Understanding Reneging: Canada's Nuclear Sharing Commitments to NATO and NORAD during the Cold War

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Abstract

How and why do leaders renege on their alliance commitments, despite institutional incentives to cooperate? According to the research on alliance reliability, three types of costs discourage reneging: material costs, reputational costs, and domestic audience costs. These costs are theorized to be especially high for leaders of democracies, junior alliance members, and members of highly institutionalized alliances. Yet, despite these characteristics, Canada's foreign policy related to its nuclear sharing commitments to NATO and NORAD between 1957 to 1984 was uneven. It included several instances of reneging or attempted reneging. Through an in-depth analysis of archival material related to Canada's nuclear alliance commitments, I propose a new theory of reneging. I show that a leader's decision to renege, choice of bargaining strategy in intra-alliance negotiations, and likelihood of success are related to the type of domestic coalition that supports reneging. Leaders with the support of nationalist domestic coalitions face fewer audience costs for reneging and have more leverage when bargaining with allies than those with the support of single-issue or anti-nuclear coalitions. Nationalist coalitions provide negotiators with three key sources of bargaining power in intra-alliance negotiations: a credible threat of withdrawal, a willingness to act unilaterally, and a low vulnerability to being swayed by foreign allies. On the other hand, single-issue coalitions do not wish to leave the alliance, are more willing to act through alliance consensus, and are more vulnerable to allies' attempts to influence their stance.

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

I declare that my thesis consists of 86,492 words.

Statement of inclusion of previous work

I can confirm that my MPhil (International Relations) dissertation that I completed at Oxford University provides an important foundation for this thesis. I have directly adapted two paragraphs in Chapter 7 from my MPhil dissertation, which I have also noted in the footnotes.

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Contents

1

Introduction

1.1 The Puzzle

On May 26th 1969, the Canadian Minister of Defence Leo Cadieux met with the American Secretary of Defence, Melvin Laird. Cadieux was presenting Canada's plan for reducing its NATO forces, which, he stressed, was "non-negotiable."[1] The plan had been approved by Cabinet and Prime Minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, and their intention to reduce their contribution to NATO had been announced to the public. Among other cuts, Canada would completely withdraw from its nuclear strike role by 1972. Since 1963, Canada had agreed to participate in a nuclear sharing arrangement with the United States as part of its military commitments to NATO and NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command), whereby Canadian forces were tasked with the delivery of American nuclear weapons during emergency and war. Laird was shocked by this announcement, and while he knew Canada was reviewing its defence policy, he was not expecting such severe and widespread cuts to its alliance contribution. In response, Laird "warned that Canadian action might be 'disastrous' by contagion within the alliance... [he] criticized making a security decision for reasons of domestic popularity."[2] When Cadieux pressed Laird for his opinion on the Canadian proposed plan, Laird responded darkly, "I think it's a mistake."[3]

This episode raises an important puzzle for the field of International Relations (IR): How and why leaders renege on international commitments despite the incentives to cooperate? This question is especially pertinent with respect to alliance commitments. Despite realist claims about the fickleness of allies, the bulk of the literature on alliance reliability conforms with Laird's assessment about the risks of

[1] RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 2 of 2, 26 May 1969.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.

defection.[4] According to Leeds, Long, and Mitchell's seminal study on alliance reliability, allies uphold their commitments about 75% of the time.[5] Underlying this tendency towards reliability is a powerful incentive structure that discourages defection: states risk material, reputational, and domestic audience costs if they do not abide by their alliance commitments.[6] This was the lesson that Trudeau's predecessor, John Diefenbaker, had learned the hard way, when he tried to wriggle out of Canada's nuclear sharing commitments in 1963. After being accused of reneging by both NATO's former Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the US State Department, Diefenbaker's government collapsed, not only removing him from office, but also defining his legacy.[7] Furthermore, his reneging attempt failed: a nuclear sharing arrangement was negotiated quickly after Diefenbaker's ousting in 1963.

However, Trudeau would not suffer the same fate. By 1972, Canada would no longer have a nuclear role in NATO; it reduced its conventional commitments to the alliance, halving the number of Canadian forces stationed in Europe. Unlike Diefenbaker, Trudeau kept his government intact and would win multiple elections afterwards, serving as Prime Minister from 1968 to 1979 and 1980 to 1984. Most Canadians were satisfied with the outcome of the Defence review: according to a July 1969 Poll 64.4% of Canadians approved of Trudeau's reductions to Canada's contributions to NATO.[8] Thus, Trudeau was not only able to renege, but he did so without suffering domestic audience costs. Despite Laird's ominous warnings, the Prime Minister also avoided a dramatic public rebuke by allies, who ultimately refrained from taking a hard-line approach in opposition to Canadian reductions.

This thesis examines how and why leaders abandon and reverse commitments in settings that should encourage reliability and cooperation. It focuses on contexts where defection should be especially difficult or costly. First, I examine cases of 'reneging,' which is defined as the reversal of a previously fulfilled alliance commitment without terminating alliance membership. Leaders that renege are faced with a tricky prospect: unlike alliance withdrawal, they are still invested in the overall health of the institution and the benefits it provides. Furthermore, they are reversing commitments that are not just expected to be fulfilled but have been fulfilled by their state, either in whole or in part. Reneging represents a purposeful change to the status quo, which

[4]On realist claims on alliance unreliability, see, for example, Mearsheimer, 1994.

[5]Leeds, Long, and Mitchell, 2000.

[6]Kreps, 2010, pp.201-203

[7]McMahon, 2009, pp.ix, xii.

[8]Gallup Canada Inc., July 1969. The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and are not those of Gallup Canada Inc.

is difficult to obfuscate. All of these factors should make reneging a particularly risky form of defection, giving leaders plenty of incentives to avoid attempting reneging or to back down once the costs become apparent.

Second, Canada's nuclear sharing commitments to NATO and NORAD are a deviant case for reneging. Canada is a democracy and a junior alliance member with a high degree of dependency on the United States; NATO and NORAD are highly institutionalized alliances. These characteristics should raise the costs of reneging, making it an even more unlikely outcome.[9] Furthermore, the history of nuclear sharing commitments has largely conformed to rational institutionalist expectations of alliance reliability. Both the United States and nuclear hosts have been reluctant to unilaterally terminate their nuclear sharing arrangements. Instead, they have opted instead for an approach that prioritizes alliance solidarity and consensus, which has prevented nuclear withdrawal after the end of the Cold War.[10]

This thesis explores how and why reneging occurs despite the presence of powerful incentives to cooperate. It rejects a traditional neorealist understanding of alliance commitment, which argues that states renege simply when it is in their self-interest to do so, unencumbered by any institutional constraints.[11] To the contrary, I demonstrate that some Canadian leaders were frustrated by these very incentives, leading them to not attempt reneging or fail in their attempts. However, the existence of these incentives does not preclude the possibility of reneging. I demonstrate that existing theories of defection do not fully capture how and why leaders may break their commitments after they have become institutionalized. In particular, I focus on how the domestic audience costs associated with reneging can fluctuate, giving some leaders the ability to renege on commitments at a lower cost.

1.2 Case Study: Canada's Nuclear Sharing Commitments

This dissertation engages in an in-depth analysis of Canada's shifting policy on its commitment to nuclear sharing in NATO and NORAD. Since Canada is a deviant case for reneging, it is well-suited for theory-generation using process tracing. Furthermore, many of the relevant archival records have been declassified, permitting a rich analysis of how and why various Canadian leaders supported or opposed Canada's

[9] See, for example, Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015; Leeds, 2003; Kreps, 2010.

[10] Blechman and Rumbaugh, 2014; Foradori, 2012, 2013; Franceschini and Müller, 2013; Koster, 2013; Kristensen, 2005, p.25; Lunn, 2012; Sauer, 2013; von Hlatky, 2014.

[11] Mearsheimer, 1994.

nuclear commitments. The Canadian case contains several instances of shifting commitments. This allows me to construct a theory about the mechanisms of reneging, as well as its causes. I show that existing theories of alliance defection cannot adequately explain the variation in the Canadian case; furthermore, most do not explore the process of reneging in detail. Thus, the question of how leaders renege and what reneging looks like in the context of an institutionalized alliance is as important to this study as the question of why leaders renege.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States signed bilateral agreements with several members of NATO that allowed for 'dual-key' nuclear sharing between them. This arrangement involved stationing American nuclear weapons on foreign soil. During times of emergency and war, these would be transferred to the host state for delivery. NATO allies that engaged in dual-key sharing not only provided the territory for hosting these weapons, but also purchased nuclear capable delivery systems and had their personnel trained for nuclear roles.

Canada was unique among these dual-key sharing states, as it took on nuclear commitments to two alliances: NATO and NORAD. Canada obtained four nuclear-capable delivery systems in order to fulfill its nuclear roles. Under NATO, Canadian soldiers in Germany were equipped with the Honest John surface-to-surface rocket and the CF-104 Starfighter aircraft, which had offensive or retaliatory nuclear strike roles. Under NORAD, Canada was equipped with the Bomarc surface-to-air missile, and the CF-101 Voodoo aircraft armed with Genie air-to-air nuclear rockets, both tasked with anti-bomber interception roles. At its peak, around 250-450 warheads were 'shared' with Canada.[12]

The initial commitment to engage in nuclear sharing was made by Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker (1957-1963). During the late 1950s and early 1960s, Diefenbaker tied his hands through public statements and private commitments and sunk costs through the purchasing of these nuclear delivery systems.[13] These actions not only signalled his intention to fulfill this commitment, but also raised the costs of reneging. Despite Diefenbaker's initial support for nuclear acquisition, his fears of domestic anti-nuclear backlash delayed negotiations with the Americans that would finalize a nuclear sharing agreement between Canada and the United States. By the end of October 1962, negotiations were finally progressing, but Diefenbaker's position had changed substantially: The Prime Minister now insisted he would only accept

[12]Clearwater, 1998, p.22.
[13]See Fearon, 1997.

nuclear sharing if it did not involve the stationing of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil in peacetime.

In a dramatic turn of events, the Leader of the Liberal Party and official Opposition, Lester Pearson, reversed his and his party's long-held anti-nuclear position and came out in favour of nuclear acquisition in January 1963. As domestic and international pressures to accept sharing mounted, the Diefenbaker government collapsed, and Canada was thrown into an election in which its nuclear commitments were a central campaign issue. While Pearson now supported acquisition, Diefenbaker forcefully repudiated this commitment as part of his campaign. He claimed that he would never accept nuclear weapons on Canadian soil and cast doubt on the necessity of its nuclear role in NATO. In the end, Pearson and the Liberals narrowly won the election. This paved the way for Canada to quickly fulfill its nuclear commitments and sign an agreement with the United States in 1963.

The issue would not remain settled for long. In 1968, Pearson stepped down as Prime Minister and leader of the Liberal Party. Pierre Elliott Trudeau (1968-1979, 1980-1984) replaced him, and would quickly cement his position as Prime Minister by handily winning an election. Trudeau began his tenure with a review of Canada's foreign and defence policy and called for a fundamental shift to Canada's priorities. As a result of this review and despite the protest of the United States and other NATO allies, the Canadian government announced that it would reduce its commitment to NATO, completely withdrawing from its nuclear role by 1972.

Nevertheless, despite Trudeau's long-held opposition to the nuclear arms on Canadian soil, Canada maintained its nuclear anti-bomber interception role under NORAD until 1984. While the Bomarcs were withdrawn by 1972, the nuclear-armed CF-101 aircraft remained for over a decade longer, finally being withdrawn in 1984. By 1987, Canada's nuclear sharing agreement was essentially defunct and was jointly terminated by the United States and Canada.[14]

1.3 Argument

This thesis proposes a new theory of reneging. It argues that variation in domestic coalition type changes the incentive structure that keeps states reliable, focussing primarily on audience costs. This theory will address two contrasting insights in the literature about the nature of domestic audience costs and the likelihood of reneging. On the one hand, scholars like Kreps argue that there are powerful institutional

[14]Clearwater, 1988, p.54.

incentives to cooperate within alliances, meaning that leaders and elites should maintain commitments even if they are domestically unpopular.[15] This aligns with the literature on domestic audience costs that finds that domestic audiences will punish leaders when they back down from commitments.[16] This implies that leaders will avoid reneging, regardless of the nature of their coalition. On the other hand, recent research on audience costs highlight that policy preferences of domestic groups can mitigate the punishment that they will impose on leaders for defection.[17] More general theories of foreign policy also highlight changes in domestic coalitions or interest groups can lead to shifts in policy.[18] This implies that leaders may be more or less fickle, depending on the policy preferences of their coalition. To reconcile these two sets of literature within my theory of reneging, I compare the effects of two different types of domestic coalitions that have a strong policy preference in favour of reneging: **anti-nuclear coalitions** and **nationalist coalitions**.

Both of these groups support nuclear withdrawal but offer political leaders different incentive structures in relation to reneging. Leaders with the support of nationalist coalitions are shielded from audience costs and should be more likely to attempt reneging than those with the support of single-issue coalitions, such as anti-nuclear coalitions. Nationalist coalitions seek to eliminate a broad range of alliance commitments to refocus on more 'national' aspects of defense. These coalitions see inherent value in forging an independent foreign and defense policy, emphasize domestic priorities, and see the alliance as being fundamentally out of sync with the interests of the nation. Thus, they conceive of the material and reputational costs of reneging differently to traditional institutionalist understandings. In fact, they may see material and reputation gains to reneging. In contrast, while members of single-issue coalitions oppose particular commitments, they do not question the fundamentals of alliance membership. Therefore, despite the clear policy preference of anti-nuclear coalitions, they follow what I term a 'double-edged' logic that disincentivizes reneging: leaders can still be punished for reneging despite this coalition's support for nuclear withdrawal, because of the coalition's concerns about the material and reputational costs of reneging, or because they view inconsistency as an indicator of leadership incompetence.[19]

[15] Kreps, 2010.

[16] Fearon, 1994, 1997; Levy, McKoy, Poast, and Wallace, 2015; Smith, 1998; Tomz, 2007.

[17] Chaudoin, 2014b. See also, Clare, 2007; Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012; Kertzer and Brutger, 2016; Potter and Baum, 2013; Trager and Vavreck, 2011.

[18] See, for example, Moravscik, 2008.

[19] Kreps, 2010, pp.201-202; Tomz, 2007.

Domestic coalition type is not only important for understanding political leader's calculations about whether to attempt reneging or not, but also for understanding what strategy they will adopt, as well as their likelihood of successful reneging. Unlike the decision to exit an alliance, reneging occurs in a context where the leader still wishes to maintain the benefits of alliance membership to the greatest extent possible. Thus, when attempting to renege on an alliance commitment, political leaders have incentives to engage in negotiation with allies to assess their reactions and minimize costs.

These dynamics can be modelled with Putnam's two-level game, where agreements made at the international level require domestic ratification to be finalized.[20] I demonstrate that leaders who attempt to renege on an alliance commitment face this two-stage process and use domestic coalitions as leverage in negotiations with allies. While Putnam's model has been traditionally applied to cases where commitments have been formed or augmented, such as negotiations on free trade agreements, this thesis shows that leaders also negotiate when commitments are reduced or wound down, particularly in institutionalized contexts.

This thesis shows that nationalist coalitions provide reneging leaders with three sources of bargaining power in intra-alliance negotiations: a **credible threat of withdrawal**, a **willingness to act unilaterally**, and a **low vulnerability to restructuring** by foreign allies. First, the credible threat of withdrawal reflects a high tolerance of a no-deal outcome and the ability to threaten further reductions to their commitment set. This gives political leaders the option of threatening to collapse negotiations, harden their stance, or even leave the alliance unilaterally, while still maintaining the support of their domestic coalition. Second, these coalitions maximize leadership's ability to act unilaterally in the pre-negotiation stage, as they see issues around alliance commitments as an aspect of national defense rather than multilateral policy. This allows leaders to tie their hands domestically and commit to reductions before the beginning of negotiations at the international level. Third, nationalist coalitions are less vulnerable to restructuring attempts by allies, due to their sensitivity to foreign influence. This increases the likelihood of pressure leading to "negative reverberations" or backlash, pushing a reneging leader farther away from the status quo, or it will dissuade allies from attempting restructuring in the first place.[21] Thus, leaders with the support of nationalist coalitions should be more

[20]Putnam, 1988.
[21]Ibid., p.456.

likely to attempt reneging, more likely adopt more coercive strategies in intra-alliance negotiations, and more likely to achieve reneging success.

On the other hand, single-issue coalitions do not have a credible threat of withdrawal, are more willing to act through alliance consensus, and are more vulnerable to allies' attempts to influence their stance. Single-issue coalitions have specific policy agendas and seek limited reductions to their alliance commitments. These minimalist agendas make them unable to threaten punishment or alliance withdrawal if these demands are not met. Indeed, unlike nationalist coalitions, single-issue coalitions are still subject to the double-edged penalty of reneging and have a low tolerance for the alliance discord that would result from a no-deal scenario. Leaders are incentivized to mitigate this by seeking allied approval for reductions, further undermining their threat of withdrawal from negotiations. During the pre-negotiation stage, in an attempt to signal a consensus-building approach, leaders are unlikely to tie their hands to specific reductions. In fact, they may commit themselves to seeking the approval of allies before any action can be taken. Single-issue coalitions are therefore vulnerable to accusations by allies that reneging is taking place, that it would damage their country's standing in the alliance, and that it would weaken the strength of the alliance. Thus, leaders with the support of single-issue coalitions should be less likely to attempt reneging, more likely to adopt consensus-based strategies in intra-alliance negotiations, and more likely to fail to renege.

This thesis explains Canada's shifting nuclear sharing policy using this argument. Diefenbaker's shifts in policy can be explained by his attempts to cater to differing domestic coalitions. His failed reneging attempt and inability to use his domestic constraints as leverage in negotiations with the Americans is related to the weaknesses inherent to his anti-nuclear coalition. Likewise, despite the support of an anti-nuclear coalition, Pearson ultimately supported acquisition due to his sensitivities to the international and domestic costs of reneging. Trudeau was able to renege on Canada's nuclear commitments to NATO due to his skillful management of a nationalist coalition, which provided Canadian negotiators with substantial bargaining power when negotiating with allies. However, Trudeau was not able to frame reneging on Canada's NORAD commitment in similarly nationalist terms and the coalition that favoured reneging in this case was more narrowly anti-nuclear in nature. Thus, the Prime Minister's effort in 1970 to have all nuclear weapons withdrawn from Canadian soil ultimately failed.

The role of strategic factors is also examined as an alternate explanation to reneging. Realists would argue that shifting levels or loci of international threat, diminish-

ing military utility of nuclear weapons systems, or concerns over the domestic safety and stability within the host state would explain reneging in general and nuclear withdrawal for the Canadian case.[22] However, there is only one instance of reneging that fits into the realist framework: the withdrawal of the last of its nuclear air-defence systems in 1984. These weapons were withdrawn due to the diminishing significance of long-range bombers and the availability of conventional alternatives.

1.4 Thesis Overview

The first chapter examines the concept of reneging within the broader literature on alliance reliability in International Relations. It lays out the conceptual gaps that this work aims to fill and presents the theories that will form the foundation for the theoretical chapter. The first section situates the definition of reneging that is employed here within the conceptual understanding of alliance defection that has been developed in the alliance reliability literature. The second section explores the theoretical literature on alliance defection. The scholarly consensus is that defection should be rare. This chapter organizes this literature according to three main types of costs of unreliability within alliances: material, reputational, and domestic audience costs. These costs form the basis of the incentive structure to keep alliance commitments that is referred to throughout this work. Finally, this chapter reviews other studies that have identified factors that should explain defection, despite these costs. It divides the literature into those that identify static factors, or fixed characteristics of states or alliances that affect the overall likelihood of defection, and those that identify dynamic factors, or variable contexts that can increase or decrease the probability of defection, regardless of the baseline likelihood of defection.

The second chapter presents the theoretical argument. It also introduces and rules out alternate explanations for reneging in the Canadian case. First, the selection of Canada's nuclear sharing history to analyse reneging is justified with reference to the static factors that were identified in the conceptual chapter. For these theories of defection, Canada represents a deviant case as it does not conform to their expectations. It is well-suited for theory-generation, as Canada has many characteristics that should discourage defection: it is a democracy, a junior alliance member, and a member of two highly institutionalised alliances. After defining the dependent variable, other likely explanations for the variation in Canada's level of commitment to nuclear sharing will be ruled out. Next, the theory of domestic coalition type will be

[22]Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014; Mearsheimer, 1994; Schofield, 2014; Walt, 1987.

presented in detail. Using Putnam's two-level game as a model of international negotiations, it will assert that nationalist coalitions are more likely to renege and succeed due to the increased bargaining power they provide political leaders in these negotiations. Specifically, leaders with the support of nationalist coalitions have a credible threat of withdrawal, increased willingness to act unilaterally, and low vulnerability to restructuring.

The third chapter will analyse the first case study: The Diefenbaker administration's changing policy on nuclear sharing (1957-1963). Diefenbaker's reneging strategy and bargaining power shifted according to his changing coalition-building strategy. Initially, Diefenbaker signalled his intentions to fulfill these commitments, which raised the potential international and domestic costs of reneging. After 1960, Diefenbaker's perception of rising anti-nuclear sentiment caused him to delay fulfilling Canada's commitments.[23] As further procrastination became politically impossible after the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, Diefenbaker still tried to satisfy his anti-nuclear coalition by negotiating an agreement that would technically fulfill Canada's nuclear commitments while also keeping nuclear weapons off Canadian soil in peacetime. In 1963, reacting to American intrusions into Canadian politics, Diefenbaker shifted strategies again in attempt to win the 1963 election. This time, Diefenbaker tried to appeal to a nationalist coalition that would back reneging, using the nuclear issue as a central feature of his campaign. This case provides two primary insights. First, it demonstrates the weakness of anti-nuclear coalitions in intra-alliance negotiations. Diefenbaker's bargaining power in 1962 was hampered by the weakness of his anti-nuclear coalition: it required a consensus-based approach to bargaining; they had no credible threat of withdrawal; and were vulnerable to restructuring. Thus, Diefenbaker's attempts to negotiate a compromise ultimately failed and American accusations that he was reneging led to the collapse of his government. Second, this case also shows the potential strength of nationalist coalitions. While Diefenbaker lost the election, his national framing of the nuclear issue was appealing to some voters, who supported reneging as a means of asserting Canada's sovereignty and independence. This nationalist messaging also made the Americans wary of further restructuring attempts. Nevertheless, by the time that Diefenbaker had formed a coherent nationalist message on nuclear sharing, it was too little and too late to counter the effect of domestic audience costs.

The fourth chapter examines the second case study: Pearson's decision as leader of the opposition to switch from an anti-nuclear stance to a pro-nuclear stance in time

[23]See McMahon, 2009.

for the 1963 election. While the Diefenbaker case demonstrates the weakness of anti-nuclear coalitions in international negotiations, Pearson's about-face demonstrates how leaders with the backing of anti-nuclear coalitions may avoid attempting to renege in the first place. As leader of the opposition, Pearson was in a better position than Diefenbaker to support reneging: Pearson did not make the commitment to acquire nuclear weapons. In fact, he had opposed this decision, gaining him the support of an anti-nuclear coalition. However, Pearson ultimately decided to favour acquisition due to his fear of the international and domestic costs of reneging. Pearson believed that the majority of voters would also reject reneging and ran on a platform that emphasized the importance of Canada's alliance membership and its international reputation. In an attempt to retain anti-nuclear voters, Pearson also promised that the Liberal government would attempt to negotiate out of its nuclear commitments as soon as it was feasible to do so, emphasizing a consensus-based approach to these negotiations.

In the fifth chapter analyses the third case study: Trudeau's successful attempt to end Canada's nuclear role in NATO. Despite facing a divided Cabinet, a pro-NATO public, and highly resistant allies, Trudeau reneged on Canada nuclear commitments. As a result, the nuclear weapons slated for Canadian use in NATO were withdrawn by 1972. This chapter shows that Trudeau's success was due to his ability to form and maintain a nationalist coalition that was highly skeptical of the value of NATO for Canadian national defence. By encouraging the inclusion of nationalist and NATO-skeptic voices in important aspects of the domestic debate, Trudeau signalled that the possibility of total withdrawal from NATO was on the table. Thus, Trudeau was able to co-opt status quo members of his Cabinet in his nationalist coalition, by framing Canada's nuclear withdrawal and major reductions to its conventional commitments to NATO as a compromise position.[24] This chapter argues that the nationalist character of the coalition is the key factor in understanding why the United States and NATO did not push back against Canada's defections. The nature of the coalition increased Canada's bargaining power through a credible threat of withdrawal, a willingness to act unilaterally, and a low vulnerability to restructuring.

The sixth chapter examines the fourth and final case study: Trudeau's unsuccessful push to withdraw from Canada's nuclear role in NORAD between 1970 and 1971, as well as the eventual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Canadian soil in 1984. Initially, Trudeau and members of the government were skeptical about the retention of a nuclear capability on Canadian soil. While there are few documents available,

[24]See Halloran, 2006.

it seems that some of nationalist rhetoric – which prioritized North American defense over Europe – that justified nuclear withdrawal from NATO, also made it more difficult to do the same from NORAD. Thus, Trudeau could only construct an anti-nuclear coalition that supported reneging, weakening his ability to initiate a reneging attempt and resist pressure from status quo actors. Canada's withdrawal from its nuclear role in NORAD in 1984 is best explained by changing strategic incentives, rather than domestic coalition type. Nuclear withdrawal was related to the decline of the threat of bombers and the availability of conventional alternatives for Canada to fulfill its role in NORAD. This chapter demonstrates some limitations of my theory. Firstly, it shows that there are alternate paths to reneging, while domestic coalition type may explain some cases of reneging, it does not preclude the existence of other causal pathways. Second, it demonstrates that nationalist coalitions are difficult and costly to construct and maintain. A nationalist coalition that supports reneging in one context does not automatically lend itself to reneging in another.

The conclusion summarizes the central findings of this thesis and suggests avenues for further research. It highlights the implications of my research on Putnam's two-level game theory, the costs of reneging, the strengths of nationalist coalitions, as the role of political leadership.

2

Conceptualising Reneging

This chapter provides the conceptual and theoretical foundations for the rest of this thesis. I review the alliance reliability literature related to reneging and introduce the theories and concepts that I use throughout this work. The central puzzle of this thesis is how and why leaders renege on international commitments despite the incentives to cooperate. The alliance reliability literature has identified an institutionalist incentive structure that should encourage cooperation and discourage defection. In this chapter, I explain how reneging relates to this set of incentives, what these incentives are, and why states might still defect, according to previous research.

The alliance reliability literature uses a variety of terms to refer to defection. Quantitative studies in particular tend to operationalise rather than to engage in in-depth conceptualization of 'defection' or related terms.[1] Definitions generally focus on alliance commitment violations in wartime contexts or the overall duration of the alliance.[2] However, there are a few exceptions. For example, McInnis's book on defection in military coalitions thoroughly unpacks her conceptual understanding of 'defection;' Snyder's definition of 'abandonment' encompasses peacetime violation of alliance commitment.[3] Due to the relative lack of conceptually developed definitions that relate to the violation of peacetime alliance commitments, I first specify what kind of defection I will be engaging with.

In this thesis, I explore why states **renege** on their alliance commitments. I define reneging as **a type of defection in which a state or leader reverses an explicit alliance commitment, while still retaining membership in the alliance**. This definition allows me to fill the gap in the alliance reliability literature on peacetime

[1] See, for example, Gibler, 2008; Langlois, 2012. For studies that try to conceptually unpack defection see, Leeds, Long, and Mitchell, 2000; Mattes, 2012; McInnis, 2020.

[2] See, for example, Bennett, 1997; Leeds, 2003.

[3] McInnis, 2020; Snyder, 1984, 2007.

commitments. It also best addresses the puzzle. In contrast to outright withdrawal from an alliance, a reneging leader values alliance membership and has an interest in retaining the benefits they derive from it, even while lessening their contribution. At the same time, reneging is difficult to hide, as reneging leaders are explicitly renouncing commitments or withdrawing from roles that they had previously fulfilled. For these reasons, reneging should be a particularly risky and costly form of defection.

This chapter also unpacks the institutionalist incentive structure that should make all forms of defection – and especially reneging – an unappealing option for leaders. According to Kreps, membership within a formal alliance creates a powerful incentive structure that should discourage defection, even when a commitment is unpopular at the domestic level.[4] Indeed, empirical research on alliance reliability finds wartime alliance commitments are kept 74.5% of time.[5] I identify three central types of costs that scholars have found to be associated with defection: reputational costs, material costs, and audience costs.

Despite this incentive structure, defection and reneging still occur. Scholars have identified various factors that may weaken the incentives to keep alliance commitments. Some studies have identified particular characteristics of states or alliances that should make reneging more or less costly, including regime type, the level of institutionalization of the alliance, and the power distribution in the alliance.[6] Because these are 'fixed' characteristics that affect the overall likelihood of reneging for a given state, I refer to these as static factors, which will be helpful in identifying a case where reneging should be particularly costly and therefore unlikely. Another set of studies has identified dynamic factors associated with defection.[7] These represent changing contexts or situations that increase the likelihood that a given state will renege. These factors can be divided into different categories: changes at the systemic level, changes at the domestic level, or a combination of both. This discussion of dynamic factors serves as the starting point for the theories that are developed and tested in the next chapter.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section sets out the definition of reneging and situates it within the alliance reliability literature. Next, I outline the theoretical and empirical foundation of the incentive structure that should discourage defection. I show that there are three primary costs related to reneging and defection: reputational costs, material costs, and domestic audience costs. Finally, I describe

[4]Kreps, 2010.
[5]Leeds, Long, and Mitchell, 2000.
[6]See, for example, Leeds, 2003; Walt, 1997.
[7]See, for example, Leeds, 2003; Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, 2015.

previous explanations for defection within alliances, identifying theories that highlight static characteristics of states or alliances as well as dynamic shifts in strategic and domestic contexts.

2.1 What is Reneging?

The term 'reneging' is not commonly used as a primary concept in the literature on alliances. Scholars usually use terms like 'abandonment,'[8] 'violation,'[9] 'abrogation,'[10] or 'defection'[11] instead of or alongside 'reneging' when discussing instances of nonfulfillment of alliance commitments – often interchangeably.[12] In this section, I explore the various ways that these concepts have been defined. I build on this conceptual work in order to develop a clear definition of reneging that will be used in this dissertation. It is important that reneging be precisely defined for this study, as it will help specify the dependent variable and establish the scope of the theory that will be developed.

A few articles use the term 'reneging' in their title, although they do not conceptually unpack the term in the main body of the text. Instead, they define reneging implicitly or propose how to measure it empirically. In his article, 'The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation,' Gibler considers 'reneging' to mean failing to fulfill a central purpose of the alliance in wartime.[13] Langois more consistently uses the term reneging in her article, 'Power and Deterrence in Alliance Relationships: The Ally's Decision to Renege.'[14] While she also does not explicitly define reneging, her article discusses the decision to intervene militarily on behalf of an ally after providing promises of extended deterrence, linking reneging to allied wartime behaviour.[15]

This approach to defining reneging, defection, or other related terms as nonfulfillment of commitments in wartime is one of the most frequently used in the

[8]Snyder 1984, 2007.

[9]Gibler, 2008; Mattes, 2012.

[10]Kreps, 2010; Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, 2009; Leeds and Savun, 2007.

[11]McInnis 2020; Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, 2015.

[12]For example, Mattes (2012) uses all four terms throughout her article. More neutral terms like 'alliance reliability' are also used in discussions relating to nonfulfillment of alliance commitments.

[13]Gibler, 2008, p.437. Despite the title of this article, the term 'reneging' is only used once in this text: "If past actions predict future behavior, few leaders would want to ally themselves with states that have reneged on their agreements in the past, and leaders with reputations for violating their agreements should be unable to find alliance partners" (p.432). Instead, the term 'violation' is most consistently used when describing non-fulfillment of alliance commitments.

[14]Langlois, 2012.

[15]Ibid.

alliance reliability literature.[16] For example, Leeds's seminal article on alliance violations defines this concept as "instances in which alliance commitments are invoked by a war" and then not fulfilled.[17] Like Gibler, she does not include in her analysis cases where alliances require states to consult each other during crises, as well as cases where alliances "only commit leaders to refrain from conflict with one another," as these commitments would not be invoked by war.[18] In another study, Leeds, Long, and Mitchell develop both the conceptual and theoretical understanding of alliance violation by accounting for the specific nature of the alliance obligations in order to measure whether states have violated its terms or not.[19] However, their analysis excludes consultation requirements or peacetime commitments.[20]

More recent articles, some using the term reneging, have a narrower focus on defection in the context of multilateral military coalitions.[21] In most of these texts, defection is defined by a state's withdrawal or exit from a multilateral coalition before the end of the conflict or mission.[22] However, McInnis, in her book *How and Why States Defect from Contemporary Military Coalitions*, develops this definition and engages in nuanced conceptualization of defection. She highlights that both the defector and their allies have incentives to hide defection and therefore, a defecting state may avoid total withdrawal while still substantially diminishing the defector's contribution to the coalition.[23] According to McInnis, defection should be defined broadly: "coalition defection is a significant change to a nation's operational profile that minimizes a nation's exposure to risk while increasing the operational burden of other coalition partners."[24] Under this definition, total withdrawal is considered defection, but partial withdrawal, augmenting caveats, and moving to re-role personnel or equipment can also be strategies of defection.[25]

[16]For further examples, see Berkemeier and Fuhrmann, 2018; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004; Gibler, 2008; Leeds and Anac, 2005.

[17]Leeds, 2003, p.811.

[18]Ibid., p.812.

[19]Leeds, Long, and Mitchell, 2000.

[20]Ibid., pp.693-694.

[21]See, for example: Choi, 2012; Davidson, 2014; Massie, 2016; McInnis, 2019, 2020; Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, 2015; Tago, 2009; Weisiger, 2016.

[22]For example, according to Choi (2012, p.627): "For this study, fulfilling or maintaining commitment is defined according to the abandonment behavior of states during war. In other words, whether states maintain or fail to maintain their commitments refers to whether coalition member states leave the war before it ends or fight together until the war's conclusion."

[23]McInnis, 2020, p.9.

[24]Ibid., p.18. Further, the timing of these changes is significant and must occur "significantly prior (generally at least one year) to a mission's conclusion." See also p.73.

[25]Ibid., pp.17, 73. Furthermore, McInnis highlights that not all withdrawals are defections: some withdrawals are 'routine' and 'pre-planned' and are conceptually distinct from unplanned defections.

There are two reasons for this focus on wartime commitments when defining alliance defection. Alliances are military institutions, which centre on promises and commitments that are usually activated in times of war or crisis.[26] Moreover, these studies allude to a more practical justification: focusing on war facilitates operationalization and analysis, particularly for quantitative studies.[27] Instances of interstate war have been extensively coded, resulting in a reliable dataset that is readily available to scholars that wish to study alliance behavior. However, this approach excludes a significant set of cases that would provide a more complete theoretical understanding of alliance defection.[28] In fact, their research leaves the question of why states renege in peacetime unaddressed. During peacetime, one of the main motivations for reneging – the desire to not engage in military conflict – is not a proximate factor, but the incentives that should encourage cooperation, discussed below, are still applicable.

Other studies examine alliance reliability by operationalizing it as alliance duration, providing a concept of defection that can apply outside of wartime contexts.[29] However, extrapolating a general theory of reliability from these studies conflates defection with alliance termination; these are often distinct outcomes. Leeds and Savun highlight that what they call opportunistic abrogation or the abandonment of "alliances in violation of their terms" is only one of several different pathways to alliance termination. There are at least three other paths to alliance collapse, each potentially associated with its own unique causal process: scheduled termination, loss of sovereignty, and mutual renegotiation.[30] Although not discussed by Leeds and Savun, there may also be different causal pathways for different types of defection. For example, state that commits an alliance violation that results in alliance collapse may do so for very different reasons than for a violation that occurs within an alliance that continues to function.

Finally, in his research on alliances, Snyder provides a definition of abandonment that is quite broad in scope, encompassing alliance violations during war and peace-

Important factors for distinguishing these two concepts include whether "the departure is well-planned, and conditions on the ground are such that the departure of the coalition is minimally disruptive to the local community" (pp.69-70, 71-72, 74-77).

[26]Morrow, 2000, p.63.

[27]Gibler, 2008, p.437.

[28]See Mattes (2012, p.693) for a discussion of the importance of counting instances of peacetime alliance violations.

[29]See, for example, Bennett, 1997; Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, 2009; Mattes, 2012; Morrow, 1991; Reed, 1997; Walt, 1997.

[30]Leeds and Savun, 2007, pp.1118-1119. According to their sample, 34% alliances ended opportunistically, 16% because they reached their scheduled termination date, 11% because at least one alliance member could "no longer execute an independent foreign policy," and 25% were renegotiated and replaced "with a new agreement with different obligations" (p.1119).

time. He recognizes that defection or 'abandonment' in alliances can also constitute the failure of allies "to make good on his explicit commitments; or... to provide support in contingencies where support is expected."[31] However, the broadness of this definition leaves some aspects unclear: for example, the relevance of intentionality. The phrasing of Snyder's definition implies that instances where support is 'expected' should be contrasted with 'explicit' commitments, implying that the former is a vaguer kind of obligation. This idea of 'expectation' allows for a situation where one state can perceive abandonment, while the other state does not regard their actions as amounting to such, given their understanding of their alliance commitments. The difficulty in trying to theoretically understand abandonment lies in this subjective element. A state that is knowingly abandoning an ally or intentionally violating a commitment may do so for very different reasons than a state that misjudges how their actions will be interpreted by an ally.

In this dissertation, reneging is defined to encompass all types of alliance commitments, regardless of their centrality to the alliance or their applicability in wartime. However, unlike the broadness of Snyder's definition of abandonment, reneging is more specified. It refers to situations in which a firm commitment has been made, not merely where cooperation is expected or implied. Reneging, therefore, is a *specific kind* of defection. **Reneging is going back on a commitment where progress towards fulfillment has been undertaken, without leaving the alliance outright.**

This definition of reneging has three key components. Firstly, the commitments that the reneging party is breaking must be **explicit**, rather than vague or implied. The explicitness of a commitment is crucial for clarifying the intentionality associated with reneging. The reneging party needs to have subscribed to these commitments in some capacity, creating the expectation that these commitments would be or continue to be fulfilled. A state does this through hand-tying or cost-sinking measures.[32] Broadly, there are three levels of ratification that increasingly bind a state to a commitment. Firstly, verbal or written *promises* that the commitment will be fulfilled. These promises can be *secret* or *public*, whereby public promises have more binding power than secret ones. Second, *partial fulfillment* of the commitment, whereby the state has taken steps towards fulfilling the commitment. Lastly, *complete fulfillment*

[31]Snyder, 1984, p.466. According to Snyder, in these two situations, "the alliance remains intact, but the expectations of support which underlie it are weakened." He also provides two other instances of defection: "the ally may realign with the opponent; he may merely de-align, abrogating the alliance contract."

[32]See Fearon, 1997.

of the commitment, where the state is fully delivering on the commitment. While the first level involves only hand-tying mechanisms, the latter two levels involve both hand-tying and cost-sinking mechanisms.

Second, reneging is **distinct from alliance withdrawal and alliance termination**. Allies must be trying to defect on a particular commitment or set of commitments within the alliance rather than leaving the alliance outright. Thus, states that renege are still subject to incentives that should make them reluctant to defect; they wish to maintain their status in and the integrity of the alliance.

Third, reneging needs to represent some kind of **reversal** of an explicit commitment. Reneging *changes the status quo*. States need to explicitly or formally change some aspect of their behavior in order to renege: In the case of promises, a state will have to renounce and reverse the promise in order to be considered reneging. In the case of partial or complete fulfillment, a state is considered reneging when they renounce and reverse the steps that they have taken towards fulfilling the commitment. Before attempting to renege, the momentum reinforced fulfilling or maintaining a particular commitment; reneging halts and reverses this process. A state reneges not when it merely fails to fulfill a verbal promise, but renounces it or downgrades it, removing the expectation that it could be fulfilled. This *backwards momentum* is a key feature of reneging and what makes it so puzzling, as the incentive structure described in the next section should create friction against this kind of reversal of commitment.

A common example of an alliance 'violation' within NATO is the failure of most states to live up to the 2 percent of GDP defence spending threshold. However, this would not meet the definition of reneging. Even though most members of NATO have not met this guideline, they have not renounced this commitment. This leaves room for states to claim that they are working towards meeting this commitment even if they have not fulfilled it yet.

