour would you personally say that you are?* (TeO questionnaire proposal, as approved by the CNIS in 2007).

<sup>24</sup>The caution at this point bore on questions on immigration status and visa types; religion; migratory origins; and skin colour.

religion, which had also been criticised, were however maintained. The controversy tore through political lines (D. Fassin (2012)). Opposition to the survey linked to French 'Republican' values was represented amongst conservatives, yet many in the UMP ranks (including Nicolas Sarkozy) were also in favour of introducing ethnic statistics, in which they saw a tool to evaluate integration and to benchmark migrant groups. This did not however come from or translate into support to the INSEE and especially the INED, suspected to be left-leaning and complacent towards immigrants (see for instance (Sarkozy, 2007)).

The Left and centre-Left found itself intensely divided - a recurring pattern when it comes to the questions of racism and anti-racism in France. The Republican argument is shared by many on the left. It considers racial or ethnic classification to be a danger for French Republican values and unity rooted in the French revolution. The collection of data on ethnicity, religion or race evokes the Vichy regime and its Jewish file. The academic side of this line of critique, which emerged initially during the controversy of demographers around MGIS, also objects to surveys and statistics on race and ethnicity because of the risk of essentialising inequalities and already marginalised groups. This critique, carried notably by the association *Pénombre*, articulates this risk with a broader criticism of public statistics (Pénombre, 1999). In addition, racial and ethnic statistical classifications - and by extension INSEE and especially INED who are perceived to promote them - are considered vanguards of 'Anglo-saxon' and critical-race-theory-inspired research, and accused of over-emphasizing race at the expense of class.<sup>25</sup> In November 2007, SOS Racisme, the biggest anti-racist organisation in France, launched a petition against the survey's 'ethnic filing', which gathered over 100 000 signatories, including the entire front bench of the Socialist Party and the future president François Hollande<sup>26</sup>.

The part of the left who, along with the survey team, supported the introduction of ethnic classifications, did it in the name of anti-discrimination and with the aim of exposing the reality and scope of racism and racial inequalities in France. Even within INED, tensions were rife. Some INED researcher with Hervé le Bras in the lead, attacked the survey and the survey team in the media (Le Bras et al., 2007). Less known is the resistance presented by INSEE interviewers, the survey footsoldiers, who were particularly reluctant to asking questions they considered intrusive, particularly those about skin colour and religion. The

<sup>25</sup>This accusation of the role and perspectives of INSEE and INED is for instance made by Beaud and Noiriel (2021). Their recent book was met with heavy criticism by the younger generation of French academics who engage with critical race theory (notably intersectionality, Black feminist scholarship and Critical Race Theory), and consider it relevant to the French context (an example is Sarah Mazouz (2020)).

<sup>26</sup>The petition was entitled *Fiche pas mon pote!*: 'Don't file my pal', in reference to the antiracist slogan of the 1980s-1990s *Touche pas mon pote!* ('Don't touch my pal').

INSEE union (Inter-syndicale des salariés de l'INSEE) expressed its disagreement with parts of the questionnaire, those on skin colour especially.<sup>27</sup> In a political climate correctly perceived as intensely anti-immigrant, asking people about their ethnicity seemed not necessarily irrelevant but untimely, and therefore dangerous as well as ethically dubious.

#### 1.2.4 Measuring international mobility

Nevertheless, compared to its predecessor MGIS, TeO includes considerably more information not only on self-identified religion and discrimination, but also information allowing for the contextualisation of migration experience: contextualisation in time, in legal status, in the life course, and - crucially for this research - in family formation (this and its implications for gender studies are expanded on in the next chapter). There are two explanations that can be put forward to explain this change from MGIS to TeO. Firstly, it is likely that the TeO design team, many of whom were respectfully critical of MGIS, took on board the criticism raised notably by Alain Blum that MGIS had entirely neglected to consider the migration experience in its single-minded focus on assimilation. This could be then considered parts of the efforts to create some distance between MGIS and TeO.

The INSEE side especially was resistant to the self-identified nature of questions on ethnicity, preferring more 'objective' measures such as country of birth. This is perhaps one way to understand why the TeO survey has no measure of self-identified ethnicity but a question on legal immigration channel, while Understanding Society included self-reported ethnicity but at no stage enquired about legal channels of migration. Immigration status no doubt constitutes 'sensitive' information for those with precarious or no residency rights. These are categories routinely used by the Home Office and the *Ministère de l'Intérieur*, and they powerfully shape migration journeys and migrants' lives in their host country; as such they are key information, but are not part of survey data on migrants in the UK, and only partially and cautiously so in TeO.<sup>28</sup> In addition, whereas the TeO survey differentiates between citizen by birth or citizen by acquisition, the British survey does not allow to identify, except longitudinally, how migrants may have acquired British citizenship.

The second explanation, which is perhaps particularly helpful to explain the rise of questions on the timing and transnational practices of family formation,

<sup>27</sup>Very active and very cautious on 'sensitive' material, the union wanted for an ethics committee to be set up and tasked with monitoring the production and the results of all studies which may refer to ethnic or racial origins.

<sup>28</sup>The TeO question on the first visa acquired in France was one of the questions the CNIS' was initially cautious about, but eventually agreed on.

may simply be found in the research interest of those who launched and drove the TeO project. François Héran, then director of the INED and the initiator of TeO, had written seminal pieces on couple and family formation with Michel Bozon, also an INED demographer (Bozon & Héran, 2006), and had co-led a survey specifically on couple formation in the French population.<sup>29</sup>; Christelle Hamel, one of the TeO co-leads, had researched transnational marriages, also from a critical perspective (Hamel, 2008). Their involvement and recruitment most likely played a part in putting closer to the survey designers' heart research interests around migration as movement through space, borders as well as migrants' life course

On the British front, the shift towards more measures of mobility is at first very subtle: it only appears in the limited space (and limited sample) of the extra 5 minutes question. The introduction of the IEMB 6 years later marked the extension of the focus from ethnic minorities to immigrants. Over the waves before, the inclusion criteria for the extra 5 minutes questions had also been gradually extended to foreign-born respondents. In addition, from wave 6 onwards, the survey turned all foreign-born respondents into Permanent Sample Members (PSM) (Lynn, Nandi, Parutis, & Platt, 2017). This shift does not serve this research directly, because it impacts data that comes after the one this thesis uses. But the process that leads to this change was already underway during Understanding Society's initial design phase. Though some in the survey team argued in favour of following return migrants in the survey (which would have been ground-breaking, not only because return migrants are great absents in statistics of migration, but also because it would allow for panel data that would provide information on respondents pre- and post-migration), the idea did not get any traction, in the face of the technical difficulties involved. But the survey still considerably expanded the scope of questions relevant to experience of international mobility that had ever been available for a household survey in the UK - let alone a longitudinal one.

## 1.3 Mobile and/or racialised 'Others'

### 1.3.1 (Over)sampling and racial focus

When it comes to the praxis of quantitative research, it is not simply about which questions are included and how they are formulated, but also about who gets to answer them. Sample strategy, together with rules of statistical robustness, conditions a lot of the analysis and framing (e.g. the grouping of people and categories). This is especially constraining when working with minority groups,

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<sup>29</sup>The survey *Formation des couples*, conducted by the INED in 1983-1984.

all the more so if one follows a pluralist approach and wants to distinguish between different minority sub-groups (e.g. migrants of different origins, different ethnicities). It is perhaps even more important for those quantitative researchers interested in mixed couples (however defined), since exogamy is a minority behaviour in almost all groups, majority group included (Kalmijn, 1998). With survey data, migrants (or ethnic minority groups) need to be over-represented through dedicated sampling efforts, and it is necessary to identify and pick which minority groups to focus on and over-represent.<sup>30</sup> It is impossible to satisfactorily over-represent *all* minority groups defined in *all* possible ways, but equally, not over-representing any minority group effectively prevents robust statistical analysis on most of these groups, except if aggregated. The definition and choice of groups is therefore both necessary and crucial in terms of framing.

### TeO's sampling strategy

TeO's stated objective in terms of sample design was to over-represent not only migrants but also children of migrants. In the French context, this was no small challenge. Since French census data provides the country of birth of respondents and their nationality but no information regarding the respondent's parents, the only way to obtain such information was to retrieve it from local civil registries (i.e. from birth certificates). The survey design team set up a highly intricate and labour-intensive operation. In order to create the survey sampling grid, the INSEE used data from the 2007 census to identify areas with high concentration of migrants, and then drew on data from EDP (*Echantillon démographique permanent*), manually matched with data from the local civil registries to put together data on respondents' parents (see Algava and Lhommeau (2013) and Algava, Lhommeau, and Beauchemin (2018) for more details).

The TeO sample thus over-represents migrants and descendants of migrants in general, and attributes specific sampling targets to certain countries of origin - namely South-East Asia, Turkey, Sahelian Africa, and Central and Guinean Africa - as well as French nationals born in overseas departments and natives born to parents from overseas departments (see table 1.2). The 'target groups' differ slightly from those in the previous survey, MGIS: the 'origin groups' over-sampled then were from Spain, Portugal, Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, South-Eastern Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam) and 'Black Africa'. Altogether, these groups were estimated to account for around 60% of immigrants (Tribalat, 1995). With TeO, the sampling strategy assumes that the random sampling of 'immigrants' and 'descendants of immigrants' will automatically waive high numbers of Northern African, who

<sup>30</sup>A point well laid out by Tribalat (1995) for instance

TABLE 1.2: TeO sample composition: target and effective sample

Sample components	Target	Effective sample	% Target achieved
Immigrants (age 18-60), including from:			
<i>South-East Asia</i>	9600	8456	88%
<i>Turkey</i>	800	774	97%
<i>Sahelian Africa</i>	800	830	104%
<i>Central and Guinean Africa</i>	800	665	83%
<i>Central and Guinean Africa</i>	800	736	92%
Descendants of immigrants (age 18-50), including from:	9600	8110	84%
<i>South-East Asia</i>	800	573	72%
<i>Turkey</i>	800	447	56%
<i>Sahelian Africa</i>	800	480	60%
<i>Central and Guinean Africa</i>	800	333	42%
French overseas department (DOM) natives (age 18-60)	800	712	89%
Descendants of DOM natives (age 18-50)	800	650	81%
Majority population	3400	3781	112%
Total	23600	21761	92%

Table drawn from Algava and Lhommeau (2013), p.33. Data source: TeO1 survey, INED-INSEE, 2008-2009.

form a solid majority of those groups, in the selected areas. The (verified) assumption is that there is therefore no need to set a specific sample target for these groups as they will be already and sufficiently over-sampled through the design of the sampling grid. Throughout the sample design process, identities of interest are largely assigned: nobody is asked whether they identify as immigrants or descendants of immigrants, it is inferred from their country of birth as it appears in the administrative registries.

### Understanding Society's sampling strategy

Understanding Society did not - initially - give itself the objective of over-representing migrants but ethnic minorities. The initial sample boost was the Ethnic Minority Boost Sample (EMBS or EMB), a top-up of 5,000 households with the aim of providing 1,000 households for each of the following five ethnic groups: Pakistani, Indian, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean, Black African (McFall, Nandi, & Platt, 2016). The EMB was drawn from selected areas of high-concentration of non-white ethnic minorities identified through the 2001 census data (Berthoud et al., 2009). Certain additional ethnic minority and immigrant groups did not have specific numerical targets but were included in the EMB when identified during screening. These were called the 'second-tier ethnic groups', by contrast with the five main target groups. Further, ethnic minority respondents who appeared at later waves in the sample as temporary sample member (for instance, as co-resident partner of a permanent sample member) would be made permanent sample member, as an additional form of diffuse oversampling. The over-sampling methods thus varied by group. These are listed out in the figure

## 1.1.

FIGURE 1.1: UKLHS EMB sample composition: Targeted, included and excluded groups (Berthoud et al., 2009, p. 9)

Main category	Census categories used for estimating densities	Screening categories used for selection	Target
<b>Target groups</b>			
Indian	Indian Mixed white/Asian	Indian Mixed Indian African Asian	1125
Pakistani	Pakistani	Pakistani	1100
Bangladeshi	Bangladeshi	Bangladeshi	1000
Caribbean	Caribbean Mixed white/Caribbean Black other	Caribbean/West Indian Mixed Caribbean/ West Indian	1125
African	Black African Mixed white/black African	North African Black African	1100
<b>Included groups</b>			
Other included groups	Chinese Other Asian	Sri Lankan Chinese Other far eastern Turkish Middle eastern/Iranian	(1100)
<b>Excluded groups</b>			
Other non-white minorities with diverse origins	Other	None	0
White minorities	White other	None	0

### Over-sampling and racial Others

For both TeO and Understanding, over-sampling was focused on selected areas, identified through the census as areas of high concentration of immigrants (TeO) and non-white ethnic minority households (Understanding Society). These sampling filters on selected areas of high migrants or minority density were motivated by issues of costs and a need for efficiency when targeting minorities. They also imply that the over-sampling is focused on migrant and ethnic minority individuals and households who are likely most embedded - at least geographically, but socially as well - in their ethnic/migrant community. This selection bias is perhaps particularly strong for native-born descendants of migrants who have chosen to stay in these areas. By contrast, minority individuals who live or move away from these high density areas have much less chances to be included in the survey. This is not neutral when studying issues related to families, cultural norms and integration. Migrants or other minority individuals who intermarry with the majority group are thus much more likely to end up living in low-ethnic density areas compared to those who do not intermarry (Muttarak & Heath, 2010).

A second sampling bias, more obvious perhaps, is that target groups are exclusively non-white<sup>31</sup>, an observation which extends to the UKLHS secondary oversampling strategy. In the case of Understanding Society, it also affects which questionnaire survey respondents were given. At wave 1, the conditions for eligibility for the 'extra 5 minutes' questions (on migration history, trajectories, national identity, etc.) included being non-white. Hence the extra 5 minutes questions were not asked of individuals identifying as "British", "Irish", or "other white" – even if they were born abroad. This has immediate effects for migration research, since, at wave 1, a lot of migrant individuals (including all white migrants) were not asked to provide any information about their migration experience, on top of being excluded from the oversampling procedure. Non-white migrants, by contrast, were indirectly but effectively over-sampled thanks to the sampling focus on non-white ethnicities.

As seen in table 1.1, the EMB design also uses a more refined grid than the census ethnic grid when it comes to other non-white groups (table 1.1). The screening categories which qualify respondents for inclusion in the second-tier ethnic groups thus break down 'Other Asian' into 'Sri Lankan', 'Chinese', 'Other far eastern', 'Turkish' and 'Middle eastern/Iranian'. The survey designers explain the use of this parallel grid as follow:

Analysis of Census data on country of birth by ethnic group had shown that people born in North Africa are recorded by the Census mostly as either 'white' or 'other'. It was decided to add North African to the list of ethnic groups in the screening questionnaire, and combine them with (black) Africans in the boost sample. People born in the middle east (including Turkey and Iran as well as 'Arab' countries) also tend to split between 'white' and 'other' when nominating an ethnic group in the Census. This consideration led to inclusion of the following sub-categories in addition to the target groups: Chinese, other far eastern, Sri Lankan, Turks, other middle eastern.  
(Berthoud et al. (2009), 8).

Because these groups are not target groups, it is understood that their oversampling will not yield large enough numbers to analyse them separately anyways. The point is merely to inflate the number of 'non-white' ethnic minority respondents, taken as a whole. Indeed, the problem for survey designers appears to be that respondents 'mistakenly' self-identify racially. The introduction of more detailed ethnic/national categories (such as 'Iranian' or 'Turk') allows to categorise and over-sample them as non-white, even if they would have otherwise self-identified as 'white' or 'other'. They are effectively assigned a racial identity. This last point is where pluralist perspectives on population diversity, more represented among academics, clash with a still 'dualistic' government

<sup>31</sup>They are either specifically defined as non-white (Understanding Society) or expected to be mostly non-white (TeO)

views of managing diversity, which has been the object of criticism since the 1990s (Modood & Berthoud, 1997). The final composite classifications used for over-sampling reflect the clashes of perspectives that underpin this mode of quantification.

I mean, to be honest, one of the things that was discussed most was [...] the second-tier ethnic groups. You know, there was an argument that we shouldn't include those at all, because they are not going to be of any use to ethnic minority researchers who are comparing specific ethnic groups, because they weren't going to be in the white group and they weren't going to be in any of the other groups, so they were just.. not going to be used and therefore it was a waste of money to include them. So that was a bit of a discussion. And in a way, what we ended up with was a compromise... Let's say a compromise between the more sophisticated ethnic minority researchers who take this view that you can only compare specific groups, and the more traditional government approach, which is you compare white with non-white, that's what the official statistics do a lot of the time, right, official surveys simply have two categories, white and non-white. And for that kind of use – and we do have government users, right, we have some government co-founders who have some say on what we do in Understanding Society. And they were mostly interested in us getting a larger sample of non-whites, they didn't particularly care which non-white group they came from, so as far as they were concerned, it was a cost-efficient solution to include more people from the non-white groups.

(Interviewee #3 - UKLHS survey designer)


The government focus on 'non-white' ethnic minorities, mentioned in the extract above, is also relayed by the ESRC directly, which had defined that the target groups should be non-white minorities. The demands of British and French governments reflected a similar focus on non-white populations linked to migration from ex-colonies, and concern for their *integration*. This illustrates governmental understandings of data on migration and population diversity as something that is mainly useful to *managing diversity*, and in effect often quite specifically *racial diversity*.

### 1.3.2 Where do white migrants go?

White migrants and their descendants are not targeted in the initial sample design: the UKLHS over-sampling strategy completely misses these population, as illustrated in figure 1.2.

The first part of the UpSet plot 1.2 (the coloured barplot) shows the distribution of Understanding Society's survey components by combination of characteristics: the first three bars all refer to non-white ethnic minority groups, either migrants (first and third bars) or natives with migrant parents (second bar). The composition of the bars renders well how effective and targeted the Ethnic minority sample boost (EMB) was: it provided the largest part of the sample for these groups. When looking only at the General population (GPS) sample components, it appears clearly that these groups provided neither the largest

FIGURE 1.2: UKLHS sample by sample components and markers of alterity (Upset plot)



number of second generation migrants (see fourth bar) nor the largest group of migrant by much: the fifth and sixth bars, represent white migrants who do not identify as white British. At the point of the survey's first collection wave (2009-2011), the GPS included a large number of white migrants: almost as many, in fact, as non-white migrants; the difference is that the sample for non-white migrants was then generously complemented by the EMBS.

Though it did not specifically target them, the French sample did include European and Northern American migrants, and asked them the same questions on their migration trajectories as other migrants. In this sense, TeO differed from the UKLHS initial design, by its interest in migrants taken as a whole. This difference between the two surveys receded in 2015 when Understanding Society introduced the IEMB, and started over-sampling and asking *all* migrants about their migration trajectories and cultural practices. It would be tempting to interpret the IEMB as the natural response to a sharp increase in the numbers of EU/white migration which triggered academic interest and political concern. This would however reproduce a political trope on immigration that argues that concern and xenophobia are automatically stirred once a particular threshold is reached. Yet in both France and the UK, there were large numbers of white migrants, already at the time of the survey design. EU migration is old in France, and well documented: MGIS had over-sampled Spanish and Italian migrants and descendants of migrants. In the UK, the 2001 census had shown that the largest

'ethnic' group was the 'Other white' group, and there had been a sharp increase of migration from Eastern Europe following the EU enlargements in 2004 and after. The sharpest part of this increase, however, predated the UKLHS survey design phase.

The new interest in 'immigrants' denoted by the IEMB was driven by rising political and academic interest in Eastern European migrants in particular. It also became apparent that many of the Eastern Europeans who migrated to the UK following the 2004 EU enlargement had actually stayed, whereas they had been perceived as temporary economic migration. In a parallel with the story of the German *Gastarbeiter*, these migratory flows appeared un-problematic at first because (on top of being mostly white), they were not expected to settle. The 2008 economic crisis, accompanied and followed by growing anti-immigration campaigns encapsulated by Theresa May's 'hostile environment' narrative and the rise of UKip, put immigration in the spotlight. There was growing pressure from government to come up with data on immigration and immigrants, especially Eastern European but also EU migrants. This pressure translated into the ESRC adding immigration on their research priority list.

The UKLHS survey designers were clear on the fact that the pressure was specifically about Poles and Eastern European migrants. They also expressed how the implications of the ethno-racial framework and focus became a problem, in that it poorly accommodated the notion of white ethnic groups. Poles, some in the survey design team argued, are not an ethnic group - they are a national group, a migrant group if one will, but they cannot be over-sampled within the framework of the EMB.

So, I was like... quite pushy on [the EMB] not being... that this was an ethnicity strand, that we should collect on the more, kind of the more long-standing... stable, well-known groups, who are also visible minorities, by and large. So when we did this top-up, the new boost... The IEMB, yes. So that was an Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Boost, so I said ok, [...] now we can get these people in. [...] it was recognising that this, this issue, that this wasn't going away, and there would be a lot of people who do wanted to study Poles, and we simply didn't have enough Poles, or... whatever, enough Eastern Europeans in the nationally representative study.  
(Interviewee #1 – Ethnicity strand, survey design )

From this investigation of the sampling design and the changes in sampling, the British framework around ethnicity is indeed better described as ethno-racial, also in terms of sampling design. Notably, the 'ethnicity' questions seemed incompatible with the recognition of 'white' ethnicities. When groups like 'Black African' can be operationalised as an ethnic group in spite of its great internal ethnic variety, surely Poles or Eastern European would also qualify. *Who is not ethnic?* had asked Simpson (2002) about the 2001 ethnic census question.

The reticence to 'ethnically' fragment the white group has been noted in other contexts (Nobles, 2000), also in the UK with regards to the Irish ethnic group and the reluctance that the ONS presented to introducing that category.<sup>32</sup> With the IEMB, the resistance to make Eastern European migrants into an ethnic category, combined with a growing political focus on 'immigration' more broadly, lead to 'immigrants' becoming a central category in the 2015 wave, and to measures of international mobility expanding significantly in the survey over the years. Ironically, by choosing to expand to all immigrants rather than explicitly target the population of interest, the sampling strategy lost in efficacy, as the numbers of Eastern European migrants yielded by the IEMB turned out to be lower than expected.<sup>33</sup>

## Chapter conclusion

Mixedness is conceived differently in France and the UK. Conceptually, it is much more tightly connected to migration in the first case than in the second, where mixedness is primarily defined as mixed-race and mixed identities. This is linked to different statistical genealogies but this does not actually mean that the paradigms of mixedness and migration differ much between the two countries. In both cases, what the surveys are trying to measure are mainly discrimination and ethnic inequalities, and what they are trying to fight are assimilationist and non-pluralist pressure, notably coming from the political field and from government. Sandwiched between narratives of integration and narratives of anti-discrimination, there is little space left for considerations of trajectories, that is, for understanding what the process and experience of international mobility create and represent in terms of mixing and inequalities.

What does all this imply for the quantification of migration? Mostly, that part of migration that has to do with the migration *journey* and how this journey may shape migrants' lives - the *mobility* part is relegated to the background. In the case of TeO, because the attention and controversy is entirely focused on measures of *otherness*, specifically ethnic statistics (as well as religion and discrimination, to a lesser extent); in the case of Understanding Society, international mobility is something that is evoked by the survey designers mainly to explain why emigrants and short-term migrants could not be easily integrated or followed by the

<sup>32</sup>Thompson (2015) reported that the 'ONS was reluctant to have it at all... maybe because it wasn't driven by colour. [...] The Irish group was a tougher sell – it was about 1997 when they came around. There was quite a lot of resistance.' . She further commented " ONS's unease with counting Irish was partially because the category did not align well with the state's conceptualisation of what racial disadvantage is, and therefore, what the ethnic question was designed to measure." (Thompson 2015, 127).

<sup>33</sup>As mentioned by several UKLHS interviewees.

survey. Yet in both French and British surveys, the questionnaire and/or sample design shows a gradual trend towards more and more precise quantification of migration as *movement* rather than as proxy for - or subcategory of - 'outsiders'. Subsequently, the survey focus on migrants who are also racialised.

However, where Blum (1998)'s critique led him to argue that statistics on ethnicity should therefore be avoided, I consider that they are complementary. In an intersectional theorisation of migration, researchers need to be able to consider and problematise *together* the facts and process of the migration experience, and the ethnic and cultural contexts in which it takes place. Indeed, there are gender inequalities in migration experiences and regimes (e.g. gender vulnerabilities to sexual violence and trafficking (Fund, 2018), the greater disbelief and suspicion of 'sham marriages' towards male applicants for family migration (Charsley et al., 2020; Griffiths & Morgan, 2017)) which cannot be simply limited to or conflated with ethnic difference and discrimination (e.g. intersectional ethnic and racial discrimination in the country of immigration, or the particular gender relations and ethnic traditions that orient migration decisions and opportunities in the sending country).

Yet, the overlap is imperfect and to forget this can be deeply misleading. First, it feeds into a prejudiced racial narrative of migration that holds all immigrants to be racially and culturally alien to an imagined national community (Anderson, 2016), which in Western countries is assumed to be white and culturally homogeneous. Furthermore, the conflation between mobility and alterity creates a framework where it is all too easy to collapse inequalities that derive from mobility (typically, constrained access to paid employment or services linked to immigration status, social isolation as a result of transplantation, uprooting or reduced language skills) into differences attached to alterity (for instance, discrimination and cultural differences). One cannot miss the political weight of this superposition: if we cannot disentangle these two aspects, we jeopardize our ability to correctly unpack inequalities. We risk underestimating their scope as well as their main sites and root causes. Ultimately, our diagnosis and the solutions we propose may be entirely wrong.

Although the terms - and the timing - of debates around quantification of migration, between mobility and otherness, differ between the two countries, the degree of overlap between categories and concepts used in French and British survey design on migrants has increased significantly, thanks to a variety of efforts coming from different angles. In spite of arguments of profound differences between French and British data 'regimes of difference', in both French and British surveys, the analysis of the sampling design especially shows that

the effective categories of focus are very similar in practice. This undermines the idea that notions of 'otherness' as measured by ethnicity (or nationality) and its articulation with migration would differ so deeply between France and the UK that they could hardly be compared. Le Bras et al. (2007) for instance had taken the example that Northern African migrants are considered 'as white as the Scots' in British classification, whereas in France survey designers would specifically want to distinguish. As we have seen survey designers took pains to distinguish them from any 'white' or majority group in both French and British sample design. The debates around sampling issues, as technical as they may seem, are perhaps some of the most fundamental and determinant in terms of what is open to analysis and what is not. Sampling design is a terrain where lines have to be drawn around categories to over-sample. Those lines do not always follow official classifications, as seen with the UKLHS screening categories for the second-tier oversampling, and in practice, they are roughly similar between the French and British data.

The contrast between the two statistical regimes and the two national 'models' is therefore arguably overplayed, in sometimes dramatic attempts to reinstate a French (and to a lesser extent, a British) political exception and to resist 'American' (or continental) influences. In effect, the paradigm clashes are much more intense internally, across political and academic factions, sometimes across institutions and the different bodies and interests involved in survey design. Most of the academics push for more pluralist and discrimination-oriented approaches to migration and migrants; the French and British government they interact with tends to be much more focused on measuring the (lack of) assimilation of 'problematic' and summarily racialised 'Others'.

Importantly, however, the focus on *otherness* rather than *mobility* did not altogether prevent the collection of some data on migration and conjugal trajectories and timing. But it oriented both questionnaires and sample designs towards migrant populations that are also racialised. In this context, it can be tricky (though not impossible) to avoid conflating inequalities deriving from migration trajectories, from inequalities linked to ethnic difference and racial discrimination. Recontextualising the survey design helps understand how this relative convergence came about, and why certain aspects of migration and migrants' lives continue to be left out on both sides of the channel. It also helps in highlighting how, in both countries, the quantification of migration experience and mixing is largely polarised around identifying and disputing markers of an 'otherness' in which ethnic, racial and migratory notions are more often combined than competing, and in which the migration journey is little engaged with. The issue then is not so much that already racialised groups are further

essentialised (as opponents to 'ethnic statistics' would argue), but that migration itself is racialised, made to appear to be relevant only to racialised migrants - this often in spite of survey designers' best efforts.

## Chapter 2

# The other 'Others': gender and migration in French and British survey data

... it matters what matters we use to think other matters with; it matters what stories we tell other stories with; it matters what knots knot knots, what thoughts think thoughts, what ties tie ties. It matters what stories make worlds, what worlds make stories.

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Haraway (2011, p. 4)

## Chapter introduction

Most migration scholars differentiate between 'men' and 'women'. Likewise, most surveys include a measure of biological sex (e.g. 'male'/'female') in their questionnaire and in their analyses. This applies to migration studies and to surveys with a focus on migration and population diversity such as TeO and Understanding Society. This survey data makes it possible to compute sex-segregated dichotomous tables and analyses of migrants and migration. However, survey design rarely engage with feminist theories of migration - I use the term 'feminist' to refer broadly to people and scholarship that consider women and their labour as devalued, dominated and exploited, who are committed to changing this and therefore are critical of dominant intellectual traditions that

have neglected, ignored, rationalised and/or condoned women's oppression (Acker, Barry, & Esseveld, 1983; Oakley, 1998). In the vast majority of feminist scholarship and activism, this critical perspective and solidarity is not limited to (cis-)women but includes sexual and gender minorities. It is often the case, however, that surveys entrench gendered assumptions - most obviously the gender binary (Westbrook & Saperstein, 2015) - without providing tools for understanding gender-based differences in relation to gender hierarchies and social relations. A landscape of migration statistics built on classic economic, male and Western-centred rationales of (im)migration - even when they are sex-differentiated - is unlikely to help those wishing to investigate the complex interplay between gender relations and migration, *'for the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house'* (Lorde, 1984, p. 13).

Of course, the broader issue here is that statistics and survey data are themselves, in more ways than one, the 'master's tools'. As discussed in the previous chapter, statistics and the state have a very close, mutually-constitutive and mutually-legitimising relation to one another. This is most obviously the case for national censuses, but it is no less apparent for publicly-funded, large-scale surveys, *especially* when they focus on migration and minorities. That is part of the reason why critical scholarship - feminism included - has had a long-standing suspicion of quantitative methods and data (see e.g. Stanley (1983)).

Grappling with the intersection of gender relations and migration is already a difficult and slippery task in qualitative and theoretical terms - nevermind trying to do so quantitatively. A persistent issue is the difficulty of talking about gender relations and migration without feeding into prejudice and anti-immigrant sentiment. For instance, the political narratives that followed the events of the Cologne New Year's Eve underlined the toxic entanglements between racism, nationalism and a certain brand of feminism (Hark & Villa, 2020), with Marine Le Pen jumping on the event. As Judith Butler sharply put it: 'The feminism that emerged that was against sexual violence did not appear to be also against anti-immigrant sentiment.' (Butler, 2020). Yet on the other side, among those that attempted to criticise the xenophobic turn of the narrative, some turned to gender cultures and relativism, how African men were just 'that way', quietly reinstalling white men as the proper protectors of white women, and ontologising differences between (racialised) migrants and the (white, Western) native population. To work on gender and migration is to walk a fine political line. Acknowledging and exposing gender differences and inequalities, while somehow conveying, against a monopolizing, ethnocentric-at-best and xenophobic-at-worst brand of feminism, that these differences cannot be considered or explained away as natural, immutable, external, culturally determined. In this acrobatic number of

extracting feminism and gender analysis from cultural ontology or outright racial and sexist prejudice, survey data is, as I will show, an important but ambivalent ally.

The question of the marginalisation of gender in the field of migration studies is old, and it has many different components, some broadly societal, some internal to academia and to the scholarly field of feminist and gender studies (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2012). Because quantitative analysis, especially when based on survey and census data, retains a more institutional quality, an aura of greater reliability, and a more attentive audience in the media and political arena, it also acts as a gateway towards mainstreaming theories and influencing policy-making. Survey design can thus be considered to play a key role in the (dis)enfranchisement of gender research, inasmuch as surveys will shape, to no insignificant extent, what can be quantified and hence brought to light and analysed in quantitative terms. Conversely, if gender and feminist concepts are inadequately represented in survey data on migration and in most quantitative analyses, gender is bound to remain stuck at the margins of migration studies.

Yet feminist and gender scholars cannot simply discard survey research on sweeping accusations of positivism and masculinism, as many did in the past (Reinharz, 1992; Stanley, 1983). There are some signs that surveys are becoming more permeable to gender issues and theories. The EU has been promoting gender mainstreaming since 1998 and has repeatedly called for more quantitative data on gender so as to better document gender inequalities and to benchmark EU member states on that front.<sup>1</sup> The recognition of the importance of gender relations and gender equality as a measure of social justice and development is widespread, touching most social science fields, albeit to different extents (Stacey & Thorne, 1985). This also finds an expression in surveys and statistics, with survey series such as the *Generation and Gender Program* driving the quantification of gender relations at national and cross-national level.

But as much as this now acknowledged relevance of gender marks an accomplishment for feminists, who after decades of bitter fighting finally do not have to convince policymakers and survey designers that gender equality matters, it also warrants close scrutiny. Gender mainstreaming has been accused of co-opting feminist agendas and instrumentalising narratives of gender equality to serve research interests and political agendas that are quite different, much less radical, primarily focused on labour participation and economic performance. Feminist

<sup>1</sup> Recommendation CM/Rec (2007) 17 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on gender equality standards and mechanisms (2007) and Recommendation No. R (98) 14 of the committee of ministers to member states on gender mainstreaming (1998) For a list of all EU recommendations pertaining to measures and standards of gender equality: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/genderequality/standards-and-mechanisms>

denunciation has been particularly vitriolic in international development studies (Calkin, 2015; Stratigaki, 2004). Stacey and Thorne (1985) argued in the 1980s already that sociology had been much less profoundly transformed by the incorporation of gender than other disciplines such as literature and anthropology - since core sociological theories, frameworks and practices remained largely unfazed. The same line of critique was developed by Watkins (1993) for demography. Feminist demographers and statisticians have also brought attention to problems of gender gaps (lack of data) and gender biases (skewed data and categories) in statistical classifications and survey design. They have raised a variety of issues, from the conflation of 'women' with mothers and fertility in demographic studies (Locoh, Hecht, & Andro, 2003; Watkins, 1993) to the default male 'head of household' household survey unit (Brückweh, 2018; Fouquet & Charraud, 1989); from the lack of recognition of women's qualifications (Amossé, 2004) to the non-recording of their labour, especially when unpaid and performed within the family sphere (Riley, 1998, 1999). More recently, the survey classification of gender as an identity category has also been brought into question by sociologists of gender, as an example of statistical classifications and survey design failing to stay up-to-date with contemporary gender theory (Westbrook and Saperstein (2015).<sup>2</sup> The problem is not only that gender diversity and inequalities are not adequately acknowledged, but that survey data simultaneously reproduces and confines its users to reproducing its visions of the social world and the blinders that come with it. Knowledge production, of which statistical production is a type, is thus in an important sense a cyclical process (Bowker, 1999; Hacking, 2006).

Whether and how these feminist critiques apply to survey data on migration and population diversity remains as yet mostly unaddressed. Where gender biases and gaps in the field of migration studies have been pointed out by feminist sociologists and gender theorists (Kofman, Phizacklea, Raghuram, & Sales, 2000, 2005), the critique has seldom been extended to include quantitative data sources on migration, let alone the process of survey design that produces the data available to migration researchers. Not that the role of surveys has not been hinted at: Lawson (1998) already suggested that the format of survey data might simply be ill-suited to capturing the necessarily dynamic understanding of gender and gender relations throughout migration, thus limiting the possibilities of feminist quantitative researchers on migration; Nawyn (2010) also pondered whether survey-based quantitative analysis could be completed with ethnographic feminist research in order to legitimize the second and pull the first away from narrow economic considerations and framework. Such mixed-method approaches were

<sup>2</sup>See also Spade (2015) for legal and administrative classifications of gender identities

praised by Pedraza (1991) in her seminal piece 'Women and migration - the social consequences of gender'. But the question remains open as to what it is that survey data can and cannot do for feminist research on migration, why, and why it matters.

The gender analysis I propose to deploy is an analysis of how survey data present and capture gender relations rather than gender categories, and I am in this indeed constrained by the data I use. The word 'gender', after all, never appears in the survey questionnaires under study here. This chapter is dedicated to explaining the gender issues, biases, failures and (sometimes) the successes that appeared in the survey design processes, and were ultimately engraved in the survey data. In later chapters, when I make use of the same data for the empirical analysis of gender relations and migration, I will be able to work around some of the issues I will have outlined and contextualised here; some, like the binary of the sex/gender variable, I will not be able to avoid. I also focus on gender relations in the household, and especially between partners, because that is most relevant to the rest of my thesis.

The chapter proceeds as follows: in the first section, I discuss and map out the possibilities for quantitative, survey-based research on gender and migration in France and in the UK (2.1). In the second section, I extend the discussion to how the surveys under study accommodate and frame intersectional analysis, which has more often been addressed on the ground of quantitative methodology rather than quantitative data (Sigle-Rushton, 2014; Wemrell, Mulinari, & Merlo, 2017). (2.2). In the final section, I focus on the conditions - historical, political and institutional - of emergence of the co-problematisation of gender and migration in these surveys, and I attempt to provide some sociological and political explanations as to why gender remains a peripheral topic in survey data and survey-based research on migration, in spite of surveys like Understanding Society and TeO, which are comparatively more hospitable to gender and feminist research (2.3).

The question that weaves itself through this, which ties this chapter to the previous and to the broader thesis, is whether and how survey data and statistics construct gender and gender relations in migration as a matter of *otherness*, or as a matter of *experience*, dynamically shaped by and together with inequalities. To answer these questions, I have the advantage, as in the previous chapter, not to be confined to *ex post* analysis of the finished product that are the survey questionnaires or the survey data. I also draw on the interviews conducted with the survey designers themselves, and on the step-by-step process and contextualisation of the survey design and choices reconstructed through working papers

and archives.

## 2.1 Quantifying migration as gendered and gendering process

### 2.1.1 Operationalising feminist and gender theory for quantitative data on migration

A first necessary step to tackle is the question of how one can operationalise feminist and gender theory in survey data on migration. At the most basic level, we need to distinguish between the sexes - allowing for what is sometimes called the 'add women and stir' approach (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2000; Kofman, 2004). As unsophisticated as this may appear now, this still represents progress from an age where migration was expected to be all-male and migrant men were expected to be representative of all migrants (and could therefore be the only ones sampled). Yet the analysis of sex differences is not the same thing as an analysis of gender relations. It is at best a very first step: necessary, certainly, but not at all sufficient. Gender, as distinguished from biological sex at birth and the male/female binary might not be so well understood and integrated in survey design and questionnaires (if at all) (Westbrook & Saperstein, 2015). Surveys also need to provide room to capture gender differences: for example, in order to correctly identify the gendered diversity of migration trajectories so that those that are more often travelled by women (such as family stage migration and marriage migration, to give but two examples) are actually quantified, and survey data on migration is not limited to labour migration. We would also want survey classifications of migration to give due regards to the heterogeneity of women's migration, including that covered by the umbrella terms 'family migrant' or 'family migrations'. Accordingly, we would want to be able to study the imbrication of family life and migration not only for women and those that would fall under the label 'family migrants', but also for men and economic migrants, asylum seekers, etc., and for survey data to allow us to open the 'black box of the household' and show the power relations and dissents within.

Hondagneu-Sotelo (2012) helpfully lists six arenas which emerged through the scholarship on gender and migration: (1) 'mainstream' sociological research, which tries to get gender into institutionalised migration research, e.g. on the demographic composition of migrant stock - this applies perhaps especially to quantitative research, particularly constrained by institutions of statistical production; (2) migration and care work; (3) sexualities; (4) sex trafficking; (5) borderlands and migration; (6) gender, migration and children. The key theoretical feminist input to the study of migration has been to conceptualise the entire

migration process as intricately woven and tied to gender relations (Anthias & Lazaridis, 2000; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1992; Kofman et al., 2000; Pedraza, 1991; Truong, 1996) - from the context of departure, to the decision to migrate, the mode of migration, the networks employed, the settlement period, the integration into the host countries, and the transnational ties and practices with the country of origin and those left-behind. Morokvasic (1984) theorised the importance of gendered systems of power and inequality in labour markets, cultures, families and households to explain both the decision to migrate and the experience after migration and (Mahler & Pessar, 2009) echoed this with their emphasis on 'gendered geographies of power' to understand migratory flows (why and how people migrate) and the social consequences of migration (what happens to them and to societies when they do).

Through this reconceptualisation, feminist scholarship has built an organised critique of classic economic theories of migration which, generally attached to the theorem of wage differentials, conceptualise migrants as 1) individuals, 2) only driven by utilitarian interests and 3) operating as rational agents in a field devoid of power relations (Borjas, 1989; Massey et al., 1993; Sjaastad, 1962). The influence of classic economic theories of migration means that adherence to core theoretical assumptions of methodological individualism and more or less flat understandings of economic rationality and maximisation is widespread in migration studies at large (Boswell, 2009). This also extends to the so-called new economics of migration, which though it theoretically re-centres households, does so in such a way that it posits them as uniform, power-free, conflict-free, internally wholly altruistic social units. One central aspect of critical feminist scholarship has been to uncover the tensions and power relations within the household, a lens fruitfully applied to migration processes. The critical household lens described by Nawyn, Reosti, and Gjokaj (2009) is thus to be applied to the study of households before and after (and ideally throughout) migration.

Following a simple theoretical framework laid out in substance by Morokvasic (1984) and Hondagneu-Sotelo (1992), we can assess the extent to which Understanding Society and TeO allow for an analysis of migration both as a *gendered process* and as a *gendering process*. *Gendered*, in the sense that different gender identities ('men' and 'women' at a most basic level) are associated with differences in migration trajectories and experiences; and *gendering* because migration itself can participate in the production - be it entrenchment, subversion, or adjustment - of gender relations (Pedraza, 1991).

### 2.1.2 International mobility and the life course: migration as gendered process

Let us start with the operationalisation of migration as a gendered process. By that, I mean that quantitative data would aptly capture and contextualise gender differences in migration trajectories. Gender relations are dynamic processes, phenomenon which at the micro-sociological level we know to be deeply affected by events of the life course such as couple formation, parenthood and the timing and social setting of both. Accordingly, gender roles are renegotiated or reproduced at the various stages and the contrasted circumstances of people's lives. If migration is hugely relevant to gender, it is because it is rooted in and yet also interferes - for better or worse - with these already gendered social processes, which (re)produce gender roles and inequalities. In *Gendered Transitions*, Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo stated:

Theories based on structural transformations cannot explain who migrates, when migration occurs, or how people organize migration. And while structural explanations can help account for the changing sex composition of the immigrant population, they cannot account for the distinctively gendered way that immigration and settlement occurs. [...] political and economic transformations may set the stage for migration, but they do not write the script.

(Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994), 187)

With this in mind, it is clear that the relevance and the role of gender in migration is by no means simply a question of who or how many migrated of whatever sex. Rather it a question of how, why, with whom and when, when being both in absolute terms (to posit migration in a historical, geopolitical and economic context) and in individual relative terms (relative to one' age, stage in the life course, employment, etc.). The question requires much more than sex-segregated demographic data on the composition - however precisely drawn - of migrant stock and/or ethnic minorities. The quantification of mobility, not as an abstract, instantaneous geographic translation that turns humans into migrants, but as dynamic and contingent, is no doubt a key point to capture gendered processes of migration.

This quantification needs to involve a multi-dimensional approach to mobility experience: in other words, it requires that migration be modelled as movement, through space and borders, but also through time, the life course and different gender regimes. Practically speaking, the aim is to contextualise and 'nest' the event(s) and temporalities of migration, and the modes of migration, in family formation, parenthood and, ideally, career trajectories. For that we need co-occurring information on the chronologies of migration and the life course which we can then superimpose and combine. This co-existence of data is

necessary for quantitative researchers to be able to factor in the various stages and core processes on and through which gender inequalities are (re)produced.

The following table list out some of the key information and indicates whether they are available in *Understanding Society* and TeO. It is not an exhaustive list, rather a basic and targeted one, concentrated on questions and data already used in various data sources, but which very rarely coexist in large-scale survey questionnaires. The 'yes' in brackets indicates that the information was not collected at the start of *Understanding Society* (waves 1 or 2) but appears in later waves, generally at wave 6, or at wave 9. The table focuses on three main aspects: spatiality, legality and couple and family formation.

TABLE 2.1: Movement and time: variables on migration and family formation in UKLHS and TeO1

	Understanding Society (waves 1-2)		TeO	
Temporal movement	Partner1	Partner2	Partner1	Partner2
<b>Life-course chronology (family formation)</b>				
Date of birth	yes	yes	yes	yes
Date first met current partner	no	no	yes	yes
Date start of current cohabitation	yes	yes	yes	yes
Date of current marriage	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohabited before current marriage	yes	yes	yes	yes
Start and end dates of other cohabitation spans[1]	yes	yes	yes	no
Start and end dates of other marriage spans	yes	yes	yes	no
Date of first (eldest) child's birth	yes	yes	yes	no
Date of youngest child's birth	yes	yes	yes	no
<b>Migration chronology</b>				
Date first came to the present country of residence	yes	yes	yes	yes
Date first emigrated	no	no	yes	no
Successive migration spans	yes	yes	yes	no
Start and end date of all migration spans	no	no	yes	no
When expect to migrate in the future	(yes)	(yes)	no	no
<b>Legal chronology</b>				
whether citizen of country of residence	yes	yes	yes	yes
none/other//dual/more citizenships: which.	yes	yes	yes	no
whether citizen of country of birth	yes	yes	yes	yes
whether citizen of country of residence by birth	yes	yes	yes	no
Whether has indefinite leave to remain (or equivalent) at time of interview	(yes)	(yes)	no	no
Other type of residency right at time of interview	no	no	no	no
First type of visa/residency right obtained in the country of residence	no	no	yes	no
Different visas/residency rights held successively in country of residence	no	no	no	no
Start and end date of each legal status span	no	no	no	no
Date obtained citizenship of country of residence	(yes)	(yes)	yes	no
Legal ground for naturalisation	no	no	yes	no
Whether applied for citizenship of country of residence	no	no	yes	no
<b>Geographic movement</b>				
Country of birth	yes	yes	yes	yes
All countries lived in	yes	yes	yes	no
Remittances	yes	yes	yes	no
Frequency of visits	no	no	yes	no
Where first met (country)	no	no	yes	yes
Where married (country)	no	no	yes	yes
<b>Causes for mobility</b>				
Motivations for migration (main/several)	(yes)	(yes)	no	no
If family migration/reunification: joined who?	no	no	yes	no
If family migration/reunification: brought who?	no	no	yes	no
Considers migrating	(yes)	(yes)	yes	no
Where would migrate	no	no	yes	no
Motivations for considering emigration/return migration (main/several)	no	no	no	no

**Notes:** '(yes)' indicates that the information is not collected in Understanding Society waves 1 or 2, but is collected later on (in most cases, from wave 6 onward).

Data source: UKLHS Survey questionnaire (waves 1-8), TeO1 survey questionnaire, INED-INSEE, 2008-2009. Author's own compilation.

Table 2.1 serves to highlight a couple of points: one, it documents the observation made in the previous section that the British survey gradually dedicated more space to the quantification of mobility and that there is therefore a convergence of French and British data on the quantification of migration. That opens a window for quantitative comparative research.

Second, it demonstrates that both Understanding Society and TeO open up possibilities that had not been there before for research on gender and migration. Both surveys collect information on migrants' mobility as well as on the life course and relationship patterns, thus making it possible to study migration as a *gendered process*, which differentiates between men and women in motives, channels, calendars, stages and family dynamics of migration. For instance, it becomes possible to identify sequences of migration in migrant families and in couple formation, sequences such as family stage migration, which are known to be highly gendered and gendering<sup>3</sup>. The ability to differentiate between periods of cohabitation and marriage also makes it possible to capture various important elements of family formation, which have been connected to gender relations. For instance 'direct marriages' – couples who start cohabiting only after marriage – have been associated with a greater attachment to religious values. This way of entering into cohabitation has been interpreted as signaling more patriarchal gender norms linked to virginal preservation (Condon & Hamel, 2003; Hamel, Pailhé, Santelli, & Lhommeau, 2013).

This does not mean that all gendered aspects of mobility are covered, let alone equally covered, in the two surveys. Because the survey samples individual respondents rather than all household members, TeO holds much less information on the partner and, consequently, there is less overall that can be reconstructed at the couple level. Family stage migration, for instance, can only be identified through the legal mode of entry, and as a result, it provides no information on the trajectory of migrant couples who did not use family reunification provisions or a partner visa (e.g. for E.U. migration). Understanding Society is more comprehensive on family formation and the life course. However, the British survey collects no information on the legal channel of migration, something breached - if briefly - by TeO through the question on first visa type obtained in France. As a result, gender inequalities linked to legal admission category cannot be analysed with the British data.

<sup>3</sup>Men and husbands tend to be the first movers (González-Ferrer, 2011), although that is not always the case (George, 2005). There is rich qualitative evidence documenting the reorganisation of gender relations in the context of family-stage migration, with very different dynamics depending on whether pioneer migrants are men or women (on men as first movers, see Hondagneu-Sotelo (1992, 2012), and George (2005) for women as first movers)

Neither of the two surveys make it possible to identify certain highly-gendered migration routes, for example those linked to sex trafficking (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2012). This can hardly be held against them: as is the case for illegal migration paths more broadly, quantified data and reliable estimates are difficult to come by, because the population of interest is particularly difficult to sample and the information is difficult to ask for and to obtain. Yet it is especially for these largely un-quantifiable flows that quantification is most insistently demanded in the media and in political arenas<sup>4</sup>(Boswell, 2009). While we know from qualitative enquiries that the migration routes travelled by undocumented migrants are heavily gendered, like the dangers they face on these travels, there is little quantitative work or evidence on their gendered and gendering characteristics. One exception is González-Ferrer (2011), who was able to offer an estimate and a distinct category for migrants who had (at least initially) been undocumented in Spain.

### 2.1.3 Gender relations and gendered labour: migration as gendering process

The surveys make it possible (up to a point, and to different degrees) to quantify migration not only as mobility but mobility informed by gender theory, i.e. inscribed in the life course and in family dynamics. But how well do they fare on the second dimension, when it comes to quantifying not just the *gendered processes* - i.e. the gender differences - but the *gendering effects* of migration, that is, the effect on gender relations? In theory, this would require two things: quantified indicators of gender relations, and the ability to compare gender relations before migration and after. The second is mostly out-of-reach, since migration almost always means that those who migrate disappear from surveys - even panel surveys such as Understanding Society. Survey questionnaires sometimes try to fill this gap by asking for retrospective information, typically about the migrants' employment status before migration. Though useful, this is still a poor proxy for gender relations and dynamics, especially since these questions are typically about individual labour engagement rather than relative to other family members and partners.

To be fair, quantifying gender relations is as and of itself complicated: there are different approaches and proxies, none of which fully cover the matter at hand (Richardson, 2018). That is also, of course, because gender is omnipresent in our societies, structural, structuring, and differentiating many, perhaps all spheres of life and society. It would be impossible for any survey to capture

<sup>4</sup>One of the consequences is that the floor is left to estimates with little to whimsical representative quality but clear political agendas. For an example see the debates around the creation and statistical production of Migration Watch in the UK.

all dimensions, and statistics and survey have never pretended that they could exhaust all dimensions and possibilities. Understanding Society and TeO operationalise some key concepts, however: sex-based discrimination; housework distribution between partners; childcare distribution (only unpaid in the case of TeO, paid and unpaid in the UKLHS). Understanding Society also includes a rotating module on the distribution of unpaid care delivered to elderly relatives, as well as a module on gender attitudes. Other dimensions, such as the distribution of paid work, the gender pay gap, and financial dependency between partners can also be reconstructed from the data.

Expressions of gender relations and patriarchal power which have been the chief target of third-wave feminism - such as coercion and violence (notably intimate partner violence, domestic violence, and sexual violence) - are less easily approached through these surveys. The TeO questionnaire does not include any module or reference to these experiences. *Understanding Society* has one rotating module on experiences of harassment. The module enquires about verbal and physical attacks faced by respondent over the past 12 months. Respondents are asked where they were attacked or insulted, and are offered the option 'at home' as one of the available choices. In addition, there is also a question on whether respondents felt 'unsafe' (again, at home, in public transportation, etc...), and questions as to the reasons why respondents felt they had been targeted (e.g. 'sex', 'age', 'ethnicity', 'sexual orientation'). Sexual violence is left out of the surveys altogether. Similarly, there are very few questions on sexuality (only on contraception use), and none on gender identity. *Understanding Society* has one or sexual orientation, which is part of the special licence-protected data, while TeO has none.

So it appears that the two surveys also allow for (some) measures of gender in the country of destination, at the time of the interview. Much less can be reconstructed from the state of gender relations in the country of origin. This is almost entirely lacking from the Understanding Society questionnaire, including its dedicated 'extra 5 min questions'. To some extent, it is possible to compute whether people had studied, worked and were already married before they migrated.

Here the two survey depart from one another quite clearly, since TeO makes much more room for questions on respondents' situation and cultural environment before migrating, especially as regards family formation. Notably, the survey holds information on the sphere of recruitment of the partner, including whether respondents met their current partner abroad, in what setting, and whether the family was involved. TeO's predecessor, the MGIS survey had

also specifically enquired about polygamous marriages, whether respondents were involved in one at the time of the survey, and whether polygamous unions were common in (migrant respondents') country of origin<sup>5</sup>. The MGIS questionnaire also asked respondents about kinship ties with their spouse, and whether they had been forced into their current or first union. While the question about polygamy in the country of origin are discontinued, the others are still found in the TeO questionnaire (see figure 2.1).

FIGURE 2.1: TeO questions on forced unions and kinship ties between partners

<b>*** If respondent did not take the initiative (VM 58 / C_DECIDC = 2, 4, 5, 6) ***</b>	
VM 59 / <b>C_FORCEC</b>	<b>Would you say that at the time...?</b> For this question, if another person is present or if the respondent hesitates, propose an answer using the card notebook and <b>show CARD O_2</b>
1. You really wanted to marry at that time..... <input type="checkbox"/> 1 2. You really wanted to marry but would have preferred later ..... <input type="checkbox"/> 2 3. You didn't want to marry and were obliged to through family pressure..... <input type="checkbox"/> 3 8. Refusal to answer..... <input type="checkbox"/> 8 9. Don't know..... <input type="checkbox"/> 9	
VM 60 / <b>C_COUSC</b>	<b>Do you have a family tie with your partner?</b>
1. Yes ..... <input type="checkbox"/> 1 → VM 61 2. No ..... <input type="checkbox"/> 2 → VM 62 8. Refusal to answer ..... <input type="checkbox"/> 8 → VM 62 6. Don't know ..... <input type="checkbox"/> 9 → VM 62	
<b>*** If yes (VM 60 / C_COUSC=1) ***</b>	
VM 61 / <b>C_COUSQC</b>	<b>Is your partner...?</b>
1. The son or daughter of your father's brother..... <input type="checkbox"/> 1 2. The son or daughter of your father's sister..... <input type="checkbox"/> 2 3. The son or daughter of your mother's brother..... <input type="checkbox"/> 3 4. The son or daughter of your mother's sister ..... <input type="checkbox"/> 4 5. A distant cousin on your father's side ..... <input type="checkbox"/> 5 6. A distant cousin on your mother's side ..... <input type="checkbox"/> 6 7. Other family link..... <input type="checkbox"/> 7 8. Refusal to answer..... <input type="checkbox"/> 8 9. Don't know..... <input type="checkbox"/> 9	

TeO1 English questionnaire, p. 115

The quantification of gender relations in the context of migration and family formation reproduces a framing that includes and connects forced marriages, kin marriage and polygamy, all considered and used in political narratives as markers of backward gender attitudes and intensely patriarchal gender cultures. Further, the focus on these aspects and these indicators often misses women's agency and autonomy. It is a noted historical flaw of demography (and international development studies) that is had been prone to painting third-world women in particular as passive objects of patriarchal and culturally essentialised oppression,

<sup>5</sup>MGIS (INED-INSEE 1994) questionnaire, p. 12 and p. 16

when it went beyond considering them solely as agents of reproduction (Labourie-Racapé, Meron, & Locoh, 2004; Locoh et al., 2003).

These indicators (forced unions, kin marriages, polygamy) are not meaningless, but they tell us little about the gendering effects of migration. One problem is that they hold little explanatory or comparative power, since they effectively concern a mere fraction of respondents, especially in the younger generations (Hamel, 2008). Crucially, the question of individual agency (or limit thereof) in partner selection and the related concerns about family pressure and intergenerational violence are operationalised completely differently in surveys like MGIS and TeO, focused on migrants and minorities, compared to surveys that enquire about family formation in the general population - as demonstrated by Hamel (2008). In general population surveys such *Formation des couples*<sup>6</sup> (in Hamel's example), demographers were interested in the rise of cohabitation, and whether family interference and pressures could push couples to marry - or deter, or delay, for instance in cases of social heterogamy. The framing is miles away from the one on 'forced unions' as it is applied to migrant and minority population, which is derived from a concern about non-assimilation, and inter-generational violence, especially against women. The problem is not that these phenomena are quantified, but that quantification reflects the premise that these are qualitatively different, non-endemic social practices. Accordingly, the modes of quantification of e.g. partner selection differ in surveys and questions designed for migrants and minorities, and in surveys for the general population. In practice, however, there are differences but also continuums in majority native and minority populations on e.g. family pressure in partner selection (towards social homogamy and/or ethnic endogamy), on the multiplicity of sexual and/or conjugal partners; and certainly on the matter of conjugal violence which is by no measure limited to migrant or minority men and families. That is not to say that cultural specificities do not exist or matter, but that they come out further entrenched and essentialised from the quantification process. Measuring culturally specific elements of gender relations has its value, so long as it does not relegate to the background the possibility to compare on grounds that are also widely practiced in the majority native population: sexual violence, gender roles and distribution of paid and unpaid labour, employment opportunities, wage inequality, etc... Yet on these terrains, surveys have had a mediocre record by feminist standards.

For instance, survey data has been found guilty of failing to recognize and capture women's lives and work, especially compared to the minute attention it dedicates to men's. This fact has long been known by the feminist demographers

<sup>6</sup>Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques. (1983). *La formation des couples*. ADISP. Paris. Retrieved from [http://bdq.queetelet.progedo.fr/fr/Details\\_d\\_une\\_enquete/565](http://bdq.queetelet.progedo.fr/fr/Details_d_une_enquete/565).

who tried to expose it, but it has been brought into the spotlight by recent publications, e.g. *Invisible Women* (Criado Perez, 2019). Historically, women's participation in the workforce has been systematically underestimated in official sources (Humphries & Sarasúa, 2012). In the 1990s, Marylin Waring showed that the UN's economic performance indicators were designed in such a way that they actively excluded women's labour and economic input from their estimates and calculations – thus her title *If Women Counted* (Waring, 1989). Even when recorded in survey data, work that is socially identified as 'women's work' tends to be much less finely captured by statistical nomenclatures, which often batch it into big umbrella categories (such as 'secretarial work') that recognise neither internal variety nor qualification (Amossé, 2004; Fouquet & Charraud, 1989). This should perhaps not come as a surprise when considering that statisticians were almost all men for a very long time (Fouquet, 2003). So were indeed most survey respondents: until the 1990s, household surveys recorded information from the male 'head of household' only, letting women be talked for, if talked about at all (Amossé & Peretti, 2011).

Things have since improved for women's voices in statistical production. On the front of household labour, TeO undoubtedly does better than its predecessor - MGIS had had no question on housework or care distribution. Continuing the trend, the TeO2 questionnaire<sup>7</sup> has maintained these questions on the household division of labour, and has finally included a section on gender attitude (or gender ideology).<sup>8</sup> These questions had been suggested but ultimately rejected for TeO1. The resistance of the INSEE against attitude-based questions, including (although not limited to) gender attitudes and ideology, was mentioned as a key element in this decision by several TeO interviewees.

## 2.2 Intersectional challenges

### 2.2.1 Quantifying intersectionality: categories and intersections

It has become increasingly clear that while 'women' (/ 'men') and 'gender' are an important axis of difference we cannot really speak of gender independently of other social relations. Some migrant women are wealthy, highly educated and moving within the Global North, and may have good chances of obtaining secure and high-paying jobs in their host country. Other migrant women are less privileged, and their experience of migration may be much more precarious. Gender is only 'one among many divisions in a truly uneven and heterogeneous society' (Coward, 1999, p. 211). What feminists need, then, is to

<sup>7</sup>TeO2 data due for release in 2021-2022

<sup>8</sup>Information provided by the TeO interviewees also involved in TeO2

understand how social relations, including but not limited to gender relations, work together as part of a matrix of domination (Collins, 1990), which produces intersecting - *intersectional* - forms of oppression and exploitation.