Reneging can also be distinguished from two other forms of defection on commitments: free-riding and cheating. Free-riding occurs when states benefit from public goods while offloading the costs onto other parties; in this sense it is similar to reneging.[33] However, free-riding is a more passive action than reneging. Free-riding implies that states do not act to meet their responsibilities, rather than decrease or reverse their provision of a commitment. The main difference between 'cheating' and 'reneging' is the level of openness and awareness of allies about the reduction to commitment. Reneging is mostly done openly; states try to maintain their institutional

[33]Palmer, 1990, p.149.

status and benefits through negotiation. Cheating is done surreptitiously; states try to maintain their membership in the institution through deception.[34]

'Reneging' is a kind of defection that warrants further theoretical scrutiny. McInnis highlights that the literature on coalition defection is "surprisingly thin" because members of a coalition will "often go to considerable lengths to mask the fact that a defection is, indeed, occurring" so that these actions do not undermine the "international legitimacy" and "solidarity" of the coalition.[35] Therefore, leaders have incentives to "mask" or gloss over instances of defection to avoid various costs.[36] Defecting leaders can opt for measures that are less dramatic than total withdrawal, but considerably reduce their commitment to a coalition, such as through partial withdrawal of troops or re-tasking them.[37] Thus, McInnis argues, they rarely *completely withdraw* or renege from military coalitions.[38] The same logic can apply to alliances in general, where states have incentives to publicly mask defection and to maintain some token element of commitment.[39] Indeed, scholars have argued that democratic leaders may deliberately make weaker, more contingent, or more ambiguous alliance commitments in order to avoid being technically non-compliant in their obligations.[40] With reneging there is no such mitigation: states are unambiguously ending particular commitments that they had previously subscribed to, opening themselves up to costs. Furthermore, unlike with alliance withdrawal, states still have a stake in benefits that alliance membership can provide, which should provide a powerful incentive against reneging.

2.2 The Costs of Reneging: Reputational, Material, and Domestic Audience Costs

One of the central questions of alliance reliability and commitments is the extent to which alliances are binding: Are they merely "temporary marriages of convenience" or more robust vehicles of cooperation in the security sphere?[41] This question reflects

[34] As discussed below, leaders will usually try to minimize reneging and other commitment violations to avoid material and audience costs. The distinction between this kind of 'window dressing' to blunt the costs of defection and outright cheating is whether allies are themselves aware that a state is defecting on their commitments.

[35] McInnis, 2020, p.6.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid., pp.6, 9-13, 93.

[38] Ibid., p.93.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015; Fjelstul and Reiter, 2019.

[41] Mearsheimer, 1994, p.11.

a more fundamental debate within IR about the nature of cooperation, commitment, and institutions in the international sphere. In the past, realists argued that cooperation is time-limited and not robust.[42] States simply leave institutions or back out of commitments once they no longer serve their interests. Reneging, therefore, should occur relatively frequently. Institutionalists, on the other hand, saw institutions as durable facilitators of international cooperation. Once commitments become institutionalized or formalized, they become "sticky," taking "on a life and logic of their own," and becoming difficult to break.[43] They argued it actually served the interests of states to make lasting commitments and states were willing to subject themselves to rules and other accountability mechanisms to facilitate long-term cooperation.[44] The creation of institutions, including alliances, therefore changes the incentive structure that states face in a way that should promote cooperation and discourage reneging.

Aspects of this debate crystalized in the early 1990s over the durability of NATO. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the common threat of the Soviet Union, several realist scholars expressed doubts that NATO could continue.[45] Institutionalists, however, argued that NATO's institutionalized status would allow for its continuation after the Cold War, having taken on a role beyond a narrow defence pact aimed at a particular rival.[46] In the end, NATO did not collapse. Indeed, over thirty years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, NATO remains an important security institution for its members, and has also expanded its membership and mandate.

Beyond alliance endurance and collapse, empirical research has found that defection is rare within alliances, supporting the institutionalist understanding of alliances and alliance commitments. A seminal study is Leeds, Long, and Mitchell's article on alliance reliability. This examined alliances from 1816 to 1944 and found that allies kept their commitments about 75% of the time.[47] From this finding, the durability of alliance commitments has become "conventional wisdom in scholarship."[48] However, Berkemeier and Fuhrmann note that these results do not include the post-WWII era, which could reveal different alliance dynamics. Their study of alliances from 1816 to 2003 finds that states only honored their commitments 50% of the time.[49] Further-

[42]Grieco, 1988; Mearsheimer, 1994; Waltz, 1979.
[43]Ikenberry, 2002, pp.228, 229; Keohane and Martin, 1994; Simmons, 2010.
[44]Ibid.
[45]Mearsheimer, 1994, pp.13-14; Waltz, 1993, pp.75-76.
[46]Keohane and Martin, 1994, p.40; McCalla, 1996; Wallander, 2000.
[47]Leeds, Long, and Mitchell, 2000.
[48]Berkemeier and Fuhrmann, 2018, p.1.
[49]Ibid.

more, there is a substantial difference between alliance compliance rates before and after WWII and between different alliance types.[50] Specifically for defense pacts like NATO, they find that while about 61% of these pacts were honored from 1816 to 1944, the percentage drops to about 14% in the period from 1945 to 2003. However, this disparity may not be related to changing rates of compliance or reliability among alliance members, but rather the nature of the alliances that are 'challenged' in the first place.[51] Indeed, Berkemeier and Fuhrmann suggest that this discrepancy may be related to the advent of nuclear weapons and the *increased* reliability of certain alliances, as nuclear-backed defence pacts "have rarely been challenged by war" in the post-war era, suggesting a selection effect.[52] Moreover, they note that "NATO does not appear in our dataset... precisely because potential adversaries perceive it as effective."[53] The fact that such nuclear-backed alliances are unlikely to be drawn into war highlights the importance of studying peacetime commitments to understand defection. In his study of conventional force levels of the Central Region[54] in NATO during the Cold War, Duffield found a "record of marked stability" despite shifting levels of international threat, demonstrating that the reluctance to defect extends to peacetime commitments.[55] Finally, a recent study on military coalitions in the post-Cold War era has found that defections were rare: only about 14% (19 of 134) of coalition experienced defections.[56] Overall, these empirical studies provide compelling evidence that leaders usually keep their alliance commitments.

In line with these findings, scholars have identified different mechanisms that should disincentivize defection and promote cooperation and durable commitment. I organise these mechanisms into three broad categories of costs that can result from reneging: reputational costs, material costs, and audience costs. The first two apply to states at the international level; the latter is experienced by political leaders at the domestic level.

[50]Ibid. According to the authors, they essentially followed the methodology and procedures of Leeds, Long, and Mitchell with some updates to the data.

[51]Morrow, 2000, p.67.

[52]Berkemeier and Fuhrmann, 2018, p.3.

[53]Ibid. See also Gaubatz (1996, p.124), who justifies the use of alliance duration rather than a more direct measure of reliability in order to avoid selection effects.

[54]During the Cold War, the Central Region encompassed "Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), less its territory north of the Weser river" (Duffield, 1992, p.821 ft.3). According to Duffield (1992, p.821), "the Central Region, has comprised one of the most important components of the alliance's overall military posture. These forces have formed the first line of defense in a region (Western Europe) that has been regarded as both vital to the security of the alliance as a whole and highly vulnerable to a direct Soviet invasion."

[55]Duffield, 1992, p.820.

[56]McInnis, 2020, pp.77-78.

Reputational costs occur when a state suffers a loss of standing, status, or influence due to past defection. According to Kreps, "Defecting earns states a reputation for unreliability, since failing in one instance casts doubt on the reliability of future commitments."[57] Several scholars have found that states and governments with records of violating their alliance commitments are less likely to form alliances at a later date. This demonstrates that leaders take each other's reputations for reliability into account in decision-making about alliance formation.[58] LeVeck and Narang have argued that the context surrounding alliance violations matters and that states take this into account when considering potential alliance partners. Thus, reputational costs are more likely to be paid by states that do not have 'valid' reasons for breaking their commitments.[59]

There are also material costs associated with defection, such as the denial of benefits and the infliction of punishment.[60] One key benefit that an alliance provides is security; in the case of defense pacts like NATO, this is primarily through their ability to deter aggression.[61] Reneging on particular peacetime commitments may weaken an alliance's warfighting ability as it disrupts the "prewar coordination of military and foreign policy."[62] Thus, reneging may diminish an alliance's ability to deter by making it materially weaker. On the other hand, alliances are signals of allies' willingness to fight on each other's behalf; an alliance's ability to deter aggression and reassure its members is not solely based on its military resources, but also the credibility of its members to follow through on their commitments.[63] Reneging can undercut this alliance-level credibility, sending a signal that the foundations of the alliance may not be solid. At its extreme, reneging on key commitments can therefore invite an attack or lead to the unraveling of an alliance, as enemies and allies lose faith that allies will actually come to each other's aid in war. A less severe, but still costly, effect of reneging could be an increase in external provocations short of direct aggression and increased intra-alliance tensions. Finally, defecting states can be directly punished by allies. For example, they can be expelled from the alliance, denied key positions or find themselves deprioritized within the alliance structure.

[57]Kreps, 2010, p.202; Duffield, 1992, p.836. For a discussion of reputational costs in the context of alliances see Miller, 2003. For how reputational affects alliance design, see Mattes, 2012. Material and reputational costs are tightly connected, as a loss of reputation will usually entail material consequences.

[58]Crescenzi, Kathman, Kleinberg, and Wood, 2012; Gibler, 2008. See also Miller, 2003, pp.55-56.

[59]LeVeck and Narang, 2016.

[60]Duffield, 1992, p.836.

[61]Leeds and Anac, 2005, p.185; Mattes, 2012, p.683.

[62]Morrow, 1994, p.272; Mattes, 2012, p.683.

[63]Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015, pp.969-970; Mattes, 2012, p.683; Morrow, 1994, 2000.

Outside of the security sphere, punishment can therefore also occur as a 'spillover' effect, where defection leads to a cooling of relations among allies that have economic or political entanglements.[64]

At the domestic level, leaders can face audience costs for backing down from prior commitments.[65] Domestic audience costs are usually conceptualized as a loss of domestic support for leaders, which, at its extreme, could threaten their political survival.[66] In democracies, audience costs can lead to the ousting of leaders and their parties from government if defection becomes a salient electoral issue.[67] The mechanisms that underlie these costs are related to lowered public perceptions of the leader's competence and public concern that unreliability will be damaging for their state's international reputation or future credibility.[68] Several studies have hypothesized that leaders are reluctant to defect on alliance commitments because of their desire to avoid these domestic audience costs.[69]

These international and domestic factors make a powerful incentive structure for leaders to keep their commitments even when they are domestically unpopular.[70] In her study on NATO allies' contributions to operations in Afghanistan between August 2006 and December 2009, Kreps found that despite the low "public support" for these missions, most leaders did not reduce or withdraw their troops in Afghanistan, but rather "have generally increased their troop numbers and gradually lifted restrictions on how troops can be used."[71] This tendency to keep alliance commitments is explained through elite consensus on the benefits of reliability and the risks of defection:

[64]Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015, p.970; Mattes 2012 686-687; Leeds and Savun, 2007, pp.1122-1123.
On the interplay between strategic and economic ties between allies, see Mastanduno 1998, 2020; Powers, 2004.

[65]See, for example, Fearon, 1994, 1997; Levy, McKoy, Poast, and Wallace, 2015; Smith, 1998; Tomz, 2007. Some authors argue that the audience cost effect is not consistent across varying contexts and societal groups. These arguments will be explored in the next section. While the term 'audience cost' has become synonymous with actions related to inconsistency and reneging, Fearon (1997, p.67) originally defined the nature of audience costs more broadly, as a negative domestic reaction concerning "whether foreign policy is being successfully or unsuccessfully by the leadership." See also Fearon, 1994, p.577.

[66]Levy, McKoy, Poast, and Wallace, 2015, p.989; Tomz, 2007, p.823.

[67]Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015, pp.968, 971; Fearon, 1994, p.581.

[68]Fearon, 1994, pp.580-581; Levy, McKoy, Poast, and Wallace, 2015, pp.997-999; Smith, 1998; Tomz, 2007, pp.835-836.

[69]See, for example, Duffield, 1992, p.838; Kreps, 2010, pp.201-202; Leeds, 2003, p.813; Morrow, 2000, p.72.

[70]Kreps, 2010.

[71]Ibid., p.191.

> The high costs of defection and the prospect of forgoing the benefits of cooperation create an institutional stickiness that offsets the domestic unpopularity of fulfilling alliance commitments. The incentives to maintain international commitments are powerful enough that they transcend political parties and thereby help guard the leading party from electoral consequences.[72]

Reputation and commitment are important for both international and domestic audiences. This prevents the government and even opposition parties from trying to obtain easy domestic political victories at the expense of their international alliance commitments:

> Indeed, even domestic audiences are concerned with their country or leader's international reputation... The opposition has no interest in its state suffering reputation costs of defection that make it difficult to receive the benefits of future cooperation, when it might be the government leader.[73]

Thus, the domestic gains of reneging on an unpopular commitment are likely to be *double-edged* and offset by the domestic audience costs associated with defection. Furthermore, institutionalized alliances like NATO cast "a long shadow of the future," stretching out the benefits that they can provide on a large time scale, compounding the material costs of defection.[74] This makes states even more unwilling to jeopardize the long-term benefits of loyal alliance membership for dubious and short-term domestic gains of reneging.[75]

Duffield has found that this institutionalist model of incentives applies to peacetime conventional commitments in NATO. According to Duffield, because of these incentives to cooperate, "we should expect to see few proposals for change in a country's NATO force contribution."[76] In situations where defection is attempted, Duffield argues that these proposals will either be retracted or be "diluted" through attempts to achieve allied consensus and due to domestic pushback.[77] Thus, the costs of defection should not only make leaders less likely to attempt reneging in the first place, but will also affect how leaders renege and the eventual outcome of these attempts.

[72]Ibid., p.203.
[73]Ibid., pp.202-203
[74]Ibid., p.192.
[75]Ibid., p.191.
[76]Duffield, 1992, p.839.
[77]Ibid., pp.840, 847.

2.3 Why Do States Renege, Despite the Costs? An Overview of the Literature

Despite these findings on the costs of defection, the empirical record indicates that states do violate their alliance commitments at least some of the time. Thus, the central puzzle for the institutionalist model of alliance commitment is when and why states defect, despite these costs. Previous studies have provided several theories as to why alliance violations occur. Their hypotheses centre on factors that affect the cost and benefit structure that discourages defection. This section examines the literature on alliance commitment to provide the foundation for the theoretical chapter of this thesis. Within the alliance reliability literature, the factors that drive defection and reneging can be divided into two categories: static and dynamic.[78]

2.3.1 Static Factors

Static factors are characteristics of states or of alliances that should make alliance violation more or less likely. These factors are endogenous features of the actors or alliances. The literature on alliance commitment highlights three static factors: the regime type of allies, level of institutionalization of the alliance, and power distribution within the alliance. Overall, the literature suggests that democracies, more institutionalized alliances, and junior members of asymmetric alliances should be less likely to renege on their commitments, due to the increased costs defection. All of these propositions are contested to some degree, and this is discussed below.

Many studies have proposed that regime type can affect the likelihood of defection, arguing that democracies are more reliable allies than non-democracies.[79] There are two main causal mechanisms that should discourage defection within democracies. The first mechanism is related to increased vulnerability to audience costs.[80] This is related to democracy's "defining feature": the ability of the public to remove their leaders from office if they are not satisfied with their conduct.[81] Because domestic

[78]These categories are based on those identified by Leeds (2003, pp.813, 815) in her study of the causes of defection: "Characteristics of the Alliance Member" and "Changes Since Alliance Formation."

[79]For example, Bennett, 1997, p.873; Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015; Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds, 2003; Reed, 1997.

[80]While this argument does not preclude the fact that non-democratic leaders can suffer audience costs, it does assert that this effect will be weaker, see Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015, p.972 ft 6. For critiques of the claim that democracies should be more susceptible to audience costs than non-democracies, see Weeks, 2008 and Brown and Marcum, 2011.

[81]Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015, p.968. These scholars argue that due to these increased costs for defection, democracies are more selective about the alliance commitments that they agree to.

publics are assumed to punish defection and inconsistency, these accountability mechanisms result in increased domestic audience costs for defection, making democratic leaders less likely to renege.[82] The other mechanism is related to democratic institutional structure. Because of the increased number of veto players in-built within democratic institutions, individual leaders will be prevented from making drastic decisions to defect.[83] These two factors should encourage democracies to keep their commitments, while autocracies, lacking these features, should be more likely to defect.

On the other hand, Gartzke and Gleditsch have argued that democracies are actually less reliable allies.[84] They suggest that the prevalence of formal alliances among democracies might be related to the fact that democracies are actually *less* likely to keep their commitments and therefore require more powerful institutional mechanisms to make credible commitments.[85] They argue that the main source of this unreliability is related to democratic leaders' need to accommodate shifting preferences over time about whether to go to war on behalf of allies.[86] Therefore, the formalization and institutionalization of democratic alliance commitments are needed in order to ensure that they can bind future governments and leaders to fulfill these promises. In a later study, Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, argue that the discrepancy between these findings on democracy is related to how different scholars defined alliance violation. While Leeds only counts cases "in which specific alliance obligations were invoked" and finds support for democratic reliability, Gartzke and Gleditsch count all cases where a state in a defence pact did not come to its ally's aid in war, regardless of the "specific terms of the treaty."[87]

They "are careful to design agreements they expect to have a high probability of fulfilling," which can result in them making "flexible or limited commitments," such as setting preconditions for them entering a conflict on behalf of an ally. This study suggests that democracies are able to set the parameters of their commitments and do so strategically; therefore, these findings deepen the puzzle for why a democratic regime would first commit to one thing and then renege on it. See also Fjelstul and Reiter, 2019; Leeds, 1999.

[82]Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds 2015, p.968; Fearon 1994, pp.581-582; Leeds 1999, 986-987, 2003, 813; Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel 2009.

[83]Choi, 2012; Leeds 2003, p.813.

[84]Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004.

[85]Ibid., p.777.

[86]Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004, pp.776-777, 781. This tendency is related to "[d]emocratic cycling" or shifts in the ruling coalition and varying levels of issue saliency from the initial commitment to when it needs to be fulfilled (p.777).

[87]Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds 2015, pp.979-980. Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004, p.778) speculate that the discrepancy between their research and previous studies that have found links between democracy and reliability is in part due the fact that these studies measure reliability in terms of alliance duration.

Gartzke and Gleditsch's article highlights another factor that can affect the strength of the incentive structure promoting cooperation: the level of institutionalization of the alliance. Other scholars have made similar claims about the links between institutionalization and increased alliance reliability and stability.[88] For example, Kreps hypothesizes that defection should be particularly difficult for states in NATO because of its highly institutionalised status and "extended history of security benefits and credible promise of future cooperation."[89] Furthermore, Morrow argues that states with increased "prewar military coordination" makes alliances more effective.[90] This, in turn, "makes allies more likely to come to one another's aid."[91] Increased institutionalization can be associated with the increase of all three types of costs. Since highly institutionalized alliances are more likely to be more effective in warfighting and provide a more varied package of security, this raises the material costs of reneging. In addition, increased formalization and institutionalization of an alliance should heighten the reputational and domestic audience costs leaders will face for reneging due to their increased "public profile" and formal entanglements.[92]

However, analysis by Leeds and Anac indicates that greater institutionalization may not lead to increased reliability.[93] They "find no evidence that alliances with higher levels of peacetime military coordination or more formal alliances are more reliable when invoked by war."[94] In their article, they register surprise with these results and offer a variety of tentative explanations for them.[95] These explanations indicate that they have not dismissed the potential link between institutionalization and reliability. For example, their measurement of military institutionalization is "noisy," as they base this on the level of coordination specified in the alliance agreement, rather than through a direct measure of the amount of coordination that actually occurred:

> Because we only know what the states promised to do, and not what they actually did, we can't be sure that these plans for coordination actually came to fruition. Again, anecdotal evidence suggests that in some cases, the coordination obligations were not fulfilled. Similarly, some allies may

[88] See, for example, Miller, 2003, p.58; Mattes, 2012, p.687; Walt, 1997, p.166.
[89] Kreps, 2010, p.192.
[90] Morrow, 2000, p.71.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Leeds and Anac, 2005, pp.187, 190; Morrow, 2000.
[93] Bennett (1997, pp.855-856) also finds that increased institutionalization is not associated with longer alliance duration; however, he operationalizes institutionalization very narrowly, the overall duration of the alliance, finding more direct measures of institutionalization too difficult to construct.
[94] Leeds and Anac, 2005, p.183.
[95] Ibid., p.195.

> engage in significant coordination despite the fact that such actions are not provided for in their written agreements.[96]

They also argue that the negative relationship between increased formalization and reliability could be related to leaders' reluctance to terminate these alliances, even after their underlying interests have changed.[97] This hypothesis implies that it may be harder to break alliance commitments in peacetime rather than when they are invoked by war. Overall, the authors are not convinced that their analysis definitively undermines the link between alliance institutionalization and reliability.

Finally, the power distribution within the alliance can also affect a state's likelihood of defection. The nature of the alliance can interact with characteristics of states within the alliance, making minor powers in asymmetric alliances more reliable: "minor powers are particularly likely to uphold their commitments to major powers."[98] Leeds hypothesizes that minor powers face greater costs for defection than major powers.[99] Weaker states are more dependent on alliances for the provision of their security and are therefore less willing to jeopardise their position or face "retribution" by breaking their commitments.[100] This raises the material costs of reneging are higher for weaker states when compared to stronger states. These findings are also supported by studies such as Morrow, who finds that asymmetric alliances last longer than symmetric alliances.[101]

2.3.2 Dynamic Factors

The other main set of theories highlight the role of dynamic factors. These relate to changing contexts that should promote or discourage reneging, regardless of a particular state's overall propensity towards being unreliable. Leeds, Long, and Mitchell affirmed an overall tendency for states to keep their alliance commitments. Leeds then conducted a follow-up study to identify variables that were associated with the cases of defection in order to explain the remaining 24.5 percent of cases that did not fit the general trend towards alliance reliability.[102] While she identifies certain static characteristics of states that made them more or less likely to renege (as noted above), she also finds that defection is most likely to occur when "one or more of the alliance

[96]Leeds and Anac, 2005, p.197.
[97]Ibid., p.196
[98]Leeds, 2003, p.822.
[99]Ibid.
[100]Ibid.; Morrow, 1991 pp.913, 918.
[101]Morrow, 1991; See also Walt, 1997.
[102]Leeds, 2003.

members has experienced significant changes that affect its decisions regarding participation in war since the alliance was formed."[103] Her statistical analysis highlights the importance of two changes in particular for understanding reneging: changes in regime type and changes in relative power.[104] New regimes should have different foreign policy priorities and a different strategic calculus.[105] Leeds argues then that the costs should be lower for reneging under these circumstances: "The reputational costs that are incurred for breaking agreements internationally and domestically also may be muted when the agreement is associated with the ancient regime."[106] Increases and decreases in power are also associated with defection, as it changes the calculus of the desirability of alliance membership. States that become weaker are less attractive allies and can less afford to go to war on behalf of other states.[107] States that become stronger are less reliant on allies to pursue their strategic goals, which can also encourage defection on previous alliance commitments.[108]

Reflecting Leeds's findings, there are two primary dynamic theoretical strands of when and why states renege on their alliance commitments. The first involves changes on the domestic level. Tago argues that for democracies, elections can be a driver of early withdrawal from military coalitions.[109] For example, incumbents can use defection from unpopular commitments as a means to garner domestic support and secure re-election.[110] Others examine domestic factors applicable to both democracies and non-democracies. Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago find that leadership turnover is associated with reneging.[111] They argue that new leaders are likely to have different strategic outlooks than their predecessors and are less likely to feel bound by previous administration's decisions.[112]

Another set of domestic dynamic factors that may affect when leaders renege on their alliance commitments comes from the literature on audience costs. Although most of these studies do not address alliance commitments specifically, their insights on how leaders can mitigate the effects of these costs is relevant to this discussion,

[103]Ibid., p.820.
[104]Ibid., p.816.
[105]Ibid. Leeds notes that democracies should be reluctant to ally with autocracies and vice-versa. See also Leeds (1999) for why mixed-regime alliances should be less likely to form than single-regime alliances.
[106]Leeds, 2003, p.816.
[107]Ibid., p.817.
[108]Ibid.
[109]Tago, 2009.
[110]Ibid.
[111]Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, 2015. See also Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, 2009, who find that leadership turnover is associated with alliance defection in autocracies, but not democracies.
[112]Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, 2015.

as domestic audience costs are one of the primary incentives that should keep allies reliable. According to Levendusky and Horowitz, leaders can lessen audience costs if they provide a justification "on the basis of new information" for why they are reneging on a commitment.[113] The same article also highlights the role of elite cohesion: bipartisan support for reneging can also lessen audience costs.[114] Other studies have suggested that not 'domestic audiences' uniformly punish inconsistency and commitment violation: access to information, issue salience, policy preferences, and partisan affiliation may mitigate the audience cost effect for reneging.[115]

The second strand links changes at the systemic level with alliance violations. This largely echoes the realist argument that states will engage in abandonment opportunistically when commitments no longer serve the national interest. For example, Weisiger argues that coalition defection is associated with fluctuations in "battlefield circumstances" and that states will be more likely to leave coalition when they have more strategic independence or when the chance of overall victory has been decreased.[116] Some studies present theories that combine strategic and domestic dynamic factors to explain defection. McInnis argues that defection from coalitions is related to "heightened perceptions of political and military risk" and the choice of defection strategy is "largely a function of alliance and international pressures."[117] She adopts a neoclassical realist approach whereby alliance politics, domestic politics, military capability are all important independent variables for explaining defection.[118] Davidson, in his study of coalition defection in democracies, contends that elite consensus can break down when there is disagreement about the value of the alliance or mission, or when it appears that there will be few international audience costs for defection, or if the mission appears to be failing.[119] Finally, in her study on New

[113]Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012, p.323.

[114]Ibid.

[115]Chaudoin 2014b; Clare, 2007; Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012; Kertzer and Brutger, 2016; Potter and Baum, 2013; Trager and Vavreck, 2011. Interestingly, Chaudoin's (2014b, p.242) survey experiment involved a scenario that would be highly salient to nationalist proclivities – involving a decision about whether to impose import restrictions on European "metal brackets" to protect American jobs. While Chaudoin (2014b, p.241) notes that there may be "many reasons why respondents might have *ex ante* preferences over import barriers that have nothing to do with potential inconsistency" such as "their factor endowments, their sector of employment, or their negative perceptions of the overall effect of free trade," it is unclear whether a respondent's policy preferences on free trade are specific or part of a wider belief set about the relative virtues of nationalism/protectionism and multinationalism/openness. Chaudoin (2014b, pp.248-249, 252) found evidence for a "consistency effect" among those without strong prior policy preferences, which were the majority of the sample.

[116]Weisiger, 2016, p.753.

[117]McInnis, 2020, p.10.

[118]Ibid.

[119]Davidson, 2014.

Zealand's decision to renege on its peacetime nuclear commitments to ANZUS (The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty), Catalinac finds that lowered levels of threat perception can cause domestic pushes for greater autonomy within alliances.[120]

My research builds on several of these theories and addresses several gaps within the literature on defection. Firstly, the *process* of how states negotiate out of their commitments does not feature strongly in the many of these articles. In other words, the causal mechanism remains elusive. For example, while Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago's mixed-method study proposes several mechanisms that explain why leadership changes should make coalition withdrawals more likely, these do not provide much empirical insight about the actual content of negotiations.[121] In their qualitative analysis, negotiations around reneging are black-boxed. For example, it is unclear why it took two years to negotiate the withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam, what the terms of withdrawal were, and how much leverage the United States had in negotiations.[122] Even more detailed qualitative articles tend to examine recent events, meaning that they have to rely on unclassified material and interviews. This limits their ability to analyze the process of defection without access to classified documents that can more directly trace its causal path.[123] Secondly, with a few exceptions, the literature on alliance reliability has focused on defection in wartime, rather than peacetime commitments.[124] An important subset of cases related to defection is thereby omitted. Finally, in the case of the audience cost literature, most studies of the dynamic effects of audience costs in international interactions involve crisis bargaining scenarios and the credibility of threats against rivals. [125] The vary-

[120]Catalinac, 2010, see especially p.319.

[121]Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago (2015, p.464) argue that the political costs of reneging should be lower under a change of leadership because their preferences and their evaluation of information may be different from their predecessors; furthermore, they argue that new leaders are less "entrapped" by their predecessor's decisions.

[122]Ibid., pp.479-480.

[123]Massie, 2016; McInnis, 2020; Pelletier and Massie, 2017. A possible exception to this trend is Davidson's (2014) study on early withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, which uses leaked diplomatic cables. However, it has the same limitations as Pilster, Böhmelt and Tago (2015) in terms of describing and explaining the process of negotiations on reneging, as Davidson (2014, p.253) only seeks to explain "the announcements of withdrawal rather than the withdrawal itself." Catalinac's (2010) article, while analyzing events from the 1970s and 1980s, relies on interviews conducted in 2005 and public statements in Parliament.

[124]Catalinac (2010) and Duffield (1992) are key exceptions.

[125]For example, Brown and Marcum 2011; Clare, 2007; Fearon, 1994; Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012; Schultz, 2001; Smith, 1998; Snyder and Borghard, 2011; Tomz, 2007; Trachtenberg, 2012; Trager and Vavreck, 2011. Exceptions include: Leventoglu and Tarar (2005), who explore the effects of audience costs in generalized bargaining scenarios, examining when public versus secret negotiations are more advantageous for arriving at an agreement; Chaudoin (2014a), who examines

ing effects of audience costs on bargaining power in negotiations with allies outside of crisis scenarios is not explored to the same depth. In addition, the current dominance of experimental methods to test hypotheses related to audience costs misses a crucial element: the role of the leader.[126] While survey experiments may point to the existence of consistency-related audience costs among the general population, its effect on policy decisions depends on whether leaders believe that their audiences will actually punish them for inconsistency.

2.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have laid the conceptual foundation for my definition of reneging. I explored how reneging and other related concepts have been used within the alliance reliability literature. 'Reneging' is defined here as a reversal or revocation of an explicit alliance commitment, while still maintaining membership in the alliance. This concept is important to IR because of the central finding within the alliance reliability literature that defection is costly, and therefore should be rare.[127] Reneging is conceptually significant because of its riskiness and costliness: it does not simply lessen commitment, but unambiguously reverses it, making this kind of defection more difficult to hide or mitigate. For this reason, reneging should make leaders particularly vulnerable to international and domestic costs.

In reviewing the literature, I identified three distinct costs associated with defection in general: material costs, reputational costs, and domestic audience costs. Reputational costs include the inability to form an alliance at a later date or a loss of standing or status among allies. Material costs include the weakening of the alliance or 'spillover' economic and political punishment that can occur as a result of defection. Domestic audience costs include the decline in public opinion or the ejection of leaders from office as a result of their alliance unreliability. This structure of

the interaction between audience costs and the timing of initiation of foreign trade disputes. The hypotheses that can be generated about relative audience costs in crisis versus non-crisis scenarios can be radically different. For example, Kertzer and Brutger (2016, p.13) hypothesize that in a crisis diplomacy scenario, nationalist individuals should be *more* likely to punish their leaders for inconsistency as backing down from a threat of force violates "national honor." On the other hand, in non-crisis scenarios such as Chaudoin's (2014b) vignette involving trade protectionism, one would expect higher degrees of nationalism would be correlated with increased tolerance for reneging. This idea will be explored further in the theoretical section.

[126]For experimental studies of audience costs, see for example: Chaudoin, 2014b; Kertzer and Brutger, 2016; Levy, McKoy, Poast, and Wallace, 2015; Tomz, 2007; Trager and Vavreck, 2011.

[127]See for example, Duffield, 1992; Leeds, 2003; Leeds, Long, and Mitchell, 2000; Kreps, 2010; McInnis, 2020.

costs provides a powerful incentive structure for leaders to keep their alliance commitments.[128] Furthermore, if defection or reneging is attempted, leaders have incentives engage in consensus-building with allies and water down their reductions when faced with domestic and allied opposition.[129]

Despite this powerful incentive structure, defection and reneging still occur. Scholars have identified different factors that affect the likelihood of reneging, which I organised into two primary categories: static and dynamic factors. Static factors are characteristics of states that should affect their overall likelihood to defect, such as: regime type, relative power within the alliance, and level of institutionalization. Dynamic factors are events that can shift the likelihood of a given state reneging, regardless of their baseline characteristics. For example, at the strategic level, shifts in the balance of power or battlefield circumstances can increase the likelihood of defection; at the domestic level, shifts in leadership or provision of a good justification for defection can also make reneging more likely and mitigate costs.

This chapter has established the core conceptual and theoretical foundations of the thesis and of the theory that is presented in the next chapter. Reneging has been identified as the foreign policy outcome of interest because it is an especially costly form of defection; this conceptual development helps to clearly define the dependent variable and allows me to explore the dynamics of peacetime alliance commitments. This chapter has established that the institutionalist model of cooperation – the 'incentives to cooperate' in my puzzle – is firmly entrenched in the alliance reliability literature. A theory of reneging must take these constraints seriously. I have also examined previous explanations of defection. The characteristics that should further increase the costs of reneging – making it an even more puzzling outcome – will guide case selection. The next chapter demonstrates that the case of Canada's nuclear sharing commitments to NATO and NORAD is a deviant case for reneging, as it is a democracy, a member of highly institutionalized and formalized alliances and is the junior member of those alliances. It also shows that established dynamic theories cannot explain the variation in this case. On this basis, I present my own theory of reneging.

[128]Kreps, 2010.
[129]Duffield, 1992.

3

Theory

The previous chapter provided an overview of the alliance reliability literature, which finds that defection should be rare and difficult due to the international and domestic costs that it entails. Building on this research, I defined reneging as a type of defection where the disincentives to break from commitments should be especially high. Despite this, reneging still occurs within alliances. The question at the heart of this thesis is why and how do leaders renege, despite these costs? Previous scholars have grappled with this question in two ways: some have identified state or alliance characteristics that should affect the overall likelihood of defection; others have identified dynamic factors that should encourage or discourage defection based on shifts in characteristics or contexts. Their research serves as the foundation for my case selection and theory-building.

In this chapter, I first justify my case selection. I chose the case of Canadian nuclear sharing commitments during the Cold War in order to best address the gaps in the literature on alliance reliability. Canada represents a deviant case, as it has static characteristics that should make it particularly unlikely to renege: it is a democracy, a junior alliance partner, and its commitments are to two highly institutionalized alliances, NATO and NORAD. Selecting a single case with a large amount of declassified archival material available allows for in-depth process tracing. Through the analysis of this case, I am able to build not only a theory of reneging, but also a model for how reneging is negotiated within institutionalized settings. This chapter introduces a theory and pathway for why and how leaders renege in institutionalised alliances that has not been explored within the existing literature.

The theory I present sees reneging as the outcome of both intra-alliance and domestic-level politicking. Using Putnam's two-level game as the starting point for modeling this process, I highlight that reneging has both international and domestic

components that are interrelated. Reneging is neither a purely domestic 'foreign policy option' nor the result of bargaining between black-boxed states. Political leaders can use domestic coalitions as leverage in international negotiations to minimize the costs of reneging and achieve desired outcomes. I argue that certain domestic coalitions lower the domestic audience costs of reneging. Furthermore, they can also be used as leverage at the international level and potentially minimize allied retribution for reneging. The amount of bargaining power that a leader has in intra-alliance negotiations is related to three factors: the credibility of the threat of withdrawal from negotiations, their willingness to act unilaterally rather than through consensus, and their susceptibility to 'restructuring' or foreign influence.

I argue that the key variable for understanding leverage is the type of domestic coalition that supports reneging. The important factor that I highlight is not how 'popular' or broad a particular coalition is, but rather that the very nature of a coalition's preferences in relation to reneging affects the extent that a political leader can use them as leverage. I distinguish between single-issue and nationalist coalitions.[1] Coalition type not only explains why states renege, but how they do so and whether they are likely to be successful or not. Single-issue coalitions oppose a particular commitment, but not membership of the alliance itself. I argue that these coalitions provide leaders with less leverage: they do not give leaders with a credible threat of withdrawal, they prefer that leaders act through consensus with allies, and they are more vulnerable to foreign appeals. Therefore, these types of coalitions are bound by the double-edged logic of reneging, where defection on unpopular commitments can still lead to domestic audience costs. By contrast, nationalist coalitions are skeptical of alliance commitments in general and even alliance membership itself. They provide leaders with more leverage in negotiations: they have a credible threat of withdrawal, are more willing to act unilaterally, and are less susceptible to restructuring efforts. This coalition type changes the cost structure that keeps states from reneging, as they are less concerned with appearing as a good ally and more hostile to foreign intervention into domestic affairs. Leaders with the backing of anti-nuclear coalitions are less

[1]Coalition is defined as the group that ratifies reneging at level II. As will be demonstrated in the empirical chapters, the ratifying group is often heterogeneous, with some elements supporting the status quo and others supporting reneging. Thus, I use the term 'coalition' rather than 'constituency.' Coalition type refers to who is mobilized against alliance commitments and for what reason. According to Saunders (2015, p.468), domestic publics take cues from elites on matters relating to foreign policy, meaning that elites can act as a "fire alarm" for public dissent. Furthermore, for defence matters shrouded in secrecy, the elite may be the primary domestic audience (Boyer, 2000, pp.193-197). Thus, the role of the elite is particularly pertinent to my analysis of domestic coalitions.

likely to attempt reneging, more likely to adopt consensus-based strategies in intra-alliance negotiations, and more likely to see their reneging attempts fail. Leaders with the backing of nationalist coalitions are more likely to attempt reneging, more likely to adopt coercive strategies, and are more likely to achieve reneging success.

To demonstrate the necessity of a new theory of reneging, I consider, then rule out plausible alternate explanations for Canada's shifting nuclear commitments. The first set of alternate explanations use systemic-level logics of leverage in order to explain the outcomes of negotiations on alliance commitments. These are examined detail. The second set of alternate explanations, ranging from previous theories of reneging to more generalized explanations of foreign policy, are ruled out using simple comparative analysis.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will justify my case selection, arguing that Canada represents a deviant case and particularly fertile ground for theory generation. Next, I describe the dependent variable: instances of reneging and reneging attempts related to Canada's nuclear commitments to NATO and NORAD. I then present my theory of reneging, which explains how domestic coalition type affects decisions to renege and operates within the context of negotiations between allies. Next, I consider two systemic-level explanations that also involve leverage as the key causal mechanism to explain reneging: a realpolitik model, which relates outcomes to strategic optimization, and Snyder's model of intra-alliance bargaining, which relates outcomes to levels of dependence, commitment, and interest. Finally, I consider other dynamic explanations for Canada's nuclear sharing policy that fall outside of the bargaining framework, which will be discounted using comparative analysis.

3.1 Canada's Nuclear Sharing Commitments: A Deviant Case

The history of Canada's nuclear sharing policy for NATO and NORAD is a deviant case for reneging. Canada's characteristics between 1957 to 1984 should discourage defection: it was a democracy, a junior alliance member, and a member of two highly institutionalized alliances. Based on the static factor theories of alliance reliability examined in the previous chapter, one would expect that, if Canada made nuclear commitments, it would be likely to keep them. Nevertheless, Canada's actual foreign policy on nuclear sharing fluctuated: at times, the government maintained these commitments; other times it has sought to renege on them.

The unique status of these nuclear commitments should further discourage reneging. Firstly, the history of NATO nuclear sharing arrangements has demonstrated that they are unlikely to be reinstated after total nuclear withdrawal. This means that reneging is likely to be a permanent termination of a commitment. In order to receive nuclear weapons under a dual-key arrangement, the host state needs to invest in dual-capable delivery systems as well as have personnel trained for their nuclear role. Once the weapons are gone, the host state may retire their nuclear-capable infrastructure, which greatly raises the material costs of restarting a nuclear role. Additionally, trying to reinstate a nuclear program can entail high domestic costs.[2] Secondly, nuclear weapons have special status in the alliance and are therefore not commensurate with conventional forces, making them more difficult to replace. These two features raise the stakes of nuclear withdrawal in NATO, making allies more likely to pay attention to and resist attempts to renege on these commitments, raising international costs.