The concept of 'intersectionality' was coined in the late 1980s and early 1990s by Kimberlé Crenshaw (Crenshaw, 1989, 1991), who was building on pre-existing critical race theory and Black feminist scholarship (bell hooks, 1981, 1984; Hull, Bell-Scott, & Smith, 1982). But it was mainly in the late 2000s that intersectionality rose to prominence in gender and feminist research and beyond. Its methodological and theoretical scope, usefulness or co-option has been the topic of virulent scholarly debates (Kathy Davis (2008) and Yuval-Davis (2006). For a compelling analysis of the debates see Salem (2018)). Although the scholarship on intersectionality is overwhelmingly qualitative and/or theoretical, the notion has reached quantitative research as well: only the question of how intersectionality should be operationalised is not necessarily straightforward, and leaves room for different methodological interpretations (McCall, 2005). Quantitative intersectionality can be intuitively thought of as interacting categorical variables, typically proxies for gender, race and class (as well as sexual orientation, immigration status, disability, etc...) in order to identify whether combinations - *intersections* - of characteristics may be associated with particular effects. Researchers can remain at this level (studying *inter-categorical* inequalities) or they can move towards the study of *intra-categorical complexity*. Where an inter-categorical approach uses and crosses existing categories of race/gender/class, intra-categorical approaches are critical of existing analytical categories, and tend to focus on particular social groups at 'points of intersectional failures' (Crenshaw, 1991), thus highlighting new (smaller) relevant categories - but not dismissing categories altogether (*anti-categorical complexity*) (McCall, 2005). Indeed, even if potentially justified by the recognition that categories are necessarily imbued with power relations which they help entrench and reproduce, rejecting categories altogether would make intersectionality a virtually impractical concept and framing for quantitative analysis. Statistical analysis requires analytical categories of some sort, and post-structuralist frameworks therefore show poor compatibility with quantitative research (see also Oakley (1998)).

Inter-categorical intersectional approaches initially appeared more promising for feminist quantitative research. It seemed no doubt more practical and easier to work into statistical modelling, although it faces its own set of feminist critiques. Some suggested that most modelling methods - including regressions - still rely on a reductive and essentialising understanding of intersectionality, namely that intersectional inequalities are separable and cumulative (Sigle-Rushton, 2014). This is certainly at odds with Crenshaw's reasoning, and

it is not adequately offset by interaction effects, for reasons largely related to sample limitations. Efforts have been made to come up with alternative modelling techniques for intersectional inequalities, notably by social epidemiologists (M. A. Green, Evans, & Subramanian, 2017; Wemrell et al., 2017), but for the most part, quantitative intersectional analyses have remained reliant on descriptive or regression analysis of interacted and cumulated effects. The question of data and sample size is central: cutting through categories, such as required by an intra-categorical approach, implies that one works on a reduced sample, that of a single social group, and highlights the divides within. This will be a key empirical strategy in the next chapters, which will often present separate models for migrant women and migrant men, as a way of rendering visible the heterogeneity and inequalities within these two groups. Such intra-categorical approach requires adequate analytical categories (constituted through an adequate questionnaire), as well as large sample size or targeted sample design - most often both (McCall, 2005).

We know that TeO does not record race or ethnicity, which obviously leaves that side of the intersectional framework unaddressed. Not that this has prevented French social scientists from referring to intersectionality, although 1) the use of the concept is overall much less prevalent in France than in the UK or the US and 2) it is often articulated as an intersection of sex and class (more in line with a tradition of French materialist feminists such as Delphy (1977) and Kergoat (2004)) than of gender and race, with or without class. Some intersectionality scholars have denounced this continental 'colour-blind' approach (Carbado, 2013), accusing French (and German) feminists of erasing both race and the Black feminist roots of intersectionality (G. Lewis, 2013). Colour-blind intersectionality could in fact be forced on quantitative researchers by their data, constrained by national statistical frameworks like France's or Germany's that forbid the collection of racial or ethnic statistics. Acknowledging the limits imposed by the data on the design of intersectional research is, however, a very different epistemological stance from those who argue that race/ethnicity need not be included because race is allegedly not a structural element of French society (see previous chapter). Additionally, and as previously mentioned, neither TeO nor Understanding Society enquire about the respondents' gender, and a strict sex binary is enforced throughout the survey questionnaires.

### 2.2.2 Intersectional discrimination

Crenshaw's crafting of the notion of 'intersectionality' came about in the context of a discussion of the discrimination faced by Black women in the United States, and of the inability of the American courts to recognise and sanction

these discrimination. The issue was that since race- and sex-based discrimination were treated as separate and cumulative social issues, if one could not prove the existence of racist discrimination and/or sexist discrimination taken independently from one another, one could not possibly be victim of both. In contrast, the intersectional reasoning posited that Black women could face discrimination and vulnerabilities that were distinct from the simple addition of race- and gender-based discrimination and inequalities.

Both TeO and Understanding Society include question about respondents' experiences of discrimination. As we discussed in the previous chapter, the questions give a number of characteristics to choose from (including 'sex', 'nationality', 'skin colour' (TeO) / 'ethnicity' (Understanding Society), etc...). The respondents can pick one or several options, signalling what they understood to be the characteristic(s) that had made them a target for discriminatory treatments. The issue is that although respondents can pick several motives for discrimination, there is no way of knowing whether these would reflect different discriminatory episodes, each targeting a single characteristic, or events where it was the combination of these characteristics that made them a target of discrimination.

Maud Lesné (2015), who worked on the design of TeO, discussed this in her PhD thesis. One of her key findings, demonstrated through her comparison of TeO respondents' questionnaire answers and interview answers, was that the questions on discrimination under-performed when it came to sex-based discrimination. Although "sex" and "skin colour" were both given as options to choose from when reporting discrimination, they appeared to not be equally available – cognitively and socially – to respondents. This lead to an underestimation of gender discrimination, also relative to racial discrimination. There is every reason to believe that the exact same problem would apply to Understanding Society, since the questions are worded and processed in the exact same way (aside from the fact that the option 'ethnicity' is replaced by 'skin colour' in the French survey).

It was clear, perhaps, to both survey design teams that to the extent that the surveys focused on discriminations, the focus was on racial discrimination much more than on discrimination in general, including gender discrimination. This is further clarified by the targeted audience for discrimination questions and surveys: The TeO sample for the French survey, and the Ethnic Minority Boost Sample (for the UKLHS), the Comparison sample or the LDA sample (non-white respondents in Low Density ethnic minority Areas). While in theory the experience of discrimination of various sorts may touch all parts of the native and white (but female, disabled, LGBT+, etc.) population, in practice the

discrimination that are effectively targeted and recorded are those experienced by racialised minorities.

### **2.2.3 Sampling strategies and intersectional failures**

The final point I want to make in this section thus brings us back to the over-sampling strategies investigated in the previous chapter. By constricting the sample of migrants and the questions on migration (or discrimination) to racialised minority respondents, the surveys assume that migration is something that is only relevant to them. At the same time, it focuses all statistical attention and scrutiny on these racialised others, thus further reinstalling their 'otherness', whereas other types of 'Others' (specifically, white others) remain untouched and unproblematised, in the statistical shadows – at least until they become perhaps themselves racialised. The argument that the experience of 'visible minorities' in Britain or in France is qualitatively different from that of white others is of course valid – on the ground of racism and racial disadvantage. But if we want to study migration, and especially study it critically and intersectionally, we cannot pool it together with racial disadvantage – not because they do not intersect (they certainly do), but because even though they often work together, one cannot be reduced to the other.

Going back to Crenshaw's initial case study: it is by comparing black women's experiences to those of black men and of white women that the intersectionality of discriminations could be demonstrated (Crenshaw, 1989). Only the double comparison could highlight the fact that the discriminations faced by Black women could be reduced neither to only sexist or only racist discrimination, nor to their simple addition.

Similarly, to be able to statistically construct white migrants (through adequate sample size and information on migration) is a necessary condition and counter-factual (if nothing else) to rigorously investigate the intersectionality of migration experiences. This is not an attempt to re-centre whiteness through white migrants. On the contrary, it is to improve our capacity to quantitatively investigate and understand the intersectional inequalities faced by racialised migrants – especially migrant women of colour – by taking stock of the fact that, in order to do so, we need the meaningful points of comparison that the intersectional reasoning relies on.

Racialising the sampling of migrants, whether it operates through selected ethnic identities (Understanding Society) or selected countries of birth (TeO), renders this enterprise more difficult, not only because it skews the sample, but because it frames the reasoning. It precludes the quantification of gender

relations for minority and migrant population as distinguished from (assumed) gender cultures. In so doing, there is a risk of reproducing sampling and survey design on the models of e.g. statistics of deviance, that is, with an essentialising and monitoring implicit, an emanation and a form of biopolitics in Foucauldian parlance (Foucault, 1961, 1994). The association between migrant populations and distant gender cultures is made particularly explicit in the TeO questionnaire by the pointed questions forced marriages and kin marriages. Gender relations in the context of migration and population diversity are thus framed as the product of cultural difference, of the 'Otherness' of these groups, rather than as something that is negotiated and reconstructed also on the paths of migration, from country of origin to country of destination. With these questions, surveys invite the framing of gender relations in minority group as something imported through migration, rather than something built with and through immigration regimes and gender relations in the destination country. The second reading engages the responsibility and the gender culture of the host society, whereas, in contrast, the first does not (Delphy, 2006).

## **2.3 Understanding the window for survey-based research on gender and migration**

### **2.3.1 Gender mainstreaming and survey inertia**

Nevertheless, the surveys did make some space for questions directly relating to gender relations, even if the space they carved appears at time prone to essentialist interpretations. Why do these ways of quantifying gender relations appear when they do in surveys data concerned with population diversity and migration, and why these questions and not others. One answer, which applies mostly to the British case, is survey inertia: the BHPS, of which Understanding Society is the extension (see chapter 1), had included regular modules on the division of household labour. This was no doubt linked to the fact Jonathan Gershuny, specialist of time-use research, was the Director of the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of Essex, and the Principal Investigator of the BHPS from 1993 to 2006. Subsequently, and to avoid losing longitudinal continuity, the UKLHS maintained (some, not all) of these questions. Another answer is gender mainstreaming: throughout the late 20th century and in the early 2000s, the topic of gender equality and women's studies become largely accepted and institutionalised. Pushed by the EU as well as other international institutions (notably the UN), gender mainstreaming refers to the widespread official recognition that gender equality is a priority goal to be advanced on (almost) all social and political front, and that this requires better data and improved

understanding of gender inequalities.

In the context of TeO and Understanding Society, gender mainstreaming works through two main and interconnected medium: the interest in and request for cross-national comparative research and, crucially, through the EU. Notably, the European Generations and Gender surveys,<sup>9</sup> and before that the Fertility and Family survey in the 1990s were already asking questions on household labour division.<sup>10</sup> This also ought to be put in context with the fact that the surveys are hosted by institutions (the INED and ISER) which have otherwise developed research on gender, or on issues very closely related to gender (e.g. time-use). The INED even had an explicit institutionalised focus on gender since the late 1990s. The arrival of François Héran as the new director of the INED in 1999 created a window of opportunity. François Héran had co-led the survey *Formation des couples* (Couple formation) (INED, 1983-1984) with Michel Bozon. Very supportive of sociological perspectives on demographic processes, he actively encouraged the creation of the research cluster 'Gender, demography and Society' co-founded by Michel Bozon and Thérèse Locoh, a feminist demographer who wrote extensively on gender in development programs.

The importance and dynamism of this research cluster at the INED is particularly noteworthy in light of the fact that France was behind on the 'gender mainstreaming' movement, especially compared to Northern European countries. This applied to demography and statistics but also to international development (Labourie-Racapé et al., 2004). Questions of gender were thus often given little more than polite attention and symbolic means. The combination of a survey team that includes members directly involved in gender research (several members of TeO are also part of the 'Gender, Demography and Society' cluster, now 'Gender and sexuality'), with the international incitement to include 'mainstreamed' questions on gender relations, facilitated their introduction in the TeO questionnaire. In the case of Understanding society, the same process of gender mainstreaming justified that those questions be retained from the BHPS questionnaire. This process is summarized by one of the French interviewees:

There are generalist surveys which have been taking gender into account, and so these questions in particular have been integrated into TeO. Hence the example of the distribution of [domestic] tasks for instance, that is linked to questions that were taken from the Gender and Generation Survey. And then, for TeO, there are also the three survey leads, and [one of them] really carried the theme of gender, and was really militant on the integration of questions of gender in the survey. So I think it is a conjuncture of, yes, because [gender] is a little bit unavoidable now, surveys take

<sup>9</sup>The Generations and Gender program is a series of Panel surveys which started in 2000 under the umbrella of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). Since 2009, it is maintained and developed through a cooperation of national institutes of statistics across Europe.

<sup>10</sup>Fertility and Family Survey (FFS) questionnaire, 1992, p. 29.

into question gender aspects and then... and then also, someone carried that inside the survey team.  
(TeO – interviewee 5<sup>11</sup> – INED researcher, and TeO analyst).

It is not just any aspect of gender that thus gets into survey data on migration: it is those that have become mainstream. The questions on household labour fit the bill, because they have been around for a long time, they are 'descriptive' or 'factual' which statisticians tend to prefer, and they are now common currency in European statistics. With the EU pushing for member states to collect more data on gender for cross-national comparison purposes, integrating these variables is a good way to tick that box - especially since it stirs no feathers.

On the whole there appear to have been very little disagreement within both survey team either on the legitimacy of gender as a topic, or on the scope that should be given to gender-related questions in the survey questionnaire. In fact, most survey designers, British and French alike, describe it as a non-issue: firstly, they consider that gender is *de facto* a possible angle of analysis, by virtue of the 'sex' category that allows for sex-separated tables and comparison – a classic demographic simplification of what constitute gender analysis, not to speak of feminist quantitative research (Locoh et al., 2003). Besides, survey designers point out, there are variables which can be read as speaking to gender, even if they are not explicitly about gender. This is the case of variables on housework distribution and time-use.

- [M. L] Is gender or gender research something that's present in the survey design?
- I guess it wasn't, much less so explicitly. And it's interesting to raise this cause... [...] because [some of the survey designers] work on... time-use, and you can't work on time-use without thinking about gender I think.... So, in the sense that there was that perspective, that was going back to the BHPS, that kind of an interest, even if this isn't a time-use survey at all. But it wasn't discussed, as if we would all discuss as to what made this distinctive, gender was never highlighted as the thing that made it distinctive. What was highlighted there was the ability to look at research questions, some of which you could think about as being gendered.

(Interviewee #1<sup>12</sup> – UKLHS survey designer, ethnicity strand)

There was no occasion to fight, I mean, there were very few reactions against [the thematic of gender]

(Interviewee #7<sup>13</sup> - TeO survey designer)

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<sup>11</sup>Interview conducted in September 2017

<sup>12</sup>Interview conducted in January 2018. 'M.L.' refers to the author of this thesis who is here the interviewer

<sup>13</sup>Interview conducted in December 2017

The fact that there are 'no occasion to fight' about gender, however, can be interpreted both ways: on the one hand, the topic has indeed indeed 'mainstream' and reached the field of population diversity and quantitative migration studies: from this perspective it has gained the legitimacy and institutionalised quality which feminist scholars longed for (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2012; Nawyn et al., 2009). On the other hand, the narrative of gender as uncontentious can also be read as a post-feminist statement that the cause has been won, and deserves no more argument - and certainly no discussion around data.

### 2.3.2 Data segregation

Yet as we discussed in previous sections, there are quite fundamental aspects of gender relations in and out of migration which are not included or adequately covered. The fact of the improved but limited co-existence of survey data on gender and data on migration has to do with a broader tendency to consider and treat these two topics as separate. This I call *data segregation*, echoing Nawyn (2010) who talked about the segregation of gender research in migration studies. In its most straightforward form, it plays out in the idea and practice that it is best to have surveys dedicated to gender issues on the one hand, and surveys dedicated to migration and population diversity on the other hand. The idea is not new but still stands that research on gender, although it has gained recognition and legitimacy, has also been cordoned off in 'dedicated gender spaces' such as gender institutes, gender studies departments and gender/feminist research clusters (Nawyn, 2010; Pedraza, 1991; Stacey & Thorne, 1985). In the context of survey design, this segregation often operates on a technical rather than theoretical level: largely through the mobilisation of notions of *acceptability* (whether participants - or indeed, interviewers and partner institutions - will agree to the question), *reliability* (whether respondents will understand the question and answer it in a consistent way), and *arbitration* (whether it is justified to dedicate questionnaire space to this topic at the cost of other topics).

*Acceptability* is used to disqualify topics deemed 'sensitive' and 'intimate'. This applies in particular to questions on sexual orientation, sexuality and gendered forms of violence (Intimate Partner Violence (IPV), sexual violence, etc...). The fear that respondents will refuse to answer such questions or, worse, that respondents would be triggered and alienated by these questions - especially when it comes to violence - is not a small matter. Concern for attrition and low response rates, as well as notions of respect and consideration towards survey participants underpin the 'sensitivity' argument. The label 'sensitive information' however, can also be understood as reflecting the sensibilities and values of the survey designers and of the social milieu they come from. Their viewpoint and

expectations may thus be projected onto the respondents and the data, sometimes without much empirical basis (Riley & Brunson, 2018). For instance, there had long been resistances to introducing questions on sexual orientation with the UKLHS team being divided on this. Eventually, these questions were field-tested and turned out to be widely accepted by respondents.<sup>14</sup>

Such testing was not implemented for TeO, however, and no questions on sexual orientation (or sexuality) made their way into the French survey, a decision which was criticized within the INED.<sup>15</sup> The notion of 'privacy' (*intimité*), tightly linked to that of sensitivity in the context of gender, is a slippery concept: since gender relations are largely reproduced and enacted in 'intimate' spheres (e.g. within the home) and interactions (e.g. sexuality), it can potentially disqualify many key gender themes as 'intrusive'. 'The personal is political' may still need to be asserted on this front. Institution's statistical cultures and even national statistical traditions also have a role in this. The cooperation with the INSEE imposes a more rigid framework on the French survey, reflective of a statistical and political tradition less interested in - and less accepting of - the recording of subjective measures such as 'identities' and 'ideologies' - even the INSEE's workers unions was opposed to 'subjective' questions. The 'hostilities of the INSEE', as one TeO interviewee put it, plays against the inclusion of other questions on gender in TeO.

The thing that was perhaps the most... that most limited questions on gender, in part, but as for other topics, was that the INSEE is not really, generally does not like subjective questions, that is, questions on opinions or attitudes. And it so happens that gender questions are, well, they don't have to be all like that, but it's true that, well – ok, for example, the division of task, that's descriptive, so there... but yeah, there are other questions that have to do with roles and representations... All these questions on the representations of gender roles, we didn't ask them because, when you get to the bottom of it, the INSEE did not really like questions on representations. (Interviewee #6<sup>16</sup> – TeO survey designer).

*Reliability* applies to questions which are expected to not be answered properly by respondents, because they refer to matters that are fuzzy and not yet clearly defined in the general consciousness. This typically applies to gendered

<sup>14</sup>'There was a long discussion about sexual identity and... it wasn't included initially in the study. But then, I can't remember when we started asking it but we tested asking people for their sexual identity, whether they were heterosexual or gay, lesbian, whatever and it went ok! And we did it in the self-completion questionnaire, so... if people didn't want to answer, they could just say "oh I don't want to answer this" and that's that. And it, it wasn't the interviewer asking them the question so it was more private. (Interviewee #2 - Understanding Society survey lead)'

<sup>15</sup>The lack of questions on sexual orientation and sexuality in TeO was a point of internal criticism at the INED, mostly emanating from the 'Gender and Sexuality' cluster which had developed and already used such questions in its own surveys and research.

<sup>16</sup>Interview conducted in November 2017

violence (Jaspard & the Enveff survey team, 2001), but also to gender discrimination, experiences of which are more internalised, not necessarily labelled as discrimination by respondents, and are therefore under-identified and under-reported (Lesné, 2015)).

This finally brings the question of *relevance* and *arbitration*. With only limited questionnaire length, survey designers must make choices. The question then is often not whether gender is relevant, but whether it is more important than other aspects of migration or diversity which survey designers and/or survey ordainers are interested in. Since, on top of this, the quantification of gender relations may not always be straightforward, and therefore extra questionnaire time may have to be dedicated to introducing non-intuitive concepts and questions, survey designers can easily consider that it is too big an investment and sacrifice. Questions on ethnicity and/or immigration are already a hot potato for survey designers, who know how political such classifications can become (i.e. the previous debates around the ethnic question and later on the mixed option in the British census, and the demographers' controversy in France). The consultation process carried out by the TeO ethnicity strand team can also be understood as an extensive and successful effort to preempt such critique and politicisation. The French survey team was not sparred this politicisation: the national controversy on ethnic statistics focalises attention and energy. It is perhaps no wonder then that survey designers would be reluctant to include more potentially 'sensitive' questions and, either way, gender is not perceived to be the biggest problem they have to deal with.

This segregation of gender is in fact not only a question of data design, but also a feature of the academic field of migration studies more broadly: As Hondagneu-Sotelo observed '[...] there is a continued and near total deafness [towards gender] from scholars working on other core areas of immigration studies, on segmented assimilation, immigrant religion, transnationalism and citizenship.' (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2012, p. 185). Neither the interviewees nor ultimately the survey data could in good faith be described as gender-deaf. Yet it is true that through reasoning and mechanisms of survey construction otherwise justified, gender is constructed as a relevant but largely peripheral topic; a topic that, in the end, ends up easily squeezed out when the time come for survey designers to make the 'tough choices' that decide the final questionnaire. This peripheral position of gender in the quantification of migration is also apparent in data usage. Even those few variables on the gender division of household labour that were included in TeO and Understanding Society were, in the end, little used by researchers and analysts interested in migration and minorities, and not at all in this respect by the survey designers themselves (Kan and Laurie

(2016) is an exception). This lack of success, noted by the French survey designers, can then end up further justifying the enfranchisement of gender in migration survey data.

## Chapter conclusion

The previous chapter had already dampeden the notion of a incommensurate breach between French and British statistical approaches to migrants and migration. There are no doubt differences in how the two surveys accommodate gender and migration. But most of those differences are attributable to the different survey formats (individual vs. household, targeted with reference group vs. general with oversampling) rather than to their national anchoring.

The first section of this chapter discussed critically the perimeter and centrality of gender in TeO and Understanding Society. It showed how these surveys make a gender analysis of migration possible, at least in certain (but key) respects. The second section extended this question, asking whether the surveys can accommodate intersectional analyses of migration. The answer is yes and no: the surveys make it possible to address a certain degree of inter-categorical and intra-categorical complexity. But the window they offer for intersectional analysis is constrained by the sample, the format of questions on discrimination and harassment, and the lack of information on race or ethnicity in the French survey. The final section investigated the political and institutional conditions of emergence of this window of opportunity. It showed the uncomfortable position granted to gender in survey design on migration. While the relevance of gender is not contested, its incorporation is peripheral rather than deeply involved and transformative of the way migration itself is quantified. Changes that are transformative require militant demographers in position of decision and, ideally, power (e.g. François Héran<sup>17</sup>) as well as favourable political context and statistical landscapes. These changes face resistance in the field of statistics, and especially from public statistics, whose statistical *ethos* (e.g. objectivity) and conservatism often seem to jar with the very basics of feminist methods and framing. On the broader political stage, the quantification of migration is tied into classifications of national 'others' (be they defined in ethnic or migratory terms) (see previous chapter), topics and terrains of intense polemics. This contributes to a ghettoisation of gender (Stacey & Thorne, 1985) and intersectionality (G. Lewis, 2013) in quantitative data and design which, however, the two surveys under study here managed to (partially) avoid.

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<sup>17</sup>Although François Héran would most likely argue he was not militant but simultaneously 'neutral and engagé' (Héran, 2017)

## **Part 2**

Gendered travels: couples and sequences of  
union-migration



## Chapter 3

# France-bound migration trajectories and couple formation: a typology of sequences

Patriarchal gender relations  
organize family stage migration,  
and migration reorganizes  
gender relations.

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Hondagneu-Sotelo (1992)  
p. 410-411

## Chapter introduction

As surveyed in the literature review, the quantitative connections made between migrants' couples and gender relations have been meager. Gender differences have mostly been addressed with regards to partner recruitment and specifically endogamous and transnational arrangements. With regards to intermarriage, gender asymmetries have been noted, and mainly explained through reference to gender-racialised affinities and patriarchal control, especially within certain migrant and ethnic groups, which limits the 'partnering out' of women more so than men. I argue that a further - and key - element that frames both mixedness and gender relations in couples is the migration experience *itself*. Building on life-course perspectives, the growing scholarship on family-related migration, has shown that the way and the timing in the life-cycle at which individuals both migrate and form relationships has social consequences, also for women's empowerment. In the context of international migration, these are mostly documented with respect to women's labour market participation (Cerrutti & Massey, 2001; González-Ferrer, 2006, 2011). But they should not be

considered to be solely relevant to endogamous migrant families: couples formed by primary migrants and majority natives (i.e. native born to native parents) also reflect gendered trajectories of migration and gendered modes of international partner recruitment.

This matters because there is evidence that the circumstances of migration, in terms of social and legal framework, as well as in the timing in the life-cycle can orient and impact family formation, participation in the labour market and ultimately couple dynamics and gender relations in the household. Indeed, inequalities, and perhaps especially gender inequalities, are better understood as series of contingencies, as dynamic processes that unravel and interlock (Aisenbrey & Fasang, 2017). People 'grow into their gender' as they undergo various 'engendering experiences', of which finding a partner, getting married and having children are well-documented examples.<sup>1</sup> Migration can then also be thought of as both a gendered and 'engendering' moment and process, where gender roles and power relations can be renegotiated and redistributed but often further polarised between men and women. Trajectories of family formation and migration both reflect and reshape gender differences and gender relations (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1992; Pedraza, 1991). Gendered paths of couple and migration are then also paths of gender: they concern and construct migrant men and masculinities, as they do migrant women and femininities (see chapter 2). These paths and how they connect to migrants' partner choice, constitute the focus of this chapter. The connection between these gendered paths of union-migration and the gender division of labour in couples will be the topic of the next chapters.

This part of the thesis is structured into two chapters: they both follow the same structure and develop the same methods. The first, chapter 3, does so with the French data; the second, chapter 4, mirrors chapter 3 but based on the British data. I spend more time in chapter 3 explaining the construction of the variables and the methods used. In chapter 4, I go quicker over the methods, and go into details only when the data differs from the French data. The limitations of the methods and approach developed in this part are presented at the end of chapter 4. (The same structure apply to chapter 5 and 6.)

These chapters are organised as follow: they first present a descriptive account of the distribution (notably in terms of geographic origins, religion, education) of migrants into different couple types, differentiating between those formed with other primary migrants, with native-born direct descendants of migrants (the 'second generation'), and with natives with native parents (labelled

<sup>1</sup>This point has of course been most famously formulated by De Beauvoir's 'On ne naît pas femme, on le devient.' (1949, p. 285), which has different translations, one of which is 'One is not born but rather becomes woman' (Mann & Ferrari, 2017).

majority natives). I also investigate whether the different couple types also connect to different calendars of migration and couple formation. The bulk of the chapters are then dedicated to identifying the differences in the migration-union sequences associated with migrant women and migrant men, and with each couple type.

### 3.0.1 Migrant's partner selection in France: focus on intermarriage

In the French context, the joint quantitative analysis of couple formation and migration has been developed almost exclusively in the vein of intermarriage scholarship (Collet & Santelli, 2012, 2013; Munoz-Perez & Tribalat, 1984; Tribalat, 2009). Rates of intermarriage, especially with the native majority population, are, as elsewhere, mostly taken as indicators of integration (or lack thereof) (Gordon, 1964; Waters & Gerstein Pineau, 2016), and used to benchmark different migrant groups (Safi, 2008; Tribalat, 2009), but migrant-native unions have also been also analysed as a terrain (not just a proof) of integration, intercultural conjugal exchanges and adaptation (Collet, 2015), and as medium of 'extreme assimilation', for higher-class, skilled migrant women especially (S. Scott, 2006). Empirical research on migrant-native unions in France has shown that migrants in these relationships are often amongst the most qualified and best integrated migrants (M'sili & Neyrand, 1998; Munoz-Perez & Tribalat, 1984; Tribalat, 1996). This is nuanced however by the studies that noted that the degree of integration of minority partners in mixed couples is dependent on a variety of factors, and that a high degree of cultural integration can coexist with low economic participation and performance (Song, 2009) - and vice-versa.

Additionally, in France, as in most European countries, there is little quantitative work that addresses the connection between migration, family formation (the choice of partner, timing of couple formation and fertility), and changes in women's labour performance, let alone in the gender division of labour. The process of couple formation and its interlocking with migration, is less on the radar of French empirical research, when compared with the endogamous or exogamous outcome of partner selection (although there are some important exceptions, such as Collet and Santelli (2012, 2013) and Hamel, Lhommeau, Pailhé, and Santelli (2015), Hamel, Pailhé, Santelli, and Lhommeau (2013)). This has not prevented superficial assumptions which have long assigned migrant women to a generic category of 'family migration', pejoratively associated with passivity, domesticity, and chain migration. Although there is no denial that women are a majority among family migrants overall, gender asymmetries vary with the specific category of family migrant: among those who obtained residency rights (*titre de séjour*) through family reunification, 71% were women. But among those

who were granted a partner visa as 'partner of a French national' (*conjoint de Français*), there was almost exact parity between men and women (51% women, 49% men, see Algava and Bèque (2008, p. 3)). At any rate, these legal admission categories only very roughly capture union-migration trajectories. A potentially important distinction is missed, for instance, between family-forming migrations and migrations of reunification. In the case of reunification, the couple was formed before the migration of either partner, and both were involved in the design of the couple's migratory projects. In the case of family-forming migration, one partner (generally the woman) is 'imported' by the other, and it is in the context of this migration that the couple itself is formed. While both fit into the generic categories of family migrant, 'tied migrants', and other 'trailing spouses', they do not reflect the same mode of recruitment nor the same couple dynamics. For reunified couples, the migration of both partner was often a joint couple project, of which even the 'trailing' or 'reunified' spouse could have been an integral part and an active agent. In contrast, 'imported' migrants<sup>2</sup> are in a much more asymmetrical and unfavourable position towards their sponsor partner. González-Ferrer (2011) found migrant women in this category to be associated with the lowest chances of employment. We know - although arguably in terms too rough - that migrant women and migrant men do not follow the same migration paths. But we also know that the effect of union-migration trajectories do not impact migrant women and migrant men in the same way. These union-migration trajectories, and how they are split between migrant women and men, and between couple types, are the focus of this chapter and the next.

I consider the couples formed by migrant women and migrant men, and split them into three groups: (1) migrant couples, (2) couples formed of a primary migrant and a native with migrant parent, and (3) couples formed between a primary migrant and a majority native (i.e. a native with two native parents). The literature on intermarriage has amply demonstrated that rates of mixing vary by gender and by migrant group. I will show that the mixing of migrants with majority natives also reflects different trajectories of union and migration, and that the trajectories that lead to mixing are gendered.

### 3.0.2 Women's and men's migration to France: elements of a gendered history and reality

The migration of women to France have never been only driven or explained by the legal pathway of family reunification which, for that matter, long predates the period since the 1970s that saw it turn into the main legal entry route into France (Morokvasic, 2010a). Although the literature and the political narratives

<sup>2</sup>In González-Ferrer (2006, 2011)'s terminology

on (im)migration long overlooked or dismissed women's migration, migrant women were never by any stretch a negligible proportion of France's immigrant population (Héran, 2017; Noiriel, 1988). In fact, migrant women have overall dominated migratory flows to France since the mid-1970s (M. A. Green, Evans, & Subramanian, 2017), something observed in a variety of Western countries and described as the 'feminization' of (im)migration (Beauchemin, Borrel, Régnard, & Santelli, 2015). The ratio of migrant women to migrant men fluctuated throughout the 20th and 21st century, largely reflecting the economic situation in France and, connectedly, the relative tightening or loosening of immigration regulations and criteria. Much like in many other Western countries, periods of economic growth and relative prosperity in Western countries are associated with increased demand for (cheap) labour-power (Castles & Kosack, 1973), something empirically noted by sociologists and demographers (Héran (2018)). These periods have been historically associated with a greater proportion of men's immigration (Beauchemin, Borrel, Régnard, & Santelli, 2015). In contrast, in periods of economic crisis or stagnation, economic immigration is reduced and other forms of migration, especially family migration, become more prevalent. Migrants already there, unsure of whether they may be able to come back if they leave, may decide to settle more permanently than they had originally planned.

Indeed, prior to 1974, migrant workers moved much more fluidly between France and the country they had initially come from. But with the 1974 closure of borders to labour migration came the 'end of the norias', a term employed by Gérard Noiriel (1988) to describe the back-and-forths and alternations of short stays in France and in the countries of origin. The obstacles created by greater immigration restrictions to these transnational practices forced migrants to choose. Those who decided to stay may therefore have been or become more open to bringing in relatives to join them. As other channels of migration became less available, migration flows then become dominated by family migration - mainly family reunification and partner migration (i.e. visas for partners of French citizens) - which were themselves dominated by migrant women.

Official statistics provide reliable information on the composition of *ordinary* migration flows to France, that is migrants who enter through the established set of legal pathways.<sup>3</sup> The numbers for 2010 published by the French *Ministère de l'Intérieur* reported 65 000 student visas (migrants studying in France for at least a year), 50,000 partner visas ('à titre de Conjoint de Français': when migrants are sponsored by their partner, who is a French national), 33,000 family reunification

<sup>3</sup>François Héran distinguishes *ordinary migrations* from *extra-ordinary migrations*, which refer to migration movements sparked by wars and conflicts, as well as to undocumented and unreported migrations)

migrants (when migrants are sponsored by a relative, typically a spouse or parent, who is not a French national but has the right to live in France), 18,000 migrants who were granted refugee status that year (or the right to stay for long medical treatment in France), 17,000 who entered for non-seasonal work, and an additional 12,000 who fell into the 'others' category.<sup>4</sup> Because EU citizens have been mostly exempted from visas requirements, these numbers do not account for their migration to France<sup>5</sup>. Overall, the numbers of entries from outside the EU have remained very stable since the end of the 1990s - strikingly so when considering how central immigration control was in political debates and in the agenda of Nicolas Sarkozy, who was home secretary (Ministre de l'Intérieur) and then president for most of the period (Héran, 2017; Raissiguier, 2007).

### 3.0.3 Legal pathways and gendered trajectories

The differences between both the motives and modes of migration of migrant men and migrant women were, historically, unaddressed and then subsequently overstated. This is true in France as elsewhere (N. L. Green, 1998; Morokvasic, 2010a; Nawyn, 2010). Researchers also noted a gender convergence following the clamping down on labour migration in the mid-1970s, mostly due to rising proportions of migrant men entering as family migrants. Nevertheless, there remain clear gender differences in the migratory paths walked by migrant women and migrant men residing in France. The legal admission category provides important information about how men and women first entered France, although as noted by González-Ferrer (2011), it tells only a partial and somewhat skewed story. People use the immigration channels that are available to them: some may formally arrive under a 'family visa' and yet not migrate primarily for family reasons but in search of work or change. Conversely, many of those who legally enter the country as economic migrants or as students may be encouraged or driven to migration by a partner or family left behind, who hope to join later or be rejoined. Individual 'pioneer' migrants can come to France on a non-family related visa but later use family-related immigration channels to bring their families to them. Finally, immigration status changes over time, when migrants obtain different residency rights, or when their initial visa runs out, leaving them undocumented.

Nevertheless, the legal admission category is an important factor of differentiation between migrant men and women, and it is a key aspect of the question at hand since it conditions situations of legal dependency, when the settled or

<sup>4</sup>The 'other' category includes isolated minors and 'visitors'. Numbers published on the website of the Ministère de l'Intérieur ([www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr](http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr), tab 'Statistiques'). Quoted by Héran (2017, p. 8).

<sup>5</sup>Or for Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, who also benefits from visa exemptions

native partner act as visa sponsor for the other migrant partner. In these pages, I identify legally dependent partners as 'tied migrants', because their migration and residency rights were (at least at first) legally tied to their sponsor partner. The sponsor partners can be natives or settled migrants. I will sometimes refer to migrant sponsors as 'anchor migrants'. These categories are useful because they connect to concepts and realities of legal (and hence also often economic and material) dependency (Eggebø, 2010). While legal dependency on or over a partner is not intended to last indefinitely, it can set an initial power balance and tone in couples (Riaño, 2011; Suksomboon, 2011). As discussed more at length in the literature review, it also means greater vulnerability for dependent migrants towards their partner for as long as have not secured independent rights to remain.

### **3.0.4 Gender, life course perspectives on migration and couple formation**

As Hamel et al. (2015) argued, combining insights from the sociology of family and couples, and from the sociology of migration is key here. The relative timing of events also determines much of the opportunity for mixing: people who migrated to France as children are more likely to have met their partner in France and therefore also more likely to have formed mixed unions. On the other end of the spectrum, migrants who were already in a stable relationship when they migrated are 'off the matrimonial market' and thus less likely to form relationships with natives. This is likely to apply especially to women, and can be articulated with the gender differences in the propensity to form exogamous unions, which are well documented (Wang, 2012) though more rarely a point of focus (Safi, 2008). There are also variations associated with the geographic area or origin, e.g. migrants from Turkey, who appear overall more endogamous and more likely to have formed relationships early on, prior to migration. This is especially true for Turkish migrant women (Safi, 2010). Educational attainment is also involved in patterns of family formation, both in terms of timing and recruitment (Blossfeld & Timm, 2003). In a migration context, this is reflected in mixed migrant-native unions being more likely to involve a higher degree of qualification, and for the women to be more highly qualified than the men.

In the past, life course perspectives that emphasize the superiority of trajectories over profiles have only seldom been applied to migrant populations and lives, although this is changing rapidly. An important element has been the growing attention to age at migration (Adserà, Ferrer, Sigle-Rushton, & Wilson, 2012; Choi & Tienda, 2018). In short, and to simplify, the younger the migrants are when they arrive then the easier their socio-economic integration. This is mainly

explained as the result of early socialization in the country, especially through schooling. Using MGIS data, Tribalat (Tribalat, 1996) highlighted significant integration differences between migrants who arrived as adults, and those who were still children at the time of their arrival. Recent research has also shown that child migrants consequently present different fertility patterns compared to those who were already adults at the time of their migration (Wilson, 2019), and posits child migrants closer to the native-born population than to the rest of the foreign-born population. Adserà et al. (2012), who look at France, the UK and Canada, make the point that the importance of the age at migration is also connected to the fact that in the case of migrant children, the migration experience does not directly interfere with family formation: there is therefore no *disruption* occasioned by migration in both the chances and timing of partner recruitment and fertility. Their results also reveal variations between different migrant groups, as well as across gender, suggesting that an early age at migration is a more important feature for migrant men's assimilation and intermarriage rates than for migrant women's (Castro Torres, 2020; Choi & Tienda, 2018).

### 3.1 Research questions

This chapter is driven by three main research questions:

1. Do migrants who form couples with a majority native French partner differ in origins, family patterns and calendar, from migrants in other types of partnerships (i.e. with other migrants or with direct descendants of migrants)? Does this change with the gender of the migrant?
2. Do migrants who mix with the majority native French group follow different trajectories of family formation and migration?
3. Are these trajectories gendered?

To expand briefly:

(H1) In line with assimilation theory, the possibility of mixing with the majority native group as a first-generation migration implies very fast assimilation, which presupposes a degree of selection among groups towards whom the majority group is least prejudiced (Gordon, 1964; Kulu, 2019). Considering (soft) segmented assimilation in France we should observe differences between migrant groups, who are associated with uneven pace of assimilation (Safi, 2008). Certain group borders are known to be harder to cross for out-partnering; I expect Turkish and to a lesser extent North Africans migrants are scarcely represented among migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples, while European and atheist/agnostic

migrants may be over-represented. The scale of the differences is expected to be gendered, with migrant women from these groups being even less represented in mixed unions than migrant men. This point is well-documented already in the literature, but it is necessary for the reasoning.

(H2) The hypothesis of fast marital assimilation is more plausible if migrants arrived at a younger age in the UK, were thus socialised earlier and longer in France by the time they met their native majority partner, and also had more opportunities for contact and higher chances of meeting them prior to, or during partner recruitment and family formation. Therefore one would expect that a greater proportion of migrants with a native majority partner migrated earlier in the life-course compared to migrants in relationships with other migrants. In contrast, and building here on the qualitative literature, one would expect that migrants in migrant couples are more likely to have migrated much later in the life-course, past the stage of family formation (and bringing their partner with them); while the emphasis on transnational couples would suggest that in the case of MIG-2G couples, a large proportion of migrants would have migrated to the UK at the same time as they were starting their marital life. However...

(H3) ... these also are expected to be gendered. Both gender relations in the sending areas and immigration regimes in France may make it more difficult for women to migrate 1) independently, and especially if 2) single (Kofman, Phizacklea, Raghuram, & Sales, 2005; Toma & Vause, 2014). One can therefore expect that it is a smaller proportion of adult migrant women who arrive in France prior to family formation and are then in a position to form a relationship with a majority native there. Migrant women may be more likely to come as marriage migrants, and marriage migration may not be limited to unions with other migrants or with descendants of migrants.

Thus couples that appear similar in composition (e.g. migrant-native couples involving the same migrant groups) may, at any point in time, be the result of quite dissimilar, deeply gendered processes of marriage and household formation. Mixedness would therefore potentially carry quite different meanings for both native and migrant partners.

### 3.1.1 Specific contribution

While mostly descriptive, this chapter makes several contributions to the literature. With respect to the life-course literature on migration, it offers a data-driven, complex typology which takes advantage of sequence analysis to efficiently capture the different key ways in which migration is nested in the life-course. These union-migration trajectories, thus identified, help make sense

of how migrants' choice of partner is also associated with different migration pathways and family trajectories. Crucially, the reasoning is informed by legal trajectories, but it is not restricted to migrants who fall under the immigration regime. By using sequences of union-migration and not only categories of 're-unified' or 'imported' partners who are legally tied to their legal sponsor, I can include EU migrants, who have been largely left out of the literature on family migration and the life-course.

The second key contribution goes to the literature on mixedness. Taking advantage of the union-migration sequences, I show how they strongly differentiate couple types and especially single out the trajectories of migrants who mix with the majority native partners. Crucially, I show that the union-migration sequences followed by migrants in mixed couples are not only different from those of other migrants, but they are gendered. The literature already established gender variations in intermarriage rates, and has mostly attributed it to different affinities or degree of patriarchy within migrant communities (Safi, 2008; Wang, 2012), and different opportunity structures for men and women (Kalmijn, 1998), I show that intermarriage is also gendered in the sense that the paths that lead to it are not the same for migrant men and migrant women. These paths, in turn, matter because they come with uneven degrees of dependency, devaluation or loss of resources and qualification, and chances of employment, which have consequences for the power dynamics with the native partner.

## 3.2 Data and methods

### 3.2.1 Data and sample

As detailed in the first chapter of this thesis, the sample of the French survey *Trajectory and Origins* (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009) was built so as to be representative of all people born between 1948 and 1990 (except for the sample of descendants of migrants who is only representative of those born between 1958 and 1990), residing in mainland France in an ordinary household in 2007 (Algava & Lhommeau, 2013, p. 34). The survey over-represents individuals born in French overseas departments or born to parents who were themselves born in overseas department. These populations, however, are not included in the working sample and the analyses presented in this chapter; a research choice driven by the theoretical focus on international migration - i.e. across rather than within national borders. The analyses are systematically survey-weighted so as to account for the sampling design and for non-random unit non-response.

The research draws on life-course approaches, but it is also limited by the existing data. I resort to using retrospective information to reconstruct life sequences. The TeO team dedicated a remarkable amount of questionnaire space to questions on couple formation: far from being limited to partner's demographic characteristics, the survey also includes some information on the partner's own migration trajectories and background and on the timing of partner recruitment.

The timing of migration (year and age) is not a constant across migrant groups and migration waves. For the more recent migratory waves (e.g. from other EU countries and Sub-Saharan Africa), people were already adults at the time of migration in the vast majority of cases. By contrast, the proportion of child migrants is considerably higher for migrants from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Portugal, Spain and Italy, which is also because these are older migration waves. The TeO survey is cross-sectional and limited itself to the population that was of working age (18-60, or 18-50 for descendants of migrants) in 2007. Demographic mechanics have implications for the sample of migrants: those from older waves of immigration (Italian, Spanish, Portuguese) who first came to France as adults may not be included in the sample because they would have been older than 60 in 2007.

TABLE 3.1: Sample breakdown

Sub-samples (cumulative criteria)	N
TeO survey respondents	21,761
- in cohabiting relationships	13,242
- man-woman relationships	13,155
- both partners of working age	12,612
- migrant respondents only	6,266
- excl. overseas departments natives	5,871
- excl. obs. with key missing values	5,828

Source: TeO1 (INED-INSEE)

In parallel, child migrants from recent immigration waves (from sub-Saharan countries, for instance) who were not yet 18 in 2007 would not have been selected either. Mechanically then, the sample under-represents early arrivals for recent immigration waves and over-represents them for older waves (Algava, Lhommeau, & Beauchemin, 2018; Beauchemin, Algava, & Lhommeau, 2015).

The initial TeO sample of primary migrants in cohabiting man-woman relationships is constituted of 3266 women and 3018 men (respectively 52% and 48% of the sample). After excluding respondents with key missing values (e.g. for country of birth, timing of migration and family formation, and partner's migratory background), this comes down to 2867 migrant women, and 2961 migrant men.

### 3.2.2 Variables and model specification

#### Operationalisation of partner selection

##### *Migrants*

According to the French official statistical classification, an (im)migrant is a person "born abroad and born foreign" - one of the originality of French nomenclatures discussed in the first chapter, since it adds a legal dimension to the usual criteria of country of birth. I recoded the 'migrant' category so as to exclude natives from French overseas department. Note that the sample in this paper includes only partnered migrants, that is, respondents who fit into the French 'migrant' definition and were in a cohabiting man-woman relationship at the time of the survey interview in 2008-2009. In addition, the working sample was restrained to couples constituted of two partners of working age (18-60) (see table 3.1).

##### *Couples*

Couples were defined in a shamefully heteronormative way as man-woman couples, that is, when respondents indicated that they had a partner of the other gender (since TeO only offers two options) who lived with them. Same-gender couples could not be included because of their rarity in the sample: the TeO sample only includes 87 coresident same-gender couples.

##### *Exogamy*

MIG-NAT couples involve specifically a primary migrant and a French native with French-born parents. In line with most of the recent French quantitative scholarship on mixed unions, I have also used migratory background to identify endogamy/exogamy in other couple types. If both partners were born in the same country, or have at least one parent born in the same country (excluding France's current national borders), they are considered endogamous. In cases where individuals were born to a mixed couple - i.e. they have a UK-born parent

and a foreign-born parent - the non-UK country prevails (minority focus). When parents were both born abroad, but in different countries, the mother's country of birth takes precedence.

#### *Migration trajectories and legal pathways*

The variable on legal pathways is based on the first visa obtained in France: contrary to Understanding Society, TeO asks respondents one question about the legal framework around migration. Namely, it enquires about the first type of visa (*titre de séjour*) which the respondents obtained in France. Those who had French nationality from birth were not asked the question. Other respondents can pick between refugee (or relative of a refugee), student visa, work visa, partner visa (for partners and spouses of a French national), family reunification claim, other visa, visa exemption (typically for EU nationals), visa application underway. Additionally, respondents can choose 'does not know' or 'does not want to answer'. In the classification used in the thesis, these two items along with 'application underway' are all coded as missing values, since they provide no indication on the type of migration, except perhaps the presumption – impossible to test – that some of those who preferred not to answer the question on visa were possibly undocumented or had been undocumented in the past.

I have also created a dummy variable designed to specifically identify legally tied migrants, that is, migrants who when they first migrated to France were legally dependent on their relationship with their partner as it provided the ground for their visa claim and therefore also for their right to stay. These include migrants whose first visa was a partner visa obtained as 'partner of a French national'. It also includes migrants who came through family reunification provisions when the sponsor for the family reunification was either their current partner or - much more rarely - a former partner. A further variable identifies migrants who were legal anchors ('reunifiers' in González-Ferrer (2011)'s terminology), and sponsored the migration of their partner (or in a few cases, of their former partner).

#### *Timing and ordering*

In order to build the sequences of couple formation and migration, I used retrospective data derived from the questions on the year of the start of current relationship (I collapsed year of civil marriage, year of religious marriage and year of start of cohabitation with current partner, and for each couple I retained as starting date whichever happened first), year of the start of the first relationship (following the same procedure as above), year the first relationship ended, year of birth, and year first migrated to France. I did not separate marriage and cohabitation in the sequence analysis. This would have multiplied the number

of states, which is not conducive to finding sequence groupings (Studer, 2013; Studer, Ritschard, Gabadinho, & Müller, 2011), especially in the context of small sample sizes. Moreover, pre-marriage cohabitation is virtually non-existent in certain migrant groups (e.g. Turks). Distinguishing periods of non-married cohabitation meant putting more emphasis on group differences rather than on the sequencing of migration and couple formation in the clustering. Accordingly, introducing a separate state for 'cohabitation' in the clustering would have led to a separate cluster for migrants who cohabited at any stage, regardless of when in the life-course and in relation to migration this may have been. The start of either first union or current union is situated either at the year of marriage or the year when cohabitation started, whichever happened first. The end of the first union (if applicable) corresponds with the answer given by respondents to the question 'year when your first union ended'. I also distinguish a separate state of 'childhood', which ends at age 16. Choi and Tienda (2018) showed that there are clear variation in rates of intermarriage between those who migrated as children and those who migrated as adolescent and young adults, with the first presenting much higher odds of intermarriage than the second. This served to emphasise the importance of the timing of migration in the life-cycle to understand not only fertility patterns but partner recruitment, which is assumed to be before the stage of potential couple formation. The limit of 16 years old is chosen as it is assumed to remain before the stage of couple formation.

While the survey asks about the date of the respondent's first arrival in France, it does not collect the date of the partner's arrival (if applicable). As a result, it is not possible to construct couples' joint timing of migration with the same complexity as e.g. González-Ferrer (2011). Specifically, it is difficult to precisely identify and date family-stage migration.

*Multiple relationship spells* Multiple relationship spells/divorce may denote less attachment to a strict interpretation of the institution of marriage (more 'modern' views in Berthoud's scale of traditionalism-modernism 2005), be less invested symbolically by family and kin (hence involve less pressure), and practically happen later in life, at a point where individuals have more material independence. All of these elements can be expected to affect the power dynamic of the couple, and they may also make second unions more likely to be mixed unions (Marsican, 2012). Hamel et al. (2013) thus find that mixed couples may be more likely to be second or third unions. The end of the first union (if applicable) corresponds to the answer given by respondents to the question 'year when your first union ended'. When individuals reported both distinct divorce date and separation date, the separation date is used to mark the end of the relationship.

*Geographic sending areas*

Due to the limited sample size and the great number of countries represented in migrants' origins, it was necessary to aggregate countries of birth into greater areas. Such groupings are inevitably reductive and disputable, and those I designed and used are the result of a juggling act between sample sizes for different migrant groups and efforts to have some comparability with the British data and categories. The groups are: (1) 'EU migrants' (EU-27 countries, current borders); (2) North Africa (the Maghreb region, encompassing Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia); (3) Africa: other (all other African countries); (4) Turkey; (5) Mainland Southeast Asia (mainly Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand), and (6) 'Other', which includes all other countries and areas. The last group is large (over 500 migrants) but very heterogeneous, and no single country of birth or coherent grouping could be singled out. As for the other groupings, the majority of the 'EU' category is constituted of migrants from Southern EU countries, i.e. Spain, Portugal and Italy. They are particularly represented among older migrants, whereas more recent EU migration to France is more diverse. Over a third of the group 'Africa: other' is comprised of migrants from the Sahel region. There is without a doubt significant heterogeneity within geographic groupings. Both Southern Europe and the Sahel region were identified by Hamel et al. (2015) as more gender-conservative compared to other parts of Europe or Sub-Saharan Africa respectively. This is worth keeping in mind for the interpretation of the results. For some of the descriptive analyses, I have included more detailed breakdown by sending areas in the appendix. Turkey was attributed its own category because the sample was large enough to stand separately and it could not be straightforwardly integrated into another grouping. It has been connected with distinct patterns of intermarriage and family formation, also when compared to Northern African countries (see for instance Safi (2010) and Hamel et al. (2013)).

*Religion*

As mentioned in the discussion in previous chapters, religious identification is a 'sensitive' variable under special licence. Here respondents are grouped into 7 categories: Protestants, Catholics, Other Christian faiths, Muslim faiths, Buddhists, Other religion (the biggest groups here are people of Jewish faith and of Hindu faiths), and people who identify as having no religion (atheists or agnostics). These categories are used descriptively in this chapter, but I also use a dummy variable (religious/not religious), which simply puts atheists and agnostics on one side, and everyone who identified a religion on the other side.

*Educational level and language skills*

Educational level is broken down into four categories based on the highest educational level reached. These categories include no school qualification or

qualification lower than the *Brevet des Colleges*, that is, primary education only (1); Brevet or professional equivalent (CAP, BEP) (2); Baccalauréat (general or professional) (3); and further education, which includes any university or further degree (4). It is difficult to compare educational qualifications between France and the UK, but the second category could be considered comparable to GSCEs (although the Brevet examination is earlier), and the Baccalauréat would be considered an equivalent for A-levels.

Finally, language skills of the country of immigration is an important parameter to help explain patterns of partner recruitment as well as economic and social integration. In a couple living in France, it is also key in the sense that poor mastery of the French language can feed into dependence on the more fluent partner (or children). Naturally, French language skills often evolve over time, if only as a function of the length of time spent in the country since migration. I have included two dummy variables on the degree of mastery of the French language. One identifies whether respondents stated that they had difficulties with the French language (in speaking, listening or writing) when they first arrived in France. The second enquires about whether they experienced any struggle with speaking, understanding or writing French at the time of the survey interview. Both questions were only asked of migrant respondents.

### 3.2.3 Methods

As discussed earlier in this chapter, there are several dimensions to union formation, with the most discussed in relation to migration being partner selection. The chapter will start from this approach, outlining different couple types defined through the migration ties of each partner: primary migrant (*MIG*), native with migrant parents (*2G*), and native without migration background (*NAT*). The chapter will start by mapping out differences by couple types in family patterns and calendars of family formation, using classic demographic variables such as rate of marriage, age at first union and age at first birth. This first step will allow to compare migrant women's and migrant men's timings and modes of transition to partnership and parenthood, depending on their partner selection. Similarly defined couple types - e.g. migrant-native couples - differentiated only by their gender configurations (migrant women with native men or the other way around) may in fact be quite dissimilar as regards modes and calendars of union formation.

This chapter has an exploratory and descriptive component, as efforts are aimed at rendering the interlocking of union formation and migration and to examine these joint trajectories more holistically. It is this interlocking, modelled in the shape of sequences of union-migration, which will be used in later chapters to

predict gender arrangements of labour division in couples. This chapter therefore registers a clear emphasis on the description and construction of these sequences and their clustering into a coherent typology. The hope is that this typology can serve as a tool to help understand the heterogeneity of migrants' trajectories, accounting simultaneously for heterogeneity in migration experiences on the one hand and heterogeneous patterns and modes of couple formation on the other hand.

The method chosen for the purpose is sequence analysis: there are numerous applications in sociology since Andrew Abbott brought the technique into the subject's spotlight (Abbott, 1992, 2001; Abbott & Hrycak, 1990).<sup>6</sup> Most relevant to this research are those that analysed trajectories of family formation, fertility and work (Aisenbrey & Fasang, 2010, 2017). Aisenbrey and Fasang (2017)'s sequence modelling of work and family as two different but simultaneous and interlocked trajectories and 'channels' was particularly successful in demonstrating how (intersectional) gender inequalities unravel and are deployed throughout the life course and throughout series of contingencies on both work and family channels. For this research, however, it seemed unnecessary to use multi-channel sequence analysis, since the migration sequence is defined very summarily as before and after first migrating to France. Castro Torres (2020)'s use of the method is a close parallel as it concerns itself with the trajectories of international migrants. The difference is that like Aisenbrey and Fasang, Castro Torres models work-family trajectories (and controls for age at migration) whereas the sequences presented in this chapter identifies union-migration trajectories, nesting migration to France into a broader snapshot of the life-cycle. A more elaborate modelling that would better account for the complexity of migration sequences, including transnational practices, stays in other countries, and back-and-forth, would surely usefully expand on this object, but it is not tackled here.

### 3.3 Results

#### 3.3.1 Descriptive account of migrant women and migrant men's migration and family formation

##### Partnered women and men: couples, migration, legal channels

Table 3.2 provides a first breakdown of migrant women and migrant men, and of the couples they form (MIG-NAT, MIG-2G and MIG-MIG), with the number of observations in the survey sample and the corresponding weighted proportions for each couple type and migratory origin. The table presents the

<sup>6</sup>For a short review of other work in sociology see Mills (2011, chapter 5).

larger groupings but a finer breakdown is available in the appendix 1. Further on, table 3.3 also disaggregates migrant women and migrant men based on admission category - the first type of visa they obtained in France. The tables include the sample size for each sub-group (n) as well as the weighted percentages (%-w) for migrant men and migrant women separately, and together.

As regards partner's selection, migrants' overall propensity to form relationships with either majority natives, second-generation natives or other migrants, varies little with migrants' gender. Around 60% of partnered migrants, be they women or men, have another migrant as their coresident partner. 1 in 3 partnered migrants is in a relationship with a French-born partner without direct migration background. The remaining partnered migrants (8-10%) are cohabiting with a second-generation migrant partner. As mentioned in chapter 1, the sampling of second-generation natives met with a series of difficulties, and the final TeO sample is much smaller than the sample of primary migrants or that of majority natives. Even when weighting the proportions to correct for the difficulties faced by the TeO team to sample natives with migrant parent(s), the proportion of migrants who partner up with a second-generation migrant partner is small - less than one in ten partnered migrant. Unions of this sort, which are sometimes referred to as 'transnational unions', are thus overall quite rare, but migrants are much more likely to form relationships with majority natives (MIG-NAT) and with other migrants (MIG-MIG) anyways. This applies equally to migrant women and migrant men. Although migrant women appear slightly more prone than migrant men to mixing with the native majority group, there are no great differences between migrant men and women at this level of aggregate.

The breakdown by geographic origins also shows no great gender variations. In total, about one third of all migrants come from European countries, most of them from the EU (current borders). Another third migrated from North African countries (cumulating natives from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). The final third is split between other African countries, Turkey, mainland Southeast Asia and 'Others'.

Among partnered migrants, the most common areas of origin are North African countries (1 in 3), Southern European countries (1 in 5), followed by other European (EU) countries (around 1 in 10). Migrants from Turkey represents 7% of all partnered migrants; migrants from the Sahel and from mainland Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos) each amount to about 3%. Another group encompasses all remaining migrants from African countries outside of the Maghreb and the Sahel regions. This group constitutes just under 10% of all partnered migrants. Finally, the 'other' group, which includes all remaining origins (e.g.

TABLE 3.2: Couple type and areas of birth by gender of migrants

	Migrant women		Migrant men		Together	
	n	%-w	n	%-w	n	%-w
<b>Couple types</b>						
MIG-NAT	926	34	826	30	1752	32
MIG-2G	221	9	293	11	514	10
MIG-MIG	1720	57	1842	59	3562	58
<i>Total: all couples</i>	2867	100	2961	100	5828	100
<b>Areas of birth</b>						
EU	807	32	725	29	1532	30
North Africa	625	28	752	34	1377	31
Africa: other	461	12	499	12	960	12
Turkey	316	7	366	7	682	7
Mainland Southeast Asia	264	3	297	4	561	3
Other	394	18	322	14	716	16
<i>Total: all areas</i>	2867	100	2961	100	5828	100


Note: n refers to sample size. %-w refers to survey-weighted percentages.

Source: TeO1, INED-INSEE (2008-2009)

Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.

Russia, North America, Latin America, China, etc.), includes 16% of migrants in coresident relationships.

FIGURE 3.1: Area of origin over time, among partnered migrant women and men living in France in 2008-2009



Universe: partnered migrant women (top plot) and migrant men (bottom plot)

in coresident man-woman couples in 2008-2009

(both partners age 18-60).


Source: TeO1 (2008-2009), survey-weighted

There are more differences between migrant women and migrant men along migratory origins than couple types. Partnered migrant men were more often

born in EU countries - effectively mostly Italy, Spain or Portugal - and in the Maghreb region - Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia (*North Africa*). In contrast, a comparatively larger proportion of partnered migrant women came from EU-countries, especially other EU countries than Southern European countries. This migratory flow in which women are more numerous is a relatively recent and growing phenomenon, as is the growth of migrations from 'other' areas - again, dominated by women, at least insofar as partnered migrants are concerned. When taking all European immigration as a whole, it is clear that the EU has long been a steady supplier of migration to France, although the mass immigration from Southern Europe, mostly masculine migration, abated over the course of the 1970s (Beauchemin, Borrel, Régnard, & Santelli, 2015). North African immigration, which was initially mostly masculine as one can see plainly on figure 3.3, subsequently came to include more and more migrant women. The peaks and waves on the bottom plot of figure 3.3 render well the fluctuations of migration flows, especially with respect to the migration of men, in reaction to immigration policies and closure (one can note the dip following 1974). In contrast, feminine migration appears steadier and, as noted by Beauchemin, Borrel, Régnard, and Santelli (2015), has grown more geographically diverse over time. A sizeable part of the migrant women who arrived in the 2000s thus come from 'other areas'.