Indeed, reneging on nuclear sharing commitments has been rare within NATO. In the 1950s and 1960s, Germany, Turkey, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Canada, and the United Kingdom concluded bilateral agreements that enabled dual-key nuclear sharing with the United States. Despite the Cold War ending, large reductions to the overall number of nuclear weapons in Europe, and the domestic unpopularity of nuclear weapons in host states, only three NATO nuclear hosts – Canada (1972 for NATO; 1984 for NORAD), Greece (2001), and the United Kingdom (mid-2000s) - had all nuclear weapons withdrawn.[3] While reductions have been common, both host states and the United States have been mostly unwilling to unilaterally end their dual-key sharing commitments.[4] For example, the United States

[2]Perkovich, Chalmers, Pifer, Schulte, and Tandler, 2012, p.9.

[3]The status of Turkey is more opaque than other nuclear hosts, as Kristensen and Korda (2021 p.157) speculate that Turkey's nuclear strike role may have been "mothballed" after 2010, although due to the secrecy around these programs, this cannot be confirmed. See also Foradori, 2012, p.292 ft 10; Norris and Kristensen, 2011, p.67. Furthermore, the Trump administration's decision in 2019 to prevent the delivery of the F-35 to Turkey may have implications for retention of its nuclear role, as some of these aircraft "were intended to be used in the nuclear mission" (Kristensen and Korda, 2021, p.57). This move reveals that Turkey's nuclear sharing role had not been completely scrapped, but also puts doubt on its continuity without obtaining F-35s. Lastly, the 2016 attempted coup in Turkey, which resulted in power being cut to the Incirlik base where the nuclear weapons are housed, has increased concerns among American officials and commentators about the security of the nuclear weapons stored on Turkish soil (Kristensen and Korda, 2021, p.57; Lamothe, 2016; Starr, 2016). However, according to the most recent reports, nuclear weapons still remain in Incirlik; however, the overall number of nuclear weapons has been reduced from 50 to approximately 20 B61 gravity bombs (Kristensen and Korda, 2021, p.57).

[4]At the peak of nuclear sharing with NATO, over 7,000 nuclear warheads were stationed in Europe, with 2,000 designated for delivery by the host state. Since that time, there has been a

was reluctant to pull all of its nuclear weapons out of Greece after the military coup in 1967 and after the conflict between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus in 1974, despite concerns about the physical security of the weapons.[5] While the overall number of weapons in Greece were reduced, the Americans did not withdraw all of the nuclear weapons stationed there, "after the State Department warned that removal would further alienate the Greek government from NATO."[6] Similarly, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands have broad anti-nuclear constituencies that support the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from its soil; yet, these states have been reluctant to renege on their nuclear commitments due to the opposition that they face within the alliance and their desire to maintain alliance cohesion.[7]

Canada has been selected out of these three cases of total nuclear withdrawal for several reasons. Firstly, the Canadian cases of reneging and attempted reneging occurred during the Cold War. While the more granular level of insecurity fluctuated, the bipolar confrontation that was the basis for NATO and dual-key nuclear sharing was relevant throughout this time period, providing increased pressure to maintain alliance commitments. For both Greece and the UK, total nuclear withdrawal occurred after the end of the Cold War and before the rise of a significant challenger to the United States. Secondly, the UK, while certainly 'junior' to the United States within NATO in terms of power and prestige, is still considered a major power and has substantial military capabilities, including an independent nuclear arsenal.[8] Lastly, because of the time elapsed since the end of Canada's nuclear roles in NATO and NORAD, there is a large amount of declassified and relevant archival material. This abundance of documentary evidence allows for the use of process tracing to map out the trajectory and outcome of domestic discussions and international negotiations related to reneging.

According to Gerring, deviant cases are most suitable for the generation of new theories and explanations of outcomes.[9] By definition, deviant cases do not fit existing

substantial decline in the number of shared nuclear weapons in NATO. Based on recent estimates, there are approximately 100 American tactical nuclear bombs in Europe. See Kristensen, 2005, p.25; Kristensen and Korda, 2021, p.56; Norris and Kristensen, 2010, pp.66-67.

[5]Kristensen, 2005, p.25.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Blechman and Rumbaugh, 2014; Foradori, 2012, 2013; Franceschini and Müller, 2013; Koster, 2013; Lunn, 2012; Sauer, 2013; von Hlatky, 2014.

[8]Unlike Canada and Greece, the UK still has a nuclear role within NATO through its own nuclear arsenal. Thus, the UK did not face the same equivalency problem as non-nuclear allies that have sharing commitments.

[9]Gerring, 2008, p.656.

theories, revealing a gap in the theoretical understanding of a given phenomenon.[10] The dominance of quantitative studies on alliance reliability and the paucity of research on peacetime alliance defection further points to a theoretical gap within the literature. Quantitative studies are well suited to theory-testing, particularly in determining the generalizability of particular theories. As these studies usually measure the level of correlation between variables, they are less well suited for determining causal mechanisms than methods that can actually 'look inside' the case to trace the relationship between variable and outcome. Quantitative studies are also limited in the types of variables they can test, as their analysis can be restricted by issues of data availability and the feasibility of operationalizing variables. It is therefore likely that particular explanations of reneging have been missed, which further justifies an intensive single-case study.

Through process tracing, I show how and why Canada negotiated out of its nuclear commitments. In so doing, I isolate the variables that explain Canada's shifting nuclear sharing policy over time, as well as what differentiated Canada from the nuclear hosts that have retained their commitments. This case study enables me to make a more generalizable claim about why some allies and not others renege on their commitments, which can be applied to other cases and tested in future studies. My research therefore falls between "explaining-outcome" processes tracing, which explains particular outcomes in particular cases, and "theory-building" process tracing, which establishes more generalizable claims that can be applied and tested in future research.[11]

3.2 Primary Sources

This study draws upon a variety of archival material in order to trace the process of reneging in each relevant case. In order to track Canadian decision-making and internal discussions on nuclear sharing, I consult a large volume of primary sources. Firstly, the records of relevant Cabinet meetings were accessed via electronic copies of the Cabinet Conclusions from 1957 to 1979.[12] While these records are not verbatim accounts of these meetings, many provide detailed information about the content of discussion and identity of the speakers, particularly for the sessions before the early 1970s. Second, I accessed documents from the Clearwater papers, which are a collection of documents about Canada's nuclear weapons sharing program and provide an

[10] Ibid., pp.655-656.
[11] Beach 2017, pp.19-22; Beach and Pedersen, 2013 pp.9-22.
[12] Records after 1979 are not yet available online at the time of writing.

especially valuable source for the debate around nuclear acquisition in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Third, I utilized the Raymont Papers, mainly to understand the decision to renege on Canada's nuclear commitments to NATO. This collection also contained documents related to NATO's bargaining position on this matter. Fourth, collections related to specific administrations such as the L. B. Pearson Papers, the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Papers, Paul T. Hellyer Papers, and the Douglas Scott Harkness Papers were also used. Finally, in order to trace perspective and decision-making of the United States, I consulted primary source material from the Office of the Historian's *Foreign Relations of the United States*, the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, and the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This primary source material is supplemented by secondary source materials such as historical studies, memoires, and collections of interviews.

3.3 The Dependent Variable: Canada's Shifting Nuclear Sharing Policy

Utilizing Canada as a single case study holds static factors constant, meaning that it provides a good basis for testing and generating dynamic theories. This thesis considers the time period between 1957 to 1984, capturing the initial commitment to engage in nuclear sharing to the time when the last nuclear weapon was withdrawn from Canadian soil. I will focus on the administrations of three Prime Ministers: John G. Diefenbaker (1957-1963); Lester B. Pearson (1963-1968); Pierre Elliott Trudeau (1968-1979, 1980-1984).[13]

Canada initially agreed to take on nuclear sharing commitments to NATO and NORAD early into the tenure of John G. Diefenbaker, who led the Conservative Party. Diefenbaker took steps to fulfill this commitment, tying his hands through private promises to allies and public announcements to domestic audiences, as well sinking costs through the procurement of expensive delivery systems that required nuclear weapons and warheads to be militarily effective. However, as time went on, Diefenbaker became increasingly opposed to nuclear acquisition. Frustrated with the delay, American officials tried to intervene by appealing to the Canadian public, which drew further attention to the nuclear issue and led to the collapse of the government. This culminated in an election campaign in 1963 where Diefenbaker rejected bringing

[13]Joe Clark was Prime Minister from 1979-1980, heading a government that collapsed before it could pass a budget. Clark's short tenure is not relevant to the trajectory of Canada's nuclear sharing commitments and therefore will not be discussed in detail here.

nuclear weapons onto Canadian soil and cast doubt on the viability of Canada's nuclear commitments to NATO. However, Diefenbaker and lost this election. At the same time, Lester B. Pearson, the Leader of the Liberal Party, abandoned his previous anti-nuclear stance to run on a pro-acquisition platform and won a minority government in 1963. After taking office, Pearson quickly fulfilled Canada's nuclear commitments and maintained them throughout his tenure. In 1968, Pierre Elliott Trudeau took over as leader of the Liberal Party and as Prime Minister of Canada, winning a majority government in an election shortly thereafter. Trudeau, a long-time critic of Canada's nuclear commitments, called for a reassessment of Canada's defence and foreign policy soon after assuming leadership. As a result of the defence review, Canada withdrew from its nuclear role in NATO, but retained its nuclear interceptors under NORAD. Indeed, Canada remained a nuclear host until the end of Trudeau's tenure, with these weapons withdrawn only in 1984.

There are four instances of reneging and attempted reneging that require explanation within the Canadian case, which are examined in separate chapters.[14] First, Prime Minister Diefenbaker's unsuccessful attempt to withdraw from Canada's nuclear sharing commitments from late 1962 to his electoral defeat in 1963. Second, Pearson's decision to support nuclear acquisition in January 1963, despite a history of opposing nuclear sharing during his time as Leader of the Opposition. Third, Prime Minister Trudeau's successful reneging attempt on Canada's nuclear sharing role in NATO by 1972, which also resulted in a reduction of Canada's conventional commitments to NATO. Fourth, the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Canadian soil in 1984, after Trudeau's aborted attempt to renege on this commitment in the early 1970s.

3.4 Argument

To arrive at the outcome of reneging, leaders face two sequential choices. The first is whether to initiate a reneging attempt or not. Leaders can be deterred by the international or domestic costs of reneging from even attempting negotiations to get

[14] As reneging is defined as the reversal of commitment rather than reduction of commitment, I will only examine cases where Canada attempted to completely withdraw from its nuclear role in NATO or NORAD and not where it merely reduced the weapons systems or nuclear weapons that were assigned to this nuclear role. Moreover, this study is concerned with Canada's nuclear alliance commitments and therefore will not examine the trajectory of the American nuclear weapons that were stationed on Canadian soil that were solely for the use of American forces. Clearwater (1999) provides an in-depth history of the nuclear weapons in Canada for the use of American forces. For analysis of why Canada rejected an independent nuclear arsenal after World War II, see Buckley, 2000.

out of a particular alliance commitment.[15] Increased sensitivity to these costs or the belief that negotiations would ultimately fail should strongly disincentivize leaders from initiating reneging attempts. However, if they decide to proceed with attempting to roll back a commitment, they will then choose what strategy to pursue in terms of how they renege. Leaders within institutionalized alliances have incentives to mitigate the costs of reneging through bargaining with allies. Leaders can try to deflect costs in a variety of ways that can be categorized into two broad strategy types: They can adopt a coercive approach, using threats of further defections to get allies to accept more limited defections; Alternatively, they can adopt a consensus-based approach, seeking allies' approval through inducements and reassurances.

There are risks and benefits to each approach to bargaining. A coercive strategy essentially uses the logic of material costs against status quo allies, where a leader threatens of further alliance instability and reciprocal reprisals if allies do not accept a reduced commitment. Thus, a leader may avoid costs if status-quo allies decide it would be better to accept reneging rather than further endanger the alliance. However, this strategy is risky: if these threats fail and no agreement can be struck, this could have high international and domestic costs. If these alliance tensions spill over into the public sphere, leaders can face high audience costs: allies could easily portray such leaders as damaging their state's reputation and the alliance itself. On the other hand, a consensus-based strategy attempts to mitigate the costs of reneging by signalling commitment to the alliance. Consensus-based strategies include giving allies control or a veto over the commitment restructuring process or offering to take on other commitments to compensate for their defections in other areas.[16] While this strategy risks watering down reneging or having reneging attempts fail, it can mitigate audience costs: a consensus-based approach is more conducive to reinforcing a leader's image as a 'good ally' and obscuring the fact that reneging is taking place.[17]

My argument focuses on how the costs of reneging can vary and how this variation can affect intra-alliance bargaining and the likelihood of reneging success. Much of the alliance reliability literature portrays the costs of reneging as a powerful disincentive for political leaders, making defection a unappealing foreign policy option in institutionalised alliances.[18] Even if reneging is attempted, leaders are expected to adopt

[15]Duffield, 1992; Kreps, 2010.

[16]These inducements can also include flexibility over the time frame of the withdrawal of commitments or agreeing to transform an individual commitment reassessment into an alliance-wide reassessment as a means for gaining alliance-wide consensus.

[17]See Duffield, 1992, pp.840, 847.

[18]For example, Kreps, 2010.

a consensus-building strategy, which may lead to the abandonment or "dilution" of their reneging attempt.[19] However, several studies on domestic audience costs have demonstrated that not all domestic audiences will punish reneging, particularly if they have a strong preference for a given foreign policy outcome.[20] According to this logic, the domestic disincentive to renege should be variable. I argue that, given the potential 'double-edged' nature of reneging, not all domestic policy preferences are created equal when they operate in institutionalized contexts. In the next section, I compare and unpack two different types of coalitions that can have a preference for reneging: nationalist coalitions and single-issue coalitions. Leaders with the support of nationalist coalitions will experience lower audience costs for reneging than those with the support of single-issue coalitions. The type of domestic coalition that supports reneging will affect a leader's decision to attempt reneging, the strategy adopted, and the likelihood of success.

3.4.1 Independent Variable: Domestic Coalition Type

Not all types of domestic coalitions value institutional membership and international reputations for reliability equally. As Catalinac finds in her examination of New Zealand's reneging on its nuclear commitments to ANZUS, this decision was related to domestic concerns about foreign policy autonomy and the sovereignty concerns related alliance membership.[21] In the New Zealand case, refusing port to nuclear armed ships was not framed just as a narrow nuclear issue, but as "a matter of national pride."[22] As a result, New Zealand's Prime Minister and ruling Labour party did not suffer domestic audience costs, even in the face of reprisals from the United States.[23] While Catalinac does not frame her argument specifically in terms of nationalist domestic movements – indeed, she argues that calls for autonomy are related to decreased threat perception – this case highlights the importance of domestic coalition type for explaining reneging.[24] The Canadian case will demonstrate how two types of domestic coalitions that oppose alliance commitments can lead to different outcomes in relation to reneging.

[19]Duffield, 1992, pp.840, 847.

[20]On policy preferences and audience costs, see Chaudoin, 2014b. On other sources of variability of audience costs, see Clare, 2007; Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012; Kertzer and Brutger, 2016; Potter and Baum, 2013; Trager and Vavreck, 2011.

[21]Catalinac, 2010.

[22]Ibid., p.331. By comparison, while Australia also had a "vibrant anti-nuclear movement," it failed to block US nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed vessels (pp.326-327).

[23]Ibid., pp.330-331

[24]Ibid., pp.319-320, 333.

Nationalist coalitions support reneging not solely based on their opposition to particular commitments, but as part of a broader agenda to reorient foreign policy in a way that affirms their state's sovereignty and independence. This emphasis means these coalitions are more likely to be skeptical of multilateral institutions, if those institutions are seen as not directly catering to these national priorities. Nationalist coalitions should therefore be particularly sensitive to the sovereignty costs of alliance membership. Sovereignty costs entail "[t]he potential for inferior outcomes, loss of authority, and diminution of sovereignty" over particular or broad issue areas as a result of institutional membership.[25] In the case of alliances, the main sovereignty cost is having less authority and control over defence policy. In addition to their sensitivity to the sovereignty costs, I show in the empirical chapters that nationalists can perceive material and reputational *gains* from reneging on their alliance commitments. Materially, reneging frees up resources that can be reoriented towards national defense or non-security-related domestic priorities. Reputationally, reneging demonstrates to allies that their leaders will 'stand up' for national priorities and put the interest of the nation first. Leaders backed by a nationalist coalition should be more likely to attempt reneging, more likely to adopt coercive strategies, and more likely to succeed in their reneging attempts

On the other hand, single-issue coalitions, like anti-nuclear coalitions, oppose a particular commitment that their state has taken on, but still value alliance membership and do not fundamentally question its benefits to the state. Therefore, these coalitions still care about the material and reputational costs of reneging, making leaders with the support of these coalitions susceptible to 'double-edged' domestic audience costs. This should make leaders less likely to attempt reneging, more likely to adopt consensus-based strategies, and more likely to ultimately back down from reneging attempts.

While this logic of reneging focuses on domestic audience costs, the maximalist nature of the demands of nationalist coalitions can also be used to deflect or lessen international material and reputational costs. When supported by nationalist coalitions, leaders are able to threaten broader defections and status-quo allies can be concerned about exacerbating nationalist sentiment through threats of punishment for defection. Thus, a leader's ability to deflect domestic audience costs can also translate into an ability to deflect costs at the international level.

[25] Abbott and Snidal, 2000, p.437.

3.4.2 Reneging as a Two-Level Game

This interplay between the international and domestic incentives makes Putnam's two-level game model of international negotiation particularly pertinent for understanding the dynamics of reneging on alliance commitments.[26] Several assumptions provide a foundation for using Putnam's two-level game as a model of intra-alliance negotiation. This model applies to leaders of states within institutionalized relationships – NATO nuclear hosts in particular – that have made the decision to initiate a reneging attempt on a commitment or series of commitments. While a reneging state may have a wide array of grievances with the alliance or institution, it is assumed that some form negotiated settlement is preferable to withdrawing wholesale. It is also assumed that the reneging state still has an interest in minimizing the costs that can be administered by their allies to the greatest extent possible, as well as potential audience costs. In order to do so, reneging state leaders need to negotiate with their allies so that they determine what their allies will tolerate and mitigate negative repercussions.

More generally, Putnam's two-level game model of international negotiation assumes that there are two states that are bargaining over a given issue, each being represented by a chief negotiator or the "national political leader."[27] These individuals must find an agreement that will be accepted not only by the other state at the international level (Level I), but also by their coalition at the domestic level (Level II). Ignoring the preferences of the opposing state(s) or their domestic coalition therefore risks the collapse of a negotiated settlement, either at the bargaining stage (Level I) or the ratification stage (Level II).[28] The domestic realm is especially important, as in order to maintain their position, the chief negotiator depends on a domestic coalition of support.[29] Therefore, a negotiator's 'win-set,' or the range of agreements that they will accept, is largely determined by his domestic coalition at Level II. When the win-sets of both negotiators overlap, an agreement can be struck. According to Putnam, the more constrained a negotiator is at Level II, the smaller

[26]Indeed, as Snyder (2007, 165) notes, bargaining is essential to all forms of alliance management: "Management involves pursuing both common interests and competitive interests and thus is essentially a process of bargaining, either tacit or explicit."

[27]Putnam, 1988, p.434. For a review of how Putnam's two-level game has been applied by researchers, see da Conceição-Heldt and Mello, 2017.

[28]Putnam defines ratification broadly. It does not need to follow a formal procedure and a variety of actors can engage in ratification: "I use the term [ratification] generically to refer to any decision-process at Level II that is required to endorse or implement a Level I agreement, whether formally or informally...The actors at Level II may represent bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social classes, or even 'public opinion'" (Putnam, 1988, p.436).

[29]Putnam, 1988, p.457.

their win-set will be, which increases their bargaining leverage at Level I.[30] However, narrow win-sets increase the risk of deadlock or the complete collapse of negotiations.

Putnam's model is particularly useful for negotiations within institutionalized alliances, as he notes that no agreement does not always mean a reversion to the status quo (i.e., the state retaining its nuclear commitment), but can also involve the risk of a "worsening situation."[31] Once the issue has been launched into Level I negotiations, the reneging leader needs to *agree* to back down to maintain the status quo, meaning that this is an *outcome* of 'successful' negotiation. In terms of nuclear sharing, a 'worsening situation' can encompass anything from diminishing diplomatic or political relations between the allied states, to negative economic repercussions, or even the ejection of the reneging state from the alliance. Reneging statesmen that lack bargaining power are therefore incentivized to moderate their terms or back down when faced with resolved status-quo allies. Likewise, allies may have to tolerate defection in order to placate a dissatisfied state and avoid further reductions or alliance instability. Consequently, having a **credible threat of withdrawal** if demands are not met is an important source of leverage for a reneging state against status quo allies; it represents the degree of tolerance a domestic coalition has of the costs associated with a no-deal. Thus, 'withdrawal' here can mean withdrawal from an alliance or withdrawal from negotiations. If leaders leave negotiations without a deal, there is a risk that they may still decide to renege without tacit approval of allies, which may result in more severe reductions to commitments than a negotiated settlement.

While Putnam's two-level conceptualization implies that negotiations occur sequentially between Level I (negotiation) and then Level II (ratification), Putnam makes it clear that this is more of an idealization "for the purposes of exposition" rather than a firm rule of international agreements.[32] Putnam argues that negotiation between domestic actors will likely occur prior to Level I "to hammer out an initial position for the Level I negotiations."[33] This stage, pre-negotiation Level II policy

[30]Ibid., p.440.

[31]Ibid., p.442. Eichenberg (1993, p.46), in his application of the two-level game to NATO's INF posture, highlights the importance of reaching an agreement "on important issues within a valued international institution" like NATO. He argues that political leaders have unique incentives to reach an agreement in these contexts due to the domestic audience costs associated with failure and the "potential source of general domestic support" associated with "international agreement" (Eichenberg, 1993, p.46). He finds that under these circumstances, the *narrowing* of domestic win-sets can actually lead to agreements being struck, because both parties value maintaining good relations within the alliance to the chief negotiator's preferred foreign policy outcome.

[32]Putnam, 1988, p.436.

[33]Ibid.

formulation, is particularly important for reneging states, as this is when the chief negotiator will attempt to build the domestic coalition that will support their policy. The extent to which the pre-negotiation Level II stage provides leverage in negotiations depends on the coalition's **willingness to act unilaterally** or set out firm positions that have been effectively pre-ratified at the domestic level before entering Level I. On the other hand, if the leader does not tie their hands domestically in this pre-negotiation stage, or binds themselves to a consensus-based decision, they will lose leverage in Level I negotiations vis-à-vis their allies.

It is also important to note that win-sets are not necessarily static and can be "restructured" in a variety of ways.[34] For example, the election of a new government can also affect a state's bargaining position, if the new government depends on a different domestic coalition for support. Furthermore, foreign political leadership can directly appeal to domestic actors in the opposing state in the hope of widening the other's win-set or promoting a particular negotiated outcome. A reneging state's **vulnerability to restructuring** by foreign allies is therefore another important source of leverage in negotiations.

In the most abstract version of this model, I assume that these negotiations are essentially bilateral, involving the reneging state and a status quo-oriented actor, either a particular ally or representing the alliance itself. In the context of this two-level game, nuclear withdrawal is a form of a renegotiation of a given state's alliance contributions or 'commitment set.' I also assume that there is only one state that wants to reconfigure its alliance contribution at one time. The initiator state wants to change the status quo to lessen their alliance contribution, while the other state is assumed to want to preserve the status quo to the greatest extent possible. The bargaining range is the totality of a given state's potential contributions to the alliance that will be accepted by both parties.

3.4.3 Coalition Type and Leverage

Single-issue coalitions have specific demands in relation to their state's alliance commitments. Within the context of nuclear sharing, the primary goal would be to remove nuclear weapons from the host's soil. Single-issue coalitions do not question their state's overall role in NATO and still value alliance membership. There is no risk that the reneging state will leave the alliance, making it difficult for its leader to threaten punishment if their demands are not met. It is more likely that

[34]Ibid., p.454.

leaders with the backing of single-issue coalitions will attempt to achieve a consensus decision within the alliance, fearing the domestic and international reputational and audience costs they might face if they reneged coercively. Finally, because these coalitions are more sensitive to allied reactions and opposition, they are more vulnerable to restructuring. Thus, leaders with the backing of these coalitions are more likely to apply consensus-based negotiation strategies. The weakness of single-issue anti-nuclear coalitions explains why states like Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, despite their broad anti-nuclear constituencies that would support withdrawal, continue to host nuclear weapons.

In contrast, nationalist coalitions have substantially more bargaining power. These coalitions see value in forging an independent foreign and defense policy, emphasize domestic priorities, and see the alliance as being fundamentally misaligned with national interests. Under these conditions, a coercive bargaining strategy becomes more domestically viable. Chief negotiators can more credibly threaten to pull out of the alliance or negotiations if their demands are not met to a sufficient degree, as a nationalist coalition is unlikely to ratify any agreement that is too close to the status quo. Limited reductions, or nuclear withdrawal, can be more credibly framed as a compromise outcome, especially if the reneging state is willing to retain more important commitments within the alliance. As they are more likely to see defence priorities as national rather than collective, these coalitions are also more likely to favour unilateral declarations of policy before Level I negotiations have begun, which increases their bargaining power. Finally, a nationalist coalition is less vulnerable to restructuring influences, as they are more likely to see these attempts as unwarranted foreign intrusions, which may intensify their demands. A skillful chief negotiator can effectively use nationalist demands as leverage to push their state's renegotiated commitment set away from the status quo. I expand on this pathway to reneging in the empirical chapters that will follow.

3.4.4 An Example of Leverage: Single-Issue vs Nationalist Coalitions

To elucidate the variation in leverage of anti-nuclear and nationalist coalitions when faced with an ally that wants to maintain the status quo, I show how the differences their relative preference orderings[35] can affect the outcome of negotiation. Here, one

[35]The preference ordering of each Level II coalition is related to, but conceptually distinct from, the win-set at Level II, which contains the commitment 'packages' that would be ratified at the domestic level. Some of the items included in the preference ordering may not be viable for ratification. Win-

can see what options are eliminated from the bargaining range by virtue of changes within a political leader's coalition.

The status quo ally's first choice is for the reneging state to back down and to maintain their level of commitment to the alliance. However, a smaller reduction in commitment is preferable to a large reduction in commitment, while a large reduction is preferable to a complete withdrawal from the alliance. Therefore, the preference ordering of a status quo ally is:

Status Quo > Limited Reductions > Major Reductions > Leave Alliance

If the chief negotiator of the reneging state is supported by an anti-nuclear coalition, their demands on reductions are narrowly focused on the state's nuclear commitments. These groups have no interest in fundamentally restructuring their state's position within the alliance. This coalition still values alliance membership and therefore would prefer no change to the status quo over major reductions or leaving the alliance:

Limited Reductions > Status Quo > Major Reductions > Leave Alliance.

Finally, a nationalist coalition's first preference would be broad reductions in the level of alliance commitment. This coalition contains actors that are skeptical of alliance membership and want their country to move away from multilateral defence commitments in order to reorient defence policy towards more national or domestic priorities. Some level of reductions is preferable to leaving the alliance outright, meaning that there is some maximum level of commitment that the coalition would accept. However, for nationalist coalitions, the status quo is untenable and leaving the alliance is preferable to no reduction in commitment:

Major Reductions > Limited Reductions > Leave Alliance > Status Quo[36]

With a status quo ally and an anti-nuclear coalition, the bargaining range is limited to the status quo and limited reductions:

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sets contain more specific and concrete outcomes or agreements, while preference orderings involve more general and abstract outcomes.

[36]It is possible for nationalist coalitions to be more extreme in their demands: Major Reductions > Leave Alliance > Limited Reductions > Status Quo. Furthermore, it is also possible for nationalist coalitions to be more moderate in their demands, such as Limited Reductions > Major Reductions > Leave Alliance > Status Quo or Major reductions > Limited Reductions > Status Quo > Leave Alliance or Limited Reductions > Major reductions > Status Quo > Leave Alliance. In the latter two cases, where alliance withdrawal is off the negotiation table, the credible threat of withdrawal can be understood as either the withdrawal from negotiations or further withdrawals of commitment from the alliance.

Status Quo Ally:

Status Quo > Limited Reductions > ~~*Major Reductions > Leave Alliance*~~

Single-Issue Coalition:

Limited Reductions > Status Quo > ~~*Major Reductions > Leave Alliance*~~

The chief negotiator of the reneging state has little leverage from their domestic coalition under these conditions. There is no risk that the reneging state will leave the alliance, making it difficult for its leader to threaten withdrawal or punishment if their demands are not met. Counterintuitively, having more moderate defection demands becomes an 'all or nothing' scenario, with no middle ground between the two parties. Because the anti-nuclear domestic coalition still values alliance membership, there is still potential for political leaders to face domestic audience costs if nuclear withdrawal is framed as undermining the state's position within the alliance or alliance cohesion overall. For these reasons, leaders will seek the approval of their allies through a more consensus-based mode of bargaining, which dilutes their bargaining power.[37] Similarly, these costs make anti-nuclear coalitions vulnerable to restructuring attempts by allies through such framing attempts. Overall, these factors make nuclear withdrawal an unlikely outcome.

The German attempt to renege on its nuclear sharing commitments in 2009 shows how these more limited demands can work against nuclear withdrawal. In 2009, the political parties CDU, CSU, and FDP signed a coalition agreement that explicitly called for the removal of nuclear weapons from Germany, which was an unprecedented step towards withdrawal among the NATO retainers.[38] However, this pledge "did not lead to tangible disarmament steps."[39] Instead, NATO reaffirmed the status quo of its nuclear posture twice: in the 2010 Strategic Concept and after the conclusion of the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review in 2012.[40] Germany upgraded its dual-capable fighter jets, extending its life until 2024 and pledging 250 million euros for the modernization effort, pushing the decision down the road.[41]

Why did the initial moves towards reneging fail? The effort to remove nuclear weapons from Germany was championed by Guido Westerwelle, the foreign minister

[37] See Duffield, 1992.
[38] Sauer and van der Zwaan, 2012, p.90.
[39] Davis and Jasper, 2014, p.15.
[40] Ibid., p.20; Sauer and van der Zwaan, 2012, p.82.
[41] Berger, 2012.

and leader of the FDP.[42] His base of support for nuclear withdrawal was rooted in the broad anti-nuclear sentiment within the German population.[43] The relevant clause to nuclear sharing within the coalition agreement carefully appeals to this single-issue base; it reaffirms Germany's support for the alliance, while calling for nuclear withdrawal: "...we will advocate within the Alliance and with our American allies the removal of the remaining nuclear weapons from Germany."[44] Therefore, in the pre-negotiation phase, the German government only promised to advocate for, rather than deliver, nuclear withdrawal. By seeking a multilateral, consensus-based approach to the issue, Germany gave other members of the alliance veto power over its nuclear status. Since France and other members of NATO strongly object to any moves towards nuclear withdrawal, the status quo prevailed.[45]

On the other hand, the reneging state gains leverage when it is backed by a nationalist coalition. This scenario is analysed in detail in Chapter 6, which discusses Trudeau's reneging on Canada's nuclear commitments to NATO:

Status Quo Ally:

~~*Status Quo*~~ > ***Limited Reductions > Major Reductions*** > ~~*Leave Alliance*~~

Nationalist Coalition:

Major Reductions > Limited Reductions > ~~*Leave Alliance > Status Quo*~~

Under this scenario, some level of reductions becomes a more likely outcome of negotiations. Chief negotiators can more credibly threaten to pull out of the alliance or withdraw from negotiations and renege unilaterally if their demands are not met, as their nationalist coalition is unlikely to ratify any agreement that is too close to the status quo. Because of this credible threat of withdrawal, status quo allies are forced to reconsider their preferred outcome and the scope of negotiations encompasses the extent of reductions that both sides can tolerate. Leaders are also more likely to lock themselves into a reneging position during the pre-negotiation phase, which appeals to nationalist and unilateral sentiments, and makes it more difficult for these leaders to back down in Level I negotiations. This coalition is less vulnerable to restructuring, as they are more likely to see these attempts as unwarranted foreign influence, which may intensify their anti-commitment demands.

[42] Davis and Jasper, 2014, p.24.
[43] Ibid., pp.24-26.
[44] *The Coalition Agreement Between the CDU, CSU, and FDP*, 2009, p.143.
[45] Horovitz, 2014; Sauer and van der Zwaan, 2012, p.82.

In this scenario, the size of the win-set, amount of bargaining power, and the acceptance of 'no deal' outcomes operate differently to what Putnam posits. According to Putnam, narrow win-sets should be associated with increased tolerance of no deal, giving negotiators more bargaining power at Level I.[46] However, reneging skews this logic: anti-nuclear coalitions have less bargaining power than nationalist coalitions despite the fact that their win-sets are narrower. In this case, the tolerance of no deal (i.e., the credible threat of withdrawal) is not related to win-set size. Indeed, in cases of reneging, increased win-set size can represent an increased ability to threaten further reductions if a deal is not struck. This discrepancy relates to the type of international negotiation that the two-level game is applied to. Putnam is concerned with how international commitments and agreements are contrived. All of his examples relate to the production or development of international cooperation. In contrast, I focus on how commitments are reduced or wound down. Thus, for a negotiator that seeks to renege or defect on commitments, a larger win-set can represent a lower 'floor' for reductions, providing them with more bargaining power against status-quo allies.

Having introduced my theory that links domestic coalition type to reneging, I now consider alternate explanations. Examining and ruling out alternate explanations is necessary to demonstrate that a new theory is needed to explain reneging in the case of Canada's nuclear sharing commitments. The first set of explanations consider the importance of systemic sources of leverage in intra-alliance negotiations: the Realpolitik model and Snyder's theory of intra-alliance bargaining. I show that both of these theories struggle to explain the variation in the Canadian case.

3.5 Alternate Explanation: Realpolitik Model

The basis for this explanation is drawn from realist understandings of alliances and nuclear sharing. According to realists like Mearsheimer and Walt, alliances are formed in response to threats and should adapt or collapse based on their strategic value.[47] This view of alliance commitment aligns with Fuhrmann and Sechser's and Schofield's texts on nuclear sharing. These scholars argue that the causes of nuclear sharing are related to the maximization of security of donors and, to a lesser extent, hosts.[48]

[46]Putnam, 1988, pp.440, 442.

[47]Mearsheimer, 1994; Walt, 1987. Catalinac (2010) argues that threat fluctuation in threat *perception* should lead domestic efforts to seek greater autonomy within alliances, highlighting the importance of systemic variables. However, as I will argue below, the causal direction between lowered threat perception and domestic calls to renege is unclear.

[48]Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014; Schofield, 2014.

Furthermore, some scholars have argued that dual-key nuclear sharing arrangements still have strategic or military value within NATO, which explains why these commitments have been retained after the end of the Cold War.[49] Under this logic reneging and defection should occur when systemic pressures fall below a certain threshold. According to this model, the process of bargaining is not theoretically relevant: the outcomes of negotiations should optimize the alliance's strategic posture.

Waltz has argued that neorealist theory is ill suited to explain or predict particular foreign policy outcomes; instead, it should only be applied to general trends in international politics.[50] While states may seek survival and balance against powerful challengers, the specifics of how these tendencies play out on the international stage is beyond the scope of neorealism. As he argues in *Theory of International Politics*, "balance of power theory... does not tell us why state X made a certain move last Tuesday."[51] Surely, Waltz would argue that mapping the changes in Canada's nuclear sharing posture qualifies as the theoretical examination of foreign policy and not international politics.

Nevertheless, there can be 'realist' theories of foreign policy, as long as they place a sufficient degree of causal weight on systemic factors.[52] A neorealist approach to reneging, which only takes into account systemic factors and no domestic intervening variables, provides a parsimonious theory of defection that can be tested, that I refer to as the Realpolitik model. The Realpolitik model predicts that changes in foreign policy relating to alliance commitment should primarily be based on changes in the international system or the distribution of capabilities. Allies should be seeking to maximize their power or security through their alliance commitments, dropping them if they no longer provide strategic value. Four factors will be emphasized here: changes to balance-of-power, changes to balance-of-threat, changes to geostrategic value of nuclear host countries, and the military value of particular weapons systems.[53]

[49]Kroenig, 2016; Suchy and Thayer, 2014; Yost, 2009.

[50]Waltz, 1979, 1996.

[51]Waltz, 1979, p.121.

[52]Carlsnaes, 2013; Elman, 1996.

[53]The internal stability of the host state should also determine its nuclear posture. Although this technically a unit-level factor, it still fits into the Realpolitik model, as stability is only important insofar as it affects the security and usability of the tactical nuclear weapons. Both the United States and the hosts should try to ensure that these weapons do not fall into the hands of actors that may use these weapons for purposes that may undermine their security (Schofield, 2014). Instability can involve the likelihood of theft by non-state groups or of the violent overthrow of the government of the host state. While the Canadian government and military considered in 1967 the threat of Quebecois separatist attempts "to steal a warhead" or cause violence around nuclear bases in Quebec, these concerns were ultimately dismissed and no extra safety precautions were taken at that time (Clearwater, 1998, p.211).

The first set of hypotheses for reneging applies Waltz's concept of the balance-of-power and Walt's concept of the balance-of-threat to nuclear sharing in NATO.[54] States will balance against other states based on their relative capabilities and hostile intentions.[55] If a rival state becomes weaker or one's own alliance becomes stronger, certain capabilities may no longer be necessary to ensure one's security and may even be too costly to maintain. As the perceived intentions of states change, rivals may become less threatening, which can also lead to the redundancy of certain capabilities. Thus, nuclear commitments could be withdrawn based on changing power and threat dynamics. On the other hand, new threats may emerge over time, while old threats dissipate within the international system. This means that nuclear host states can lose their geostrategic value as threatening states are located farther away from their territory. Indeed, Fuhrmann and Sechser argue that one of the primary purposes of nuclear sharing is the projection of power.[56] If hosts no longer provide a viable platform to project the donor's or alliance's power, nuclear weapons may be withdrawn.

While the discussion above treated nuclear commitments as part of the aggregate capabilities of NATO, the next set of explanations relate to their specific military functions. Since these weapons are costly to maintain, they should not be deployed if they are not useful in some kind of tactical military scenario, otherwise they may lose their value as deterrents as well.[57] Thus, as weapons become obsolete, they should be withdrawn. Modernization can also lead to reductions in the number and kinds of weapons that are deployed abroad.[58] Withdrawal should be more likely if there are cost-effective conventional alternatives to the nuclear options deployed in host states. In both of these cases, withdrawal should occur close to the end of the service lives of the weapons involved.

I demonstrate that there is a link between an individual's assessment of these strategic variables and their support for reneging or retention of commitments. However, these differences did not affect the outcomes observed. Status-quo supporting officials in Canada and in allied states believed that the international system was threatening, and that Canada's nuclear weapons were a valuable means of combating those threats.[59] On the other hand, officials that supported reneging in Canada of-

[54]Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987.
[55]Ibid.
[56]Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014.
[57]Kamp and Remkes, 2011, p.79.
[58]See Foradori, 2013; Futter, 2011, p.549.
[59]Simpson, 2001.

ten justified this stance by highlighting that the Canadian nuclear contribution was marginal to security, that these weapons had little military value, or that the international situation was easing.[60] The empirical chapters will show that the latter did not win over the former because they were convinced that systemic pressures had eased.

Indeed, when strategic concerns were present, they were often used to support domestic agendas rather than the other way around. For example, during his 1963 campaign, Diefenbaker emphasized the concerns around the efficacy and accuracy of the Bomarc but not the CF-101s. Yet, he was calling for reneging on nuclear sharing in its entirety, rather than merely scrapping the dubious Bomarc. However, despite the doubts about its accuracy and military utility, Pearson agreed to retain the Bomarc as part of Canada's nuclear sharing role. Trudeau also invoked strategic factors when justifying his call to reduce Canada's commitment to NATO. However, in a later interview he noted that the decision to halve its forces was "arbitrary," based on concerns related to his domestic coalition and alliance politics rather than strategic optimization.[61] The Realpolitik model only provides a plausible explanation for reneging for one case: the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Canadian soil in 1984. The decline of the level of international threat, the obsolescence of the weapons systems, and the availability of conventional alternatives explain why Canada reneged on its nuclear role in NORAD.

3.6 Alternate Explanation: Snyder's Theory of Intra-Alliance Bargaining

Like the Realpolitik model, Snyder also highlights the importance of systemic factors. Unlike the Realpolitik model, for Snyder, outcomes of intra-alliance negotiations are not simply the product of security optimization, but are related to relative bargaining power between actors. Like my theory of domestic coalition type, Snyder highlights the role of a credible threat of withdrawal or breakdown of the alliance.[62] However, a significant point of divergence between these two theories is the locus of bargaining power. My theory focuses on the domestic level. For Snyder, the relevant variables exist at the system and state level, with the domestic level mostly black-boxed within

[60] Ibid.

[61] Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.378.

[62] According to Snyder (2007, 168), threats of defection and withdrawal "even if mostly implicit or existential, are perhaps the most important tactical source of bargaining power."

the analysis.[63]

Three variables affect the amount of bargaining power an ally has relative to the other members in its alliance: dependence, commitment, and interests. I examine each of these factors in turn. According to Snyder, "a state's bargaining power will be greater, the lower its dependence, the looser its commitment, and the greater its interests at stake."[64] Snyder's theory is couched in general terms and applies to intra-alliance bargaining scenarios beyond reneging, but its application to reneging can be extrapolated. By his logic, a state should be more likely to renege when it has a high degree of bargaining power relative to its allies. To approximate relative bargaining power, Snyder assigns a three-point score to each of these variables to "arrive at a composite indicator of [a given ally's] bargaining power."[65] Allies with a higher score have more bargaining power and are more likely to "stand firm even at considerable risk of breakdown" of negotiations, while those with a lower score have less bargaining power and are more malleable.[66] The outcome of negotiations depends on the relative bargaining score of each side: a wide difference in bargaining is likely to result in the higher scoring state's favour, while a narrow difference should result in "compromise."[67]

Next, I apply the level of dependence, commitment, and interests to the Canadian case in order to test the viability of Snyder's theory in explaining its fluctuating nuclear commitment policy. [68] I conclude that while some of Snyder's concepts are relevant to the Canadian case study, his theory of intra-alliance bargaining does not provide additional causal weight over and above my theory of domestic coalition type.

3.6.1 Dependence

Throughout the time period under study, Canada was overwhelmingly dependent on the United States for the provision of security. According to Snyder, dependence is related to a state's need to rely on allies for security, the extent that a particular ally or alliance provides security, and the availability of alternate means for providing

[63]While the 'interest' variable could relate to domestic politics, it is narrowly defined as the level of interest in the particular issue that is being negotiated.

[64]Snyder, 2007, p.166.

[65]Ibid., 175.

[66]Ibid.

[67]Ibid.

[68]Snyder (2007, p.166) explicitly includes "the sharing of preparedness burdens in peacetime" as one of "the most prominent issues in intra-alliance bargaining." Therefore, this theory of intra-alliance bargaining power directly pertains to the issue of nuclear sharing.

security.[69] While Snyder notes that level of dependence is not directly equivalent with relative military capabilities, the yawning power imbalance is clearly relevant for understanding Canada's dependent position.[70] Canada has a small military force, large landmass, and is geographically proximate to the United States. This means that it relies on the United States for many core security needs and is also unlikely to seek an alternative alliance. One could argue that, as Canada is geographically separated from the main operations of NATO, Canada is more dependent on NORAD than NATO for the provision of its core security needs. Therefore, Canada has more bargaining power against NATO than NORAD, explaining why reneging occurred only in the former case in the early 1970s. However, deducing the relative dependency of Canada on each of these alliances is far from straightforward. NATO provided an essential security function for Canada by keeping the Cold War cold: any outbreak of hostilities in Europe would carry with it the likelihood of escalation to a global conflict. Furthermore, it is unclear if one can separate these two alliances in terms of Canada's relationship with and bargaining power over the United States. It is also important to highlight that Canada's nuclear sharing commitments, while integrated within NATO as well as NORAD, resulted from a bilateral agreement with the United States. The empirical chapters demonstrate that the United States was involved in the negotiations on Canada's nuclear commitments at each stage and provided clear signals that it opposed reneging on these commitments. This shows that Canada's relationship with the United States could not be easily separated from its relationship with NATO. If, despite these caveats, one still wishes to separate NATO from NORAD in terms of scoring the dependency of Canada and therefore its relative bargaining power, issues still remain in explaining Canada's fluctuating nuclear policy. [71] Canada's greater dependency on NORAD than NATO is a static variable throughout this time period. Canada would always have greater relative bargaining power against NATO; therefore, it cannot explain the timing of reneging. Furthermore, Diefenbaker's reneging attempt in 1963, which was primarily aimed at Canada's nuclear commitments to NORAD, is difficult to explain with this theory. Finally, according to Snyder's index, Canada's higher dependency score would likely

[69]Ibid., p.167. While Snyder (2007, p.166) acknowledges that dependence can be broadly defined to include "a wide range of values in addition to military security," such as "prestige" and "domestic stability," he focuses primarily on military dependence. Even if one expanded the concept of dependence, Canada's dependence on the United States extended beyond the military realm as well, including the provision of status, cultural, economic, and political benefits.

[70]Ibid., p.167.

[71]Snyder (2007, p.168) highlights that the notion of dependency should be understood in relative terms, as mutually dependent allies could not easily make credible threats of withdrawal.

be offset by NATO's higher interest in Canada's nuclear commitments, which will be discussed further below. As the empirical chapter on Trudeau and NATO shows, both Canada's conventional and nuclear contributions to the Central Front were considered by strategic planners within NATO to have high military value; reductions to these commitments would leave a substantial gap that would need to be filled.[72]

3.6.2 Commitment

Given the level of formalisation and institutionalisation involved in NATO and NORAD, as well as the alignment of their core security interests, Canada, the United States, and other allies in NATO are scored as having equally high degrees of commitment to their alliances. According to Snyder, increased levels of commitment undermine the credibility of threats of withdrawal.

3.6.3 Interests

Finally, a state's interests in a particular issue can also affect their bargaining power.[73] A state that is highly invested in a particular outcome is likely to have more clout in negotiations than a state that has only a lukewarm stake in the issue.[74] In each instance of attempted reneging or withdrawal, Canada has a high interest in the nuclear sharing issue, as it directly influences their security, sovereignty, and material investment in its alliances. The act of attempting to renege on a commitment indicates a high degree of interest in the issue, given the potential costs associated with the initiation of negotiations.

For the United States and the rest of NATO, their level of interest is less easily determined. Firstly, Snyder is unclear as to whether interest is a relative or absolute concept. For example, the United States' interest in stationing nuclear weapons in Canada in the early 1960s could be conceivably construed as low if one compares it with alliance issues that are more directly related to the Soviets, such as the Berlin Crisis. However, as I will show in Chapter 4, President Kennedy and other key members of his administration were increasingly frustrated by Diefenbaker's unwillingness to make good on his nuclear commitments, saw the failure to deploy nuclear weapons on Canadian soil as a security gap, and took a keen interest in trying to resolve the impasse.[75] If one takes a relative view of interest, one would argue that the American

[72]DHH, RP, 2530, 19 July 1969.
[73]Snyder, 2007, p.170.
[74]Ibid., p.171.
[75]See, for example, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol.XIII, Doc.426, 3 August 1961.

interest in this issue was low. If one takes an absolute understanding of interest, it was clear that the Americans were actively vested in the outcome of negotiations, and one could argue that they had a moderate level of interest. Secondly, given that the nuclear sharing issue directly affects alliance military capabilities, there is some overlap between dependence and interests in this case. A state that is more dependent on an ally for security is also likely to be more interested in the particular issue under discussion, when it directly involves the means of providing that security.

3.6.4 Relative Bargaining Power: Canada, the United States, and NATO

This section applies Canada's relative bargaining power against the United States and NATO according to Snyder's three-point scale. In each of these cases, Canada has a score that is only within one point or tied with each of these actors. When bargaining with the United States over nuclear weapons sharing, Canada would have a dependency score of 1 (high), a commitment score of 1 (high), and an interest score of 3 (high). The United States would have a dependency score of 3 (low), a commitment score of 1 (high), and an interest score of 1/2 (low to moderate), depending on how one weighs its relative interest in the Canadian nuclear issue. Canada's total score would be 5, while the United States would have a score of 5 or 6. When bargaining with the rest of NATO, Canada would have a lower dependency score of 2 (moderate), a commitment score of 1 (high), and an interest score of 3 (high). NATO would have a dependency score of 1/2 (high to moderate), a commitment score of 1 (high), and an interest score of 2/3 (moderate to high). Canada would have a score of 6 in these negotiations and NATO would have a score of 5, regardless of how one evaluates the importance of the Canadian contribution. [76] In both scenarios, according to Snyder, the relatively close scores between allies would be expected to lead to an outcome of "compromise" rather than one state dominating over the other.[77] How does this prediction square with the outcomes observed and the conduct of negotiating allies? Trudeau's successful reneging attempt on Canada's nuclear commitment and substantial reduction of its conventional commitments provides a straightforward case of defection and reneging. As I explain in Chapter 6, Trudeau refused to compromise on Canada's nuclear commitment, insisting on total

[76] As noted before, the dependency score and the interest score are related: their scores depend on how one evaluates the military value and necessity of Canada's nuclear and conventional contribution to NATO. The more dependent they are on Canada's military commitments, the more interested NATO would be in these negotiations.

[77] Snyder, 2007, p.175.

withdrawal by 1972 despite the objections of NATO and the United States. Despite the closeness in relative bargaining power scores, the Canadian government's conduct in negotiations seems to better fit with Snyder's predictions about states with wide gaps in bargaining power, with the Canadian government largely "stand[ing] firm" on their priorities and "threaten[ing] credibly to cause breakdown if it did not get its way."[78] Canada succeeded because negotiators could credibly threaten withdrawal when bargaining with the United States and NATO, which caused them to back down and accept Canadian defections.

If Canada's bargaining power was not so strong according to Snyder's calculus, why did it behave as if it was dominant? One possible explanation can be found in Snyder's theory, which highlights the fact that it is not the objective measures of bargaining power that matter, but rather opposing allies' perception of their relative power. Snyder assumes that negotiators would "have a better idea of the interests and dependence of their own state than those of the allied state."[79] States therefore have "incentives to deceive" in order to try to achieve better bargaining outcomes, by convincing their allies they are less dependent or more interested than they actually are.[80] However, neither the United States nor NATO were under the impression that Canada was not dependent on them for security; Canada's defections and conduct were baffling to them for this very reason. There is no evidence that the Canadian government misrepresented their level of interest, so the outcome in this case cannot be traced down to misperception.

Having exhausted the variables that Snyder presents in his theory, it is clear that the domestic level needs to be accounted for in order to explain why Canada reneged on its nuclear commitments to NATO, which will be explored in detail in Chapter 6. I show that Trudeau's bargaining power in these negotiations was related to the nationalist coalition that supported him, which enabled defection on conventional commitments and reneging on nuclear commitments. It was this domestic level factor that gave Canada a credible threat of withdrawal.

3.7 Excluding Plausible Dynamic Theories

Finally, I rule out plausible dynamic theories that fall outside of the intra-alliance negotiation framework. These theories are rejected using simple comparative analysis; essentially, I show that the independent and dependent variables in the Canadian case

[78]Ibid.
[79]Ibid., p.176.
[80]Ibid.

do not correspond to the theory's predictions. This section examines five plausible alternative explanations. The first two were discussed in the previous chapter as dynamic explanations of reneging: leadership turnover and elections. While these theories will ultimately be rejected, both contain insights about the importance of shifting constituencies and coalitions in explaining defection. The next three theories are not taken from the literature on alliance commitment, but instead are explanations of foreign policy that could plausibly explain reneging: the role of political parties, the role of international norms, and the role of the beliefs of leaders.

Leadership turnover. Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago argue that leadership turnover should provide a pathway to reneging, as new leaders are more likely to have different preferences than their predecessors, leading to different perspectives and priorities.[81] They would not be beholden to the constituencies of the old leadership and likely face lower audience costs for reneging.[82] Therefore, a new leader should correspond with reneging. Pearson's abandonment of nuclear withdrawal is particularly puzzling from this perspective. In 1963, leadership turnover led to the *fulfillment* of Canada's nuclear commitments, rather than reneging. Pearson decided to support nuclear acquisition, despite his and the Liberal Party's previous opposition to nuclear acquisition and appeals to anti-nuclear constituencies. This theory also encounters difficulty in explaining both Diefenbaker's and Trudeau's inconsistent decision-making trajectory. Diefenbaker attempted to renege despite the fact that he had made the commitments to NATO and NORAD only a few years before. Trudeau had clear anti-nuclear preferences and made promises during his 1968 leadership and electoral campaign to reassess Canada's defense commitments. Yet, this only resulted in Canada reneging on its NATO nuclear commitments, while its NORAD nuclear interception role was retained until 1984.

Elections. Tago, on the other hand, argues that elections themselves, rather than leadership turnover, are the driver of defection from alliance coalitions.[83] He argues that incumbents who face "a challenger that opposes an international commitment, may announce the termination of the ongoing commitment policy to counter the opposition parties' campaigns."[84] According to his theory, incumbents will "reverse an unpopular commitment to win national election" and found that leaders were more likely to announce the withdrawal of their forces from the Coalition of the Willing

[81] Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, 2015, p.646.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Tago, 2009.
[84] Ibid., p.225.

during election months.[85] While the 1963 and 1968 electoral campaigns in Canada are significant to my study, Tago's theory does not provide much insight into Canadian decision making. Firstly, while Diefenbaker's stance on reneging crystalized during his election campaign in 1963, he was not incentivized by a challenger who was critical of maintaining Canada's nuclear commitment. In fact, Pearson had announced his support for nuclear acquisition shortly before the collapse of the Diefenbaker government. On the other hand, incumbent Diefenbaker *did* face pressure to reverse his stance on nuclear sharing during the 1962 election, when Pearson was still supporting an anti-nuclear platform. Yet, during 1962, Diefenbaker chose not to announce his intention to renege, nor did he make Canada's nuclear commitments a major feature of his campaign. Second, while Trudeau promised a review of national defense and a reexamination of Canadian security commitments during the 1968 campaign, he only announced a "planned and phased reduction" of its commitments to NATO almost a year later.[86] The precise nature of this reduction was only specified several months after this announcement. While it could be argued that Trudeau aimed to fulfill an electoral promise, the announcement and specification of the reductions to Canada's commitments were not election-winning tactics, as Tago envisions. Moreover, while there was a sense across the political spectrum during the 1968 campaign that Canada needed to reexamine its defense commitments, Canada's specific nuclear sharing commitments were not a central feature of the campaign and did not come under particular scrutiny.

Partisan shifts in government. Another possible explanation could examine the partisan shifts in the Canadian government over the course of this time period. While there are multiple parties with seats in Parliament and some wield political influence, the government has been dominated by two parties: The Liberals and the Conservatives. They fall along a traditional left-right axis, with the Liberals being a center-left party and the Conservatives being a center-right party. Since conservative or right-wing voters have been theorized to have greater sensitivity to "sovereignty costs" and are less trusting of multilateral institutions than those on the left, governments led by right-wing or conservative parties should be more likely to renege on their alliance commitments.[87] While the prediction that right-leaning parties should be

[85]Ibid., pp.225, 230.

[86]DHH, RP, 2109, 3 April 1969.

[87]Rapport and Rathburn, 2020, pp.1-2, 3-4. This article examines the role of party ideology on the institutional design of alliances, rather than on the likelihood of defection. However, the proposition that right-leaning parties and individuals should be more sensitive to sovereignty costs should also have implications for reneging.

more sensitive to these costs maps on well to Diefenbaker's reneging attempt, as well as Pearson's reluctance to alienate allies, this theory fails to explain Trudeau's trajectory. Despite being a member of the left-leaning Liberal Party, Trudeau drew upon nationalist rhetoric and alliance-skepticism in order to justify reneging on Canada's nuclear and conventional commitments to NATO in the early 1960s. While domestic coalitions and politics are significant for explaining reneging, the divide between the left and the right does not appear to be deterministic in this case. Instead, focusing more directly on nationalist coalitions that would be most sensitive to sovereignty costs provides an explanation that transcends the traditional left-right split.

The NPT. A systemic norms-based theory would focus on the emergence of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. Some scholars have highlighted the watershed nature of the NPT, referring to the time period after its passage as the "second nuclear age."[88] The NPT is significant because it provided a formal international proscription against nuclear proliferation, providing a clear-cut norm and legal principle against the spread of nuclear weapons.[89] Canada was an early signatory to the treaty and ratified it in January 1969. It is possible, therefore, that the passage of the NPT and the debate around the spread of nuclear weapons led to an anti-nuclear "norm cascade" within Canada that empowered Trudeau to reject Canada's nuclear commitments.[90] However, this theory cannot explain why Trudeau withdrew from his NATO commitments by 1972, yet retained nuclear weapons on Canadian soil until 1984, as these were the weapons that were most problematic for anti-nuclear activists. In addition, under Trudeau, the debate around the withdrawal of Canada's nuclear commitments to NATO and NORAD centered more around the merits of the alliances themselves rather than the NPT or anti-nuclear ideals. In the early 1970s, when the NPT was invoked in Cabinet, it was to *justify* the retention of Canada's nuclear-armed interceptors:

> In contrast to the situation in 1963 [when nuclear weapons were acquired], the non- proliferation treaty is now in effect and Canada conforms to the provisions of that treaty whereby countries other than the existing nuclear powers can have nuclear weapons on their territory only under a two-key system of control.[91]

[88]Solingen, 2007, p.3.
[89]Ibid., Robinson, 2015, pp.60-61.
[90]Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p.895.
[91]Senator Paul Martin in LAC, CC, 2001, 15 July 1971.

In other words, it was thought that the NPT did not apply to nuclear weapons that were shared under dual-key. This statement suggests that the passing of the NPT may have relieved some normative pressure on Canadian political elites, as it divorced the concepts of nuclear proliferation and nuclear sharing.

Leaders' anti-nuclear beliefs. Finally, norms can also operate at the individual level. Regardless of the systemic tolerance of nuclear sharing or nuclear weapons, leaders' personal anti-nuclear beliefs could explain the variation in reneging. The role of individual leaders is especially pertinent to the Canadian case because of the high level of executive power concentration and largely majoritarian democratic structure.[92] Indeed, Chapter 6 will show that Trudeau's personal anti-nuclear beliefs played a role in his support for reneging on Canada's nuclear commitments. However, his opposition to nuclear weapons does not explain why he backed down from reneging on Canada's nuclear role in NORAD in 1971, despite his consistent opposition to nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. Furthermore, the role of personal anti-nuclear beliefs is even more puzzling for explaining the actions of Pearson and Diefenbaker. While Pearson is considered to have betrayed his principled stance on disarmament and nuclear weapons by supporting acquisition in 1963, Diefenbaker did not have deeply rooted anti-nuclear beliefs and had an ambivalent relationship with the anti-nuclear movement.[93]

3.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, I presented my case study: Canada's shifting nuclear sharing commitments to NATO and NORAD during the Cold War. I showed that Canada was a deviant case for reneging, as it has many static characteristics that should encourage reliability: it is a democracy, a junior alliance member, and a member of two highly institutionalized alliances. Nevertheless, there is substantial variation on the dependent variable. I demonstrated that the dual-key nuclear sharing provides a useful starting point for analysis, as the historical trajectory of nuclear sharing commitments in other NATO host states has largely conformed to institutionalist expectations. Due to the amount of time that has elapsed since the end of Canada's nuclear sharing commitments, a large amount of formerly classified archival material is now available. This allows for in-depth process tracing. This case is therefore particularly well suited for generating a new theory of reneging on alliance commitments.

[92] Studlar and Christensen, 2006.
[93] McMahon, 2009.

In the empirical chapters that follow, I will show that reneging is related to the domestic coalition that supports defecting on commitments. In this chapter, I have outlined two primary types of coalitions that oppose alliance commitments: nationalist coalitions that have broad agendas to distance their country from an alliance and single-issue coalitions that seek to disengage from a particular commitment rather than the alliance as a whole. For leaders of single-issue coalitions, the double-edged logic of reneging applies; it is likely to be a costly activity, even if the commitment under scrutiny is unpopular. Leaders with single-issue support will have little leverage in international negotiations because of this vulnerability to domestic audience costs. They will have no credible threat of withdrawal, be expected to seek consensus, and will be vulnerable to restructuring attempts. Nationalist coalitions, on the other hand, are not subject to the same structure of costs. Because nationalist coalitions value their state's independence over their allies and see material and reputational gains from defection, leaders will be less vulnerable to domestic costs and have more leverage in intra-alliance negotiations. They will have a credible threat of withdrawal, have the ability to act unilaterally and coercively, and will have low vulnerability to restructuring. For this reason, leaders with nationalist backing for reneging should be more likely than those with anti-nuclear coalition to attempt to renege and more likely to succeed when they do.

In order to demonstrate the value added of a new theory, this chapter has also considered and ruled out established theories that could explain reneging in this case. I demonstrated that systemic sources of leverage, leadership turnover, elections, partisanship, global anti-nuclear norms, and individual anti-nuclear beliefs do not provide an adequate explanation for the variation that is observed. However, my theory does not represent the only pathway to reneging for all cases. Indeed, I show that the final instance of withdrawal is best explained by strategic optimization, or what I call the 'Realpolitik model.'

4

Case Study 1: John G. Diefenbaker

> *"The full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads... It is our intention to provide Canadian forces with modern and efficient weapons to enable them to fulfill their respective roles."*
>
> – Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, February 20 1959[1]

> *"We oppose the spread of the nuclear club. We will not acquire nuclear weapons for our forces in Canada so long as there is hope East and West can come together for an acceptable disarmament."*
>
> – Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, May 30 1962[2]

> *"We are not going to accept [the] role for Canada of nuclear ammunition dump nor will we be [a] decoy target... I want Canada's decisions [to] be made in Canada. I want Canada strong not subservient."*
>
> – Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, April 3 1963[3]

This chapter explores the shifting nuclear sharing policy of the Diefenbaker administration (1957-1963). Early in his tenure as Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker committed Canada to a nuclear sharing role in NATO and NORAD. These commitments involved tying hands through public and private statements in support of acquisition, as well as formal agreements. Diefenbaker also shored up Canada's nuclear commitments through sinking costs by purchasing weapons systems that required nuclear warheads to be militarily effective. By the end of October 1962, Diefenbaker firmly opposed the stationing of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil in peacetime. Yet,

[1]DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)a.

[2]DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)b.

[3]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 5 April 1963. Quoted from speech extracts that were sent to Secretary of State.

the Prime Minister still sought a consensus-based solution that would allow him to retain the image of a 'good ally.' During the election in the spring of 1963, however, Diefenbaker openly embraced reneging and pursued a nationalist coalition. Canada, Diefenbaker claimed during the campaign, would not be "a dumping ground for nuclear warheads."[4] He also implied that Canada's nuclear role in NATO would no longer be necessary in the near future.[5]

As discussed in previous chapters, material, reputational, and audience costs should dissuade leaders from reneging on commitments and from making commitments that they do not intend to keep. Studies on audience costs suggest that domestic populations punish their leaders for inconsistency, viewing them as incompetent and as damaging national reputation if they make commitments only to break them.[6] According to the polls available to the government at the time, a majority of Canadians supported nuclear acquisition throughout Diefenbaker's administration.[7] Members of Diefenbaker's party, the Progressive Conservatives, also largely supported acquisition throughout this time period. Strategic conditions also seemed to encourage acquisition: Cold War tensions dramatically increased after the Berlin Crisis in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, underscoring the need for Canada to shore up its alliance commitments. Accordingly, the United States strongly pressured Canada to acquire nuclear weapons for its forces in both NORAD and NATO.

All these factors should have discouraged reneging; yet, as time went on, Diefenbaker's reluctance to follow through on his commitments increased. First, he delayed decision making. Next, he sought a compromise with the United States to keep nuclear weapons off Canadian soil. Finally, he ran a nationalist campaign that cast the United States as encroaching on Canadian sovereignty, where the rejection of nuclear weapons was a central feature. Thus, the central puzzles of this chapter are: Why did Diefenbaker make nuclear commitments, only to attempt to renege a few years later? Why did Diefenbaker first attempt a consensus-based approach only to switch to an antagonistic and nationalist campaign in 1963? And why did his attempts to renege fail?

[4]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 13 March 1963a.

[5]Ibid. "Now, there is a doubt whether that [NATO] strike-reconnaissance role should be continued, in view of the recent Nassau declaration concerning nuclear arms."

[6]Fearon, 1994, pp.580-581; Levy, McKoy, Poast, and Wallace, 2015, pp.997-999; Smith, 1998; Tomz, 2007, pp.835-836.

[7]Gallup Canada Inc., March 1963. This Gallup poll asked, "Just from what you know, or have heard, in your opinion should Canada's armed forces be armed with nuclear weapons or not?" 58% responded 'yes,' compared to 37.8% 'no.'

While some scholars attribute Diefenbaker's actions to a pathological inability to come to a decision, Patricia McMahon argues that Diefenbaker's vacillations were based on political calculation.[8] Diefenbaker was worried that acquiring nuclear weapons would provide force to Canada's growing anti-nuclear movement and, by extension, to the anti-nuclear Liberal opposition.[9] While Diefenbaker himself did not identify with this anti-nuclear sentiment, he feared it.[10] Furthermore, several members of his Cabinet, including the influential Secretary of State for External Affairs Howard Green, were strongly opposed to nuclear acquisition. Rather than deal with the political fallout of a controversial decision, Diefenbaker delayed and obfuscated his position. Through this lens, Diefenbaker was not indecisive, but trying to keep both the pro- and anti-nuclear factions within his coalition on side through a straddle strategy.[11]

Nevertheless, Diefenbaker could not delay a decision forever. By not forcing a consensus at the elite level and allowing both sides to become more entrenched in their positions, Diefenbaker needed a political compromise to satisfy these opposing positions on nuclear sharing. As the anti-nuclear coalition did not oppose membership in NORAD or NATO, focussing on the presence of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil was the only way out. Diefenbaker eventually supported the 'standby' and 'missing part' proposals, which would mean that nuclear weapons would not be brought onto Canadian soil until an impending emergency. Effectively, settling the nuclear issue in this way would amount to reneging on the NORAD commitment, while fulfilling Canada's commitment to NATO. However, Diefenbaker hoped to mask this through a consensus-based approach. If the United States agreed, he could credibly claim to domestic audiences that he had fulfilled his commitments.

The Prime Minister's negotiating position was undermined by three critical factors related to the anti-nuclear nature of his coalition: the need for a consensus-based solution, the lack of a credible threat of withdrawal, and its vulnerability to restructuring. First, Diefenbaker adopted a consensus-based approach to reneging in order to reduce costs and satisfy both the pro- and anti-nuclear factions. More practically, Canada could not unilaterally impose a standby or missing part arrangement: it required the support of the United States. Second, the reliance on an anti-nuclear coalition undermined any threat of withdrawal if the United States did not accept this compromise. The Americans knew that a substantial portion of the public and

[8]McMahon, 2009.
[9]Ibid.
[10]Ibid.
[11]Ibid.

Cabinet supported nuclear acquisition and would not tolerate a public rebuke from a trusted ally, meaning Diefenbaker could not walk away from negotiations easily. Finally, because of this vulnerability, the United States used their own dissatisfaction with Diefenbaker's unreliability to attempt to restructure Canada's bargaining position.

The Americans' restructuring attempt had desired and unintended consequences. On the one hand, it directly contributed to the collapse of Diefenbaker's government, setting the scene for an election that would substantially alter Canada's negotiating position in the Americans' favour. By calling out Diefenbaker's attempt to renege, the United States undercut the pro-nuclear elements of the Prime Minister's already wobbly coalition and damaged his reputation domestically. However, this clear attempt at American interference also provided the impetus for Diefenbaker to form a nationalist coalition, which opposed nuclear sharing as a means of asserting Canadian sovereignty and independence. If Diefenbaker had won this election with a nationalist coalition that supported reneging, he would have been in a more advantageous position to withdraw from Canada's nuclear commitments.

This chapter shows that leaders with the support of anti-nuclear coalitions will face considerable constraints when attempting to renege on commitments. Caught between demands to withdraw from a specific commitment while still appearing to support the alliance as a whole, leaders will either try to delay decision-making or seek allied approval. However, due to the threat of audience costs if they do not gain allied approval, a reneging leader's bargaining power will be constrained.

The threat of nationalism was salient in this case. Indeed, Diefenbaker's electoral performance demonstrates the potential of nationalist domestic coalitions. Many voters were attracted to this nationalist messaging and supported reneging on these grounds. Nevertheless, Diefenbaker's effort to construct a nationalist coalition was too late for him to attract enough support to retain his Premiership. While the Americans dismissed the potential threat of an anti-nuclear backlash to nuclear acquisition, they consistently worried about how nationalist sentiment within Canada might affect its reliability. They adopted a cautious approach after Diefenbaker tried to appeal to nationalist sentiments.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, the political context in which Diefenbaker came to power is described. Next, Canada's nuclear commitments to NATO and NORAD are detailed. I establish that Diefenbaker committed himself by tying hands through public and private statements and sinking costs through the purchasing of delivery systems that required nuclear arms to be maximally effective. The third part

of this chapter demonstrates that Diefenbaker delayed finalizing acquisition until 1962 due to his concerns about growing anti-nuclear sentiment. Delaying a decision was part of a straddle strategy intended to keep the anti- and pro-nuclear elements in his coalition onside. The fourth section explores Diefenbaker's failed attempt at reneging. The first stage occurred in November 1962, when negotiations with the United States to finalize the nuclear sharing agreement were restarted after years of delay. At this time, Diefenbaker continued his straddle strategy, attempting to minimize costs by adopting a consensus-based approach that would keep nuclear weapons off Canadian soil while appearing to keep its commitments. Diefenbaker's bargaining power was undermined by his anti-nuclear coalition and the American's belief that he could not credibly form a nationalist coalition. After a restructuring attempt by the State Department, Diefenbaker switched strategies and directly appealed to a nationalist coalition in support of reneging. This next stage of Diefenbaker's reneging strategy encompassed the 1963 campaign. While Diefenbaker was ultimately punished for his waffling and unreliability at the ballot box, there is evidence that his nationalist strategy mitigated the effect of reneging-related audience costs for some voters. Diefenbaker's nationalist appeals also affected the behaviour of the United States, deterring them from further attempts at restructuring.

4.1 Background

Throughout its history, control of the Canadian government has alternated between Canada's two primary political parties: center-left Liberal Party and the center-right Conservative Party. The Canadian government had been the domain of the Liberal Party for over two decades before, concurrently winning five elections. Diefenbaker and the Conservative Party's victory in 1957 represented an emergence from the political opposition that had previously defined Diefenbaker's career and the party's standing in Parliament.[12] While the Conservatives had won only a minority government in 1957, they quickly cemented their position by calling another election in 1958. This was a landslide victory for Diefenbaker. With 208 seats out of 265, Diefenbaker's majority was the largest in Canadian history at that time.[13]

Diefenbaker's rise also coincided with a resurgence of nationalism[14] and anti-

[12]McKercher, 2016, p.6.

[13]This victory was only surpassed in 1984, where Brian Mulroney and the Conservatives won a majority of 211 seats.

[14]The nationalism that will be discussed throughout this dissertation is English Canadian nationalism, focusing on the pride and place of Canada as a country, which is distinct from the Quebecois nationalist and separatist movement.

Americanism within Canadian politics.[15] Diefenbaker's 1957 campaign was distinctly nationalist in character, accusing the rival Liberals of seeking "to make Canada into "a virtual 49th economic state." "[16] As McKercher observes, this campaign marked the end of the "postwar lull in Canadian anti-Americanism."[17] This anti-American streak within Canadian nationalism has old roots: the United States' preeminent position and geographical proximity always represented a threatening force that also served as a critical binding agent for Canadian society.[18] In the 1940s and 1950s, this feeling "abated somewhat" in the face of military cooperation during WWII and an influx of American investment within the Canadian economy.[19] However, by the end of the 1950s, anxieties related to American economic, cultural, and political dominance were on the rise again, in part fuelled by these closer economic ties.[20] Diefenbaker's appeals to Canadian distinctiveness and promises to lessen dependence on the United States therefore tapped into historical as well as contemporary undercurrents of Canadian politics.[21]

History, or rather, historians, have not been kind to Diefenbaker.[22] He is often portrayed as a petty and indecisive individual, who let perceived personal slights drive his policies; as being paralyzed when faced with a difficult or unpopular decision; as a nationalist and populist that needlessly antagonized relations with Canada's closest ally, the United States.[23] However, he was also noted as an effective campaigner, passionate orator, and "strong believer in the sanctity of human rights."[24] What is clear is that domestic considerations and public opinion were at the forefront of

[15]The distinction between Canadian nationalism and anti-Americanism is often blurred and an in-depth analysis of this important distinction is beyond the scope of this study. However, many scholars have explored the link between Canadian nationalism and anti-Americanism, see McKercher (2016, pp.11-14) for discussion and citations.

[16]Diefenbaker in McKercher, 2016, p.12. At the time, Alaska and Hawaii had not yet become states.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid., p.11.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid., p.12.

[21]Ibid., p.11.

[22]According to McKercher (2016, p.6), "Overwhelmingly, studies of Diefenbaker are unfavourable. He was, apparently, a "renegade in power," a "rogue Tory," and "a bit megalomaniacal, so paranoid, and almost certainly a bit mad." "

[23]According to McMahon (2009, p.xii), "Words such as "inept" and "indecisive" are routinely employed to describe his [Diefenbaker's] behaviour [on the nuclear issue], and "Why Diefenbaker dithered" could easily have been the title of this book."

[24]McKercher, 2016, p.157; Bothwell, 2007, p.135. Diefenbaker is noted for supporting "South Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth over apartheid and gave Canada a Bill of Rights" (McKercher, 2016, p157).

Diefenbaker's decision-making calculus, even for matters of foreign policy.[25] While Diefenbaker's nuclear policy was characterised by inconsistency and indecisiveness, he still made difficult policy decisions over the course of his tenure that he believed would be unpopular.[26] For example, after protracted waffling, Diefenbaker eventually authorized the cancellation of the Canadian-made Arrow interceptor aircraft, despite knowing that it would lead to the loss of thousands of jobs and would be a massive blow to the Canadian aircraft industry.[27] He also rashly decided to peg Canada's currency to the American dollar in the midst of the 1962 electoral campaign, which precipitated an economic crisis.[28] Diefenbaker's fiery rhetoric could also make way for the realities of government: early in his tenure, Diefenbaker promised to shift 15% of Canada's trade from the US to the UK.[29] However, this proposal never got off the ground.[30] Indeed, "ultimately the Tories proved largely unwilling or unable to take action against American economic interests in Canada," as this would be too costly to be practical policy.[31]

In many ways, Diefenbaker was a classic 'Cold Warrior' and a strong supporter of the Western Alliance.[32] He was not a neutralist, nor did he identify personally with the growing anti-nuclear and disarmament movements in Canada.[33] During international crises such as the Berlin Crisis, Diefenbaker supported the United States, even during the Bay of Pigs fiasco, when Canadian public opinion was against the Americans.[34] In this respect, his cool attitude towards the Americans during the Cuban Missile Crisis was somewhat of an outlier.[35] However, Canada and the United States parted ways in some of their Cold War dealings. While maintaining his anti-Soviet stance, Diefenbaker was pragmatic about Canada's economic relationships with Communist states and did not fully cut trade with Cuba and China.[36]

[25]See McKercher, 2016, pp.6-7; McMahon, 2009, pp.28-29.

[26]Indeed, on the nuclear sharing issue, Bothwell (2007, p.178) notes that early in his tenure, "Diefenbaker was not hesitant on taking decisions or making commitments" related to nuclear weapons and defence, which will be discussed in greater detail below.

[27]See Story and Isinger, 2007. However, Diefenbaker delayed the decision until after the 1958 election, see McMahon, 2009, p.17.

[28]See McKercher, 2016, pp.141-144.

[29]Ibid, pp.22-24.

[30]McKercher (2016, p.23) bluntly refers to it as a "dud."

[31]Ibid., p.24.

[32]Ibid., p.13.

[33]Ibid.; McMahon, 2009, p.x.

[34]McKercher, 2016, pp.66-68, 149.

[35]Ibid., p.149.

[36]Ibid., p.15.

4.2 Canada's Nuclear Commitments

4.2.1 Tying hands: Public and Private Commitments

This section will show that, while the formal agreement to acquire nuclear weapons was not concluded until after Diefenbaker's defeat in 1963, Diefenbaker agreed to the principle of nuclear acquisition early into his tenure. According to Fearon, leaders tie their hands by "creating audience costs" at the domestic or international level.[37] Diefenbaker tied his hands primarily through public pronouncements, but also through formal agreements relating to Canada's nuclear sharing commitments. With these, he committed himself at the domestic and the international level to the principle of nuclear sharing, laying the groundwork for audience costs if he reneged.

The Americans first broached the prospect of nuclear sharing with Canada in January 1956, albeit informally. During this time, the government was headed by Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent and the Liberal party. American officials were hoping to secure the use of Canadian soil and airspace for the storage and deployment of nuclear-armed aircraft or missiles for the interception of Soviet bombers that would come through the north.[38] Anticipating pushback stemming from concerns over sovereignty and control, American officials indicated that they would be willing to train Canadian military personnel to use these weapons.[39] Thus, a nascent framework for nuclear sharing and joint control was proposed by the Americans. The St. Laurent government did not come to any final decision or make any firm commitments. The question of whether Canada should acquire nuclear weapons was therefore a decision for the Diefenbaker government alone.

The decision to join NORAD was also taken by the Diefenbaker government. The NORAD agreement committed the United States and Canada to the joint protection of North American airspace.[40] While this agreement did not specify nuclear weapons acquisition, it provided the framework for cooperation between the United States and Canada on the surveillance and protection of North American airspace, meaning that the detection and interception of Soviet bombers in Canadian airspace was a priority. The Americans hoped that Canada would accept nuclear sharing, as they believed

[37]Fearon, 1997, p.70.

[38]DHH, CP, 98/15-89, 10 January 1956; DHH, CP, 98/15-89, 11 January 1956; DHH, CP, 98/15-89, 16 March 1956.

[39]DHH, CP, 98/15-89, 12 March 1956. One of the biggest sticking points that was anticipated by the Americans was on the question of custody, as American law did not allow for custody of nuclear weapons to be transferred to non-American nationals.

[40]McKercher, 2016, p.26.

that arming the Canadian military with nuclear weapons would ensure rapid and effective interception of Soviet bombers that penetrated North American airspace.[41]

At the same time, NATO was also increasing its strategic reliance on nuclear weapons. In May 1957, the importance of nuclear weapons for NATO defence was enshrined in the documents MC 14/2, which outlined NATO's strategic concept, and MC 48/2, which specified measures for the implementation. These documents laid the foundation for nuclear stockpiling and nuclear sharing in Europe, as they called for a rapid and nuclear response to Soviet attacks.[42] Diefenbaker participated in his first NATO meeting in December 1957, where these documents were approved. Diefenbaker endorsed these documents and the principle of nuclear stockpiling in Europe. According to Simpson, his words at the meeting and approval of nuclear stockpiling "implied his agreement to the concept of nuclear weapons for Canadian air and land forces in Europe."[43] In fact, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe's (SHAPE) planning guidance for 1958 shows that NATO expected that Canada would acquire nuclear weapons, recommending nuclear-armed missiles and fighter-bombers for Canadian forces in Europe.[44] The Canadian government saw these actions as significant, as well. In a Cabinet discussion in December 1960, the Cabinet agreed that,

> in the discussion at the N.A.T.O. meeting this month, Canadian Ministers should recognize that the government has agreed, at the meeting in December 1957 and at other times, and is morally bound, to supply Canadian forces under N.A.T.O. command equipped and ready to use nuclear weapons if and when they are necessary.[45]

This shows that the government perceived itself as tying its hands through these formal measures.