In contrast to the classification by area of origin, which shows no great variations by gender, the breakdown by legal mode of entry (first visa types) tells of vast gender differences in the legal pathways of migration. The evolution of admission categories (first visa type granted in France) helpfully underlines the changes in the type of migration. Although the bulk of migrants - mainly men - arrived in the early 1970s as labour migrants, the proportion dropped post-1974 and never recovered since. Conversely, the proportion of family-related migration (family reunification and partners of French nationals) rose, driving most of the increase in women's migration to France. It also comprises a growing proportion of migrant men, especially among those arrived since the late 1990s.

FIGURE 3.2: Legal mode of entry, by gender



Data: TeO1 (2008-2009), survey-weighted  
 Universe: migrants in coresident  
 man-woman couples (18-60)  
 Interpretation: for 45% of partnered migrant women  
 the first visa granted in France was a family visa

FIGURE 3.3: Legal mode of entry (first visa type) over time, among partnered migrant women and men living in France in 2008-2009




TABLE 3.3: First visa, tied migration and ordering of migration and couple formation, by gender of migrants

	Migrant women		Migrant men		Together	
	n	%-w	n	%-w	n	%-w
<b>First visa (%)</b>						
work	287	11	780	29	1067	20
studies	270	10	387	12	657	11
family	1277	45	680	24	1957	34
none needed	376	14	355	12	731	13
other	657	20	759	22	1416	21
<i>Total</i>	2867	100	2961	100	5828	100
<b>Tied migration</b>						
% tied migrants	958	33	322	11	1280	22
% anchor migrants	149	5	506	16	655	11
<b>Ordering</b>						
% migrated after or same year as current relationship	1463	50	826	28	2289	39
% migrated before current relationship	1399	50	2120	72	3519	61

Note: n refers to sample size. %-w refers to survey-weighted percentages.

Source: TeO1, INED-INSEE (2008-2009)

Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.

It is worth noting here already that these proportions are very likely overestimated with respect to the overall migrant population; only partnered migrants are considered here, who in all good logic are more likely than non-partnered migrants to be already in a relationship at the time of migration. Hence, partnered migrants would also have been more likely to come through family migration. A further bias, working in the same direction, comes from the fact that I only look at migrants who live in France with their partners - those who are the most *settled* in France. Those who were also partnered at the time of migration but with somebody they were leaving behind and to whom they returned eventually (thus disappearing from the sample) would have also been less likely to come through family reunification or partner visas.

Keeping in mind therefore this note of caution on how representative this sample is, this breakdown by admission category powerfully draws out how gendered the legal pathways into France have been (see table 3.3). Migrant women's legal mode of entry was a work visa in 11% of cases. For both migrant men and migrant women, student visas account for about 1 in 10 first visas; visa exemptions (the *none needed* visa category, which typically includes EU citizens and people who migrated as children and asked for citizenship before turning 18) concern between 12 and 14% of migrants, while the remaining 20% fall into the 'Other' category, which includes refugees, those whose visa application was underway, and those with rarer visa type (e.g. diplomatic visas). Among migrant men in the sample, 29% arrived as labour migrants and 24% as family migrants, whereas almost half (45%) of all migrant women partnered in 2008-2009 were

initially admitted as relatives or partners, with a big increase in the late 1990s-mid-2000s. In parallel, the channels of migration used by migrant men became more diverse (Beauchemin, Lhommeau, & Simon, 2016). Both phenomena reflect responses to the ever more restrictive immigration regime. With the hindsight of over ten years, we know that Nicolas Sarkozy's stated objective of drastically cutting down family migration into France only had a very temporary effect of delaying the processing of applications. Numbers of family migrants have remained quite stable since the survey collection and indeed since the early 2000s (Héran, 2017; Ministère de l'Intérieur, 2021). Immigration restrictions since the 1970s mainly curbed labour migration, which was overwhelmingly (though never only (Morokvasic, 1984)) masculine. They also increased requirements on family migration, but never halted it (Héran, 2017; Noiriel, 1988).

Beauchemin, Borrel, Régnard, and Santelli (2015) noted that women's modes of migration appeared to diversify towards the end of the 2000s; but the proportion of women who arrived as family migrants is still much higher than men's, as is the proportion of *tied migrants* - those who were specifically dependent on their partner - among them. One in three women were initially granted admission as partner/spouse of a French national or of a settled foreigner in France<sup>7</sup>, compared to one in ten migrant men. Anchor migrants are overall rarer than tied migrants, which is easily explained by the fact that while tied migrants are necessarily migrants, anchors can also be natives. At any rate, the role of anchor remains very masculine: migrant men acted as legal anchor for a partner in 16% of cases, three times as often as migrant women (who are anchors in 5% of cases).

This also reflects the fact that the context of women's migration with regards to couple formation is quite different from men's. Half of migrant women were already married or cohabiting with their current partner when they first migrated to France, whereas a strong majority of the men migrated before they met their partner (table 3.3). All of this, however, varies considerably depending on who they partnered with.

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<sup>7</sup>This can be the current partner or a former partner.

### Does the partner matter? Descriptive analysis by couple types

TABLE 3.4: Migrant women and migrant men in France: area of origin, religion, education and language skills, broken down by couple types


	Migrant women				Migrant men			
	MIG-NAT	MIG-2G	MIG-MIG	All	MIG-NAT	MIG-2G	MIG-MIG	All
<b>Area of birth</b>								
EU	44	28	26	32	40	26	23	29
North Africa	16	51	31	28	31	52	33	34
Africa: other	12	3	14	12	11	6	14	12
Turkey	1	6	10	7	2	9	10	7
Mainland Southeast Asia	3	2	4	3	2	1	5	4
Other	24	10	15	18	14	5	15	14
<i>Total</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Religion</b>								
Protestant	5	2	4	4	2	1	3	3
Catholic	32	22	23	26	32	21	23	26
Other Christian	13	5	6	8	6	4	6	6
Muslim	16	56	48	38	26	59	48	43
Buddhist	3	2	4	3	0	1	3	2
Other religion	3	1	3	3	3	2	2	2
No religion	29	12	11	17	30	14	14	19
<i>Total</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Education</b>								
Further education	44	33	21	30	34	18	24	27
Baccalauréat	19	12	13	15	18	12	13	15
CAP, BEP, Brevet or equivalent	19	23	23	22	24	32	23	24
No or lower qualifications	18	33	42	33	23	38	39	34
<i>Total</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>French language skills</b>								
% had difficulties when first arrived in France	62	70	77	71	58	73	77	71
% still have difficulties	32	47	57	48	27	46	56	46

*Note:* all percentages are survey-weighted

*Source:* TeO1, INED-INSEE (2008-2009)

*Universe:* partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.

FIGURE 3.4: Area of origin and religion of migrants by couple type, among migrant women (right) and migrant men (left) living in France



The geographic origins of migrants vary as we have seen by gender, but they also vary depending on migrants' partner selection (see table 3.4). When breaking down migrant women and migrant men into different couple types based on their partners' ties to migration (native without direct migration background (NAT); native with migrant parent(s) (2G); or primary migrant (MIG)), one finds that areas of origin are not equally represented in each type of relationship. Some migrant groups are more likely to form relationships with majority natives (French nationals without direct migration background) than others; thus European migrants account for 42% of all migrant-native relationships overall, while migrants from North African countries are involved in over half of all unions formed between primary migrants and natives with migrant parents (2G). Yet migrant women from the Maghreb region represent only 16% of migrant women - native men relationships (MIGw-NATm). This proportion is doubled for migrant men from the same region (31% of migrant men - native women relationships (MIGm-NATw)). European migrants are on the whole less involved in relationships with other migrants or with second-generation natives. Their distribution by couple types does not vary widely by gender, although if we were to break it down to distinguish Southern European migrants, we would find that the migrant men from this group are more often in MIG-NAT relationships (and to a lesser extent, in MIG-2G relationships) than women, while the reverse is true for migration from the rest of the EU.

The two widest gender gaps concern migrants from the Maghreb region and migrants from other, un-categorised regions of the world. The first case was already mentioned, but the second one is asymmetrical in the other direction: in MIG-NAT relationships, the proportion of migrants coming from 'other' parts of the world is much higher when the migrant partner is a woman, rather than a man (24% against 14%). These gendered variations in the geographic profiles of each couple types are only partially explained by the fact that these migratory flows were historically also gendered (with men numerically dominating migration from North Africa (and from Italy, Spain and Portugal), and women coming more often than men from other EU countries (see table 3.4 above). The composition of MIG-NAT couples, with respect to the geographic origins of the migrants involved, appears quite different from the recruitment of other couple types. In addition, it is more gendered, with variations depending on the gender configuration of the couple (migrant woman/native man or migrant man/native woman), whereas the two other couple types are mostly very consistent across gender (see figure 3.4).

The distinctiveness of migrant-native couples comes out again with regards to religious affiliations. Notably, they involve a much higher proportion of atheist and agnostic (*no religion*) (and *other Christians*) migrants (close to one in three migrants in a relationship with a majority native; in comparison the proportion for other couple types is closer to one in ten). Another third of the migrants in MIG-NAT relationships identifies as Catholic (compared to around one in five for other couple types). Muslim migrants represent almost half of the migrants in migrant couples and over half of migrants in relationships with 'second generation' French natives. However, Muslim migrant men also represent one in four migrant men partnered with a majority native French - though the proportion is lower for Muslim women in MIG-NAT relationships (16% of all MIG-NAT relationships involving migrant women). Puzzlingly, the proportion of 'other Christian' is sizeable among migrant women who mix with the native majority group - 13% -, which is twice the proportion for migrant men in similar relationships.

This singularity of migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples is also reflected in educational level, with a greater proportion of highly-educated individuals amongst migrants involved in MIG-NAT relationships, compared to migrants in other union types. As illustrated by table 3.4, this is especially true for migrant women partnered with majority natives, a strikingly large proportion of whom had access to further education (44%). This proportion is much higher than for migrant women in other partnerships (26% when the partner is a native with migrant parent(s), 21% when the partner is also a migrant). It is also higher than for

migrant men in MIG-NAT relationships (34%) or indeed in any partnerships. Around 1 in 3 migrant women or men in migrant couples have no more than primary schooling qualification, a proportion only slightly lower (27%) when migrant women partner up with a native man with migrant parent(s). Migrants with little formal schooling are however much less represented among those who form relationships with majority natives. Without knowing whether couples are educationally homogamous, it is not possible to assess here whether this singularity of migrant-native couples results from mixing being more likely among highly-educated individuals (if MIG-NAT couples are mostly educationally homogamous, as e.g. Nottmeyer (2014) found) or whether this is better explained in terms of exchange theory (if highly-educated migrants are more likely to be in relationship with majority natives, but only if they 'marry down' from the point of view of educational level (Kingsley Davis, 1941; Merton, 1941)). Exchange theory has been mostly used to describe intermarriage involving highly-educated minority women and migrants (Basu, 2017). When looking at MIG-NAT relationships, the proportion of highly-educated migrant women is indeed 10 points higher than that of men.

Exchange theory would appear to account better for this gender gap than gender asymmetries in assimilation levels. There is no such gender difference in language skills (last section of table 3.4). Migrants who mix with the majority native group struggle less often with the French language overall, compared to migrants in other types of partnerships. Around 60%, men and women, stated that they had some language difficulties when they first migrated to France. The proportion is 10 percentage points higher when they partnered with a direct descendant of migrant, and higher still if they partnered with another migrant (77%). But in contrast to educational level, this is mostly consistent between migrant men and migrant women.

### Legal pathways: partnerships and gendered paths

TABLE 3.5: Migrant women and migrant men in France: legal pathways, broken down by couple types


	Migrant women				Migrant men			
	MIG-NAT	MIG-2G	MIG-MIG	All	MIG-NAT	MIG-2G	MIG-MIG	All
<b>Admission category (first visa, %)</b>								
work	13	7	11	11	21	26	33	29
studies	16	12	7	10	16	7	12	12
family	36	59	47	45	27	38	20	24
none needed	20	13	11	14	15	11	11	12
other	16	9	24	20	20	17	24	22
<i>Total</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>% tied migrants</b>	29	50	33	33	12	27	8	11

*Note:* all percentages are survey-weighted

*Source:* TeO1, INED-INSEE (2008-2009)

*Universe:* partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.

FIGURE 3.5: First visa type by couple types, among migrant women (left) and migrant men (right) living in France



*Interpretation:* Over 25% of migrant men in a relationship with a majority native woman were initially admitted as family migrants (family reunification or partner of French national).

*Universe:* partnered migrants in coresident man-woman couples in ~2008-2009 (age 18-60)

*Source:* TeO1 (2008-2009), survey-weighted

Table 3.5 gives the weighted percentages of admission category by couple types, for migrant women and migrant men. MIG-NAT couples still stand out, but importantly, and as the plot 3.5 illustrates, there is much more asymmetry between migrant men and migrant women. The gender asymmetry is the widest for MIG-2G and MIG-MIG couples, who include a much larger proportion of male labour migrants than female labour migrants, and a much larger proportion of female

The descriptive breakdown by areas of origin, religion, education and exogamy brings out clear differences in the patterns associated with the different couple type, the most obvious point being the singularity of mixed (MIG-NAT) relationships. This suggests that the recruitment of migrant partners into such mixed unions differs markedly than for other unions. The story so far is not strongly gendered. This changes considerably once we start considering not only where migrants came from, but also how they came. Ta-

family-related migrants compared to male family migrants. Most migrant women (59%) who form unions with natives descendants of migrants came as family migrants. This asymmetry is not surprising as such, we had already identified this in the previous section. More surprising is the fact that family migration also represents the most common legal pathway for migrant men who partner with descendants of migrants (38%). Thus 'transnational' unions involving migrant men are less common than those involving migrant women, but are by no means rare within the group of MIG-2G unions (although this type of unions are themselves quite rare). In fact, family migration represents an important category of admission for migrant men in all partnership types, never under 20% of partnered migrant men in all couple types. The proportion is closer to (or more than) 50% for migrant women, except for those in MIG-NAT relationships. Migrant women who mixed with the majority native group are still more likely to be family migrants than any other legal category, but comparatively less often (36%) than for women in other partnerships.

It is useful at this point to specifically consider the proportion of tied migrants, that is, the subgroup within family migrants who came specifically as tied partners.<sup>8</sup> Tied migrants form the majority of family migrants for migrants in all couple types (except for men in migrant couples). It is when looking at tied migration that gender asymmetry becomes most obvious, while the gap between couple types narrows somewhat. Tied migration concerns a third of migrant women in relationships with either another primary migrant (MIG-MIG), or a majority native (MIG-NAT), half of those with a second-generation partner (MIG-2G). These proportions are always at least twice as high as the equivalent for migrant men (8% (MIG-MIG), 12% (MIG-NAT) and 27% (MIG-2G) respectively). When considering migrant couples, this can be interpreted as underlining the gendered nature of family-stage migration, that is, when a partnered migrant migrates first, independently, and then brings their partner to them through family reunification. This proportion can also reflect migration trajectories whereby people migrate independently, before couple formation, and later seek a partner from their country of origin, whom they bring to them through family reunification. We could thus approximate that women appear to be four times more likely to be the second (tied) partner in these union-migration trajectories, compared to men. However, we should also consider that some of the migrants who migrated as children may later be matched with a primary migrant - a practice documented by Charsley, Bolognani, Ersanilli, and Spencer (2020) in the British context. This

<sup>8</sup>There would be no great relevance in showing the breakdown for anchor migrants here, as it would concern almost exclusively migrant couples. Indeed, a migrant can hardly operate as a legal anchor for a native partner. There are a handful of cases in the sample where migrants in relationships with native partners reported having in the past brought a former (migrant) partner through family reunification.

could account for the drop between the proportion of family-related migration and that of tied migrants for migrant women especially (from 47%, for family migration, to 33% for tied migrants).

The key findings from these tables are that the legal admission category strongly differentiates migrant women and migrant men (much more so than area of origin, religion or education). This is especially true when it comes to tied migration - i.e. when couple and migration are legally interlocked. The second important finding is that MIG-NAT couples are associated with a greater diversity of legal pathways, and notably with a greater proportion of migrants exempted from immigration control. The gender profiles appear at first to be less obviously gendered, although the identification of tied migration nuances this by highlighting that the category 'family migrant' includes a much bigger proportion of tied migrants among migrant women, than among migrant men in MIG-NAT relationships. This emphasizes the need to consider migration trajectories and couple formation together in order to grasp the gendered dynamics at play.

### **Gendered calendars of migration and couple formation**

Here the relative timing of migration and couple formation is helpful in showing how different couple types are associated with different models of partner recruitment. The fact that women are much more often than men already partnered at the time of migration holds true across all couple types, but the proportion varies depending on the choice of partner. Migrant women who form a union with a native man without direct migration background are much more likely than others to have migrated independently from (i.e. prior to) this relationship. Two thirds of them migrated before starting their current relationship, whereas this applies to no more than half of those who partnered with a second-generation migrant and only to two out of five of those in relationship with another primary migrant. Migrant men with native majority women are also the most likely to have migrated before becoming involved in this relationship (84% of migrant men in MIG-NAT relationship, against around 65% of migrant men in other union types). Migrant-native relationships with a majority native thus appear to be frequently associated with separate calendars of migration (first) and couple formation (later), whereas partnerships that do not involve a majority native more often involve a relationship that pre-dates migration.

However, simply ordering the two events does not contextualise migration and couple formation in the life course, which is what the *timing* part of table 3.6 addresses. Migrant women were on average younger than migrant men (24 years old and almost 28 years old, respectively) when they formed their first union. The same difference applies to the timing of children, since migrant women were

aged around 25 on average when their first child was born, and migrant men around 29. For both events (union start and children's arrival), migrant couples are associated with an earlier calendar of family formation compared to other couples, especially MIG-NAT couples. Gender differences in the timing of family formation are expected: it is a well-known demographic fact that family events such as marriage or the arrival of children tend to happen earlier in the life-course of women than of men, something which is reflected in the calendars of migrants' family formation.

Altogether, most couples involving a migrant are married, but migrant women in migrant couples are more often married than other women. They are mothers 9 times out of 10 (8 out of 10 for other migrant women) and twice as many of them have large families, i.e. three or more children. MIG-NAT couples appear more 'informal', further on in the second demographic transition (Potârcă, Mills, & Lesnard, 2013).<sup>9</sup> Thus MIG-NAT couples are associated with comparatively postponed couple formation and parenthood, a lower marriage rate and are less likely to be living with young children.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, one in four migrants in a relationship with a majority native had other relationships prior to this one, a proportion much higher than those of other couple types.

One of the most important observations based on table 3.6 is the variation of migrant women's timings of family formation and migration with each couple type. As far as migrant women's process of family formation is concerned, it appears to matter whether their partner is a majority native, a second-generation migrant or a primary migrant. In contrast, for migrant men, the timing of family formation differs little between MIG-MIG and MIG-2G couples. It is only when the partner is a majority native that the transition to first union and to first child is slightly delayed. In addition, while men and women migrated to France at about the same age (around 20, though a little older for migrant couples), we can observe that migrant men in these relationships were on average two years younger when they migrated, compared to their female counterparts. MIG-NAT couples also offer a contrasted picture. While those couples that involve a migrant man and a majority native woman are in all aspects almost perfectly aligned with native couples, when a migrant woman is involved, migrant-native couples are much more likely to be married, although they are not more likely to be living with children.

<sup>9</sup>The “second demographic transition” (SDT) brings sustained sub-replacement fertility, a multitude of living arrangements other than marriage, the disconnection between marriage and procreation, and no stationary population.’ (Lesthaeghe, 2010, p. 211)

<sup>10</sup>Although this is also linked to the fact that the sample of descendants of migrants is younger on average, ergo more likely to have children who are still young. Indeed, parenthood is equally common for migrant women with native partners, be they majority natives or descendants of migrants.

TABLE 3.6: Migrant women and migrant men in France: unions, timing and ordering, breakdown by couple types

	Migrant women				Migrant men			
	MIG-NAT	MIG-2G	MIG-MIG	All	MIG-NAT	MIG-2G	MIG-MIG	All
<b>Unions and children</b>								
% exogamous	100	28	7	41	100	19	7	36
% still with first partner	73	88	90	84	73	84	86	82
% married	77	87	89	85	71	85	90	84
% coresident children under 16	59	75	71	67	60	80	69	68
% parents	82	83	91	87	82	90	90	88
% more than 2 children	24	22	45	36	29	25	45	38
<b>Timing</b>								
Age at first union	25.88 (0.24)	24.08 (0.38)	23.6 (0.18)	24.36 (0.14)	28.96 (0.3)	27.23 (0.45)	27.26 (0.17)	27.7 (0.14)
Age at first child	26.73 (0.24)	26.32 (0.4)	24.87 (0.16)	25.58 (0.13)	29.37 (0.26)	28.61 (0.45)	28.66 (0.17)	28.85 (0.14)
Age at migration	19.75 (0.43)	18.42 (0.76)	22.05 (0.3)	20.95 (0.24)	17.28 (0.48)	19.13 (0.71)	22.36 (0.28)	20.49 (0.24)
<b>Ordering</b>								
% migrated before current relationship	64	52	43	51	86	65	68	73
% migrated before first relationship	58	50	42	48	84	65	66	71

*Note:* all percentages and means are survey-weighted

*Source:* TeO1, INED-INSEE (2008-2009)

*Universe:* partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.

**Exogamy** Finally, a word about exogamy of *origins* - origins defined here through the area of birth of ego or ego's parents. Exogamy refers therefore to couples where partners (or partners' parents) come from different great geographic areas (following e.g. Hamel et al. (2015)'s operationalisation). By design MIG-NAT couples can only be exogamous. 7% of migrant couples involve partners with different migratory origins. When primary migrants form a relationship with a second-generation natives, the rate of exogamy is higher, but varies depending on who the primary migrant is, and who the native with migration background. MIG-2G couples involving a migrant woman are exogamous in 34% of cases, in contrast with those that involve a migrant man, and are exogamous in only 23% of cases.<sup>11</sup> The small sample size for MIG-2G couples warrants however that we take this gender variation with some caution. MIG-2G couples are much more likely to be exogamous (minority-minority) than migrant couples. When both partners migrated, partner selection and couple formation is more likely to have happened first, in the country of origin, and couples migrated together (or

<sup>11</sup>The proportions for couples that do not involve a primary migrant partner are not displayed in the table, but they are available in the appendix, table 3. It is interesting to note that 30% of 2G-2G couples are exogamous - around the same combined proportion as MIG-2G couples. For further empirical enquiries into unions between primary migrants and second-generation natives in France, see for example Bélanger and Flynn (2018) and Eremenko and González-Ferrer (2018))

in stages) afterwards. We would expect that a higher proportion of those who partnered with French natives met them in France, post-migration. Their sphere and mode of recruitment may have been affected by migration, by giving them access to new environments in which to meet potential partners, by enabling (or forcing) socialisation with other groups, by reducing family or community influence and weighting over partner selection, and so forth.

### 3.3.2 Sequence analysis: couple formation in motion

#### Introducing sequence analysis methods and sequences

This section presents the process and the results from the sequence analysis. The analysis does not apply to the entire life course, or even the entire adult or working life. The sequences nest the event of the first migration to France in the localised context of couple formation, from five years before respondents first migrated to France ('mig-5'), to five years after ('mig+5').


Most sequence analysis techniques in use in the social sciences are related to algorithmic (Abbott & Tsay, 2000) or correspondence analysis methods (Roubette, Bry, & Lelièvre, 2015). Optimal matching (OM) analysis is by far the most widespread sequence analysis technique. It has the major conceptual advantage of jointly addressing the different temporal aspects of a sequence: the moment of a transition, the duration of a stage, and the order within the sequence (Aisenbrey & Fasang, 2010, 2017; Wu & Li, 2019). I use optimal matching analysis for the dissimilarity matrix, with substitution costs indexed on the transition rate between each state; more common transitions are thus assigned a lower cost, while rarer ones are considered to denote greater distance between states. Homogeneous patterns of sequences are then identified based on the dissimilarity matrix, through a combination of algorithms. Namely, I use hierarchical clustering (Ward technique) to identify a substantive structure and logic in the clustering and partitioning around medoids (PAM) to delineate the final clusters<sup>12</sup>. The clustering is survey-weighted, and as are the associated quality measures.

I designed five states on which the sequences of couple formation draw: (1) 'childhood' (younger than 16), (2) single, before any cohabitation/marriage span, (3) cohabiting/married with current partner (4) cohabiting/married with former partner (when the partner at the point of the interview is not the first partner), (5) period in-between 1st and current partner. The fifth state is essentially a period where individuals were of age and presumed to be on the partnership market, since we know that they had had a first union before and would form another union (their current one) at a later point in life. We have no way of knowing whether they were single or had other relationships for the period in-between. The construction of states (for state sequences) is such that each year is assigned one state, and each sequence is constituted of 10 successive states (10 years). The survey offered the possibility of a finer sequencing, namely by month, but the much higher rates of missing values was deterring.

<sup>12</sup>All the analyses pertaining to the sequence analysis in this chapter and the next were computed using the WeightedClusters (Studer, 2013) and TraMineR R packages (Gabadinho, Ritschard, Müller, & Studer, 2011)

Figure 3.6 shows the weighted distribution of all individual sequences. The Sequence frequency plot identifies the most common individual sequences, starting from the bottom.<sup>13</sup> The most common individual sequence is one where respondents were children for the entire sequence, that is, from five years before migration to five years afterwards. The second most common individual sequence describes respondents who were single before they first migrated to France, and entered their first relationship the same year they migrated.

FIGURE 3.6: Sequences of family formation around migration (weighted)



The two plots in figure 3.7 contrast migrant women and migrant men's migration-union individual sequences. They powerfully illustrate how gendered the distribution is.


Migrant women are overall more likely to be in a relationship (larger orange area). The sequence plots illustrate that their migration is also more likely to take place in the context of an already existing and established relationship.

Most striking is how the comparison exposes a much greater temporal interlocking between migration and the formation of a first relationship for

<sup>13</sup>The weighting of sequences groups together identical sequences, which is why the 'weighted ns' appears much smaller than the full unweighted sample of migrants (n=5987)

migrant women. This is denoted by the vertical drop at mig=0 (figure 3.7). It is much steeper on the right plot, and signals the common transition between being initially single and entering a first partnership (marriage or cohabitation) the same year as migrant women first arrived in France. Such sequencing identifies and cover marriage migration (Charsley, Storer-Church, Benson, & Van Hear, 2012) and more generally what Lievens (1999) labelled 'family-forming' migration. There are of course different ways of dating the beginning of a relationship and it is likely that many of these couples knew each other prior to the point where they were married or moved in together. Indeed, the migration context itself can delay this stage when couples are geographically separated by migration and borders, and therefore cannot live together, or when marriage is postponed until a point where the partner in France is financially secure enough. Thus one can expect that most relationships started - romantically and logically - some time before they appear in the sequences as cohabiting or married relationships.

FIGURE 3.7: Sequences by gender of migrant




Migrant women's sequences thus reflect much more change around the time of migration. This is consistent across couple types (see figure 3.8). The sudden increase in the proportion of migrant women married or cohabiting the same year as their migration to France is visible in all couple configurations. This contrasts with migrant men, whose timing of migration and couple formation appear mostly unconnected, except when they partner with descendants of migrants. (see plot for *Migrant men - partner 2G* with the drop at mig=0 (in figure 3.8). There is no such discernible drop in the union-migration sequences for migrant men in other types of partnerships. This first glimpse at union-migration sequences confirms what we had noted earlier about MIG-2G couples, namely that this couple type included a greater proportion of tied migrant men. Overall, however, it is a very small proportion of migrant men who were not single before the

year they migrated; this proportion is a little bit higher for those with a migrant partner.

Looking specifically at migrant-majority native couples (MIG-NAT), one can also see on the bottom right of figure 3.8 the greater incidence of multiple partnership spells among migrant women who eventually partner up with a majority native French partner (the red area on the graph). The vertical drop marks that the aforementioned superimposition of migration and family formation applies to a non-trivial proportion of migrant women in relationships with native majority men - and not just to migrant couples or 'transnational couples'. In contrast, migrant men in MIG-NAT relationships appear the most likely to have migrated during childhood (blue area), and least likely to have migrated while already in a relationship. These are only exploratory comments based on

FIGURE 3.8: Sequences by gendered couple types



a visual analysis of the sequence plots. However, the clustering of sequences

helps elucidate these differences by gender and couple types in union-migration trajectories.

### Partitioning into migration-union sequence clusters

The combination of optimal matching and clustering therefore allows the delineation of clusters of sequences and to pick a number of clusters that strike a satisfactory compromise between simplification (there could be as many clusters as different sequences), substantive interest, and robustness. Given the limited sample size, it is important to avoid having too many clusters. Figure 3.9 presents the hierarchical cluster tree for the first 6 sequences.

FIGURE 3.9: Sequences tree display: family formation and migration (weighted)





FIGURE 3.10: Cluster cutoff criteria for migration-couple formation clusters derived with sequence analysis and partitioning around medoids (weighted)



As visible in the cluster tree (figure 3.9), the strongest distinction is between adult migrants and child migrants (level 2 in the tree). In other words, between the first generation migrants and the 1.5 generation (those who migrated as children or in their early teenage years). Amongst adult migrants, the clustering then sets apart a group who migrate before family formation as single adults (level 3 - mostly young adults). In contrast with these independent adult migrants, a further branch of the tree refers to migrants whose couple formation either preceded or coincided with migration (level 4). The coinciding of migration and couple formation may be that of a first relationship, or a family reconfiguration and the start of a later relationship, but we need a minimum of five clusters to capture trajectories involving several partnership spans. Having six clusters further differentiates between two groups of single adults: those just out of childhood and those older, and seemingly more durably installed in single life, around the time of their migration.

TABLE 3.7: Quality measures for sequences partition into six groups

Measures <sup>a</sup>	Value
PBC	0.69
HG	0.92
HGSD	0.92
ASW	0.53
ASWw	0.54
CH	636.57
R2	0.68
CHsq	1937.87
R2sq	0.87
HC	0.04

<sup>a</sup>Source: TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009)

The figure 3.10 shows the quality measures for the partitions, calculated for

any number of clusters between 1 and 10. Six clusters appears to be a reasonable cut-off point, since it is a local peak on several measures, most importantly the Point Biserial Correlation (PBC)<sup>14</sup> and the weighted average silhouette width (ASWw)<sup>15</sup>. The quality measures for six groups (see table 3.7) also rule out the possibility of the partition being no more (or little more) than a statistical artefact. According to 1990's indicative silhouette width range, an AFWw above 0.5 identifies a reasonably coherent and robust structure.

### Typology of six union-migration sequences

The typology of sequences, whose construction I have detailed, thus leads to a classification in six groups. I have labelled these migration trajectory types as follows: *Child migrants*, *Single young adults*, *Single adults*, *Formation first partnership*, *Established first partnership*, and *Partnership reconfiguration*. The silhouette width plots for each group is presented in figure 3.11. The most characteristic sequences of each cluster are represented towards the top of each plot, while those on the edge of the group, which are least consistent with the rest of the cluster, are located at the bottom. The silhouette width plots help visualise the degree of homogeneity within each sequence cluster. The first and fifth clusters show very consistent sets of sequences of childhood (cluster 1) and uninterrupted first relationships (cluster 5), whereas the cluster with partnership reconfiguration (cluster 6) appears much more heterogeneous. The sequence most characteristic of this group involves migrants entering a new (second or more) relationship around the time of their first migration to France. This new relationship does not immediately succeed the first relationship.

<sup>14</sup>HG refers to Hubert's Gamma and HC to Hubert's C. They follow a similar logic to that of the Point Biserial Correlation(PBC) in that they are (differently) measures of the capacity of the partition to reproduce the distance matrix (Liao (2010) and Milligan and Cooper (1985), for HG and HS (Hubert & Arabie, 1985)

<sup>15</sup>A high ASWw signals a high coherence, namely high distance between groups, and high homogeneity within the groups (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 1990)

FIGURE 3.11: Sequence clusters: silhouette widths





FIGURE 3.12: Trajectory types of couple formation around migration



The sequence plot for each cluster is presented in figure 3.12, and tables 3.8 and 3.9 provide a descriptive breakdown of how different couple types, areas of origin and more or less highly-educated migrants are distributed between union-migration sequences.

TABLE 3.8: Migrant women in France: union-migration sequence clusters

	Child migrants (1.5G)	Single young adults	Single adults	Formation 1st partnership	Established 1st partnership	Partnership reconfigurations	Total %
<i>All migrant women (partnered)</i>	25	10	6	36	17	6	100
<b>Couple types</b>							
MIG-MIG	21	12	5	34	25	4	100
MIG-2G	30	10	7	42	9	3	100
MIG-NAT	30	8	8	37	7	10	100
<b>Areas of birth</b>							
EU	34	10	5	28	14	8	100
North Africa	26	10	5	41	16	2	100
Africa: other	12	12	8	39	21	7	100
Turkey	27	16	0	24	29	2	100
Mainland South-east Asia	39	12	12	23	12	2	100
Other	12	5	10	44	21	9	100
<b>Qualification (highest)</b>							
Further education	19	6	12	39	14	10	100
Baccalauréat	20	8	6	43	14	9	100
CAP, BEP, Brevet or equivalent	44	9	3	30	10	4	100
No or lower qualifications	23	15	4	34	22	3	100
<b>First visa types</b>							
work	16	14	13	33	17	8	100
studies	17	18	23	33	3	7	100
family	19	8	2	46	19	5	100
none needed	53	8	3	17	12	7	100
other	27	9	6	28	24	6	100
<b>Tied migrants</b>	1	5	2	60	26	6	100

*Note:* all percentages are survey-weighted

*Source:* TeO1, INED-INSEE (2008-2009)

*Universe:* partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.

*Child migrants* (cluster 1) refers to individuals who migrated when they were still (young) children (the blue refers to those younger than 16 years old). Adulthood and family formation years are thus outside of the sequence altogether, making for very consistent, transition-free sequences. This cluster accounts for one in four partnered migrants, women and men. Consistent with marital assimilation and the concept of the '1.5 generation' coined by Rumbaut (1994), this sequence is more common for migrants who form relationships with native partners (native majority or descendants of migrants). EU migrants and migrants

TABLE 3.9: Migrant men in France: union-migration sequence clusters

	Child migrants (1.5G)	Single young adults	Single adults	Formation 1st partnership	Established 1st partnership	Partnership reconfigurations	Total %
<i>All migrant men (partnered)</i>	27	14	20	24	11	4	100
<b>Couple types</b>							
MIG-MIG	19	17	22	23	15	3	100
MIG-2G	32	11	13	36	6	2	100
MIG-NAT	42	11	19	19	4	5	100
<b>Areas of birth</b>							
EU	42	16	8	18	10	5	100
North Africa	25	15	25	27	7	2	100
Africa: other	7	15	40	21	13	5	100
Turkey	30	12	7	34	15	1	100
Mainland Southeast Asia	35	25	19	11	10	0	100
Other	15	9	24	27	21	5	100
<b>Qualification (highest)</b>							
Further education	21	9	28	26	11	5	100
Baccalauréat	23	8	20	29	15	5	100
CAP, BEP, Brevet or equivalent	47	11	14	18	8	3	100
No or lower qualifications	21	24	17	24	11	3	100
<b>First visa types</b>							
work	12	23	25	24	12	4	100
studies	14	18	47	19	1	1	100
family	41	10	7	34	6	2	100
none needed	50	9	7	14	13	7	100
other	26	10	21	19	19	4	100
<b>Tied migrants</b>	0	3	11	69	12	5	100

*Note:* all percentages are survey-weighted

*Source:* TeO1, INED-INSEE (2008-2009)

*Universe:* partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.

from mainland Southeast Asia are most likely to fall into this 'child migrants' cluster (at a rate of about 35%) , especially EU men (42% of male EU migrants are child migrants). Migrants from Subsaharan Africa and the Sahel, in contrast, mostly migrated as adults. In terms of educational attainment, migrants with lower to medium education are over-represented, but the cluster still accounts for one in five migrants with further education. Many in this sequence were exempted from having to obtain a visa, which likely reflects the high rate of European migrants as well as those who entered as former colonial subjects (e.g. the migration of 'pieds-noirs' and 'harkis' from Algeria who came to France before, and especially during and immediately following Algerian independence).

*Single young adults* (cluster 2) includes those who migrated while just about

adult or even teenager, most between 16 and 20. Compared to the *single adults* group, they are of course younger, but their trajectory is also less characterised by long periods where they remain single. Their migration precedes their first relationship, but often not by much, and they appear to partner up early. This is a smaller cluster, comprising 10% of migrant women, and 14% of migrant men. In terms of proportion, this cluster is more or less evenly represented among all couple types and across origins with three exceptions. Firstly, it represents a larger proportion of migrant men (17%) in migrant couples (presumably the 'pioneer' migrants who later bring a migrant spouse), secondly, it accounts for a larger share of migrant men from mainland Southeast Asia (25%), and of migrant women from Turkey (16%). When compared with other clusters, migrants in this cluster are more likely to have little to no education. Unsurprisingly cluster 2, like cluster 3, involves a high number of labour and student migrants.

*Single adults* (cluster 3), tend to be single throughout the entire sequence, signalling a migration process that is temporally completely disconnected from that of family formation. Migration here happens long before the formation of the first couple. This cluster concerns mainly men (20% of migrant men); few women (6%) followed this path of union-migration. Migrant couples are slightly more common for migrant men, while migrant women in this cluster are slightly more likely to have a majority native French partner. The cluster includes relatively few of the migrant men who form relationships with descendants of migrants in France. This type of union-migration sequence is highly gendered with regards to migrants' geographic origins. It includes virtually no migrant women from Turkey, but over 1 in 10 women from Southeast Asia and from the 'Other' groups. A high proportion of the (few) women in this group are highly-educated, which also applies, although less starkly, to migrant men. Migrant men's geographic origins differ markedly from those of the migrant women in this cluster. Migrant men from Africa are disproportionately represented: the cluster accounts for 25% of male migrants from the Maghreb and a staggering 40% of male migrants from other African regions. Migrants who initially entered on a student visa, especially men, very often fall in this cluster (almost 50% of men with student visa)

*Formation first partnership* (cluster 4) identifies a group of migrants for whom migration happens mostly simultaneously (the same year) or in quick succession with the formation of the first relationship (as measured by first marriage or first cohabitation). This cluster can be expected to cover most or all of so-called 'marriage migration', 'transnational marriages' and other 'mail-order bride' type arrangements, whereby migration is tightly tied in with (and at least in some cases a motivation for) the formation of the relationship. It can also include couples that were formed very quickly following migration and couples who

waited to get married or to start cohabitation until the migrant partner could join the other in France. This is by far the largest union-migration cluster for migrant women (36%) and a large cluster among migrant men (25%). It is more common (42%) among migrant women in relationships with second-generation partners and it also concerns a large proportion (34%) of migrant women in migrant couples. Less expected perhaps, is the fact that it is also the most common union-migration sequence among women in relationships with majority native French partners (37%). This contrasts with the migrant men in the cluster, however, with men in MIG-NAT relationships being under-represented and men in MIG-2G unions being vastly over-represented (36%, when the cluster only accounts for 20% of migrant men overall). The coinciding of the formation of the first couple with migration to France is particularly common among migrant men from Turkey (34%) and to a lesser extent the Maghreb and mainland Southeast Asia. In comparison, migrant women from 'other' regions of the world fall most often into this cluster (44%), as do migrant women from North Africa (41%) and other African regions (39%). EU migrants are under-represented for both genders. A feature of the cluster is the concentration of highly-educated migrants within it, especially women's: it accounts for almost 40% of migrant women with further education and 43% of those with a *baccalauréat*. The cluster is in fact quite polarised in terms of women's education: it also includes 34% of migrant women with no qualifications. The profile of migrant men is similarly U-shaped, with a relatively high proportion of migrants with further education and *baccalauréat* or equivalent, but also a sizeable proportion of migrants with no school diploma beyond primary schooling. It represents the largest group of family-related legal admissions (46%) for women and the second largest for men, most of which is tied migration (60% of all tied migrant women and 69% of tied migrant men follow this sequence). However, it also involves about one in four male labour migrants and one in three female labour and student migrants. This underlines that a not insignificant part of this cluster, especially among women, involves people who likely migrated independently and formed a relationship shortly thereafter.

*Established first relationships* (cluster 5) is comprised of individuals who were in their first relationship long before they first migrated to France, and remained in the same relationship long after. From at least five years before migration (for most of them), to at least five years after migration, these mark durable relationships, in which the migration project and experience is nested. As well as established couples migrating at the same time (joint migration), this cluster is likely to include most of family-stage migration, especially from the perspective of the second (reunified) partner's migration. It includes more

migrant women (17%) than migrant men (11%) and, logically, mostly migrant couples. 25% of migrant women in migrant couples migrated within the context of an established relationship (15% of migrant men). These trajectories are most common among migrant women from Turkey (39%). They also account for a considerable share of female migration from North Africa and from the 'other' group and for male migration from 'other' areas. The migrant men mostly have some school qualification, whereas a larger chunk of the women have none beyond primary school. The 'other' legal admission category is over-represented in this group, likely signalling a larger than average proportion of refugee families and couples.

Finally, the cluster *partnership reconfigurations* (cluster 6), which I also call *Multiple partnership spells* or *multiple partnerships* for short, is a much smaller group. It is characterised by sequences where migration interlocks with either the end of a first partnership or the start of a new partnership spell that does not correspond to the respondents' first relationship. In this cluster, migration is part of a family trajectory that is more complex than the overall sequence *childhood* → *adult and single* → *first relationship*. In this sense, it reflects less linear and less common trajectories (in that having had a single partner is the experience of the majority of partnered migrants). This cluster includes 6% of migrant women, and only 4% of migrant men. It clearly stands out from other clusters: almost 60% of migrant women who follow this union-migration path form relationships with majority French native partner. The proportion is comparatively less marked for migrant men (38%). This suggests that Hamel et al.'s finding that mixed migrant-native relationships were more often associated with complex relationship patterns is more valid for- and mainly driven by-migrant women (Hamel et al., 2015). Migrants in this cluster are largely recruited among European migrants, whereas migrants from North Africa, Turkey and mainland Southeast Asia are rare (between 0 and 2%). The cluster also includes a larger-than-average share of *baccalauréat* graduates and migrants with further education. Admission categories are varied, distributed between all categories, except for the fact that migrant men are more likely to be visa-exempt and almost never entered on a student visa or as family migrants.

### **Union-migration sequences: gendered paths to partnering**

From the description of the clusters, it is clear that they depict highly gendered stories of migration and couple formation. It is also clear that the stories differ depending on the couples that migrants form and that each sequence cluster is associated with different proportions of couple types (table 3.10).

Among child migrants, women are more likely to partner with another migrant, while men are more likely to partner with a native partner without migration background. The sequence *Single young adults* differentiates little between men and women: it is in the *Single adult* cluster that a clear gender gap emerges. Women who migrated as single adults are evenly distributed between those with a migrant partner and those with a native NAT partner. In contrast, men from this sequence cluster ended up in migrant-migrant relationships two times out of three. It appears that the migrants most likely to partner with majority French natives are child migrants and those whose migration happens in the context of multiple partnership spells, to which one must add independent adult migration in the case of women. In comparison, the relationships of migrants in the *Established first partnership* clusters are (logically) much more likely to be with another primary migrant.

The breakdown of each couple type by gender and by union-migration sequence, as illustrated in figure 3.13, shows a different picture from the distribution by area of birth or by religion. Each couple type is still associated with a different distribution between sequence clusters, but the plot also highlights a degree of gender asymmetry which was not as visible before. The paths that migrant women and migrant men take to live in similar partnerships in France, for example, in a union with a majority native French partner, diverge. Child migration is by far the most common path that brings migrant men to MIG-NAT unions, but for migrant women it is 'marriage migration' - the formation of a first partnership. Similarly, migrant men in migrant couples are much more likely to have migrated as 'young single adults' or 'single adults', whereas their female counterparts migrated much more often in the context of the formation of their first couple, or while already long partnered. The sequence profile of the couples formed by migrants with French-born descendants of migrants is the most gender-symmetrical and involves a high proportion of marriage migration.

## 3.4 Discussion

### 3.4.1 Gendered calendars of union-migration

This descriptive analysis of union-migration trajectories brings out gendered experiences and paths of migration that go beyond numerical asymmetries in migration flows by origin. It is not simply that migration from, for example, Northern Africa, involves more men than women, it is also that men and women from Northern Africa do not journey to France in the same way and at the same point in the life-course and in the cycle of family formation. In part, this reflects

TABLE 3.10: Migrant women and migrant men: partner by union-migration sequence

Migrant women				
	MIG-2G	MIG-MIG	MIG-NAT	Total
Child migrants (1.5G)	11	49	41	100
Single young adults	8	66	26	100
Single adults	9	46	45	100
Formation 1st partnership	10	55	35	100
Established 1st partnership	4	82	14	100
Multiple partnerships	4	36	59	100
All	9	57	34	100
Migrant men				
	MIG-2G	MIG-MIG	MIG-NAT	Total
Child migrants (1.5G)	13	41	47	100
Single young adults	8	69	23	100
Single adults	7	65	28	100
Formation 1st partnership	17	59	24	100
Established 1st partnership	6	84	10	100
Multiple partnerships	5	57	38	100
All	11	59	30	100

<sup>a</sup> Note: 41% of migrant women in the child migrant sequence cluster were in a coresident relationship with a native man with native French parents at the time of the survey.

<sup>b</sup> All percentages and means are survey-weighted.

<sup>c</sup> Source: TeO1, INED-INSEE (2008-2009).

<sup>d</sup> Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60

the known fact that family formation happens later in men's life than in women's life.

The sequence analysis proved particularly powerful in revealing gender difference, not only in the *timing* of family transition and migration, but also in the *order*, of events pertaining to migration and partnering, as well as the duration and juxtaposition of each state. Migrant women who live with a partner are more likely than migrant men to have already been in that relationship when they first migrated to France. Migrant men, comparatively, are more likely to have migrated before meeting their partner, as children or as single adults. Most migrant men who have a partner they live with were thus not part of that relationship when they first migrated to France. Overall, men's calendar of couple formation places migration firmly ahead, and family formation firmly later. This is not so for migrant women. This matters to understand the unions migrant women and migrant men form, and the dynamics within those unions.

The most striking finding from the sequence analysis is perhaps how often the moment of couple formation and the moment of migration are simultaneous for migrant women. The literature had already found descriptive evidence that migration and family were more closely tied together for women (insofar as more women than men migrated after family formation and migrated as 'tied' family migrants (Krieger, 2019; Taylor, 2007)). But the sequence analysis compellingly underlined how these processes are tied not only by conditionality (when family formation enables or motivates women's migration) but also temporality (when migration and family formation happen in the same short space of time - in this case, one year). This had sometimes been correctly assumed, but not empirically established in the scholarship on migration and family formation. Furthermore, the one term that specifically implies this co-occurrence of migration and couple formation - 'marriage migration' - had mostly been treated as if it were relevant only to 'transnational couples' (between natives from the second-generation and first-generation migrants) or in the context of sham marriages.

Most empirical evidence concurs that insincere and short-lived 'marriages of convenience', contracted for the sake of obtaining residency rights or citizenship, are mostly anecdotal (see M'sili and Neyrand (1998) but Azzolini and Guetto (2017) for nuances). Without presuming therefore about the durability or authenticity of marriage migration, the sequence cluster *formation 1st partnership* is nevertheless a major feature of women's migration. It is in fact the most common sequence for migrant women in all partnership types. Importantly, this union-migration pattern is not specific to groups identified as more endogamous. The 'importing' of co-ethnic migrant spouses has been mostly problematised with

regards to migrants from the Maghreb and from Turkey in the case of France (Beck-Gernsheim, 2011; Safi, 2010). Instead, the couple-forming cluster represents at least one migrant women in four (and up to almost one in two) in any of the migrant groups, including EU migrants. This union-migration trajectory is much more common among migrant women, but it is also associated with 25% of partnered migrant men on average. In fact, sequences in which migration is interlocked with family formation (cluster 4 to 6) represent 40% of men's migration compared to only one in three migrant men who migrate as single adults (either cluster 2 or 3), before forming a relationship. In other words, it is a minority of partnered migrant men who fit into the archetypal concept of the male economic migrant. However, this may not apply to migrant men overall, as those who do not partner up, or who return, may be more likely to fit into this male, single and labour-driven picture of the economic migrant.

This typology of sequences thus reveals clear differences between migrant men and migrant women, in conjunction with geographic origins, legal admission category and educational attainment. A lot of the overall, roughly gendered elements were known: men are more likely to migrate as single adults, they are more likely to have come through a work visa, and so forth. The typology of sequences, however, allows us to refine where these differences happen and play out, and to contrast them with one another. Among others, the distinction brought about by the partitioning between *single young adult* and *single adult*, is instructive. The contrast between men and women is the largest of all for the latter: very few women but a great many men fall into the union-migration sequence of *single adult*. Its defining characteristic is a prolonged period, from before to after migration, where individuals are neither married nor in a cohabiting relationship. In the other cluster of single migrants, the *young single adult* sequence, individuals do not remain single for very long after reaching adulthood; we find a greater representation of women in this cluster, and most of the 'anchor' migrant women (who mostly arrived on student visas). The men in this category are more often independent migrants, meaning that they came before meeting their partner and met a partner either there or after the partner had migrated. They are also more likely to have come with a work visa; it is the extended period of single life during which migration occurs which appears to be the most specifically male feature of union-migration sequences. In contrast, female migration is far more often characterised by legal dependency via tied migration.

### 3.4.2 Different trajectories of union-migration by couple type and by gender

Looking specifically at migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples, it is clear that migrant women are much more likely to follow a native majority French man back to France than migrant men are to follow a native majority French woman. The overall gendered rates of intermarriage showed no great discrepancy between migrant women and migrant men in the proportion that forms relationships with majority native partners. Distinguishing between migrant and religious groups resulted in some gender differences emerging, which suggested varying degrees of affinities for intermarriage (and possibilities for intermarriage) for women and men who migrated from the EU and North Africa. Like (Collet & Santelli, 2012; Hamel & Rault, 2014), I found that mixed migrant-native unions in France are also more likely to be second unions, compared to unions formed with a second-generation migrant, or another migrant, but that the contrast is stronger for migrant women.

However, it is by looking at legal pathways and union-migration trajectories that a gendered story of MIG-NAT mixing emerges most powerfully. Migrant men are most likely to mix with the majority group when they migrate as children. While migrant women are also often child migrants, most of those who form MIG-NAT relationships migrated as adults with their migration mostly coinciding with couple formation. These gendered paths to migrant-native mixedness suggest different interpretations for what mixing with the majority native French group effectively represents for migrant men and migrant women. For migrant men, mixedness can be interpreted straightforwardly as trajectories of marital assimilation. It involves migrant men who migrated as children, were therefore socialised in France and presumably assimilated to the point where they could meet and be deemed suitable partners by majority native women. This applies especially to EU migrants who arrived as children.


This narrative of the assimilation of the 1.5 generation can not account for most of migrant women's mixing with the majority group. The fact that many migrant women migrated very shortly before or after officially entering a relationship with a majority native French man defeats the idea that they could have already been very assimilated by the time the couple was formed. This is confirmed by the greater proportion who still struggle with the French language. Something else is involved which is perhaps best described by Varro's analysis analysis of the *transplantation* of migrant women in relationships with majority native partner (1984). Varro described American women who had either followed their French partner to France or had met them in France briefly after migrating

there for what they thought was going to be a limited period of time, which turned into a life-long commitment. The migration-union trajectory of the *femme transplantée* (transplanted woman) is associated with legal dependency on the partner, and the partnership is perhaps best understood through exchange theory. Rather than getting to mixedness through assimilation, migrant women may thus find (on the partnership market) opportunities to mix with a member of the majority group and hence migration to a Western country, that are not so open to (or tempting for) migrant men. However, this involves them following their partner, often being legally tied to them, and quite possibly accepting educational hypogamy (downward matching). The fact that migrant women in MIG-NAT unions tend to be highly-educated could support this interpretation. It matches the analyses proposed by qualitative studies, such as Dos Santos Silva (2012) on Brazilian migrant women with majority native French men, Suksomboon (2011) on Thai migrant women in MIG-NAT couples in the Netherlands, or Riaño and Baghdadi (2007) on South American women in similar partnerships in Switzerland.

Importantly for the later parts of this thesis, these are also trajectories of migration and mixedness which the aforementioned qualitative research associates with very one-sided gendered power dynamics. That is, that 'transplanted' women find themselves very dependent on their partner - socially, culturally, financially and legally - and unable to resist their French partner's arrangements and gender expectations, which may not be what they aspired to.

Whilst 'transplanted men' in unions with majority native French women exist, they are much rarer: men rarely agree to follow their partner and to 'transplant themselves' for them. In addition, even when they do so, men may still be able to yield patriarchal authority to counteract the power imbalance in the couple. This is what Collet (2015) contends in her analysis of 'conjugal mixedness'. The connection between partnership, gendered migration trajectories and gender dynamics in the couple, is precisely what will be addressed in the next chapter.

FIGURE 3.13: Union-migration sequences by couple type, among migrant women (left) and migrant men (right) living in France



Interpretation: Universe: partnered migrants in coresident man-woman couples in ~2008-2009 (age 18-60)  
 Source: TeO1 (2008-2009), survey-weighted

## Chapter 4

# UK-bound migration: couples and gendered trajectories of family formation and migration

### Chapter introduction

Sociological and demographic scholarship on migrant families living in the UK has grown significantly in recent years (e.g. Charsley, Storer-Church, Benson, and Van Hear (2012), Hannemann and Kulu, Hill (2015), Kulu (2019), and Kulu, Hill and Hannemann (2016)). This literature, on top of the already well-established scholarship on ethnic minorities in Britain, has provided us with a detailed analysis and enhanced understanding of how fertility patterns and rates of inter-ethnic unions vary by ethnic group and between primary migrants and the British-born 'second-generation' (Berrington, 1994; Coleman, 1994; Muttarak & Heath, 2010). Yet how this also reflects differences along migration paths and trajectories is patchily addressed and understood. Certain paths of migration and couple formation have been the topic of intense political, media and research coverage - mainly marriage migration in the context of co-ethnic unions between South Asian migrants and UK-born children of migrants (e.g. Ballard (1990), Charsley et al. (2012), and Shaw (2014)). In contrast, little is known about how family formation and migration interlock in the trajectories of other couples and other migrants, including mixed couples formed between primary migrants and majority natives. Migrants who form a union in their country of birth, before migrating to the UK, are logically more likely to have partnered with a fellow national, who may come with them, precede them or later join them. Conversely, those who migrate as children or independently, before couple formation, are more likely to be in contact with British natives at a time where couple formation may be on the table for them. The sequencing of migration and couple formation

may thus diverge between migrants in relationships with other migrants, and migrants in relationships with natives. This matters for understanding how gender operates in migration, because men and women tend to not follow quite the same timing of couple formation, nor the same migration path; for instance, in 2014, almost three quarters of migrants granted family visas by the Home Office were women (Home Office, 2019). This could be connected to gendered rates of exogamy, but it could also highlight the fact that a similar household composition - e.g. migrant-native couples - may conceal different trajectories of migration and couple formation, depending on whether the migrant partner is a woman or a man. Different sequencing of migration and couple formation, in turn, may foster different couple dynamics and therefore gendered trajectories of migration may be linked to gender relations in the household post-migration - this will form the topic of the next part of the thesis. In this chapter, as in the previous one, I focus on investigating the timing and sequencing of migration and couple formation for migrant men and migrant women. Specifically, I concentrate on whether different couple types - i.e. migrant/migrant (MIG-MIG), migrant/native descendant of migrant (MIG-2G), and migrant/native majority (MIG-NAT) - are associated with different union-migration trajectories, and whether these are consistent across gender configurations.

### **Migrant families and Intermarriage in the UK**

Similarly to France, the topic of intermarriage has long attracted the attention of sociologists and demographers, but migrant-native couples have scarcely been studied in the UK, where *mixedness* has other avatars. In British studies, it is mainly the inter-ethnic lens of mixedness which has prevailed. Berrington (1994, 1996)'s seminal papers dissected trends of intermarriage across different ethnic groups, using data from the UK Labour Force Survey and the 1991 census. She found significant differences between ethnic groups, with much larger proportions of exogamous couples among people of Caribbean, Chinese and Sub-Saharan African ethnicity, compared to individuals with Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity. Similar ethnic differences in inter-relationship rates were mentioned in Coleman's work (1994). The 2011 British Census established that while nearly 1 in 10 partnered individuals is in an inter-ethnic relationship, this proportion is lower for White British (4%), Bangladeshi (7%) and Pakistani (9%); it is much higher for other ethnic groups, notably White Irish (71% partnered are in an inter-ethnic union), Other Black (62%) as well as among people identifying with a mixed ethnic group (85% of whom are in inter-ethnic relationships). Of all inter-ethnic relationships, only 4 in 10 involve a White British partner; among those that do, the most common constellation is with a White British partner and an 'Other white' partner (ONS, 2014). Analysing data from the General

Household Survey, Muttarak and Heath (2010) also found that both men and women identifying with a South Asian ethnicity appeared more likely to be in intra-group relationships compared to other ethnic groups, notably people of Caribbean, Chinese, and Black African ethnicities.

Because this literature is interested in inter-generational integration and patterns of convergence (notably in family formation and fertility), primary migrants are generally distinguished from UK-born descendants of migrants. In all ethnic groups, South Asians included, UK-born descendants of primary migrants (the 'second generation') are associated with higher propensities to form unions with a member of the native majority group - White British - than primary migrants (the 'first generation') from the same ethnic group. This was already noted by Berrington (1994), and confirmed by Muttarak and Heath (2010). Nevertheless, the lower rates of exogamous unions among the South Asian 'second generation' in comparison to other groups led these authors to suggest that Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi minority groups were likely to follow a pluralistic rather than a linear path of inter-generational assimilation. They explained this by these groups' strong community structures and support and by cultural norms which encourage the recruitment of endogamous partners.

Inter-generational differences in intermarriage have thus been covered extensively, whereas heterogeneity within migrant groups and among primary migrants who follow different migration paths have hardly been addressed. The only distinction that now appears regularly is between those who migrated before adulthood - the '1.5 generation' - and those who migrated as adults (see e.g. Kulu and Hannemann (2019) and Kulu, Hill and Hannemann (2016). Distinguishing child migrants has indeed proven relevant to explain different fertility patterns among primary migrants (Wilson, 2019). The reasoning stems from acculturation-based hypotheses: the point is to establish how early exposure to the native majority society started, and for long it has been going on in migrants' lives. This explains why primary migrants' age at migration and years since migration to the UK are now factored in (Kulu, Hill & Hannemann, 2016; Kulu, Hill, Milewski, Hannemann, & Mikolai, 2019)), but why it would not necessarily lead to a wider and more complex problematisation of migration journeys in the empirical scholarship. Accordingly, while there are rich and detailed empirical breakdowns of differing rates of inter-ethnic unions across ethnic groups and generations, there is virtually nothing on whether mixedness, for primary migrants, may also reflect alternative migration journeys and modes of partner recruitment.

#### 4.0.1 Transnational couples and gender relations

In the qualitative literature, the articulation between family formation and paths of migration has been made, quite specifically, to address so-called 'transnational unions': unions involving the descendant of a migrant and a primary migrant from the same ethnic group. Primarily focused on Pakistani Muslims and Indian Sikhs, the scholarship highlights connections between the formation of ethnically endogamous unions between British natives and foreign-born individuals, and particular migration paths, namely marriage migration (Charsley, Bolognani, Ersanilli, & Spencer, 2020; Charsley et al., 2012; Shaw, 2014). These transnational unions, more common among South Asian groups, have also been associated with different modes of partner recruitment - namely arranged or semi-arranged marriages - and in the case of Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities in the UK, with higher rates of cousin marriages (Qureshi, Charsley, & Shaw, 2014; Shaw, 2014). In these scenarios, the family of UK-born children of migrants finds and suggests suitable partners selected in the community of the parents' country of origin. If the match is agreed, the migrant partner will look to move to the UK, with the UK-born partner generally acting as the sponsor partner in the application for spouse visa. In practice, the percentage of family migrants in the whole of UK-bound migration is rather small. At its latest peak, in 2006, it amounted to 74,000 migrants, one in five non-EU migrant for that year. South Asian migrants form the biggest group, but not the majority among family migrants (34% in 2010).

**Differences within the South Asian group** Sociologists have pointed out, however, that there are cultural divides within the South Asian groups with regards to family formation and marriage migration. Ballard (1990) contrasted Sikh and Hindu on the one hand, and Muslims on the other hand. Where early cohorts of UK-born Sikhs did look for migrant partners recruited among Punjabi Sikh, later cohorts proved more likely to partner with other UK-born Sikh partners (or recruited from the Sikh diaspora worldwide). Muslim Pakistani, in contrast, continue to recruit partners in Pakistan much more frequently, specifically in the Mirpur district whence their family had come. This was in large part because of the obligations that parents (the primary migrants) felt they had to honour towards their relatives and community in Pakistan (see also Shaw (2014) and Qureshi et al. (2014)).