Diefenbaker did more than simply agree to the principle of nuclear sharing in private: he publicly declared this commitment. The Prime Minister announced his government's intentions to acquire nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in the House of Commons on February 20th 1959. The public nature of the announcement and Diefenbaker's confident tone about the military necessity of nuclear acquisition

[41]FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol.VII, Pt.1, Doc.293, 30 December 1958; FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol.VII, Pt.1, Doc.296, 5 March 1959.
[42]Simpson, 2001, p.102.
[43]Ibid.
[44]Ibid., p.103.
[45]LAC, CC, 20550, 6 December 1960.

demonstrated the government's favorable attitude towards nuclear sharing and belief that it would fulfil these commitments. This speech therefore further tied the government's hands to nuclear sharing:

> The full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads. The government is, therefore, examining with the United States Government questions connected with the acquisition of nuclear warheads for Bomarc and for other defensive weapons for use by the Canadian forces in Canada and the storage of warheads in Canada. Problems connected with the arming of the Canadian Brigade in Europe with short range nuclear weapons for NATO's defence task are also being studied.
>
> We are confident that we shall be able to reach formal agreement with the United States on appropriate means to serve the common objective. It will of course be some time before these weapons will be available for use by Canadian forces.[46] The government, as soon as it is in the position to do so, will inform the House, within the limits of security, of the general terms of understanding which are reached between the governments on this subject.
>
> ...
>
> It is our intention to provide Canadian forces with modern and efficient weapons to enable them to fulfill their respective roles.
>
> ...
>
> We must reluctantly admit the need in present circumstances for nuclear weapons of a defensive character.[47]

Overall, these statements are vaguer on the subject of Canada's nuclear commitments to NATO than to NORAD. Only the Bomarc missiles are specified, which would be stationed on Canadian soil. However, contained within this message was a ringing endorsement of the principle of nuclear sharing. It also set the expectation at the domestic level that these commitments would be fulfilled. The fact that Canada's nuclear sharing commitments were public knowledge, as well as the strength of Diefenbaker's endorsement, would later come back to haunt him at the ballot box when he tried to reverse these commitments.

[46]While this aspect of the statement can be seen as a hedge, it also reflects the fact that the weapons systems would only become available and ready to be armed with nuclear warheads in several years.

[47]DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)a.

4.2.2 Sinking Costs: The Delivery Systems

The Canadian government committed themselves further by obtaining four weapons systems that required nuclear arms to be maximally effective: the Bomarc and the CF-101 for NORAD and the CF-104 and the Honest John for NATO.[48] The government made these purchases with the understanding that they could only be justified by nuclear acquisition. Therefore, they knowingly sunk costs during this period to shore up their commitment to nuclear sharing by spending millions of dollars on specialized equipment.

The Bomarc missile became the centre of domestic furor around Canada's nuclear commitment by the end of Diefenbaker's tenure. However, the Cabinet's initial decision to purchase the Bomarc in September 1958 was relatively smooth and uncontroversial. The Canadians acquired the Bomarc B anti-bomber missile, which could only be armed with a nuclear warhead, as no conventional warhead was produced for this weapons system.[49] Diefenbaker later claimed that he had thought the Bomarc that had been purchased by Canada could be effective with either a conventional or nuclear warhead. From this perspective, buying the Bomarc did not represent a firm commitment to bring in nuclear weapons.[50] However, his statements in the House of Commons indicate that he knew that a nuclear warhead was necessary to make the Bomarc effective. On January 18th, 1960, the Prime Minister stated, "Eventually Canadian forces may require certain nuclear weapons if Canadian forces are to be kept effective. For example, the Bomarc anti-aircraft missile to be effective would require nuclear warheads."[51] Indeed, the nuclear capacity of the Bomarc missile was

[48]For a detailed technical history of these weapons systems, see Clearwater, 1998.

[49]The weapons system that the government purchased was the Bomarc B, as opposed to the Bomarc A, which could be fitted with a conventional warhead. The Bomarc A was discussed by Cabinet on February 6th 1960, where the Minister of Defence laid out the differences in ranges between the Bomarc A and B (LAC, CC, 19406, 6 February 1960). However, Cabinet records more consistently refer to either the Bomarc B specifically or directly mention the Bomarc's nuclear capability. On May 3rd 1960, the Cabinet records show that the Cabinet specifically discussed the Bomarc B, indicating that they knew which missile they would receive: "Improvements in air defence – Bomarc B missile and launching bases" (LAC, CC, 19734, 3 May 1960). On December 6th 1960, the Cabinet records show again that Ministers knew that the Bomarc B missile would only be effective with a nuclear warhead (LAC, CC, 20550, 6 December 1960; See also: LAC, CC, 22826, 23 August 1961; LAC, CC, 22829, 25 August 1961). Nuclear weapons were thought to be more effective than conventional arms for anti-bomber interception due to their larger blast radius and ability to totally destroy the Soviet bombers, preventing the triggering of "dead man fuses" at lower altitudes (Simpson, 2001, pp.103-104; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 19 December 1961; LAC, CC, 22826, 23 August 1961).

[50]Simpson, 2001, p.104.

[51]DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)a. Simpson (2001, p.104) also cites Diefenbaker's February 1959 speech, which explicitly refers to the efficacy of nuclear arms.

discussed in Cabinet and viewed as an asset by some Ministers, due to its strategic utility and cost-effectiveness.[52]

The decision to acquire the CF-101 Voodoo aircraft, also for an anti-bomber interception role, came considerably later: in June 1961, after a protracted period of domestic and international negotiation.[53] Citing fear of domestic backlash, Diefenbaker ensured that the purchase of the CF-101s would not be formally or publicly tied to nuclear acquisition, much to the disappointment of the Americans.[54] However, records show that the Prime Minister was aware that the aircraft's military effectiveness was tied to nuclear armament and that the Americans expected them to be nuclear-armed, despite dropping the formal provision from the agreement.[55] In a meeting with President Kennedy about the CF-101 deal in May 1961, Diefenbaker promised to shore up domestic support for nuclear sharing across Canada, reassuring American officials that he expected "that in a few months, the decision could be taken."[56] After the Americans agreed to provide the aircraft without a prior commitment on nuclear weapons, Diefenbaker "indicated [to Merchant] he believed matter would work out as he and President desired."[57] Thus, in public, Diefenbaker was cautious about nuclear commitment that was tied to the acceptance of the CF-101. In private, there was recognition among both American and Canadian officials that

[52]LAC, CC, 17438, 28 August 1958.

[53]LAC, CC, 22558, 12 June 1961. For the extensive Cabinet discussions on whether and how to acquire this weapons system, see also: LAC, CC, 9397, 4 February 1960; LAC, CC, 19406, 6 February 1960; LAC, CC, 19491, 8 March 1960; LAC, CC, 19931, 4 July 1960; LAC, CC, 19973, 15 July 1960; LAC, CC, 30378, 16 July 1960; LAC, CC, 20034, 9 August 1960; LAC, CC, 20078, 12 August 1960; LAC, CC, 20098, 17 August 1960; LAC, CC, 20129, 31 August 1960; LAC, CC, 20136, 6 September 1960; LAC, CC, 20165, 12 September 1960; LAC, CC, 20200, 16 September 1960; LAC, CC, 20219, 20 September 1960; LAC, CC, 20222, 21 September 1960; LAC, CC, 20238, 28 September 1960; LAC, CC, 21993, 19 January 1961; LAC, CC, 22173, 25 February 1961; LAC, CC, 22190, 2 March 1961; LAC, CC, 22299, 30 March 1961; LAC, CC, 22490, 23 May 1961; LAC, CC, 22530, 6 June 1961; LAC, CC, 22548, 9 June 1961.

[54]LAC, CC, 22558, 12 June 1961; JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General Rostow Memorandum 5/16/61 and related materials 5/61-5/63, 17 May 1961; JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 5/15/61-5/30/61, 23 May 1961.

[55]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General Rostow Memorandum 5/16/61 and related materials 5/61-5/63, 17 May 1961; JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 5/15/61-5/30/61, 24 May 1961. The Canadians also accepted the aircraft without modifications, so that it still had the capability of carrying nuclear rockets, see JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 5/15/61-5/30/61, 28 May 1961a. Furthermore, the agreement made a distinction between which kinds of armaments could be transferred to Canada. According to a telegram to the Secretary of State this distinction was made for the eventually of nuclear acquisition: "Purpose of distinction is to preserve basis for later furnishing other armament (i.e., nuclear weapons) title to which would not be transferred and would not be subject to cost sharing" (JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 5/15/61-5/30/61, 28 May 1961b).

[56]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General Rostow Memorandum 5/16/61 and related materials 5/61-5/63, 17 May 1961.

[57]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 5/15/61-5/30/61, 23 May 1961.

nuclear weapons would eventually be obtained for this aircraft.

Canada agreed to acquire two nuclear weapons systems for NATO in the 1950s. Like the Bomarc, these were relatively uncontroversial decisions within Cabinet. The decision on the CF-104 was related to the growing obsolescence of the F-86, the previous aircraft to the Canadian Air Division in NATO.[58] The replacement aircraft fulfilled The Supreme Allied Commander Europe's (SACEUR) recommendation that the Canadians take on a nuclear strike and reconnaissance role.[59] While some Ministers worried that this strike role would amount to an offensive nuclear role, the Cabinet adhered to the Minister of Defence's recommendation and purchased the CF-104.[60] Records show that this aircraft had also been specifically designed to take on a nuclear role. This was brought to the attention of Cabinet in December 1960 by an unnamed minister, who noted that "the CF-104 would have to be redesigned to take a conventional weapon."[61] In 1960, the government agreed to obtain the Honest John rocket for its infantry brigade in Germany.[62] The Honest John could be armed with a conventional or nuclear warhead, but Ministers noted that equipping this rocket with a conventional armament would undercut its effectiveness.[63]

Diefenbaker and his Cabinet therefore knew that these weapons systems would eventually require nuclear weapons for them to be maximally effective. Some Cabinet Ministers even explicitly referenced the binding nature of sinking costs in August 1961:

> Some said that Canada was, in effect, committed to obtaining nuclear weapons when the decisions were made to procure the Bomarcs, the Honest John missiles and the CF-104s. These weapons were known to require nuclear weapons to be fully effective in the roles assigned to them.[64]

By buying these weapons systems, the government had knowingly created momentum that pushed them towards acquisition.

[58]LAC, CC, 18528, 19 June 1959. According to the Minutes the Minister of National Defence stated, "In addition to being obsolete as an interceptor, the F-86 was not capable of performing the strike/reconnaissance role."

[59]Ibid.

[60]Ibid.

[61]Ibid. He also noted that "It had to be remembered that these weapons [the CF-104, the Bomarc, and the Honest John] would be virtually ineffective without nuclear warheads... conventional warheads were not being produced for the BOMARC II. The Honest John could be fitted with a conventional H.E. warhead."

[62]Simpson, 2001, p.109. Initially, Cabinet agreed to obtain the Lacrosse II missile in October 1958, also knowing that the Lacrosse would require nuclear arms (LAC, CC, 17541, 15 October 1958; Simpson, 2001, p.109). However, due to the "complexity of the Lacrosse system," the government decided to change to the Honest John missile instead (Simpson, 2001, p.109).

[63]LAC, CC, 19591, 31 March 1960; LAC, CC, 20550, 6 December 1960.

[64]LAC, CC, 22829, 25 August 1961.

Additionally, purchasing these weapons systems had a knock-on tying hands effect. If the government appeared to be wasting public funds by buying weapons systems that they would not or could not effectively arm, they would incur domestic audience costs. This pressure only increased as these weapons systems became operational. As one Minister warned during a Cabinet meeting in December 1960:

> The CF-104s would start coming off the assembly lines towards the end of 1961 and the BOMARC would be ready about the same time. If a decision were not made soon, the government would be acutely embarrassed by having very expensive but virtually useless equipment on its hands.[65]

Sinking costs also opened the government up to international audience costs by deepening Canada's commitment and its allies' expectations that it would be fulfilled. The hesitation in concluding an acquisition agreement after agreeing to buy these weapons systems was especially bewildering for American officials. The American Ambassador to Canada, Livingston T. Merchant, highlighted this tension in Canada's partial fulfilment of their commitment in a telegram to the State Department, where his frustration was palpable: "[the] question [of nuclear acquisition] has been stalled on dead center despite fact Canadian Armed Forces have now taken delivery substantial quantities expensive military hardware which next to useless without nuclear tips."[66]

Thus, while Canada did not sign a formal nuclear sharing agreement, the government had made a substantial effort to bind itself to its nuclear commitments through hand-tying and cost-sinking measures. These measures were mutually reinforcing in increasing both domestic and international expectations that Canada would acquire nuclear weapons. This amounted to a partial fulfillment of this commitment. At this level of commitment, Diefenbaker could expect substantial international and domestic costs if he attempted to renege on these promises.

4.2.3 Alignment Over Joint Control

The particulars of how these nuclear weapons would be administered or 'shared' would become a major stumbling block for negotiations. This section shows that

[65]LAC, CC, 20550, 6 December 1960. See also: LAC, CC, 19929, 4 July 1960: "The question relating to warheads for Canada's forces had arisen at this time because other questions were being asked as to why large sums of money were being spent on equipment and weapons which would not be effective unless equipped with nuclear warheads."

[66]FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol.XIII, Doc.429, 26 February 1962.

the Canadian and American positions were actually aligned on this matter. Diefenbaker and the government advocated for an arrangement of 'joint control' until 1962, when Diefenbaker began favouring an approach that would not have nuclear weapons on Canadian soil.[67] While the specifics of 'joint control' are hazy, one central and consistent feature was that Canada would have final authorization over the use of these nuclear weapons.[68] Several times, Diefenbaker articulated a preference for an arrangement similar to the United Kingdom, essentially amounting to dual-key control.[69] The Americans were amenable to this kind of arrangement.[70]

The Canadians received reassurance that the Americans were aligned with a dual-key arrangement. On February 19th 1961, Diefenbaker met with President Kennedy; Diefenbaker's stated aim for this meeting was to ascertain "how far President Kennedy would go in the direction of joint control over the use of nuclear arms if located in Canada."[71] In the meeting, Diefenbaker emphasized that "joint control and joint custody" were essential to any agreement.[72] The President responded favourably to this demand: "The President inquired as to whether or not the arrangements we have in this regard with the British Government would satisfy the Prime Minister." The Prime Minister responded affirmatively.[73] Diefenbaker relayed the details of this meeting to Cabinet the next day.[74] This should have increased the confidence that Canada could get favourable terms on joint control from the United States.

Thus, fundamental unalignment over American and Canadian positions on the nature of nuclear sharing does not explain the long delay in formal negotiations. With such firm commitments and basic agreement over key principles of the arrangement, why did Diefenbaker stall?

[67]Simpson, 2001, pp.111-112, 114-118; For Cabinet discussions on joint control, see, for example, LAC, CC, 18760, 26 August 1959; LAC, CC, 22812, 21 August 1961; LAC, CC, 22826, 23 August 1961; LAC, CC, 22829, 25 August 1961. For Diefenbaker's and his government's public statements on joint control, see DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)a; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)b.

[68]For example, LAC, CC, 17541, 15 October 1958.

[69]LAC, CC, 16961, 29 April 1958; LAC, CC, 17438, 28 August 1958; LAC, CC, 22136, 21 February 1961.

[70]FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol.VII, Pt.1, Doc.293, 30 December 1958. This National Security Council report indicates a clash between the Canadian and American positions: While Canadian officials hoped that greater Canadian control and authority over these weapons would *slow down* the decision-making process, United States officials wanted to cede custody and control of these weapons to the Canadians to *speed up* the release of these weapons.

[71]LAC, CC, 22110, 14 February 1961; See also LAC, CC, 22128, 17 February 1961.

[72]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 1/61-3/61, 20 February 1961.

[73]Ibid. "The Prime Minister said that he thought something along these lines would do so."

[74]LAC, CC, 22136, 21 February 1961.

4.3 Straddle Strategy: Dither and Delay

4.3.1 Pro- and Anti-Nuclear Sentiment

The delay can be explained by the consolidation of anti-nuclear sentiment in Canada, which permeated Diefenbaker's Cabinet, partisan politics, and the Canadian public.[75] While the anti-nuclear position was never the majority view in Canada, its increasing political salience deeply affected Diefenbaker.[76] The Prime Minister, faced with anti-nuclear Ministers within his own Cabinet, an anti-nuclear Opposition, and organized anti-nuclear activist campaigns, felt that he needed to accommodate this sentiment within his coalition. However, he needed to balance this with domestic pro-nuclear sentiment and American pressure to acquire nuclear weapons.

In March 1959, Sydney Smith, the Secretary of State for External Affairs died unexpectedly in office. His position was filled by Howard Green, who would quickly become the chief critic of nuclear acquisition within Cabinet and a key proponent of disarmament.[77] Initially, Green did not oppose measures that committed Canada to nuclear sharing; however, this changed only a few months later, when Green learned of the horrific effects of nuclear fallout.[78] These principled anti-nuclear beliefs undergirded his opposition to nuclear acquisition. For example, during the Berlin Crisis, Green made an impassioned plea to Cabinet, arguing that nuclear acquisition would essentially make Canada "a nuclear power," putting the horrors of nuclear war in stark perspective: "It was an issue that might determine whether or not Montreal, Toronto, Hamilton, Ottawa, and other Canadian cities might be blotted off the map."[79] While Green was a sharp critic of nuclear weapons and was skeptical of American interference in Canadian affairs, he did not oppose Canada's membership within NATO or NORAD; indeed, during the Berlin crisis, he did not oppose the Defence Ministers proposal to build up Canada's conventional commitments in Europe.[80]

[75]McMahon, 2009.

[76]Ibid.

[77]McKercher, 2016, p.28; LAC, MG32 B19, Vol.57, The Nuclear Arms Crisis, 19-27 August 1963; Simpson, 2001, p.111.

[78]Heidt, 2012.

[79]LAC, CC, 22746, 24 July 1961. Interestingly, Mr. Green highlighted that he was primarily opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces and "that he did not have as much objection to the storage of nuclear weapons on leased bases" in Canada for American forces. The Minister believed that this could be justified as it was "not implying that Canada was becoming a nuclear power." While the Prime Minister also stated that the negotiations for the weapons at Goose Bay and Harmen Field for American forces no longer needed to be held up, nothing was done on this matter.

[80]LAC, CC, 22811, 17 August 1961; LAC, CC, 22812, 21 August 1961; McKercher, 2016, p.28; Simpson, 2001, p.121-122.

Green was a consistent thorn in the side of pro-nuclear officials in his efforts to frustrate nuclear acquisition.[81] As Secretary of State for External Affairs, Green helped stall negotiations with the United States through a protracted battle with the Department of National Defence over Canada's draft nuclear sharing proposal.[82] In Cabinet, he argued that nuclear acquisition would represent an expansion of the nuclear club; that it would undermine global disarmament efforts as well as Canada's reputation abroad; that the United States would never accept meaningful joint control.[83] Other members of Cabinet echoed these sentiments along with claims that questioned the military necessity of nuclear weapons.[84]

As Green was gaining influence within the government, the anti-nuclear movement in Canada was consolidating. Three organizations were the primary forces behind this movement: the Canadian Committee for the Control of Radiation Hazards, the Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and the Voice of Women.[85] Through protests, letter-writing campaigns, and petitions, these groups aimed to organize and galvanize anti-nuclear sentiment within Canada and dissuade the Diefenbaker government from nuclear acquisition.[86] These efforts reached a pinnacle in the fall of 1961, when after a 73-hour pro-disarmament protest in front of Parliament that was attended by several hundred people, the Canadian Committee for the Control of Radiation Hazards "delivered a massive petition to the government" with over 100,000 signatures against the spread of nuclear weapons, which was personally delivered to the Prime Minister.[87] Crucially, while there may have been neutralist elements within these organizations, they coalesced around a single issue: preventing Canada from acquiring nuclear weapons.

[81]See Harkness's account: LAC, MG32, B19, Vol.57, The Nuclear Arms Crisis, 19-27 August 1963.

[82]DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 25 April 1961; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 2 May 1961; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 4 May 1961; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 25 January 1962; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 2 October 1962; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 3 October 1962; Maloney, 2007, pp.229-230, 243-244, 276. Green insisted that the technical agreements for each weapon system needed to be drafted in advance of the onset of negotiations, along with the general agreement covering the more basic elements of the nuclear sharing arrangement. According to Harkness, "This was essentially a delaying tactic, as we did not have the full information on which a detailed [technical] agreement would have to be based" (LAC, MG32, B19, Vol.57, The Nuclear Arms Crisis, 19-27 August 1963).

[83]LAC, CC, 20550, 6 December 1960; LAC, CC, 22746, 24 July 1961.

[84]Ibid.; LAC, CC, 22826, 23 August 1961; LAC, CC, 22829, 25 August 1961.

[85]McMahon 2009 p.xiv

[86]Ibid.

[87]Ibid., p.125. McMahon estimates of the total number of signatures ranged from 140,000 to 180,000. The protest was discussed in Cabinet, where it was noted that representatives from all three anti-nuclear organizations would be in attendance (LAC, CC, 22982, 6 October 1961). McMahon (2009, p.128) notes that while it "was the only time that cabinet really discussed a meeting with anti-nuclear activists... the ministers' overarching concern was whether there were any communist influences within the organization."

Finally, the government's main opponent, the Liberal Party, appealed to anti-nuclear sentiment.[88] Under Lester Pearson, the Liberal Party took on an anti-nuclear platform, opposing nuclear acquisition in Parliament and aligning itself with the disarmament movement more broadly.[89] However, despite their anti-nuclear stance, Pearson and the Liberals were supporters of NATO and NORAD, advocating conventional support for these alliances.

On the other hand, there was considerable support for nuclear acquisition within Canada. In Cabinet, the main proponent of nuclear acquisition was the Minister of Defence, Douglas Harkness, who replaced George Pearkes in October 1960, just as Green's anti-nuclear push was taking shape.[90] Both Harkness and other Ministers highlighted the international and domestic costs of not fulfilling their nuclear commitments. For example, one Minister noted that not acquiring the CF-101 would undermine the credibility of NORAD and the American deterrent:

> Having these interceptors in Canada might well prevent an attack on Canada and the U.S. through an otherwise unprotected corridor. If the U.S.S.R. thought there was a [gap] in North America's armour, they might be tempted to launch another "Pearl Harbour."[91]

Polls showed that a plurality or majority of Canadians consistently supported nuclear acquisition, leading to fears of audience costs if Canada reneged on these commitments. These polls were discussed several times in Cabinet and were taken as strong indicators of public opinion. As stated in one Cabinet meeting in August 1961. Ministers highlighted that they would come under criticism if they did not fulfill their nuclear commitments.[92] First, for appearing incompetent for buying such expensive weapons systems then refusing to arm them with the weapons that were required to make them effective. Second, for jeopardising Canadian security by not having effective weapons.

Outside of Canada, the United States was a key proponent of nuclear acquisition. During the Berlin Crisis, Kennedy personally wrote a message to Diefenbaker, which directly linked the necessity of nuclear acquisition to the deteriorating international situation:

[88]McMahon, 2009, pp.84-85

[89]Ibid.

[90]For Harkness's account of the Diefenbaker government's vacillation on the nuclear issue during his time as Minister of National Defence, see LAC, MG32, B19, Vol.57, The Nuclear Arms Crisis, 19-27 August 1963.

[91]LAC, CC, 30378, 16 July 1960.

[92]LAC, CC, 19311, 15 January 1960; LAC, CC, 20550, 6 December 1960; LAC, CC, 22829, 25 August 1961.

> There is, however, an aspect of our continental defense which, for reasons which we both understand, is imperfect. This is the lack of orderly arrangements for insuring that the RCAF as well as the USAF should be possessed of nuclear weapons to respond to any attack across the Pole... I recognize that this is not an easy matter for you, but I do believe that we cannot achieve a successful negotiating position on Germany and Berlin until we have taken every reasonable step to strengthen our military security.[93]

Thus, Diefenbaker experienced pressure from three sources. Domestically, he faced the need to accommodate both pro- and anti- nuclear members of his coalition. Internationally, the United States was attempting to push Canada to accept its nuclear commitments.

4.3.2 Diefenbaker's Straddle Strategy

Thus, Diefenbaker, faced with these two opposing elements in his coalition, was wary of alienating either faction.[94] Aiming to maximize his popularity, smooth over conflicts within his Cabinet, and keep the United States on side, Diefenbaker adopted a straddle strategy that sought to delay firm decision making and obfuscate his government's position.[95] Initially, Diefenbaker was more aligned with the pro-acquisition camp. However, he made no active attempts to formulate a consensus within Cabinet or the public at large. This only served to retrench divisions. As time went on, the Prime Minister became increasingly opposed to nuclear acquisition. In particular, he began to oppose the stationing of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil in peacetime. Throughout, Diefenbaker was intent on maintaining his ambiguity and was equally reluctant to fully cast off or confront both the pro- and anti- nuclear elements of his coalition, regardless of his shifting personal position on the issue.

Diefenbaker initially seemed more aligned with the Ministers that supported nuclear acquisition. For example, on January 12th 1960, the Prime Minister opened a discussion on nuclear acquisition by stating that the "government had agreed in principle to the storage of nuclear weapons in Canada" and expressed confidence that the Americans would accept a joint control arrangement .[96] Over a year later, during the Berlin Crisis, the Prime Minister also expressed support for acquisition and called

[93]FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol.XIII, Doc.426, 3 August 1961.
[94]Bothwell, 2007, p.163; McKercher, 2016, p.89.
[95]Ibid.
[96]LAC, CC, 19283, 12 January 1960.

for an end to the delay to negotiations.[97] However, even when Diefenbaker expressed support for nuclear sharing, he did not force Cabinet to come to a decision. As Prime Minister, Diefenbaker needed to "call the consensus" in Cabinet in order to come to policy decisions that could then be implemented.[98] Under the principle of Cabinet solidarity, once the Cabinet came to a decision or the consensus was called, all members of Cabinet must support it or resign as Minister.[99] While Cabinet engaged in many debates about the issue, a final decision was continuously deferred.

These delays became increasingly frustrating to Harkness and other pro-nuclear members of Cabinet.[100] The Prime Minister attempted to keep these Ministers on side by insinuating that he was ultimately in agreement with them. According to Harkness's account, early into his tenure as Defence Minister, Diefenbaker reassured him that he was essentially aligned with Harkness's position against Green, but thought that they should support the Secretary for the time being, as the nuclear weapons systems had not yet been delivered:

> He [Diefenbaker] agreed that chances of a meaningful disarmament agreement were remote and that we must secure the nuclear ammunition for the weapons we had ordered. However, as these were not yet in the hands of our troops there was no need for the agreement to be signed immediately and Howard Green should not be embarrassed in his disarmament efforts by entering into the agreement immediately.[101]

While this strategy did little to force consensus, it allowed Diefenbaker to keep his Cabinet together for as long as he could delay a decision.

Diefenbaker reassured the Americans that he would eventually acquire nuclear weapons, also leading them to believe that he was really aligned with the pro-acquisition elements of his coalition. For example, the Prime Minister told Kennedy in May 1961, after negotiating the removal of any formal requirement of a nuclear role for the CF-101s, that Diefenbaker would attempt to sway public opinion towards nuclear acceptance:

> The Prime Minister said that he intended to speak across Canada this summer and fall on the issue and thought he could gain public support

[97]LAC, CC, 22746, 24 July 1961.
[98]White, 2005, pp.54, 67.
[99]d'Ombrain, 2004, p.335; LAC, CC, 15971, 21 June 1957.
[100]LAC, MG32, B19, Vol.57, The Nuclear Arms Crisis, 19-27 August 1963.
[101]Ibid.; Harkness in Stursberg, 1976, p.25.

> for the acceptance of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil as part of Canada's defenses.[102]

In August 1961, Diefenbaker provided further reassurance that "he would take the necessary steps within the Canadian Government to initiate the discussions."[103] However, this concerted campaign never materialized. As late as March 8th 1962, Diefenbaker told the Ambassador to Canada Livingston T. Merchant that he "confidently expects to proceed forthwith on negotiations looking at least to initialing texts as finally agreed" within the next two weeks.[104] According to Merchant, Diefenbaker "discounted [the] significance of such pacifist or quasi-pacifist organizations such as Voice of Women... He said that he had told them Canada had defense responsibilities which it could not shirk."[105] Merchant, who noted that Diefenbaker could always come up with some excuse to stall once again, expressed surprise and encouragement at Diefenbaker's disparagement of the disarmament movement, despite the Prime Minister's "customary sensitivity to any evidence of adverse public opinion."[106] Even as negotiations were not forthcoming after this episode, the Americans still felt assured that the Prime Minister was on their side.[107]

After 1960, Diefenbaker continuously hedged his position in public, moving away from a pro-acquisition stance to one that was more ambiguous. He repeatedly told the public that "no decision" had been made on acquisition for Canadian forces, but that the government would obtain nuclear weapons "when and if" it was necessary.[108] He insisted that joint control would be a central feature of any nuclear sharing arrangement, but implied that the Americans were resistant to this arrangement. For example, when questioned in Parliament about joint control on February 26th 1962, Diefenbaker asserted that, under the current law of the United States, "joint control is impossible," seemingly laying the responsibility for delay at the Americans' doorstep.[109] The Prime Minister and other officials also implied that negotiations

[102]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General Rostow Memorandum 5/16/61 and related materials 5/61-5/63, 17 May 1961.
[103]FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol.XIII, Doc.426, 3 August 1961, ft. 1.
[104]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 2/62-3/62, 8 March 1962.
[105]Ibid.
[106]Ibid.
[107]See also JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 4/62-5/15/62, 13 April 1962. In this memorandum, the March 8th conversation is mentioned again, noted as a recent instance where Diefenbaker "privately indicated a willingness to have an agreement negotiated and ready for the time when the Government's decision could be announced."
[108]Diefenbaker in Simpson, 2001, p.112; See also: DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)a; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)b.
[109]DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)a.

were ongoing, when, in fact, they had not really begun, obscuring the fact that the Canadians were actively delaying following through on their commitments.[110]

Contradictions in Diefenbaker's stance served his straddle strategy. For example, Diefenbaker aligned himself with his pro-nuclear Ministers by airing his scepticism about the disarmament movement, telling Cabinet:

> On the one hand, there were the oft expressed views about disarmament. He personally did not have much hope for success in this field... While disarmament was a laudable purpose he was afraid of the Conservative party being dubbed the disarmament party.[111]

However, Diefenbaker would later use the supposed progress on disarmament as an excuse to stall negotiations, signalling his support for the anti-nuclear faction. His rhetoric to Cabinet on its prospects for success also changed as time went on. On February 20th 1961, the day after Diefenbaker received reassurance on joint control by Kennedy, Cabinet convened to discuss this meeting.[112] Kennedy had removed a crucial stumbling block to restarting negotiations, yet Diefenbaker still insisted to Cabinet that he could not come to a decision. This was due to the progress on disarmament: "so long as serious disarmament negotiations continued, Canada did not propose to determine whether or not to accept nuclear weapons for the Bomarc bases or for the Canadian interceptors."[113] Similar points were repeated to Parliament and the public throughout this period as a justification for why no decision had been taken on the nuclear issue.[114]

By 1962, Diefenbaker's position increasingly aligned with the anti-nuclear perspective. Diefenbaker made public statements that the government does "not intend to have nuclear arms in Canada in time of peace."[115] However, he would still not state categorically that he would refuse nuclear arms for Canadian forces. This left his government's nuclear policy ultimately unclear. Indeed, Diefenbaker never abandoned the pro-nuclear position entirely. According to Harkness, "Right up to a week or so before I resigned [in January 1963], Mr Diefenbaker was still assuring me that eventually we would get these warheads for these weapon systems, but the time wasn't right."[116] This applied to Diefenbaker's public statements as well. On February 24th

[110]Ibid.; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)b
[111]LAC, CC, 20550, 6 December 1960.
[112]LAC, CC, 22136, 21 February 1961.
[113]Ibid.
[114]DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)a; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)b.
[115]DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)b.
[116]Harkness in Stursberg, 1976, pp.24-25.

1962, when asked about the prospects of Canada acquiring nuclear weapons, Diefenbaker stated: "Should war come, are we going to arm Canadians with bows and arrows?"[117] The Prime Minister went further, highlighting that nuclear arms were needed because Bomarc and the CF-101s were "more effective with nuclear weapons" and that in the event of war "we must have available the necessary instruments."[118] This statement was still ambiguous: Diefenbaker was evasive about the prospect of peacetime storage of these weapons, erroneously insinuating that these weapons could be quickly transferred to Canada if necessary.[119] The fact that the CF-101 interceptors were referenced here is especially important, as Diefenbaker had taken specific care to delink the acquisition of CF-101s and the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Yet, he publicly made the connection in this statement.

4.3.3 Explaining the Straddle Strategy

Given Diefenbaker's deep concern with his popularity and electoral prospects, it may seem odd that he did not throw more support behind what polls had clearly indicated to be the majority view. While Cabinet members dismissed the validity of polling in general, McMahon argues that Diefenbaker's fixation on the domestic dangers of acquisition was a political calculation: the anti-nuclear movement was a minority, but vocal.[120] If anti-nuclear groups could turn nuclear sharing into a major political issue, it might cause a shift in public sentiment.[121] Indeed, several times in Cabinet, Diefenbaker expressed concern that merely entering into negotiations with the United States would be interpreted by the public as nuclear acquisition, leading to backlash.[122] Furthermore, Pearson was directly appealing to anti-nuclear sentiment. By the summer of 1960, the Liberals had overtaken the Conservatives in the polls "and remained ahead thereafter."[123] With such a clear contrast between the Liberal and Conservative position, Diefenbaker was wary of making moves that would play into that divide and potentially decrease the Conservatives' popularity.[124]

Polling indicates that there were a substantial minority that opposed acquisition

[117]DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)b.
[118]Ibid.
[119]Ibid. Diefenbaker "added he had read a recent report that nuclear warheads could be made available in half an hour to an hour, and indicated there was some credence in this report."
[120]McMahon, 2009.
[121]Ibid.
[122]LAC, CC, 22826, 23 August 1961; LAC, CC, 22829, 25 August 1961.
[123]Bothwell, 2007, p.163.
[124]Ibid.; McMahon, 2009, p.85.

as well as individuals who were unaware of the issue.[125] For example, a poll taken in September 1961 showed that about 67% of Canadians that had some awareness of the nuclear issue supported nuclear acquisition, while 33% were opposed.[126] However, only 61% of total respondents had "heard or read anything about the question of arming Canada's forces with nuclear weapons," while 39% had not.[127] While the number of undecideds steadily decreased over time, the issue settled into about a 60/40 split, with about 60 percent of Canadians supporting nuclear acquisition and 40 percent opposing.[128]

Furthermore, aspects of the anti-nuclear movement also appealed to Diefenbaker's populist streak. According to Pierre Sévigny, the associate Minister of Defence, Diefenbaker believed that this coalition represented the "grass roots" of Canadian society: "Diefenbaker started saying [after receiving anti-nuclear letters], 'The grass roots don't want nuclear weapons, the grass roots are against this.' "[129] Diefenbaker's populist desire to connect with the average Canadian explains his skepticism of polling and his embrace of letters that he received from Canadians decrying the prospect of nuclear sharing.[130] Indeed, the Prime Minister emphasized that the letters he received did "not appear to represent an organized campaign," underscoring his view that anti-nuclear sentiment represented more of an organic groundswell than an organized campaign.[131] Diefenbaker expressed a similar sentiment to Kennedy during the Presidential visit to Canada on May 17th 1961, when Diefenbaker asked for reprieve on the requirement to arm the CF-101 with nuclear weapons. In justifying his stance, Diefenbaker emphasized that 'ordinary Canadians' seem to be against nuclear acquisition by highlighting the volume of critical letters he has received, from not just "Communists and Leftwingers," but also "professors" and "mothers and wives."[132] Diefenbaker was not interested in appealing to more radical members of the anti-nuclear movement that may have supported the wholesale withdrawal of Canada

[125]According to McMahon (2009, pp.130-131, 176), Diefenbaker overestimated both those that rejected nuclear sharing and those that were undecided. By the end of 1961, a majority of Canadians were pro-acquisition, even when accounting for undecideds. At the end of November 1961, Harkness cites a Gallup poll that showed that 61% were pro-acquisition, 31% opposed, and 8% undecided, a dramatic shift from the September 1961 poll (LAC, CC, 23164, 30 November 1961)

[126]Gallup Canada Inc., September 1961.

[127]Ibid.

[128]Gallup Canada Inc., November 1962; LAC, CC, 23164, 30 November 1961.

[129]Sévigny in Stursberg, 1976, p.25.

[130]McMahon, 2009, pp.175-176.

[131]LAC, CC, 22128, 17 February 1961. According to Harkness, Diefenbaker "didn't seem to realize that this was an organised campaign and that the letters coming in did not represent the majority of the people of Canada to any extent at all" (Stursberg, 1976, p.25).

[132]FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol.XIII, Doc.423, 17 May 1961.

from its alliances or rejected the fundamental narratives of the Cold War. 'Ordinary Canadians' opposed nuclear weapons, but still wanted Canada to be a good ally of the Western Alliance against the Soviet Union.

Diefenbaker's straddle strategy was a way of maximizing domestic support and avoiding audience costs. By delaying a decision, Canada was not reneging on its nuclear commitments, nor was it fulfilling them. This allowed Diefenbaker to retain both pro- and anti-nuclear elements of his coalition. It was the single-issue nature of the anti-nuclear coalition that Diefenbaker wanted to appeal to that created this contradiction. The main thrust of the anti-nuclear message focused on the nuclear weapons themselves, rather than questioning alliance membership. Indeed, anti-nuclear elites like Green and Pearson supported Canada's membership in these alliances and did not oppose increases to its conventional commitments. However, Diefenbaker could only hold together this coalition through inaction for so long.

4.4 Reneging: From Consensus-Building to a Nationalist Campaign

4.4.1 The Standby Approach: Inability to Act Unilaterally

In October 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the nuclear issue back to the forefront of Canadian foreign and defence policy. The Cuban Missile crisis emphasized the danger of the Cold War for Canadians, increasing the domestic pressure on the government to fulfill its defence commitments to its allies.[133] Canada's delay in publicly declaring its full support for the United States during the crisis also increased pressure on the government to show its commitment to its allies.[134] Polls demonstrated that a solid majority of Canadians supported acquisition.[135] Even the most skeptical members of Cabinet were shocked into action by the crisis. According to McMahon, "even Green now believed that national security required an agreement covering nuclear weapons."[136] Diefenbaker's tactic of delay was now untenable and a definitive solution to the nuclear issue needed to be found.[137] The delivery systems in Europe and Canada were now operational, awaiting nuclear arms in order to be fully effective. A decision had to be made.

[133]McMahon, 2009, p.151.
[134]Bothwell, 2007, p.169.
[135]Gallup Canada Inc., November 1962.
[136]McMahon, 2009, p.151.
[137]Simpson, 2001, p.120.

The Prime Minister was more cross-pressured than ever. On the one hand, there were clear international and domestic pressures to fulfill Canada's nuclear obligations and to be seen as a 'good ally.'[138] On the other hand, after the lackluster results of the 1962 election, the Conservatives were now a minority government, leaving Diefenbaker with even less room to maneuver. The other parties in Parliament were against nuclear acquisition and the anti-nuclear movement was still campaigning against these weapons. Moreover, the pro- and anti- nuclear factions within Cabinet were entrenched in their positions, with little obvious common ground between them.

For Diefenbaker and certain members of the Cabinet, the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated American recklessness and Canada's need to protect its sovereignty. Diefenbaker was briefed on the situation only two hours before Kennedy's public address about the Crisis.[139] According to McMahon, "Diefenbaker was upset that he had not been genuinely consulted, and he convinced himself that Kennedy's decision to send a retired ambassador to deliver such an important message was a personal insult."[140] During the Crisis, there was a feeling among some Ministers in Cabinet that Canada was being "stampeded" into decisions by the actions of the American government.[141] To Diefenbaker, this had wider implications for the prospects of joint control for nuclear sharing: the Cuban Missile Crisis seemed to indicate that Canadian interests would not be taken into account in an emergency.[142] Worse, Canada would not even be consulted.[143]

Facing increasing and contrasting pressures, Diefenbaker tried to devise a solution that would allow him to maintain control over his Cabinet, satisfying both the pro- and anti- nuclear elements of his coalition. By 1962, Diefenbaker began to favour 'standby arrangement' for nuclear weapons.[144] Under a standby framework, Canada would agree to nuclear sharing in principle, but would not have nuclear weapons on Canadian soil in peacetime. The nuclear weapons would be on 'standby' in American custody, located elsewhere, until a time of emergency or war, when they would be

[138]Bothwell, 2007, p.169; Stevenson, 2014, p.9; Stursberg, 1976, pp.14-16.

[139]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 10/62-1/63, 22 October 1962; McMahon, 2009, p.148.

[140]McMahon, 2009, p.148. However, McKercher (2016, p.172) notes, "the Canadian prime minister was one of the few Western leaders who received a briefing in advance of Kennedy's televised address, as well as a personal message from the president."

[141]LAC, CC, 21653, 23 October 1962.

[142]Bothwell, 2007, p.167; McMahon, 2009, pp.150-151.

[143]Ibid.

[144]McKercher, 2016, pp.107-108. A 'standby' arrangement had been previously contemplated by various officials within the Canadian government on several occasions before the fall of 1962; however, this solution was usually dismissed as it was not considered to be militarily viable. See: DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 19 January 1962; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 30 April – 3 May 1962

transferred to Canadian personnel for delivery.[145] A similar proposal called the 'missing essential part approach' was also explored by the Canadians at this time, whereby a key part of the nuclear weapon would be stored outside of Canada in peacetime.[146]

This kind of proposal had already been considered and rejected: it was "impractical," and unlikely to be accepted by the Americans according to Canadian military assessments.[147] Nevertheless, the standby proposal was the only political solution for Diefenbaker's anti-nuclear coalition.[148] The government could claim that it technically fulfilled its nuclear sharing commitments, while also asserting that they had prevented Canada from joining the 'nuclear club.'[149] Anti-nuclear members of Cabinet, such as Green, were satisfied with this. Pro-nuclear Ministers like Harkness were supportive of opening negotiations with the Americans under these terms. They saw it as a means of breaking the years of stasis that had prevented Canada from fulfilling its commitments.[150] In the face of a clear stance from the Canadian government, the Americans considered a standby-type arrangement for the nuclear weapons on Canadian soil, despite their own reservations on its viability.[151] Like the pro-nuclear Minister in Canada, the Americans were anxious to get the government to the negotiating table and were reluctant to immediately rebuff any potential solution to this impasse.

To successfully execute this strategy, Canada needed American agreement. While Diefenbaker had already indicated publicly that a standby-type arrangement was feasible, he still needed ratification from the United States.[152] Canadian officials were constrained in even conceiving of the technical solution to their political predicament. Given the imbalance in expertise on nuclear weapons, the Americans would determine whether it was feasible to store nuclear weapons outside of Canada and only transfer them to the Canadians in a crisis.[153]

[145]DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 16 October 1962.

[146]Simpson, 2001, p.121.

[147]DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 16 October 1962; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 2 October 1962. The prospect of a standby approach had also been rejected by American military officials as early as April 30th, see DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 30 April – 3 May 1962.

[148]McKercher, 2016, pp.107-108.

[149]Ibid.

[150]LAC, CC, 21711, 30 October 1962; LAC, MG32, B19, Vol.57, The Nuclear Arms Crisis, 19-27 August 1963.

[151]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 10/62-1/63, 19 November 1962; JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 10/62-1/63, 15 December 1962; Stevenson, 2014, pp.13-17.

[152]DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)b.

[153]It is telling that the proposals for these arrangements all originated with the Americans. When the Canadians found them unsatisfactory, they would direct the Americans to find the technical solution that would allow nuclear weapons to not be stationed on Canadian soil. See: LAC, CC, 21711, 30 October 1962; JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 10/62-1/63, 5 December 1962; JFK,

In addition, Diefenbaker was reluctant to further tie his hands domestically beyond the vague promise of no nuclear weapons on Canadian soil in peacetime. In fact, he insisted that the talks remain secret.[154] Diefenbaker and other members of Cabinet were still concerned that even entering negotiations on this issue would be interpreted as an acceptance of nuclear acquisition and create anti-nuclear backlash.[155]

4.4.2 No Credible Threat of Withdrawal: Stalled Negotiations

The Canadians had two main sources of bargaining power. Firstly, they insisted that the European arrangement would only be finalized *after* the arrangement for NORAD had been agreed.[156] By the end of November, Canadian and American officials agreed on a nuclear sharing arrangement for Canadian forces in Europe, which was similar to that of other NATO allies.[157] However, this agreement would not move forward until a solution could be found for the weapons systems on Canadian soil, providing an incentive for the Americans to be flexible and open to concessions.[158]

Secondly, Canadian negotiators emphasized the constraints of their anti-nuclear coalition. In Putnam's terms, they highlighted the narrowness of their win-set, where they could only satisfy their coalition by ensuring that nuclear weapons were not brought onto Canadian soil. As a telegram sent to the American Embassy in Ottawa from Secretary of State Dean Rusk on November 19th 1962 put it:

> [During negotiations with the Canadians, American officials] would point out that standby weapons on U.S. soil for Canadian forces North America appear impractical but we are ready to discuss and explore possibility in hope arriving at some mutually acceptable arrangement... In light [of]... Diefenbaker's statement to RCAF Association November 16 that there would be no immediate acquisition of nuclear weapons for home defense forces and no storing nuclear weapons in Canada, *we are inclined to believe Canadians unlikely go at this stage beyond what they have proposed.*[159]

NSF, Box 18, Canada General 10/62-1/63, 28 December 1962; Stevenson, 2014, pp.13-17.

[154]LAC, CC, 21711, 30 October 1962.

[155]Ibid.

[156]Stevenson, 2014, p.13.

[157]Ibid.

[158]Ibid.

[159]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 10/62-1/63, 19 November 1962. Interestingly, the message also suggests that there was some side channel between the American Ambassador to Canada and Canadian Defence Minister Harkness, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk suggests that the Ambassador "may wish to seek Harkness' advice on this tactic."

> [emphasis added]

Thus, the Americans understood that the Canadians, after years of delay, were finally taking a firm stance. Given their domestic constraints, they saw very little room for flexibility.

In an embassy telegram to the Secretary of State, the American Ambassador to Canada, William Walton Butterworth, revealed that the Americans recognized Diefenbaker's insistence on the standby and missing part approaches as the latest iteration of his straddle strategy:

> A "missing part" approach must appear to [Diefenbaker's] government the most promising method resolving its problem because its adoption under bilateral agreement would enable it to say commitments met and adequate defense assured without doing violation Diefenbaker's basic public position no nuclear arms except in case emergency.[160]

The telegram goes on to state that any partial agreement would remove the "political pressures" on the Diefenbaker government, making them even less likely to agree to nuclear storage on Canadian soil in the future:

> As situation stands today alternative facing USG is whether to accept a partial solution or live with continuation of the status quo in the hope that the present trend of events in Canada may ultimately force this or a successor government to accept full storage.[161]

Thus, the Americans recognized that Diefenbaker was domestically constrained and that his win-set was narrow. They recognized that there were potential risks to refusing this offer, which was acknowledged as a "partial solution," as it would quickly resolve the nuclear issue for Canada's forces in NATO.[162]

This diagnosis did not result in the Americans accepting the Canadian offer. Butterworth believed that Diefenbaker did not actually have the political support to walk away from negotiations without a deal or to renege on Canada's commitments unilaterally.[163] Indeed, he believed that pro-nuclear domestic pressures would push Diefenbaker into a position more favourable to the United States.[164] The American Ambassador counselled that the best approach would be to wait on a final decision

[160]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 10/62-1/63, 9 January 1963.
[161]Ibid.
[162]Ibid.
[163]Ibid.
[164]Ibid.

given the political climate in Canada. He noted that in the "next ten days there are two events which may throw some light on" the best course of action for the United States.[165] Despite concerns about the workability of the standby approach, Butterworth cautioned that negotiators should remain cooperative "as protection against [the] contingency [that] Diefenbaker may blame USG [for the] failure [to] reach solution [to the] nuclear problem."[166] Thus, Butterworth wanted to keep negotiations going not because of his worries about anti-nuclear backlash, but his fear of stoking Diefenbaker's anti-American streak.

Pressure to retain Canada's commitments on Diefenbaker emanated from both outside and inside the government, further undermining Diefenbaker's bargaining power. Butterworth noted that Pearson would give a statement on January 12th that "may clarify" his and the Liberals' position on nuclear acquisition. The Conservative party conference beginning January 17th could also reveal a change in Diefenbaker's stance, as there was a "growing grass roots demand within [the Conservative] party for more coherent defense policy."[167] In fact, an earlier telegram sent on January 2nd from Butterworth to the Secretary of State noted that a "usually reliable press source" informed the Embassy that both Pearson and Diefenbaker would "advocate [for the] immediate conclusion [of a] bilateral GOC/USG agreement providing for acceptance Nuclear [sic] weapons by Canadian forces "if and when necessary... Source says part of Pearson's motivation this decision is his certainty GOC will make similar decision in annual meeting Progressive Conservative Association." "[168] American officials had suspected for several months that Diefenbaker was facing increasing criticism within his own party over the nuclear issue and would be under pressure to not further exacerbate relations with the Americans.[169]

The government's decision to not accept 'a partial solution' is related to their belief that Diefenbaker did not have a credible nationalist coalition that would allow for him to totally abandon Canada's nuclear commitments and walk away from negotia-

[165]Ibid.

[166]Ibid.

[167]Ibid. In a later interview, Eddie Goodman, "a prominent Ontario party worker... [and] chairman of the policy and resolutions committee" for the Progressive Conservative Association that met in January 1963, concurs with Butterworth's assessment: "It was clear from the resolutions that came in that there was a strong feeling across the country that we should accept nuclear warheads and live up to our commitment... that was certainly the grass roots feeling in the party" (Stursberg, 1976, p.30).

[168]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 10/62-1/63, 2 January 1963.

[169]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 10/62-1/63, 9 November 1963. Butterworth notes that criticism amongst Conservatives "specifically centers on Cuban policy and nuclear arms... we believe criticism approaching point where Diefenbaker will have to pay attention to it."

tions. American officials had worried about the potential of anti-American Canadian nationalism for years and had monitored the domestic situation in Canada closely. One telegram from Ambassador Merchant to the Secretary of State in 1961 noted that "resistance to American influence becomes fuzzily connected in some quarters with... anti-nuclear sentiments."[170] Despite this, Merchant concluded that most of Canada had a favourable view of the United States and especially President Kennedy, remaining "highly susceptible and sympathetic to American influence."[171] In March 1962, the Department of State produced "Guidelines for Policy and Operations" for Canada. It highlighted the "ever present nationalist sensitivity" in Canada that should guide relations with them; essentially, while overall relations were good, the United States should work to not inflame nationalist sentiments by not appearing to infringe on Canadian sovereignty.[172] On the nuclear sharing issue, this report identifies it as the "major defense problem at the present time."[173] It cautions that the United States should "avoid heavy-handed pressure, which would probably be counter-productive, and we should realize that some time might be required for the Canadian government to take this step."[174] The United States saw nationalist and anti-American sentiment in Canada in much the same terms as Diefenbaker saw anti-nuclear sentiment: as having the potential to become a major issue if they were not careful. However, the pressure to restructure would soon become irresistible and would have a major impact on the fate of Canada's nuclear sharing commitments.

4.4.3 Vulnerability to Restructuring: The Downfall of Diefenbaker's Government

As suggested in the previous section, an important aspect of Diefenbaker's coalition's lack of leverage was its vulnerability to restructuring or foreign influence. The Prime Minister was still attempting to reassure members of his Cabinet and the public that he could satisfy the anti-nuclear movement while remaining a good ally. This careful balancing act could only be maintained as long as allies were willing to put up with it. Any suggestion from Canada's allies that it was reneging on its commitments would shatter this façade and open Diefenbaker up to domestic audience costs. By January 1963, two key events amounted to foreign restructuring of Canada's nuclear stance: first, a retired NATO General and then, the US State Department unambiguously

[170]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 4/61-5/14/61, 12 April 1961.
[171]Ibid.
[172]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 2/62-3/62, March 1962.
[173]Ibid.
[174]Ibid.

asserted that Canada would be reneging on its commitments to NATO and NORAD if it did not acquire nuclear weapons soon.

These events had two simultaneous effects – or in Putnam's terms, reverberations – that both helped and undermined the Americans' ultimate goal. Firstly, the foreign pressure on the Canadian government to accept its commitments was at least partially responsible for Pearson and the Liberals' change in position. This pressure directly led to the downfall of the Diefenbaker government, setting the stage for full nuclear acquisition. Secondly, these foreign intrusions into Canadian affairs pushed Diefenbaker to galvanize nationalist sentiment against the United States and towards reneging on Canada's nuclear commitments.

On January 3rd 1963, General Norstad, who retired as SACEUR, made a statement to Canadian press while visiting Ottawa. In response to questioning on the nuclear issue by the Canadian press, Norstad stated that Canada had made a commitment to acquire nuclear weapons for its forces in NATO, but had not followed through.[175] If Canada continued to delay a decision, it would effectively be reneging on its commitments to its allies.[176] This statement represents the first incidence of public foreign pressure on Diefenbaker's government to accept nuclear weapons from an allied source.[177] According to Bothwell, "Norstad's comments created a storm in Canada... [although] not the storm that Diefenbaker expected, or wanted."[178] It pulled Diefenbaker towards a more nationalist stance. Green similarly saw this incident in nationalist terms: "I thought he had a lot of nerve to come here to Canada and try to tell the Canadian government what it should do."[179] However, for others, Norstad's statement cemented the reality that Canada was losing standing and rapport with its closest allies.[180]

On January 12th, Opposition leader Pearson gave a speech that shifted the Liberal Party's position on nuclear sharing to a pro-acquisition stance. The increasing pressure from Canada's allies – both public and private – to accept its commitments was a central feature of this decision.[181] The timing of his announcement soon af-

[175]Stevenson, 2014, p.19.

[176]McKercher, 2016, p.182. "When a reporter next asked "that if Canada does not accept nuclear weapons for these aeroplanes [does] that [mean] she is not actually fulfilling her NATO commitments?" Norstad responded, "I believe that's right." "

[177]Bothwell, 2007, p.172; McMahon, 2009, p.159; Stevenson, 2014, p.19. The force of Norstad's comments were further amplified by the chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, Air Marshall Frank Miller, who agreed with Norstad's statements.

[178]Bothwell, 2007, p.172.

[179]Green in Stursberg, 1976, p29.

[180]Bothwell, 2007, p.172; McKercher, 2016, p.182; McMahon, 2009, p.159.

[181]McMahon, 2009, p.159.

ter Norstad's remarks and the rhetoric that Pearson used in justifying his change of stance played up the importance of the reputational costs of reneging. The rationale behind Pearson's change in stance is discussed further in the next chapter.

Pearson's about-face created political pressure on Diefenbaker to distinguish himself from the opposition and draw support from the anti-nuclear groups that felt alienated by Pearson's decision.[182] In addition, if Diefenbaker accepted nuclear weapons now, it would appear as if he was simply following the lead of the opposition after years of delay.[183] Despite these constraints the Prime Minister could have used this opportunity to decisively negotiate a nuclear sharing arrangement with the United States.[184] Indeed, Harkness had thought that the Prime Minister would react this way; after all, the main source of opposition in Parliament had been removed.[185]

Diefenbaker responded to the growing domestic and international pressures on the nuclear issue with a lengthy speech in Parliament on January 25th, which did little to ease the confusion around conservative nuclear policy.[186] The Prime Minister took the opportunity to ridicule Pearson's lack of consistency, while also affirming that his own policy on nuclear weapons had never changed. He implied that technological and strategic changes made nuclear acquisition less of a necessity for allied defence. Diefenbaker also insinuated that the recent meeting at Nassau may have obviated the need for nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in Europe. At the same time, Diefenbaker revealed that secret negotiations with the Americans had been underway for several months to work out a nuclear sharing arrangement. The substance of the speech did little to clarify the government's nuclear policy. While the Canadian papers reported that the speech indicated that Diefenbaker would be reneging on Canada's nuclear commitments, Harkness understood it to affirm a more pro-nuclear stance and a commitment to continue negotiations.[187]

American officials viewed this speech as Diefenbaker laying the ground to back out of Canada's nuclear commitments.[188] According to a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to the Under Secretary of State on January 29th:

[182]Ibid., pp.161-163; Bothwell, 2007, p.173.
[183]McMahon, 2009, p.163.
[184]McKercher, 2016, p.186.
[185]Ibid.; Bothwell, 2007, p.173; LAC, MG32, B19, Vol.57, The Nuclear Arms Crisis, 19-27 August 1963.
[186]Bothwell, 2007, p.173; McKercher, 2016, pp.186-187
[187]LAC, MG32, B19, Vol.57, The Nuclear Arms Crisis, 19-27 August 1963.
[188]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 10/62-1/63, 27 January 1963.

> In his remarks, Diefenbaker beclouded the whole issue of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces with misleading references to Nassau, to NATO, to multilateral nuclear forces, to NORAD, and to "not enlarging the nuclear family". His purpose was to stop if possible, and at least to slow down, the momentum towards a clarification of Canadian defense policy which began as a popular movement after the Cuban crisis, and which reached a high point in Liberal leader Pearson's speech earlier this month.[189]

Believing that the majority of the Canadian public was essentially aligned with the American position, State Department officials recommended that the department appeal directly to the Canadian people: "The Embassy in Ottawa believes that prompt action should be taken by us to clarify the record and to sweep away the confusion which Diefenbaker's statement can cause in Canadian minds."[190] Reacting quickly, under Secretary of State Ball approved a press release, which was made public on January 30th, entitled, "United States and Canadian Negotiations Regarding Nuclear Weapons."[191] The press release was a strong and explicit refutation of Diefenbaker's statement and a clear case of an attempt to restructure Canada's negotiating position. It laid out in stark terms the extent of Canada's nuclear commitment, highlighting that each of the four weapons systems purchased by the government needed nuclear weapons to achieve "their full potential effectiveness."[192] The Americans laid the deadlock in negotiations firmly on Diefenbaker's doorstep: "the Canadian Government has not as yet proposed any arrangement sufficiently practical to contribute effectively to North American defense."[193] It also directly refuted the claim that there had been any change to Canada's nuclear obligations as a result of the Nassau meeting.[194] Finally, the press release directly confronted the main anti-nuclear detractors, highlighting the fact that Canadian nuclear acquisition would "would not involve an expansion of independent nuclear capability, or an increase in the "nuclear club." "[195] It also affirmed the principle of jointed control. Essentially, this statement was directly and publicly confronting the Prime Minister, implying that he had

[189]FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol.XIII, Doc.443, 29 January 1963.
[190]Ibid.; JFK, NSF, Box 18, 'Canada General 10/62-1/63,' 'Telegram to Secretary of State from Ottawa (Butterworth), 949, January 27 1963.' Secret.
[191]FRUS 1961-1963, Vol.XIII, Doc.444, 30 January 1963.
[192]Ibid.
[193]Ibid.
[194]Ibid.
[195]Ibid.

been misleading the public about the nuclear issue.[196] It also revealed in no uncertain terms that the Americans viewed anything short of nuclear acquisition as reneging, as they stated that Canada had made a clear commitment to both NORAD and NATO.

The Americans attempted to restructure the Canadian position not only because of their frustration with Diefenbaker's delay tactics and misleading statements, but also because they did not believe that he actually had a credible nationalist coalition behind him. In fact, they believed that international criticism for reneging would result in heavy domestic audience costs, as the public was invested in Canada upholding its commitments to its allies. A telegram sent from the American Embassy to the State Department provides insight into the rationale behind the press release:

> In effect we have now forced issue and outcome depends on basic common sense of Canadian electorate. Our faith in their good judgment is based on our reading that public has been way ahead of political leadership of all parties. Moreover Embassy had benefit recent grass roots assessment... which independently reached same conclusion with greater emphasis on importance attached by public to Canada honoring its commitments. Public reaction to current developments (Embtel 987 and Tousi 34) supports this assessment. In short we think Canadian public is with us, even though some liberal politicians have been afraid we have handed Diefenbaker an issue he can use against them and US. We think Canadians will no longer accept irresponsible nonsense which political leaders all parties, but particularly progressive-conservatives under Diefenbaker, have got away with for several years.[197]

Essentially, the Americans hoped that by directly appealing to the Canadian public, they could alter Canadian policy on nuclear weapons: a classic example of Putnam's 'restructuring.'

The State Department's press release was the final push for Diefenbaker towards a nationalist appeal for reneging. The Prime Minister had considered running a more nationalist and anti-American campaign in the 1962 election, but had ultimately been

[196]Bothwell (2007, p.173) summarizes the press release in similar terms: "In effect, the State Department was calling Diefenbaker a liar."

[197]FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol.XIII, Doc.445, 3 February 1963. It also seems that the State Department intended to use this press release to influence Canadian policy not only through appealing to the Canadian public at large, but also by putting pressure on Pearson and the Liberals. According to the same telegram: "Let us also face fact that we are forcing Pearson to go faster and further than he desires in the direction we favor."

dissuaded from doing so.[198] After the press release, Diefenbaker was delighted with the potential electoral implications of the American response: " "We've got our issue now," Diefenbaker gloated to his finance minister, Donald Fleming."[199] This overt meddling in Canadian affairs was the event Diefenbaker had been waiting for, one that could galvanize a nationalist coalition and allow him to regain his majority. Diefenbaker wanted to go to the polls running an anti-American campaign.[200]

While even the opposition condemned the State Department's intrusion into Canadian politics, the substance of Diefenbaker's nuclear policy came under further scrutiny.[201] During a Parliamentary debate on this matter, Pearson emphasized Diefenbaker's lack of a clear policy of policy on nuclear acquisition.[202] While some members of the Kennedy administration – including Kennedy himself – were not pleased with the heavy-handed actions of the State Department, they ultimately believed that the Canadian public was on their side.[203] According to a telegram from the American Embassy in Canada to the Department of State, the Americans did not believe a nationalist coalition would coalesce around this issue, even if Diefenbaker campaigned on it:

> In any event Diefenbaker can be counted on to mount his campaign on anti-US platform and had earlier last month launched "made in Canada" slogan at National Party Convention. However, we are persuaded such a campaign would not have the success some observers predict. Not only is this not 1911, when "no trade or truck with the Yankees" was slogan which won an election, but it is not even 1957, when Diefenbaker first came to power on wave of anti-US jingoism. World has changed and Canadian people know it... we are convinced anti-Americanism could not now effect a Canadian Government.[204]

Diefenbaker's straddle strategy meant that the pro-acquisition elements within his Cabinet and in the public were alive and well – and coming to bear on the beleaguered

[198]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General Rostow Memorandum 5/16/61 and related materials 5/61-5/63, 5 May 1962; JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General Rostow Memorandum 5/16/61 and related materials 5/61-5/63, 8 May 1962.
[199]Bothwell, 2007 p.174.
[200]Ibid.
[201]McKercher, 2016, p.190-191.
[202]Ibid.
[203]Ibid., 191-193. Kennedy did not sign off on the Press Release and apparently was not aware of it prior to its publication, see also JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 2/1/63-2/14/63, 1 February 1963. Furthermore, the administration "closely monitored" the Canadian response to their press release (McKercher, 2016, p.191).
[204]FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol.XIII, Doc.445, 3 February 1963.

government. Almost half of the Cabinet supported nuclear acquisition and were firmly against taking on an anti-American tone in a new election campaign.[205]

Despite unintentionally increasing Diefenbaker's zeal towards nationalism and reneging, the American's restructuring effort ultimately had the desired effect of setting in motion a change in Canada's bargaining position. It precipitated the collapse of Diefenbaker's government. For Harkness, the Americans' rebuke was the last straw. He had already considered resigning after Diefenbaker's speech on January 25th; however the State Department's stark statement that Canada was reneging on its alliance commitments could not be ignored.[206] With no solution to the nuclear deadlock forthcoming, Harkness resigned from Cabinet on February 3rd, citing his frustration with Diefenbaker's nuclear policy and highlighting the importance of maintaining a strong defence relationship with the United States.[207] In a CBC interview on February 4th, Harkness explained that Canada had made "definite and implicit" commitment to acquire nuclear weapons.[208] He also claimed that the current government was reneging on these obligations if they continued to delay nuclear acquisition, and that he was confident that the "great majority of [the] Conservative Party feel as I do."[209] On February 5th, the Prime Minister lost a motion of confidence. This launched Canada into an election where its nuclear policy and relationship with the United States would be a major focus of the campaign.

Shortly after the collapse of Diefenbaker's government, two more pro-nuclear members of Diefenbaker's Cabinet resigned: The Associate Minister of Defence Sevigny and the Minister of Trade George Hees. In their letters of resignation, both men cited concerns about Diefenbaker's nuclear policy and his support of an anti-American campaign.[210] According to Sevigny's letter of resignation, "Any so-called pro-Canadian policy based on this event [the State Department press release] can only be interpreted as anti-Americanism and manufactured electoral propaganda."[211] These resignations underscore the double-edged nature of the American restructuring effort. They both alienated Diefenbaker from the pro-nuclear factions in his coalition, pushing him farther down the path towards nationalism and reneging. At the same time, they also undermined the Prime Minister's leadership, paving the way for a new government with a more compliant approach to nuclear sharing.

[205]Bothwell, 2007, p.174.
[206]LAC, MG32, B19, Vol.57, The Nuclear Arms Crisis, 19-27 August 1963.
[207]Ibid.
[208]JFK NSF, Box 18, Canada General 2/1/63-2/14/63, 5 February 1963.
[209]Ibid.
[210]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 2/1/63-2/14/63, 9 February 1963.
[211]Ibid.

4.4.4 A Nationalist Campaign

During the 1963 election campaign, the nuclear issue was explicitly tied to the themes of Canadian nationalism, sovereignty, and independence from the United States. Unlike the previous election in 1962, the question of nuclear acquisition and reneging were key campaign issues. While the remaining pro-nuclear and pro-American elements of Diefenbaker's Cabinet and coalition prevented him from acting on his most anti-American impulses, Diefenbaker still ran a nationalist campaign, emphasizing 'pro-Canadianism.'[212] The campaign endorsed the importance of Canadian sovereignty. It framed the American attempts to influence their policies as direct affronts to Canada's national pride. Foregrounding the attempt to influence Canada's nuclear policy was a central component of this strategy.[213]

Diefenbaker drew upon multiple arguments to bolster support for reneging on Canada's nuclear commitments. Firstly, he claimed Canada had never made a firm commitment to store nuclear weapons on its soil or to engage in nuclear sharing.[214] He suggested that the commitment to NATO could be renegotiated during the next Ministerial meeting in May.[215] Secondly, that the weapons – at least the ones that would be stationed in Canada – were not effective: the age of the bomber was ending, giving way to intercontinental missiles, which could not be intercepted with BOMARCs or the CF-101.[216] This claim was reinforced a week before Canada went to the polls, when the American Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara gave testimony in the US House Appropriations Committee "in which he admitted that the BOMARC installations were largely meant to "draw fire" away from important sites rather than provide protection."[217] Both of these appeals tried to take the bite out of reneging, perhaps in an effort to attract more moderate voters.

However, the nationalist element was at the heart of Diefenbaker's campaign to renege on Canada's nuclear commitments. He tried to stir voter sympathies by playing on their sense of national pride, as well as their fear of nuclear war and foreign domination. During his nominating speech on March 2nd, Diefenbaker played on the

[212]Bothwell, 2007, p.174; JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 2/1/63-2/14/63, 8 February 1963; McKercher, 2016, p.197. Elements of a nationalist platform had emerged during the Conservative Party conference in January, when Diefenbaker launched the slogan "Made in Canada."

[213]McKercher, 2016, p.197

[214]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 19 February 1963; JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 20 February 1963a; JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 20 February 1963b.

[215]Ibid.

[216]McKercher, 2016, p.197; JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 4 March 1963; Simpson, 2001, pp.124-125.

[217]McKercher, 2016, p.199.

sense of fear and outrage of the Canadian public: "[W]e shall not have Canada used as a storage dump for nuclear weapons."[218] In Diefenbaker's hands, McNamara's statement was not just about the efficacy of the BOMARC, but also took on nationalist overtones, making it about the fundamental survival of Canada:

> The Liberals party would have us put nuclear warheads on something that is hardly worth scrapping. What's it for? To attract the fire of intercontinental missiles. Never, never, never, never has there been a revelation equal to this. The whole bottom fell out of the Liberal program today. The Liberal policy is to make Canada a decoy for intercontinental missiles.[219]

These statements insinuated that the United States was not acting in Canada's best interests, and there could be dire consequences if Canada did not vigilantly guard its independence in its security policy.

The importance of Canadian sovereignty in the nuclear matter was another key theme. During his official opening campaign speech on March 4th, the nuclear issue featured heavily. Diefenbaker proclaimed, "We want Canada to be in control on Canadian soil."[220] Diefenbaker contrasted himself with Pearson, highlighting that he had Canada's best interest at heart, while his rival was catering to foreign powers: "we make <u>our</u> policies in Canada, not generated by special pressures or even business across the border."[221] He continued,

> our responsibility for the security of Canada lies with Canadians, the maintenance of our national sovereignty. We come before the Canadian people and say, "We believe, as did [Canada's first Prime Minister] MacDonald that Canadians have the right to decide what is best for Canada." That's <u>our</u> view... whether it is ... defense, the economy, our culture, our institutions and our social standards.
>
> We are going to discharge that responsibility always in cooperation but never from coercion... That's the stand that this Government will take.[222]

[218]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 4 March 1963. For the whole speech, see JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 13 March 1963a. See also JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 5 April 1963.

[219]Diefenbaker in Simpson, 2001, pp.124-125.

[220]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 13 March 1963a.

[221]Ibid. Transcript of a campaign speech by Diefenbaker, emphasis was added by the individual that transcribed the speech.

[222]Ibid.

Thus, reneging was reframed as a reassertion of sovereignty: a means by which Canada could take back control of its defence policy.

Meanwhile, the campaign tried to portray Diefenbaker as a beleaguered 'man of the people.'[223] Green reinforced this in his own speeches, claiming that "no Canadian Prime Minister had ever been subject to such vicious and unfair attacks... I don't think the people will stand for this sort of treatment."[224] Diefenbaker also drew upon this theme in campaign speeches: "Last election I flew over Canada and saw the people from above. This time I'm going to be with the people in the grass roots of this nation."[225]

Towards the end of the campaign, the nationalist rhetoric escalated when rumors surfaced in Canadian newspapers that there was an "ace up Diefenbaker's sleeve:" a document that demonstrated that the United States was planning to 'push' Canada – and Diefenbaker – to accept its nuclear weapons, using explicit threats of sanctions if they did not comply.[226] This memo – known as the 'Push Memo' – had in fact been left behind during Kennedy's official visit to Canada in May 1961, and eventually made its way to Diefenbaker.[227] Despite the salacious reports, the real memo was quite benign. With the subject, 'What we want from the Ottawa trip,' it contained no reference to the nuclear issue, nor any concrete threat of retaliation if the Canadians did not take on the desired policies that were mentioned.[228] The Prime Minister had considered releasing this memo during the 1962 elections to run a more nationalist campaign but was eventually dissuaded from doing so by the Americans.[229]

[223]According to one American assessment, Diefenbaker was "using all his forensic talent to portray himself as the little man fighting powerful vested interests both nationally and internationally. He is seeking to project the image of the underdog, likens himself to Harry Truman in 1948, and claims everybody is against him except the people" JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 14 March 1963. This document was part of a campaign assessment that was requested by the president. See also JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 15 March 1963.

[224]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 19 February 1963.

[225]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 13 March 1963a. Transcript of a campaign speech by Diefenbaker, emphasis was added by the individual that transcribed the speech.

[226]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General Rostow Memorandum 5/16/61 and related materials 5/61-5/63, 27 March 1963. According to one report, "Possible pressures to be brought to bear in achieving these objectives were the threats of cuts in U.S. defense production sharing and the possibility of quotas or increased tariffs against Canadian gas and oil, lead and zinc and timber products entering the United States market."

[227]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General Rostow Memorandum 5/16/61 and related materials 5/61-5/63, 16 May 1961.

[228]Ibid.

[229]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General Rostow Memorandum 5/16/61 and related materials 5/61-5/63, 5 May 1962; JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General Rostow Memorandum 5/16/61 and related materials 5/61-5/63, 8 May 1962.

The Americans suspected that Diefenbaker himself leaked the memo, despite his denials and vague refutations of these reports.[230] The Americans saw an advantage to this approach: it allowed the Prime Minister to distance himself from the leaking, while still benefiting from it, as it directly fed into the nationalist rhetoric in his campaign. It also allowed Diefenbaker to avoid correcting some of the falsehoods that were being circulated, which painted the United States in an extremely bad light. As one American official hand wrote on a telegram on this matter, this strategy seemed to be a "[p]retty clear use of the of the "push" document without "using" it!"[231] The President took a similar view.[232] In his frustration, Kennedy considered intervening in the Canadian election in a phone call on March 28th:

> And it is just the question of what reaction it is having. If it is helping Diefenbaker, we ought to think about knocking it down and the question would be how. It ought to be just Canadian. We ought to get the actual [document]... perhaps consider whether they ought to leak in Canada the true version of what it said... Or maybe we just ought to shut up. That, I don't know.[233]

The President and his administration ultimately decided to take the latter approach: to shut up.

4.4.5 The Restructuring Dilemma

As Diefenbaker's anti-American and nationalist rhetoric escalated, the Americans nervously watched from the sidelines.[234] The American Embassy in Canada consistently projected that the Conservatives would not be able to achieve a majority and that the Canadian population was not responding to his anti-American campaign, but this did

[230]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General Rostow Memorandum 5/16/61 and related materials 5/61-5/63, 2 April 1963; JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General Rostow Memorandum 5/16/61 and related materials 5/61-5/63, 3 April 1963; JFK, POF, Presidential Recordings, JFKPOF-TPH-16A-5. While there is no concrete evidence that Diefenbaker was the source of the leak, there is some convincing circumstantial evidence. Diefenbaker had already threatened to release the push memo before the previous election, revealing that he clearly saw it as a political tool that could be used to rally voters.

[231]JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General Rostow Memorandum 5/16/61 and related materials 5/61-5/63, 1 April 1963.

[232]JFK, POF, Presidential Recordings, JFKPOF-TPH-16A-5. Quote taken from transcript with audio file.

[233]Ibid.

[234]Documents suggest that the Kennedy administration closely followed the 1963 election, with the Embassy sending regular updates about the status of the election to the State Department. See, for example, JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 11 March 1963; JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 28 March 1963; JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 4 April 1963a.

not fully ease American concerns. While officials were confident that most Canadians were supportive of both nuclear acquisition and the United States, they still worried that Diefenbaker might win the election or remain in power. In fact, the Secretary of State asked the Canadian Embassy to "evaluate the constitutional" feasibility of a scenario where the Conservatives would lose their plurality, but Diefenbaker would not give up his Premiership.[235]

Despite these fears, the Americans rejected any further public attempts at restructuring. Most American officials agreed that the best course of action would be to stay out of the campaign and not respond to the anti-American provocations. They thought that this would end up playing into the hands of Diefenbaker and further strengthen his campaign. As Ambassador Butterworth cautioned in one telegram to the Secretary of State, American officials should be careful not to inadvertently help Diefenbaker's cause by appearing to put their thumb on the scale: "Embassy believes it important that extreme care be used on our side to avoid any public or private statement which would aid Diefenbaker and undercut our friends who are waging a battle for a coherent defense policy."[236] According to a memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, prepared by military advisor L.J. Legere,[237] "Our governing policy line continues to be avoidance of all association with Canadian affairs, especially military affairs."[238] Legere ensured this policy was being followed by being "in daily contact with the Canada Desk, where the watchword is 'Remember January 30,'" referring to the date of the State Department's press release.[239] This attitude continued even after the reports of the push memo, which was viewed as a provocative attack against the American government. According to a memorandum to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense by Bundy on April 1st, despite the likely increase in inflammatory and anti-American rhetoric, the "President wishes to avoid the appearance of interference, even by responding to what may appear to be untruthful, distorted, or unethical statements or actions."[240]

[235]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 20 March 1963.

[236]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 20 February 1963b.

[237]L.J. Legere was the assistant on military policy and NATO to Maxwell Taylor, who was the special military assistant to the President.

[238]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 13 March 1963b.

[239]Ibid.

[240]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 1 April 1963a. This memo was sent at the urging of Legere, who believed that "a formal and supplementary warning" would better serve the administration in keeping potentially disgruntled individuals in line: "Everyone theoretically supports the shut-up policy, but when a given individual or agency is maligned by Diefenbaker, he or it becomes strongly tempted to lash back" (JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 1 April 1963b).

The Americans worried that restructuring would serve to strengthen Diefenbaker's nationalist appeals and therefore be counterproductive.

Negotiations between the US and Canada were still technically ongoing. The Canadian government wanted to follow with the same hard line that no nuclear weapons could be housed on Canadian soil; they pushed the United States to find a solution to this impasse.[241] However, even with the threat of a nationalist resurgence hanging in the air, Diefenbaker was not able to achieve any leverage with the Americans. As Butterworth details in a telegram sent on February 26th, a compromise solution with the Canadians was even less desirable at this time. It could ultimately help Diefenbaker's electoral chances and could have a hand-tying effect even in the case of a Liberal victory:

> With the liberal party finally adopting forthright policy nuclear storage in Canada, we would strongly recommend no indication be made during pre-election period of USG willingness to accept other than normal provisions stockpile agreement. This not only because compromise would undercut campaign position those favorably disposed but because a contrived solution at this juncture would prejudice the attainment of an operationally satisfactory solution in post-election period if liberal party wins majority or strong plurality.[242]

Ambassador Butterworth cautioned that the United States should essentially stall, avoiding any "definitive decision" by delaying the response to the Canadian offer and by asking for further information once a response was sent.[243] Thus, while the potential of Diefenbaker's nationalist coalition was strong enough to curb further American attempts at restructuring, it was not credible enough to translate into bargaining power in negotiations.

4.4.6 Nationalist Appeals and Domestic Audience Costs

Among Presidential National Security documents on Canada, there was a series about the 1963 election, entitled 'The Voter Speaks,' by Sam Lubell, published in the

[241] The continuation of negotiations was essential for the government to portray itself as still being in good faith while also standing up to the Americans.

[242] JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 26 February 1963. Butterworth also cautioned that if there was a Conservative and Social Credit coalition or a Liberal minority dependent on the NDP, the United States government "may prefer an imperfect solution to none at all" for nuclear sharing.

[243] JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 26 February 1963.

Toronto Star Syndicate. Lubell was an American political analyst, who utilized a mixed-method technique to predict the outcome of elections that used polling results to select geographical areas and demographic subsets for door-to-door interviews.[244] He recorded his findings in a series on the Canadian election, which was published from March 25th to April 7th and contained projections about the likely result of the election. According to his own account, Lubell had no expertise on Canadian politics and affairs, relying wholly on his interview subjects to gain a sense of Canadian political dynamics and priorities.[245] These reports represent a significant primary source of historical Canadian attitudes on nuclear weapons, reneging, and nationalism. While the generalizability of his findings should be interpreted with caution, Lubell conducted interviews on many Canadian voters, providing a rich source of primary data on what voters were thinking.

The nuclear question was a major electoral issue and had a substantive impact on voting patterns. Diefenbaker's embrace of nationalist reneging caused a shift of Conservative voters to the Liberals. Lubell estimated that Diefenbaker's reneging rallying cry "seems to be costing the Prime Minister at least a fifth and perhaps a fourth of his 1962 vote," an election that was already considered a dismal result for the Conservatives."[246] In fact, "no other campaign issue is causing anywhere as many voter shifts as is the nuclear agitation."[247] He noted that if the Liberals did win the election, it would be due to Diefenbaker's mishandling of the nuclear issue.[248] These shifts were not just a reflection of Canadians desire to have nuclear weapons on their soil. In fact, Lubell found that the nuclear issue became a proxy for how citizens felt about the United States and its involvement in Canada.[249]

An interesting aspect of Lubell's account is how some voters' reasoning for abandoning the Conservatives overlaps with previous theories of the micro-foundations of

[244]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 25 March 1963; Smothers, 1987.

[245]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 25 March 1963. Interestingly, Lubell notes with surprise the degree to which the United States featured in Canadian politics: "Like most Americans, I have never thought that the United States has a "Canadian problem." But for some years to come, I suspect, Americans will have to learn to adjust to a restless, none-too satisfied neighbor on our northern frontier."

[246]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 26 March 1963.

[247]Ibid.

[248]Ibid.