A further distinction concealed by both an ethnicity-based or country-of-birth based approach is one that contrasts South Asian migrants who came directly to the UK, and the 'twice migrants' described by Bhachu (1985), who first migrated to East Africa, and later to the UK. The direct migrants who came in

the 1950s and 1960s were mostly drawn from rural areas, and from the regions of Mirpur and the Punjab (Gardner, 1995). In contrast, the 'twice migrants', mostly Indian Sikhs and Indian Muslims, were more urban, mostly professionals, who spoke English fluently. In addition, by the time they arrived in the UK, their links to South Asia had already grown more tenuous. Their migration trajectory helps explain why Indians have been associated with greater socio-economic integration in the UK compared to Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups (Modood & Berthoud, 1997). In Bhachu's account (1985), East African Asians appeared less insistent on traditionally arranged matches, and newly-married couples were more likely to live in nuclear rather than inter-generational households; women were also more likely to be in the labor force, to be graduates and to delay marriage and childbearing. Thus different cultural rules are associated with different modes of partner recruitment, and different interlocking of union formation and migration. Researchers have also noted a shift in perceptions of transnational and arranged marriages, with the UK-born generation - especially young women - who want to be involved in the choice of partner, are interested in 'love marriages', and describes the process of matches as 'assisted' or even simply 'introduced' by parents or relatives rather than 'arranged' (let alone forced) (Ahmad, 2012; Twamley, 2014). Finally, Charsley et al. (2020), Charsley, Bolognani, and Spencer (2017) noted that for British-born Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, marrying a partner in Pakistan or Bangladesh who subsequently moves to the UK can actually be an act of empowerment, as it means that their partner, rather than themselves, have to uproot to the other's family Lievens (1999).

Thus the association that would equate family migration with marriage migration, marriage migration with South Asians, South Asian with Islam and all of it with acute patriarchal violence and domination, hides many layers of complexity and nuances. Firstly, family migration to the UK involves much more than marriage migration: people also migrate as reunified children, or in the case of family-stage migration, as reunified partners. Many couples will have been formed for years before they can reunify (or start their cohabiting life) on British soil. It is quite a misconception to assume - even in the case of marriage migration - that the couple has just been formed for the purpose of migration. Secondly, while South Asians form the biggest group of family migrants, there is also a lot of heterogeneity within the group with regards to marriage practices and couple formation (Shaw, 2014). Hindus and Sikh have followed different patterns of assimilation and union-migration for native-born children, compared to Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims. At the very least, this would imply that we need to distinguish between Indians and Pakistani or Bangladeshi migrants. Thirdly, the association between marriage migration and

an avenue of patriarchal domination is disputed, especially because contrary to the political implicit, marriage migrants are also men (Charsley, 2005). As for the role of Islam, Qureshi et al. (2014) also discuss how young women draw on it as a resource to assert their agency in terms of partner recruitment and marriage decision. There is much generational diversity among British Pakistani Muslims.

#### 4.0.2 Exogamy, marriage and cohabitation

Importantly, while South Asians are the bigger group among non-EU family migrants, they are not the only group for whom migration may be relevant to and connected with family formation - although they may well be the group whose migration *and* family formation are most tightly monitored and policed (Turner, 2015). On the other end of the spectrum, the migration and family trajectories of European and Old Commonwealth countries in Europe go almost entirely un-researched.<sup>1</sup> EU migrants have arguably been the most invisible, since until very recently their migration and hence also their family forms did not come under the scrutiny of the Home Office. As a result, we know very little about how they migrate, at what stage in their life-course, and with what outcomes. The group made of European and Old Commonwealth countries shows the highest propensity to be in an exogamous relationship. It is by and large the group most likely to mix with the White British native majority population (Kulu & Hannemann, 2019; ONS, 2014). Kulu (2019) interpret it as a sign of rapid marital assimilation, but also suggest that 'marriage migration may have played an important role' (Kulu & Hannemann, 2019, p. 193), thus diversifying the association between marriage migration and South Asian migration.

With regards to Caribbean migrants, Foner (1979) described an initial migration wave with pioneer migrants - typically men - joined by common-law wives or girlfriends shortly thereafter, while children remained in the care of their grandmothers until their parents had made enough money to afford to bring them to the UK (see also (Olwig, 2007). Even if the first generation of Caribbean migrants to Britain may have adapted, to some extent, to the marital norms of Britain in the 1960s and 1970s,<sup>2</sup> they have remained less likely to marry and more likely to cohabit, have single-parent families or remain single compared to other ethnic groups, including the White British native majority (Hannemann & Kulu, Hill, 2015). Black Caribbeans are also one of the most exogamous ethnic groups, which is perhaps not unrelated to the higher degree of informality in the

<sup>1</sup>see Kulu (2019), for an exception.

<sup>2</sup>Foner thought that the first generations to have arrived in the UK had turned somewhat more traditional in their marital forms and timing (they appeared quicker and more likely to marry) compared to the Caribbean family system they had come from, where families were centred on generations of women, and in which premarital relationships and informal unions were widespread (Shaw, 2014).

union they form. Indeed, cohabitation and exogamy tend to be connected, in the sense that the level of mixed unions tend to be higher among non-marital unions (cohabiting and non-cohabiting) compared with marital unions (Berrington, 1994; Brown, 1984; Kulu & Hannemann, 2016) although, as Berrington (1994) noted, this is also confounded with age (younger people are more likely to cohabit) and with ethnicity (e.g. the Black Caribbean group as just discussed). Highly-educated migrants to the UK have been associated with higher rates of mixing with the majority native-born population (Kulu & Hannemann, 2019). There is also a similar effect for migrants with good English skills, and for those less religious.

#### 4.0.3 Migrants' couple formation and gender asymmetries

The extent to which these paths of migration and mixedness differ by gender has rarely been a focal point, although migrant spouses, implicitly female and implicitly South Asian (Simmons, 2008; Wray, 2011), have long been politically targeted. Claire C. Alexander (2013) links this to the growing (and somewhat ironic) notion that family migration is a zone of unregulated border governance, whereby migrant women 'brought over' to marry co-ethnic British natives can easily settle in, have children etc. The policy management of family migration is perceived therefore as a matter of social order, including gender order. Equating family migration with marriage migration and 'chain migration' within South Asian communities, the heavily racialised and gendered narrative paints migrant spouses/partners as caught in a series of patriarchal relationships, from the family who 'marry her off' to the UK-based family she marries into, all of which make her ill-equipped for integration into British society (Charsley & Shaw, 2006; Wray, 2011). It also provides anti-patriarchal justifications for the political narrative targeting family migration. In this discourse, the migrant woman is not only a wife but a submissive one, perceived to be entirely outside the labour market, either on welfare benefits or as a housewife, which further compromises acculturation and socio-economic integration (Home Office, 2002, 2011).

Beyond the narrow focus on 'transnational unions', the question of gender differences in intermarriage was tackled by Smith, McDonald, Forster, and Berrington (1996), who found two exceptions to the quasi-symmetry between men and women's propensity to endogamy: Pakistani/White and Other Asian/White unions. In the first case, Pakistani women/white men were much less common than the reverse. In the second case, it was the other way around: Other Asian women were more likely to be in inter-ethnic relationships with White men than Other Asian men were with White women. These gender asymmetries have persisted: in 2011, the Chinese ethnic group presented the widest gender gap in ethnic exogamy: Chinese women were twice as likely to

be in a inter-ethnic relationship compared to their male counterparts; 'Other Asian' women were also more often part of inter-ethnic couples compared to 'Other Asian' men, as were 'Other white' women compared to 'Other white' men. The reverse was true for the Arab, Black African and Black Caribbean groups, all of whom were associated with higher rates of inter-ethnic relationships for men rather than for women. The same also applies (although the gender gap was much smaller) for Pakistani and Bangladeshi (ONS, 2014). When women from a particular group are more exogamous than men, explanations generally revolve around gendered and racialised - orientalist, in Edward Said's sense (Said, 1978) - representations: the British majority group may portray Asian women as submissive and attractive embodiment of femininity and Asian men as inadequate (e.g. effeminate, unattractive) embodiment of masculinity, making them unevenly suitable partners. When migrant men are more exogamous than women, on the other hand, this tends to be analysed as the expression of patriarchal gender norms among the migrant/ethnic group, which exert stricter monitoring and control over women's sexuality and choice of partner. Opportunity structures and gendered-asymmetric migration flows are also acknowledged to play a role (Kalmijn, 1998; Muttarak & Heath, 2010).

In general, compared to migrant men, migrant women are more likely to enter as family migrant, and they are more likely to be in married relationships. Migrant women from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are most likely to be married compared to natives and to any other migrant group Kulu (2019) and they are also more likely than almost any other group to be in an endogamous relationship. They tend to enter their relationship earlier in the life course, whereas, in general, migrant-native unions with a majority British-born partner tend to be formed later in the life course; this applies to migrant women and men (Kulu, 2019).

## 4.1 Contribution and research question

From this survey it is clear that while there is an understanding - especially in political narrative - that migration paths and modes of couple formation differ by gender, and that this has consequences for gender relations in couples, in the UK, this has been patchily addressed in empirical research. The question and relevance of gender relations in shaping trajectories of migration has been raised and investigated mostly with regards to South Asian migration, especially Muslim migrants, and it has been almost entirely focused on co-ethnic unions and marriage migration. In the story of how gender interlocks with family formation, migration and ultimately gender relations, the matter is politically treated as if

the root causes are to be found solely in differing gender cultures and sustained endogamy. The question I develop here, which mirrors the previous chapter, is whether trajectories and life-course calendars of migration distinguish the migration of women and men beyond particular migrant groups and cultures, and whether this is dependent on the choice of partner.

Migration and family formation may be temporally detached, for instance when migration happens years before couple formation, or years after. Even when the initial events that mark the start of couple formation or the first migration to the UK are separated by many years, they may still vastly influence one another (in terms of partner recruitment, or mode of migration for instance). But it is also often the case that the two processes happen simultaneously, or in close succession.

This chapter, which is primarily descriptive in aims, makes several contributions to the literature, while also building the blocks for the analyses conducted in the next part of the thesis. Firstly, it systematically investigates gender differences in timing of family formation and in partner recruitment among migrants. Secondly, it presents a methodological approach for modelling migration trajectories as interlocked with different stages of the life-course and of couple formation. Lastly, it shows how migrants' exogamy reflect not only group differences (propensity to endogamy) but also gendered paths of migration and couple formation. This nuances understandings of 'mixing' as meaning different things for migrant men and migrant women involved. Which typical paths lead to a mixed union with a British majority native for migrant men and migrant women? How do union-migration paths vary overall for men and women of different migrant groups? Through this focus on union-migration trajectories, and its use of sequence analysis, the chapter offers a more holistic and incisive grasp of how gender differences unravel in and throughout migration. It also highlights how important the circumstances of migration are to the formation of mixed couples, and hence how immigration restrictions themselves limit the possibility of mixing.

The questions that guide the analysis mirror the previous chapters:

1. Do migrants who form couples with a majority native French partner differ in origins, family patterns and calendar, from migrants in other types of partnerships (i.e. with other migrants or with direct descendants of migrants)? Does this change with the gender of the migrant? Considering patterns of soft segmented assimilation in the UK, we should observe differences between migrant groups, who are associated with uneven pace of assimilation (Muttarak & Heath, 2010). Notably, I expect that South

Asians and Muslims are comparatively scarcely represented among MIG-NAT couples, while Caribbean, European and atheist/agnostic migrants may be over-represented.

2. Do migrants who mix with the majority native French group follow different trajectories of family formation and migration?
3. Are these trajectories gendered?

## 4.2 Data and methods

### 4.2.1 Data

The data used here is, as discussed before, extracted from *Understanding Society, the UK Longitudinal Household Survey* (University of Essex & Institute for Social and Economic Research, 2019). In order to match as closely as possible the time frame for the French data, the analysis focused on data from the second wave of the survey, which was collected between 2010 and 2012. Wave 1 would have been an even better temporal fit, but the module on household labour (which is key in the next analytical stage) only appears in the questionnaire at wave 2. The second wave is also the point at which the sample from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) was integrated in Understanding Society. The analysis is directed at individuals who were in a cohabiting relationships when they were interviewed for the survey's second wave of data collection. In addition to the main data, I took advantage of the dataset on partnership histories re-released in 2020 (ISER & University of Essex, 2020). This dataset contains information about all partnership spells reported by adult respondents in Understanding Society (UKHLS) and British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) samples, with spells ranging from 2018 as far back as 1912. Some relevant questions (notably on language skills and religion) were not asked (or asked again) at wave 2 but appeared in previous or later waves. In cases where answers were missing for Wave 2, I imputed answers from either the latest previous waves, or alternatively the earliest later wave with a non-missing answer.

Not all individuals who took part in the survey at Wave 2 are included in the dataset on partnerships history (see table 4.1 for the sample breakdown), and the sample shrinks significantly if we only keep couples where both partners appeared in this dataset. Indeed, information on past relationships and their timelines are missing for many respondents or for their partner (for instance when the partner was only a temporary sample member or proxy respondent).

Questions on partnership history were asked at Wave 1 for the UKLHS sample, and only partial information is available for people who entered the survey after

TABLE 4.1: Sample breakdown

Sub-samples (cumulative criteria)	N
UKLHS individual survey respondents (w2)	54,565
- in cohabiting relationships	34,281
- both partners were full survey respondents	27,058
- man-woman relationships	26,826
- both partners of working age (18-60)	18,200
- exc. key missing values <sup>a</sup>	17,286
- with individual partnership history data	15,678
- migrant respondents only	2623

Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex)  
Wave 2 (2009-2012)

<sup>a</sup>Key missing values refer to missing values for migration background (whether UK-born) and for couple type.

Wave 1.<sup>3</sup> For the analyses that do not require a detailed timeline of partnership histories, the chapter will use data from the main survey, so as to maximise sample size and use.

The final sample of migrants in coresident relationships ends up at about half the size of the equivalent TeO sample. However, the data here is complete and mostly symmetrical for both partners, which allows for a much more detailed analysis of the couples' dynamics. In contrast to the TeO sample, however, the number of individuals cannot be equated to the number of couples: here one couple includes two individuals who are both respondents in the survey. Hence the number of couples in the sample is half the number of individuals, and individual observations are not independent from one another but coupled, as well as nested in households.

Sample restrictions that apply to all analyses are the following: only respondents in cohabiting relationships, and for which the partner is also a survey respondent at Wave 2; I include only respondents in man-woman relationships that involve two individuals of working age (18-60).

#### 4.2.2 Variables

##### Key variables: migration, family formation, timing

###### *Migrants*

In UKLHS data, a (im)migrant is defined straightforwardly as an individual who was born outside the current national borders of the United Kingdom (it therefore includes for instance British citizens born in former colonies). As we have seen in earlier chapters, the sampling of migrants is in fact more specific than that; nevertheless the formal definition and variable remains solely based on the place of birth as in or outside the UK's current borders. *Understanding Society* provides information on the citizenship of respondents at the time of data collection (for certain waves), but the questionnaires do not enquire about nationality at birth. It is not possible therefore to construct the category of primary 'migrant' to be fully identical to the French statistical category of immigrant as *born abroad and born foreign*. Since according to the French survey designers, it is at any rate a tiny fraction of individuals born abroad who were not also born foreigners (Beauchemin, Hamel, & Simon, 2016), I assume that this does not distort the analyses to any significant extent. The classification for second-generation migrants is similarly altered, since second-generation migrants' parent(s) are considered migrants by the same definition that applies to primary migrants. The category native (NAT)

<sup>3</sup>For more details on the construction and data of the partnership history dataset, see Nandi, Menon, and Smith (2020)

encompasses all individuals born in the UK regardless of their nationality at birth or later. As in the larger working sample, the sample of migrant is restricted to those who, at Wave 2 of *Understanding Society*, were 1) partnered and lived with their partner; 2) between 18 and 60 years old; 3) whose coresident partner was also aged 18-60. Together these specifications construct the category that the sample here under study can hope to be representative of, namely partnered migrants of working age in coresident relationships. Migrants who were either single, or in a non-cohabiting relationship (whether that be with partners abroad or partners residing in the UK), are entirely excluded from the analysis.

#### *Couples*

At Wave 2 of *Understanding Society*, the survey included 250 individuals in same-sex relationships; once applying the same filters (fully productive interviews only, coresident, partnership history, etc.), this number dwindles to a very small group of individuals, and an even smaller number of couples. In this chapter as in the previous one the framing is therefore restricted to man-woman couples. Couple types (native couples, migrant couples, and so forth), associated characteristics and estimates refer to coresident couples as they were reported at Wave 2. These include married and unmarried couples as well as a small number of couples in a civil partnership.

#### *Timing and ordering: sequences of migration and couple formation*

*Understanding Society* does not provide any information regarding either the mode of entry into the UK, or the immigration status at the point of survey data collection. This is in line with other British surveys, a situation deplored by quantitative migration researchers (e.g. Demireva (2011)). Importantly for this research, it is not possible to identify people who were, or are legally dependent on their partner for residency rights in the UK and, concurrently, one cannot precisely distinguish in this data between those who would be identified, in legal immigration regulations, as family migrants (spouse visas, family reunification) from independent migration (work visas, student visas) and refugees/asylum seekers. It is only through the reconstitution of sequences of family formation and migration nested within the life course, that one can hope to identify - not without imprecision - whether migration happened before and presumably independently from the couple, or if it happened during the relationship.

In order to build the sequences of couple formation and migration, I used retrospective data derived from the questions on the year of the start of current relationship (I collapsed year of civil marriage, year of religious marriage and year of start of cohabitation with current partner. For each couple I retained as starting date whichever happened first). I also use the year of the start of

the first relationship (following the same procedure as above), the year the first relationship ended (if applicable), the year of birth, and the year the migrant respondent first migrated to France. All these events are considered as nested within the life course, and as such, it is the age at which they occurred, and the context of their happening and the time that separates them that matters. Similarly to the French chapter, the state sequences distinguish a 'childhood' state, which ends at age 16.

#### *Ordering and timing of migration and couple formation*

I also included a simple variable for the ordering of migration and couple formation, which is coded 'migration before couple' if migrants arrived in the UK before marriage or the start of cohabitation (whichever happened first) with their current partner. When the migration year was after the starting year of the current relationship, I coded it 'couple before migration'. This category also includes individuals who married or started cohabiting the same year they first migrated to the UK, on the reasoning that it appears more likely that these couples were already formed before migration, rather than to assume that within less than a year of first migrating to the UK, individuals married or moved in with a partner they had not been involved with prior to migration.

#### **Further variables and controls**

##### *Exogamy*

I have included two operationalisations of couple exogamy, to reflect the distinct British and French statistical approaches to mixedness. The first type of exogamy refers to inter-ethnic mixed couples, defined as couples for which the ethnic identity of one partner (as defined by the box they checked for the question on ethnic identity) differs from that of the other partner.<sup>4</sup> The second form of exogamy relies on migratory background to identify endogamy/exogamy. It is similar to the classification used in French statistics (as well as most other continental European statistical definitions on which 'ethnic statistics' are based (Morning, 2008)). If both partners were born in the same area, or have at least one parent born in the same (non-UK) area, they are considered endogamous. In cases where individuals were born to a mixed couple - i.e. they have a UK-born parent and a foreign-born parent - the non-UK country prevails (minority focus). When parents were both born abroad, but in different countries, the mother's country of birth takes precedence.

<sup>4</sup>Following the 2001 Census ethnic categories, the UKLHS ethnic categories were: British/English/Scottish/Welsh/Northern Irish; Irish; Any other White background; Indian; Pakistani; Bangladeshi; Any other Asian background; Caribbean; African; Any other Black background; Arab; Any other ethnic group, as well as the four mixed ethnic options: White and Black Caribbean; White and Black African; White and Asian; Any other mixed background.

*Geographic areas of origin*

I aggregated regions of origin of migrants (and, occasionally, of natives' parents) following a classification close to that of Kulu and Hannemann (2016)). The aggregates are: (1) UK ; (2) EU-27 countries<sup>5</sup>, plus the other EEA countries (Switzerland, Norway and Iceland); (3) Caribbean countries; (4) African countries; (5) India; (6) Pakistan and Bangladesh<sup>6</sup>; (7) South East Asia (plus Sri Lanka) ; and (8) all other origins (e.g. Canada, the United States, Canada, China, Hong Kong). The same classification is used for parents' area of birth. A more detailed breakdown of the country of birth represented in the sample is presented in the appendix (see Appendix table 4).

Working with these country-of-origin aggregates involves no trivial amount of simplification and problematic labelling. For instance, children of the 'twice migrants' born in East Africa will appear in this classification as African. As demonstrated by e.g. Westwood and Bhachu (1988), aggregating Sikh, Muslim and Hindu from Punjabis, Tamils, Gujarati, Goans and Bengalis into 'Indian', 'Pakistani' and 'Bangladeshi' origin or ethnic minority groups is decidedly reductive. However, in view of the limited data and sample available, it seems the only feasible option.

The 'other' group as a whole is large but no specific country or coherent aggregates within it provides a large enough sample that would allow for it to be analysed separately. Migrants from Turkey were not numerous enough to be singled out, and in light of the existing research and the previous chapter, could not be aggregated with another group (e.g. Africa or Europe) either. Some researchers have justified aggregating migrants from Western, English-speaking countries, namely Irish migrants with migrants from North America, Australia and New Zealand (e.g. Demireva (2011) and Kulu (2019)). This, however, would result in batching together Irish migrants, who have not fallen under British immigration regulations for decades, and other migrants who have to compose with the immigration regime. I therefore decided against it.

<sup>5</sup>A note of caution here: because the EU has expanded over time, some of the migrants who fall into this category may have migrated before their country became a EU member state. They would not have been considered EU migrants at the time of their migration. It would not be entirely valid therefore to state for instance that none of these migrants faced immigration regulations that constrained their entry, the terms of their remaining in the UK, or their right to be joined by their family members if applicable.

<sup>6</sup>The literature on Bangladeshi migration and notably marriage-related migration to the UK is much more limited than that on Indian or Pakistani migration, but suggests similarities with Pakistani migration. Like migration from Pakistan, migration to Britain from Bangladesh has been since the 1980s numerically dominated by marriage-related migration involving the already-settled British Bengali community (Charsley et al., 2012; Gardner & Shukur, 1994). The relevant scholarship also gives anecdotal evidence of relatively high rates of arranged or semi-arranged marriages (Gardner, 1995, 2006)

*Educational level, Religion, religiosity and language skills*

I classified respondents' educational level into five categories, based on the highest educational qualification obtained: tertiary education (mainly university degrees); other higher education (e.g. nursing degrees), A-levels, GSCE, no qualification or lower than GSCE.

The different religious affiliations were clustered into the following categories: Protestants (all Anglican and protestant confessions); Catholic (Roman Catholic, under the authority of the Pope); Other Christian faiths; Muslim; Hindu; other religions (an eclectic mix including Buddhist, Jewish, Sikh and other faiths); and those declaring no religion. The majority of UKLHS respondents were not asked about their religious identification at Wave 2, and the variable yields a large number of missing answers.<sup>7</sup> A simpler 'religiosity' dummy variable contrasts respondents who identify as having a religion (regardless of which one), with respondents who stated that they have no religion.

*English Language skills* Unfortunately, there was no question asked about English language skills at Wave 2, so I resorted again to cross-wave imputation.<sup>8</sup> If respondents indicated that they had any difficulty doing any of a number of tasks in English (routine daily interactions, reading, phone conversations, completing forms), either at wave 1 or at wave 5, they were identified as having 'some difficulties' with the English language. If they answered the questions and reported no difficulty for any of the tasks, they were identified as having no difficulty with English. In cases where the information was missing, but the respondents had identified English as being their first language, and/or they were UK-born to UK-born parents, it was assumed that they would not have any particular difficulty with the English language. As with the questions on religion, the numbers of missing values were high. I present descriptive analyses in this chapter for these variables, analyses which exclude cases with missing answers, but I do not include them at in the more complex models in later chapters.

<sup>7</sup>Only new entrants and people who had not been able to give a full interview before were asked about their religion at Wave 2. To compute this variable I pooled together the little data that was available in Wave 2, with data from Wave 1's module on religion and from the last wave of the BHPS (wave 18). In spite of these efforts, the variable still yields a large number of missing answers, which is reflected in the standard errors.

<sup>8</sup>The language module came up at wave 1, and then not before four waves later, at wave 5. I have pooled together the data from wave 1 and that from wave 5, a triangulation which still leaves many missing answers, some due to attrition.

### 4.2.3 Methods

#### Weighting and statistical tools

All analyses are survey-weighted unless specified otherwise, using the weights made available by the survey design team.<sup>9</sup> The weighting accounts for non-random missing values and for the complex survey design, which is clustered and stratified, and includes the Ethnic Minority Boost Sample. Whenever the issue of strata with a single primary unit arose, the standard error estimates for such strata are calculated on the distance from the mean across strata, rather than a strata mean (Pitblado, 2009), as recommended by *Understanding Society*'s survey design team (Lynn, 2015). When applicable, standard errors are in brackets.

#### Analytical methods

I will not repeat here the technical details of the sequence analysis - the reader is referred to the previous chapter. As before, the sequences range from five years before migration to five years after migration. The sequences are left-truncated if migrants were not yet born on any of the given years before migration; they are right-truncated by the year of Wave 2 interview, as couples' trajectories are not accounted for after that. As before, I use optimal matching for the dissimilarity matrix and base the distances on the frequency of transitions between states. The computation of the dissimilarity matrix and the clustering are survey-weighted.<sup>10</sup> As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the sample is much smaller than the one exploited for the sequence analysis of migrants living in France (about half of the equivalent TeO data). All analyses are survey-weighted unless specified otherwise.

<sup>9</sup>Specifically, I use the Wave 2 cross-sectional weights for main interview data from UKLHS full respondents (drawn from the GPS, EMBS and BHPS samples). Proxy respondents are excluded since the proxy questionnaire skipped questions that are essential to this research (e.g. on certain timings of family formation and on household labour contribution). Having not made use of the extra 5 minutes questions, it was not necessary to use the related weights.

<sup>10</sup>The tools used for the sequence analysis and clustering allow to factor in survey weights, but not to account for stratified survey design. This is a possible flaw of the weighting strategy used here for optimal matching and clustering applied to UKLHS data, an issue which does not arise for the TeO analyses.

## 4.3 Results

### 4.3.1 Partnered migrants in the UKLHS: couple types and geographic origins

TABLE 4.2: Couple type and areas of birth by gender of migrants


	Migrant women		Migrant men		Together	
	n	%-w	n	%-w	n	%-w
<b>Couple types</b>						
MIG-NAT	541	30	406	24	947	27
MIG-2G	217	9	265	9	482	9
MIG-MIG	1644	61	1638	66	3282	64
total: all couples	2402	100	2309	100	4711	100
<b>Areas of birth</b>						
EU	383	32	296	28	679	30
Caribbean	49	2	54	2	103	2
Africa	337	16	408	21	745	18
India	263	12	262	13	525	12
Pakistan/Bangladesh	430	10	476	11	906	11
Southeast Asia	172	8	124	6	296	7
Other areas	308	20	250	19	558	20
total: all areas	1942	100	1870	100	3812	100

Note: n refers to sample size. %-w refers to survey-weighted percentages.

Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012)

Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.

FIGURE 4.1: Area of origin over time, among partnered migrant women and men living in the UK in 2009-2012




Universe: migrant women (top plot) and migrant men (bottom plot) in coresident man-woman couples in ~2010 (both partners age 18-60).  
Data: UKLHS, Wave 2 (2009-2012) respondents, survey-weighted

The figure 4.1 illustrates the distribution of migratory origins by year of arrival, among partnered migrants living in the UK at the end of the 2010s. One should keep in mind, however, that the figure represents the (weighted) distribution of migrants' origin in the UKLHS sample, and not migration waves as such, let alone number of entries per year or any such estimate. The general upward trend is largely attributable to the fact that migrants recently arrived are less likely to have left the survey (because of e.g. return migration, survey attrition or death), and will therefore be represented in the sample in proportionally larger numbers. Nevertheless, for both partnered migrant men and migrant women, the share of European migrants increases sharply in recent migration, i.e. among migrants who arrived in the 2000s. The rise is most noticeable for the year 2004 and after, which marked the EU-enlargement and the accession of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia to EU-membership. The waves of migrant women and migrant men do not appear very differentiated, certainly less so than in the French case.

Caribbean migrants constitute a small fraction of the population under study here. This is also to be understood in the context of their lower rates of marriage and cohabitation (Hannemann & Kulu, Hill, 2015; Kulu, 2019), which implies that they would be less represented among partnered migrants.

FIGURE 4.2: Area of origin and religion of migrants by couple type, among migrant women (right) and migrant men (left) living in the UK



The figure 4.2 provides a visualisation of the breakdown of areas of origins and main religions, by couple types and by gender. The singularity of migrant-native couples (MIG-NAT) is apparent on both aspects. As noted by many researchers, including some who used UKLHS data, European migrants are much more likely than others to form relationships with majority natives. They

are by far the most represented origin among migrants in relationship with a majority British native. This applies to migrant women/native men couples, as well as to migrant men/native women couples. The second most represented geographic group for migrants in MIG-NAT couples is the 'other' category. In contrast, when looking at migrant couples and MIG-2G couples, the proportion of African, Indian and Pakistani migrants is much more sizeable. Interestingly, the plots for MIG-NAT couples and for MIG-MIG couples are symmetrical, showing no signs of significant gender difference in terms of geographic origins. The plot for MIG-2G couples is more lopsided, reflecting different composition (or recruitment) for migrant men and migrant women. Migrant men who partner up with descendants of migrants born in the UK are more likely to come from Pakistan/Bangladesh, India or Africa; migrant women in MIG-2G unions come comparatively more often from Europe or from the 'other areas' group. The same analysis broadly applies to the distribution by religious identification in each couple type. Couples formed by a primary migrant and a UK-born descendant of migrants differ by gender, with migrant men being more likely to identify as Muslim, and migrant women more likely to be Catholic. Other couple types are symmetrical from the point of view of gender, but show stark variations across couple types. Migrant-native couples contrast sharply with the other two types, with a much larger proportion of non-religious migrants - close to or over 1 in 2 migrants in a migrant-native couples. This supports other research that found religiosity to be associated with higher propensity for intra-group marriage (Kulu & Hannemann, 2016)). Migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples also involve a greater proportion of protestant migrants, something which aligns with the idea that migrants who are culturally close to the majority (Anglican, protestant) British-born population are more likely to form unions with them compared to other groups. On this note, it is interesting here to observe that Catholic migrants are evenly represented across couple types and gender (with the exception of men in MIG-2G couples, who are less often Catholic), which would suggest that they do not enjoy a greatly facilitated access to - or partner recruitment in - the British majority population. Nevertheless, there is still a clear contrast with non-Christian faiths, e.g. Muslim and Hindu migrants who are almost never involved in migrant-native couples (MIG-NAT); at the same time, Muslim migrants constitute the largest religious group in MIG-2G couples and in migrant couples, and Hindu migrants form a sizeable section (about 15%) of migrant couples.

An interesting point here is brought by attention to fluency in the English language. One finds little difference between couple types and between genders - except when it comes to migrant-native couples. The proportion of migrant

TABLE 4.3: Migrant women and migrant men, by couple types

	Migrant women				Migrant men			
	MIG-NAT	MIG-2G	MIG-MIG	All	MIG-NAT	MIG-2G	MIG-MIG	All
<b>Area of birth</b>								
EU	45	24	26	32	39	13	26	28
Caribbean	2	6	1	2	2	6	1	2
Africa	12	12	18	16	20	17	21	21
India	1	9	18	12	1	23	16	13
Pakistan/Bangladesh	0	21	13	10	1	31	13	11
Southeast Asia	10	6	8	8	7	1	7	6
Other areas	30	20	16	20	31	8	16	19
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Religion</b>								
Protestant	13	8	6	8	16	6	5	8
Catholic	21	20	21	21	19	5	19	18
Other Christian	10	7	12	11	6	6	12	10
Muslim	1	26	23	17	3	38	22	19
Hindu	1	4	13	9	0	7	13	9
Other religion	10	8	9	9	2	13	7	7
No religion	44	27	17	26	54	25	22	30
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Education</b>								
Tertiary education	45	47	41	42	38	33	43	41
Other higher education	16	17	16	16	14	12	13	13
A-levels	10	4	8	8	11	11	10	10
GCSE	13	10	10	11	18	11	8	11
No or lower qualifications	16	22	26	23	20	34	27	26
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>English language</b>								
% have difficulties with English	35	48	69	57	15	46	67	53

*Note:* All percentages are survey-weighted.

*Source:* UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).

*Universe:* partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.

TABLE 4.4: Migrant's union formation, exogamy, ordering and timing

	Migrant women				Migrant men			
	MIG-NAT	MIG-2G	MIG-MIG	All	MIG-NAT	MIG-2G	MIG-MIG	All
<b>Exogamy</b>								
% interethnic couples	63	40	16	33	45	25	16	24
% exogamous (migratory origins)	100	58	22	49	100	26	17	40
<b>Unions and children</b>								
% married	73	89	88	84	73	90	87	84
% coresident children under 16	50	64	63	59	48	73	62	59
% parents	75	89	86	83	78	83	87	84
% more than 2 children	11	26	24	20	10	24	22	19
<b>Ordering</b>								
% migrated before relationship	73	51	39	51	89	66	52	63
% migrated before 1st relationship	66	47	35	46	85	63	47	58
<b>Timing (mean)</b>								
Age at first marriage	27.44 (0.36)	25.72 (0.61)	25.23 (0.23)	25.92 (0.18)	28.24 (0.51)	28.38 (0.78)	28.14 (0.22)	28.19 (0.21)
Age at first child	26.78 (0.5)	25 (0.75)	25.05 (0.27)	25.51 (0.23)	28.93 (0.54)	28.31 (0.61)	28.21 (0.23)	28.4 (0.21)
Age at migration	17.57 (0.67)	19.13 (0.94)	24.6 (0.34)	22.02 (0.31)	12.54 (0.83)	19.63 (1)	25.96 (0.47)	22.1 (0.42)

*Note:* All percentages and means are survey-weighted.

*Source:* UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).

*Universe:* partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.

women in migrant-native relationships who reported some difficulties in English (35%) is more than twice that of migrant men in relationship with a native (NAT) woman (15%).


### 4.3.2 Timings and ordering of migration and couple formation: gendered calendars

### 4.3.3 Union-migration sequences

The typology of union-migration sequences was built using the same approach as in the chapter on France-bound migrations. The states used for the state sequences are similarly defined as (1) childhood (16 years old or younger); (2) single (and at least 17 years old); (3) first relationship (whether cohabiting or married); (4) in-between (time between the end of the first relationship and the start of the relationship the respondent was a part of at the time of the UKLHS Wave 2 interview); (5) later relationship (refers to the relationship at Wave 2 if it is not the respondents' first relationship). As in the chapter on France, the 'in-between' state can cover periods of other relationships and/or periods of single life. States referring to periods of relationship (i.e. 'first relationship' and 'later relationship') include both periods of cohabitation and marriage with one

partner. The starting date of a relationship is either the start of cohabitation or the date of marriage (or civil partnership), whichever happened first. In cases where respondents gave distinct separation and divorce date for the end of the first relationship (if applicable), the separation date is used as end date.

FIGURE 4.3: Union-migration sequences (weighted)



As was the case with the TeO data, the most common sequence is that of child migrants, when migration to the UK occurs between 5 and 11 years old (see figure 4.3). The second most common sequence is also the one that sees migration coincide with the formation of the first relationship. Whereas with the TeO data, the quality assessment of the partitioning pointed to an optimum at six clusters, with the UKLHS, the quality measures are best overall for a clustering into five groups (see plot 4.4). The quality measures for a partitioning in five clusters are satisfactory; they are presented in the appendix, table 5.

The five clusters thus formed through optimal matching and partitions around medoids are very similar to those identified with the French data. The one difference is that the same population that was divided into two clusters in the last division in the French typology ('young single migrants' and 'single adult migrants') is collapsed into one cluster ('single adult') in this classification'. The 'single adult' group is not split by an extra partition. Moving from five to six clusters leads to a distinction among child migrants, between those who migrated very young, and those who migrated in their early teens (see Appendix, table 12). In this the results of the sequence analysis differ between the French and British cases. The difference is, however, very minor. Other clusters appear entirely consistent with the classification based on the French data (see figure 4.5).

FIGURE 4.4: Cluster cutoff criteria for union-migration sequence clusters (weighted)






FIGURE 4.5: Union-migration sequence clusters



The gender difference in the union-migration is again clearly apparent when plotting migrant women's and migrant men's sequences side-by-side (figure 4.6). The drop at  $\text{mig} = 0$  (year of first migration to the UK) in the plot of women's sequences contrasts with men's sequences. It marks, as in the previous chapter, the simultaneity of (first) couple formation and migration as a important, common and distinctive feature of women's migration.

FIGURE 4.6: Union-migration sequences by gender of migrant



As expected, women are more likely than men to fall into the sequence 'formation 1st partnership'. This is true across couple types but the contrast with migrant men is in no small part attributable to migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples. Figure 4.7 shows the breakdown of sequence clusters by couple types, distinguishing between migrant women and migrant men. One can see that among MIG-2G couples, the proportion of migrant men who migrated around the same time as they were forming their first union is only very slightly lower than that of women. The difference is starker among migrant couples, but still concerns a large proportion of migrant men (over 30%) as well as migrant women (over 40%). The gender difference is more acute among migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples, with migration coinciding with the start of the first relationship for slightly under 30% of women, but only half of that for men. The asymmetry (or symmetry) across the vertical axis of the barplots in figure 4.7 helps visualise the gender differences (or similarities) in the distribution of union-migration sequences.


MIG-2G couples are mostly symmetrical, with less obvious differences between migrant women and migrant men's sequences of union-migration, compared to other couples. The main point of gender asymmetry is child migration, which concerns a greater proportion of migrant men than migrant women. The

sample size for migrants in relationships with descendants of migrants is, however, rather small (hence the large standard errors brackets). In migrant couples, single adult migration is more common among men, while the coincidence of migration with the formation of the first partnership is more common among women. In other respects, the distribution of sequences does not change markedly between men and women.

Migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples stand out visibly, and this in two different ways: the distribution of sequences is most obviously asymmetrical, signifying that the paths of union-migration leading to a relationship with a majority British native are more acutely gendered; and the prevalence of child migration is uniquely high, compared to other couples. This is especially true for migrant men: almost 60% of migrant men in a relationship with a majority British native (MIG-NAT) migrated when they were children, long before family formation years. This is three times the proportion for migrant men in migrant couples, and twice the proportion for migrant men in relationship with a descendant of migrant. Likewise, 40% of migrant women with a British-born partner with no direct migration ties migrated as children (25% for migrant women in MIG-2G couples, and under 20% of women in migrant couples). In addition, migrant women in MIG-NAT couples are the ones most likely to have migrated as single adults, both compared to their male counterparts, and to migrant women in other types of relationships. While the proportion of single adult migrants is indeed higher for migrant men than for migrant women in migrant couples and in MIG-2G couples, this is reversed for migrants in MIG-NAT couples. This brings some further nuance (if any was needed) to the image of single adult migrants as the default migrants and as default-masculine. When looking at partnered migrants, the union-migration sequence that locates migration after childhood but (generally long) before couple formation concerns only a small proportion of migrants (under 20% overall); and, in the case of MIG-NAT couples, it concerns a greater proportion of migrant women than migrant men.

The figure 4.7 thus illustrates three key points: (1) how the different couple types are associated with different distributions of union-migration trajectories; (2) it highlights the singularity of migrant-native MIG-NAT couples' trajectories; and (3) it shows how trajectories varies depending on the gender of the migrant considered.

FIGURE 4.7: Union-migration sequences by couple type, among migrant women (left) and migrant men (right) living in the UK



## 4.4 Discussion

My first hypothesis, already well-established in the literature, was that, from the point of view of geographic origin, the composition of migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples would differ compared to other couple types. Indeed, European migrants notably, appear in much greater proportion in MIG-NAT couples compared to migrants from other groups, as do migrants who declare no religion. This would suggest that fast marital assimilation is more available or accessible for these groups, while it is not for South Asian migrants and for either Muslim or Hindu migrants. This is not necessarily, or not only, about endogamous preferences on the side of the migrants, but also about the constraints linked to migration timing and regime. Contrary to EU migrants who have been mostly free to come and go independently, family migration has been the main mode of entry for South Asian migrants for some decades. By definition, this mode of migration involves an already-established relationship, or at the very least dependence and reliance on established relatives. Except for couples formed between migrants and second-generation migrants, differences in the geographic origins of migrants in different couple types were not clearly gendered. The greater proportion of migrant men from Pakistan/Bangladesh and India in relationships with UK-born descendants of migrants could reflect the practice of finding overseas, co-ethnic partners for the British-born second-generation, something which

TABLE 4.5: Migration women: union-migration sequence clusters

	Child migrants (1.5G)	Single adults	Formation 1st partnership	Established 1st partnership	Partnership reconfigurations	Total %
All migrant women (partnered)	24	13	39	17	6	100
<b>Couple types</b>						
MIG-NAT	40	19	28	4	9	100
MIG-2G	26	13	47	7	7	100
MIG-MIG	16	10	44	25	5	100
<b>Areas of birth</b>						
EU	22	15	43	11	9	100
Caribbean	53	20	14	7	5	100
Africa	30	15	28	25	2	100
India	19	6	53	21	1	100
Pakistan/Bangladesh	35	5	44	15	0	100
Southeast Asia	15	12	40	23	10	100
Other areas	19	15	37	19	9	100
<b>Qualification (highest)</b>						
Tertiary education	17	15	44	16	7	100
Other higher education	21	17	35	20	5	100
A-levels	30	15	39	12	4	100
GCSE	62	6	19	9	4	100
No or lower qualifications	19	7	44	24	7	100

Note: All percentages are survey-weighted.

Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).

Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.

has been documented for South Asian migrant groups (especially Pakistani and Bangladeshi) and is seemingly more common for second-generation daughters than sons (Charsley et al., 2020). In line with this interpretation is the proportion of migrant men in these couples whose migration coincided with couple formation.

The migration-union trajectories undertaken by migrants in relationships with majority natives are not typically the same as those of migrants in migrant couples (who tend to be already in a relationship when they migrate) or those of migrants who form a union with a native descendant of migrant (who are more likely to have migrated around the same time as their relationship started). If we consider that the third sequence cluster (*Formation 1st partnership*) likely covers most of marriage migration, then it is worth noting that while MIG-2G couples have the highest proportion of such union-migration trajectories (especially for men), they still represent a very small proportion of (any) sequence and do not by any means have the monopoly of marriage migration (see figure 4.8). In fact, and as ventured by Kulu (2019), a non-trivial proportion of migrant women partnered with a native majority man fit into this same migration-union cluster. It is actually the second most common trajectory for MIG-NAT couples involving a migrant

TABLE 4.6: Migration men: union-migration sequence clusters

	Child migrants (1.5G)	Single adults	Formation 1st partnership	Established 1st partnership	Partnership reconfigurations	Total %
All migrant men (partnered)	30	19	28	17	7	100
<b>Couple types</b>						
MIG-NAT	62	14	15	3	6	100
MIG-2G	35	17	38	4	5	100
MIG-MIG	16	21	32	24	7	100
<b>Areas of birth</b>						
EU	27	21	26	14	12	100
Caribbean	52	7	16	11	13	100
Africa	33	22	22	15	8	100
India	16	17	45	21	1	100
Pakistan/Bangladesh	31	17	39	13	0	100
Southeast Asia	33	20	19	24	5	100
Other areas	31	16	27	19	7	100
<b>Qualification (highest)</b>						
Tertiary education	25	21	28	20	6	100
Other higher education	29	18	33	8	12	100
A-levels	25	29	34	12	1	100
GCSE	64	10	13	6	6	100
No or lower qualifications	26	15	30	21	8	100


Note: All percentages are survey-weighted.

Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).

Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.

woman. This undermines the credibility of the equation that treats marriage migration as an expression of minorities' endogamous matrimonial strategies only.

FIGURE 4.8: Couple types distribution by union-migration clusters, by migrants' gender



Migration-union trajectories thus distinguished couple types, but also revealed gender differences within couple types, depending on the gender configuration of the couple. Among the migrants in relationships with native majority

partners, migrant men and migrant women proved to have followed rather different trajectories of migration and couple formation. The migrant men who form relationships with native majority women are overwhelmingly recruited among child migrants. In contrast, migrant women in relationships with native majority men are comparatively much more likely than their male counterparts to have arrived into the UK as adults, whether independently (*Single adult sequence*) or coinciding with the formation of their first relationship (*Formation 1st partnership sequence*). One way to interpret this gendered trajectory is that migrant men who form relationships with native majority are on a path of fast intra-generational assimilation, reflected in their marital assimilation. It is facilitated by the fact that many of the migrant men involved are European and white. In contrast, couples formed by a migrant woman and a native majority also involve paths of marriage migration, reflecting international partner recruitment which selects primarily highly-educated migrant women. It is interesting to note, however, that the partnered women, those who migrated as single adults, and the women who migrated after the end of a first union spell (*cluster multiple union spells*) were almost as likely as child migrants to have formed relationships with majority natives - an observation which does not apply to migrant men (see figure 4.8). This could suggest that for women who migrate with a certain degree of independence from the institution of marriage and their (first) partner may be in a position to follow particularly rapid paths of acculturation and marital assimilation (something suggested for instance by S. Scott and Cartledge (2009) in the context of European migration, and by Collet (2015)).

More generally, the sequence analysis paints a complex but highly gendered picture of migration trajectories. Very consistent with the analysis drawn from the French data, the decomposition by sequence clusters highlights the complexity of how migration and couple formation meet and overlap in the life-course. The interlocking of migration and couple formation is particularly tight for migrant women, for whom the transitions of migration and entering couple life come often simultaneously. However, the analysis shows that the migration of men is often entangled in couple formation too, even if for a larger proportion of them, couple formation happens long before or long after. The breakdown by educational level brings further gendered nuance: even within migration sequences, the recruitment can be quite different: an important point is the particularly high educational level of migrant women in marriage-migration sequences, something which echoes studies of women's geographical hypergamy (see e.g. Suksomboon (2011) but also Basu (2015)).

These two chapters (chapter 3 and 4) thus contribute to the literature on migration and notably family migration by constructing a methodological approach

to tackle the migration trajectory more comprehensively and more holistically as nested in the life-course. This refines understandings of family migration, identifying distinct paths where migration and partnerships are intertwined - when migration coincides with the formation of a first relationship; when it happens within the context of a long-going relationship; when it happens after the dissolution of a first relationship, and/or involves a later relationship. Specifically, this is an important empirical contribution for feminist scholarship on migration. This approach also help emphasise the significance and relevance of gender relations when considering the different ways in which migration and family interlock, even when the migration itself does not fit in the narrow box of the legal admission category of family migrant. Indeed, union-migration paths reflect deep divides between migrant women and migrant men, which are reflected in legal admission category (see chapter 3) but also extend beyond them and especially beyond legal distinctions between family and work migration.

Further, these chapters contribute to the scholarship on mixedness and intermarriage by bringing another dimension to how gender plays out in mixed unions. The fact that intermarriage rates vary by gender and by ethnic or migrant group is well-established in the literature (Wang, 2012). It is generally explained by gender asymmetries within groups, opportunity structures, as well as gender-racialised affinities and orientalist stereotypes that make some minority women (and some minority men) more attractive partners for the majority group than others. I show that gender also strongly differentiates between the paths that lead migrant women and migrant men to intermarriage.

#### 4.4.1 Limitations

In this part of the thesis which encompasses chapter 3 and 4, I have built a typology of trajectories followed by (ultimately) partnered migrants. In the definition of partnership I have however reproduced a narrow definitions that emphasizes the nuclear man-woman family and household co-residence among those often tied by legal marriage. Such focus has rendered many immigrant families invisible in the past (Ishii-Kuntz, 2000): female-headed families with no resident husband or partners, transnational families, extended families, families that are not based around a couple or blood ties such as co-residence groups, which emerge out of the conditions of migration.

One obvious limitation of the approach developed here is that it is entirely focused on partnered migrants, which implies a non-trivial selection bias, since many migrants might remain single and the trajectories of those who are likely to differ and to be more embedded in family formation. Further, the analysis I have conducted only considers partnered migrants whose partner also lives

in France with them. The couples geographically separated by migration, as described by Hochschild (2000) and Parreñas (2005), or by Palenga-Möllenbeck (2013) for European care chains, are absent. The sequences also do not model the arrival of children in family formation sequences, although I have tried to account for that in the rest of the modelling. Finally, the sequence design does not allow for the integration of more complex migration sequences. So-called 'birds of passage' (Piore, 1979) - migrants whose migration is either temporary or circular (Morokvasic, 1984; Piore, 1979) - would have little chance of being adequately represented here.

Yet one aspect of what has been described as the 'feminization' of migrations to France or the UK is the return migration of those (mainly single men) who decided not to stay when the labour market and immigration policies became less hospitable. Many migrants whose experiences in France or the UK perhaps did not live up to their expectations returned to their country of origin before they could enter the surveys, and we have very little information on them. The lack of data on the number of people who leave and, more importantly, who they are, why they left and what happened to them after they did, remains a major shortcoming of most survey-based quantitative migration research. As in most empirical analyses of migration, I too cannot account for return migration. It is likely that a significant proportion of migrant workers in Europe, who arrived in the second half of the 20th century, have since left (Böhning, 1984; Courbage, 1995; Dustmann, Bentolila, & Faini, 1996)<sup>11</sup>. The gender composition of the migrant population, captured at any single time in a given survey, is therefore distorted by the unequal capacities of (cross-sectional) methods and data to account for migrants who leave, and for the fact that those who stay are more likely to have or to bring a family in their host country.

The retrospective re-construction of their relationship story by respondents may also warrant some caution. I have chosen to rely on a compound variable that situates the beginning of a relationship at the point where it appears official to respondents - either because they consider it to be official (for first relationships) or because they married or moved in together. The fact that migration and couple formation appear to happen simultaneously or in close succession for many migrants, women especially, may perhaps reflect in some cases relationships that actually pre-existed, but became official when the project of migration was brought up. In addition, married and cohabiting relationships are by no means the only forms of relationships. Non-cohabiting relationships are one of

<sup>11</sup>For instance, Böhning (1984) gauges that as many as two thirds of Germany's *Gastarbeiter*s went back, whereas it is often assumed that most settled in Germany, ultimately bringing their partner and family to them.

the features of the 'second demographic transition'. Marsican (2012) found that mixed couples are more likely to be non-cohabiting partnerships, and if cohabiting, are less likely to be married. This she interpreted as reflecting precisely the social cost of mixing and the fear of community and family disapproval, which is partially avoided by choosing more informal (and discrete) modes of partnership. The analysis presented in the present thesis, in addition, also does not fully consider or accommodate union dissolution (except through second unions).

## **Part 3**

From gendered trajectories to the gender division of labour



## Chapter 5

# Trajectories of migration and mixing and the gender division of labour in France

### Chapter introduction

In the previous part, I showed that migrant women and migrant men follow different path of union-migration, and that these paths also vary widely depending on the couple they form and the partners they pick. I now use this part to investigate whether these paths - these sequences of migration and couple formation - can help make sense of the gender division of labour deployed in migrants' couples. This part tries to answer two questions: one naive, and one trickier; the first one could be formulated as such: from the point of view of gender equality in couples, is it better for migrants to mix with majority natives? But the second question complicates this by asking - does it depend on the gender of the migrant involved, and on how they got there?

### Intermarriage, gender specialisation and exchange theory

Intermarriages between migrants and natives specifically, have also been connected to lower specialisation of labour between partners, which Nottmeyer (2014) links to a higher degree of positive assortative mating on human capital (notably education) (see also Chiswick and Houseworth (2011) and Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2010, 2011). In Becker-inspired approaches (G. S. Becker, 1981, 1985), couples in which both partners have the same educational level and career prospects have less incentives to specialise. Migrants who intermarry - especially migrant women - are, as observed earlier in this thesis, often highly-educated, (Hamel, Lhommeau, Pailhé, & Santelli, 2015). Subsequently, they are more likely

to be matched or hypogamous in educational terms, and therefore, one would expect, less likely to specialise in domestic labour.

Yet Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith (2000) also found differences by gender on human capital selectivity among intermarried migrant men and women. This suggests that the specialisation of labour in the household may also be a function of the gender of the intermarried migrant partner. Indeed, Basu (2017) observed that the degree of labour specialisation was much higher when the migrant partner was a woman: the division of labour was more polarised in intermarriages involving migrant women, compared to those involving migrant men. This was also Nottmeyer (2014)'s finding. In line with status exchange theory, some have theorised that migrant women may choose to bargain away their career aspirations and accept a more domestic role in exchange for the higher status attached to partnering with a native. Grossbard-Shechtman (1993) and Grossbard-Shechtman and Fu (2002) found this approach to hold truer for women. Although the vocabulary of exchange theory presents this as the outcome of a bargain, it is unclear however whether the women involved actually anticipate and consented to such a deal, or whether it is the product of the asymmetry of power between them and their native partner. That is certainly what some of the literature suggests, notably with respect to migrant women whose decision to uproot to join or marry their native European partner was also motivated by hopes of gender-egalitarian relationship and opportunities that were, ultimately, disappointed. Overall, previous literature on immigrants in Europe, Australia and the USA has found that male migrants' labour performance mostly benefits from intermarriage. This benefit (measured in terms of income gains) is thought to be the result of their ability to tap into the native partner's social networks and better socio-economic integration (Meng & Gregory, 2005; Nottmeyer, 2014). For migrant women, on the other hand, intermarriage can be associated with a wage penalty. Explanations vary from un-observable heterogeneity to greater specialisation in the domestic sphere at the cost of labour market participation (Basu, 2015). But they may also have to do with how people migrated and met - in other words, union-migration trajectories.

The power relation in mixed couples can be heavily tilted in favour of the native partner because of their greater familiarity, integration and networks in the country of immigration. This asymmetry can be rooted in or reinforced when it is reflected in legal dependency - when the migrant partner obtained the right to enter and settle in the country as 'partner of nationals' (*conjoint de Français*). Furthermore, the migration experience itself can affect the bargaining power of the migrant partner by devaluing their qualifications and isolating them from their social and family networks, typically in the case of couple-forming

migration. The observation that partner and family visa can become a tool of power and be used to impose patriarchal divisions of roles and labour, had been made by Nicollet (1992, p. 310) long ago in studies of the Sub-Saharan African couples formed in the first waves of family reunification. Zehraoui (2003) made this point with regards to Algerian couples formed when women joined in France their already-long settled husbands. The issue has also been raised with regards to intermarried migrant-native couples across Europe (see Bensaid (2013, pp. 116–117) and Riaño and Baghdadi (2007)).

More specifically, we would expect that this effect on dependency and power relation is heightened when women follow specific paths of migration – notably those that match best with the categories of 'reunified' migration and 'family forming' migration (González-Ferrer, 2011; Huschek, de Valk, & Liefbroer, 2011). In the sequence typology I designed, that would be the sequences *formation 1st partnership* and *established first partnership*. Marriage migrant women also have higher fertility levels than women who did not migrate in the context of the formation of a relationship (Kulu & González-Ferrer, 2014; Wolf, 2016). Conversely, some studies investigated the potential advantages of anchor spouses in the couple's power balance and gender division of labour (Beck-Gernsheim, 2007). (Lievens, 1999). When contracted by migrant women, the 'debt' of having been brought in is part of a migratory context and arrival that is prone to fostering patriarchal models, where the settled or native husband is an indispensable intermediary and referent. We could expect this to apply to native majority women, although, as seen in the previous chapters, couple-forming sequences of union-migration are rare among intermarried migrant men. In the context of intermarriage, there may also be a native 'premium', which tilts the power balance further in the favour of the native man, but could also potentially have the opposite effect when the native partner is a woman...

On the other hand, natives are unlikely to hold a great advantage over their migrant partner if the latter migrated as children: the 1.5 generation's social capital and autonomy is likely mostly restored by the time they start partner selection. As it happens, we know now thanks to the previous part that the trajectories of migrant women and migrant men in mixed unions are different, and that women's path to mixing with the French or British majority groups involve a high proportion of couple-forming migration and legally tied migration. If the context of migration and family-formation matters for the gender division of labour, we should expect to find differences between the mixed couples formed by migrant women and those formed by migrant men.

This is the core hypothesis: that union-migration sequences matter for the

gender division of labour. This does not mean that nothing else matter. I expect that this is combined with other factors: the area of origin (which gives a measure of distinct gender-socialisation or 'gender cultures'), and mixedness as such. We know that there are differences in the gender division of housework along ethnic lines in the UK, with different ethnic groups operating with more or less gender-specialisation. Migrants may arrive with gender representations and expectations that are the product of their socialisation in the country of emigration and in their community. These can significantly differ from dominant gender attitudes in Western countries of immigration (Roeder & Mühlau, 2014) and be reflected in their expectations and practices of gender-specialisation of labour, and not always in the direction of more patriarchy. Concurrently, migrants who arrived as children are more likely to be influenced by the gender norms of the country of immigration, whereas those arrived adults may be more set on the gender norms they have been socialised to in their country of birth. Finally, even among adult migrants, Espiritu (1999) suggested that the process of international migration and mixedness could weaken conservative gender expectations around the male breadwinner/female homemaker specialisation models. Both migration and conjugal mixedness (Collet, 2015) may therefore create situations in which individuals are confronted with different gender practices and norms, which may contribute to them re-thinking or re-negotiating their gender expectations. Both migration and mixedness, because they tend to be associated with greater distance from family and kin, may make straying from expectations (including gender expectations) potentially easier, because less easily noticed, and less easily sanctioned by relatives and community.

## 5.1 Theoretical framework and research questions

Here the gender division of labour - *la division sexuelle du travail* - is understood as a foundational feature of the stage, production and reproduction of gender relations and inequalities (the *rapports sociaux de sexe*, Kergoat (2017)). Migration and intermarriage play into this when they create situations of vulnerability and dependency for migrant women and constrain them to abide by gender expectations of feminine domesticity, devotion and seclusion projected upon them by their native or more settled husbands. Mounchit (2018) analysed the biographic trajectories of 'reunified' migrant women from Sub-Saharan Africa, describing both their shock and disempowerment after arrival and their confinement into a highly gender-specialised division of labour where they had no access to paid work and thus no financial autonomy. In these accounts, it is the interlocking of migration, the couple dynamics and patriarchal expectations

which, together, create and impose a strict gender-specialisation of paid and unpaid labour.

In this chapter, I therefore approach the entities of the couple and the family as social units crossed and structured by power relations (Kellerhals, Troutot, & Lazega, 1984). These power relations depend on the distribution of resources between members. Although the economic parameters factored in relative resources theory are important (Blood & Wolfe, 1960), these are not the only capitals involved in setting the balance of power: capitals include the 'native' and 'majority' premium, as well as high education. The bargaining of resources is also structured by gender relations, which allows men to negotiate better deals out of unfavourable asymmetries. The gender division of labour, constructed in this way, is not simply a production of power relations in general, but a production and an expression of gender relations especially: it produces gender roles that are both separate and hierarchised (Delphy, 1977; Kergoat, 2004, 2017). This also implies that specialisation means something very different depending on whether it is gender-conforming or gender-subversive. While not limited to economic dimensions only, it is clear from the literature that the distribution of money is important, especially in the form of economic dependency. In this theoretical framing, migration and mixedness are conceived as engine, mechanism or obstacle for the acquisition of power advantages by each partner, man and woman, and therefore have to be considered as factors in themselves (Parrado & Chenoa, 2005). This framing adds another, possibly competing, dimension to one that would explain differentiated modes of gender divisions of labour in migrants' couples mainly as the expression of (generally more conservative) gender cultures, more or less diluted through intra- or inter-generational assimilation.

From this approach, I can set three competing hypotheses, whose merits will be assessed against and in combination with one another:

(1) *Acculturation-based hypothesis*: In line with the assimilation hypothesis, I expect that for a migrant, partnering with a majority native partner denotes a high degree of integration; thanks to greater exposure to French (or British, in the next chapter) gender norms as well as facilitated integration into French social networks and labour market, for migrants to be with a native majority partner (French-born to French-born parents) should be associated with more gender-equal divisions of both paid and unpaid labour, compared to other partnered migrants. By the same reasoning, migrants who partner with a native descendant of migrants may see their couple adopting modes of gender divisions of labour that are different but closer to those of migrant couples, because of partial but incomplete inter-generational assimilation. Intermarriage in this case

is understood as selecting both natives and migrants among the more independent and least attached to traditions, including gender roles. The effect should be similar for migrant men and migrant women and be quite robust to a variety of migration trajectories and modes of couple formation, and mostly vary by generation/integration levels. Notably, it should increase with years spent in the country (intra-generational acculturation and integration into the labour market, etc.).

(2) *Native advantage hypothesis*: Because of the power imbalance (linked to social, legal, linguistic dependency etc.) between migrant and native partners, migrant partners in relationships with native partners will take on a comparatively greater share of the unpaid labour and a smaller share of the paid labour (*bargaining power*). This is the 'native premium' hypothesis. It should result in more gender-specialisation when the migrant partner is a woman and less gender-specialisation when the migrant partner is a man.

(3) *union-migration trajectories hypothesis* Migration-union sequences have an impact on the gender division of labour because the ways in which people migrate and form their relationship impact the power dynamic between partners. Specifically, *couple-forming* and *couple migration* are expected to tilt the power balance against migrant partners because they correspond to situations where migrants are uprooted and in a (socially, linguistically) dependent situation. This may not apply to the same extent to migrant men in the *established first relationship* cluster, who likely include lead migrant men. In comparison, intermarried migrants who migrated as children were therefore already long established in France when they met their native partner. The migrants in the *child migrants* cluster are therefore expected to be in a more favourable situation compared to marriage migrants. In addition, adult single migrants, i.e. those who migrated independently, may be less familiar with French society compared to child migrants. However, as far as the couple is concerned, their migration and economic survival did not depend on their partner, and I expect migrant women in this cluster to be in less gender-specialised relationships.