[249]Ibid. However, the nuclear issue and nationalist standoff with the United States were not the primary issue of concern to most voters: rather, the economy and jobs were the number one issue for most Canadians. On the other hand, one's view of the United States certainly intersected with these matters: with some believing that the Canadian economy was too reliant on the United States to fully thrive, while others believed that a close and positive relationship with the United States was crucial for Canada's economic health (JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 27 March 1963).

audience costs. Canadian voters shifted from Conservative to Liberal because they were worried about the material and reputational costs of reneging: "I've never voted Liberal but Diefenbaker is wrecking American relations with his nuclear arms policy."[250] As one woman argued, Diefenbaker "made such a fool of this country over nuclear arms."[251] Another former Conservative voter noted, "Pearson is no campaigner but he won't wreck our relations with the rest of the world."[252] Some also believe that reneging reflected Diefenbaker's ineffective leadership and deficient personality. These included criticisms like: "He's so irresponsible he makes me ashamed I am a Canadian" and "He can't make up his mind" and "He's not a leader. He just sits on the fence."[253]

Nevertheless, there were voters that were receptive to the nationalist message. In his March 29th release, Lubell notes that within the last ten days, there was "a fairly dramatic shift in how many voters feel towards" Diefenbaker – or "Canada John" as one voter referred to him.[254] He finds a surge of support for the Prime Minister because "He knows his own mind" and "No one tells him what to do" or "he won't be bossed around not even by the U.S."[255] Another voter demonstrated how Diefenbaker's nationalist campaign rhetoric resonated with some voters: "I don't like to feel we're sitting ducks for the Yanks, just decoys."[256] Lubell shows that Diefenbaker's attempts to portray himself as a populist 'man of the people' did have a positive effect on his image among some voters.[257] Further, the Prime Minister's claims that the Bomarc was obsolete cast doubt on the utility and necessity of these weapons, even among "strong Liberal supporters who criticize Mr. Diefenbaker" for his anti-American rhetoric.[258] These arguments were substantiated on April 3rd, after the reporting McNamara's testimony to a Congressional Committee that the BOMARC's had only limited military utility. This testimony, along with the rumors about the

[250]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 25 March 1963.
[251]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 29 March 1963.
[252]Ibid.
[253]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 2 April 1963. The last quote is from an individual that was still intending on voting for the Conservative Party but was hoping that Diefenbaker would be impeached.
[254]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 29 March 1963.
[255]Ibid.
[256]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 4 April 1963b.
[257]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 29 March 1963. According to one voter: "I was going Liberal... But I saw a picture of Old John in front of a big crowd saying everybody is against me but the people. He was standing so straight. He stands up for what he believes."
[258]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 26 March 1963; JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 25 March 1963.

push memo, seemed to provide external validation for Diefenbaker's hostility towards the United States, emphasis on Canadian sovereignty, and his anti-nuclear stance.

However, this crystallization of the message came too late to make up the losses that his party had already endured. Regardless of the persuasive power of his nationalist appeals, much of his base was supportive of nuclear acquisition. Furthermore, the collapse of support from the elite level also alienated Conservative voters. According to Lubell, Conservative "shifters" tended to "criticize Mr. Diefenbaker as "a born squabbler" or "a one-man man" or "a dictator who can't get along with anyone."[259] According to Lubell a "frequently expressed criticism" that was lobbed at the Prime Minister was, "When a man's own cabinet ministers resign there must be something wrong with him."[260] Diefenbaker's failure to hold his coalition at the elite level therefore affected his ability to garner a nationalist coalition at the mass level. Thus, his original straddle strategy laid the groundwork for his failure to achieve a nationalist coalition that would elect him and support reneging.

Another aspect that affected Diefenbaker's support was voter confusion. Diefenbaker's inconsistent stance up until the election was not immediately clarified by his new nationalist tone and rhetoric, leaving some voters unsure about what is actual message was. In late March, Lubell reported that voters were split on how they perceived Diefenbaker's stance towards nuclear weapons: some believing he was pro-acquisition, others believed he was against, and others were not sure.[261] Some voters complained that "the more I hear the more confused I get," demonstrating that the nuclear issue, after so many shifts in policy, was ill-suited for a rally-around-the-flag appeal.[262]

In the end, Diefenbaker could not make up his lost support by picking up enough dissatisfied anti-nuclear voters from the Liberal Party. The Liberals largely maintained their support or lost their staunch anti-nuclear voters to the leftist NDP, which was also running an anti-nuclear and anti-American campaign.[263] Diefenbaker lost the 1963 election, paving the way for a Liberal minority government under Lester Pearson.

[259]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 29 March 1963.
[260]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 2 April 1963.
[261]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 26 March 1963.
[262]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 4 April 1963b.
[263]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 11 March 1963; JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 26 March 1963.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the weakness of anti-nuclear coalitions in intra-alliance negotiations and the potential of nationalist coalitions for reneging. The dramatic shifts in Diefenbaker's policy towards Canada's nuclear alliance commitments were related to changes to his domestic coalition. Diefenbaker initially intended to keep his commitment to acquire nuclear weapons for Canadian forces. Between 1957 to 1960, Diefenbaker went out of his way to signal to both domestic and international audiences that he intended to fulfill these commitments through hand-tying and cost-sinking mechanisms. However, beginning in 1960, Diefenbaker became wary of alienating the growing anti-nuclear movement and tried to accommodate anti-nuclear sentiment within his coalition. Worried about the negative political repercussions of both reneging and acquisition, the Prime Minister delayed a decision on Canada's nuclear policy and adopted an increasingly vague approach. The single-issue nature of Diefenbaker's coalition allowed for this straddle strategy: by delaying, Diefenbaker could keep nuclear weapons off Canadian soil, while still appearing as if he was maintaining alliance solidarity and not breaking his commitments.

After the Cuban Missile Crisis, domestic and international pressures for a resolution to the nuclear issue made it impossible to delay negotiations further. In a continuation of Diefenbaker's straddle strategy, Canadian negotiators pursued the standby and missing part approach: a compromise solution that would allow Canada to claim that it fulfilled its obligations while keeping nuclear weapons off their soil. However, Canadian leverage was undermined by the anti-nuclear nature of Diefenbaker's coalition: its need for a consensus-based process and mutual agreement, its lack of credible threat of withdrawal, and its vulnerability to restructuring. Essentially, both pro- and anti-nuclear elements of this coalition had a stake in maintaining Canada's status as a 'good ally' and were vulnerable to claims that it was reneging on its commitments. Ultimately, the State Department's attempt to restructure Canada's negotiating position through the publication of a press release led Diefenbaker to change strategies and try to appeal to a nationalist coalition in support of reneging.

In one sense, this case affirms institutionalist logics of the costliness of reneging. Diefenbaker paid the price for threatening to renege and appearing to be an unreliable ally. This had direct consequences within his own Cabinet and then at the ballot box. However, the way that events unfolded also suggests that there are differences between anti-nuclear and nationalist coalitions. While American officials consistently discounted nascent anti-nuclear sentiments, they worried about a potential nationalist

coalition emerging as a threat to allied relations. While confident that most Canadians had a positive view of the United States and President Kennedy, they were wary that Diefenbaker could turn the nuclear issue into a nationalist one. However, the Prime Minister refrained from doing so, until the 1963 election. Thus, Diefenbaker failed to lay the foundations that could have increased his bargaining power when negotiations finally began. Lubell's public opinion data indicates that as Diefenbaker's nationalist message began to cohere, his electoral support increased, suggesting that some voters were more willing to accept reneging on nationalist terms rather than anti-nuclear ones. American officials were dissuaded from any further restructuring attempts, worried that it would only strengthen Diefenbaker's nationalist support.

Domestic considerations, rather than strategic factors, governed the changes in Diefenbaker's foreign policy outlook. The military argument in favour of nuclear acquisition in general remained constant over time. Only when Diefenbaker saw nuclear sharing as a potential election issue that could be framed in nationalist terms, did he cast doubts on the strategic necessity of nuclear sharing. The only weapons system which was considered dubious in terms of military effectiveness was the Bomarc. While Diefenbaker claimed that this explained his reluctance to accept nuclear weapons, it cannot explain the Prime Minister's equal unwillingness to accept the CF-101 interceptors.

In the end, this change in strategy came too late to save Diefenbaker from the consequences of reneging. Diefenbaker miscalculated. His straddle strategy aimed to keep his coalition together. Instead, it eventually alienated members of his Cabinet and the Party at large, which triggered the fall of his government and resignation of several of his Ministers. The inconsistency in his nuclear policy and inability to hold together his Cabinet also alienated potential Conservative voters. Some viewed the collapse of Diefenbaker's Cabinet as a failure of leadership and character, taking signals from the elite level on Diefenbaker's handling of the nuclear issue. In these circumstances, Diefenbaker could not form a nationalist coalition and lost the election.

5

Case Study 2: Lester B. Pearson

> *"As a Canadian, I am ashamed if we accept pledges with our allies and then refuse to honour them. In acting thus we deceive ourselves, let our armed forces down, and betray our allies. As I understand international affairs, when you make and continue to accept commitments in any area, you carry them out until they are changed by agreement."*
>
> – Lester B. Pearson, Leader of the Liberal Party, January 12 1963[1]

In Chapter 3, I argued that leaders with the support of anti-nuclear coalitions are less likely to renege than those supported by nationalist coalitions. This is due to the fact that anti-nuclear coalitions' support for reneging is specific and limited. They do not fundamentally question alliance membership. They care about the material and reputational costs associated with reneging. Leaders with the support of these coalitions are likely to suffer double-edged domestic audience costs for alliance defection and therefore less likely to attempt reneging, more likely to adopt consensus-based strategies, and more likely to fail in their reneging attempts. The previous chapter demonstrated the weakness of these coalitions by showing that Diefenbaker's anti-nuclear coalition provided little leverage in negotiations with the Americans, ultimately leading to reneging failure.

This chapter will address how the weakness of anti-nuclear coalitions may cause leaders to not even attempt reneging. I will use the shifting nuclear policy of Lester Pearson, leader of the Liberal Party (1958-1968) and then Prime Minister of Canada (1963-1968) as a case study. From the late 1950s, Pearson and the Liberal party opposed nuclear acquisition. However, despite Pearson's anti-nuclear coalition and his personal anti-nuclear beliefs, Pearson reversed his stance. The Liberal Party ran

[1]LAC, MG 32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 12 January 1963.

on a pro-acquisition platform in the 1963 election and Pearson accepted a nuclear sharing role for Canada within the first year of his tenure as Prime Minister.

The main puzzle that is explored here is therefore: Why did Pearson dramatically reverse his position on nuclear sharing in 1963? Pearson and the Liberals had opposed the government's nuclear policy from the beginning of Diefenbaker's tenure. Yet, on January 12th 1963, Pearson gave a speech in Scarborough, Ontario that unambiguously gave his – and the Liberal Party's – support to nuclear acquisition. There are two central elements to this puzzle: the substance and the timing of Pearson's reversal. Substantively, Pearson's about-face is surprising due to his previous principled anti-nuclear position and the Liberal Party's long-held opposition to nuclear sharing. Moreover, according to literature on reneging, Pearson should have felt that he had a freer hand in reversing a previous administration's policy than the Prime Minister that had made the commitment in the first place.[2] The timing of Pearson's reversal is also of note. Pearson maintained his anti-nuclear stance and nuclear sharing did not feature as a central issue in the June 1962 elections. However, by November 1962, according to Pearson's own account, he was reconsidering his position.[3] This timing corresponds to the hardening on Diefenbaker's stance in opposition to nuclear acquisition. Furthermore, Pearson *took the initiative* to announce his unambiguously pro-nuclear stance *before* Diefenbaker had clarified his own policy. In doing so, Pearson left the possibility open for Diefenbaker to fulfill Canada's nuclear commitments and blame the Opposition for the delay. This chapter will not only examine why Pearson changed his position so drastically, but also why he did so at that precise moment in history.

This chapter argues that Pearson reversed his position on nuclear acquisition because he was unwilling to suffer the high costs of reneging on Canada's nuclear commitments. Pearson built his coalition on the proposition that it was possible to be wholeheartedly supportive of the Western Alliance, while *specifically* rejecting a nuclear role for Canada. Beginning in the fall of 1962, Pearson realised that the anti-nuclear coalition that supported that platform would not inoculate him from the material, reputational, and domestic audience costs that Diefenbaker's government was suffering due to its own non-fulfillment of its nuclear commitments. Pearson attempted to use the government's increasingly hostile position towards the United States and nuclear sharing to his electoral advantage, capitalizing on the domestic

[2]Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, 2015.

[3]LAC, MG 32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 9-11 January 1961; Pearson, 1975, pp.70-71.

audience costs that Diefenbaker was suffering to gain more votes for the Liberal Party. Pearson directly appealed to voters by focusing on the firmness of Canada's commitments. He argued that reneging would undermine national security and ruin Canada's reputation among its allies. He also promised anti-nuclear Liberal supporters that he would try to renegotiate Canada's nuclear role as soon as it was possible, emphasizing a consensus-based approach in international negotiations.

This chapter explores several possible explanations for Pearson's reversal, demonstrating that all of them relate to his sensitivity to the costs of reneging, despite his personal and political anti-nuclear stance. The timeline of events shows that there were escalating pressures on Pearson to reverse his stance. These pressures should have applied equally to the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. Yet, the fears of the high costs of reneging came to bear down only on Pearson because he was not trying to appeal to a nationalist coalition.

This chapter proceeds as follows. After providing a brief background on Pearson's political career, I describe the Liberals' anti-nuclear coalition up to 1962, demonstrating how they specifically rejected a nuclear role of Canada, while supporting its participation in alliances more generally. The next section focuses on why Pearson changed his position on nuclear acquisition when he did, showing that it was related to his increased awareness of the material, reputational, and domestic audience costs associated with reneging. The final section examines how Pearson managed to retain most members of his anti-nuclear coalition, despite his drastic change in policy.

5.1 Background

Lester Pearson became the leader of the Liberal Party on the heels of the party's electoral defeat in 1957. The 1958 election was called soon after he took over party leadership. According to his own account, Pearson was unprepared to lead this campaign.[4] The 1958 election was a humiliation for the Liberal Party, resulting in not only the Liberals' defeat, but also reduced their number of seats in Parliament to just 48 out of 265. Previously, the Liberals had been in a dominant political position and had controlled government from 1935 to 1957.

In many respects, Pearson and Diefenbaker contrasted starkly in terms of background and leadership style. Unlike Diefenbaker, who thrived in the limelight of campaigns, Pearson "could never really feel comfortable with those enormous two-

[4]Pearson, 1975, p.34.

or three-hour political jamborees before five or ten thousand people."[5] Compared to Diefenbaker, who had spent most of his career in the opposition benches, Pearson had ample insider experience, serving as Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1948 to 1957. He also had an extensive experience as a diplomat and civil servant, winning the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in ending the Suez Crisis, affirming his reputation as someone highly adept in international affairs.[6]

5.1.1 Pearson's Anti-Nuclear Coalition

Pearson and the Liberal party had firmly rejected a nuclear sharing role for Canada before January 1963. This position was supported not only by the leader of the opposition, but also many influential Liberal Party officials, and by wider party membership. While the majority of Canadians supported nuclear sharing, the Liberal party had a strong anti-nuclear core at the elite and party level.[7] By the spring of 1962, Pearson and the Liberal party had firmly and publicly taken an anti-nuclear stance. They argued that nuclear sharing would amount to an expansion of the nuclear club, frustrate the prospects of disarmament, and that the nuclear weapons systems were ineffective. At the same time, Pearson and the Liberals were unwavering in their support of the Western Alliance. Liberal officials took pains to clarify that their rejection of a nuclear role was not a repudiation of NATO or NORAD. Thus, the coalition that Pearson constructed was single-issue in nature.

Pearson himself represented the double-edged nature of single-issue anti-nuclear beliefs: he took a principled stance against nuclear acquisition, while taking pains to underscore his support for Canada's alliance ties more generally.[8] Pearson was morally opposed to the horrors of nuclear war, even stating in an interview that he would "rather be red than dead."[9] According to Judy LaMarsh, a Liberal MP who would later serve in Pearson's Cabinet, Pearson's anti-nuclear credentials were extensive:

[5]Ibid., pp.34-35.

[6]Ibid., p.43.

[7]See Kent, 1988, p.187.

[8]Pearson adopted a more nationalist tone in his early criticisms of nuclear sharing. While Pearson still rejected nuclear acquisition, he argued that *if* Canada did accept nuclear weapons, it should be under sole Canadian control and custody, rather than joint control. However, this line was dropped over time and the Liberals focussed on a more firmly anti-nuclear rationale to justify their rejection of nuclear sharing. See LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 10 March 1959; LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 2 July 1959; LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 20 January 1960; LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 27 January 1960.

[9]Bothwell, 2007, p.172.

> This man had stood for peace throughout his whole lifetime. He repeated over and over again that we must not permit the proliferation of atomic weapons or their use. He had been as responsible as any in refusing to let Canada make its own nuclear weapons...[10]

As Pearson wrote in response to a member of the Voice of Women, Canada "should use all of her influence in the councils of the world to bring about negotiations which will prevent the holocaust of nuclear destruction."[11] In this letter, Pearson also applauded the Voice of Women's call for a 'World Peace Year.' However, he was careful to highlight that Canada should oppose membership in the nuclear club "while playing her full part in collective defence."[12]

Pearson repeatedly clarified his position on Canada's alliances, dissociating himself and the Liberal Party from a neutralist stance.[13] In November 1961, Pearson received a letter from Mrs. F. L. Showler, a concerned citizen, who decried Pearson's refusal to automatically reject a request from the US or UK to base nuclear weapons in Canada under American or British control. She believed that this was a "reversal of stand."[14] In his response, Pearson insisted that his "position in regard to the acquisition and use of nuclear arms by Canada has not changed... Canada should not become a nuclear power" and should not have custody or control over nuclear weapons.[15] However, while nuclear sharing was an unacceptable expansion of the nuclear club, nuclear basing, where the nuclear weapons state retained control, was another matter. He noted that he supported NATO, the "Western nuclear deterrent," and rejected the prospects of "unilateral disarmament."[16] Further, according to Pearson, Canada, as

[10]LaMarsh, 1969, p.28.

[11]LAC, MG26 N2, Vol.50, 806.2, 4 October 1961. In fact, Pearson's wife was a member of the Voice of Women, she cut ties with the group after her husband came out in support of nuclear acquisition.

[12]Ibid.

[13]See LAC, MG26 N2, Vol.88, "Neutralism," 2 February 1960, a memorandum by Pearson on his views of neutralism: "I do not feel that Canada can be neutral in the "cold" war so long as one side represents Communism as a form of government and the other free democracy. To be neutral would be to make no distinction between them. However, while avoiding "neutralism" of this type, I think that Canada should do everything she can to prevent the conflict of ideas developing into war and, indeed, to remove eventually the control itself on terms which are honourable and security. I have always believed also that security in the world of today requires working closely with our friends. It is something we cannot achieve by ourselves. This means co-operation with those friends, not neutrality or neutralism." A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates that this was used as a template response to letters that inquired after Pearson's position on neutralism ('Keep for future [illegible]'). See, for example, LAC, MG26 N2, Vol.88, Neutralism, June 1960.

[14]LAC, MG26 N2, Vol.50, File 806.2, 14 November 1961.

[15]LAC, MG26 N2, Vol.50, File 806.2, 17 November 1961.

[16]Ibid.

a member of NATO, was obligated to at least a consider a request for the use of her territory as a base for nuclear weapons for the US or the UK. While he expressed doubt about the strategic utility of nuclear basing in Canada and indicated that he would likely reject this request, Pearson highlighted that if he was Prime Minister, he would have to at least consider the request as a member of the Alliance: "Refusal to give consideration would I think, seem that we should withdraw from the Alliance completely and I am not in favour of that."[17] In this letter Pearson rejects *both* nuclear sharing and withdrawing from NATO, drawing a clear distinction between the two: "In short, I repeat that I am not willing to advocate a policy, either of Canada becoming a nuclear power by acquiring nuclear weapons or of Canada withdrawing from the NATO coalition by" refusing to even consider a nuclear basing request from the US or the UK.[18]

During a TV interview in late March 1962, Pearson, still facing accusations of having a "murky" defence policy, stated that the Liberal Party now rejected both nuclear sharing and basing, equating nuclear forward deployment with the expansion of the nuclear club:

> I believe that we should have a defence policy which will not require Canada to become a nuclear power in the sense of making, or using, or securing, nuclear weapons for her forces and which would be under national control. Now, that's clear cut... we should not become a nuclear power. We should not have a policy that requires us to be a nuclear power by having our soil used as a nuclear base under the national control of any other country"[19]

While his position on basing had changed, his support for Canada's alliances had not. Pearson also emphasized during the interview that Canada would still have to "do our full part... in the collective Western defence effort."[20] Thus, the issue was not the nature of the alliance but the means of supporting it, which could be done "through conventional methods, rather than through nuclear methods."[21] This interview was later transcribed and published as a press release by the Liberal Party.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid. Pearson sent multiple letters with a similar response to other concerned Canadians that objected to his perceived pro-nuclear shift in policy. For one example, see LAC, MG26 N2, Vol.50, 806.2, 7 December 1961.

[19]LAC, MG32 B33, Vol.75, 21, 28 March 1962.

[20]Ibid

[21]Ibid

This anti-nuclear stance was supported by officials in the Liberal Party's inner circle. Many important Liberal MPs and advisors held firm anti-nuclear positions.[22] While some opposed nuclear weapons on moral grounds, others doubted the strategic necessity of nuclear acquisition. For example, Paul Hellyer, who would later become Defence Minister in Pearson's government, argued that nuclear weapons had little military utility and that defence dollars were best spent on conventional weaponry.[23] Similar to Pearson, Hellyer was equally opposed to Canada taking on a non-aligned position, stating in the House of Commons in January 1961, "We cannot be neutralist. To be neutralist is to be nothing."[24]

This anti-nuclear position was also reflected in official Liberal policy and among the wider membership. During the National Liberal Rally in January 1961, which was intended to formulate the Liberal platform for the next election, the Liberal Party rejected nuclear sharing, even under joint control, asserting that it would amount to an extension of the nuclear club.[25] In a defence policy paper, the Liberals argued that if Canada accepted nuclear weapons for its forces, it would undermine its own disarmament goals:

> Canada cannot deny nuclear weapons to other nations and at the same time arm her own forces with them. A new Liberal government therefore would not acquire, manufacture or use such weapons either under Canadian control or under joint U.S.-Canadian control.[26]

This document specifically highlights that a new Liberal government would renege on its nuclear and conventional interceptor role NORAD, while retaining other conventional commitments:

> Under a new Liberal government Canada will withdraw from NORAD insofar as its present interceptor role is concerned. Liberal policy would, however, provide for an appropriate Canadian contribution to continental defence in co-operation with the U.S.A. The Canadian role in such defence should be that of detection, identification and warning. We would stop using our defence resources on interceptor fighter squadrons or on Bomarc missiles.[27]

[22]Kent, 1988, p.188; McMahon, 2009, p.159.
[23]LAC, MG32 B33, Vol.75, 21, (No Date); LAC, MG32 B33, Vol.75, 21, 25 September 1962.
[24]LAC, MG26 N2, Vol.88, Neutralism, 31 January 1961.
[25]LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 9-11 January 1961.
[26]Ibid.
[27]Ibid.

Indeed, according to Kent, "At the National Rally the predominant sentiment has been strongly against acceptance of any nuclear role for Canada."[28] However, consistent with other clarifications of Liberal policy towards nuclear sharing, this defence policy paper also highlighted the importance of NATO and its strategic relationship with the United States. It accepted the principle of nuclear sharing only under the multilateral control of NATO, rejecting a bilateral system of nuclear sharing.

The Liberals' opposition to nuclear sharing did not abate after the June 1962 election. Less than two months before he would try to convince Pearson to accept nuclear sharing, Hellyer wrote an op-ed on September 25th 1962 entitled, "The Case Against Atomic Weapons: False Security and No Real Defence."[29] In this article, Hellyer argued that both the BOMARCs and the nuclear strike role for the Air Division in Europe had little military utility and outlined his practical concerns with the weapons systems that Canada had committed to acquiring. While he advocated that the nuclear question should be decided on the basis of strategic, rather than moral, considerations, he also noted the dangers of nuclear proliferation: "A good case can be made for limiting control [of nuclear weapons] and thereby limiting the number of fingers on the trigger."[30] In addition, Pearson had also affirmed his stance late into 1962. According to Tom Kent, an advisor to Pearson:

> As late as November 12, 1962, he circulated to caucus the model letter that he was using in replying to correspondence about the nuclear issue, which said: "May I assure you that I do not believe that Canada should accept nuclear arms under national control by herself or by the United States. On the contrary, I have consistently argued that the nuclear club should not be extended."[31]

Nevertheless, just two months later, the Liberal Party would support the acquisition of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces and the retention of all four nuclear weapons systems.

[28]Kent, 1988, p.187.
[29]LAC, MG32 B33, Vol.75, 21, 25 September 1962.
[30]Ibid.
[31]Kent, 1988, pp.187-188

5.2 Why did Pearson Support Nuclear Acquisition in January 1963?

This section will examine various explanations for why Pearson reversed his anti-nuclear position and supported acquisition in January 1963. I will argue that Pearson's about-face was related to his increasing awareness and sensitivity to the costs of reneging. Beginning in the fall of 1962, Pearson began to grasp that Diefenbaker's inability to fulfill Canada's nuclear commitments were undermining Canada's reputation abroad as well as Diefenbaker's popularity at home. By witnessing the mounting reputational and audience costs of reneging, Pearson realised that he could avoid alliance instability, diplomatic turmoil, and provide himself with a path to the Prime Minister's office by supporting nuclear acquisition. Pearson's personal opposition to nuclear sharing, as well as the anti-nuclear coalition that he had constructed were not strong enough in the face of such pressures.

I examine four different explanations for Pearson's reversal. First, I explore the argument that Pearson's about-face was related to an increase in Canada's level of commitment, due to the arrival of the nuclear delivery systems by the fall of 1962. Second, I examine whether the Cuban Missile Crisis augmented Pearson's evaluation of the strategic necessity of nuclear acquisition. Third, I examine whether the international costs of reneging changed Pearson's mind. I focus on two key events that affected Pearson's calculations of international costs: Hellyer's report on the November 1962 NATO conference and General Norstad's statement in early January 1963. Lastly, the effect of domestic audience costs is explored. I focus on the polling data that Pearson received after November 1962, which revealed the support for keeping Canada's nuclear commitments and the Conservatives growing unpopularity.

All these factors reveal that there were escalating pressures on Pearson to change his stance on reneging. However, the latter two explanations, which focus on Pearson's increasing awareness of the international and domestic costs of reneging, provide the most insight into the direct causes of Pearson's decision-making. The first two explanations, on their own, do not explain why Pearson reversed his stance. In reading this section, one could conclude that Pearson's reversal was over-determined, that in the face of such pressures *any* politician would have supported nuclear sharing. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these were the very conditions that led Diefenbaker on the *opposite* path, in support of reneging on these commitments. The key for understanding this divergent behaviour is the coalition that they identified with and believed would carry them to win the 1963 election. While Diefenbaker

appealed to a more inward-facing, nationalistic coalition, Pearson had constructed a more outward-looking coalition that strongly valued alliance membership.

5.2.1 Increased Level of Commitment

One explanation of Pearson's reversal is that the level of commitment had changed by January 1963: the delivery vehicles had become operational by 1962. This explanation for the sudden reversal in Liberal policy was offered by Pearson in an interview a few weeks after the Scarborough speech, where he first established his support for nuclear acquisition.[32] One interviewer pushed Pearson on why he only recently reversed his position on whether the CF-104s should be nuclear armed, in "direct contrast to the position you took a year ago."[33] Pearson responded by highlighting that the context had changed. Before, Canada had only given a promise to take on a nuclear strike role. Now, Canada had acquired the CF-104s that could only be effective with nuclear weapons, meaning that they were more firmly committed to their nuclear role:

> ... Perhaps you think there is a contrast, but the fact remains that until the equipment was delivered to the squadrons, it was possible to change that role, to change that commitment to something else... Once the planes were delivered to the squadrons, and that began last November I believe, then it was up to use to ensure that the men who had those planes were able to discharge the role that had been entrusted to them until that role was changed.[34]

Thus, the level of commitment of Canada substantially increased only after November 1962.

The substance of this argument is repeated in a Liberal document on defence policy from 1963.[35] It argues that while it was possible to withdraw from Canada's

[32]LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 29 January 1963.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Ibid. Parts of this transcript were adapted with handwritten notations, which do not change the substance of the transcription. I have quoted the text here with the handwritten adjustments.

[35]LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, (No Date). Although this document does not have a date listed, it is clearly from 1963: it references the Norstad statement and discusses the change in the Liberals' nuclear policy. The document is also unsigned and entitled 'For Val Sears – Re: Defence Policy." Val Sears was a Canadian journalist for the Toronto Star. The document repeats many of the same points of the Scarborough speech, providing a justification for Pearson's and the Liberals' change in policy. The first-person language and the content indicate that Pearson was possibly the author of the document or at least it was intended to be his voice coming through. The information provided on the document, combined with its informal nature suggests that it may have been notes for a speech, but this is unclear.

commitments a year ago when they were softer, it was now impossible to renege, because the commitments "are now fixed and firm."[36] The document specifically mentions the completion of the Bomarc bases and the fact that the "missiles [are] now there" as well as the delivery of the CF-104s.[37]

This argument mirrors my claims about how tying hands and sinking costs can increase levels of commitment. In Chapter 2, I argued that making promises was a weaker form of commitment than partially fulfilling commitments. Partially fulfilled commitments involve both hand-tying as well as cost-sinking, increasing the strength of the commitment and therefore the costs of reneging. The claims made in the Liberal defence document above therefore have theoretical grounding. It is possible that the incentives to maintain a commitment made by a previous administration only become binding on a new administration only once they achieve partial fulfillment. This rationale could explain the timing of Pearson's reversal and why he only became sensitive to the costs of reneging in the latter half of 1962.

However, it is unlikely that the change in the level of commitment was the only or direct cause of Pearson's policy shift. Firstly, most of the weapon systems had started to be delivered by the end of 1961. By the end of October 1961, Pearson made a statement regarding the delivery of the first Bomarc to Canada, calling it "the day of decision" for the Diefenbaker government.[38] He also decries the lack of decision on the other nuclear weapons systems, highlighting the fact that the situation was not tenable:

> until some decision is taken about war-heads these weapons – and perhaps some others such as the Honest John and the U.S. Jets we are getting – are useless as a straw against a tank. At the moment they are weapons without <u>any</u> ammunition.[39] [Emphasis in original]

Thus, Pearson knew of the delivery of the Bomarc to Canada at least by 1961 and was aware that the other weapons systems would soon face a similar predicament. Secondly, regardless of his awareness of the delivery of specific weapons systems, Canada's commitments were clearly 'fixed and firm' even before their arrival to the military: the government had spent millions of dollars on the procurement of these

[36]Ibid.

[37]Ibid.

[38]LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 28 October 1961. This statement also revealed that Pearson was aware that the government had ordered the Bomarc B missile, which "is designed for nuclear war-heads only." See also Cabinet discussions of the delivery of Bomarc Missiles, CC, 23130, 21 November 1961.

[39]LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 28 October 1961.

weapons systems, sinking considerable costs. Lastly, focusing only on the increasing level of Canada's commitment over time does not explain why these pressures did not affect Diefenbaker's calculations in a similar way. The costs of reneging should have been just as high – if not higher – for Diefenbaker after Canada had partially fulfilled its nuclear commitments. The escalating level of commitment by the fall of 1962 merely exacerbated the problem of reneging for Pearson. The fact that the nuclear weapons systems were delivered by then did not in itself cause Pearson to change his position.

5.2.2 Increased Strategic Threat

Another explanation that will be rejected is a purely strategic one: that Pearson began to warm to nuclear acquisition after the level of threat (or his perception of it) changed after October 1962, when the world came to the brink of nuclear war. In his memoirs, Pearson cites the Cuban Missile Crisis as one of the two main events that caused him to change his mind on nuclear acquisition.[40] In his memoirs published many years later, Pearson highlighted how the Crisis made him fully appreciate the military necessity of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces:

> Even when our bases were put on alert, we discovered that we were impotent to use them since we had failed to make arrangements to acquire nuclear warheads for our defence systems; there was no warhead possible for the Bomarc except for the atomic one, and without nuclear-tipped rockets the Voodoo lost much of its effectiveness as an interceptor.[41]

Thus, it was only after the Cuban Missile Crisis that Pearson fully appreciated the need for Canada to have nuclear weapons to ensure that it was prepared to fight in a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union.

However, a purely strategic interpretation of the link between the Crisis and Pearson's nuclear acceptance misses another significant mechanism. For Pearson, the Cuban Missile Crisis put into stark relief the domestic and international costs of reneging, especially the degree to which Canada's reputation was declining among its allies. According to Pearson's interpretation of these events, Diefenbaker's government's refusal during the crisis to put Canada's bases on alert for two days, coupled with its history of foot-dragging on its nuclear commitments, "appears to have shocked

[40]Pearson, 1975, pp.69-70.
[41]Ibid., p.70.

some people across the border into the belief that Canada was an unreliable ally."[42] Canada's inability to act during the Cuban Missile Crisis was not just a practical security concern, but also a reputational one. Furthermore, Pearson noted in his memoir that the public had a similar interpretation of these events, alluding to the potential domestic audience costs associated with reneging: "Many Canadians were indignant that we could not effectively carry out our defence commitments in a crisis of this kind."[43] Pearson would attempt to capitalize on this sentiment by changing his position.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was significant in changing Pearson's mind, but not solely for strategic reasons. The Crisis did raise the perception of international threat, thus validating the military need for nuclear weapons. At the same time, it revealed the extent of the growing tensions between the United States and Canada under Diefenbaker. For Pearson, Canada's inability to live up to its commitments during a crisis revealed the extent to which reneging could lead to international reputational costs and domestic audience costs.

5.2.3 Reputational and Material Costs

Building on the lessons of the Cuban Missile crisis, two more events cemented Pearson's notion that Canada would suffer unacceptable reputational costs if it reneged on its nuclear commitments: Paul Hellyer's visit to a NATO conference in November 1962 and General Norstad's statement in January 1963.[44] Paul Hellyer was an influential MP for the Liberal Party and would later become the Minister of Defence in Pearson's government.[45] As demonstrated in the previous section, he was a staunch critic of the military utility of the nuclear weapons slated for Canadian use. In November 1962, Hellyer attended a NATO Parliamentarians' meeting in Paris, where he received a stark warning about Canada's position within the alliance if it continued to shirk its commitments. According to McMahon,

[42]Ibid.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Depending on the version, it is unclear which of these two events had a greater impact on Pearson's decision-making. According to Pearson's (1975, p.71) account, it was the former, as he claims that he had firmly made up his mind to support acquisition by Christmas 1962. McMahon (2009, p.157), on the other hand, puts more stock into General Norstad's statement: "Pearson may not have been immediately responsive to Hellyer's suggestion [to support acquisition], but his attitude began to change during the first week of January." McMahon (2009 p.156) still acknowledges that Hellyer "had played a significant role in changing Pearson's attitude," while finding evidence that Pearson did not necessarily make up his mind until mid-January.

[45]In his memoirs, Pearson (1975, p.70) refers to Paul Hellyer as "our defence critic."

> Hellyer was struck by how Canada's position within the alliance had changed within the seven years since he last attended a NATO conference... [He learned that] the NATO council was losing patience with the Canadian government and had even talked about passing a resolution expressing its concern.[46]

Hellyer also observed that the Diefenbaker government's inability to properly equip its forces in Europe was having a serious effect on morale, whereby "pilots were so ashamed they avoided bars frequented by their NATO colleagues."[47] While Hellyer was still unconvinced of the strategic merits of acquiring nuclear arms, he now firmly believed that Canada needed to live up to its nuclear commitments due to his new awareness of the unacceptable reputational costs that Canada was suffering.[48] As McMahon succinctly summarizes, "For Hellyer, it was a matter of honor and obligation more than nuclear strategy."[49] However, Hellyer still needed to convince Pearson to shift Liberal policy towards nuclear acceptance.

According to Pearson, Hellyer's information was a decisive factor in changing his mind.[50] In his memoirs, Pearson notes that "our men were fed up... [and s]o were our allies."[51] According to Kent, Pearson was also swayed by his sense of commitment and obligations; in other words, his sensitivity to reputational costs. As Kent describes Pearson's motivations, "Mike [Lester Pearson] took the position he did because he was utterly dedicated to the co-operation of the Western nations as a group; he could not bear the thought of Canada failing to carry out an agreement with them."[52]

Pearson's awareness of the high reputational costs to Canada was reinforced on January 3rd, when General Norstad provided a statement that left no doubt that the Alliance saw Canada as shirking on its commitments by refusing to arm its forces with nuclear weapons. This event provided further confirmation to Hellyer's report. It demonstrated that Canada's refusal to accept nuclear weapons was not just causing a rift with the United States, but also with NATO.[53] Indeed, Pearson referred to Norstad's statement when he announced his new pro-acquisition stand. He highlighted that Norstad had made it clear that Canada was not living up to any of its

[46]McMahon, 2009, p.156. The NATO council ultimately decided to "postpone the motion." See also Hellyer, 1990, p.25
[47]Hellyer, 1990, p.24.
[48]Ibid., pp.23-25; McMahon, 2009, p.157.
[49]McMahon, 2009, p.157.
[50]Pearson, 1975, p.70.
[51]Ibid.
[52]Kent, 1988, p.192.
[53]McMahon, 2009, pp.158-159.

commitments: "If there were any doubt about those facts, that doubt was removed the other day by a man who should know, General Norstad."[54]

Pearson drew upon the importance of Canada's reputation among its allies when justifying his change of stance to the public. In the Scarborough speech, in which he reversed his position on nuclear acquisition, he noted that Canada's positive reputation abroad was built upon its reliability and its steadfastness in keeping its commitments: "If we had not done so in the past, Canada would not have achieved a position of respect and influence in the world."[55] The reputational costs of reneging were also a key theme in the election. Pearson accused Diefenbaker of having "betrayed our allies and jeopardized the good name of Canada" by reneging on its commitments.[56] He also highlighted that Canada needed to fulfill its obligations in order to have influence within its alliances and on the world stage more broadly.[57]

In the same speech, Pearson also emphasized the importance of NATO and alliances for Canada's national security, implying the heavy material costs that could result from reneging and the weakening of the alliance.[58] Canada needed to rely on its allies for security, and this implied that it should fulfill its obligations.[59] During a speech to the National Council meeting in February 1963, Pearson again highlighted the importance of collective action for Canada's national defence. He also noted the dangers of nationalist reneging that threatened alliance solidarity. Pearson strongly connected reneging with undermining the credibility of the alliance and by extension, Canada's security:

> Any party which advocates policies that would weaken and divide that coalition [the Atlantic alliance], that would bring about the withdrawal from it, or even weaken Canada's position within it by refusing to fulfil pledges or honour commitments that have been taken; any part that would do this directly or indirectly is not only weakening Canada's security, it is undermining the collective action of free countries to preserve the peace and promote progress in the world.[60]

[54]LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 12 January 1963.
[55]Ibid.
[56]LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 11 February 1963.
[57]Ibid.
[58]LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 12 January 1963.
[59]Ibid.
[60]Ibid.

Thus, Pearson highlighted the costs of reneging in order to justify his support for acquisition. This provides some evidence that his growing awareness of these material and reputation costs were foundational for his nuclear acceptance. Whether these speeches represent a sincere belief or was merely expedient political rhetoric are explored in the next section.

5.2.4 Domestic Audience Costs

During the key time period between November 1962 and January 1963, Pearson also became increasingly aware of the domestic audience costs of reneging that were undermining support for the Conservative Party. Gallup polls in November and December revealed that not only did a majority of Canadians support nuclear acquisition, but also that the Liberals were leading against their Conservative counterparts "47 percent to 32 percent."[61] These, along with previous polling that indicated Canadian support for nuclear sharing, bolstered Hellyer's claim that the "great majority of Canadian people... would want their country to fulfil its obligations," despite the Liberals previous anti-nuclear stance.[62]

Pearson and his advisors also received an electoral study on two key provinces for the Liberal party: Ontario and Quebec. According to McMahon, this report was likely more decisive than the Gallup polls, even though it was only received by Liberal Party offices just two days before the Scarborough speech.[63] The study highlighted the importance of the nuclear issue to the electorate, claiming that "nuclear weapons were now the number one concern for Canadians" when the issue had "not even registered" in the previous poll that had been conducted in September 1962.[64] The report also revealed that the support for nuclear acquisition was overwhelmingly high in Ontario at 70 percent and that "Ontario was crucial to a Liberal victory in the next election."[65] The Liberal party could therefore gain from Diefenbaker's and the

[61]McMahon, 2009, p.160; The Gallup poll data from November 1962 shows a strong majority of about 60 percent in favour of nuclear acquisition; however, the Liberal's lead over the Conservatives is considerably smaller: only about 4 points ahead or about 36 to 32 percent (Gallup Canada Inc., November 1962).