The effects of gender cultures, assimilation and power relations as affected by the migrant/native asymmetry and by the migration sequence are not expected to be mutually exclusive. Rather, my contention is that gender cultures and assimilation do not explain the whole story. It is therefore also that intermarriage covers different gender realities for migrant men and migrant women, in part because it involves different trajectories of union-migration. I expect effects to be intersectional and to differ across gender, migrant groups, as well as class (I use the rough proxy of educational achievement). High degrees of educational

achievement have been associated with more liberal gender attitudes, higher rates of dual-earner couples and somewhat more equal divisions of domestic labour. In the context of intermarriage and migration, Suksomboon (2011) suggested that migrant women may exchange a high degree of qualification for the chance to migrate to a more prosperous and enviable (or perceived to be so) Western world - thus trading educational *hypogamy* (when their partner is less educated than themselves) for geographical *hypergamy* (because their Western partner has citizenship and offers residence in a more favourable part of the world). Although exchange theory can be usefully applied to partner selection, it does not give any lead about the gender arrangements that couples will develop once the stage of couple formation is over;

### **Institutional and social framework**

As a regime of gender-division of labour, Cunha and Atalaia (2019) characterised France as one of the European countries that is *low gender-unequal with high commitment to paid work* (the cluster also includes Sweden, Denmark and Portugal). They found that, relative to other European countries clusters, women in France allocated the least time to care work, little time to housework and the most time to paid work. In comparison, they found that men allocated more time to housework and care work than men in other clusters. Although the welfare state is, as in other corporatist welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990), structured around a female homemaker/carer and male main breadwinner model, France also has a long tradition of female full-time employment (J. Lewis, 1992). Notably, women tend to return to full-time work quickly after the birth of a child, a social fact attributed to a history of universal nursery services and education for children (Fagnani & Math, 2011). Nurseries are mainly public, the costs are heavily state-subsidized, places are available for all pre-school children age 0-6 and indeed take-up is near universal (OECD, 2010; Jan Windebank, 2001).<sup>1</sup> According to the OECD, in 2006, 43% of children under the age of three attended a creche. Since motherhood is known to be a defining moment in the gender-specialisation in couples, its effect may be somewhat mitigated by this institutional framework. The choice for French mothers is generally a stark one: between working full-time and not working at all (hence no specialisation of paid labour, or complete male specialisation of paid labour). The division of housework remains deeply gendered. According to the time-use survey *Enquête Emploi du Temps et Décisions dans les Couples* (INSEE, data from 2009-2010), French women spent 3 hours 44 minutes on housework such as shopping and making food, compared to slightly over 2 h per day for men. In comparison, British women spent 4 h 08 a day

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<sup>1</sup>Parents who prefer nannies and childminders are also supported by tax allowances and cash subsidies for childcare costs (Jan Windebank, 2001).

on similar tasks, but the time dedicated to them by British men was the same as French men (UK Time Use Survey (2014-2015), comparison compiled by the OECD time-use database<sup>2</sup>).

The INSEE thus provides little information to help understand how and if migration or mixedness affects the provision and division of unpaid and reproductive labour. The INSEE's *Emplois du temps* surveys, which are the main source of time-use data (the last one was conducted in 2009-2010), do not over-represent migrants or identify descendants of migrants. The little sociological scholarship that connects migration and/or intermarriage with the gender division of labour in couples is overwhelmingly qualitative.

Conversely, the INSEE publications periodically remind us, migration means a loss of qualification and a drop in employment for both male and female migrants, at a national or international scale (see notably Faugère and Bouvet (2016) and Mikol and Tavan (2006)). In France, studies of the early performance of new arrivals are bleak, as many of the migrants that have arrived since 2000 could not (or would not, or were discouraged in their attempts to) enter paid work within the first three years after arrival. Certain modes of migration were especially at risk of inactivity. Based on the 2006 longitudinal Survey of the Trajectories and Profiles of Migrants (PPM), 60% of those who arrived as spouse/partner of a French citizen and over 80% of those who arrived as a reunified partner or relative were not engaged in paid work after a year (Algava & Bèque, 2008; Bèque, 2007). These reports found that migrant women were both less likely to work prior to migration and more likely to disengage from the labour market following migration to France. Whereas half of the women surveyed in the PPM were employed a year before migration (compared to 74% for men), this proportion dwindled to 26% who had secured paid employment a year after migration (in comparison to 67% for men). The drop in economic activity was especially high for highly-educated migrant women with 48% of migrant women with tertiary education transitioning from economic activity to inactivity after migration. Some migration paths were most affected (family migration and marriage migration). They are also numerically dominated by women, although, as established in the previous part, marriage migration or family reunification involving reunified or 'imported' men is not exceptional, and it has become more frequent (Beauchemin, Borrel, & Régnard, 2013).

<sup>2</sup>OECD. (2021). Gender data portal [Oecd.stat]. Retrieved March 27, 2021, from <https://www.oecd.org/fr/parite/balancing-paid-work-unpaid-work-and-leisure.htm>.

## 5.2 Data and methods

### 5.2.1 Data and sample

The data on which this chapter builds its analysis is drawn as before from the French survey *Trajectory and Origins*. In the first part of the analyses presented in this chapter, the sample includes all respondents in coresident man-woman couples formed of two partners of working age (18-60) at the end of 2008 (halfway through the TeO data collection phase). In the later part of the chapter, the sample is further reduced and involves only migrant respondents.

### 5.2.2 Variables

Indexes of household labour specialisation have been designed and employed previously, for instance by Stratton (2005). Basu (2017) and Nottmeyer (2014) usefully applied it to the study of migrant-native intermarriage household dynamics. In contrast to these studies, however, I designed the scores for labour division so as to be explicitly gendered - hence my referring to them as scores of *gender-specialisation* and not simply *specialisation*. As discussed, a high degree of specialisation takes on very different social meanings depending on whether the partner doing most of the household labour is a man or a woman (e.g. a 'modern man' or a 'kept woman' or, perhaps more commonly, a 'normal' woman and a 'tamed' man). In societies where women have long been doing and continue to do most of the reproductive and unpaid labour, where such labour is in fact largely identified as 'feminine' and accordingly devalued, the type of specialisation that involves women doing most of the unpaid labour and men little of it can be considered largely gender-normative. The reverse specialisation that sees men doing most of the unpaid labour and women most of the paid labour is, in contrast, subversive of socially ascribed gender roles and expectations. Charsley (2005)'s work on marriage migrants and notably Pakistani migrants to the UK showed the relevance of this for migrants, and the social pressure, perceived stigma and intense discomfort that can come with reverse gender-specialisation of paid and/or unpaid work. Furthermore, in an overwhelming majority of cases, the partner 'specialised' in housework is, in fact, the woman. In light of this social reality, it makes little practical sense to refer to an unspecified 'degree of specialisation' - a methodological choice which has been defended as 'gender-neutral' (e.g. Nottmeyer (2014)), but which would be perhaps better described as 'gender-blind'. The literature on household labour also tends to separate housework and childcare. Admittedly, micro-level gender theories appear to apply better to housework than childcare (Sullivan, 2013). The other difficulty is that childcare represents extra labour, which couples without

co-resident children will by definition not undertake. However, since my reasoning is based not on absolute labour but on partners' share of the couple's labour, this particular problem is avoided. The theoretical approach in terms of gender division of productive and reproductive work also warrant that unpaid care work be included. The variables on the gender division of unpaid labour therefore include some aspects of childcare, and all models include a control variable for whether the couple lives with children under 16. The French data is however very limited with respect to how couples and families organise and distribute childcare.

### Gender division of unpaid labour

With respect to unpaid labour and especially reproductive labour, the French data offers a series of four questions which are directly relevant to the distribution of housework and childcare. These include '*Who is responsible for the grocery shopping?*', '*Who is in charge of preparing daily meals?*', '*Who looks after the bills and budgeting?*' and finally "*Who is responsible for bringing the children to school?*". For each of these questions respondents can pick between '*Always or mostly me*', '*Always or mostly my partner*', '*Mostly shared*', '*Others*'.<sup>3</sup> While doing the grocery shopping, the daily meals and taking the children to school (if applicable) are all strongly correlated, the managing of the family budget and bills stands apart. Therefore I do not aggregate it with the others in the construction of the variable on unpaid labour distribution. For the questions on grocery shopping, meals and school, the answers are recoded as follow:

- If the respondent identified themselves as a woman and they indicate that the task is mostly or only their responsibility, the variable takes on the value 1. If they say it is mostly or only shouldered by their partner,<sup>4</sup> it is coded as -1. If they pick the 'mostly shared' or 'others' options, it is coded as 0.
- The same coding process is applied to cases where the respondent identifies as a man, only it is reversed, so that if the men states that they are the main or sole person responsible for doing any of these housework or childcare task, this will be coded as -1, whereas when they say it is mostly (or only) undertaken by their partner, it will be +1.
- These recoded numerical values for each variable are then added.

<sup>3</sup>The question on school trips has the extra options '*The older children bring the younger ones to school*' and '*The children go alone*'.

<sup>4</sup>Since the sample has been reduced to man-woman couples only, the partner identifies as a man in this scenario.

Unpaid labour score (individual, unstandardised)  
 = groceries + meals + school trips

The score thus range from - 3 to + 3 but needs to be standardised to account for the fact that not all couples undertake the same total amount of unpaid labour (e.g. depending on whether have children or not). This score is therefore divided by the total tasks undertaken by the couple (i.e. not outsourced to paid help or to a third party). The final standardized couple score for the gender distribution of unpaid labour  $Su_{it}$  thus runs:

$$Su_{it} = \frac{\text{groceries} + \text{meals} + \text{school trips}}{\text{total applicable answers}} \left( \frac{\text{Score according to ego}}{\text{Total tasks undertaken by the couple}} \right)$$

This score ranges from -1 to 1 and indicates the degree to which the couple conforms to a gender-segregated division of unpaid labour (score close to 1) or, on the contrary, upholds a division of unpaid labour that runs counter to gender expectations, i.e. if the man takes on most or all of these tasks (score close to -1). Scores around zero indicate more egalitarian arrangements, reflecting situations where tasks are either shared or equally distributed between partners.

### Gender division of paid labour

While TeO provides a variety of measures for survey respondents' labour market engagement, it holds comparatively little information on their partner's paid labour. Crucially, the partner's typical work hours are not recorded. The gender division of paid labour is therefore approached in this chapter through an admittedly rather crude employment status dummy: ego and ego's partner are each either in paid employment ('*actif occupé*') or they are not. These two binary measures of labour market engagement (engagement at the time of the survey collection in 2008-2009), one for each partner, are then combined and gendered, into a new variable with four categories:

- Only the woman is in paid employment.
- Only the man is in paid employment.
- Both are in paid employment.
- Neither are in paid employment.

There are then arranged on a scale of -1 to +1, with

- **-1** = gender-reversed (only the woman is employed)
- **0** = egalitarian (both work or neither of them work)
- **1** = gender-conforming (only the man works).

This is evidently a very rough way to approach the gender division of paid labour. With the British data, it will be possible to consider a finer distribution based on the hours spent in paid work by each partner, relative to the other partner. As household-level data, in which moreover measures of time-use are well-represented, *Understanding Society* is no doubt superior to TeO when it comes to analysing household and couple micro-level dynamics.

### Gender specialisation of labour

The variable for the overall gender specialisation of labour builds on the two score variables for the gender distribution of paid and unpaid labour by simply adding them:

The index for the gender specialisation of labour time is then constructed as follows, where  $S_{it}$  refers to the gender specialisation of labour in an individual  $i$ 's couple, at the point  $t$  of the time of the TeO survey interview (2008-2009):

$$S_{it} = \frac{(Su_{it} + Sp_{it})}{2}$$

$Su_{it}$  stands for the gender specialisation of unpaid labour tasks, while  $Sp_{it}$  represents the gender specialisation of paid work in the couple. The gender specialisation index ranges from -1 to +1. 1 identifies a completely gender-conforming and gender-specialised distribution of paid work, housework and childcare taken on by the couple, whereby the man does all the paid work and the woman is not in paid work but is responsible for all the housework and childcare (as measured by the available variables).

Subsequently, this index can be dealt with as a continuous scale of gender arrangements, the highest scores signalling a very patriarchal, gender-conforming division of labour, and the lowest (negative) scores marking a reversal of gender roles. More gender-specialised arrangements are often described as more 'traditional' and more equal arrangements (where both paid labour and unpaid labour are more evenly distributed between men and women) as 'modern'. There are some issues with that, not least because historically migrant women - especially working-class women - have often engaged in paid labour. I use a scale that is

not unlike the scale of 'traditionalism' used by Muzhi Zhou and Kan (2019), but I call it a scale of gender-specialisation.

*Gender specialisation* considers specialisation as articulated with gender: a specialisation that is gender-normative, with women taking on more or all of the unpaid labour and men taking on more or all of the paid labour, does not mean the same thing as an equally specialised but reversed division of labour - quite the contrary, in fact. The measure of gender specialisation goes from very specialised along gender-normative lines, to not very specialised, to very specialised in gender-subversive terms.

### **GII: the Gender Inequality Index**

This chapter takes advantage of a further measure, the Gender Inequality Index (from hereon, GII). The GII is a country-level measurement designed and produced by the United Nations, which define it as "a composite measure reflecting inequality in achievement between women and men in three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market".<sup>5</sup> Each (participating) country is given a GII score which ranges from 0 to 1: the closer to 1, the greater the degree of gender inequality. The GII is calculated every year since 2011 but is not available for all countries (or all years), and some imputations were necessary. I used the 2010 GII measures or the first measurement after 2011. For countries that did not have a GII score, I used the regional estimate. With the TeO survey, access to the TeO detailed grid of all countries of birth is tightly restricted, and I could only use the rougher grid, which gives only aggregates for rarer origins (e.g. 'North America'). I computed GII scores for these missing countries by using the regional estimate or if needed by averaging the GII scores of the largest countries in the aggregate.<sup>6</sup> Individuals are associated with the GII score of their country of birth in the vast majority of cases. It is evident that using the GII, and using it this way, is not without flaws: the gender equality situation of countries of origins may have changed significantly since migrants moved to France or Britain. Using 2010 GII score does not reflect this. Nevertheless, it is a useful, one-dimensional numeric measure that can be substituted or added to country of birth or geographic areas as a measure of the context of gender socialisation that migrants may have been exposed to. The GII score can also be interpreted as

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<sup>5</sup>See technical note 4 at [http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2020\\_technical\\_notes.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2020_technical_notes.pdf) for more details on the Gender Inequality Index and on the calculations that underpin it. The GII data used here is available on the United Nations Development Programme webpage: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/68606#>

<sup>6</sup>See appendix 5 for the full table and the imputations.

denoting the room for women's empowerment and autonomy in the country of origin.<sup>7</sup>

### Other controls

I also included in the models measures of age, to account for cohort differences. This means either a measure of the couple's average age (calculated at the level of the couple as the mean between the woman's and the man's age) or individual age (in models structured around individual migrants rather than at couple level), and their respective quadratic terms. In addition, all models include age gap between partners, measured as the age difference in years between the man's age and the woman's age (man's age - women's age). Indeed, for women to form unions with much older partners can potentially heighten the power differential and encourage gender-specialisation, since the men will be comparatively much more advanced in their career and the women comparatively much less (Bozon, 1990a, 1990b; Wheeler & Gunter, 1987) - although there is little robust empirical evidence on the topic, and it is moreover focused on majority native Western groups. Nevertheless, this may matter in the context of migration and international or transnational partner recruitment. In addition, Oksuzyan et al. (2017) suggest that there may be a selection effect, with large age gaps involving younger women and older men reflecting more gender-conservative arrangements and views. The models also control for the presence of children (of either or both partners') under 16 years of age living in the household. Finally, models include a measure of educational level, which for parsimony's sake aggregates the education variable presented in chapter 3 into a categorical variable with three categories (primary schooling; secondary schooling or professional degree; tertiary or other higher education) or, in the most complex models, only as a dummy for tertiary/higher education to identify highly-educated individuals.

#### 5.2.3 Analytical methods

The main statistical tools used in this chapter involve survey-weighted distributions and linear regression models, using the scores mentioned above as dependent variables. The modelling strategy involves separate modelling for migrant men and migrant women and a step-wise progression, using the union-migration sequences designed in the previous chapter as predictor, alongside notably couple types and geographic area of origin. I first model unpaid


<sup>7</sup>Other studies have also used country-level composite measures of gender equality/women's empowerment for similar purposes. For instance, Roeder and Mühlau (2014) include the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) in their modelling. However, the GEM has a lower coverage than the GII and is somewhat elite-biased. The GII, on the other hand, is more embedded in and confounded with measures of human development at large (Klasen, 2006).

labour and paid labour separately and then as an aggregate through the gender-specialisation score. Missing values were omitted in the modelling. Coefficients are not standardized when presented in the table, but they are scaled in the coefficient plots.

## 5.3 Results

### 5.3.1 Descriptive results: Couples' gender division of labour in France

FIGURE 5.1: Histograms: gender specialisation of labour across all couples (France)



*Note:* Survey-weighted histogram density and smoothed splines (bandwidth = 0.1).

*Source* TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).

*Universe:* all coresident man-woman couples (18-60).

The plots in figure 5.1 illustrate the density of different levels of gender division of labour on the scales and index described above, for all cohabiting couples aged 18 to 60 (including native couples). The density distribution of paid labour shows that an overwhelming majority of co-resident couples in this age bracket are dual-earner couples, with both partners in employment (or neither in employment). A much smaller proportion of couples are in a sole male breadwinner arrangement and an even smaller proportion in a sole female breadwinner model. Plot 3 shows the distribution for the gender division of unpaid labour. While there is a local peak at the middle - signalling an equal distribution of unpaid labour tasks between man and woman - it is plain that most couples fall on the positive side of the graph, that is, the gender-specialised side, with many with a score of 1, marking the fact that the woman in the relationship is the main person in charge of all the tasks included in the variable. The gender-specialisation index (plot 1) reflects the aggregation of the two other scores. Very few couples are in the negative (the high bar at zero identifies those with a

score of zero, not inferior to zero), which underlines how rare gender-reversals are when it comes to the division of labour. The histogram pulls towards the right, with most couples falling between 0.3 and 0.5, which can be therefore considered the 'normally' patriarchal degree of gender-specialisation in French society.

### **Couples' migratory types and gender specialisation**


The barplots underneath (figures 5.2 and 5.3) present a first rounded overview of how the division of paid and unpaid labour varies by couple type. The bars represent the mean scores for gender-specialisation, paid labour division, and unpaid labour division, for each couple types (NAT-NAT, NAT-2G, MIG-NAT, etc.). A first observation is that all scores on all indexes are positive: all couple types, on average, specialise along expected gender lines and roles. The degree of specialisation, however, varies by couple type and labour type.

Looking first at gender-specialisation overall, couples that include at least one native partner without migratory ties (NAT-NAT, NAT-2G and NAT-MIG) appear to be overall less gender-polarised than other couples. However, the disaggregation between unpaid and paid labour shows that much of this difference, if not all, is located in the realm of paid work. Here couples with one (or two) native partner(s) are strongly differentiated from couples composed of first or second-generation migrants. Couples who include at least one native partner without direct migratory ties (NAT), regardless of the migratory ties of the other partner, thus present at first glance a more equal distribution of paid labour between men and women. By contrast, couples that include no native (NAT) partner seem to have a higher incidence of paid work divisions structured around a male sole-breadwinner model. The average score is slightly higher still when first-generation migrants are partnered with second-generation migrants (MIG-2G). At any rate, the clearest line in the gender division of paid labour lies between couples with a native partner born to native parents and couples without.

Yet this line is not visible as such with respect to unpaid labour distribution. Here couples with a native (NAT) partner are no less patriarchal in their division of housework and childcare responsibilities than other couples. Thus couples composed of two French-born partners born to French-born parents are as unequal in the gender-distribution of this labour as migrant couples. Only migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples present a slightly lower (if still far from equal) average score. These descriptive observations are supported and refined by the models presented in table 5.1.

Included in table 5.1 are the linear models which use the gender-specialisation index, the paid labour division score and the unpaid labour

FIGURE 5.2: Barplots: Gender division of labour, by couple types



Source: TeO1 (2008-2009), survey-weighted | Universe: coresident man-woman couples (age 18-60)

division score as dependent variables. The models include the migratory couple types, as well as the controls. Using native couples without direct migratory ties (NAT-NAT) as the baseline, I found that couples involving primary migrants and/or direct descendants of migrants (MIG-MIG, MIG-2G and 2G-2G couples) appear to have more gender-specialised divisions of labour between partners. However, this effect is only significant for the gender division of paid work and no such relation is found for the distribution of housework and childcare. That said, the third model, for the gender division of unpaid labour, also identifies a significant and reverse effect associated with migrant-native (MIG-NAT) partnerships. MIG-NAT couples are associated with a less unequal gendered division of housework and childcare responsibilities, compared to native (NAT-NAT) couples. None of the other couples, including migrant couples and couples involving second-generation migrants, can be significantly differentiated from couples composed of two majority native French partners.

One should already note that the variable for the distribution of unpaid labour shows little sensitivity. It does not register statistical significance for factors which we would expect to impact the gender division of unpaid labour. The most blatant is the presence of children, which increases the overall time spent by couples on unpaid labour (both housework and childcare) but women's much more so than men's. The fact that the model finds no significant association with children can only be interpreted as the reflection of the limit of the index. This type of index will be compared and complemented with one based on the sharing of unpaid labour time in the next chapter, which uses the British data. It is useful to mention that, although rarely significant, the coefficients for this variable are consistent (in terms of direction) with effects identified by the labour-time based measure. This suggests that this variable lacks in sensitivity but is not altogether misleading.

TABLE 5.1: Survey-weighted linear models: Gender specialisation by couple types

	Dependent variables:		
	Gender-specialisation	Paid labour	Unpaid labour
		(1)	(2)
(Intercept)	.159 (.149)	.124 (.212)	.195 (.187)
<b>Couple types</b> [ref=NAT-NAT]			
2G-NAT	-.023 (.026)	-.014 (.032)	-.032 (.032)
2G-2G	.090 (.043)*	.129 (.057)*	.051 (.039)
MIG-NAT	-.014 (.030)	.066 (.036)	-.093 (.040)*
MIG-2G	.091 (.022)***	.182 (.028)***	-.001 (.025)
MIG-MIG	.093 (.015)***	.185 (.021)***	.000 (.019)
Age (couple average)	.002 (.008)	.002 (.011)	.002 (.010)
Age-squared (couple average)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Age gap (man-woman)	-.002 (.002)	-.005 (.003)	.001 (.003)
Children under 16 [ref: no]	.064 (.018)***	.079 (.022)***	.049 (.026)
Education [ref: primary or lower]			
Secondary/professional qualification	.012 (.024)	-.012 (.033)	.036 (.030)
Higher/tertiary education	-.008 (.026)	.011 (.035)	-.027 (.033)
Both partners unemployed [ref: no]	-.081 (.029)**	-.076 (.032)*	-.086 (.045)
Deviance	1792.366	2856.178	3173.227
Dispersion	.154	.246	.273
Num. obs.	11629	11629	11629

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$

Source: TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).


Universe: partnered migrants (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).

### Gendered effects of couple types

The effects of couple types thus identified may, however be dependent on or affected by the gender configuration of the couple (which goes back to the previous research hypotheses). Since migrant women and migrant men follow different migratory paths, migrant-native couples may not present the same associations with the gender-specialisation of labour depending on whether the migrant partner is a woman or a man (and, symmetrically, whether the native partner is a woman or a man). I start to explore this with figure 5.3, which replicates figure 5.2 discussed above, but splits each mixed couple type (MIG-NAT, MIG-2G and 2G-NAT) into two gendered categories. MIG-NAT couples are divided between couples composed of a migrant woman and a native man (MIGw-NATm) and couples composed of a migrant man and a native woman (MIGm-NATw). The same goes for MIG-2G couples (now MIGw-2Gm and MIGm-2Gw) and 2G-NAT couples (now 2Gw-NATm and 2Gm-NATw), as per the same classification of gendered migratory couple types used in chapter 3 and 4.

This gendering of mixed couples brings to light certain sharp differences amongst migrant-native couples (MIG-NAT). Most strikingly, the more 'equal' distribution of paid labour which they had been associated with in the former

FIGURE 5.3: Gender specialisation by gendered couple types



analysis appears to be entirely driven by those couples where the native partner is a woman and the migrant partner is a man. These couples appear to have a lower prevalence of male sole-breadwinners compared to any other couple type except those made of a native (NAT) woman and a second-generation migrant man. This creates a very contrasting picture with the other gender configuration for MIG-NAT couples, that is, when the migrant partner is a woman and the native partner a man. These couples have a much more gendered specialisation of paid labour, on par with second-generation couples and migrant couples. Their distribution of unpaid labour, however, appears somewhat more equal, if only slightly, than other couples.

TABLE 5.2: Survey-weighted linear models: Gender specialisation by gendered couple types


	Dependent variable:		
	Gender-specialisation	Paid labour	Unpaid labour
		(1)	(2)
(Intercept)	.168 (.149)	.143 (.212)	.194 (.187)
<b>Couple types [ref=NAT-NAT]</b>			
2Gw-NATm	-.011 (.028)	.005 (.037)	-.027 (.042)
2Gm-NATw	-.035 (.039)	-.032 (.048)	-.038 (.044)
2G-2G	.090 (.043)*	.128 (.057)*	.051 (.039)
MIGw-NATm	.014 (.046)	.151 (.052)**	-.122 (.063)
MIGm-NATw	-.046 (.032)	-.033 (.044)	-.060 (.039)
MIGw-2Gm	.127 (.038)***	.242 (.045)***	.012 (.042)
MIGm-2Gw	.060 (.021)**	.132 (.031)***	-.011 (.023)
MIG-MIG	.092 (.015)***	.184 (.021)***	.000 (.019)
Age (couple average)	.002 (.008)	.001 (.011)	.002 (.010)
Age-squared (couple average)	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Age gap (man-woman)	-.002 (.002)	-.005 (.003)	.001 (.003)
Coresident children under 16 [ref=no]	.065 (.018)***	.080 (.022)***	.049 (.026)
Education [ref= primary or lower]			
Secondary/professional qualification	.011 (.024)	-.013 (.033)	.036 (.030)
Higher/tertiary education	-.009 (.026)	.008 (.035)	-.026 (.033)
Both partners unemployed [ref=no]	-.082 (.029)**	-.078 (.032)*	-.086 (.045)
Deviance	1791.077	2848.081	3172.380
Dispersion	.154	.245	.273
Num. obs.	11629	11629	11629

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

Source: TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).

Universe: partnered migrants (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).

FIGURE 5.4: Couples' joint employment status, by gendered couple types



of migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples is clearly visible on figure 5.4, which breaks down the mode of paid labour division by gendered couple type. Whilst over 30% of MIG-NAT couples involving a migrant woman fit into a sole male breadwinner model, this is the case for only about 20% of MIG-NAT couples

Couples composed of a migrant man and a native woman appear to resemble other couples involving natives without migratory background. On the other side, MIGw-NATm couples, with a migrant woman and a native man, divide paid labour much more evenly, and involve a greater proportion of sole male earners. The contrast between the two types


formed instead by a migrant man and a native woman.

Interestingly, because MIG-NAT couples with a migrant woman and a native man are associated with slightly more patriarchal arrangements with regard to paid labour division, and somewhat less patriarchal arrangements with regard to unpaid labour, these two dimensions balance out in the gender-specialisation index. As a result, these couples cannot be significantly differentiated from native majority (NAT-NAT) couples with respect to gender-specialisation overall.

Migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples aside, the disaggregation of couple types by gender configuration does not otherwise change the direction or significance of the association between couple type and gender division of labour. However, it is worth noting that the magnitude of the effect varies: thus couples composed of a migrant woman and a native man with migrant parents (MIGw-2Gm) are associated with a 0.24 increase in scores for the division of paid labour (a large effect when recalling that the index range only runs from -1 to 1). This suggests that a larger proportion of couples formed by a migrant woman and a second-generation man are structured around a sole male breadwinner model, which is then reflected in the gender-specialisation score. The reverse gender configuration (migrant man with second-generation woman) is also associated with more gender-specialisation, but the coefficient is much reduced (half of the coefficient associated with MIGw-2Gm)

A couple of further general findings can also be drawn from this first, broad brush investigation of the connections between migration ties, partnerships and the gender division of labour. Unsurprisingly, age and living with co-resident children are both factors associated with a greater gender-polarisation of labour. Equally unsurprisingly, all couple types are, on average, patriarchal. Looking at these couple types as aggregates, one can find none that subvert gender roles. In effect, the practical scale only ranges from 'very patriarchal' to 'somewhat more equal' and all mean scores are found in between 0 and 1. Thus native majority (NAT-NAT) couples are not more equal than others when it comes to distributing housework and childcare, using this scale. It might appear as if native women are more likely to be in paid employment and therefore less likely to be in male sole breadwinner couples. However, when it comes to unpaid reproductive labour, native couples' practices appear as equally gendered (i.e. equally unequal) as those of migrant couples and/or descendants of migrants.

FIGURE 5.5: Couples' joint employment status, by area of birth



trajectories to partnership differs depending on the partner they end up with (be it majority native, primary migration or second generation and vice-versa). These trajectories - that is sequences of migration and couple formation - may be a constitutive part of the gender arrangements in the destination country. Likewise, gender cultures in migrants' countries of origin and communities can set constraints around migration and what mode and calendars of migration are acceptable for men and women. But they could also durably influence their gender arrangements and practices even after migration.

There is no denying that the gender division of paid work in couples presents a stark contrast depending on the migrant group at hand. Figure 5.5 presents the distribution of couples' joint employment status by migrant group, including those born in France (whether direct descendants of migrants or not). EU migrants and migrants from Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia (mainland Southeast Asia) appear overall indistinguishable, with low rates of sole male breadwinner arrangements (under 25% of couples), high rates of dual-earners (around 75%) and rare unemployment. In stark contrast to this, migrants from Turkey are in sole male breadwinner couples in about 60% of cases and the proportion of unemployed couples is also higher (around 12%). The latter also applies to migrants from North Africa and to a lesser extent to migrants from other regions of Africa. For both groups, and for the 'other' migrant group, sole male breadwinner couples represent about 40% of co-resident couples. The next section tries to understand exactly how geographic origin, migration-union

The analyses just presented did not differentiate between different migrant groups. In so doing, they aggregated groups with potentially very different gender practices. Another obvious shortcoming is that they look at partnering as a process. As the previous chapter showed, couple formation takes on a variety of forms and timing in the context of migration. Migrants' trajec-

sequence and the choice of partner play out for migrant men and for migrant women.

### 5.3.2 Gendered paths of migration, gendered outcomes

In this section the focus thus shifts from all couples to the couples formed by migrant respondents only. The aim of this section is to understand the role played by the type of partnership, the country and community of origin and the migration trajectories in explaining the gender division of labour post-migration. The statistical models which this section builds on uses the gender division of paid and unpaid labour (tables 5.3, 5.4) or the overall gender-specialisation as the dependent variable. They are presented in a step-wise fashion: in all three tables, the first section (comprising the first two columns) includes the main geographical areas of origin (EU, Turkey, North Africa, Other Africa, mainland Southeast Asia and Other) as the independent variable. The next two columns are models that do not have areas of origin as covariates, but include sequences of union-migration, following the classification designed in chapter 3 (labelled 'migration sequence' in the models). The final section of the tables (comprising the last two columns) includes both area of origin and migration-couple formation sequences. All models factor in the migratory ties of the migrant's partner (MIG, 2G, NAT) and control for the length of time (in years) since migrants first moved to France. All the other control variables are also included. The modelling strategy systematically distinguishes between gender. Table 5.3 presents models for migrant women only; table 5.4 models for migrant men. Table 5.5 then juxtaposes the gender-specialisation models for migrant women and migrant men, in adjacent columns, to facilitate the comparison between migrant women and migrant men.

TABLE 5.3: Stepwise linear regression models: migrant women and the gender division of paid and unpaid labour

Dependent variables:						
	Paid labour	Unpaid labour	Paid labour	Unpaid labour	Paid labour	Unpaid labour
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<b>(Intercept)</b>	.287 (.317)	.084 (.232)	.321 (.326)	.006 (.215)	.212 (.333)	-.001 (.221)
<b>Partner</b> [ref: migrant (MIG-MIG)]						
Partner native 2G (MIG-2G)	.065 (.050)	-.015 (.037)	.069 (.051)	-.013 (.037)	.068 (.050)	-.015 (.037)
Partner majority native (MIG-NAT)	.006 (.032)	-.085 (.027)**	-.014 (.032)	-.090 (.027)***	.016 (.033)	-.081 (.028)**
<b>Where born</b> [ref=EU]						
North Africa						
Africa: other	.112 (.039)**	-.021 (.030)	.113 (.039)**	-.030 (.048)**	-.024 (.031)	-.103 (.040)*
Turkey	-.038 (.048)	-.106 (.040)**	.285 (.052)***	.089 (.044)*	-.030 (.046)	-.044 (.039)
Mainland Southeast Asia	.292 (.051)***	.087 (.045)	.118 (.051)*	.082 (.045)	-.032 (.047)	
Other areas	.110 (.051)*	-.032 (.047)	.049 (.092)	.046 (.092)	-.042 (.039)	
<b>Migration sequence</b> [ref=Single adults]						
Single young adults						
Formation 1st partnership	.061 (.083)	.045 (.066)	.055 (.080)	.032 (.066)		
Established 1st partnership	.129 (.064)*	.096 (.045)*	.120 (.063)	.084 (.045)		
Partnership reconfigurations	.178 (.072)*	.086 (.051)	.161 (.072)*	.064 (.051)		
Child migrants (1.5G)	.049 (.092)	.018 (.075)	.046 (.092)	-.004 (.076)		
Child migrants (1.5G)	.081 (.080)	.135 (.058)*	.080 (.079)	.130 (.058)*		
How long in France (years since migration)	-.008 (.001)***	.000 (.001)	-.006 (.003)*	-.001 (.002)	-.007 (.003)*	-.002 (.002)
Age						
Age-squared	-.005 (.016)	.009 (.011)	-.007 (.016)	.008 (.011)	-.006 (.015)	.009 (.011)
Age gap (Man-Woman)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Coresident children under 16 [ref=no]	.003 (.003)***	.006 (.002)*	.001 (.003)	.004 (.002)	.002 (.003)	.005 (.002)*
Higher/ tertiary education [ref=no]	.153 (.035)***	.111 (.031)***	.157 (.035)***	.104 (.031)***	.150 (.035)***	.110 (.030)***
Both partners unemployed	-.051 (.032)	-.084 (.028)**	-.057 (.032)	-.084 (.028)**	-.044 (.032)	-.082 (.029)**
Deviance	859.990	569.751	871.747	571.413	855.779	566.829
Dispersion	.316	.210	.321	.210	.315	.208
Num. obs.	2720	2720	2720	2720	2720	2720

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ . Source: TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).

Universe: partnered migrant women (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).

### Women's migration sequences and partnerships

The first section of the table (first two columns, models 1 to 2) tests the effects of migrant women's area of origin on the gender division of labour. When controlling for the migratory background of the partner (whether native, migrant, or second-generation) as well as the presence of children, age and education, the models find certain areas of origin to be significantly associated with specific patterns of gender division of labour. Migrant women from Turkey tend to have a much more patriarchal distribution of paid labour compared to women born in EU countries. A similar connection also comes into statistical significance for the gender division of unpaid labour, but not until union-migration sequences are also integrated in the model (model 6). Migrant women born in the Maghreb region are also associated with a higher incidence of sole male breadwinner relationships, as are migrant women from mainland Southeast Asia. The coefficients are, however, much smaller than those observed for Turkey and are not significant when combined into the gender-specialisation index (see table 5.5 further on). In contrast, migrant women from other African regions appear to have, on average, slightly more egalitarian relationships than European migrant women with respect to how couples divide responsibilities for housework and childcare. Although there is no significant difference in paid work division, the distribution of housework and childcare is less gender-polarised and so is the overall gender-specialisation of their relationships (table 5.5).

The second set of models (model 3 to 4) test the association between the gender division of paid and unpaid labour, and migrant women's union-migration sequences, without accounting for area of origin. Using the single adult cluster as reference level, model 3 finds the couple-forming sequence (first partnership formation) and the established first partnership sequence to be connected with a clear gender-polarising effect on the division of paid labour. No significant effects are found for unpaid labour division for established relationships. But there is a significant effect associated between the sequence *formation first partnership* and migrant women taking on more of the housework and childcare tasks on average. A slightly larger effect is observed for migrant women who migrated as children. As far as paid labour division is concerned, the migrant women from the '1.5 generation' do not significantly differ from those who migrated as single adults, prior to couple formation. However, with respect to unpaid labour, they appear to be in more patriarchal relationships.

The final section of table 5.3 (models 5 to 6) accounts simultaneously for area of origin and the union-migration sequences. The overall conclusion is that effects are not cancelled out or reversed by this combination and remain fully

consistent with the other models discussed above. This defeats the hypothesis of either gender cultures or sequences of migration being confounding factors for one another: their effect appears distinct. The gendering effect of certain union-migration sequences - *established first partnerships*, for paid labour, and *child migrant* for unpaid labour - remain significant after controlling for area of origin and therefore cannot be simply attributed to specific gender cultures. Conversely, certain migrant groups (notably migrant women from Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Maghreb and Asian countries) are more likely to find themselves in a male breadwinner setup of paid work division, regardless of their trajectory of migration and family formation. The statistical robustness of the connection is not the strongest, but considering the limits of the dependent variable, these are nonetheless important findings, which the next chapter will expand upon.

In all the models for migrant women, the effects associated with couple types are similar in orientation and significance. For migrant women, being in a relationship with a native French partner without migratory background (MIG-NAT couples) rather than a migrant or second-generation native partner is strongly associated with a more egalitarian division of unpaid labour (but not paid labour). The effects of the control variables are mostly consistent across all models. The length of time spent (presumably in France) since the first migration is strongly associated with a more equal gender division of paid labour, which is likely mainly driven by the fact that migrant women's chance of employment tend to improve over time (González-Ferrer, 2011). Once accounting for years since migration, the effect of age is not significant, although age gap is associated with a slight patriarchal effect. The presence of children consistently and strongly polarises the gender division of labour on both paid and unpaid fronts, regardless of geographic origins or family trajectories. Migrant women who went into further education appear to have more egalitarian division of labour, which plays out mainly in the distribution of unpaid labour. Because of the way the scores of gender division were built, this cannot be simply attributed to a greater propensity to outsource housework and/or childcare. The next sub-section presents the same models, applied to migrant men.

TABLE 5.4: Stepwise linear regression models: migrant men and the gender division of paid and unpaid labour

	Dependent variables:					
	Paid labour (1)	Unpaid labour (2)	Paid labour (3)	Unpaid labour (4)	Paid labour (5)	Unpaid labour (6)
(Intercept)	.547 (.299)	-.271 (.233)	<b>.693</b> (.294)*	-.201 (.231)	.523 (.296)	-.232 (.235)
Partner migrant [MIG-MIG]	-.029 (.043)	.009 (.035)	-.016 (.043)	.014 (.033)	-.021 (.042)	.017 (.034)
Partner Native 2G [MIG-2G]	<b>-.195</b> (.029)***	<b>-.079</b> (.026)**	<b>-.205</b> (.028)***	<b>-.080</b> (.027)**	<b>-.186</b> (.029)***	<b>-.072</b> (.027)***
Partner majority native [MIG-NAT]						
Where born [ref=EU]						
North Africa	.127 (.035)***	-.041 (.031)			.139 (.035)***	-.040 (.031)
Africa: other	-.010 (.042)	-.043 (.038)			-.001 (.042)	-.050 (.039)
Turkey	<b>.246</b> (.045)***	<b>.143</b> (.039)***			<b>.249</b> (.045)***	<b>.140</b> (.039)***
Mainland Southeast Asia	-.041 (.046)	<b>-.091</b> (.040)*			-.044 (.046)	<b>-.098</b> (.041)*
Other areas	<b>.096</b> (.042)*	-.045 (.040)			<b>.096</b> (.042)*	-.052 (.040)
Migration sequence [ref=Single adults]						
Single young adults						
Formation 1st partnership						
Established 1st partnership						
Partnership reconfigurations						
Child migrants (1.5G)						
How long in France (years since migration)	.000 (.001)	<b>.003</b> (.001)**	-.000 (.003)	<b>.005</b> (.002)*	-.001 (.003)	.004 (.002)
Age	-.010 (.014)	<b>.027</b> (.011)*	-.015 (.014)	<b>.024</b> (.011)*	-.011 (.014)	<b>.026</b> (.011)*
Age-squared	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)*	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)*	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)*
Age gap (Man-Woman)	<b>.012</b> (.003)***	.002 (.002)	<b>.013</b> (.003)***	.002 (.002)	<b>.012</b> (.003)***	.002 (.002)
Coresident children under 16 [ref=no]	.026 (.034)	-.021 (.027)	.051 (.032)	-.021 (.027)	.027 (.033)	-.020 (.027)
Higher /tertiary education [ref=no]	-.012 (.028)	<b>-.092</b> (.025)***	-.010 (.028)	<b>-.106</b> (.025)***	-.006 (.028)	<b>-.090</b> (.025)***
Both partners unemployed	<b>-.277</b> (.023)***	.003 (.035)	<b>-.259</b> (.022)***	.008 (.035)	<b>-.281</b> (.023)***	.001 (.035)
Deviance	874.103	658.971	885.102	663.066	868.055	656.047
Dispersion	.303	.228	.307	.230	.301	.227
Num. obs.	2885	2885	2885	2885	2885	2885

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ . Source: TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).

Universe: partnered migrant men (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).

### **Men's migrations and partnerships**

When considering the equivalent models for migrant men (table 5.4), some of the same observations apply. Models 1 to 2 (with areas of origin) reiterate the greater gender polarisation of labour in relationships formed by migrant men from Turkey. Compared to EU migrant men's couples, and with respect to paid labour, a greater gender-polarisation is observed in couples with migrant men born in North Africa and 'other' areas, although the coefficients are much smaller than for Turkey-born migrants. Men's area of origin appears to be more tightly connected to the gender division of unpaid labour than women's: men born in Turkey are more likely to be in relationships with more patriarchal division of labour, compared to migrant men born in Europe. Migrant men from any African region and from Asia actually appear to contribute to unpaid labour slightly more than European male migrants, though that difference is only significant for Southeast Asian migrants. In contrast, the area of origin of migrant women showed little association with unpaid labour distribution (except for migrant women from Africa outside of the Maghreb region).

Models 3 and 4 in table 5.4 show weaker connections between men's migration-partnering sequences and the gender division of labour in their relationships in the country of destination when compared to migrant women (table 5.3 above). For migrant men, having a long-established first relationship at the time of their migration is associated with higher gender-specialisation compared to men who migrate as single adults, prior to family formation. This is mostly true in terms of paid work distribution, but it is also valid in the gender division of housework and childcare. That being said, the significance and magnitude of men's sequences of migration-partnering are smaller than those of migrant women, suggesting that men's timing and ordering of family formation and migration is less crucial for gender dynamics than women's. Indeed, once combining origin and sequences (models 5 to 6), the effects of sequences are further reduced, while the effect of area of origin remains unchanged. Only the connection between *established first relationship* and paid work division remains statistically significant, which likely reflects the fact that these sequences correspond to family-stage migrations in which men are much more likely to be the lead migrant rather than the reunified migrant (González-Ferrer, 2006, 2011). Thus the effect associated with this sequence can be interpreted as reflecting the *combined* effect of migrant men's lead migration and migrant women's reunified migration.

Couple-forming migration (sequence *formation 1st partnership*) is not associated with any significant effect, although there was a significant effect for both

paid and unpaid labour with migrant women. Furthermore, the presence of children in the household does not impact the gender division of labour in migrant men's relationship to the same extent as it did migrant women's - especially when controlling for area of origin. Thus where migrant men come from emerges as the strongest predictors in the gender division of labour, much more so than the circumstances in which they migrated and came to form their relationships. Migrant men's geographic origins has explanatory power for both the gender division of paid and unpaid labour; men's high educational level is associated with a more equal division of unpaid labour, but bears no significant connection to the division of unpaid labour.

As in the models for migrant women, the effects of couple types are consistent and suggest that migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples are more prone to egalitarian arrangements. Compared to migrant men partnered with other migrants, and all other things being equal, migrant men in MIG-NAT unions contribute more to unpaid labour tasks overall. What is more, this effect is also reflected in the division of paid labour between partners, which contrasts with MIG-NAT relationships involving migrant women. Migrant men mixing with the majority native French group is associated with a large and strongly significant negative effect on gender-specialisation, i.e. a positive effect for gender equality in the couple. This can be interpreted as signalling the fact observed earlier in the chapter that these couples are much less likely to organise paid labour distribution around a sole male breadwinner model, in comparison to any other couple involving a primary migrant (men or women). I refer the reader back to figure 5.4. Interestingly, the time spent in France since migration shows a connection to gender division that does not mirror the one observed for migrant women. No significant effect can be found for the gender division of paid work, while there is a significant positive effect for unpaid labour. Thus it would appear that migrant men's longer exposure to French majority norms (as measured by the length of time spent in the country) does not as such increase gender egalitarianism in unpaid labour distribution. Men's age is positively associated with a more gender-polarised division of unpaid labour (where women's age was not significant). The quadratic term indicates a slight upward curvature, suggesting that the effect levels somewhat past a certain age. Age gap is strongly significant, associating couples that involve older migrant men with younger women with a higher incidence of sole male breadwinner situations.

### **5.3.3 The gender specialisation of labour: different mechanisms for migrant women and migrant men**

This section moves on to directly comparing gender-specialisation (the aggregate of unpaid and paid labour distribution) for migrant women and migrant men, using the same stepwise progression. Models for migrant woman and migrant men are now presented side-by-side rather than separately, as in table 5.5

TABLE 5.5: Stepwise linear regression models: gender-specialisation of labour, for migrant and migrant men

Dependent variable: Gender-specialisation index score						
	Migrant women (1)	Migrant men (2)	Migrant women (3)	Migrant men (4)	Migrant women (5)	Migrant men (6)
(Intercept)	.185 (.226)	.138 (.215)	.163 (.222)	.246 (.208)	.106 (.222)	.146 (.212)
Partner [ref: migrant (MIG-MIG)]	.025 (.030)	-.010 (.031)	.028 (.030)	-.001 (.030)	.027 (.030)	-.002 (.030)
Native 2G (MIG-2G)	-.040 (.024)	-.137 (.022)***	-.052 (.024)*	-.142 (.022)***	-.033 (.024)	-.129 (.022)***
Partner majority native (MIG-NAT)						
Where born [ref=EU]						
North Africa	.045 (.027)	.043 (.025)			.045 (.027)	.050 (.025)
Africa: other	-.072 (.032)*	-.027 (.032)			-.067 (.033)*	-.026 (.032)
Turkey	.189 (.038)***	.194 (.033)***			.187 (.038)***	.194 (.033)***
Mainland Southeast Asia	.039 (.038)	-.066 (.031)*			.044 (.038)	-.071 (.031)*
Other areas	.020 (.035)	.026 (.032)			.019 (.034)	.022 (.031)
Migration sequence [ref=Single adults]						
Single young adults						
Formation 1st partnership						
Established 1st partnership						
Partnership reconfigurations						
Child migrants (1.5G)						
How long in France (years since migration)	-.004 (.001)***	.002 (.001)	-.004 (.002)	.002 (.002)	-.004 (.002)*	.002 (.002)
Age	.002 (.011)	.008 (.010)	.001 (.011)	.005 (.010)	.001 (.011)	.008 (.010)
Age-squared	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
Age gap (Man-Woman)	.004 (.002)*	.007 (.002)***	.002 (.002)	.007 (.002)***	.003 (.002)	.007 (.002)***
Coresident children under 16 [ref=no]	.132 (.026)***	.003 (.024)	.131 (.026)***	.015 (.023)	.130 (.026)***	.004 (.023)
Higher /tertiary education [ref=no]	-.068 (.023)***	-.052 (.021)*	-.070 (.024)***	-.058 (.021)***	-.063 (.024)***	-.048 (.021)*
Both partners unemployed	-.156 (.023)***	-.137 (.022)***	-.146 (.022)***	-.125 (.022)***	-.158 (.023)***	-.140 (.022)***
Deviance	427.534	453.377	432.166	457.740	424.480	449.403
Dispersion	.157	.157	.159	.159	.156	.156
Num. obs.	2720	2885	2720	2885	2720	2885

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ . Source: TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).


Universe: partnered migrant women or partnered migrant men (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).

Migrants from Turkey, both women and men, continue to be associated with more gender-specialised divisions of labour overall, regardless of the migratory background of their partner and the migration-union sequence. In comparison with EU migrants, other groups are not significantly more patriarchal when using the compound gender-specialisation score. As observed in the previous tables, North African migrants (men and women) tend to be in relationships where the incidence of sole male breadwinner is on average higher. However, because their distribution of unpaid labour tasks is somewhat more gender-equal than those of EU migrants' couple, the paid labour and unpaid labour aspect levels out in the gender-specialisation approach. This is not the case for Turkish migrants, who abide by stricter gender roles and specialisation in both types of labour, hence also in overall gender specialisation. Migrant women from Africa (excluding the Maghreb) are associated with more gender-equal arrangements overall, as are migrant men from the ex-Indochina region (mainland Southeast Asia).

An important point highlighted by table 5.5, and already mentioned in the previous analyses, is the enduring significance of union-migration sequences, which is not simply cancelled out once accounting for area of origin. Therefore, this cannot simply be considered to be a feature specific to particular migratory flows and gender cultures. Specifically, two union-migration trajectories consistently contrast with the baseline of *single adult migrants*: when migration coincides with the formation of the first official relationship (*formation first relationship*) and when it happens in the context of an already existing and steady relationship (*established first relationships*). The first of the two is associated with more gender-specialisation of labour in couples when concerning migrant women. The second is connected with more patriarchal divisions of labour for both migrant men and migrant women.

Figure 5.6 focuses on the regression coefficients of union-migration sequences for the gender-specialisation index in the full models just discussed (models 5 and 6 in table 5.5 illustrate the asymmetrical effect and relevance of union-migration sequences). There are clear and significant variations in the gender division of labour in couples, depending on migrant women's sequence of migration and couple formation - even when we keep the area of origin constant. Compared to women who migrate as single adults, most other sequences (child migration excepted) are negative for gender equality in couples, with the effect of partnership reconfiguration being particularly strong. In contrast, migrant men's sequences matter less (and area of origin matters more) and the coefficients point to a effect that is reverse (see figure 5.6). The absence of statistical significance is also linked to the smaller number of men who follow these sequences of couple-related migration (seq 2 to seq 4 on the coefficient plot), as shown by the long tails

FIGURE 5.6: Coefficient plots: effect of union-migration sequences for gender specialisation



*Estimates (scaled) from survey-weighted linear models. Not displayed but included in the models are: couple type, area of birth, years since migration, age and age-squared, age gap, whether the couple has coresident children under the age of 16, and a control for unemployed couples.*

of the confidence interval. In addition, while migrant men's higher educational attainment shows no connection to the gender-specialisation of labour, all models concur in pointing to a greater capacity of highly-educated migrant women to negotiate a more gender-balanced division of labour in their relationship.

The effect of acculturation is largely cancelled out by the integration of union-migration sequences. However, it becomes significant again when controlling for different migrant groups. This confirms that there is a form of intra-generational acculturation over time when it comes to the gender division of labour, but it is segmented by migrant groups and only significant for migrant women. This is probably best explained in the terms of Kalmijn (2010) that different migrant groups follow similar processes of assimilation, but starting from different levels: thus when it comes to gender arrangements in the household, different migrant groups start from different levels of gender-polarisation. The fact that there is no significant effect for migrant men further suggests than men's propensity to contribute to housework/childcare and to be in dual-earner rather than single male earner relationships is more stable than migrant women's. While this is clearly influenced by the migrant group (where they were born) and to a point by how they migrated, migrant men's gendered practices of labour division is little impacted by time and exposure to life in France. In other words, as far as migrant men are concerned, the effect of gender socialisation (migrant group), mainly, and the effects of migration's disruption (through mode of migration), more peripherally, are much more relevant than how long they spent in France

to explain the gender-specialisation of labour in their relationships.

### **Focus on migrant-native couples**

Looking specifically at mixed (MIG-NAT) couples, I find that migrant men who form relationships with majority French natives are strongly differentiated from other partnered migrant men with respect to how their couple split labour between men and women. This is not, however, simply attributable to the higher number of child migrants in this group, i.e. an effect of the gender acculturation and assimilation of the 1.5 generation migrant men who grew up at least partly in France. Indeed, compared to those who migrated as single adults, men who were still children at the time when they first migrated to France do not appear significantly more egalitarian in their practice; what is more, controlling for men's union-migration sequence does not make the effect associated with mixed unions disappear. If anything, it actually slightly increases the size of the effect. Thus it would appear that men who partner with French natives from the majority group tend to contribute more to unpaid labour and are less likely to be sole male earners compared to other partnered migrant men. This could be an effect of self-selection: mixing is socially sanctioned and migrants who 'marry out' (or to 'partner out') are likely to be those who are less bound to traditions of endogamy *and* possibly gender roles. In addition, endorsing conservative gender expectations may in itself make migrant or minority men less likely to be recruited as a partner by a member of the majority group. Thus in the same way that mixed couples are more likely to be cohabiting, they may hold more egalitarian views and abide by more egalitarian practices. This is consistent with the fact that a higher-than-average proportion of these migrant men/native women (MIG-NAT) couples include highly-educated migrants, but the distinct effect of tertiary education is accounted for in the model. Thus remains the effect of the power balance between woman and man being tilted in favour of the native majority woman.

In support of the interpretation of native advantage, we find that there is no such overall balancing when the make-up of the migrant-native couple involves a migrant woman and a native majority man. As seen in the previous section, these couples are associated with a slightly more equal division of unpaid labour, but this does not extend to paid labour division. At the level of gender-specialisation, both dimensions level out. These unions are not significantly dissimilar from migrant couples, from the perspective of migrant women. The fact that being with a majority native French partner is associated with a slightly more gender-equal distribution of housework and childcare responsibilities could be attributed to more gender-egalitarian attitudes on the side of the native men, and/or to a selection effect. That is, the migrant women likely to mix with the majority

group could be selected among the most independent and most attracted by egalitarian possibilities. For the third-world women described by Suksomboon (2011) and Riaño and Baghdadi (2007), egalitarian attitudes and hopes were important incentives to form a relationship with a native Westerner, whom they imagined as holding less gender-conservative views than the men from their own communities. However, regardless of the particular gender ideologies of either partner - which cannot be assessed here - this does not seem to affect the gender division of paid labour. Migrant women in relationships with native majority men are not significantly less likely to be financially dependent on their partner than migrant women in other types of relationships. In the case of intermarried migrant women, there is no evidence of a positive effect of, for example, having access to native's networks through the native partner, or of native majority men being more open to their migrant wives or partner participating in paid work.


### **Going further: the weight of religion, the GII, and legal dependency**

In this final results section, I further explore three dimensions. First, the importance of religiosity in explaining the gender specialisation of labour and differences between migrant groups. Second, the relevance of the gender equality framework of the country of origin, measured through the Gender Inequality Index score of the country of birth. Finally, the extent to which the effect associated with union-migration sequence reflect situations of legal dependency, when the migrant arrived on a partner or spouse visa.

Religiosity has a straightforward effect. I found that migrants who identified as religious (rather than non-religious) were overall more likely to divide paid and unpaid labour along gender lines than migrants who identified as having no religion. Factoring in religiosity did not cancel the effect associated with the different migrant groups - except for African migrants from outside the Maghreb region. It even increased the gender-polarising effect associated with Turkish migrants. This does not quite match Steinbach's findings (2009), who suggested that religiosity explained most of the differences in the division of household labour between native majority German and Turkish migrants or direct descendants of migrants. Steinbach used a more detailed scale of religiosity however, which allowed her to distinguish not only between religious and non-religious individuals (indeed, very few in certain communities, including the Turks, identify as non-religious). It also allowed her to distinguish within religious individuals, those who had an active religious practice, as distinct from those who identified with a religion but did not regularly attend services or religious events. The more basic religious/not religious scale I used would not capture this finer dynamic.

The GII proved to be a poor replacement for area of birth. The models were a poorer fit than when including separate areas of origin and when adding the GII score to models that included area of origin as independent variable, the coefficients for different migrant groups were little affected. Nevertheless, adding the GII score of the country of birth to the existing model was a way of identifying gender cultures beyond the institutional framework of opportunities for women in the country of origin. The effect of the GII was not significant and, surprisingly enough, the coefficient was negative, suggesting that a lower GII (meaning higher on the gender equality ranking) would be (though not significantly) associated with more gender-specialisation, and vice-versa.

FIGURE 5.7: Coefficient plots: Stepwise modelling of gender specialisation, with sequences (2) and GII and religion (3)




Estimates from survey-weighted linear models. Not displayed but included in the models are: years since migration, age and age-squared, age gap, whether the couple has coresident children under the age of 16, and a control for unemployed couples.

Figure 5.7 presents the step-wise modelling of the gender-specialisation of labour, for migrant women (in green) and migrant men (in yellow and orange) respectively. The darker dots and tails identify the coefficients and confidence intervals (at the 0.95 level) for the smallest models (1), which only includes partner choice and the area of birth of the migrant (as well as all the usual controls, although they are not all displayed in the figure). I then added to the modelling

the union-migration sequences (2) and finally the GII score and religiosity (3). The progression highlights the fact that except for religiosity, the expansion of the models did not much alter the effects the migratory ties of the partner and with the migrant group. The effect connected to being in a relationship with a native majority partner is distinctly away from gender-specialisation for migrant men. It is unaffected by sequences of migration, the GII of the country of birth and religiosity. The equivalent effect of mixing with the majority French group for migrant women is not so clear-cut. While slightly negative, it never steps into statistical significance, or more specifically not when the models include migrant women's area of birth.

The last parameter that needed investigating was the legal admission category of migrants, and specifically if migrants had (at least initially) been sponsored by, and therefore legally dependent on, their partner (and in a few cases, on their former partner). Since much of the relevant literature focuses on 'reunified' or 'imported' migrant women who arrive as dependent on their partner, it is important to know whether the legal dependency is at the root of the difference observed for union-migration sequences of couple-forming and established relationships. Figure 5.8 shows the coefficients for the sequence, as displayed before in figure 5.6 for models 5 and 6 in table 5.5. They are identified as 'm1' in the legend. But in addition, this plot also includes the coefficients for models that add a control for legally tied migrants. These are identified in the legend as 'm2'. The 'tied migrants' category refers to migrants who were initially brought in by a settled migrant partner through family reunification, or who obtained their first visa in France as 'partner of a French national'. The objective here is to test whether the asymmetry inherent in legal dependency suffices to explain the differentiated gendered effects between sequences. As shown on figure 5.8, tied migrant women are indeed and clearly associated with more gender-specialised divisions of labour. No similar (or reverse) effects can be observed for tied migrant men. Including a control for legally tied migrants in the models increases the confidence intervals of union-migration sequences. It dents the statistical significance of migrant women's union-migrations sequences, but the coefficients remain little changed, which suggests that legally tied migration is not the whole story when it comes to how migration-union trajectories play into the gender division of labour.

FIGURE 5.8: Coefficient plots: Stepwise modelling of gender specialisation, with (m2) and without (m1) legally tied migration



*Estimates from survey-weighted linear models. Not displayed but included in the models are: couple type, area of birth, years since migration, age and age-squared, age gap, whether the couple has coresident children under the age of 16, and a control for unemployed couples.*

## 5.4 Discussion

### Do union-migration sequences matter for gender equality in couples?

From these analyses, a picture emerges which suggests that, though the gender division of labour is a complex construct and only approximately captured by the measure I have used in this chapter, the particulars of migration *experience* and *trajectories* matter. Other factors, such as area of origin, parenthood and years since migration, also matter but the way men and women migrate and meet significantly affects the manner in which they (re)produce the gender-specialisation of labour and roles in their relationship. This appears to be especially valid for migrant women. Women are more likely to migrate in the context of a relationship either just formed or long tied, and are more likely to follow or join their partner as legally tied migrants. Ultimately, their mode of migration shows significant associations with the gender-specialisation of labour. This is mainly driven by a higher incidence of paid work arrangements structured around a sole male breadwinner, especially in the case of two union-migration sequences : couple-forming migrations and established relationships.

In addition, arriving as a legally tied migrant is associated with a clear gendering effect for migrant women, who are more likely to take on (even) more of the housework and childcare responsibilities. They are also at higher risk of being out of the labour market and hence economically dependent on their

sponsor partner. This may be a self-selection effect, in that women who agree to become legally tied to their partner might also be more likely to endorse gender-specialisation of labour and more conservative gender ideologies that put the career of husbands first and give women a role focused on the family. But the qualitative literature surveyed provided ample evidence that that is not always the case. Moreover, even when it is not the case, the legal dependency and the uprooting associated with the process of tied migration has the capacity to confine migrant women to more domestic and dependent role whether they aspired to them or not (Riaño & Baghdadi, 2007; Suksomboon, 2011).

The effect of migration sequences and legal mode of migration is independent from the effect of migrant groups, religion and gender opportunities in the country of origin (insofar as it can be measured based on the GII). For migrant women, all sequences when migration happens during a relationship (either established or in formation) are thus connected with more gender-specialised roles in the household. This contrast with the migration of single adult women. These women are comparatively in more gender-equal relationships. Women who migrated as children or quickly partnered as young adults, are mostly in a less favourable position (in terms of gender equality) compared to those who migrated as single adults. The effects are rarely significant, but we could draw from the comparison the interpretation that the migration of girls and very young women generally happens under the authority of parents, and is therefore not associated with the same independence as single adult migrant women. It may be this independence that single adult migrant women can then build on to negotiate more egalitarian arrangements in their relationships.

Union-migration sequences appear less decisive for migrant men, except when migration happens in the context of a stable relationship, in which case it is also associated with heightened gender-specialisation for migrant men. This makes sense once we consider that, when couples organise relationships together but do not migrate at the same time (family-stage migration), men are more likely to be sent ahead first (lead migrants) (González-Ferrer, 2011; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1992). When their wife joins them later, it is as a dependent spouse, who - less familiar with the country of immigration - will often have to rely on them for their residency right as well as for social networks and help dealing with the language barrier, etc. Hondagneu-Sotelo (1992) reported anecdotal evidence of lead migrant men who had to learn domestic skills during the time they spent separated from their wives, and who continued contributing more to housework after reunification. The analyses presented here finds little evidence of this, although they are inhibited by two limitations. Firstly, the construction

of the sequence variables and the modelling do not precisely single out family-stage migration; the union-migration sequences only capture the interlocking of migration and couple formation for one partner (not for both). Secondly, the analyses are limited by the roughness of the measure for the division of unpaid labour. Not only does it rely on tasks (rather than labour time) and on the estimation of one partner only, but it also does not include the most routine household labour tasks (cleaning, tidying, laundry), which are also the most stubbornly gendered (Coltrane, 2010).

When controlling for other factors, couple-forming migration seems to edge migrant men towards more gender-equal relationships. Even if this is not significant, it backs up the idea that these migration trajectories come with forms of uprooting and dependency for the side of the migrant partner which affects the power balance in the couple. Indeed, marriage migrants (men and women) often find themselves socially isolated, reliant on their settled or native partner and family or networks. Difficulties with the language, obtaining recognition for their qualifications and securing paid employment, may confine migrants in this cluster to more domestic roles. For migrant men, it also means that the position of breadwinner might be out of reach, and even reversed when they find themselves economically dependent on their wives (Charsley, 2005; Fleischer, 2011)

### **Does mixing with the native majority French group mean more gender-equal couple arrangements for migrants?**

For migrant men, having a native woman partner without a direct migration background is strongly associated with a more equal division of paid work. This could be because of these native women's better integration into the labour-market. One hypothesis was that these couples were more likely to involve female sponsors and tied male migrants. Since sponsors have to be economically active, this would pave the way for more gender equality (or even a gender reversal) in the division of paid labour (and through relative resource and time availability, in the division of unpaid labour). However, the effect remained after controlling for tied migration and was therefore not limited to tied male migrants - who are, at any rate, rarer. Mixing with the native majority group was associated with more gender equal relationships for migrant men. This can be interpreted as a selection effect, with out-partnering being more likely to appeal to men who are already willing to break away from norms of endogamy. Therefore they may also be more open to step away from strict gender roles in labour division. It may also be an effect of conjugal mixedness and of the power balance between men and women being somewhat levelled when the woman is a French majority native

and the man a primary migrant (even if a child migrant). The two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and the qualitative literature finds evidence for both Collet (2015) and Fleischer (2011).

In contrast to suggestions made in the literature that having a native partner would increase migrant women's labour market engagement (Baker & Benjamin, 1997), I found that partners being native (NAT or 2G) did not help predict the division of labour in couples once accounting for union-migration trajectories. The findings thus concur with González-Ferrer (2011), who found no consistent effect of being in a migrant-native relationship on the labour performance of migrant women living in Spain. Neither could a robust effect be found between having a native French majority partner and more equal gender divisions of domestic and care work. The idea that migrant women fare better, emancipation-wise, when they partner up with a French majority native compared to another migrant or a descendant of migrants is thus not clearly supported by the analysis. The models find more robust support for the effects of women's migration-union sequences, areas of origin and educational attainment. It is not being with a majority native itself which results in more gender equality, but rather that the paths that lead there are both self-selective and often involve more room for empowerment (e.g. education in the country of destination and independent migration), as well as comparatively less room for spousal dependency.

Some group borders are more easily crossed (Choi & Tienda, 2018; Wang, 2012). EU migrant women likely combine racial and cultural closeness (majority white and Christian or no religion) with the French native group, which is associated with greater levels of intermarriage and assimilation. But crucially, their migration, employment and family lives are (mostly) unhindered by immigration regulations and their qualifications are likely better recognised. Migration therefore does not mean a loss of resources and qualifications to the extent that it might for non-EU migrant women. In addition, their labour participation and performance is less likely to suffer from racist and intersectional discrimination which mainly targets 'visible' minorities (Beauchemin, Simon, Hamel, Lesné, & de l'enquête TeO, 2010). The fact that these EU migrant women, together with highly-educated migrant women, represent a large proportion of the migrant women involved in the migrant-native (MIG-NAT) category is a more convincing explanation as to why migrant-native couples have less unequal divisions of labour compared to other couples formed by migrant women. It is in other words more about the selection criteria of migrant women by French majority native men, and their migration-union paths, and less (or nothing) to do with the presumably more gender-equal practices of the French majority men involved.

This point is fruitfully supported by the two levels of comparison I drew on this chapter. In latter part of the chapter, it was useful to be able to compare migrant-native couples with couples formed by other migrants, but also with couples formed by natives, as I did in the beginning of the chapter. The conclusion we can draw from this, is that in comparison to migrant women in other relationships, migrant women who form unions with majority French native men might fare slightly better in terms of gender equality in labour division, although most of this effect is linked to area of origin and sequences of migration. However, in comparison to native majority couples, these unions are clearly more patriarchal, especially with regards to paid labour division and economic dependency.

Neither French majority natives nor EU migrants appeared more egalitarian, across the board, than other couples. EU migrant men could not be significantly distinguished from migrants from African regions outside of the Maghreb, and appeared less gender-equal in their division of labour compared to men born in mainland Southeast Asia. Only migrant men from Turkey (and to an extent North Africa) were significantly more likely to have gender-specialised relationships than EU migrants. Similarly, migrant women from Turkey were more likely than EU migrant women to be doing most or all of the housework and childcare tasks and to be out of the labour force and economically dependent on their husband. However, the opposite was true for women of Sub-Saharan and Sahelian Africa.

Switching the independent variable as I did in the last models, in order to use an ethnic (and interethnic) lens rather than one based on area of origin and migration status, confirmed the analysis. Crucially, the importance of union-migration sequence for migrant women was reaffirmed, as was the disconnect between the effect of sequences for migrant men and for migrant women.

#### **5.4.1 An effect of time: acculturation or autonomisation**

The effect of the time spent in France (years since migration) warrants particular attention here. The analysis of the models found a linear (if small) but very significant negative association with the gender-specialisation of labour, for migrant women only. This indicates that, for migrant women, the odds of being entirely economically dependent on their husband/partners declines with time. This effect is reduced by accounting for union-migration sequences but it remains significant. This can be connected with the analyses of the post-migration processes and trajectories of 'reunified' and 'imported' migrant women which recent qualitative literature has unearthed.

This echoes the stories recalled by Mounchit (2018) of the 'reunified' migrant women from Sub-Saharan Africa, who had joined their settled or native husbands in France. Initially, there was a period of 'first shock' and isolation<sup>8</sup>, during which these women found themselves in a vastly asymmetrical power balance towards their sponsor partner. This translated into (and was experienced as) an acutely patriarchal gender relationship that confined them to domestic roles and economic dependence, even when they had been economically autonomous prior to migration. Although the migration and initial couple experience itself was profoundly disempowering, migrant women did not simply accept or remain forever locked in a status of 'dominated wife' (Hervouet & Schiff, 2017). Gradually, they negotiated job training, and sought and found paid work. This restored a degree of economic autonomy, a form of self-determination and life outside of the home and conjugal circle and decisively shifted gender relations in the couple towards a (comparatively) more equal distribution of power and arrangements in the couples. Thus the analysis may here capture the agency of migrant women, which is often missed in reductive or purely descriptive representations of family reunification and migration. Migrant women's lives are better characterised by a process in which dependency and autonomisation co-exist and are interlocked (Morokvasic, 2010b), something which also applies to migrant women who form relationships with majority French men (Hervouet & Schiff, 2017). This does not exclude the possibility of a parallel process of gender acculturation (Roeder & Mühlau, 2014) which could also affect the gender division of unpaid labour. But this was not captured by the measure I used.

No such effect for paid labour could be identified for migrant men. It is reasonable to suppose that migrant men are indeed less likely to be initially expected (or pushed) by their partner to stay out of paid work and to take on a domestic and secluded role. On the contrary, both native and migrant women are likely to mobilise networks and dedicate important amounts of time and family resources to helping migrant men find paid employment or start a business as soon as possible (Baker & Benjamin, 1997; Falquet, Hirata, & Kergoat, 2010; Ferree, 1979; Pedraza, 1991). Indeed, there is evidence of such gender asymmetries in the urgency and intensity with which men's and women's unemployment is handled by families and couples in general (Rao, 2020). However, the length of time spent in the country did have a small connection to the gender division of unpaid labour, which could suggest a small gender acculturation effect.

A high educational level was found to foster slightly more gender-equal

<sup>8</sup>These 'first shocks' were observed by Albert Nicollet (1992, p. 68) in his studies of Black African migrant women in Le Havre.

divisions of labour, mainly unpaid labour. While education level does not significantly alter the gender division of paid labour in the form of women's economic dependency, it seems to provide a bargaining chip. This allows highly-educated women to negotiate for the housework and childcare to be (more) equally shared between partners. Additionally, it suggests that highly-educated migrants are more willing to contribute to unpaid labour as well.

#### **5.4.2 On the use of considering paid labour and unpaid labour division separately, and together**

Separately analysing the gender division of paid and unpaid labour, as I did in many of the models, highlighted the difference between them. While undoubtedly connected, the way couples split paid work and housework or childcare is sensitive to different factors. Age, for instance, matters more for unpaid labour than paid labour division, with older men being more likely to be in relationships that assign all or most of the unpaid labour to women. The distinction between the two also helped to understand more finely what the driving factors were in the gender-specialisation of labour as a whole.

In this chapter, the division of paid labour appeared altogether more sensitive to migration experiences, couple types and variations by migrant groups. This may be because paid work is more public and more institutionalised and is therefore more affected by external factors, changes linked to migration and 'othering', such as discrimination and devaluation of qualifications. This would also have a direct and immediate effect on migrants' labour performance and opportunities. In contrast, the gender division of unpaid labour is largely private. It can therefore even act as a 'buffer' or compensatory mechanism, a way to re-establish gender roles and identities when the gender division of paid work is not gender-conforming. For example, when migrant men are unemployed or poorly-paid and the woman becomes the main or sole breadwinner, yet still does most or all of the couple's housework and care work (Charsley, 2005). It makes sense therefore that the division of unpaid labour would be more stable, less prone to change (other than perhaps slow acculturation). The next chapter will bring further elements of interpretation, thanks to a more detailed measure of division of unpaid labour.

## Chapter 6

# The interlocking of union-migration trajectories and the gender division of labour: the British case

### Chapter introduction

As dissected in the literature review, there is a wealth of British literature on the gender division of labour and its ties to gender equality in the labour market, in the household and in representations and social norms (Baxter & Wright, 2000; Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson, 2000; Bianchi, Sayer, Milkie, & Robinson, 2012; Rosemary Crompton, Brockmann, & Lyonette, 2005; Gershuny & Sullivan, 2003; Kan & Pudney, 2008). Most of this research, in the UK as in France (or indeed most Western countries) has focused on the majority, White and native-born population. As a result, it has largely remained blind to how gender inequalities and gendered labour may be associated with migration as well as ethnicity, socio-economic status and, of course, gender. As Kan and Laurie (2018) noted and as discussed in chapter two, this is partly because the data did not allow for disaggregation by ethnic group, let alone by migration paths. Although research on migration and migrants in the UK has grown tremendously in recent years, the connection with gender relations has therefore seldom be drawn empirically. It has also never crossed path with the British scholarship on intermarriage. This scholarship is (as elsewhere) largely focused on rates of intermarriage across different groups. It engages much more rarely with the 'social consequences' of intermarriage (Kalmijn, 2010), let alone with its gender consequences. Moreover, mixing and intermarriage in Britain have been mostly conceptualised and analysed through the lens of mixed-race and inter-ethnicity

(e.g. Berrington (1994, 1996), Coleman (1994), Muttarak and Heath (2010), and ONS (2014)). This means that, conceptually, it has been further removed from the consideration of migration paths and the inequalities they carry.

### 6.0.1 UK-bound migration, ethnicity and gendered division of domestic labour

There is virtually no empirical research dedicated to UK-bound migrants' gender division of domestic labour, but precious insights can be drawn from the (rare) available research on ethnicity and domestic labour. Kan and Laurie (2016, 2018) found clear differences along gender and ethnic lines, even when controlling for employment and educational level of both partners. Notably, ethnic Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi women were shown to have higher housework hours and shares than other women, while Black Caribbean men contributed more to housework than other men. Kan and Laurie (2018, p. 60) have argued that migration may play a role: 'Immigration experience is another key factor influencing the intersectionality between gender and ethnicity.' Accordingly, they distinguished primary migrants who arrived to the UK after the age of 12 from the '1.5 generation' (migrants who arrived in the UK when they were still children), grouped with the 'second generation', those born in the UK to migrant parent(s). Descendants of migrants, as well as child migrants educated in the UK, may mix norms and gender ideology from their culture of origin and from the UK (Nandi & Platt, 2014). In the acculturation approach, adult primary migrants, more so than child migrants, are expected to bring with them and enforce gender norms, values and expectations from their country of origin. Migration matters for gender, then, but only insofar as it is related to acculturation. The social and gender implications of migration and family trajectories *per se* are not problematised, except in qualitative scholarship on marriage migration.

#### Gender equality: a matter of acculturation into British society?

When gender has been connected to migration in the UK, it has been largely been around integration concerns and assumptions of patriarchal practices and cultures. Politically, these particular concerns about gender relations in migrant families are mostly raised to justify greater obstacles to immigration and notably transnational, co-ethnic marriages. As Charsley, Bolognani, and Spencer (2017) argued, there is much valid criticism to be made towards the theoretical idea and conceptualisation of integration, which, being often narrowly defined, bears its own exclusionary project (Modood, 2012; Spencer & Charsley, 2016). Certainly the term integration is often used with connotations that go beyond a more humble understanding of social cohesion, and carry no small amount

of normative cultural expectations. In the context of gender relations, it often pits a 'gender-equal' and progressive British majority society against 'traditional' and patriarchal immigrants. The expectation is that when acculturated to British gender norms, migrants and their descendants would gradually become more attuned to gender equality views and practices. The normative part of this narrative of integration, in which gender equality becomes a feature and a marker of 'Britishness' is doubtless disputable. It has notably been tackled in critical scholarship on marriage migration to the UK (Charsley, Bolognani, Ersanilli, & Spencer, 2020). Yet the empirical question also needs addressing.

Analysing differences in gender practices and inequalities solely through the lens of cultural background and acculturation has its limits. Cultural ideologies about women and gender roles are only one part of a complex interplay (Brah & Phoenix, 2013), and varying degrees of acculturation to British majority norms may only partially explain variations in the gender division of labour. Thus, Archer (2002) objected to interpreting South Asian ethnic girls' educational and employment aspirations purely as the expression of their cultural background and instead emphasised the role that British society's institutional racism and sexism may play in framing Asian girls' expectations and hopes. Discrimination is another possible explanation for observed difference between migrant groups on the labour market. By constraining access to paid employment for certain categories of migrants, discrimination can also impact on the gender division of labour as a whole, and many minorities are found to face discrimination and ethnic penalties (A. F. Heath, 2018; Li & Heath, 2018). British society seems overall much more hospitable towards 'Other White' (rather than non-white) migrants, although this lower level of prejudice is changing due to the increased visibility and politicisation of white migrants, especially Eastern Europeans and other EU migrants (Demireva, 2011). Discrimination may also be intersectional (Crenshaw, 1989) in that specific obstacles to employment apply to certain racialised categories of migrant women. There is ample evidence of persisting ethnic disadvantage in employment in the UK, with some groups such as black African, black Caribbean, Pakistani and Bangladeshi associated with higher rates of unemployment and lower earnings. Rates of unemployment are especially high for some women (notably Pakistani and Bangladeshi) and some men (notably Black Caribbean)


There is also some empirical research on the effect of family migration on gender relations (especially employment) in Britain within couples. These have focused on internal family relocation (i.e. internal 'tied' migration). Taylor (2007) thus found that tied migration significantly reduced the probability of employment for both husbands and wives. The effects were similar in size, but

wives were much more likely to be tied migrants than husbands. However, no such parallel was found for domestic and care labour.

### 6.0.2 UK-bound migration, ethnicity and gendered employment

In general, migrant men are more likely to be employed than UK-born men (84% vs 79% in 2019), but migrant women are less likely to be involved in paid work compared to UK-born women (67% vs 73%). In 2019, the Migration Observatory noted that this was true across all migrant groups with the exception of migrant men born in Central, East and Southeast Asia (71%) and EU-born women, who had higher rates of employment than British-born women. They found wide differences in rates of employment between groups, as well as the gender gap within groups.

FIGURE 6.1: UK migrants' employment by area of origin and by gender (Fernández-Reino & Rienzo, 2021)



These differences in migrants' employment and occupational achievement by migrant and ethnic group, cannot be simply attributable to differences in human capital (Demireva, 2011). Different ethnic groups have also been associated with different gender cultures with regards to how women's employment is perceived. Ballard (1983) observed that in the Jullundri Sikhs communities, there were less objection to women and wives entering the labour force compared to Mirpuris. At a broader level, Charsley et al. (2020) and Shaw (2014) notes that in Indian families, women - including marriage migrants - are often expected to work and contribute to the family income. In contrast, women in Pakistani and

Bangladeshi families are more often expected to fulfil a purely domestic and care-focused role and are therefore much more rarely involved in paid employment (see figure 6.1). The segmented assimilation approach has shown that integration patterns depends on the segment of society migrants integrate, so that one can be acculturated (also in terms of gender norms) without being economically very integrated (e.g. Black Caribbeans in Britain) or have strong ethnic community and culture while being economically integrated (e.g. Indians).

### **British institutional framework for the gender division of labour**

The British welfare state has generally been characterised as one of the non-interventionist liberal countries (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Soskice & Hall, 2001). This is also the case in the context of research on cross-national variations in time-use and household labour distribution (Cunha & Atalaia, 2019; Gershuny & Sullivan, 2003; Kan, Sullivan, & Gershuny, 2011).<sup>1</sup> This cluster refers to welfare regimes which provide low levels of welfare support and social policies that are generally built around the assumption that the market's self-regulation is most efficient in fostering human development. Accordingly, state interventionism in social and family policies is limited (one measure of this is, for instance, lower total social expenses). This also means that a wide array of social services and support are provided by private providers and insurance schemes (e.g. pensions, extended medical care). This is particularly salient in the UK with respect to nursery care and childcare services, which are mostly market-based or provided by employers. They tend to be very expensive and with limited availability. There is also limited parental leave, especially for fathers. The same diagnosis applies to elderly care. The gender ideology model inherent to this type of welfare state has been labelled 'modified breadwinner', reflecting the idea that most women are expected to take part in paid employment, but also to provide most of the domestic and care labour for the family, since there is no public institutional structure or support for it to be outsourced.

With respect to the comparison of the British and French 'gender regimes', the literature has established several, now well-known features, chiefly based on cross-national comparisons of women's employment (Gregory & Windebank, 2000). In these studies, the British model contrasts with the French model mostly in the extent to which women and couple resort to part-time work. Compared to France, the UK is characterised by lower rates of female economic inactivity but much higher rates of women in part-time work. The dominant model is therefore a dual-earner couple in which the man works full-time and the

<sup>1</sup>Other states associated with this cluster are Australia, Canada, and the USA.

woman part-time. In contrast, France has somewhat higher rates of female inactivity, but much higher rates of women in full-time employment and of couples formed by two partners who both work full-time (Franco & Winqvist, 2002). This difference is also reflected in gender attitudes, with the evidence suggesting that British couples exhibit a much stronger preference for the full-time (male) breadwinner/part-time (female) carer model (Rosmary Crompton & Feuvre, 2000). Based on the Labour Force Surveys,<sup>2</sup> Rosmary Crompton and Feuvre (2000) found that among couples with children, the proportion of partners both working full time constituted the majority in France, but under 30% of those couples in the UK, who were more likely to be in male full-time/female part-time situations (40% of UK couples vs. only 16% of couples in France). The proportion of sole male breadwinners was indeed slightly higher in France (36% vs. 30% in the UK), from which it follows that French couples should be comparatively more often associated with female economic dependency (sole male breadwinner situations). However, if we think of the gender division of paid work in terms of couples' division of labour *time* rather than couples' joint employment status, then we should also consider that the proportion of women who take on as much or more of the labour time as their partner is lower in the UK compared to France.

## 6.1 Research questions

This chapter follows the same architecture as the previous chapter, following the theoretical thread that the gender-specialisation of labour in migrants' families is a reflection of both cultural and gender socialisation (which can potentially be mixed) *and* power relations which are potentially affected by the mode of migration and partner recruitment.

(1) In line with the assimilation hypothesis, I expect that for a migrant, partnering with a majority native British partner denotes a high degree of integration; by extrapolating this through the notion of gender-acculturation, I can assume that the gender division of labour in these couples will resemble those of majority native couples, and will differ significantly from that of migrants partnered with other migrants. Direct descendants of migrants are expected to be in the middle between the two. However,

(2) Having established in part 2 of this thesis that migrant women and migrant follow different paths of migration and couple formation, including between those who form unions with native majority partner, I expect that there will be variations in the gender division of labour depending on:

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<sup>2</sup>Labour Force survey data from 1999 for the the UK and from 2000 for France

- the gender of the migrant partner (in MIG-NAT couples) - the union-migration trajectories

(3) Notably, I expect that trajectories of couple-forming migration have a particularly disempowering effect on migrants who follow them, which should lead to more gender-specialisation when they involve migrant women, and less when they involve migrant men. Other trajectories involving already-partnered individuals at the time of their migration are expected to diminish women's bargaining power but not necessarily men's because, in contrast to marriage migration, men tend to be first movers and decisions to migrate as a couple are mostly done for the benefit of the husband's employment, etc (Mincer, 1978).

(4) Taking stock of the differences between France and the UK, especially as regards paid work, I expect that the gender division of paid labour based on employment status may show less variations, because it is less suited to the gendered stratification of employment in the UK (especially female part-time work). Accordingly, and taking advantage of the richer data available for the UK, this chapter develops a second measure of gender-specialisation alongside one that mirrors the French index. I also expect that if there are divergences between the French and British analyses, they are likely to be more marked in the division of paid labour. The reasoning is migrants' labour performance is more directly affected by migration experience and trajectories (through the devaluation of qualifications, career or training interruptions, language barriers etc) and that, in addition, the gender division of unpaid labour has been found to be less sensitive to external changes such as policy changes (Pailhé, Solaz, & Souletie, 2019; Vagni & Cornwell, 2018), also because of the performative gendered dimension of housework, i.e. 'doing gender' (Robinson & Milkie, 1998; West & Zimmerman, 1987). Therefore, the gender division of labour might be more stable during and after migration compared to the division of paid employment.

## 6.2 Methods, data and analytical categories

### 6.2.1 Couples disagreements, combinations and imputations

With the TeO data we had no choice but to rely on individuals' assessment of the distribution of housework and childcare. In the UKLHS data, in contrast, partners are matched and they each provide their own answers. This enriches the data but also complicates analyses since partners' answers do not necessarily concur, and that leaves the researcher in a position where they have to arbitrate or combine answers. There is some empirical evidence to suggest that people's perception of their contribution to housework, even in absolute terms, is often

quite skewed. While both men and women tend to over-report the time they spend on housework (S. Berk & Shih, 1980), couples may also tend to minimize the gender gap in unpaid labour, with women over-reporting the time they spend on housework (though less than men overestimate their contribution). What is more, partners do not necessarily agree on their contribution relative to that of their partner, although perceptions align more often about the woman's hours (Kamo, 2000). Rather than arbitrating between the two partners' answer, I have chosen to combine answers at the couple level, through either averaging between the two partners' answers, or aggregating answers and calculating each partner's share. Both methods may lead to underestimating the gendered polarization of domestic work. Nevertheless, considering the nature of the subject and the difficulty in obtaining more reliable data (such as time-diary data), this provides a suitable measure (see for instance (Schober, 2009)).

### 6.2.2 Operationalising the gender division of labour in couples: distribution of tasks, status and labour time

I have created two indexes of gender specialisation of labour. The first mirrors the index used with the French data. The second takes advantage of questions on time spent weekly on paid work, housework, and unpaid care, questions which were not part of the TeO questionnaire but are acutely relevant to the question under study. The variables on the gender division of unpaid labour include childcare and care labour. As with the French data, all models include a control variable for whether the couple lives with children under 16.

#### Index 1: gender-specialisation of tasks and employment

The Domestic Labour module which kicked in at Wave 2 of *Understanding Society* included questions that follow exactly the same template as the questions on housework in TeO<sup>3</sup>. The gender division of unpaid labour is here once again tackled through the distribution of responsibility for tasks. These tasks include grocery shopping and daily cooking (as with the French data), but also cleaning and washing/ironing. I used the question on 'who is mostly responsible for childcare?', which provided a (broader) replacement to the question on 'who is responsible for bringing the children to school', asked in the French questionnaire but not the British one. As in the previous chapter, when respondents identify the woman in their couple (either themselves or their partner since this study focuses on man-woman couples) as taking charge for any of these housework or childcare task, this is coded as 1. If instead, the man is identified as being

<sup>3</sup>For instance: 'Here are some household jobs. Could you please say who mostly does this work here? Is it mostly yourself, or mostly your spouse/partner, or is the work shared equally? - First, grocery shopping...' Domestic Labour Module, UKLHS Wave 2 questionnaire)

the main person responsible for any of these tasks, this results in a -1. When individuals state that the tasks is taken on by 'paid help only' or 'other', this is coded as zero (neutral) since it does not alter as such the division of the remaining labour between partners. Answers are then aggregated as follow:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Unpaid labour score (individual, unstandardised)} \\ = \text{groceries} + \text{meals} + \text{cleaning} + \text{washing/ironing} + \text{childcare} \end{aligned}$$

The score thus ranges from -5 to +5, but needs to be combined, to account for both partners, and standardised. Both partners' scores are added and divided by two, leaving us with an average of their answers. This score is then divided by the total tasks undertaken by the couple (i.e. not outsourced to paid help or to a third part). In cases where the total number of tasks undertaken by the couple, as identified by one partner, does not match the total declared by the other partner, the highest total is retained. The final standardized couple score for the gender distribution of unpaid labour tasks  $Su_{it}$  thus runs:

$$Su_{it} = \frac{\text{groceries} + \text{meals} + \text{cleaning} + \text{ironing} + \text{childcare}}{\text{total applicable answers}} \left( \frac{\text{Couple average}}{\text{Couple's highest total}} \right)$$

This unpaid labour scores ranges from -1 to 1: a score closer to 1 indicates that the couple conforms to a very gender-segregated division of unpaid labour, while a score closer to -1 indicates that the couple upholds a division of unpaid labour that runs counter to gendered expectations, i.e. the man takes on most or all of these tasks. Scores around zero indicate more egalitarian arrangements, and reflect that tasks are either shared or equally distributed between partners. It is constructed in the same way as the French score for unpaid labour division, but because it is based on a wider selection of housework tasks, it can be expected to more finely capture variations in gender distribution of housework. This expectation is further justified by the fact that, in contrast with the French score, this one includes some of the most routine parts of housework (cleaning, tidying and laundry), which are also the tasks that have been less affected by men's increased contributions to housework and have therefore remained most gender-segregated Bittman and Wajcman (2000), Kan and Gershuny (2010), and Sullivan (1997)).

To continue mirroring the French data, the gender specialisation of paid employment is first constructed around a simple dummy, based on employment status: individuals are either in paid work (employed or self-employed) or not. The couples' joint employment status is then coded as follow: situations where

only the man is in paid work are given the score of 1. When the situation is reversed, the score is -1. When both partners are in paid employment, or neither of them are, the gender-specialisation of paid work is considered neutral, and the variable codes 0.

The first index for the gender specialisation of labour time is therefore, exactly like in the French chapter, based on the following equation, where  $S_{it}$  refers to the gender specialisation of labour in an individual  $i$ 's couple, at the point  $t$  around the time of Wave 2 survey interview:

$$S_{it} = \frac{(Su_{it} + Sp_{it})}{2}$$

$Su_{it}$  stands for the gender specialisation of unpaid labour tasks, while  $Sp_{it}$  represents the gender specialisation of paid work in the couple, based on the couple's joint employment status. The gender specialisation index ranges from -1 to +1. 1 identifies a completely gender-conforming and gender-specialised distribution of paid work and housework and childcare taken on by the couple, whereby the man does all the paid work and the woman is not in paid work but is responsible for all the housework and childcare.

### **Index 2: gender division of labour time**

Another way of operationalising the division of household labour is to base it on how unpaid reproductive labour time and paid labour time is distributed between men and women in couples. *Understanding Society*'s Wave 2 questionnaire involves questions on how much time individuals typically spend weekly on household tasks (for instance, "About how many hours do you spend on housework in an average week, such as time spent cooking, cleaning, and doing the laundry?"); on caring (unpaid) for someone (or several people); and on paid labour. To compute an individual's total hours spent on paid labour per week, I added weekly hours spent in waged employment and weekly hours spent in self-employment (when applicable). Although answers given by respondents to surveys questions formulated in this manner have proven less accurate than diary-based estimates, errors are mostly random (Kan & Pudney, 2008).

By aggregating the answers given by the two members of a couple, we can then calculate gendered ratios representing women and men's share of different types of labour. Hours reported by each partner are divided by the total of the two partners' combined weekly hours. This leaves us with a percentage representing their respective share of the couple's total household labour time. Because I am interested in gender specialisation, and not just any specialisation, the variable of

interest in this case will be more specifically the woman's relative share of the total time spent by the couple on housework per week. This approach has the notable advantage of avoiding arbitrating between partners' perception of their own and their partners' contribution, and/or imputing the couple's division based on one partner's perception only. Measure in terms of labour time may also be able to capture asymmetries in the gender division of unpaid labour more finely than tasks-based measures.

Two scores of gender division of unpaid labour time and paid labour time thus emerge: the first one aggregates hours spent on housework and unpaid care; the second combines hours spent on paid employment and self-employment. In the first case, the focus is on the woman's share of unpaid labour, and in the second case, it is on the man's share of paid labour. This simplifies interpretation, as both of these indicators are expected to often work together in the same direction, i.e. that when a woman does a greater part of the housework, the man will be doing a greater part of the paid work and vice-versa, as per time-availability constraints theory. The equations underneath formally present the construction of these indexes, with  $STu_{it}$  representing the gender Specialisation of Time spent on Unpaid labour in the couple of which individual  $i$  is a member around the time  $t$  of the interview, and  $STp_{it}$  representing the gender Specialisation of Paid labour time.

$$STu_{it} = \left( \frac{hu_{w,it}}{hu_{w,it} + hu_{m,it}} \right) \times 100$$

$$STp_{it} = \left( \frac{hp_{m,it}}{hp_{w,it} + hp_{m,it}} \right) \times 100$$

The gender specialisation of unpaid labour time  $STu_{it}$  is thus a percentage of the hours spent weekly by the woman on unpaid reproductive work  $hu_w$ , out of the total of hours spent by the couple as a whole (both man and woman) on such work. The gender specialisation of paid labour time  $STp_{it}$  represents the proportion of the couples' hours of paid work that is done by the man.

Finally, I combine  $STu$  and  $STp$  to obtain a compound index of the gender specialisation of labour time, following the calculation below.

$$ST_{it} = \frac{STu_{it} + STp_{it} - 100}{100}$$

This index thus ranges from -1 to +1, with values around zero indicating little or no gender-specialisation of labour time. This can mean that both unpaid

labour time and paid labour time are equally distributed between man and woman; or it can reflect situations where a more gender-specialised division of time on one front (e.g. paid labour time) is compensated by a gender-subversive division of time on the other front (e.g. the man spends more time on unpaid labour than the woman does). Values close to 1 would suggest almost complete gender-specialisation, with men doing all or almost all of the paid labour time and none or almost none of the unpaid labour time. Negative values indicate a reversal of gender-specialisation of labour time, where -1 would be a complete reversal, with women doing all of the couple's paid labour time, and none of the couple's unpaid labour time.

This focus on gender-specialisation of labour, either through tasks or labour time provided by men and women respectively, is one way of approaching the gender division of labour. It is conceptually particularly interested in asymmetries between partners, on the assumption that these asymmetries betray power imbalances in the couple, which can also be translated more broadly into situations of precariousness, financial dependency, constrained access to and involvement in paid work, etc. From this perspective, there is no reason to exclude unemployed couples from the analysis (defined as neither partner doing any hour of paid work in the previous week). The fact that these couples have no paid work time to share simply means for us that there is no imbalance between partners as regards paid work time. These couples' distribution of paid work time is thus considered to be equal (half and half), and is coded zero (neutral) in both indexes of gender specialisation – a semantic but not a theoretical stretch. However, it is possible that unemployed couples represent a singular case in the division of labour. As a category, they constitute only a fraction of couples, but enough of the total that, for the sake of rigor, I include in all models a dummy variable that controls for couples' unemployment.

I end up with two indexes for the overall gender specialisation of labour in couple:  $S_{it}$  replicates (although with slightly richer information) the modelling strategy designed with the French data.  $ST_{it}$  proposes an approach that could not be constructed using the French data: instead of reasoning in terms of employment status and responsibility for tasks, the variable is constructed on the distribution of paid and unpaid labour time. The gendered division of unpaid labour time, since it integrates care time, can be considered a (rough) measure of the distribution of reproductive labour, rather than a narrower measure of housework distribution, which would arguably miss an important aspect of what the gender division of labour is about (Bhattacharya, 2017; Kofman, 2014).

## Other variables

I have not included marital status in the analyses, not because it is not relevant to couples' gender arrangements (it is), but because in the context of migration it is a somewhat complicated to interpret. For instance, almost all migrant couples are married (indeed most migrants are married), and cohabiting couples are virtually non-existent in the sample for certain migrant groups (e.g. Pakistani migrants). Marriage is also to a large extent necessary to certain migratory paths - e.g. spouse visas - but this would only affect certain migrant groups and not others - typically not EU migrants.

### 6.2.3 Methods and tools

#### Systematically gendering

As mentioned in the construction of the variables for the gender division of labour, one of the major difficulties of working at a couple level is that we always have to factor in two pieces of information instead of one, and often have to arbitrate between them. Couple are matched through couple types (e.g. migrant-native), but in most respects the analyses are based on individual rather than couple-based or couple-matched characteristics. Notable exceptions are couple's age (average across the two partners) and age gap (calculated as the age of the man, minus the age of the woman) as well as the key dependent variables of gender division of labour.

#### Sample, weighting and statistical tools

As before, all analyses are survey-weighted unless specified otherwise. The statistical methods employed include descriptive methods and survey-weighted linear regression models. The weighting accounts for the complex survey design – with cluster, stratification and boost samples – and for non-random missing values. Standard errors are in brackets. All regression models control for (but do not always display in the tables): the presence of dependent children under 16 living in the household; the age of women (or the age of men when the models segregate by gender and focus on women/men only); age gap; and whether the couple is not engaged in any paid work at the time of the interview (combined hours of paid work in past week: 0). Whenever the issue of strata with a single primary unit arose, the standard error estimates for the strata with a single primary units are calculated on the distance from the mean across strata, rather than a strata mean (Pitblado 2009), as recommended by the Understanding Society design team (Lynn 2015).

## 6.3 Results

### 6.3.1 Couples' gender division of labour in the United Kingdom


When taken as a whole and put side by side, it is apparent that while the gender division of paid and unpaid labour time reflect some broad symmetry, but no perfect resemblance. The plots in figure 6.2 illustrate the density of different levels of gender division of labour, for all cohabiting couples aged 18 to 60, on the scale and indexes described above. The column on the left provide visualisation for the variables involved in the first index of gender-specialisation. The density distribution of paid labour indicates that an overwhelming majority of co-resident couples are dual-career couples, in the sense that both woman and man are in paid employment. A much smaller proportion of couples are in a male-sole-breadwinner arrangement and an even smaller proportion in a female-sole-breadwinner model. Here having the two variable construction side-by-side is instructive: the plot that illustrates the density distribution for men's percentage share of paid labour time provides further information in showing how this dual-employment category is very skewed to the right. It peaks on an equal distribution of paid labour time,<sup>4</sup> but also shows high densities on the right of this centre peak. This indicates that in many couples, women and men are in paid employment but the men do more hours than the women, and in a not-insignificant proportion of cases, do all of the couples' hours of paid work.

The distribution of unpaid labour appears very consistent across the two relevant variables (gender division of domestic and childcare responsibilities (on the left) and gender division of housework and care time (on the right). Both plots present a similar shape, with a gradual, almost linear increase of density as the distribution of unpaid labour becomes more gender-specialised. However, one can note, a relative peak at an equal distribution, but not to the extent that it catches up with the density level observed for fully gender-specialised arrangements (couples where the woman reports doing all of the unpaid labour and the man none of it).

The compound measures of gender specialisation appear overall consistent, although the second index, based on labour time distribution, paints a somewhat more patriarchal picture, with more couples appearing closer to 1, that is, completely gender-specialised division of labour. This is mostly explained by the greater sensitivity of the labour time approach to gender asymmetries in the division of paid labour time among dual-employment couples.

<sup>4</sup>In this case, the bar at 50% also includes couples where neither partner does paid work, which contributes to the peak effect at this point.

FIGURE 6.2: Histogram: gender specialisation of labour across all couples (UK)



*Note:* Survey-weighted histogram density and smoothed splines (bandwidth = 0.05)


*Source* UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2(2009-2019).

*Universe:* all coresident man-woman couples (18-60))

### 6.3.2 Couple types and gender specialisation

These first measures showed varying levels of gender-specialisation in the partnered population at large. From hereon, I distinguish between different couple types, based on the migratory background of both partners. The first question I try to answer here is whether there are measurable differences in the gender division of labour between partners, depending on the type of couple. Figure 6.3 shows the mean score for gender-specialisation (index 1), the gender division of paid labour, and the gender division of unpaid labour. The equivalent barplots for scores based on labour time are not included here but they look very similar. The table 6.1 presents the results from the regressions that simply model the association between couple type and gender division of labour, controlling for age, the presence of dependent children in the home, and the educational level of both partners. The top part of table 6.1 gives the results for the models that use the variables of the first index of gender-specialisation as dependent variables. The bottom part of the table uses the variables based on the division of labour time as dependent variables (index 2).

FIGURE 6.3: Gender specialisation by couple types



Data: UKLHS, Wave 2 respondents (2009-2011) survey-weighted | Universe: coresident man-woman couples (18-60)

The mean gender-specialisation of most couple does not differ from the mean of native majority couples (NAT-NAT, both partners born in the UK to UK-born parents). Thus, couples constituted of a native majority partner and either a descendant of migrant or a primary migrant are not distinguishable from native majority couples in terms of gender-specialisation of labour. This also applies to unions formed by two UK-born descendants of migrants, in which the gender division of both paid and unpaid labour is consistent with that of native majority couples. The couples that are the exception are migrant couples, and couples formed by a migrant and a direct descendant of migrant. It is specifically in relation to paid labour that these couples differ notably from the others, with a greater proportion of male-sole-breadwinner couples. This

greater specialisation of paid labour drives the significant association found between these couple types and a higher score on the gender-specialisation index (index 1). Interestingly, the first index does not capture significant differences in the division of unpaid labour, suggesting that all couple types are more or less evenly patriarchal in their gender division of routine housework and childcare responsibilities. In contrast, measuring the division of unpaid labour in terms of the women's share of the couple's total household and care labour time brings out significant associations. In couples formed by two migrants or one migrant and one descendant of migrant(s), the women's share of unpaid labour time is a couple of percentage points higher than in native majority couples (4% higher for MIG-2G couples, and just under 3% for migrant couples). Similarly, every other point of the analysis in terms of labour time (Index 2) confirms the results based on housework and childcare responsibilities (Index 1).

Unsurprisingly, living with dependent children is closely related to more gender-specialised divisions of labour: the presence of children under the age of 16 in the home is connected with a 10% increase in men's share of paid labour time, and a 7% increase in women's share of unpaid labour time. The effects are also significant when looking at the other measures of labour distribution. The role of age is slightly more ambivalent: younger couples appear somewhat more egalitarian than older couples when it comes to the gender division of unpaid labour, but this does not apply to paid work. The labour time measures find no significant linear association between age and paid labour distribution between men and women, while the more basic measure on employment status (index 1) finds a negative connection, suggesting that there would be more dual-career or female-breadwinner couples among older couples than among younger couples. As regards educational level, higher education (including university-level and other types of higher education) is associated with slightly less unequal arrangements within couples.

TABLE 6.1: Gender specialisation by couple types

	Gender-specialisation of labour (Index 1)	Gender division of paid labour	Gender division of unpaid labour
(Intercept)	.335 (.034)***	.364 (.049)***	.304 (.038)***
<b>Couple type</b> [ref=NAT-NAT]	-.024 (.013)	-.017 (.019)	-.030 (.018)
2G-NAT			
2G-2G	-.030 (.033)	-.034 (.046)	-.032 (.037)
MIG-NAT	-.000 (.016)	.025 (.022)	-.025 (.019)
MIG-2G	.070 (.026)***	.132 (.034)***	.009 (.030)
MIG-MIG	.074 (.014)***	.138 (.021)***	.010 (.018)
Age (couple average)	-.009 (.003)***	-.019 (.004)***	.002 (.003)
Age-squared (couple average)	.000 (.000)***	.000 (.000)***	.000 (.000)
Age gap (man-woman)	-.003 (.001)***	.001 (.001)	-.005 (.001)***
Coresident children under 16 [ref=no]	.166 (.009)***	.181 (.013)***	.152 (.012)***
Education [ref= < GSCE]: GSCE	-.014 (.010)	-.024 (.014)	-.003 (.012)
Education: Higher/tertiary	-.056 (.010)***	.062 (.015)***	.051 (.013)***
Both partners unemployed [ref=no]	-.147 (.012)***	.177 (.011)***	.117 (.020)***
Deviance	1968.934	3767.305	2781.838
Dispersion	.114	.219	.162
Num. obs.	16822	16847	16822
	Gender-specialisation of labour time (Index 2)	Gender division of paid labour time	Gender division of unpaid labour time
(Intercept)	.225 (.034)***	<b>61.487</b> (2.313)	<b>61.452</b> (2.001)***
<b>Couple type</b> [ref=NAT-NAT]	-.030 (.015)*	-1.722 (.977)	-1.279 (.921)
2G-NAT			
2G-2G	-.061 (.036)	-2.696 (2.450)	-3.457 (2.175)
MIG-NAT	.014 (.018)	<b>2.334</b> (1.153)*	-.947 (1.073)
MIG-2G	.098 (.026)***	<b>4.741</b> (1.620)**	<b>4.755</b> (1.532)**
MIG-MIG	.088 (.017)***	<b>5.271</b> (1.131)**	<b>3.438</b> (.954)***
Age (couple average)	-.002 (.003)	-.305 (.188)	.112 (.165)
Age-squared (couple average)	.000 (.000)	.006 (.004)	.005 (.003)
Age gap (man-woman)	-.005 (.001)***	.188 (.062)**	-.342 (.057)***
Coresident children under 16 [ref=no]	.193 (.010)***	<b>11.285</b> (.643)*	<b>7.981</b> (.638)***
Education [ref= < GSCE]: GSCE	-.018 (.011)	-.748 (.718)	-1.016 (.632)
Education: Higher/tertiary	-.080 (.012)***	<b>3.512</b> (.784)***	<b>4.395</b> (.671)***
Both partners unemployed [ref=no]	-.190 (.015)***	<b>13.878</b> (.785)***	<b>5.054</b> (1.241)***
Deviance	2274.789	9673883.228	7930104.159
Dispersion	.133	561.196	463.885
Num. obs.	16707	16847	16707

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ 


Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).

Universe: partnered migrants in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60.

### 6.3.3 Insights from gendering partnerships


As we have seen in the previous chapter, the connections between couples' migratory configuration and the gender division of labour may be dependent on couples' particular gendered (and not just migratory) profile. It may be of use therefore to distinguish between different kinds of 'mixed' couples (i.e. where partners have different relationships to migration) along gender lines. Figure 6.4 offers the same kind of visualisation we just analysed, but 2G-NAT, MIG-NAT, and MIG-2G couples are each split into two categories reflecting the two possible gender configurations. Table 6.2 shows the result for the corresponding survey-weighted linear regressions models.

FIGURE 6.4: Gender specialisation by gendered couple types



This analytical approach serves to highlight some important points. No statistical differences emerge with regards to couples with at least one native majority partner regardless of the migration background of the other partner and the gender configurations of the couple. Using both measuring strategies of gender-specialisation further demonstrates this consistency across all types of native majority couples, which as detailed also extends to migrant-native majority couples (MIG-NAT). The models also confirm that migrant couples are significantly associated with more gender-specialised divisions of paid and unpaid labour, although the effect is much stronger for the division of paid work, and indeed there is no significant association with the gender division of unpaid labour tasks.

FIGURE 6.5: Couples' joint employment status, by gendered couple types




is consistent across both measuring strategies, with the labour time approach additionally finding a significant 5% increase in these women's share of unpaid labour time (as well as a 5% decrease in their share of paid labour time) compared to native women in native majority couples. Conversely, the task-based measure found no significant association. However, the reverse gender-configuration of MIG-2G couples, namely MIGm-2Gw (migrant man, native woman with migrant parent(s)) is associated with a much more nuanced effect, smaller in scale, and only significant for paid labour division.

This empirical evidence effectively supports the argument postulated by Charsley et al. (2017) (see also, Charsley et al. (2020), Charsley, Storer-Church, Benson, and Van Hear (2012) in support of the 'Lievens hypothesis' (Lievens, 1999)); namely, for women who are direct descendants of migrants, marriage with a migrant man is not necessarily a marker or a vector of patriarchal imposition. Instead, they suggest that for some women who are UK-born descendant of migrants (in their respective case studies, the native-born daughters of Pakistani migrants living in the UK and of Turkish migrants living in Belgium), marrying a migrant partner could be a way to negotiate independence and agency against family pressure and gender norms.

What the gendering of couples brings to the analysis is a distinction between migrants and UK-born direct descendants of migrants. In the models, with the controls, we find that when those couples that involve a migrant woman and a British-born man with migrant parent(s) (MIGw-2Gm) are associated with significantly more gender-specialised divisions of labour. This

Contrary to what appeared in the French data, however, couples comprising descendants of migrants (2G-2G) do not significantly differ from other native couples on any axis or measure of labour division between men and women in couples. This could be interpreted as suggesting that the UK performed better than France in terms of assimilating descendants of migrants to prevalent gender practices of labour distribution in the majority population. There are however two points of caution to consider. Firstly, the sample size for descendants of migrants is small, not insignificantly smaller than for the French survey, which as we have seen specifically over-sampled descendants of migrants born in France. This reduces both the statistical power and the chances that these models yield statistically significant results for couples that include descendants of migrants. Secondly, the idea that migrants and descendants of migrants' gender practices is best interpreted as integration (or lack thereof) into the majority British population on the basis of how more or less patriarchal these practices are, is somewhat flawed, since the native majority population is in many regards not gender-equal. Couples comprising men and women who are both British-born and born to UK-born parents, divide paid and unpaid labour unequally between genders. While native majority women appear to have a better access to paid labour, the gender distribution of unpaid labour appears as unequal in native majority couples as in most other couple types. Keeping this in mind, it is possible to offer some trails for interpreting this difference between the behaviours associated with descendants of migrants in France and in the UK. Such a trail can be found for instance in Ichou's work (2015) on educational performance of descendants of migrants in both countries. Ichou explains the lower performance of this population in France by the class origin of their migrant parents - showing that the migrant populations that migrated to the UK were selected from higher social strata in their country of origin, compared to France-bound migratory flows. This in turn meant that descendants of migrants in the UK are more likely to have parents and especially mothers who, in line with their class origins, value, emphasize and support educational capital and performance - more so than in France. Roeder and Mühlau (2014) found that a high degree of educational achievement, especially in migrant women, was linked to increased pace and odds of declaring and adopting gender-egalitarian

FIGURE 6.6: Mean gender-specialisation score by gendered couple types (index 2)



beliefs post-migration. Accordingly, descendants of migrants in the UK are more likely to have had educated mothers compared to their counterparts in France - especially if their mother identifies as 'Other white', 'Chinese', 'Black Caribbean' or 'Black African' (Ichou, 2015, p. 35).

In general, when using this very rough scale of migrant / native with direct migration background / native majority (no direct migration background), migrant women appear to experience more gender-specialised couple arrangements, doing more unpaid labour and less paid labour than their partner, relative to non-migrant women in various couple types. The exception is when migrant women are partnered with native majority men.

TABLE 6.2: Gender division of labour (index 1 (top) and Index 2 (bottom)) by gendered couple types

	Gender-specialisation of labour (Index 1)	Gender division of paid labour	Gender division of unpaid labour
(Intercept)	.335 (.034)***	.365 (.049)***	.303 (.038)***
<b>Gendered couple type [ref=NAT-NAT]</b>	<b>-.058 (.019)**</b>	<b>-.052 (.026)*</b>	<b>-.065 (.024)**</b>
2Gw-NATm	.010 (.019)	.016 (.027)	.003 (.024)
2Gm-NATw	-.030 (.033)	-.034 (.046)	-.032 (.037)
2G-2G	.011 (.021)	.054 (.029)	-.031 (.023)
MIGw-NATm	-.016 (.024)	-.015 (.032)	-.017 (.030)
MIGm-NATw	.084 (.038)*	.153 (.044)***	.015 (.048)
MIGw-2Gm	.057 (.038)	.110 (.051)*	.003 (.036)
MIGm-2Gw	.074 (.014)***	.138 (.021)***	.011 (.018)
MIG-MIG			
Age (couple average)	-.009 (.003)**	-.019 (.004)***	.002 (.003)
Age-squared (couple average)	.000 (.000)***	.000 (.000)***	.000 (.000)
Age gap (man-woman)	-.003 (.001)***	.001 (.001)	-.005 (.001)***
Coresident children under 16 [ref=no]	.166 (.009)***	.181 (.013)***	.152 (.012)***
Education [ref= < GSCE]: GSCE	-.014 (.010)	-.024 (.014)	-.003 (.012)
Education: Higher/tertiary	-.056 (.010)***	.062 (.015)***	.051 (.013)***
Both partners unemployed [ref=no]	-.146 (.012)***	.177 (.011)***	.116 (.020)***
Deviance	1966.524	3763.565	2779.657
Dispersion	.114	.218	.161
Num. obs.	16822	16847	16822
	Gender-specialisation of labour time (Index 2)	Gender division of paid labour time	Gender division of unpaid labour time
(Intercept)	.226 (.034)***	<b>61.500 (2.314)</b>	<b>61.489 (2.000)***</b>
<b>Gendered couple type [ref=NAT-NAT]</b>	<b>-.070 (.021)***</b>	<b>-.3922 (1.354)</b>	<b>-.3089 (1.207)*</b>
2Gw-NATm	.010 (.021)	.431 (1.361)	.487 (1.293)
2Gm-NATw	-.061 (.036)	-.2688 (2.451)	-.3449 (2.175)
2G-2G	.031 (.022)	3.009 (1.541)	.155 (1.222)
MIGw-NATm	-.011 (.029)	1.405 (1.639)	-.2486 (1.766)
MIGm-NATw	.118 (.038)**	<b>5.510 (2.199)*</b>	<b>6.015 (2.300)**</b>
MIGw-2Gm	.077 (.035)*	3.967 (2.352)	3.470 (2.003)
MIGm-2Gw	.088 (.017)***	<b>5.286 (1.132)*</b>	<b>5.455 (.954)***</b>
MIG-MIG			
Age (couple average)	-.002 (.003)	-.305 (.188)	.109 (.165)
Age-squared (couple average)	.000 (.000)	.006 (.004)	.005 (.003)
Age gap (man-woman)	-.005 (.001)***	.195 (.062)**	-.348 (.057)***
Coresident children under 16 [ref=no]	.193 (.010)***	<b>11.274 (.644)*</b>	<b>7.983 (.638)***</b>
Education [ref= < GSCE]: GSCE	-.018 (.011)	-.746 (.718)	-.1017 (.633)
Education: Higher/tertiary	-.080 (.012)***	<b>3.525 (.785)***</b>	<b>4.415 (.671)***</b>
Both partners unemployed [ref=no]	-.189 (.015)***	<b>13.842 (.786)***</b>	<b>5.036 (1.243)***</b>
Deviance	2271.153	9664166.924	7921538.381
Dispersion	.133	560.632	463.384
Num. obs.	16707	16847	16707

\*\*\*p &lt; 0.001; \*\*p &lt; 0.01; \*p &lt; 0.05


Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).

Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.

### 6.3.4 Migrant women and migrant men: from gendered paths to the gendered labour of love

Building on this rough outline of partnerships, what is at stake is to assess whether these differences reflect cultural differences and areas of socialisation or contrasting experiences of migration - or both.

FIGURE 6.7: Couples' joint employment status, by individuals' area of birth



and (2) migrants' union-migration trajectories. Then in a second stage I combine both in single models (the third column section of tables 6.3 and 6.4). The first table (table 6.3) displays the models' results and fit for the weighted sample of migrant women. The second table (table 6.4) displays the equivalent for migrant men. In both tables, the dependent variables are the scores for the gender division of paid labour (1) and unpaid labour (2). The top half of the tables present the estimates for models based on joint employment status and housework/childcare tasks. The bottom half display the estimates for models based on time-distribution. Finally, the third table (Table 6.5) uses the compound gender-specialisation indexes as dependent variables, putting models for migrant women alongside those for migrant men to facilitate comparison.

The first column section includes the variable on the birthplace of migrants, as well as the migratory background of their partner. EU-27 migrants form the baseline category for the first, and migrant couples for the second - since the vast majority of migrants are partnered with other migrants. All models control, as before, for age, the presence of children under the age of 16 in the household, and whether respondents had access to university or another form of higher

The analysis shifts here from all couples to migrant individuals in different couple configurations. The regression models are complexified and gender-segregated, with different models fitted to migrant women and migrant men respectively. I proceed in step-wise fashion. First, I model separately the statistical relationship between the gender division of paid and unpaid labour and (1) migrants' areas of origin (as well as couple types and other covariates),

education.

TABLE 6.3: Step-wise survey-weighted linear regression models. Gender division of labour: migrant women

	Paid labour	Unpaid labour	Paid labour	Unpaid labour	Paid labour	Unpaid labour
(Intercept)	<b>1.079</b> (.288)***	<b>.686</b> (.220)**	<b>.949</b> (.335)**	<b>.724</b> (.233)**	<b>.230</b> (.099)*	<b>.362</b> (.076)***
Partner [ref: migrant (MIG-MIG)] Native 2G (MIG-2G)	.032 (.046)	.010 (.045)	.037 (.050)	-.017 (.050)	.005 (.050)	-.018 (.051)
Majority native (MIG-NAT)	.014 (.039)					
Where born [ref=EU] Caribbean	-.093 (.090)					
Africa	-.005 (.046)					
India	.075 (.049)					
Pakistan/Bangladesh	<b>.340</b> (.052)***					
Southeast Asia	.081 (.058)					
Other areas	.039 (.048)					
Migration sequence [ref=Single adults]						
Formation 1st partnership						
Established 1st partnership						
Partnership reconfigurations						
Child migrants (1.5G)						
How long in the UK (years since migration)	-.006 (.001)***	.001 (.001)				
Deviance	473.987	278.249	438.198	253.412	439.221	247.419
Dispersion	.248	.147	.277	.161	.281	.159
Num. obs.	1738	1748	1532	1526	1516	1510
	Paid labour time	Unpaid labour time	Paid labour time	Unpaid labour time	Paid labour time	Unpaid labour time
(Intercept)	<b>103.763</b> (15.754)***	<b>89.463</b> (12.772)***	<b>97.729</b> (17.626)***	<b>91.252</b> (13.811)***	<b>97.282</b> (17.366)***	<b>88.437</b> (14.456)***
Partner [ref: migrant (MIG-MIG)] Native 2G (MIG-2G)	1.098 (2.332)	3.624 (2.428)	1.588 (2.557)	2.432 (2.774)	.545 (2.598)	2.904 (2.775)
Majority native (MIG-NAT)						
Where born [ref=EU] Caribbean						
Africa						
India						
Pakistan/Bangladesh						
Southeast Asia						
Other areas						
Migration sequence [ref=Single adults]						
Formation 1st partnership						
Established 1st partnership						
Partnership reconfigurations						
Child migrants (1.5G)						
How long in the UK (years since migration)	-.219 (.079)***	.040 (.071)				
Deviance	-2.238 (.806)***	-1.312 (.700)	-2.055 (.891)*	-1.402 (.749)	-2.201 (.875)*	-1.375 (.783)
Age-squared	.029 (.010)**	.017 (.009)	.025 (.011)*	.018 (.009)	.027 (.011)*	.018 (.010)
Age gap (Man-Woman)	.008 (.170)	-.165 (.160)	-.075 (.172)	-.206 (.161)	-.088 (.180)	-.241 (.168)
Coresident children under 16 [ref=no]	<b>13.211</b> (1.744)***	<b>7.973</b> (1.663)***	<b>14.963</b> (1.899)***	<b>8.910</b> (1.849)***	<b>13.935</b> (1.890)***	<b>7.826</b> (1.822)***
Higher/tertiary education [ref=no]	<b>-7.416</b> (1.638)***	<b>-4.797</b> (1.414)***	<b>-8.571</b> (1.727)***	<b>-5.324</b> (1.493)***	<b>-7.416</b> (1.730)***	<b>-4.589</b> (1.491)***
Both partners unemployed	<b>-24.410</b> (2.448)***	-.029 (2.696)	<b>-22.289</b> (2.623)***	-.414 (2.974)	<b>-24.171</b> (2.722)***	-.1048 (2.928)
Deviance	1210390.112	708366.431	1104465.180	656284.555	1064379.953	625773.944
Dispersion	632.752	459.687	698.601	483.996	680.129	467.006
Num. obs.	1738	1504	1532	1319	1516	1303

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ . variables for the first models (top half of the table) are not displayed. Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012). Universe: partnered migrant women (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).

TABLE 6.4: Step-wise survey-weighted linear regression models. Gender division of labour: migrant men

	Paid labour	Unpaid labour	Paid labour	Unpaid labour	Paid labour	Unpaid labour
(Intercept)	<b>1.059</b> (.318)***	.313 (.264)	.825 (.354)*	-.015 (.292)	<b>.947</b> (.345)***	-.082 (.293)
Partner [ref: migrant (MIG-MIG)] Native 2G (MIG-2G)	<b>-.109</b> (.051)*	-.017 (.037)	-.012 (.059)	-.033 (.047)	-.051 (.051)	-.031 (.043)
Majority native (MIG-NAT)	<b>-.107</b> (.046)*	-.050 (.041)	-.090 (.046)	-.028 (.040)	-.051 (.049)	-.025 (.042)
Where born [ref=EU] Caribbean	<b>-.148</b> (.077)	<b>-.193</b> (.080)*	-.036 (.038)		<b>-.160</b> (.081)*	-.158 (.084)
Africa	<b>.042</b> (.047)	<b>.036</b> (.038)			.040 (.053)	-.014 (.044)
India	<b>.072</b> (.059)	<b>.006</b> (.039)	<b>.080</b> (.042)		.114 (.063)	.074 (.044)
Pakistan/Bangladesh	<b>.352</b> (.056)***	<b>.004</b> (.060)	<b>-.076</b> (.061)		<b>.391</b> (.062)***	-.088 (.068)
Southeast Asia	<b>.004</b> (.056)	<b>.185</b> (.056)***	<b>.033</b> (.039)		<b>.164</b> (.057)***	.019 (.044)
Other areas					<b>-.104</b> (.049)*	.055 (.041)
Migration sequence [ref=Single adults]						
Formation 1st partnership						
Established 1st partnership						
Partnership reconfigurations						
Child migrants (1.5G)						
How long in the UK (years since migration)	<b>-.001</b> (.002)	<b>.005</b> (.001)***			<b>-.002</b> (.003)*	-.033 (.057)
					<b>.006</b> (.003)*	<b>.006</b> (.003)*
Deviance	437.500	250.217	375.521	210.764	352.433	201.921
Dispersion	.237	.138	.292	.164	.276	.159
Num. obs.	1528	1523	1263	1258	1253	1248
	Paid labour time	Unpaid labour time	Paid labour time	Unpaid labour time	Paid labour time	Unpaid labour time
(Intercept)	<b>77.556</b> (15.885)***	<b>66.718</b> (15.617)***	<b>66.987</b> (18.090)***	<b>55.835</b> (17.834)***	<b>73.412</b> (18.142)***	<b>53.577</b> (17.511)***
Partner [ref: migrant (MIG-MIG)] Native 2G (MIG-2G)	<b>-.5531</b> (2.424)*	<b>-.1859</b> (2.191)	<b>-.1.906</b> (2.823)	<b>-.3.418</b> (2.779)	<b>-.3.426</b> (2.443)	<b>-.4.495</b> (2.565)
Majority native (MIG-NAT)	<b>-.4.416</b> (2.362)	<b>-.6.099</b> (2.301)**	<b>-.3.184</b> (2.308)	<b>-.6.666</b> (2.244)**	<b>-.2.123</b> (2.543)	<b>-.5.179</b> (2.326)*
Where born [ref=EU] Caribbean	<b>-.10.272</b> (4.159)*	<b>-.4.072</b> (3.920)			<b>-.10.962</b> (4.431)*	<b>-.4.078</b> (4.019)
Africa	<b>-.351</b> (2.466)	<b>-.070</b> (2.270)			<b>-.735</b> (2.827)	<b>-.2.057</b> (2.479)
India	<b>-.469</b> (3.066)	<b>6.894</b> (2.294)*	<b>10.470</b> (2.363)***		<b>1.105</b> (3.304)	<b>5.309</b> (2.565)*
Pakistan/Bangladesh	<b>15.848</b> (2.485)***		<b>2.179</b> (3.709)	<b>-.231</b> (3.507)	<b>17.727</b> (2.895)***	<b>11.492</b> (2.547)***
Southeast Asia			<b>8.867</b> (2.525)***	<b>3.831</b> (2.396)	<b>.711</b> (4.161)	<b>-.621</b> (3.953)
Other areas					<b>8.110</b> (2.756)***	<b>2.876</b> (2.589)
Migration sequence [ref=Single adults]					<b>-.5.350</b> (2.473)*	<b>-.5.36</b> (2.468)
Formation 1st partnership						
Established 1st partnership						
Partnership reconfigurations						
Child migrants (1.5G)						
How long in the UK (years since migration)	<b>.151</b> (.084)	<b>.230</b> (.066)***			<b>-.527</b> (3.194)	<b>-.824</b> (3.292)
					<b>-.2.890</b> (4.681)	<b>-.1.303</b> (4.756)
					<b>-.3.741</b> (3.612)	<b>-.3.981</b> (3.623)
					<b>-.208</b> (.177)	<b>.197</b> (.174)
Age	<b>-.869</b> (.828)	<b>-.363</b> (.795)	<b>-.192</b> (.923)	<b>.406</b> (.900)	<b>-.580</b> (.931)	<b>.488</b> (.882)
Age-squared	<b>.007</b> (.010)	<b>.006</b> (.010)	<b>-.002</b> (.011)	<b>-.003</b> (.011)	<b>.003</b> (.011)	<b>-.005</b> (.010)
Age gap (Man-Woman)	<b>.390</b> (.177)*	<b>-.248</b> (.165)	<b>.482</b> (.194)*	<b>-.149</b> (.190)*	<b>.397</b> (.190)*	<b>-.184</b> (.189)
Coresident children under 16 [ref=no]	<b>12.542</b> (1.833)***	<b>6.752</b> (1.878)***	<b>13.825</b> (2.038)***	<b>5.002</b> (1.923)***	<b>12.653</b> (2.058)***	<b>4.360</b> (1.940)*
Higher/tertiary education [ref=no]	<b>-.858</b> (1.542)	<b>-.209</b> (1.534)	<b>.131</b> (1.786)	<b>.282</b> (1.615)	<b>-.173</b> (1.777)	<b>.314</b> (1.651)
Both partners unemployed	<b>-.23.243</b> (2.724)***	<b>-.1.274</b> (2.552)	<b>-.17.234</b> (2.478)***	<b>-.1.843</b> (2.976)	<b>-.20.341</b> (2.470)***	<b>-.2.959</b> (2.922)
Deviance	1096429.154	716879.550	952456.067	607947.764	894352.018	573905.480
Dispersion	594.660	498.877	740.070	514.780	700.365	489.687
Num. obs.	1528	1418	1263	1165	1253	1156

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ . variables for the first models (top half of the table) are not displayed. Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).

Universe: partnered migrant men (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).

The first table, on migrant women, reveals a number of significant associations. At the same time, adding the birthplace of migrant women or their union-migration trajectory, or both, makes couple types' effects drop below the threshold of statistical significance. Considering the limited sample size and statistical power, this does not mean that we can rule out the possible relevance of couple types. Nevertheless, it contrasts with the strong association found between Pakistani- or Bangladeshi-born migrants and more gender-polarised divisions of both paid and unpaid labour. Compared to migrant women from EU-27 countries, according to this model, Pakistani- or Bangladeshi-born migrant women tend to be in couples in which they bear on average 10% more of the couples' unpaid labour time, and in which male partners take on almost 12% more of the couple's paid labour time. The labour-time approach also shows that Indian-born migrant women take on a greater share of the unpaid labour time, although not significantly less of the paid labour time - something that concurs with the observations made by Charsley et al. (2020, ch. 7) on e.g. Sikh transnational marriages.<sup>5</sup> Women in other migrant groups did not differ significantly from European migrants.

The second category of models, (centre column section) replaces area of origin with union-migration sequences. The baseline category here is the sequence cluster of 'single adult migrations'. With the tasks and employment status-based dependent variables (top half), only the sequence cluster for the first partnership formation appears significantly associated with a more gender-specialised division of paid labour. The labour-time based models also associates the partnership formation sequence with a gendering effect but in unpaid rather than paid labour time distribution - namely a 10% increase in women's share of couples' unpaid labour time.

The models presented in the last two columns on the left (Table 1) include both areas of origin and union-migration sequences as predictors. The effects of both are significant: migrant women from Pakistan/Bangladesh remain the only group consistently associated with more gender-specialised divisions of paid and unpaid labour. Indian migrants are also associated with more gender-specialisation but specifically of unpaid labour. Likewise, when considering the association between sequences of first couple formation and partnership reconfiguration on the one hand, and more gender-specialisation of labour in the other hand, we find that it remains significant even when keeping area

<sup>5</sup>Charsley et al. (2020, p. 198) note that while marrying a woman from 'back home' can be associated (or even motivated) with the expectation that she would be more willing than a British-born woman to extensively provide domestic and care labour, '[i]n Sikh families, expectations of a more 'traditional' Indian bride often went alongside an expectation that they would take up paid employment.'


of origin constant. The positive coefficients associated with these interwoven sequences remain strongly significant. Notwithstanding area of origin, when women migrate at around the same time as they form their first relationship, this is associated with these women taking on a relatively smaller share of the paid labour time. By contrast, when women migrate after the end of a first relationship and, often, around the time where they start another partnership, this is not connected to any significant difference in paid labour distribution compared to couples formed by migrant women who migrated as single adults, prior to partnership formation. The division of unpaid labour, however, is more gender-specialised. Compared to women who migrate as single adult migrants, those who follow a union-migration trajectory of *partnership reconfiguration* take on a share of housework and care time that is 10 percentage points higher, and this regardless of area of origin. In addition, controlling for area of origin sees the child migrant sequence now associated with a comparatively slight but significant gendering of the division of unpaid labour.

Looking now at the mirror models fitted to the sample of migrant men (table 6.4), I find that migrant men from Pakistan/Bangladesh are similarly associated with more gender-specialised divisions of paid labour and unpaid labour, and Indian migrant men with more gendered domestic and care arrangements. In contrast, Caribbean migrant men are connected with a greater prevalence of gender-equal or gender-reversed divisions of paid labour (but not unpaid labour), something supported by the literature that points to the greater proportion of male unemployment and female-breadwinner households among Caribbean couples (Foner, 1979; Li & Heath, 2018). Migrants from the residual 'other areas' also divides paid labour in a more gender-specialised way compared to European migrant men, the reference group.

All effects of areas of origin survive the introduction of sequence variables within the model (full models, last two columns in table 6.4). The coefficients associated with men's union-migration sequences, however, reveal a clear contrast with those of migrant women. The sequence cluster *formation 1st partnership* is connected to a gender-subversive effect on paid labour, with migrant men having followed this sequence having less of a monopoly on paid labour time. Similarly, *partnership reconfiguration* sequences are associated with a more equal division of *unpaid* labour, the complete inverse of the associations observed for migrant women. This association however is not significant once controlling for area of origin, whereas the link between *formation 1st partnership* and paid labour division endures and indeed the effect is larger when we introduce areas of origin into the models. The same observation applies to the effect of areas of origin. Areas of origin being reported as Pakistan/Bangladesh, India, the

Caribbean and 'other areas' are still linked to significant effects when accounting for different union-migration sequences, and indeed some coefficients - all those that significantly link to paid labour division - increase.

FIGURE 6.8: Coefficient plot: association between sequences of union-migration and the gender-specialisation of labour-time



It is interesting to note that the two measures of paid labour divisions yield noticeably different results in the case of migrant men. Thus some of the models that use the measure of paid labour division based on joint employment status as dependent variable find that having a native majority partner (rather than a migrant partner) is connected, for migrant men, with lower propensity of sole male breadwinner arrangements. This is in line with the analyses from the chapter on France, which associated MIG-NAT relationships, when they involved migrant men and native majority women, with less gender-

specialisation of paid labour. However this is not confirmed by the time-distribution approach. In the models that use the division of paid labour *time* as the outcome variable, there is no significant association between MIG-NAT partnerships and lower gender-specialisation of paid labour in couples. On the other hand, there is a statistically robust and large effect of such relationship for the division of *unpaid labour time*, something which was not captured by the models using housework/childcare tasks distribution as outcome variable. This suggests that migrant who partner with majority native British women, compared to those with primary migrant or second-generation partners, do proportionately more of the unpaid labour as measured in *time* but not clearly so in *tasks*.

Finally, the table 6.5 shows the models for the two compound indexes of gender-specialisation, for migrant men and migrant women respectively. As in the previous tables, the top half and bottom halves use task-based variables and labour-time distribution variables respectively as dependent variables. Migrants from Pakistan/Bangladesh, both women and men, continue to be associated with

more gender-specialised divisions of labour overall, regardless of the migratory background of their partner and the migration-union sequence. Migrant women from India also tend to be in couples with slightly more gender-specialised divisions of unpaid labour, while men born in the Caribbean are associated with more egalitarian couples. The category 'other areas' is associated with more patriarchal divisions of labour in couples, for migrant men especially, but the variety of origins covered by this category makes this observation difficult to interpret, or only to say that European migrants appear significantly less gender-specialised than migrant men who fall into this 'other' category of origin.

The most important points highlighted by this table and the gender-specialisation index is the gendered effect and relevance of union-migration sequences. Figure 6.8 presents a visualisation of the divergence between the effects of union-migration sequences for migrant women and migrant men respectively. There are clear and significant variations in the gender division of labour in couples, depending on migrant women's sequences of migration and couple formation - even when we keep the area of origin constant. Compared to women who migrate as single adults, most other sequences (child migration excepted) have a positive effect on gender-specialisation, which can be extrapolated as a negative impact on gender equality in couples, with the effect of the *partnership reconfiguration* sequence being particularly strong. In contrast, migrant men's sequences matter less (and men's area of origin matters more), with the corresponding coefficients pointing to an inverse effect (see figure 6.8). The absence of statistical significance attributed to migrant men's sequences is also linked to the fact that a substantially smaller number of men follow these sequences of couple-related migration (seq 2 to seq 4 on the coefficient plot), as also shown by the long tails of the confidence interval. In addition, while migrant men's higher educational attainment shows no connection to the gender-specialisation of labour, all models concur in pointing to a greater capacity of highly-educated migrant women to negotiate a more gender-egalitarian division of labour in their relationship.

TABLE 6.5: Survey-weighted linear regression models: Gender-specialisation of labour (Index 1 and 2, migrant women and migrant men)

	Migrant women (Index 1)	Migrant women (Index 2)	Migrant men (Index 1)	Migrant men (Index 2)
(Intercept)	.826 (.225)***	.832 (.245)***	.432 (.254)	.217 (.273)
<b>Partner:</b> [ref: migrant (MIG-MIG)]				
native 2G (MIG-2G)	−.002 (.041)	.034 (.046)	−.040 (.040)	−.069 (.038)
majority native (MIG-NAT)	−.002 (.031)	−.002 (.034)	−.038 (.037)	−.076 (.041)
<b>Where born</b> [ref: Europe]				
Caribbean	.039 (.062)	.014 (.070)	−.161 (.071)*	−.142 (.071)*
Africa	.023 (.038)	−.009 (.045)	−.004 (.039)	−.039 (.046)
India	.041 (.037)	.076 (.041)	.049 (.044)	.052 (.049)
Pakistan/Bangladesh	.209 (.043)***	.233 (.037)***	.232 (.045)***	.281 (.047)***
Southeast Asia	.060 (.043)	.037 (.047)	−.063 (.050)	−.003 (.074)
other areas	.043 (.036)	.095 (.039)*	.091 (.040)*	.108 (.044)*
<b>Sequences</b> [ref: single adult]				
formation 1st partnership	.056 (.037)	.100 (.040)*	−.023 (.034)	−.049 (.040)
established 1st partnership	.040 (.046)	.124 (.050)*	−.027 (.047)	−.006 (.053)
partnership reconfiguration	.114 (.056)*	.199 (.055)***	−.042 (.065)	−.058 (.079)
child migrant (1.5 G)	−.020 (.057)	.074 (.060)	−.058 (.050)	−.036 (.059)
How long in the UK (years since migration)	.000 (.002)	−.001 (.002)	.003 (.002)	.004 (.003)
Age	−.030 (.012)*	−.034 (.013)**	−.007 (.013)	.001 (.014)
Age-squared	.000 (.000)*	.000 (.000)**	.000 (.000)	−.000 (.000)
Age gap	−.002 (.002)	−.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.001 (.003)
Coresident children < 16	.202 (.027)***	.215 (.029)***	.156 (.030)***	.170 (.034)***
Higher/Tertiary education	−.099 (.024)***	−.122 (.028)***	−.012 (.025)	.006 (.029)
Both partners unemployed	−.178 (.026)***	−.253 (.043)***	−.197 (.028)***	−.229 (.044)***
Deviance	208.983	197.665	172.858	186.264
Dispersion	.134	.148	.136	.159
Num. obs.	1510	1303	1248	1156

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ .

Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).

Universe: partnered migrant women or migrant men (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).

TABLE 6.6: Survey-weighted linear regression models: Gender-specialisation of labour (Index 1 and 2, migrant women and migrant men)


	Migrant women (Index 1)	Migrant women (Index 2)	Migrant men (Index 1)	Migrant men (Index 2)
(Intercept)	.732 (.246)**	.754 (.261)**	.487 (.265)	.260 (.267)
<b>Partner</b> [ref: migrant (MIG-MIG)]				
native 2G (MIG-2G)	.010 (.043)	.041 (.045)	-.027 (.040)	-.058 (.037)
majority native (MIG-NAT)	.009 (.034)	-.018 (.036)	-.034 (.036)	-.073 (.041)
<b>Where born</b> [ref: Europe]				
Caribbean	-.016 (.071)	-.040 (.083)	-.216 (.084)*	-.191 (.087)*
Africa	-.057 (.065)	-.072 (.073)	-.098 (.074)	-.120 (.087)
India	-.064 (.066)	-.003 (.072)	-.040 (.076)	-.021 (.088)
Pakistan/Bangladesh	.098 (.070)	.146 (.068)*	.138 (.075)	.200 (.086)*
Southeast Asia	.003 (.051)	.004 (.056)	-.109 (.060)	-.034 (.081)
other areas	.018 (.043)	.088 (.045)*	.082 (.049)	.103 (.057)
<b>Sequences</b> [ref: single adult]				
formation 1st partnership	.058 (.039)	.103 (.043)*	-.045 (.033)	-.087 (.038)*
established 1st partnership	.052 (.049)	.143 (.052)**	-.047 (.047)	-.035 (.051)
partnership reconfiguration	.135 (.059)*	.233 (.059)***	-.022 (.064)	-.039 (.075)
child migrant (1.5 G)	-.027 (.061)	.052 (.065)	-.060 (.052)	-.035 (.059)
How long in the UK (years since migration)	.002 (.003)	.002 (.003)	.002 (.002)	.003 (.003)
<b>GII score</b> (country of birth)	.214 (.136)	.174 (.145)	.140 (.144)	.096 (.170)
<b>Religiosity</b> [ref: no religion]	.038 (.032)	.003 (.035)	.067 (.031)*	.082 (.034)*
Age	-.028 (.013)*	-.032 (.013)*	-.012 (.013)	-.002 (.014)
Age-squared	.000 (.000)*	.000 (.000)*	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Age gap	-.002 (.002)	-.003 (.003)	.005 (.003)*	.003 (.003)
Coresident children < 16	.192 (.028)***	.214 (.030)***	.150 (.031)***	.169 (.034)***
Higher/Tertiary education	-.103 (.025)***	-.119 (.028)***	-.020 (.026)	-.002 (.030)
Both partners unemployed	-.191 (.028)***	-.271 (.047)***	-.205 (.031)***	-.239 (.050)***
Deviance	191.347	175.785	149.731	159.684
Dispersion	.135	.144	.128	.148
Num. obs.	1387	1188	1150	1066

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ .

Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).


Universe: partnered migrant women or migrant men (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).

FIGURE 6.9: Model estimates: couple type, geographic origin and the gender specialisation of labour time for migrant women and migrant men



*Estimates from survey-weighted linear models. Not displayed but included in the models are: age and age-squared, age gap, whether the couple has coresident children under the age of 16, and a control for unemployed couples.*

FIGURE 6.10: Model estimates: stepwise modelling, gender-specialisation of labour time



## 6.4 Discussion

### Do union-migration sequences matter for gender equality in couples?

It emerges from these analyses that while the gender division of labour is affected by a broad range of factors, migration experiences matter - for women especially. The effect of women's union-migration sequences are clear and significant, and remain so even when making space for other explanations: the relevance of sequence was not specific to certain migrant or minority groups, but sufficiently robust to account for migratory origins, gender opportunities in country of origin (through the GII) and religion.

The timing and interlocking of migration and couple formation can therefore be considered a strong, enduring and independent factor, connected to both dimensions of labour division - paid and unpaid - in migrant women's relationships. All sequences characterised by an interlocking of migration and couple are thus connected, for migrant women, with more polarised gender roles in their relationships. This stands in contrast with women who migrated as adults but before couple formation, who are associated with comparatively less gendered divisions of labour in the household - but who are also a minority. Women who migrated as children are in a more equivocal position - in some models, the *child migrant* sequence was connected with a gendering effect, compared to independent adult migration, but the effect is overall slight and more volatile. It is perhaps that as children typically migrate with parents, their migration happens under the authority of parents and fathers - if not that of a partner. The migrations of women in the single adult sequence cluster, in comparison, may both exhibit and foster greater independence and autonomy which in turn gives them better ground to obtain (comparatively) more egalitarian relationships.

By contrast, for migrant men, the effects of migration-union sequence are more tenuous. While not statistically significant for gender-specialisation as a whole, the direction of the estimated effects of men's union-migration sequences suggest that when men's migration is not detached from couple formation (i.e. long before), this may be linked to somewhat less gender-specialised arrangements in the home. In particular, the results support the idea that couple-forming migration (of which marriage migration is a case) tend to put the joining migrant ('marriage migrant' or 'imported migrant' in González-Ferrer's typology (2011)) in a more vulnerable and dependent position. This translates into reduced bargaining power, henceforth a more domestic and secluded role for female marriage migrants, and no breadwinner role for male marriage migrants. In the case of migrant men, it is only in the field of paid labour division that couple-related

sequences of union-migration are associated with more equal arrangements. The migration of men coming through family or spousal channels may result in more complicated or delayed integration into the labour market compared to adult single migrants.<sup>6</sup> Situations of the sort have been thus reported by Charsley (2005) and discussed by Beck-Gernsheim (2007). Migrant men who find themselves financially and/or socially dependent on their native-born or pioneer migrant spouse may find the experience distressing, especially as it collides with representations of masculinity. This point is also raised by Strasser, Kraler, Bonjour, and Bilger (2009) in the context of female sponsors for family reunification. As taking on more of the domestic care responsibilities may deepen what can be experienced as an unwelcome and painful reversal of gender roles, men in such situations may be resistant to doing so. 'Doing gender' theories would suggest that they may even do comparatively less than others, precisely as a compensatory mechanism, although I found no statistical evidence for this on the basis of this (admittedly limited) data. This reversal of gender roles in the division of paid labour has been associated within the scholarship with acute couple tensions, which can escalate to 'domestic violence, or even marital breakdown'.<sup>7</sup> This is not in any way specific to migration or migrants. It serves as a reminder, however, that what the analysis and the models here identify as more gender-equal divisions of paid labour are by no means synonymous with couple harmony or happiness (or with a more equal division of unpaid labour).

Overall, migrant men's mode and timing of migration matter little for their domestic engagement, whereas women's migration sequences matter for both unpaid and paid labour division. For migrant men, the effect of area of origin and religion appear to contain much more explanatory potential than for women. Having a native majority partner without a direct migration background is associated for migrant men with a more equal division of paid work. This could be because of these native majority women's better (or firmer) integration in the labour-market, and also because these couples are more likely to involve female sponsors (see French chapters). Sponsors have to be economically active (Charsley et al., 2020), something which applies to female sponsors as well as their male counterparts and would thus drastically increase (potentially permanently) the proportion of couples where women are in full-time paid employment. In any case, the effects of migration trajectory and timing on gender-specialisation

<sup>6</sup>As mentioned before, stock data is partial towards 'successful' migrants, who have higher odds of remaining in the country and of appearing in the data (Dustmann, Bentolila, & Faini, 1996). Migrants who migrated independently but whose labour market and/or social integration was more difficult are also more likely to have gone on or gone back.

<sup>7</sup>In the words of Beck-Gernsheim (2007, p. 283). A perhaps clumsy ordering that seems to put domestic violence one step below separation on the scale of the severity of consequences. Then again, there are many normative undertones looming behind definitions of what constitutes a good and a bad couple, perhaps especially when it comes to migrant or minority couples.

is not significant for migrant men once areas of origin, GII score and/or religion are accounted for. A consistent finding across models was that migrating after childhood but before couple formation (the *single adult* sequence cluster) was associated with less gender-specialisation in couples compared to other union-migration trajectories. This finding concurs with Cerrutti and Massey (2001)'s observation that women who were single at the time of migration were then more often involved in paid work at the later time of the survey interview, and had higher salaries on average compared to other migrant women. This was also González-Ferrer (2011)'s finding, although she noted that the effect only stood for women who had been single at the time of migration, but were married at the time of the survey interview. In this research, I have chosen to focus exclusively on respondents who were partnered at the time of data collection. Therefore it may be that the positive effect I find to be associated with migrant women's single adult migration are in fact limited to migrant women who did not remain single.

### **Do migrant women in relationships with British-born majority men get a better deal in terms of gender equality?**

Contrary to suggestions made in the literature that having a native partner would increase migrant women's labour market engagement (Baker & Benjamin, 1997), I found that the migration or native background of partners did not help predict the division of labour in couples once accounting for union-migration trajectories. In this the findings concur with González-Ferrer (2011) who, looking at migrant women living in Spain, found no consistent effect of being in a migrant-native relationship on their labour performance. Neither could a robust effect be found between having a native British majority partner and more equal gender divisions of domestic and care work. The idea that migrant women fare better, emancipation-wise, when they partner up with a British majority native compared to another migrant or a descendant of migrant(s) is thus not supported by the analysis. Instead, the models point to a greater effect of women's migration-union sequences, areas of origin and educational attainment. It is not so much, therefore, that being with a majority native means more gender equality, but rather that the paths that lead there are both self-selective and more often involve room for empowerment (e.g. education in the country of destination, independent migration) and/or less room for spousal dependency (e.g. legal, social and linguistic dependence on the male partner). With regards to European migrant women, not only do they combine the racial and cultural closeness with the British majority native populations (majority white and Christian or no religion) that is associated with greater levels of intermarriage and assimilation (Kulu & Hannemann, 2019; Muttarak & Heath, 2010), but their migration and

couple formation experiences are unhindered and mostly unconstrained by the immigration system (something which can soon be expected to change). Additionally, the greater likelihood that their qualifications will be recognised and the fact that they are less likely to suffer from racist and intersectional discrimination, probably significantly facilitates their integration into the labour market. The fact that these European migrant women, together with highly-educated migrant women, represent a large proportion of the migrant women that make up the migrant-native (MIG-NAT) category provides a more convincing explanation as to why migrant-native couples have less unequal divisions of labour compared to other couples formed by migrant women. It is in other words more about the ability of migrant women to select British majority native men, and their migration-union paths, and much less about presumably more gender-equal practices of British majority men.

Indeed, neither British majority natives nor European migrants appear across the board more egalitarian than other couples. European migrants could not be significantly distinguished from migrants - men or women - from Africa or Southeast Asia (which could also be linked to heterogeneity within that category), and appeared less gender-equal in their division of labour compared to Caribbean migrant men. Only migrant men from Pakistan or Bangladesh - and, to a point, men from India and 'other areas' - were significantly more likely to have gender-specialised relationships than European migrants.

The effect on gender equality of having a British native majority partner is slightly more ambiguous when considering migrant men. It is mostly not significant when including all covariates in the larger model, and generally disappears or fades once areas of origin are introduced in the analysis. Nevertheless, there are hints that native majority women may acquire - in relative terms - a greater degree of bargaining power within the couple when they are partnered with a migrant man.

Overall, it appears to matter little whether migrants have migrant or native partners, and whether native partners have migrant parents or not. The conceptual approach that uses migration background as an identity category is arguably then not the most useful for the study of gender inequalities and relations. Migration *experience* and its particulars and interlocking with family formation matters; community and socialisation matter. *Being* a migrant or a descendant of migrant does not explain much. We learn more, in terms of gender relations, by looking at *trajectories* of migrations than by searching for *profiles* of migrants - a methodological distinction and orientation which Howard Becker insisted was crucial to the sociological exercise and analysis of migration, and its

political interpretations (H. S. Becker, 1998).

### Labour time or responsibility distribution

In almost all respects, the labour time approach proved more sensitive and painted more polarised pictures of gender roles in couples. The approach based on employment status and distribution of tasks, was useful in giving more weight and visibility to situations of economic dependency, notably couples that function on a male-sole-earner model. From this perspective, it captured a different and complementary aspect to that painted by labour time approach. On the ground of unpaid labour, however, the task-based measure captured much less variation than the time-based measure, even though the tasks that could be included were more numerous and thus the measure theoretically more robust than the equivalent designed for the French data. How to interpret this? Perhaps asking people how much time they spend weekly on housework and care does not carry the same normative weight as asking 'who is mainly responsible' for such-and-such household task. This latter frame might push survey participants to select 'shared', arguably a vaguer, blanket term as a survey answer. It may be therefore that time-based questions and measures are more reliable, but this would need to be assessed against measures and data that are known to be of greater precision, notably time-diary data.

#### 6.4.1 Limitations

In addition to those previously discussed, the analyses in this chapter and in the previous one are limited by three methodological obstacles. Firstly, causal claims are prohibited by the nature of the data. In the absence of an experimental or longitudinal design that would follow migrants before and after migration, it is impossible to back up causal explanations about the impact of migration sequences and partnering on the gender division of labour.

Secondly, the comparisons I have drawn have always been either between migrants from different areas of origin or between different migrants and native groups. Not included within this are also comparable individuals, from the same country of birth and with similar characteristics and relationships, who did not migrate.<sup>8</sup> This would provide an important point of comparison and constitute perhaps a better method to identify what the combination of migration sequences and mixedness creates. But, to the best of my knowledge, there is no large-scale data that would fit this purpose.

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<sup>8</sup>This could include for instance couples formed by French 'expats' with natives of the country they reside in.

Thirdly, the analysis is also limited by the fact that it does not reconstruct the migration trajectories of both partners so as to securely identify pioneer or lead migrants and 'trailing' or joint partners. Yet we know these to be key aspects of migration trajectories, not only in that they reflect deeply gendered patterns, but also in that they have gendering effects (González-Ferrer, 2011; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1992, 2000). Combining the union-migration sequences and the 'legally tied' status in the French models was an effort to narrow this down, but what can be done is limited by the absence of information on admission category in the British survey, and information on immigration status in both French and British surveys.

A final limitation of the analysis in this chapter is the same as in previous chapters. The focus on partnered migrants constitutes a bias and it may influence the results. Migrants who stayed in the destination country until the point of the interview are more likely to be 'success stories' compared to all those who migrate and then return. Moreover, migrants who form relationships in the country of immigration or found a way to live with their partner are a different sample and tell a different story from the many who either remained single, or could not be (re)united with their partner, left behind in the sending country. This research does not engage with these transnational relationships, where co-residency is suspended, renounced or delayed past the survey date and further empirical research is needed to investigate this. In addition, focusing solely on those migrants who are partnered and co-resident with their partner is not necessarily benign in terms of how results can be extrapolated.

## Chapter 7

# Comparison and conclusion

In the first part of this thesis, I contextualised and historicised the construction of 'mixed couples' and the survey data and survey categories on mixedness and migrants in the French and British surveys. I discussed why and how mixing, migration and gender relations could be connected. In the second part, I described the different couple types formed by migrants, focusing on mixed couples formed with majority native partners, and I constructed a typology of union-migration sequences. I thus showed that for migrant women and migrant men, mixing (or non-mixing) is associated with different trajectories of migration and partnering. This emphasis on trajectories detached the analysis of migrant women and men's couple formation from one that only considers differences between different migrant groups. Of course, trajectories and groups overlap to some extent, since the migration of some groups is much more constrained (by immigration regimes and by social norms including gender norms) than others - typically intra-EU migration. In the last part, I analysed the connection between, on the one hand migrants' trajectories of union-migration, and on the other hand the gender division of labour in couples.

This chapter streamlines the findings, by comparing the French and British cases, focusing especially on the consistencies between them. While France and the UK share very similar colonial pasts and immigration regimes, the two countries have often been contrasted as different models of welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and integration (Favell, 1998), and the scholarship has highlighted some differences in the gender division of labour. I discuss the insights from the comparative frameworks, taking stock from the fact that cross-national differences were difficult to precisely investigate in the context of limited sample size and differences in questionnaire design. Because the thesis is focused on first-hand migration journeys, its framework and scope are centred on primary migrants, but I also make some space in this chapter to discuss the scope and relevance of this research for second (and third, etc.) generations. The first section of this chapter

is dedicated to gendered paths of union-migration and mixing for migrants living in France and the UK at the end of the 2000s; the second section concentrates on how these connected to gender-specialisation in couples. I discuss the insights from using the two cases and data-sets in a continuous and complementary way, as well as comparatively *stricto sensu*. In the fourth section, I reflect on how this inform understandings and implications of mixedness for gender relations in the context of migration. In the fourth and final section, I go back to the question of survey design, as pivotal for quantitative and critical scholarship on gender and migration.


## 7.1 Gendered paths, gendered labour

### 7.1.1 Gendered paths of migration and partnering

With respect to sequences of union-migration, the sequence analysis identified trajectories of couple formation and migration that were overall very similar between the French and the British case. Five sequences overlap perfectly. The fact that there is a sixth one, in the French case (*Single young adults*), is puzzling, perhaps suggesting that there was a greater occurrence of teenage and young adult migration coming into France and settling there, compared to the UK. The breakdown by first visa type showed that many of the women in this group entered through family migration (mainly family reunification) while the men's first *titre de séjour* was most commonly a working visa (see figure 7.5). In terms of the men, we could hypothesise that they are part of the population of young, sometimes minor *sans-papiers* whose situation was later regularised. This is merely speculative, however.

Putting aside the *young single adults* cluster, the five other sequences of union-migration appeared identical in construction between the French and the British data. This is striking when considering that there was little overlap between the main migrant groups represented in the French and British data. Primary migrants living in the UK at the end of the 2000s were in large proportions South Asians, whereas they were much more often Northern Africans migrants in France. Conversely, there were few South Asians in the French sample. This reflects the particular historical connections with different areas of the world, which are the result of British and French colonial geographies and imperialist past. Even the category of migrants identified as 'EU-27' effectively covered somewhat different populations, with many South Europeans in the case of France, and more exclusively Western and Eastern Europeans in the British data.

FIGURE 7.1: Migration-union sequences, by couple types. Migrants in France (left) and the UK (right)



*Survey-weighted distribution (%) of partnership types, for migrant men and migrant women, for each union-migration sequence cluster.*

*Source: TeO (left column) | Understanding Society, wave 2 respondents (right column)*

In spite of this diversity, however, the gendered paths of migration and couple formation which I have identified were very consistent between the French and British cases. They also correlated in the same way with the formation of different couple types. Importantly, the trajectories that brought migrant women and migrant men to form relationships with majority native partners (whether British or French) were broadly similar on both sides of the channel. They showed that though the proportions of migrant men and migrant women who enter such relationship do not differ, they connect to different - gendered - paths. Migrant men who partner with majority natives were, overwhelmingly, child migrants. Accordingly, they were, at least for some years of their childhood and teenage years, socialised and most likely schooled in their country of immigration. It is credible therefore that mixing with the majority group *in their case* chiefly identifies and rewards a high degree of assimilation to the majority society in the immigration country. The trajectories that connect male primary migration and mixing with the majority native group can thus be relatively straightforwardly interpreted as paths of intra-generational and marital assimilation. Migrant men who partnered with majority native French or British partners were thus the least likely to have difficulties with the local language. These paths of fast-tracked marital assimilation are also ethnically selective: they mainly concern European (and, more generally, white) child migrants.

In contrast, the high frequency of couple-forming migrations among migrant women partnered with majority native French demonstrates the limits of the assimilation hypothesis to understand migrants' mixing with majority natives. Migrant women in such relationships, in comparison to their male counterparts, more often migrated as adults, more often in the context of the formation of their relationship, and they were more likely to struggle with the language of the country of immigration. Although a significant proportion of these women also migrated as children, the rate of couple-forming migration suggests that there is another common path into unions with majority natives, specifically for women. This path, furthermore, is not a function of early exposure and therefore cannot be expected to mark a high degree of assimilation.

FIGURE 7.2: Migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples in France. Distribution of sequences, for migrant women and migrant men





FIGURE 7.3: Migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples in the UK. Distribution of sequences, for migrant women and migrant men



In the case of couples in France, unions formed between a migrant woman and a majority native are more often associated with couple-forming migration than with child migration. That is not quite the case in the UK, where mixed unions are mostly formed by former child migrants, men or women. Indeed, the proportion of child migrants in MIG-NAT unions is even higher than in the French case: involving 60% of migrant men and 40% of migrant women partnered with a British majority native. Yet here also the proportion of couple-forming migration among migrant women in partnerships with native majority British men is high, much higher than in the reverse gender configuration of migrant-native unions (30% vs. 15%). The British case also reveals a high proportion of single adult migrant women among those who mix with the majority native group.

Part of this discrepancy between the French and British case can be explained by the re-distribution of the migrants who, in the French classification, would fall into the cluster of *Single young adults*. In the absence of this cluster in the British classification, these migrants are likely split between the *Child migrants* and *Single adults* categories, inflating the ranks of both compared to the French distribution. We could also link this to the particularly high proportion of international students in the UK compared to France. In 2008, the number of non-citizen students enrolled in a British university was almost twice the number for French universities (462,609 for the UK, and 243,463 for France (OECD 2021)). It is plausible that student migration play a role in this since migrant-native unions are more likely to involve highly-educated and educationally homogenous partners (Nottmeyer, 2014), which are exactly the profile of couples often formed at university (Blossfeld & Timm, 2003; Bozon & Héran, 2006). But since we do not know whether migrants initially arrived in the UK with a student visa, nor if studies provided the initial motive for their migration, we cannot further substantiate this explanation.

Alternatively, or in addition, the greater frequency of single adult migration among migrant-native couples in the UK could be linked to the particular migrant population represented by the Irish and migrants from the Old Commonwealth. Since these migrant populations are formed of native English speakers, and with the great majority of them being white, one could have expected that they would be more likely to follow paths of fast assimilation and marital assimilation, and could alter the distribution towards a greater proportion of child migrants and single adult migration. Yet removing them from the sample does not change the distribution in any decisive manner, and the slight differences between the French and British couples persists.

In spite of these variations, the general findings stand and are consistent across the French and British data. Kulu (2019) had correctly hypothesized that both marital assimilation and marriage migration were likely at be at play in the couples formed between primary migrants and the majority native group in the UK. One of the important contributions of this thesis is to have established that these are indeed different paths to mixing and that these paths are profoundly gendered (see figure 7.2 and figure 7.3).

From this finding, I derive two observations: firstly, a larger proportion of male child migrants than female child migrants have grown to form unions with majority native partners. Migrant women who migrated as children are comparatively slightly more likely to form unions with other migrants and this is consistent between the French and British data. This suggests that migrant


families may exercise more control or pressure on the partner choice of daughters. Sons, in contrast, may enjoy a greater degree of independence in partner selection and may be in a better position to choose to 'partner out'. This is consistent with observations made by e.g. Charsley, Bolognani, Ersanilli, and Spencer (2020) and, in a more general tone, by Varro (2003), who ventured that the mixing of women is often perceived as more problematic or subversive than that of men (see also Caballero (2012) on the British case and MacMaster (1997) for French-Algerian intermarriage).

Conversely, the fact that a large proportion of couples involving a majority native partner and a migrant woman derive from couple-forming migration suggests that there is an international marriage market on which migrant women (but not migrant men) can be recruited by majority native British and French men (and vice-versa). Conjugal arrangements that have been characterised as 'geographic hypergamy' typically involve women from the South and native men from the North (here, France and the UK). Couple-forming migration sequence involving a native majority partner concern migrant women much more than migrant men.

That migrant men and migrant women in mixed relationship would follow different paths of migration and couple formation matters for how we interpret both mixedness and gender relations in the context of migration. Indeed, with different union-migration paths also come different couple dynamics and different degrees of dependency from the migrant partner on the native partner. Based on the French data, the legal dependency that derives from being on a partner visa is much more common for migrant women, especially those who follow couple-forming migration trajectories (see figure 7.4). Thus the higher rates of couple-forming migrations among migrant women partnered with majority native men also means higher rates of legally tied migration. Accordingly, mixing with the majority native French group often correlates with 'imported' partners and legal dependency for migrant women, but not for migrant men.

Therefore, it is not only that calendars of migration and couple formation are different for men and women, with many more men migrating independently and prior to couple formation. It is also the case that even when migrant women and men follow the same sequences of migration and couple formation, they still use different legal channels. This point was made clear by consideration of the legal admission category, which the French data allows for. It highlighted, for example, that when men are already in an established relationship when they migrate, it is generally on a work visa, while for women in the same sequence cluster, it is as a reunified partner, on a dependent visa. This reflects the fact

FIGURE 7.4: Proportion legally tied migrants by sequence cluster



that women and men do not hold the same position in relationship and that in migration decisions, men tend to be attributed the role of first mover, and women that of second, tied mover (González-Ferrer, 2006, 2011; Mincer, 1978). This is true for intra-national relocations (Krieger, 2019; Taylor, 2007) as it is for international migrations. This finding has been documented in previous studies, but what this thesis contributed was its demonstration that, in the case of international migration, this phenomena is not limited to migrant couples, or couples formed between migrants and natives with migrant parents. It applies also to those couples formed between primary migrants and majority natives, a couple type that rarely involves tied migrant men and often involves tied migrant women.

### 7.1.2 From gendered paths to gender roles

#### Considering migrant groups

Overall, partnering with a majority native (relative to partnering with another migrant or a direct descendant of migrant) was not very decisive for the gender division of labour, in comparison to the effects associated with migrant groups (as measured by area of origin), and trajectories of union and migration. Here again, however, the story was very much gendered, although some elements were constant across men and women. I start with the latter.

Certain migratory origins are systematically associated with a more gender-specialised division of labour; the groups that stand out in this way are Turkish migrants in France and migrants from Bangladesh or Pakistan in the UK. Migrants from these groups very rarely formed relationships with majority French or British natives and were much, much more likely to be partnered with other migrants or direct descendants of migrants from the same country of origin (Turkey, Pakistan or Bangladesh). They combined a high frequency of couple-forming migration with a high degree of gender-specialisation.

Indian migrants, in the UK, and Northern African migrants, in France, presented more mitigated patterns. In the case of India-born migrants, the gender division of labour was more polarised in certain models, but only for unpaid labour, not for paid labour. This echoes findings from qualitative research that showed that Indian families living in the UK often expect women to engage in paid work and to contribute to the family income (Ballard, 1983; Charsley et al., 2020; Charsley, Bolognani, & Spencer, 2017). The particular gender expectations of this group thus do not entail gender-specialisation of paid labour, as is more often the case among Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants, but they do apply to housework and care work, which is highly gender-specialised (Kan & Laurie, 2018). However, this particular mode of gender-polarisation of labour associated with Indian migrants disappeared once controlling for religiosity and GII score.

In the case of Northern African migrants in France, both men and women, the reverse seemed true: the distribution of paid labour was more gender-specialised in some models, but the variables on the division of housework and childcare did not pick up any significant variation. One should also note that Northern African migrants in France differ from Indian migrants in the UK in a variety of ways. Among other things, they tend to be extracted from less privileged classes compared to the British South Asian migrant populations (Ichou, 2015); they are more likely to form unions with majority natives. Cases of Algerian or Moroccan migrants forming relationships with native majority

French partners are thus not quite so rare as they are among Turkish migrants in France, or Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi migrants in the UK.

In contrast, certain groups, especially Caribbean migrant men residing in the UK and to a lesser extent men born in Africa outside the Maghreb region residing in France, were associated with less gender-specialised arrangements, compared to EU migrants. These effects were particularly enduring for Caribbean migrant men, and they played out both in paid labour and unpaid labour distribution, who appeared more likely to be in comparatively more egalitarian or gender-reverse relationships, compared to EU migrants living in the UK. Considering the very limited sample size, however, these results have to be considered indicative. Furthermore, co-resident man-woman couples are a less common form of family among Caribbean migrants than among other populations, especially migrant populations (Kulu, 2019). This is important to keep in mind when extrapolating results, as the analyses presented here are restricted by the couple framing I employed. In addition, the effects only applied to Caribbean migrant men, in comparison to EU migrant men. No such difference was observed between Caribbean migrant women and EU migrant women.

Indeed, the effects associated with migrant groups (as measured by areas of origin) were often not symmetrical between migrant men and migrant women from the same areas. Thus migrant men from Southeast Asia appeared more likely to be in gender-equal or gender-reversed divisions of labour, but this did not apply to migrant women from the same areas. One can contrast this with Turkish migrants (in France) and Pakistani/Bangladeshi migrants (in the UK), specifically with respect to the gender division of paid labour. In these two cases, the gender-specialisation of paid labour was particularly skewed towards men when their partners had been born in Turkey or Pakistan/Bangladesh. As appeared in various analyses, Turkish and Pakistani or Bangladeshi migrant women are at particularly high risks of being outside of the labour market and economically dependent on their husband as the couple's sole breadwinner. The contrast was not quite so strong with regards to unpaid labour, and the greater gender-polarisation of domestic and care labour in these migrant groups appeared to be more driven by migrant men than women. It is clear, however, that these groups tend to implement a more rigid separation of gender roles. As noted in the relevant literature, part of the motive for marrying a woman born in Turkey or in Pakistan or Bangladesh are to honour kin networks and debts (Ballard, 1990), but it is also often linked to wishes to partner with women who are expected to be more traditionally-minded', more willing to abide by a strict gender-specialisation of labour and less likely to question the man's status as head of household (Huschek, de Valk, & Liefbroer, 2011; Milewski & Hamel,

2010). Indeed, this can be an explicit element of the bargain, enforced more easily by the fact that migrant women in these groups very rarely migrate autonomously and mostly as dependent. It is unlikely that patriarchal expectations play the same role in men's migration. Indeed, in the case of male marriage migrants, who are not uncommon among both Turkish and Pakistani/Bangladeshi migrants, the expectations of the women they join and who sponsor their migration might well be towards greater gender-egalitarianism rather than less (Charsley et al., 2020; Lievens, 1999). This brings me to discussing the role of union-migration sequences, which lends some credence to a broad interpretation of the Lievens hypothesis.

### **Considering trajectories: couple-forming and couple migration, and single adult migration**

The effects linked to areas of origin, especially with the British data, were oftentimes stronger and/or larger for migrant men than for migrant women. In contrast, for migrant women, the effect of union-migration sequence often appeared much more significant for gender dynamics in their relationship, post-migration. Among the key findings that were consistent across French and British analyses was the patriarchal effect of trajectories of couple-forming and established couple migration, when these involved migrant women. Thus for migrant women, the sequence clusters *Formation first partnership* and *established first migration* were consistently associated across models with greater gender-specialised divisions of labour. This allows me to state two conclusions, with some degree of security about their reliability since the findings were consistent across the two national cases and datasets.

Firstly, one can safely state that couple-forming migration, as captured by the sequence cluster *formation first partnership*, tends to be associated with more gender-specialised division of labour in couples when compared with autonomous migration, prior to couple formation. In both French and British analyses, the effect was larger for the gender distribution of paid labour, but also noticeable (if not always significant) in the unpaid labour distribution. There is therefore evidence that this particular interlocking of migration and the life course leads to migrant women being notably less engaged in the labour market and more likely to be economically reliant on their husband. This is not limited to certain migrant women, certain migrant groups or endogamous couples, since the effect persisted in the models that controlled for these other explanations. This is connected to - but not explained away by - the phenomena of legal dependency, when migrants (mainly migrant women) are initially legally tied to their partner for residency rights in the UK or France.

The fact that this same sequence of family-forming migration is associated, in migrant men, with noticeably less gender-specialisation in couples corroborates the theory that this migration trajectory contributes to reshuffling power relations. It suggests that, schematically, in the process of this union-migration trajectory, migrants loses some bargaining power relative to their partner, who often sponsor their migration. This is likely due in no small part to the fact that these migrants may find it particularly difficult to find paid employment following migration, which is reflected then in the gender division of labour. But it also likely reflects their isolation from kin and support networks and a more general dependency on the native/settled partner for linguistic help, network and money. In fact, based on the qualitative literature, it is quite possible that native/settled partners are conscious of this lopsided power dynamic between them and their migrant partner. For instance, UK or French-born women who are direct descendants of migrants (or were child migrants) may anticipate that a transnational union will mean that they will not have to uproot. It will be their husband who will be more isolated and dependent on them, and therefore will not be in a position to question their autonomy or to assert patriarchal demands (Charsley et al., 2020; Lievens, 1999; Shaw, 2014). In parallel, settled or second generation men may expect that a marriage migrant wife will have more 'traditional' gender values, and (correctly) assume that the women will be in a difficult position to question them (Charsley, 2008). This mode of migration trajectory and partner selection implies a mix of power and gender representations: in the first case, aspirations for gender-egalitarianism; in the second case, aspirations for rigid gender roles and docile 'traditional women'. The heightened gender division of labour associated with this sequence is linked to the fact that in the case of marriage migrant women, the women's migration is expected and organised to fill in a family role (González-Ferrer, 2006).


The sequence *established first partnership* was also linked to greater gender-specialisation for migrant women. This is consistent with the explanations above since many women in this cluster mostly migrated as family migrants and were admitted in France as the 'tied partners' (of a settled migrant or a French national) in half of cases. It is reasonable to conclude that most women in this sequence cluster were joining their partner, either after years of marriage but delayed cohabitation, or more likely in the context of second-mover in family-stage migration. Therefore, the same reasoning applies about the experience of migration fostering isolation, dependency on the more settled partner, degraded labour market participation, performance (González-Ferrer, 2011), and hence limited bargaining power. There is no evidence here of such trajectories creating windows of opportunities for less gender-specialisation in households, although

there is no comparison with the couple's arrangement prior to migration. Admittedly, however, even in Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994)'s account, these windows were contingent on a number of other things, notably labour market participation. The big picture is that, when compared to single adult migrant, women who migrate while already in a established relationship tend to end up in more gender-specialised relationships.

In the case of *established first partnerships*, we do not observe the reverse effect for migrant men in this sequence, as we did with the *formation first partnership* sequence. If anything, the sequence seems more often associated with greater gender-polarisation, even for migrant men. This is coherent if we consider that though migration perhaps happens at the same time in the life course for migrant men and migrant women in this sequence, they do not refer to the same dynamic, because women in this sequence typically follow a partner, while men in this sequence typically lead (González-Ferrer, 2006). Indeed, if we consider the breakdown of sequences by legal admission category, as allowed by the French data (figure 7.5), it is clear that most migrant men who follow this trajectory do not actually migrate as family migrant and are rarely sponsored by their partner (7.5). This case thus highlights that even when migration occurs at the same point in women and men's life course, it does not follow that they tread the same legal pathways. Both migration trajectories and the life-course have to be considered in distinctly gendered ways.

The numerical domination of work visa for migrant men in almost all sequence clusters can help explain why union-migration sequences do not impact on migrant men's couple dynamics to the same extent that they do for women. If we go by the French data, it is only in the sequence *formation first partnership* that family-related visas are the most common mode of entry for adult migrant men (putting aside child migration). It is no coincidence then that is also the sequence that is most likely to be associated with reduced gender-polarisation.

FIGURE 7.5: Percentages by legal admission category, by sequence cluster



Overall, the *single adult* sequence used as reference level was associated with less gender-specialisation of labour for migrant women. The migration of women can foster empowerment, even compared to native women, but it appears to hold this possibility only for these very specific and selective forms of autonomous migration which constitute a small minority of women's migration. I chose to use this particular sequence as a baseline in all models because it fits best with what was long considered the default mode of migration (single, adult, etc), and because this trajectory could be considered to be mostly consistent and comparable for both men and women (whereas, as we have seen, family-related trajectories are more likely to encompass very gendered realities).

It is clear however that single, adult migration is not an obvious baseline, especially for women. It is likely that it involves a very specific profile of women, who both have the resources and the autonomy to decide to migrate independently. In this respect, it refers to a scenario of female migration that is more extra-ordinary than ordinary. One thing that the descriptive analyses by sequences made clear was that couple formation, to a large extent, conditions the migration of women. It is a small minority of migrant women who do not migrate under the tutelage of a parent (as child migrants) or in the context of a forming or pre-existing relationship. This does not imply that partnered women have no agency. However, this agency should not be overplayed: modes of migration, mode of conjugalit and partner choice are heavily constrained by immigration restrictions. In addition, agency is constrained by social relations (including but

not limited to gender relations) in the society of emigration and in the society of immigration.

Toma and Vause (2014)'s studies on Senegalese and Congolese migrations showed that women's migration - even when excluding marriage and partner migration - tends to be organised around and to rely on close relatives and kin networks. Men's migration is overall less dependent on close kin and draws on looser networks, but the sharpness of the contrast between men and women's migration and the types of networks that facilitate them is linked to gender inequalities and regimes; in comparatively more patriarchal Senegal, women are unlikely to migrate as single adults unless it is within the framework and control of a close kin network; meanwhile, in Congo, Toma and Vause (2014) found no evidence of significant differences between the networks drawn on by men and women who migrate. This helps make two important points: firstly, even single adult migration may reflect different migration experiences - e.g. different networks - for men and women, and therefore the homogeneity of the baseline category cannot be considered entirely foolproof. Secondly, single adult migration does not necessarily denote autonomy or independence from family or kin networks and their demands, though - if nothing else - it implies independence from partner.

### **Considering trajectories: child migration, separation and remarriages**

In the French analyses, migrant women in the *Child migrants* (1.5G) cluster were significantly more likely to take on a greater share of the unpaid labour (and a smaller share of the paid labour) than women who had migrated as single adults. The same did not apply for migrant men and the link was more tenuous in the British sample. There are some hints of a similar gender divergence, and of child migrant women being in somewhat more patriarchal couple arrangements (notably when using the labour-time share measures (index 2)), but child migrant women never significantly differ from migrant women in the *Single adult* sequence cluster with regards to the gender division of labour. This may have to do with the baseline category which, as discussed, differs subtly between the French and British models.

The observation that young migrant girls, compared to young migrant boys, may grow up in to form relationships that are more gender-polarised is ground for questions. It has been argued that there may be greater monitoring and policing of girls by migrant families at least in some migrant groups including Mexican and Asian families in the U.S. (Das Gupta, 1997; Suárez-Orozco, 2001; Min Zhou & Bankston, 1999) and Turks in Europe (e.g. Idema and Phalet (2007)); if they are more tightly monitored than boys, migrant or second generation girls

may also have less wiggle room to go against gender roles and less agency in partner selection and the notion of their intermarrying may be less tolerated. This cannot however be easily investigated and certainly cannot be generalised: in cultures with preferences for sons (e.g. Chinese), families may be more involved in the monitoring and controlling sons' socialisation and selection of partner. Either way, there is no automatic connection between the potential monitoring of daughters, a greater control on partner selection and more polarised gender roles in ensuing relationships. Greater monitoring does not mean that individuals have no agency, though perhaps agency has to be exercised in more subtle ways.

Migrant women from the younger age groups and women from the 'second-generation' may be more attached than their parents to ideas of companionate and egalitarian love, but these aspirations of love and conjugal equality may be at odds with those of their partners, and indeed are often at odds with realities of inequality (Twamley, 2012). More generally, even if migrant women and their daughters may be more prone than migrant men and their sons to declaring and/or adopting gender-egalitarian values (e.g. Roeder and Mühlau (2014), Idema and Phalet (2007)), this does not necessarily translate directly and practically into more egalitarian divisions of labour. For that matter, this is in no way specific to migrants or ethnic minorities, and applies also to white, educated and middle class Western natives (see, for example, the recent work by Daminger (2020) on how couples use 'de-gendered' narratives to justify gender-specialisation).

Twaley's account of Gujarati couples' narrative of love, intimacy and gender relations is illustrative here. Though the women in her study insisted on the egalitarian nature of the couples' dynamics and on the gender-egalitarian attitudes of their husbands, the husbands in question were, in contrast, quite clear on their position as head of household, their control over their wives' degree of engagement in paid work, and their wives' paramount duties towards domestic and care work (Twamley, 2012). Twaley's diagnosis is that the narrative of 'love' and 'companionate marriage', in this context, was actually disempowering for women, because recognising and questioning the couple's unequal dynamics would have appeared as cracks in the success story of love and intimacy, and the attachment to this story meant that no such cracks could be acknowledged.<sup>1</sup>

Since migrant women - especially from South Asia, Turkey and North Africa - who migrated as children are likely to be partnered with other migrants or

<sup>1</sup>This critique of narratives of love echoes central ideas of second-wave feminists (e.g. De Beauvoir (1949)). Their argument was that 'love' and intimacy is used to cajole women into accepting unequal arrangements and subjugated situations. It collides with Giddens's theory, which suggest that the modern emphasis on the emotional bond between partners naturally fosters empathy, respect, hence greater equality between partners.

with direct descendants of migrants (while men who migrated as children are comparatively more likely to form mixed unions with the native majority group), it could be expected that these women's partners will be less attached to gender-egalitarianism than they are (also because migrant men and descendants of migrant men tend to follow slower paths of gender-acculturation (Roeder & Mühlau, 2014)). Based on Twaley's work, individuals' greater involvement in their partner selection and greater attachment to love-based marriages among the second and the '1.5 generation' may neither lead to nor help with negotiating less-gender-specialised roles in their relationship.

When it comes to the connection between union-migration trajectories and the gender-specialisation of labour, the British and French analyses differed mainly with regards to the *partnership reconfigurations* trajectories. The effects associated with this sequence cluster were not consistent for migrant women in France and in the UK. While there was no difference of any sort in the French case between single adult migrant women and women marrying after the end of a relationship, the same sequence cluster was associated with a distinctly gender-polarising effect for migrant women living in the UK. Interestingly, this effect played out most strongly for the division of unpaid labour between migrant women and their partner. There are no obvious differences here between the French and British data: almost half of it is made of EU migrants in both cases, with a further 20 to 25% consisting of migrants from 'other' areas, and the migrants in this cluster migrate at around the same age (33). One gender difference that should be noted in the British case, is the higher incidence of African migrants among men (23% of men, compared to 4% of women), and more importantly perhaps, the higher incidence of Southeast Asian migrants among women (13% of women, compared to 4% of men in the cluster). In the French case, there is no such group of Southeast Asian migrants among women in this sequence cluster: the distribution by migratory origin is gender-symmetrical and follows roughly the same pattern as the men in the equivalent British cluster.

This leads me to conclude that it is this particular population of Southeast Asian women (who migrate after the dissolution of a first union and often as a new union is forming) that may explain this discrepancy. Biographical trajectories that follow this line have been described by Suksomboon (2011) in her ethnographic study of Thai marriage migrant women. Many of the women in question (half, to be precise) had been previously married to a Thai partner. Their marital past stigmatised them in the eyes of Thai's gendered conceptions of sexuality, which mostly overlooks men's previous and extra-marital sexual experiences, but holds that the same actions make women unfit ('impure' 2011, p. 233) for


marriage. This made it difficult for these women to re-partner within Thai society, whereas, in contrast, women's past sexual or conjugal experiences were not perceived as a major hindrance by the Dutch men they ultimately partnered with. Through marriage migration and partnering with a European husband, they had sought 'new beginnings', greater opportunities, and many had also hoped for more equality (see also Riaño and Baghdadi (2007)). However, societies of immigration and their status as dependent, combined with the patriarchal expectations of their sponsor partner, had led to highly gender-specialised divisions of labour - something which the women in Suksomboon's study resented, and which in some cases led to separation (Suksomboon, 2011, p. 224). As to why these scenarios would be more likely to involve British (or Dutch) rather than French men, perhaps the answer is as simple as the contrasting scale of British and French tourist flows,<sup>2</sup> and the language barrier. While English is mandatory in Thai schools and widely spoken in Thailand (and in the Netherlands), French is much less common, which may limit the possibility of developing intimacy between French visitors and Thai natives.

This brings us back to the need to contextualise men and women's migration, partner selection and gender relations, within 'gendered geographies of power' (Mahler & Pessar, 2009). That is, at the junction between the power imbalance that links native/settled partner and migrant partner and often goes hand-in-hand with trajectories of 'geographic hypergamy'; the globalisation of the marriage market; the development of mass tourism in Southeast Asia; and Western orientalist perceptions of Asian women as simultaneously attractive and docile. It also highlights the need for more research connecting migration and separation in the life-course, as migrant women's social status and bargaining power can be greatly altered by marital breakdown, and motivations to migrate can be linked to re-partnering efforts. Trajectories of migration post-separation (which are not limited to trajectories of re-partnering) appeared in this study as singular but altogether not anecdotal cases for both mixing and gender relations. There is however very little empirical research to draw from on these particular migration and family processes (for an exception and a discussion of this oversight in existing scholarship, see Mand's work on migrant Sikh women negotiating separation (2005)).

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
<sup>2</sup>According to statistics from the Thai department of tourism and sports (Visitor statistics, 1998-2016), in 2008 and prior there were over twice as many British visitors (over 800,000 in 2008) than French visitors (just under 400,000 in 2008). Though French tourism has most caught up since.

FIGURE 7.6: Gender-specialisation of labour (Index 1), migrant women and migrant men in France (top) and in the UK (bottom)



Estimates from survey-weighted linear models. Not displayed but included in the models are: age and age-squared, age gap, control for unemployed couples.

FIGURE 7.7: Model estimates UK: gender-specialisation (index 2 - distribution of labour time)



*Estimates from survey-weighted linear models. Not displayed but included in the models are: age and age-squared, age gap, control for unemployed couples.*

### 7.1.3 Mixedness, migration and gender

This thesis thus established that, when it comes to migration and the gender division of labour in couples, it matters both where people came from and how they came. But what about who they partnered with? Here I come back to the question of partner selection and specifically mixedness and whether and when it can foster more gender-equality in couples.

Descriptively, I found that migrants who mixed with majority natives are recruited disproportionately among EU-migrants (and Old Commonwealth countries for the UK), and tend to follow different migratory paths: mostly child migration, and in the case of migrant women, also couple-forming migration. This already suggests that classic theories of family migration, notably of economic inspiration (e.g. Mincer (1978)), cannot appropriately account for these couples' migration and/or their gender-specialisation, because for an overwhelming majority of them, they do not make a decision to migrate as a couple. Either because both of them already live in the country of immigration when they meet (when child migrants are involved) or because only one of them (typically the woman) migrates in order to join the other (when couple-forming migration is involved).

These couples do not by any stretch represent rare or exceptional cases - they are much more common than transnational unions involving second-generation migrants, which are however much more discussed and researched. It is both important and useful, therefore, to specifically study them and their gender arrangements, in order to refine and nuance understandings of migration as gendered and gendering, which have mostly been focused on migrant couples and on couples formed by migrants and descendants of migrants.

The fact that migrants who partner with majority natives have different union-migration trajectories and are recruited from specific (mostly white) groups while entirely excluding groups that are most associated with gender-polarised divisions of labour (notably Turks and Pakistanis/Bangladeshis) could be expected to already contain the explanation as to why these couples appeared overall less gender-specialised than other relationships formed by migrants. Yet as we saw, this was only true of couples formed by a migrant man and a majority native woman.

The fact that couple-forming migration was an important feature for migrant women/native majority men couples provided then a way to interpret the observed difference between the two gender configuration of MIG-NAT couples (migrant women/native majority men, or migrant men/native majority women). Indeed, once accounting for area of origin and for union-migration sequence (along with the other controls), the effect of partnering with a native majority partner seemed of little relevance to explain the gender division of labour in migrant women's couples. This was not the case for migrant men. In the French analyses, and in the British analyses based on time shares, migrant men in MIG-NAT unions were found to have less gender-specialised arrangements with their partner than other migrant men with migrant or second-generation partners. This gender-equalising effect could be observed for both unpaid labour and paid labour division, although in the British analyses, it only shows in the time-share models. The French analyses also picked up a gender-equalizing effect associated with mixedness for migrant women, but only for unpaid labour division. This did not show in any of the British models.

How to interpret this? For migrant women, it appears that partnering with a native majority French or British man does little to enhance gender equality in the household as such. The way women migrate and the context in which they form their relationship definitely matters for the gender roles they ultimately develop. But the migratory background of their partner does not appear very decisive. As the qualitative literature had suggested, partnering with a Western man is not a ticket to gender-equality and definitely not when it involves moving to the

man's country (Dos Santos Silva, 2012; Heyse, 2010; Riaño & Baghdadi, 2007; Suksomboon, 2011). It is possible that native majority French men contribute somewhat more to housework and care work, compared to migrant or second-generation men, but this does not permeate into paid labour division.

What of migrant men's experiences of conjugal mixedness with a native majority French or British woman? In their case, mixedness is associated with reduced gender-specialisation, which could be interpreted in two ways: one, the 'native premium' gives their native partner an advantage in the power relation, which translates into less gender-specialisation. However, since the vast majority of the migrant men in these unions were child migrants, it is unlikely that their partner would have a great advantage over them. It is also possible that while picking a native majority partner is an option that seems more open to men who were child migrants than to their female counterparts, it comes at the cost of a degree of alienation and distance from their own group and kin, which subsequently weakens their position in the couple compared to other migrant men. But this should also apply to migrant women, and the absence of a clear gender-specialising effect of mixedness for migrant women undermines this interpretation. It seems more credible, therefore, that the gender-equalising effects associated with migrant men's mixedness are linked to a combination of self-selection, conjugal mixedness and what partnering with another migrant comparatively entails.


Firstly, migrant men who partner with native majority French or British women may be recruited among the migrants who are least attached to their migrant/ethnic group and traditions. This greater independence and the willingness to cross group lines by mixing may translate also into more openness towards subversion of social norms in other areas: for instance, in gender roles and representations. Secondly, the experience of mixedness as such may further foster this (Collet, 2015). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we have to consider the weight of the alternatives. The most common one by far is for migrant men to partner with another migrant. In that case, it is highly likely that the wives followed migration-union trajectories which we have identified as increasing gender-specialisation. Even among child migrants (which, as discussed, constitute most of the migrant men who partner with majority native women), cases of former child migrants partnering with primary migrants are very likely to involve couple-forming migration for the second migrant partner. Cases of child migrants partnering with the native-born second-generation are rare, but they are also likely to reflect active endogamous strategies and to entail a degree of expectations and control by the community in the UK or France and by the kin networks that assist in forming these unions. Part of these expectations revolves

around cultural and gendered expectations, and these situations and mode of union formation can in fact be feared and avoided by second-generation women for this exact reason (Charsley et al., 2020; Lievens, 1999). The explanations I offer are multilevel: to summarize, the fact that for migrant men, partnering 'out' with a native majority partner is connected with comparatively greater gender-equality is likely explained by the fact that, firstly, the migrant men who intermarry tend to be selected among the most assimilated migrants and the most egalitarian; secondly, partnering with majority native partner is unlikely to be invested (by men and/or their family) with gender-conservative expectations (rather the contrary); and thirdly, partnering with a majority native partner in the country of immigration does not involve patrilocal relocation for the woman - whereas it often does if the partner is a migrant man. Accordingly, female native partners are comparatively more likely to be in work and less likely to be cut from their social networks, etc.

This therefore suggests that there is something specific to mixedness, for migrant men only, which in the case of migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples involves explanations linked to specific family formation and migration trajectories, and to mixedness *as such*, in the sense of the crossing of social boundaries perceived as structuring a given society. Here it is useful to finally take advantage of the ethnic question in *Understanding Society*. If we replace the migrant group by the ethnic group, and if we replace migrant-native mixing by inter-ethnic mixing, what do we get? The models presented in figure 7.8 show a shape that is entirely consistent with the other British models discussed previously. We observe the same result, namely that for migrant men, inter-ethnic unions are associated with more gender-egalitarianism in labour division, but that the same is not true for migrant women. Once the models take migration trajectories and migrant or ethnic groups into account, there is very little evidence that intermarriage (however defined) enhances gender equality for migrant women. It derives that endogamy as such is not necessarily a gender equality issue for migrant women, but the modes of migration and couple formation are.

The ethnic and inter-ethnic lens, rather than the classification by area of birth and couples' migratory types as before changes little for the interpretation. The distinction between Pakistani and Bangladeshi suggests that the effect observed prior for the category Pakistani/Bangladeshi may have been more strongly driven by Pakistan migrants. In the main, the analysis is consistent and the ethnic lens brings little no new information. In fact, it confirms and slightly increases the effects. Crucially, the importance of union-migration sequences for migrant women was reaffirmed, as was the disconnect between the effect of sequences for migrant men and for migrant women.

FIGURE 7.8: Model estimates: (inter)ethnicity and the gender specialisation of labour time for migrant women and migrant men



*Estimates from survey-weighted linear models. Not displayed but included in the models are: age and age-squared, age gap, whether the couple has coresident children under the age of 16, and a control for unemployed couples.*

## 7.2 Comparative insights, policy implications, and theoretical contribution

### 7.2.1 General comparison and measures of gender-specialisation

I have discussed the divergences and consistencies between French and British analyses overall. The general consistency is highlighted by the visual comparison enabled by the presentation of French and British models in figure 7.6. The models I picked for this were the most directly comparable. They use the first index of gender-specialisation (as this was operationalised with both French and British dataset) and only variables that were present in both data sets.

In terms of direction, the estimates for migration sequence are consistent across the French and British models (see figure 7.6). When considering the estimates for the dependent variables associated with Index 1 of gender-specialisation (based on joint employment status and tasks), the reduced magnitude and significance of the British estimates are to be considered in the context of the British modified male breadwinner model (Kan, Sullivan, & Gershuny, 2011). The variable on joint employment status does not consider asymmetrical gender arrangements characterised by women working part-time work and men working full-time, which is much more common in the UK than in France (Jan Windebank, 2017). It is not surprising therefore that this variable would be less discriminating in the British context and that this would subsequently also be reflected in the estimates for gender-specialisation.

This is also why it is useful to consider the second index, based on time use and, more precisely, time shares between men and women (see figure 7.7). Here the parallel with the French models is even more marked. The comparison between the labour-time approach and the tasks-distribution approach with the British data demonstrated that the two measures did not capture quite the same thing (although results were mostly consistent). It also underlined the greater sensitivity of the labour-time approach. In the absence of finer data for France, it is difficult to precisely compare estimates for the gender division of labour between the two cases. Nevertheless, the French models, for unpaid labour especially, can be expected to correctly suggest the direction of relations, if not their significance or scale. In this regard they are indeed mostly in line with the British analyses that model the second index of gender-specialisation.

It is clear from the comparison between French and British data that certain demographic elements are critical for the gender-specialisation of labour, especially for women. For migrant women, having a university or other higher degree is clearly associated, across data and models, with reduced gender-specialisation

of labour. In the British analyses, this is especially true for the gender division of paid labour. A high degree of educational achievement in migrant men is less decisive for the gender division of labour. In the British analyses, it has no effect whatsoever, while in the French analyses, it is a very small, gender-equalizing effect (but at any rate much smaller than for migrant women).

Conversely, living with children under the age of 16 is, unsurprisingly, associated with more gender-specialisation of labour. The effect is larger for migrant women than for migrant men. In the British models, the effect is also larger than in the French model: for migrant women living in France, and all other things being equal, women with coresident children under 16 are associated with a 0.1 increase of gender-specialisation (Index 1, ranging from -1 to +1), whereas the effect is over 0.2 for migrant women in the UK. The greater magnitude of the children-related effects in the British models holds for paid and unpaid distribution. Considering the difference in survey design and sample size, this is to be taken with a pinch of salt. However, it is possible that this also reflects the better and - crucially - more affordable childcare services and coverage in France. The most interesting part of this comparison is in fact the gender divergence: the French analyses find no effect of living with children for migrant men's gender-specialisation, when accounting for other factors. But in the British analyses, the presence of underage children in the home is associated with a stark increase of gender-specialisation, for migrant men and for migrant women. This suggests that although there is always a motherhood penalty<sup>3</sup> for migrant women (regardless of who they are with, how they arrived, and where they came from), this effect is less constant for migrant men. In France, it appears to be dependent on other factors, which suggests that for migrant men's relationship, having children is not as decisive in gender-specialisation as partner selection, perhaps because native French women are more likely to use public childcare and to be able to work full-time during children-rearing years.

Throughout this thesis, I have complemented analysis that could be compared between French and British data with one-sided analyses that used data only available in one or the other dataset. Thus the use of the British ethnic question in the previous section allowed us to confirm the relevance of boundary crossing, to refine the analysis by group which underpins the notion of gender culture and to further establish that the effect linked to union-migration sequences could not be limited to or confounded with effects of ethnic groups and aforementioned gender cultures. I also used the greater variety of measures on housework and care work in the British data to refine the analysis.

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<sup>3</sup>By motherhood penalty I mean more than a career delay or a increased wage gap, but a general shift towards more gender-specialisation in the couple.

In addition, I took advantage of the information on legal admission category available in the French data and, building on the general comparability of the French and British immigration regimes, I was able to push the reasoning further. The French models identified the legal category of admission as a strong predictor for the gender-specialisation of labour. To be more precise, they showed that migrant women who entered the country as the dependent partner of a settled migrant or a French citizen were more likely to end up in very gender-specialised couple division of labour, though there was no gendering effect on migrant men. This emphasizes the need to take into account immigration status and legal trajectories, to understand the gendered *and* gendering features of migration experience and partner selection on a global scale.

### 7.2.2 Policy implications and critical border theories

This research has several noteworthy policy implications: firstly, it strongly undermines the notion that intermarrying with the majority British or French group is a key vector of gender equality for migrant and minority women especially. Politically, this means that the 'feminist' or 'pro-gender-equality' arguments targeted at migrant minorities and endogamous behaviours are wanting: even if all migrant women intermarried with majority native French or British people, this study suggests that these marriages would in all likelihood perform poorly in terms of gender equality between partners. The problems have more to do with women's access to independent paths of migration and to opportunities on the labour market post-migration. From a gender equality perspective, facilitating these should arguably be a much stronger point of policy focus than ever-more restrictive policing of family migration, which is largely justified by the targeting of endogamous behaviours (through e.g. policies against arranged marriages and 'chain migration').

The analyses presented in this thesis suggest that certain paths of migration, notably marriage migration and couple reunification, may especially lock women into rigid gender-specialised roles. Yet this should in no way be taken as an argument to undermine family migration provisions. As Schrover and Moloney (2013) recount, there have been initiatives in the past, driven by feminist critiques, notably of the dependent status of reunified or marriage migrant women. But these initiatives have often back-fired, when the critiques were co-opted into the stigmatisation of migrant families, used to feed into anti-immigrant sentiment and to undermine the right of migrants to live with their family. As many have argued in opposition to stated objective of drastically cutting down family migration in France and the UK - this type of migration is anchored to the human right of migrants to have a family life (Héran, 2017). The last thing I would want

is for this work to be used to undermine or suspend this right, which when it comes to migrants is already much too often compromised.

The critique I have tried to articulate here, which emphasizes the importance of the life course and of migration trajectories, connects with a critical approach to gender relations and inequalities and how they shape migration opportunities and outcomes. It also speaks, albeit less directly, with a critique of Western immigration regimes. The French and British states have, by practically closing off any entry channel other than family migration for non-EU migrants, condemned most prospective migrants to illegal or family migration, both of which are especially prone to creating situations where women are vulnerable, economically dependent, and confined to rigid interpretations of gender roles. It seems clear that, again from a gender equality perspective, the period of time before sponsored partners can apply for an independent visa should be reduced rather than increased, which has been the current trend. Indeed, while it is crucial that partners and family members be allowed to join or follow, it is disputable whether that should warrant a different, more conditional and restrictive type of visa.

Autonomous trajectories of migration, notably those of single, adult migrants, may well be the most empowering for women (Sassen, 2005). But they are precisely the paths that have been most reduced and where selection works most against women. Gender inequalities at the world scale are such that overall, women and girls are more likely to be illiterate, less likely to have access to school or university, and hold less formal qualifications than men and boys (United Nations, 2021). This puts them at a further disadvantage to fit into British or French residual labour migration pathways tailored for highly-skilled migrants (so-called 'chosen immigration').

Furthermore, by emphasising the role of couple trajectories in defining gender roles and acknowledging how these trajectories are deeply constrained and shaped by immigration regimes, this research engages with scholarship in critical border studies. Western assumptions about what is a 'proper' family, or an 'authentic' couple (especially when mixed), or a caring parent, in combination with gendered and racialised stereotypes, underpin British and French (im)migration policies and restrictions. This point is particularly compelling when it applies to the management of intimacy (Stoler, 2010) via family migration visa requirements and practices (Turner, 2015; Turner & Espinoza, 2019), and via the policing of intermarriage. Historically, this was explicitly about managing (or preventing) mixed-race unions (Heuer, 2009; MacMaster, 1997; Thompson, 2009), and it now polices mainly mixed-nationality status couples (De Hart, 2015). Through the

immigration requirements and the policing and monitoring that goes with them (and especially with not meeting them), governments split migrants and families between normal/abnormal, authentic/disingenuous, tolerable/intolerable. The working of these *biopolitics* (Foucault, 1994) also participates in policing and reproducing highly gendered roles. These often work against migrant women who are confined to spouse visas and family reunification; but they also work against men, whose emotional involvement as fathers and partners is often denied (Griffiths & Morgan, 2017; Wray, 2011). Yet in the (rare) cases when men follow or join their partner, gender roles and inequalities in the home may be profoundly shaken and re-negotiated. With the typology I used, men's migration trajectories and how they fitted in the life course did not appear as a decisive factor for gender (in)equality in labour division. But this also reflected the fact that the vast majority of the migrant men follow the same union-migration trajectories. They either migrate as children, or as single adults, or if need be as lead migrants.

### 7.2.3 Theoretical contribution

Rather than focusing only on push-pull factors (motives and context of migration decision) or profiles of migrants (composition) to explain labour distribution post-migration, the thesis considered migration experience itself as a potent parameter. In a broad sense, the thesis thus operationalised a theoretical framework drawn from feminist theories of migration. These theories emphasize that gender relations inform and frame all aspects of migration: from the context of departure (before) to the mode and timing of migration (during) and its outcomes (after). The thesis further implemented feminist theories by combining gendered analyses with an analysis of gender relations - that is, by integrating gender both as an independent and as a dependent variable. Another parameter, that was left little addressed in these pages, is how both gendered migrations and gendered outcomes of migration can be affected by the structure of the labour market in the country of immigration. Some migratory flows such as those of nurses from the Philippines or the Carribbeans are mainly composed of women; these flows are linked to a demand for particular skilled labour in the country of immigration (in this example, the UK). These migrations which are numerically dominated by women are logically associated with very high levels of labour engagement among the migrant women involved, even though many of them were already partnered and/or had children when they migrated (for more examples see notably the literature on care chains Hochschild (2000), Lutz and Palenga-Möllenbeck (2012), Palenga-Möllenbeck (2013), and Parreñas (2005, 2015)). Further investigation would pay closer attention to the structure of the labour market in countries of destination, which would help refine the connection

between couple formation, migration trajectories and gender dynamics of labour division post-migration.

Nevertheless, this thesis developed a theoretical architecture that combined and adjusted theories of gender and labour division in couples to the context of migration. Indeed, specialisation theory, time availability and relative resources approaches have seldom been discussed with regards to migrants and minority groups. In the main, ethnic differences in the gender division of labour, when they have been studied, have been explained with references to different gender cultures, which can be boiled down in theoretical terms to variations around 'doing gender' theories. This thesis laid out this theoretical articulation and made room for associated culturalist explanations to ethnic differences in the gender division of labour. These explanations proved to be particularly relevant to understanding migrant men's relative contribution to paid and unpaid labour in their relationships. However, I also expanded the theoretical framework by putting emphasis on how migration experiences and trajectories can affect the resources of migrants, hence also the power balance between migrants and their partner post-migration. Drawing there mostly on relative resource theory, I argued that, in the context of migration, other resources than purely economic resources need to be considered relevant to couples' internal bargaining. Specifically, native and more settled partners can leverage a settled or native 'premium'. This 'premium' can take the form of legal sponsorship in cases of dependent partner visas: the asymmetry induced by partner visa is thus one thing that can affect the relative bargaining power of partners in the context of migration. Further resources to consider include for instance better language skills and access to local networks and opportunities. When these resources are unevenly distributed between partners - typically when one partner is a recent migrant and the other a native of the country of residence - , this creates situations of dependency towards the native or more fluent and better integrated partner. These asymmetries and dependencies can be missed by using a classic economic lens (e.g. income or asset distribution) to assess the relative resources of each partner. Yet in the context of migration, they are highly relevant to understanding the power dynamics and bargaining context of couples, arguably especially those of migrant-native couples. The focus on migration trajectories to explain the division of labour post-migration draws directly on this theoretical construction. Namely, it posits that certain migration trajectories (e.g. couple-forming or couple migration) can foster multi-leveled forms of dependencies for marriage migrants or trailing migrant partners, which in turn affects their bargaining power in the negotiations around the distribution of labour in the couple. It is likely however that the strength of the effect is different depending on whether the (more) dependent partner is a

man or a woman, as couples tend to be more invested in re-establishing equal footing between partners when men are dependent (e.g. unemployed) than when women are dependent.<sup>4</sup> This remains open to investigation, as do the relative explanatory power of different types of asymmetries, e.g. legal, linguistic, social capital, etc.

This thesis further contributes to nuancing theories of marital assimilation as they relate to intermarriage. It built on and tested the idea that though theories of assimilation can explain part of why some migrants and some migrant groups are more likely to intermarry with the majority native group, these theories leave unaddressed a whole chunk of migrant intermarriage that occur not through assimilation but through marriage migration. Furthermore, as the thesis showed, such couple-forming trajectories are common among intermarried migrant women but rare among intermarried migrant men, which lead to conclude that theories of intermarriage as markers of marital assimilation need to be amended to account for the gender diversity of paths to intermarriage. Specifically, though theories of marital assimilation perform well in explaining migrant men's propensity to intermarry, they do poorly with regards to migrant women's intermarrying, because they do not account for marriage migration for which status exchange theory provide a better theoretical framework. Theories of assimilation imply that intermarriage rewards a high degree of assimilation: it derives that assimilation has to happen before intermarriage. But in the case of couple-forming migration, assimilation is more likely to occur after (if at all) rather than before. Theoretically, this means that the link between intermarriage and assimilation is gendered. Firstly, the link, especially the causal link, is weaker for migrant women, who, though marriage migration, can intermarry without being already culturally assimilated; secondly, the temporality is different: migrant men have to assimilate prior to intermarriage; but in the case of many migrant women, assimilation happens mainly after intermarriage. The idea that classic theories of marital assimilation may better account for minority men's intermarrying, while other theories (including status exchange) are needed to make sense of minority women's intermarrying is not of relevance only to primary migrants - it can also informs our approach to the second or third generation.

<sup>4</sup>See for instance Rao (2020)'s work on how married couples face unemployment, which highlights the gender disparities in how much time and resources both dependent and bread-winning partners dedicate to work search depending on whether the unemployed partner is a man (work search is a couple priority) or a woman (women's unemployment can much more easily becomes a status quo).

### 7.3 Limitations and avenues for further research

As the literature on internal couple relocation suggested, the gendering effects of migratory experience are largely linked to the fact that trajectories are themselves gendered. Certain migratory and conjugal paths are open and acceptable for men, but not for women, and vice-versa. Gender-conforming migratory paths (men as independent migrants or as lead movers, women as marriage migrants or second-movers) also have gender-conforming effects. In the context of migration, the subversion of gender inequalities, which in a feminist materialist sense implies the end of gender-specialisation of labour in (as well as out) of the household, likely comes about through the subversion of gender norms and regimes around how and when in the life-course men and women should migrate. This echoes the idea raised in the family relocation literature that the 'gender display' dimension may play out most heavily in framing migration decisions and timing.

In this way, the notion of gendered and gendering paths of migration involves a form of path dependency. Indeed there is evidence of path dependency effects in gender-specialisation, which indicates that once a couple shifts to even slightly gendered division of labour, this slows down the process of human capital accumulation for the woman, which in turn makes it easier to push for increased gender-specialisation (Kan & Gershuny, 2009). The literature often mentions the birth of a first child as such a transition, but it seems plausible that migration also works in this fashion, through the complex interplay of gender norms, gender regimes, immigration restrictions and the globalisation of the marriage market. For migrant women, the union-migration process may kick-start gender-specialisation and then create career breaks and dependency which further justify and embed it. In the absence of longitudinal data pre- and post-migration I cannot investigate this claim as such, but taking advantage of the available longitudinal data would make it possible to analyse the evolution of the gender division of labour in migrants' couples post-migration. This would help better understand whether specialisation continues to increase following gendering union-migration trajectories or, instead, diminishes over time, as socio-economic and linguistic integration progresses and perhaps alongside phenomena of gender-acculturation (Roeder & Mühlau, 2014). The French analyses suggested that this might be the case for migrant women.

### 7.3.1 Endogeneity of gender attitudes and union-migration trajectories

This also brings us back to an important limitation of this research, which is the possibility of self-selection into certain union-migration trajectories and mixed or non-mixed unions based on pre-existing gender-egalitarianism or gender-conservatism. We know from the literature on intra-national relocations that couples with gender-specialised arrangements are more likely to migrate (Mincer, 1978; Vidal, Perales, & Baxter, 2016), because they unambiguously prioritise the man's employment prospects over the woman's. It is also highly likely that gender attitudes orient who follows which paths of union-migration. Gender ideologies likely influence how open women are to following their partner abroad (whether as marriage migrants or as second or joint mover) or, conversely, how open men are to following their partner. Thus gender attitudes could be a confounding factor for the gendering effects which I have associated with sequences of union-migration and mixedness.

Again, having no information on gender attitude pre-migration in the British data, and none at all (also post-migration) in the French data, it is difficult to evaluate the merit of this possibility. Yet there is ample qualitative literature documenting that migrant women, including marriage migrants, are often actually seeking gender-egalitarianism through migration to Europe, and are even surprised and disappointed when it does not deliver. To quite a large extent, women's gender attitudes and taste for gender-egalitarianism is of limited consequence on the actual division of labour, and gender attitudes are hardly affected by relocations (Vidal & Lersch, 2019). I have treated union-migration sequences as if their effects could be isolated from the groups who travel them, based on an argument that gender trajectories could be distinguished from gender cultures - that their effects are not only linear but also independent, thus implicitly *separable* and *cumulative* (Sigle-Rushton, 2014; Spelman, 1990). In effect, however, there is no question that the two interlock. This approach was a research design, *apart pris*, by which I stand, which allowed for an analysis that moved away from essentialising narratives of gender relations in migrant and ethnic groups. But it does rely on a assumption of linearity which is no doubt reductive and an assumption of independence which is to some extent artificial. To improve the multi-level comparison (between men and women, between mixed couples and other couples, between trajectories, and between origins) and relax the hypothesis of independence, it may be useful to look at more complex but potentially better suited methods, such as e.g. exact matching (as fruitfully employed by e.g. Ichou (2015)).

### 7.3.2 Limits of the operationalisation of the gender division of labour

Further limitations are linked to the way I operationalised the gender division of labour. On the one hand, with respect to unpaid labour, I chose to focus on routine, physical housework (cooking, grocery shopping, and in the British case, cleaning and tidying). Accordingly, I put aside other tasks such as gardening and DIY jobs, which are less routine and whose distribution is not clearly correlated with the other tasks. This was pertinent in order to aggregate the undertaking of these tasks into a score variable that made sense and to focus on the distribution of the most 'gendered' (i.e. 'feminine') labour. But this might exaggerate the gender-division of labour, since the increase in men's contribution to unpaid work has been overwhelmingly to non-routine work (Kan et al., 2011).

Conversely, I have only factored in the housework and care work done by either partner and ignored (in fact, erased) the work done by other people, including paid help but also relatives. This design choice is not without problems for the matter at hand. Firstly, as I have mentioned before, it artificially constructs migrants' families as solely nuclear families, which is often a distorted if not plainly inaccurate prism (Shaw, 2004). Communities and migrants around the world live and develop extended households and varied family forms that go beyond or bypass the man-woman couple unit connected by marriage or a nuclear, distinctly Western understanding of 'the couple' (Pyke, 2008). This limitation is apparent when looking at the Caribbean sample in this study. Though one of the largest ethnic groups in the UK, the sample was small in this study. This reflects the fact that this migratory flow is already quite old (many who identify as 'Black Caribbean' are grand-children of migrants (Ichou, 2015)), but also that the narrow couple lens I have used to define couples and families (coresident man-woman couples) misses many Caribbean families and households, who are more likely than other groups to involve single mothers (Kulu, 2019) and several generations of coresident women (Foner, 1979; Shaw, 2014). Most importantly, in focusing exclusively on the work done by either the man or the woman in man-woman co-resident couples, the design of the unpaid labour variable cannot account for the fact that most outsourced labour is in fact done by women, whether paid (paid domestic workers) or unpaid (grandmothers, sisters, etc.). When considering the broader picture of who does the labour needed for social reproduction (Bhattacharya, 2017), it is plain that the design of this variable very likely under-estimates the actual gender division of labour, at the scale of the family and household, but also at societal level.

Furthermore, with regards to paid labour distribution, although I tried to make the best of the data I have, even the average time spent at work weekly

cannot distinguish the variety of shift work schedule (Lesnard, 2008). This is an important point, since it is arguable that, nowadays, shift schedules socially stratifies paid work more than the distinction part-time/full time or hours spent in paid work overall (Vagni, 2020). Migrant workers are more likely to be working antisocial hours and jobs with poor working conditions and poor pay, especially in care work, where migrant and racialised women are over-represented. We could thus expect migrant women, as well as migrant men, to be over-represented in the kind of time use patterns that denote nonstandard work schedules (shift work, weekend work, etc). The gender division of labour plays out in different ways when considering how couples organise and cope with nonstandard work schedule. The information necessary for such analysis was, however, not available in the data (which brings us back to the discussion on the segregation of data on migration and gender in part I). The analysis of migrants' time use and detailed patterns of paid and unpaid labour remains open for further, important research.

### 7.3.3 Intersectionality: going back to the data

Throughout this work, I have attempted to follow an *intra-categorical* (McCall, 2005) approach to the question at hand, on the intersectional assumption that experiences of migration and mixedness would likely have different consequences and work in different ways for migrant men and for migrant women and that both categories would hide a high degree of heterogeneity and social stratification. This intra-categorical approach, characterised by systematically segregated modelling did highlight different - gendered - dynamics, but it was also clearly limited both by the sample size and construction, and by the information contained in the datasets. Like Choi and Tienda (2018) I conducted separate analyses to document variations in gender-specialisation separately according to men's characteristics and trajectories and women's characteristics and trajectories. Sample size and sample design permitting, future studies will expand on this by combining the perspectives of both partners, so as to assess how husband and wife's journeys interact to shape, together, the gender outcomes of migration.

The difficulty in finding adequate points of comparison among white groups for intersectional analysis is striking. It would have been very helpful, for instance, to work with a large enough sample of North American or Old Commonwealth migrants, who, contrary to EU migrants, have to submit to immigration regulations. US-born individuals were the 6th largest migrant group in both the 2001 and the 2011 Census (ONS, 2001, 2011), ahead of Bangladeshis or Jamaicans. But though there is a long history of immigration and emigration between the UK

and the USA (and also a sizeable US-born population living in France<sup>5</sup>), the presence of these migrants has never been much questioned and consequently they have never been specifically over-sampled in relevant surveys. White American women living in the UK who followed or migrated with their partner, perhaps on a partner visa, would provide a key point of intersectional comparison with e.g. Caribbean, African or South Asian migrant women with the same trajectories or pathway of migration. To no small extent, our ability to obtain adequate, carefully thought-through samples of white migrants conditions our capacity to offer quantitative investigation of intersectional inequalities in the context of migration.

It has not been possible in this thesis to 'split' the predominantly white migrant groups, purely for reasons of sample size. Notably, this has meant that I could not compare in the models EU (and in the case of the UK, Irish) migrants, whose migration is (was) unrestricted, from other predominantly white but controlled migratory flows (e.g. from the U.S., Australia, etc...). Yet it is of course very plausible that the fact that EU migrant women are somewhat less likely to be financially dependent on their partner, is linked to the fact that the entry and participation in the labour market of the women in that group were greatly facilitated by the absence of interference, restrictions or induced legal dependency from the immigration regime. If, however, we had a large enough sample of 'immigration-controlled' white migrants, it would be much more straightforward to precisely identify the role of race and by extension of intersectionality in the link between union-migration trajectories and the gender division of labour. This is an important path for further work and it represents a crucial empirical need to understand how race, together with gender, class and immigration regimes, mediates how gender inequalities are (re)produced in and through international migration. It is also an important theoretical pre-requisite to avoid reproducing research frameworks that constitute gender and patriarchal relations as only relevant to the international migration of non-Western groups - when everything we know about intra-national relocations within Western countries indicate that that is decidedly not the case.

It is clear that the emergence of data on gender relations in surveys on migration and ethnicity was neither the product of chance nor simply a logical development in a growing interest in gender. It necessitated that people in positions of power in the survey design had made it their own research object. It is also clear that as much as patriarchal gender relations are brandished against migrant and ethnic communities and groups, political pressure at the national

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<sup>5</sup>American women with French husbands formed the case study of some of the seminal French qualitative studies on conjugal mixedness (Varro, 1984)

level is not focused on expanding data on that front. The dynamics and actors within the field of demographic research and on the academic side of survey designs (as well as the EU agenda of promoting gender equality) were key drivers here. It is in large part through their influence that topics of family formation, migration and the gender division of labour co-exist in the data and accordingly I expect that it is through more of the same that the scope for intersectional research on gender relations and migration can be expanded.

Survey data, it should be noted, is not the only data available to analyse and estimate migration flows. Although states and state-backed surveys long had the monopoly of migration data production, the use of computational methods has opened new avenues of quantitative data collection and analysis which bypass survey data and associated politics. Leading in this is arguably Emilio Zagheni and his team, who have used a variety of digital traces (emails, facebook and twitter data among others) to calculate non-survey or state registry-based estimates of international migrations (M. Alexander, Polimis, & Zagheni, 2020; Zagheni, Weber, & Gummadi, 2017). While these methods hold much promise - not least because they do not directly rely on states measures - they will help develop research on gender relations in and throughout migration probably only if they consciously set out to do so.

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
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# Appendices

## Appendix: chapter 1

### Appendix: Understanding Society: design chronology

FIGURE 9: Appendix: Understanding Society - Extra five minute questions and targeted samples (McFall et al., 2018, p. 21)



### The controversy around the design of the French survey Trajectoires et Origines (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009)

In the first TeO project presented for approval to the CNIS<sup>6</sup> in May 2006, the questionnaire included questions on migration trajectories, nationality, country of birth, parents' country of birth, first visa obtained in France, as well as questions on religion and respondents' self-identified and socially perceived skin-colour. These last two aspects in particular were innovative in the context of a national survey. Although initially approved, approval is then questioned and delayed, and the CNIS goes through a series of extraordinay and extraordinarily heated meetings dedicated to the question of TeO (Héran, 2010, p. 18). The caution at this point surrounds the questions on immigration status and visa types; religion;

<sup>6</sup>CNIS: National Council of Statistical Information, the official body that regulates the production and use of public statistics in France.

migratory origins; and skin colour. Ultimately, however, the CNIS approved all questions, and only put restriction on the distribution of the data: access to 'sensitive' questions will require a special licence, to be delivered by the CNIS only. Consequently, the first version of the TeO survey, to be tested out in late November 2007, included the following questions on skin colour.

"

- "When people meet you, how do you think they see you in terms of [skin] colour(s)?" (open answer, no predefined categories)
- "And what colour would you personally say that you are?"

" (TeO questionnaire proposal, as approved by the CNIS in 2007)

In spite of the CNIS' green light, the above 'ethnic questions' as well as the questions on religion soon become the topic of a national debate. Highly unusual in the world of demography, which rarely lends itself (or is submitted) to such political turmoil, the work of survey design and classifications are discussed on a national, public scale, and the survey designers had to actively engage in the debate to defend their survey as well as their own epistemological and political stances (recounted by Patrick Simon (2015), one of the survey leads). Opponents to the ethnic questions brought up the dark heritage of the Vichy regime and its 'Jewish files', and the shining colour-blindness of French Universalism and Republicanism. The controversy tore through political lines. Opposition to the survey linked to French 'Republican' values was represented amongst conservatives, yet many in the UMP ranks (including Nicolas Sarkozy) were also in favour of introducing ethnic statistics, in which they saw a tool to evaluate integration and to benchmark migrant groups so as to expose the more 'sectarian' communities deemed 'unable and unwilling to integrate'. Meanwhile, the Left and centre-Left found itself intensely divided - a recurring pattern when it comes to the questions of racism and anti-racism in France (D. Fassin, 2012). In November 2007, SOS Racisme, the biggest anti-racist organisation in France, launched a petition against the survey's 'ethnic filing', which gathered over 100 000 signatories, including the entire front bench of the Socialist Party and the future president François Hollande<sup>7</sup>. The part of the left who, along with the survey team, supports the introduction of ethnic classifications, does it in the name of anti-discrimination and with the aim of exposing the reality and scope of racism and racial inequalities in France. Yet even within the INED, tensions were rife. Hervé Le Bras, an INED researcher and specialist of immigration

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<sup>7</sup>The petition was entitled *Fiche pas mon pote!*: 'Don't file my pal'.

violently attacks the survey and the survey team in the media (Le Bras, Blum, & Guérin-Pace, 2007). Within the INSEE, the union (Inter-syndicale des salariés de l'INSEE) also expresses its disagreement with parts of the questionnaire, those on skin colour especially<sup>8</sup>

The pressure rose to such levels that the questions on skin colour were eventually revoked by a decision of the Constitutional Council, mid-November 2007. This decision stated that

The treatments necessary to the study of measures of people's diversity of origins, of discrimination and of integration [...] may rely on objective measures but may not rely on ethnic origin or race, without going against the principle of article 1 of the Constitution.

The INED and the INSEE were thus forced to cut these questions out of the questionnaire, replacing them with a broader question on origins: '*When you think about your family history, what would you say your origin is?*' (Héran, 2010). The questions on discrimination retained a skin colour category, so that it was possible for respondents to state that they have been victims of discrimination because of their skin colour, but not what their skin colour might be. The questions on religion, which had also been criticised, were however maintained.

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<sup>8</sup>Very active and very cautious on 'sensitive' material, the union wanted for an ethics committee to be set up and tasked with monitoring the production and the results of all studies which may refer to ethnic or racial origins.

## Appendix: chapter 3

TABLE 1: Appendix: Areas of origin (finer grid) by gender of migrants


	Migrant women		Migrant men		Together	
	n	%-w	n	%-w	n	%-w
<b>Couple types</b>						
MIG-NAT	926	34	826	30	1752	32
MIG-2G	221	9	293	11	514	10
MIG-MIG	1720	57	1842	59	3562	58
<i>Total: all couples</i>	2867	100	2961	100	5828	100
<b>Areas of birth</b>						
Southern EU	466	18	544	22	1010	20
EU-27: other	341	14	181	7	522	11
Turkey	316	7	366	7	682	7
North Africa	625	28	752	34	1377	31
Sahelian Africa	184	3	215	3	399	3
Africa: other	277	9	284	9	561	9
Mainland Southeast Asia	264	3	297	4	561	3
Asia						
Other	394	18	322	14	716	16
<i>Total: all areas</i>	2867	100	2961	100	5828	100

*Note:* all percentages and means are survey-weighted

*Source:* TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).

*Universe:* partnered migrants (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).

FIGURE 10: Appendix: Area of origin over time, among partnered migrant women and men living in France in 2008-2009



The table above situates the union patterns of couples formed by primary migrants, to compare them with couples formed by natives and second-generation natives. It presents the weighted proportions of married unions in each couple types, the proportion of couples living with dependent children (their own children, under 16), and the proportion of exogamous couples. The table also adds the weighted mean age at first marriage and at first child, for men and women respectively.

TABLE 2: Appendix: Distribution of areas of origin, educational level, and family patterns and timing, by gendered couple types

	Migrant women				Migrant men			
	MIG-NAT	MIG-2G	MIG-MIG	All	MIG-NAT	MIG-2G	MIG-MIG	All
<b>Area of birth</b>								
Southern EU	20	17	16	18	29	23	18	22
EU-27: other	23	11	9	14	12	3	6	7
Turkey	1	6	10	7	2	9	10	7
North Africa	16	51	31	28	31	52	33	34
Sahelian Africa	3	1	4	3	2	2	4	3
Africa: other	10	3	10	9	9	5	10	9
Mainland Southeast Asia	3	2	4	3	2	1	5	4
Other	24	10	15	18	14	5	15	14
<i>All areas</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Education</b>								
No educational attainment	14	27	32	25	19	32	30	27
High school/professional degree	42	40	47	45	47	50	46	47
Further education	44	33	21	30	34	18	24	27
<i>All educational levels</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Unions and children</b>								
% married	77	87	89	85	71	85	90	84
% coresident children under 18	59	75	71	67	60	80	69	68
% parents	82	83	91	87	82	90	90	88
% more than 2 children	24	22	45	36	29	25	45	38
% exogamous	100	28	7	41	100	19	7	36
<b>Ordering</b>								
% tied migrants	29	50	33	33	12	27	8	11
% couple before migration	38	49	57	50	16	35	33	28
% migration before couple	62	51	43	50	84	65	67	72
<b>Timing (mean)</b>								
Age at first union	25.88 (0.24)	24.08 (0.38)	23.6 (0.18)	24.36 (0.14)	28.96 (0.3)	27.23 (0.45)	27.26 (0.17)	27.7 (0.14)
Age at first child	26.73 (0.24)	26.32 (0.4)	24.87 (0.16)	25.58 (0.13)	29.37 (0.26)	28.61 (0.45)	28.66 (0.17)	28.85 (0.14)
Age at migration	19.75 (0.43)	18.42 (0.76)	22.05 (0.3)	20.95 (0.24)	17.28 (0.48)	19.13 (0.71)	22.36 (0.28)	20.49 (0.24)

*Note:* all percentages and means are survey-weighted

*Source:* TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).

*Universe:* partnered migrants women or migrant men (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).

Most co-resident couples overall are married (72%) , and about half of them live with children age 17 or younger. These proportions vary however widely by couple types (see appendix 3). Thus 90% of migrant couples (MIG-MIG) are married, and they live with dependent children in two thirds of cases. When primary migrants partner with second-generation natives, the proportion of married couples drops slightly, but the proportion of couples with young children in their care is higher still (3/4 of MIG-2G couples). This may also be due to the fact that second-generation natives are on average younger, something reflected in the TeO survey and sample (Beauchemin, Algava, & Lhommeau, 2015). Indeed, this proportion of couples with young children is also higher among couples formed by two descendants of migrants (2G-2G). On the whole, couples formed between native majority individuals and native minority (i.e. with migrant parent(s)) - 2G-NAT couples - behave very similarly to native majority couples as regards both marriage and children, although they are somewhat less likely to be married. The same resemblance with native majority couples applies to those couples that involve a native majority partner and a primary migrant (MIG-NAT couples). Yet this observation only stands at the level of the aggregate (*all* MIG-NAT couples). Distinguishing MIG-NAT couples that involve a migrant woman and a native majority man (MIGw-NATm), and comparing them with MIG-NAT couples composed of a migrant man and a native majority woman (MIGm-NATw), brings to light a clear contrast. While MIGm-NATw couples are in all aspects almost perfectly aligned with NAT-NAT couples, the same does not apply to MIGw-NATm couples. When a migrant woman is involved, migrant-native couples are much more likely to be married, although they are not more likely to be living with children.

TABLE 3: Appendix: Marriage, children and exogamy by couple type

	% married	Women's age at first marriage (mean)	Men's age at first marriage (mean)	% coresident children under 18	Women's age at first child (mean)	Men's age at first child (mean)	% exogamous
<b>NAT-NAT</b>	70	24.77 (0.19)	27.3 (0.28)	54	25.68 (0.16)	27.92 (0.19)	0
<b>2G-NAT</b>							
2Gw-NATm	70	25.75 (0.76)	29.29 (1.67)	54	26.63 (0.39)	28.25 (0.73)	100
2Gm-NATw	59	25.02 (0.76)	27.27 (0.51)	57	26.6 (0.72)	28.18 (0.48)	100
2G-NAT (all)	64	25.41 (0.54)	28.3 (0.90)	56	26.62 (0.42)	28.21 (0.42)	100
<b>2G-2G</b>	70	23.76 (0.39)	26.2 (0.56)	60	25.44 (0.36)	27.9 (0.42)	29
<b>MIG-NAT</b>							
MIGw-NATm	82	25.88 (0.24)	29.82 (1.28)	54	26.73 (0.24)	30.07 (1.58)	100
MIGm-NATw	64	26.52 (1.15)	28.96 (0.3)	57	26.2 (0.97)	29.37 (0.26)	100
MIG-NAT (all)	74	26.13 (0.46)	29.42 (0.7)	55	26.53 (0.41)	29.71 (0.79)	100
<b>MIG-2G</b>							
MIGw-2Gm	83	24.08 (0.38)	28.36 (0.59)	73	26.32 (0.4)	29.06 (0.95)	33
MIGm-2Gw	85	23.73 (0.33)	27.23 (0.45)	76	25.47 (0.44)	28.61 (0.45)	23
MIG-2G (all)	84	23.85 (0.25)	27.86 (0.39)	75	25.76 (0.31)	28.84 (0.54)	28
<b>MIG-MIG</b>	90	23.6 (0.18)	27.26 (0.17)	70	24.87 (0.16)	28.66 (0.17)	7
<i>All</i>	71	24.79 (0.15)	27.57 (0.23)	56	25.78 (0.13)	28.17 (0.16)	20

*Note:* all percentages and means are survey-weighted

*Source:* TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).

*Universe:* partnered migrants (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).

## Appendix: chapter 4

FIGURE 11: Appendix: Area of origin over time, among migrant women and men (with or without co-resident partner) living in the UK around 2009-2012




TABLE 4: Appendix: Areas of birth (finer grid) by gender of migrants (partnered)

	Migrant women		Migrant men		Together	
	n	%-W	n	%-W	n	%-W
Ireland (Éire)	112	6	80	6	192	6
Southern EU	49	3	46	4	95	4
Other EU-27	324	23	252	18	576	21
USA, Canada, Australia, NZ	105	7	71	6	176	6
Carribbeans	102	3	117	3	219	3
India	332	12	350	14	682	13
Pakistan	259	6	294	7	553	7
Bangladesh	233	3	246	4	479	4
Southeast Asia	118	5	62	3	180	4
Sri Lanka	76	2	78	3	154	3
China	49	2	38	2	87	2
Maghreb + Turkey	32	1	45	2	77	1
Sahelian Africa	94	3	110	3	204	3
Other Africa	288	11	330	15	618	13
Other areas	202	11	172	10	374	10
total: all areas	2375	100	2291	100	4666	100

Note: all percentages and means are survey-weighted

Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).

Universe: partnered migrants (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).

FIGURE 12: Appendix: Sequences cluster tree: union-migration sequences (weighted)




TABLE 5: Appendix: Quality measures for sequences partition into five clusters (UKLHS union-migration sequences)

Measures <sup>a</sup>	Value
PBC	0.71
HG	0.90
HGSD	0.90
ASW	0.54
ASWw	0.54
CH	1294.94
R2	0.64
CHsq	3964.97
R2sq	0.85
HC	0.04

<sup>a</sup>Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012)

## Appendix: chapter 5

TABLE 6: Appendix: Distribution of sequence types - all migrants  
(survey-weighted percentages)

	Child migrants (1.5G)	Single young adults	Single adults	Formation 1st partnership	Established 1st partnership	Multiple partnerships	Total %
migrant women	25	10	6	36	17	6	100
migrant men	27	14	20	24	11	4	100
MIGW-migm	21	12	5	34	25	4	100
MIGM-migw	19	17	22	23	15	3	100
MIGw-2Gm	30	10	7	42	9	3	100
MIGm-2Gw	32	11	13	36	6	2	100
MIGw-NATm	30	8	8	37	7	10	100
MIGm-NATw	42	11	19	19	4	5	100
couple before migration	0	2	0	55	35	8	100
migration before couple tied migrants	42	19	22	14	1	3	100
1	5	4	63	22	6	100	
work	13	20	22	27	13	5	100
studies	15	18	36	25	2	4	100
family	28	9	4	42	14	4	100
none needed	52	9	5	15	13	7	100
other	26	10	14	23	22	5	100
Southern EU	52	16	5	19	7	2	100
EU-27: other	13	8	10	33	21	16	100
Turkey	29	14	4	30	21	1	100
North Africa	25	13	16	33	10	2	100
Sahelian Africa	6	9	31	33	17	4	100
Africa: other	11	15	22	29	17	6	100
Mainland Southeast Asia	37	19	16	16	11	1	100
Other	13	7	16	36	21	7	100
No qualifications	23	18	11	29	15	3	100
High school or professional degree	33	12	11	28	13	4	100
Further education	20	8	20	33	13	7	100

*Note:* all percentages and means are survey-weighted

*Source:* TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).

*Universe:* partnered migrants (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).

## Appendix: chapter 6

TABLE 7: Appendix: Gender division of labour by couple types  
(standardized coefficients)

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender-specialisation		
	survey-weighted normal	survey-weighted normal	survey-weighted normal
	(1)	(2)	(3)
2G-NAT (ref=NAT-NAT)	-0.048*** (0.023)	-0.014*** (0.014)	-0.033*** (0.015)
2G-2G	0.180 (0.060)	0.132 (0.038)	0.049 (0.040)
MIG-NAT	-0.035*** (0.029)	0.061 (0.018)	-0.096*** (0.019)
MIG-2G	0.153 (0.045)	0.164 (0.028)	-0.011*** (0.030)
MIG-MIG	0.161 (0.030)	0.171 (0.019)	-0.010*** (0.020)
Age (couple average)	0.003 (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.0005)	0.007 (0.001)
Coresident children under 18 (ref=no)	0.166 (0.015)	0.118 (0.010)	0.047 (0.010)
Further education (ref=no)	-0.027*** (0.016)	0.025 (0.010)	-0.052*** (0.011)
Constant	0.332 (0.037)	0.185 (0.023)	0.148 (0.024)
Observations	11,629	11,629	11,629
R <sup>2</sup>	0.017	0.039	0.022
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.016	0.038	0.021
Log Likelihood	-20,078.720	-14,713.580	-15,356.690
Residual Std. Error (df = 11620)	0.785	0.495	0.523
F Statistic (df = 8; 11620)	24.613***	59.057***	32.172***

\*\*\*p < 0.001; \*\*p < 0.01; \*p < 0.05.

Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).

Universe: all partnered individuals (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).

TABLE 8: Appendix: Step-wise survey-weighted linear regression models of gender division of labour: migrant women and migrant men

Migrant women		Migrant men		Migrant women		Migrant men	
(Intercept)	.343 (.057)***	.306 (.058)***	.326 (.066)***	.312 (.071)***	.296 (.066)***	.308 (.070)***	.308 (.070)***
MIG-2G (ref=MIG-MIG)	.006 (.037)	-.038 (.035)	.004 (.039)*	-.016 (.047)	-.007 (.040)	-.029 (.040)	-.029 (.040)
MIG-NAT	-.024 (.027)	-.046 (.031)	-.027 (.028)	-.055 (.035)	-.006 (.031)	-.033 (.037)	-.033 (.037)
Caribbean (ref=EU)	-.033 (.057)	-.164 (.067)*			.027 (.057)	-.166 (.071)*	
Africa	-.015 (.035)	.002 (.035)			.010 (.038)	-.011 (.040)	
India	.057 (.035)	.045 (.040)			.046 (.037)	.051 (.044)	
Pakistan/Bangladesh	.172 (.037)***	.202 (.039)***			.180 (.041)***	.211 (.046)***	
Southeast Asia	.051 (.041)	-.042 (.046)			.054 (.043)	-.071 (.049)	
Other areas	.029 (.034)	.100 (.037)**			.037 (.036)	.081 (.040)*	
Formation 1st partnership			.055 (.035)		.055 (.036)	-.041 (.032)	
(ref=Single adults)			.018 (.043)		.025 (.044)	-.074 (.037)*	
Established 1st partnership			-.089 (.053)		-.095 (.060)	-.073 (.061)	
Partnership reconfigurations					.103 (.053)	-.013 (.037)	
Child migrants (1.5G)					-.011 (.036)	-.001 (.001)	
Age					-.016 (.036)		
Corresident children under 16 (ref=no)					-.001 (.001)		
Higher/ tertiary education (ref=no/lower)					.196 (.024)***	.175 (.026)***	.160 (.027)***
Deviance	239.636	218.037	220.650	188.140	214.051	177.170	
Dispersion	.127	.120	.140	.147	.137	.139	
Num. obs.	1738	1526	1526	1258	1510	1248	
(Intercept)	.290 (.068)***	.156 (.067)*	.244 (.074)***	.214 (.076)***	.206 (.075)***	.210 (.076)*	
MIG-2G (ref=MIG-MIG)	.037 (.040)	-.027 (.034)	.034 (.045)	-.027 (.047)	.031 (.045)	-.050 (.039)	
MIG-NAT	-.025 (.030)	-.046 (.037)	-.021 (.031)	-.086 (.039)*	-.006 (.034)	-.064 (.042)	
Caribbean (ref=EU)	-.042 (.076)	-.130 (.068)	-.032 (.076)	-.032 (.071)	-.148 (.072)*	-.049 (.047)	
Africa	-.035 (.043)	-.015 (.040)	-.022 (.047)	-.082 (.041)*	-.056 (.049)		
India	.101 (.039)**	.004 (.043)	.192 (.040)***	.192 (.040)***	.253 (.046)***		
Pakistan/Bangladesh	.196 (.037)***	.239 (.036)***	.014 (.066)	.030 (.047)	-.008 (.073)		
Southeast Asia	.036 (.045)	.116 (.040)**	.098 (.040)*	.087 (.039)*	.098 (.044)*		
Other areas	.084 (.037)*		-.050 (.039)	.102 (.041)*	-.068 (.039)		
Formation 1st partnership (ref=Single adults)							
Established 1st partnership							
Partnership reconfigurations							
Child migrants (1.5G)							
Age							
Corresident children under 16 (ref=no)							
Higher/ tertiary education (ref=no/lower)							
Deviance	233.418	233.322	214.984	205.100	206.011	191.979	
Dispersion	.151	.162	.159	.174	.154	.164	
Num. obs.	1510	1421	1319	1165	1303	1156	

\*\*\*p < 0.001; \*\*p < 0.01; \*p < 0.05. Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012). Universe: partnered migrant women or migrant men (in corresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).

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HDI_Rank	plbornc_all	ToO_regionnaise2	Country_GII	GII_pick2011	1995	2000	2005	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
NA	missing	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NA	inapplicable	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NA	proxy respondent	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NA	refusal	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NA	don't know	9999	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NA	other areas	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
169	afghanistan	NA	afghanistan	0.743	NA	0.745	0.751	0.743	0.734	0.724	0.714	0.702	0.690	0.673	NA	0.655	
69	albania	NA	albania	0.249	NA	0.334	0.306	0.242	0.249	0.230	0.221	0.217	0.207	0.205	0.187	0.186	0.181
91	algeria	2101	Algeria	0.500	0.682	0.624	0.552	0.507	0.500	0.419	0.416	0.424	0.427	0.425	0.434	0.433	0.429
148	angola	NA	Angola	0.537	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.537	0.534	0.531	0.539	0.537	0.536	
46	argentina	NA	Argentina	0.354	0.427	0.417	0.372	0.358	0.354	0.351	0.348	0.345	NA	0.338	0.332	0.328	0.328
81	armenia	NA	Armenia	0.337	0.479	0.473	0.392	0.342	0.337	0.320	0.307	0.308	0.309	0.303	0.266	0.264	0.245
8	Australia	NA	Australia	0.132	0.180	0.160	0.139	0.138	0.132	0.127	0.119	0.116	0.110	0.108	0.104	0.103	0.097
18	austria	4402	Austria	0.106	0.186	0.150	0.119	0.111	0.106	0.102	0.093	0.090	0.089	0.087	0.079	0.076	0.069
88	azerbaijan	NA	Azerbaijan	0.314	NA	0.341	0.313	0.314	0.315	0.318	0.321	0.316	0.317	0.319	0.321	0.323	
58	bahamas	NA	Bahamas	0.378	NA	0.403	0.363	0.380	0.378	0.379	0.376	0.373	0.367	0.363	0.343	0.343	0.341
42	bahrain	NA	Bahrain	0.221	NA	NA	0.321	0.247	0.221	0.234	0.230	0.226	0.236	0.235	0.231	0.213	0.212
133	bangladesh	NA	Bangladesh	0.591	0.708	0.683	0.638	0.592	0.591	0.585	0.579	0.570	0.562	0.555	0.542	0.540	0.537
58	barbados	NA	Barbados	0.323	0.392	0.359	0.351	0.327	0.323	0.319	0.306	0.301	0.308	0.298	0.286	0.261	0.252
53	belarus	NA	Belarus	0.149	NA	NA	NA	0.150	0.149	0.154	0.153	0.153	0.153	0.138	0.134	0.128	0.118
14	belgium	NA	Belgium	0.086	0.162	0.122	0.104	0.091	0.086	0.081	0.074	0.063	0.057	0.054	0.052	0.048	0.043
110	belize	NA	Belize	0.455	0.554	0.516	0.484	0.459	0.455	0.440	0.435	0.430	0.423	0.412	0.418	0.416	0.415
158	benin	2504	Benin	0.633	0.681	0.673	0.656	0.626	0.633	0.628	0.624	0.619	0.624	0.619	0.614	0.613	0.612
129	bhutan	NA	Bhutan	0.507	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.507	0.536	0.512	0.492	0.481	0.470	0.428	0.421
107	bolivia	NA	Bolivia	0.487	NA	0.587	0.550	0.491	0.487	0.483	0.477	0.440	0.440	0.431	0.424	0.419	0.417
73	bosnia and herzegovina	NA	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.201	NA	NA	NA	0.228	0.201	0.193	0.183	NA	0.168	0.167	0.161	0.158	0.149
100	botswana	NA	Botswana	0.504	0.568	0.519	0.512	0.506	0.504	0.500	0.496	0.483	0.481	0.478	0.473	0.472	0.465
84	brazil	NA	Brazil	0.452	0.532	0.510	0.474	0.456	0.452	0.448	0.448	0.442	0.439	0.436	0.428	0.410	0.408
47	brunei	NA	Brunei	0.299	NA	0.299	0.269	0.262	0.255								
56	bulgaria	4501	Bulgaria	0.243	0.370	0.329	0.253	0.244	0.243	0.229	0.217	0.236	0.227	0.225	0.214	0.213	0.206
182	burkina faso	2407	Burkina Faso	0.610	NA	NA	0.641	0.614	0.610	0.605	0.601	NA	0.619	0.616	0.605	0.605	0.594
185	burundi	NA	Burundi	0.528	NA	0.624	0.567	0.532	0.528	0.523	0.519	0.515	0.508	0.505	0.504	0.504	
126	cape verde	NA	Cape Verde	0.416	NA	0.416	0.404	0.400	0.398	0.397							
144	cambodia	3201	Cambodia	0.502	0.658	0.598	0.568	0.506	0.502	0.497	0.493	0.488	0.483	0.478	0.475	0.473	0.474
153	cameroon	2506	Cameroon	0.614	0.706	0.696	0.654	0.617	0.614	0.611	0.577	0.575	0.572	0.569	0.561	0.561	0.560
16	canada	NA	Canada	0.124	0.184	NA	0.139	0.132	0.124	0.121	0.119	0.116	0.114	0.101	0.095	0.088	0.080
188	central african republic	2507	Central African Republic	0.680	0.743	0.711	0.693	0.693	0.680	0.678	NA	NA	0.694	0.682	0.680	0.680	
187	chad	2409	Chad	0.714	NA	0.714	0.713	0.718	0.709	0.710							
43	chile	NA	Chile	0.331	0.483	0.433	0.377	0.342	0.331	0.325	0.309	0.303	0.300	0.288	NA	0.253	0.247
85	china / hong kong	NA	China / Hong Kong	0.189	NA	0.269	0.227	0.194	0.189	0.186	0.178	0.175	0.172	0.169	0.168	0.167	0.168
83	colombia	NA	Colombia	0.466	0.524	0.501	0.494	0.468	0.466	0.463	0.461	0.436	0.433	0.431	0.432	0.428	
175	democratic republic of congo	2510	Democratic republic of congo	0.661	NA	0.654	0.661	NA	0.655	0.626	0.637	0.641	0.638	0.636	0.635	0.617	
62	costa rica	NA	Costa Rica	0.323	0.467	0.427	0.349	0.331	0.323	0.313	0.313	0.321	0.316	0.319	0.311	0.291	0.288
43	croatia	NA	Croatia	0.144	0.285	0.205	0.157	0.146	0.144	0.139	0.133	0.127	0.151	0.160	0.131	0.126	0.116
70	cuba	NA	Cuba	0.313	0.422	0.383	0.340	0.320	0.313	0.317	0.316	0.316	0.315	0.312	0.310	0.305	0.304
33	cyprus	4502	Cyprus	0.139	0.331	0.253	0.140	0.132	0.139	0.137	0.134	0.118	0.114	0.091	0.089	0.088	0.086
27	czech republic	4509	Czech Republic	0.133	0.252	NA	0.153	0.135	0.133	0.133	0.138	0.139	0.134	0.135	0.132	0.135	0.136
162	ivory coast	2501	Ivory Coast	0.667	0.707	NA	0.684	0.678	0.667	0.667	0.664	0.665	0.664	0.660	0.656	0.648	0.638
10	denmark	4405	Denmark	0.052	0.096	0.076	0.064	0.056	0.052	0.049	0.046	0.044	0.042	0.041	0.040	0.038	
88	dominican republic	NA	Dominican Republic	0.483	0.550	0.494	0.494	0.488	0.483	0.480	0.478	0.477	0.472	0.458	0.457	0.456	0.455
86	ecuador	NA	Ecuador	0.424	0.592	0.502	0.475	0.424	0.424	0.417	0.403	0.399	0.391	0.383	0.385	0.385	0.384
116	egypt	NA	Egypt	0.579	0.668	0.637	0.579	NA	0.574	NA	NA	NA	0.452	0.451	0.450	0.449	
124	el salvador	NA	El Salvador	0.433	0.508	0.511	0.482	0.435	0.433	0.412	0.405	0.400	0.388	0.386	0.384	0.384	0.383
29	estonia	NA	Estonia	0.192	0.392	0.291	0.227	0.176	0.192	0.180	0.162	0.171	0.144	0.142	0.118	0.105	0.086
138	NA	NA	Eswatini (Kingdom of)	0.555	0.621	0.633	0.592	0.559	0.555	0.551	0.566	0.564	0.562	0.560	0.559	0.567	0.567
173	ethiopia	NA	Ethiopia	0.583	NA	NA	0.622	0.587	0.583	0.579	0.570	0.561	0.534	0.528	0.522	0.519	0.517
93	fiji	NA	Fiji	0.435	0.506	NA	0.435	NA	NA	NA	0.377	0.371	0.374	0.380	0.369	0.370	
11	finland	4407	Finland	0.073	0.101	0.085	0.088	0.077	0.073	0.070	0.067	0.064	0.063	0.060	0.057	0.054	0.047
26	france	1101	France	0.105	0.185	0.162	0.138	0.107	0.105	0.109	0.098	0.097	0.085	0.081	0.061	0.055	0.049
119	gabon	2508	Gabon	0.551	0.622	0.603	0.581	0.553	0.551	0.545	0.541	0.541	0.537	0.536	0.530	NA	0.525
172	gambia	2403	Gambia	0.654	0.757	0.750	0.654	0.658	0.654	0.651	0.647	0.634	0.631	0.627	0.618	0.614	0.612
61	georgia republic	NA	Georgia Republic	0.406	0.431	0.409	0.391	0.406	0.406	0.364	0.366	0.362	0.359	0.335	0.329	0.327	0.331
6	germany	4403	Germany	0.093	0.156	0.130	0.117	0.097	0.093	0.091	0.083	0.081	0.076	0.076	0.084	0.084	0.084
138	ghana	2502	Ghana	0.576	0.632	NA	0.574	0.577	0.576	NA	0.559	0.557	0.556	0.554	0.542	0.540	0.538
32	greece	4401	Greece	0.148	0.284	0.221	0.179	0.157	0.148	0.135	0.132	0.127	0.124	0.126	0.129	0.125	0.116
127	guatemala	NA	Guatemala	0.539	0.590	0.585											