[62]McMahon, 2009, p.157.

[63]Ibid., pp.160-161.

[64]Ibid., p.160. This finding appears to be corroborated by other polling. According to a Gallup poll taken in June 1962, when asked what the greatest problem Canada is currently facing, only 3.6 percent mentioned responses related to nuclear war (Gallup Canada Inc., June 1962). In March 1963, responding to the same question, 15.4 percent of respondents mentioned the nuclear arms situation/nuclear war (Gallup Canada Inc., March 1963).

[65]McMahon, 2009, p.160.

Conservatives' decision to support reneging. A change in policy on nuclear acquisition could be the key to winning the next election.[66]

Pearson was also aware of the tensions within the Conservative Party on this issue.[67] His public acceptance of nuclear sharing could exacerbate these tensions and maximize audience costs. According to Pearson, "As their [the Conservatives] disunity increased, so [did] our [the Liberals] excitement and our energy mounted. We had them on the ropes and would not let them escape."[68] If this was indeed a desired effect of this speech, it was successful, as Pearson notes that the "impact of my Scarborough speech on the government benches... was obvious and helped widen the division within the Tory government."[69]

The question of whether Pearson changed his mind due to concerns over Canada's reputation and alliance solidarity or due to his desire to topple the government is subject to debate among commentators and academics. Initially, Pearson denied that polling had any bearing on his decision making. In an interview on January 29th, Pearson claimed that the December Gallup poll showing a majority of Canadians favoured nuclear acquisition "had nothing whatever to do with my statement... I didn't even know what the Gallup Poll results were."[70] Kent reinforces this narrative that Pearson changed his position out of principle rather than political expedience, even arguing that his about-face actually hurt him in the election, preventing a Liberal majority.[71] However, in Pearson's memoirs, his previous repudiation of the impact of polling and domestic calculations softens somewhat. While Pearson claims in his memoirs that the Cuban Missile Crisis and Hellyer's report were the primary catalysts for the change, he also indicates that the domestic context had some impact:

> The fact it was obvious the government was split on the issue, and this would soon be revealed; the fact that the Gallup poll showed the majority of Canadians believed that the decision should be the one I had come to – these factors certainly did not inhibit me.[72]

In another interview, years after the nuclear affair, Pearson remarked that this moment was "when I really became a politician."[73]

[66]Ibid., p.161.
[67]Pearson, 1975, pp.71, 74.
[68]Ibid., p.74.
[69]Ibid., pp.71-72.
[70]LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 29 January 1963.
[71]Kent, 1988, p.192.
[72]Pearson, 1975, p.71.
[73]Pearson in Bothwell, 2007, p.172.

Even the most cynical interpretation of Pearson's motives – that he did not truly care about the reputational and material costs of reneging and only about supplanting Diefenbaker as Prime Minister – still substantiates the importance of the costs of reneging in his calculations. Pearson's statements on the importance of keeping commitments and Canada's reputation abroad, 'genuine' or not, were clearly meant to appeal to Canadian voters. This reveals that Pearson, like many IR theorists, believed that most Canadians saw a link between reneging and Canada's international reputation and material wellbeing and cared about alliance solidarity. Indeed, according to the American pollster Sam Lubell's interviews of Canadian voters, many individuals justified their support for Pearson along these lines, which will be discussed further below.

This is an important factor for understanding an important aspect of the puzzle – why Diefenbaker attempted to renege in 1963, and Pearson did not: they were appealing to different segments of the Canadian population. Diefenbaker believed that he could win a substantial number of voters by drawing upon and amplifying Canadians' nationalist sentiments by using the United States as a foil. For Diefenbaker, the increasing pressure from the United States after the Cuban Missile Crisis only provided further fuel for a grievance-based, nationalist campaign. On the other hand, Pearson believed that most Canadians would reject nationalism and reneging, believing that the costs would be too high. As he stated in a speech in February 1963:

> Today no country, certainly not Canada, can live unto itself, either politically or economically. The world is too small and the dangers are too great for narrow and inward-looking nationalism... A Liberal government will not try to prove that we are for "Canada First" by getting into trouble with our friends. We will not try to show how broad our Canadian shoulders are by going around with a big chip on them. [74]

Pearson believed that Canadians would favour a more cooperative approach with the United States and respond positively to an 'outward-looking' campaign on defence. Therefore, the increasing public dissatisfaction of the United States and Canada's allies also provided the grounding and justification for the Liberals' campaign. Thus, the same series of events and pressures pushed these two political leaders in opposite directions.

[74]LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 11 February 1963.

5.3 The Weakness of Anti-Nuclear Coalitions

From the outset, Pearson's anti-nuclear stance had been qualified by his support for and identification with the Western alliance. While Pearson had built a coalition that was anti-nuclear, it was also outward-looking and pro-NATO. Ultimately, with the growing pressure on Canada to fulfill its commitments, Pearson would have to abandon his anti-nuclear position, running the risk of alienating this coalition.

Pearson's campaign attempted to both retain anti-nuclear voters as well as appeal to those that were pro-acquisition or did not have a strong opinion on the nuclear issue. While the strongest nuclear activists abandoned the Liberal party in 1963, Pearson's campaign rhetoric attempted to keep some anti-nuclear voters on board, without calling for unilateral reneging.[75] In his Scarborough speech, Pearson tried to burnish his and the Liberals' anti-nuclear credentials, reminding the audience that they had originally opposed nuclear weapons, but that the current position was unsustainable.[76] He also made the pledge that his government would immediately review Canada's defence policy and would negotiate out of these nuclear commitments as soon as possible, but with the support of Canada's allies.[77] Thus, Pearson, attempting to appeal to anti-nuclear voters, favoured a consensus-based approach to ending Canada's nuclear commitments. He also reassured potentially skeptical voters that Canada would be able to prevent the use of these weapons through joint control: "In such an agreement, a U.S. finger would be on the trigger; but a Canadian finger would be on the safety catch."[78] In contrast to his previous position on nuclear sharing, Pearson claimed that nuclear sharing would not amount to the expansion of nuclear powers or the "nuclear club," highlighting that other NATO allies functioned as nuclear hosts through a similar bilateral arrangement.[79]

Many of Pearson's appeals in 1963 echo theories of the importance of alliance commitments and international reputation among domestic audiences. As demonstrated in the previous section, the potential reputational and material costs of reneging were key parts of Pearson's justification of his change in stance. In his Scarborough speech, the idea that a country, rather than a government, makes binding commitments was

[75] McMahon, 2009, pp.161-162.

[76] LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 12 January 1963. Pearson also noted that he did not view this matter as a "moral question," about the inherent morality of nuclear weapons. As Pearson had always supported NATO, a nuclear alliance, this implied an acceptance of the nuclear deterrent and the general existence of nuclear weapons.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid.

[79] LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 29 January 1963.

used in order to shore up Canada's obligations.[80] Like institutionalist scholars, Pearson highlighted the importance of reliability, especially in the context of government changeover:

> These are not treaties, however, merely between governments. The obligations they involve are between nations... In dealing with our friends, we must assume that a change of government would not normally mean a sudden and unilateral renunciation of the treaty obligations they have undertaken. Our friends have the same right to assume that the commitments of Canada are the commitments of the nation; that they would not automatically disappear with a change of government.[81]

As such, this issue was framed as a matter of basic foreign policy, where partisan politics have no place.[82]

Did these arguments prevent a collapse of the anti-nuclear coalition? Canada's anti-nuclear activist groups abandoned the Liberal Party after the Scarborough speech.[83] According to McMahon, anti-nuclear activists felt "horrified," "abandoned," and betrayed, and "moved quickly to denounce Pearson... [and] turned to embrace Diefenbaker."[84] Anti-nuclear figures with close ties to the Liberal Party also made their objections known. Most notably, the future Liberal leader and Prime Minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, rebuked Pearson as the "unfrocked priest of peace."[85] Before Pearson's pro-acquisition statement, Trudeau "had been expected to run under the Liberal banner;" instead, he threw his support behind the NDP.[86]

At the elite level, most prominent Liberals decided to keep ranks despite their personal feelings on the nuclear issue. As Pearson's advisor Tom Kent notes, Kent "tried to console a good many unhappy Liberals. A few of them left the party, most decided to stay."[87] As for Kent himself, he accepted the decision and would not resign from the party, even though he was "appalled" with Pearson's pro-nuclear stance:

> While I disagreed with Mike [Lester Pearson], I understood and respected the motives that led him to his conclusion. He had always worked so hard

[80]LAC, MG32 N2, Vol 114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 12 January 1963.
[81]Ibid.
[82]Ibid. See also LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 11 February 1963.
[83]McMahon, 2009, pp.161-162.
[84]Ibid.
[85]McMahon, 2009, p.161; Trudeau, 1963.
[86]McMahon, 2009, p.161.
[87]Kent, 1988, p.191.

> for collective decision making in the international community. He just could not bear the thought of Canada as a renegade, not doing what it had undertaken, by a collective process, to do.[88]

Walter Gordon, another prominent member of the Liberal party had said that Pearson's about-face "was very upsetting to me."[89] Yet, he ran as a Liberal and joined Pearson's Cabinet as the Minister of Finance in 1963. Other Liberal politicians, like Hellyer, were convinced by the reputational and domestic political merits of supporting acquisition. Likewise, the Liberal Party membership was supportive of Pearson's new pro-acquisition policy.[90]

As for voters at large, it appears that this strategy was effective in retaining some Liberal supporters, while attracting disaffected conservative voters. According to the political analysist Sam Lubell, the retention of Liberal supporters was not necessarily due to their the popularity of nuclear weapons themselves, but rather the importance of keeping commitments: "Often staunch Liberal supporters talk of the need "to honor our commitments" with the mournfully manful tones of someone who is willing to take it on the chin for a bad bargain."[91] This analysis indicates that Liberal voters were more persuaded by the perils of reneging rather than the inherent merits of nuclear arms. In fact, Lubell predicted that it would be politically impossible for any government to accept nuclear warheads for the Bomarc missiles, given the controversy over their utility that had been generated throughout the campaign, concluding that "the whole nuclear issue will have to be re-negotiated after the election."[92] According to Lubell's analysis, the Conservatives were bleeding voters to the Liberals at a much higher rate than Liberal voters to the Conservatives.[93] Lubell found that "only 5% of the Liberals appear to be shifting their ballots because they disagree with Lester Pearson's stand that Canada should "honor our commitments and accept the warheads."[94] As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Conservative-to-Liberal shifters overwhelmingly cited their concerns about American relations as one of the central reasons for abandoning the Conservative Party.[95] Overall, Lubell finds that the shift

[88]Ibid.

[89]Gordon in Bothwell 2007, p.413 ft.54. According to Hellyer's (1990, p.26) account, "Walter Gordon told me he was "pretty irritated and damn nearly resigned." See also Kent, 1988, p.192.

[90]McMahon, 2009, p.161; According to Hellyer (1990, p.26), "the vast majority of Liberals were as pleased as they were surprised, and quite comfortable with their leader's common-sense stand."

[91]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 4 April 1963b.

[92]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 8 April 1963.

[93]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 26 March 1963.

[94]Ibid.

[95]Ibid.; JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 2 April 1963.

from Liberal to Conservative was not all that significant, with some Liberal voters deciding to favour the anti-nuclear NDP instead.[96]

Gallup polling from March 1963 supports Lubell's claim that Tories were losing more voters than the Liberals. Table A below shows responses regarding preferred political party by previous voting behaviour, which gives some indication of the relative amount of vote switching that occurred for each party.[97] Only about 71% of those that voted Conservative in 1962 continued to prefer the Conservative Party by March 1963; however, about 85% of previous Liberal voters still preferred the Liberal Party. These statistics indicate a greater degree of voter retention among the Liberals than the Conservatives, as Lubell finds. Furthermore, about 15% of previous Conservative voters were switching their support to the Liberals, while only about 3% of previous Liberal voters now preferred the Conservatives. Only about 5% of former Liberal voters now preferred the more staunchly anti-nuclear NDP, indicating that there was only a relatively small abandonment of the Liberal party on anti-nuclear grounds.

	Voted For Last Federal Election					
Present Preferred Political Party	**Progressive Conservative**	**Liberal**	**NDP**	**Social Credit**	**Labor Progressive**	**Total**
Progressive Conservative	70.9	2.7	4.5	4.4	40.0	34.3
Liberal	14.8	84.6	18.0	10.2	0.0	39.5
NDP	2.9	4.9	68.5	3.6	40.0	9.2
Social Credit	10.3	7.4	9.0	81.0	20.0	16.3
Labor Progressive	1.0	0.2	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.6
Other	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=	622	488	111	137	5	1,363

Source: Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO). 1963. Gallup Poll, March 1963, #301 [Canada]. [public-use microdata file]. Toronto, Ontario. Gallup Canada Inc. [distributor].

Table 5.1: Results from Gallup Polling in March 1963. Present Preferred Political Party by Voting Behaviour in the Last Election.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter showed how leaders with anti-nuclear coalitions may still be deterred from reneging due the international and domestic costs associated with defection. It explored the puzzle of why Pearson decided to support nuclear acquisition in January 1963, despite his and the Liberal Party's previous opposition to nuclear sharing. I argued that both Pearson's personal anti-nuclear beliefs as well as the anti-nuclear

[96]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 26 March 1963.
[97]Gallup Canada Inc., March 1963.

coalition that supported him were not strong enough to overcome the pressures to maintain Canada's commitments. He decided to favour nuclear sharing as he became increasingly aware of the international and domestic costs associated with reneging. Thus, his about-face on nuclear weapons largely aligns with institutionalist theories on why leaders avoid reneging on alliance commitments, affirming the importance of a state's reputation for reliability for domestic audiences.

The first section demonstrated the single-issue nature of Pearson's and his coalition's opposition to Canada's nuclear commitments. While Pearson and the Liberals opposed nuclear sharing on moral and strategic grounds, they consistently tempered this opposition by emphasizing their broad-based support of NATO and the Western Alliance. The second section examined the various reasons for Pearson's change in policy. Ultimately, as Pearson became more aware of the reputational, material, and domestic audience costs of reneging beginning in the fall of 1962, his stance on nuclear acquisition changed. The final section evaluates Pearson's attempts to maintain his coalition and attract voters to win the 1963 election on a pro-nuclear platform.

In the end, for both the Conservatives and the Liberals, this election was fought less on the grounds of how individual voters felt about nuclear weapons and more about how Canadians felt about reneging and their relations with the United States. Both Pearson and Diefenbaker saw incentives to win the election by framing the nuclear debate in these terms. In the end, Pearson won a minority government. The Liberal Party and their voters prioritized general aspects of alliance policy – such as retaining the country's standing and reputation – over more specific policy preferences – avoiding nuclear acquisition.

In this sense, Pearson's support of nuclear sharing is similar to modern European leaders that still retain nuclear weapons on their soil. While anti-nuclear sentiment has been widespread in Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium since the end of the Cold War, so is support for NATO.[98] Like Pearson, leaders in these countries decided to prioritize good relations with their allies and a more cooperative approach to defence by retaining these commitments, rather than risk the costs of reneging.[99] These cases seem to validate institutionalist arguments about alliance reliability and the reasons leaders keep commitments. The next chapter will show that this weakness on reneging is not a feature of all domestic coalitions. Trudeau's experience with

[98]Blechman and Rumbaugh, 2014; Foradori, 2012, 2013; Franceschini and Müller, 2013; Koster, 2013; Lunn, 2012; Sauer, 2013; von Hlatky, 2014.
[99]Ibid.

reneging on Canada's NATO commitments will show that constructing a nationalist coalition provides a pathway to reneging success.

6

Case Study 3: Pierre Elliott Trudeau and NATO

> *"We should be protecting our internal security, defending our three seas, and then considering other possible international commitments. It was not logical or rational to not protect that which was ours."*[1]
>
> – Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, March 29 1969

> *"The Canadians had decided to change their role [in NATO] . . . Unless they contribute constructively to the alliance, they would withdraw. Canada understood the importance of consultation, but its basic position was 'non-negotiable.' "*[2]
>
> – Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp, June 25 1969

The previous chapters have highlighted two pathways for reneging failure, both of which demonstrate the costs and risks associated with reneging. Those cases have shown that the material, reputational, and audience costs that were presented in Chapter 2 influence a leader's calculus on whether to attempt to renege and the likelihood of success. Leaders that ignore the drawbacks of reneging risk political exile. Those that account for these costs have powerful incentives to back down or seek consensus-based solutions in order to be seen as reliable allies and competent leaders by potential voters.

How then, do some leaders successfully renege without incurring domestic audience costs? This chapter will explore a case of a reneging attempt that succeeded. Between 1968 and 1969, the newly elected Prime Minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau,

[1] LAC, CC, 2873, 29 March 1969.
[2] FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.95, 25 June 1969.

embarked on a strategy to form a nationalist coalition. This coalition contained officials who were highly skeptical of the level of Canada's contribution to NATO, seeing it as out of sync with the national interest. Some Ministers even advocated for full withdrawal from the alliance. Trudeau's nationalist coalition supported reneging on Canada's nuclear role in NATO as well as substantial reductions to its conventional commitments. Trudeau's government took steps to tie their hands domestically and publicly committed themselves to reductions before negotiations at the international level, which also strengthened their bargaining position. The nationalist character of Trudeau's coalition prevented the United States from attempting to restructure Canada's win-set, as this could have backfired and been condemned as undue foreign interference in Canadian affairs.

I first consider the possibility that the risks of material, reputational, and audience costs of reneging were somehow lower for this case or that the Trudeau government was somehow unaware of the potential costs of reneging. I reject this explanation. Documents show that officials within the Trudeau administration were deeply concerned with the implications of reneging on both nuclear and conventional commitments within NATO. They vocally opposed any substantial reductions to its NATO commitments for fears of the negative material and reputational effects that would be brought by appearing to be an unreliable ally. In addition, both the Nixon administration and NATO officials opposed these reductions and initially attempted to stop the Canadian government from reneging.

There was also potential for domestic audience costs. Most Canadians had favourable views of NATO and supported Canada's role in the alliance.[3] Like Diefenbaker, Trudeau faced a sharply divided Cabinet: some Ministers opposed deep or unilateral cuts to Canada's commitment to NATO, while a substantial minority in Cabinet were skeptical of NATO and advocated for substantial reductions, full military withdrawal, or even neutrality. Unlike Diefenbaker's government, *both* the Minister of National Defence, Léo Cadieux, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, strongly supported maintaining the status quo. This should have strengthened the hand of officials that opposed reneging. A crisis in Cabinet that led to the resignation of either of these Ministers could have been very damaging to Trudeau and his government.[4]

[3]According to an October 1968 Gallup poll, about 71% of respondents who have heard or read anything about NATO supported maintaining Canadian troops in Europe, while about 25% believed they should be called back (Gallup Canada Inc., October 1968).

[4]According to Paul Martin, a Liberal politician and leader of the Senate under Trudeau, "I don't think the cuts would have ever taken place if Cadieux had kept fighting and not thrown in the towel

Yet, Trudeau managed to avoid domestic audience costs after he reneged. While both Cadieux and Sharp considered resigning over the issue of NATO over the course of these internal debates, Trudeau managed to keep them in the fold and even co-opt their support for widespread cuts to their commitments.[5] Trudeau retained support at the mass level as well. According to one Gallup poll in July 1969, about 64% of Canadians approved of Trudeau's reductions to NATO.[6] Indeed, Trudeau's reneging did not engulf him or his administration in the same political quagmire as Diefenbaker. Trudeau remained Prime Minister until 1979 and from 1980 to 1984.

The puzzle at the heart of this chapter is: Why did Trudeau attempt to renege on these commitments despite the potential costs? How did Trudeau succeed in reneging and in avoiding domestic punishment, while Diefenbaker had failed? Why were Trudeau's threats of withdrawal credible, despite widespread elite and public support for NATO?

Trudeau was an early critic of Canada's participation in nuclear sharing. As an anti-nuclear proponent, Trudeau was disgusted by Pearson's acceptance of nuclear weapons in 1963 and only came into the Liberal fold several years later. That Trudeau would set out to remove nuclear weapons from Canadian soil as Prime Minister was therefore, at least partially, a product of his anti-nuclear beliefs. However, Trudeau wanted to inject new thinking into Canada's defence policies and concepts.[7] Despite the completion of a defence review just a year before under Pearson, Trudeau commissioned his own review of Canada's defence and foreign policy soon after taking office. Believing Canada to be overextended in the international sphere, Trudeau advocated for a refocusing on distinctly national aspects of security and called for new ways of thinking about defence.[8] Revising and reducing Canada's role in NATO fit within these nationalist priorities.

This chapter will show that Trudeau, unlike Diefenbaker, embarked on a coherent strategy to gain nationalist support for reneging *before* negotiating at the international level. At the elite level, Trudeau consistently empowered the NATO-skeptic group within the Cabinet who articulated their support for reneging in nationalist terms. He allowed for these members of Cabinet to participate in debates related to defence, regardless of their portfolio. He also undercut the influence of powerful status quo

– but then there might have been a real schism in cabinet" (Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.65, Interviewed on 10-11 February 1987).

[5]Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.133, Interview with Léo Cadieux on 9 December 1987; Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, p.18.

[6]Gallup Canada Inc., July 1969.

[7]Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, pp.126-127.

[8]Ibid.

supporting officials by rejecting their reports that uncritically supported maintaining Canada's level of alliance commitment and even commissioning his own report that would advocate for widespread cuts to alliance commitments.[9] At the public level, Trudeau presented himself as a candidate that represented change for Canadian policies, someone who would question status quo assumptions. He opened the defence review process, allowing academics to participate and NATO-skeptic members of Cabinet to publicly speak their mind.[10]

Ultimately, the government agreed to a compromise: staying in the alliance, but with reductions to their commitments, which included reneging on their nuclear role.[11] Trudeau's effort to strengthen the hand of the NATO-skeptic members of Cabinet, especially those who were pushing for Canada to leave the alliance, made it possible for reneging to be conceived as a 'compromise' or less extreme outcome. Thus, Trudeau co-opted the status quo members of Cabinet and kept his government together, which inoculated him from the severe domestic audience costs that Diefenbaker faced. Trudeau had the full agreement of Cabinet before he announced that Canada would be embarking on a "planned and phased reduction" to its military contribution to Europe.[12] As a result, when negotiations began at the international level, Trudeau and his government had publicly tied their hands to reneging.

While the Americans initially attempted to push back against Canadian reductions, both American and NATO negotiators eventually backed down and accepted substantial reductions to Canada's commitment. As with the status quo members of Cabinet, this tolerance was related to their belief in the strength of the nationalist NATO-skeptic wing within government. This made the Canadian threats to leave the alliance if their terms were not accepted credible. By conceiving of these reductions as part of a nationalist, rather than collectivist, policy, Trudeau was able to act unilaterally in setting the level of reductions and the agenda for executing them, weakening the potential for genuine input from allies. The Americans were also wary of attempting to restructure Canada's position, worried that foreign interference would only intensify demands for withdrawal.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section provides a background and overview of the events described in this chapter. It considers whether the outcome

[9]Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, pp.5-6, 15-16; Halloran, 2006, pp.130-131, 137-138; LAC, CC, 4277, 19 July 1968.

[10]Fortmann and Larose, 2004.

[11]Halloran, 2006.

[12]DHH, RP, 2109, 3 April 1969.

of nuclear withdrawal was already determined by the time Trudeau came into office. The second section examines the incentives that Trudeau's government faced to maintain the status quo. Domestically, Trudeau faced substantial opposition at the elite level to any major reduction to commitment, which emphasized the potential costs of reneging. Internationally, both the American and NATO officials strongly rejected any substantial cuts to Canada's commitment. They initially pushed back against Canadian proposals to reduce their commitment. The third section describes how Trudeau successfully reneged on Canada's nuclear commitments. At the domestic level, Trudeau formed a nationalist coalition. He strengthened the hand of the NATO-skeptics in his Cabinet and co-opted officials that supported the status quo into accepting reneging on Canada's nuclear role and other conventional commitments. At the international level, officials in the United States' government and NATO were ultimately persuaded that they should accept Canadian reductions due to the nationalist character of Trudeau's coalition. I outline how this nationalist coalition provided Canadian negotiators with three sources of bargaining power, which led to a successful reneging attempt: a credible threat of withdrawal, an ability to act unilaterally, and a low vulnerability to restructuring.

6.1 Background and Timeline of Events

6.1.1 Decisions Predating the Trudeau Government

While most scholars argue that the Trudeau government was primarily responsible for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from NATO, some have emphasized that the seeds of withdrawal were planted by Prime Minister Pearson and that neglect had reinforced an erosion of commitment.[13] When nuclear weapons were first brought into Canada, the government had only allocated funds for the maintenance of these weapons until 1968 and estimated that they would require replacement in the late 1960s or early 1970s.[14] In 1967, the Pearson government revisited this issue and

[13]In a memoir written by Trudeau and his advisor Ivan Head, they argue that the matter of force reductions in Europe "was insignificant compared with the major decision to retire from the nuclear strike role," implying that not only was Trudeau a key driver of this decision, but also that his primary goal in restructuring Canada's commitment to NATO was to secure nuclear withdrawal (Head and Trudeau, 1995, p.85). For other scholars that support the argument that Trudeau was largely responsible for Canadian withdrawal, see Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, pp.3-35; Lennox, 2009, p.66; Paul, 2000, p.63; Trudgen, 2009, pp.52-54.

[14]DHH, RP, 3178, August 1963; DHH, RP, 2099, 30 September 1963. The run-down of the nuclear weapons systems was also discussed in Cabinet, with particular emphasis on the Air Division (LAC, CC, 23709, 9 May 1963; LAC, CC, 25005, 25 March 1964). Interestingly, Defence Minister Hellyer projected that the nuclear role Brigade would outlast that of the air division. However, the nuclear

decided not to procure or plan for any replacements for the nuclear delivery systems, essentially allowing them to be worn down over time.[15] In fact, it was suggested in a telegram from the American Embassy in Canada to the Department of State in July 1969, that Trudeau's decision to "de-emphasize" Canada's role in NATO and withdraw troops was in part related to "built-in neglect (long pre-dating Trudeau) of any constructive or farsighted capital equipment plan for military establishment."[16] While this was only one of six factors that were suggested in this telegram, it sill raises an interesting question: To what extent does path dependency explain the trajectory of Canadian nuclear sharing policy?[17]

While these factors created a critical juncture for nuclear decision-making in the late 1960s that facilitated reneging, the path dependency argument is not a satisfactory explanation for reneging. Firstly, explanation that emphasizes inertia does not account for the extent to which the decision to withdraw nuclear weapons from Canadian command was a hard-fought and contested decision, both within the Canadian government and without, which is demonstrated below. Second, a path dependency or inertia explanation implies that withdrawal should occur when the weapons systems are obsolete. Outcomes should follow the path of least resistance, making them more likely to ride out the usable life of these weapons even if their military value has diminished due to the lessening or changing of the nature of international threats. However, the nuclear weapons stationed in Europe were withdrawn before the end of their useful life, according to the government's own assessments of their nuclear weapons systems.[18]

Finally, Pearson would not have withdrawn nuclear weapons in the same time

role of the Brigade ended up being phased out first, with the Honest Johns phased out in 1970, and the nuclear strike role of the Air Division lasting until 1972.

[15]Bothwell (2007, p.269) notes that Pearson's decision to not replace aging equipment had a role in nuclear withdrawal: "Essentially the government had decided to terminate Canada's nuclear role in NATO, by ensuring that Canadian forces were incapable of performing it." DHH, RP, 2100, 23 March 1967; DHH, RP, 2100, 29 June 1967; DHH, RP, 2100, 21 July 1967.

[16]FRUS 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.96, 7 July 1969.

[17]In fact, this is a plausible explanation for why Prime Minister Diefenbaker failed in his attempt to renege on his commitment to bring nuclear weapons into Canada in the early 1960s: the decision had been announced publicly and the nuclear weapons systems had been purchased and installed. While *inertia* could explain withdrawal under Trudeau, the institutional *momentum* towards nuclear sharing could have been the one of the more decisive determinants of Diefenbaker's failure to effectively back out of his nuclear commitments. This hypothesis implies that the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Canada was largely predetermined, and that the Trudeau government would only have a minimal impact.

[18]See, for example, DHH, RP, 2100, 23 March 1967; DHH, RP, 2103, 23 April 1968; DHH, RP, 2105, February 1969. The Defence Policy review projected that the CF-104s could be in service in a nuclear role until at least 1978.

frame as Trudeau. In 1967, when Pearson was discussing Canada's contribution to NATO for 1968-1972, he asserted that "the present Canadian contribution constituted 'the minimum price for club membership."[19] His administration recognised that withdrawal may be possible in the future, but emphasized the need for the support of allies and shunned unilateral actions. According to a paper prepared by the Department of External Affairs, "[A] drastic unilateral reduction of our contribution either in Europe or North America would negate the principle of collective security and would likely to affect adversely our relations with the West European countries and the United States and would reduce the general effectiveness of Canadian foreign policy."[20] Thus, the timing and mode of withdrawal may have been very different under different political leadership.[21]

6.1.2 The Defence Review

Trudeau took office on April 20th 1968, replacing Lester Pearson as leader of the Liberal Party and Prime Minister of Canada, quickly called an election. On June 25th 1968, Trudeau and the Liberals had a majority in Parliament. The Prime Minister's popularity was on the upswing. As Bothwell and Granatstein note, the Liberal Party "had not won a majority since 1953, and thereafter they gazed at Trudeau respectfully."[22] Among some groups, the favourable opinion of Canada's new leader was so intense that it was referred to as 'Trudeaumania.' Domestically, among his supporters, Trudeau was seen as a young, energetic, and non-conformist leader, who would enact progressive policies. On the international stage, Trudeau was iconoclastic, calling for a "break with the past" and a review of Canada's defence and foreign policy.[23] This review would analyse "the fundamentals of Canadian foreign policy to see whether there are ways in which we can serve more effectively Canada's current interests, objectives and priorities."[24] There was a general climate for change in how Canada conducted itself on the international stage, with the Conservatives calling for their own review during the 1968 election.[25]

[19]LAC, CC, 29624, 12 September 1967.
[20]DHH, RP, 2103, 22 March 1968.
[21]Indeed, Léo Cadieux had run for Liberal Party leadership alongside Trudeau in 1968. If Cadieux had won, Canada's contribution to NATO would have likely remained unchanged, given his strong opposition to Trudeau's effort to restructure Canada's alliance commitment.
[22]Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.6.
[23]Ibid.
[24]Halloran, 2006, p.126.
[25]Ibid., p.128.

Trudeau ordered a "comprehensive" review of Canada's defence policy on May 15th 1968.[26]After internal and public debate on the nature of Canada's defence policy and role in NATO, the Defence Review was finalized and debated in Cabinet on March 29th and 30th 1969. The Cabinet agreed that Canada will remain in NATO but diminish its level of military commitments to the Alliance. On April 3rd, Trudeau announced this decision, calling for "a planned and phased reduction of the size of the [Canadian] forces in Europe."[27] However, the specifics of this reduction were not detailed at this time. Canada finalised its proposal for its reduced commitment to NATO in late May 1969, beginning the international stage of negotiations. Trudeau's proposal envisioned substantial reductions: lowering the number of Canadian forces in Europe from 10,000 to 3,500 and eliminating Canada's nuclear role. NATO returned their counter-proposal to Canada on August 3rd, which called for the retention of Canada's nuclear strike role and 6,500 troops. Canadians responded with a revised offer on August 15th. On August 27th, NATO accepted the proposed reductions to Canada's NATO forces and roles, including the halving of their troops to 5,000 and the elimination of their nuclear role by 1972.

6.2 The Incentives to Maintain the Status Quo

This section demonstrates that there was considerable domestic and international opposition to reneging on Canada's nuclear commitments to NATO. Therefore, reneging in this case was not overdetermined, nor was it a foregone conclusion. Officials in the Canadian government, the Nixon administration, and NATO command opposed and attempted to resist Trudeau's effort to reduce Canada's military role in the Alliance.

According to the institutionalist model of alliance reliability, statesmen should be reluctant to renege due to fears of specific negative consequences that would arise from their actions. In my conceptual chapter, I laid out three broad categories of costs: reputational costs, material costs, and domestic audience costs. This section will demonstrate that many political elites in Canada did not support major reductions or complete withdrawal from NATO due to their worries about incurring these costs. Most members of Trudeau's cabinet did not support drastic reductions to their alliance commitments and in favour of maintaining the status quo, at least in the short term.[28] Thus, the structure of incentives that encourages political elites to keep their commitments still applied in this case, despite the outcome of reneging.

[26]Ibid., p.126.
[27]DHH, RP, 2109, 3 April 1969.
[28]Bothwell, 2007, p.288.

This section is divided into three parts. The first part explores the nature of the support for the status quo in Canada, focusing on officials' fears of the international and domestic costs of reneging. The second part explores the United States' status quo position. It shows that the Americans initially did not expect the defence review to produce any major changes to Canada's role in NATO. Once the extent of reductions became known to the Nixon administration, American officials emphatically rejected them. Similarly, the third part demonstrates that NATO attempted to convince Canada to maintain its commitment to the Alliance to the greatest extent possible, including retaining its nuclear role.

6.2.1 Canadian Officials' Status Quo Position

Within Canada, there was broad and influential support for the status quo at the elite level. The majority of the cabinet supported alignment with NATO and rejected total withdrawal.[29] Chiefly among these Ministers were the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, and the Minister of National Defence, Léo Cadieux. At every step of the process, these Ministers tried to reign in Trudeau's unilateralist tendencies, dissuade his support for the nationalist coalition of ministers, and prevent major reductions to Canada's commitments. Sharp and Cadieux were supported by other officials within their departments and the military. The Liberal caucus "members were overwhelmingly in favour of continued participation in NATO."[30] Status quo officials viewed reneging and unilateral reductions as something that should clearly be avoided. However, it is important to note that this group was not opposed to changing Canada's role in NATO and even reductions to its commitments over a more gradual timeframe and with consultation with Canada's allies. While Canada could reduce its role, it should try to minimize the amount of friction with allies to the greatest extent possible, so it would not be seen as shirking on its commitments.

Heavy reductions to NATO were specifically labelled as reneging by officials to highlight the negative features of this course of action on at least one occasion. On April 23rd 1968, soon after Trudeau called for the Defence Review, the Department of National Defence Estimates Review Committee discussed a new role for Canada's NATO forces. It envisioned a more modest reduction of forces over a longer timeframe.[31] According to the Director of General Force Objectives, W.K. Carr, this

[29]Bothwell, 2007, p.288.

[30]LAC, CC, 2873, 29 March 1969.

[31]HH, RP, 2103, 23 April 1968. Part of this plan involved the withdrawal from Canada's nuclear role by 1974/75, if allies were amenable to the new structure.

gradual plan was appealing because it "did not see Canada reneging on its international commitments."[32] Reneging, or even the *perception* that Canada was reneging on its commitments, should be avoided.

Status quo oriented officials specifically complained about the rapid and unilateral nature of the reductions that they were forced to contemplate because Trudeau's defence review. 'Unilateralism,' like reneging, took on a negative connotation. These officials believed that Canada should not be considering such reductions to their commitments unless they had the explicit support from allies. They were very concerned with whether the Canadian's government rationale for reductions would be accepted by NATO. For example, a Department of Defence memorandum to Cabinet on April 30th 1968, which discussed issues related to inflation and the defence budget, cautioned against a unilateralist approach to Canadian defence policy and highlighted the importance of allied reaction to wide-scale reductions:

> ...in terms of standards of measurement applied by NATO members, Canada's defence expenditures are relatively low.[33] It is difficult to see how Canada could convince its NATO allies that it is essential on economic or financial grounds to eliminate Canada's contribution to the European integrated NATO forces. Withdrawal, without Canada's case on the grounds being accepted by its allies, would be tantamount to Canada taking a unilateral decision in favour of significantly reduced defence efforts regardless of the consensus of its partners as to the defence needs of the Alliance."[34]

[32]Ibid.

[33]Status quo officials highlighted the weak case that Canada had for reneging that would make it even more likely to garner a negative allied response. Canada's contribution was already among the lowest amongst NATO and that allies would therefore not see further reductions as valid. According to the memorandum: "As a percentage of Gross National Product, which though imperfect, is the standard of comparison most widely accepted in NATO, Canada's defence expenditures have declined not only absolutely but relatively in comparison with those of most of its allies. Measured according to the common NATO definition, Canada's defence expenditures dropped from the fourth highest level in NATO (after the United States, Britain and France) in the peak years of the 1950s to the fourth lowest level in NATO, exceeding only those of Belgium, Denmark, and Luxembourg, in 1967" (DHH, RP, 2101, 30 April 1968).

[34]DHH, RP, 2101, 30 April 1968. This sentiment was repeated on July 2nd 1968, in an early draft of the Defence Policy Review document. It argued that if the withdrawal of military forces from NATO "was undertaken unilaterally and for reasons, such as the need to economize, which its allies would not consider valid, Canada's action would affect both NATO and European security relations with the allies" (DHH, RP, 2101, 2 July 1968). Elsewhere in this document, it highlights that Canada's formal and informal obligations could not be unilaterally renounced: "Some of these commitments are of a legally binding nature embodied in formal government-to-government agreement which cannot be unilaterally renounced. Others are of a more informal nature but include a moral obligation to consult with allies before they are substantially altered. In these circumstances, any modification in

Supporters of the status quo advocated for a more consensus-based approach to alliance policy, arguing that if the reductions took place in a different context, they would be more warmly received by their allies.[35] Status quo oriented officials also highlighted that allies would be more likely to accept withdrawal if it coincided with the end of the useful life of the weapons systems involved.[36] For these reasons, if major reductions were necessary, they should not occur immediately, but several years in the future.

The status quo objections to rapid and unilateral withdrawals are effectively summarized by the Minister of External Affairs Sharp during a Cabinet debate on April 1st 1969:

> [H]e had no objection to a phased reduction of Canadian forces in Europe so long as any reduction was brought about under the umbrella of the balanced force reduction theories of NATO and were made in the light of, and dependent upon, prevailing international circumstances. Mr Sharp cautioned that he believed it unwise and difficult to defend a policy statement which evidenced a unilateral decision to reduce the size of forces in Europe without qualifications to the extent that he recommended.[37]

Thus, these officials would only support reductions if they were not too drastic, if the allied support was obtained, and if Canada would adopt a consensus-based approach to intra-alliance negotiations.

6.2.1.1 Reputational Costs

Those that supported the status quo emphasized that reneging on alliance commitments would have a negative impact on Canada's status, prestige, and influence. As early as April 22nd 1968, officials within the Canadian government worried about the reputational implications of a reduction to their military role. The Deputy Minister of

Canada's defence policy and the commitments which flow from them should be planned far enough in advance to allow for orderly adjustments to be made in consultations with Canada's allies" (DHH, RP, 2101, 2 July 1968).

[35]DHH, RP, 2101, 2 July 1968. As stated in the July 2nd draft of the Defence Policy Review, "If the withdrawal [of all Canadian forces from NATO] had the agreement of Canada's allies – because a peace settlement in Germany had been reached; or because it formed part of an agreement with the Russians for mutual reduction of the external forces in Europe; or because Canadian troops were needed elsewhere for an important undertaking such as a peacekeeping operation in Vietnam – the [negative] impact might be negligible."

[36]DHH, RP, 2103, 23 April 1968; DHH, RP, 2101, 2 July 1968.

[37]LAC, CC, 2870, 1 April 1969.

National Defence, E.B. Armstrong, and the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Marcel Cadieux, argued that a drastic reduction to their defence expenditures[38] would affect Canada's standing within NATO:

> [Armstrong] suggested that there was a point [of defence expenditures] below which they could not drop and have Canada regarded as a serious ally. He wondered if Canada had now reached this stage. Mr. Cadieux said he was inclined to agree. There had been some quiet questioning as to where Canada was going in NATO.[39]

The idea that Canada needed to make a certain minimum level of contribution to be considered a "serious ally" was also repeated in a meeting the next day.[40]

Other officials worried that reneging would reduce Canada's influence on the world stage more generally. According to these officials Canada's main vehicle of international influence was its membership in multilateral alliances, if it reduced its commitments or withdrew outright, Canada would not be able to exercise this power. According to the Canadian Vice Chief of Defence Staff, alliance membership and international influence were tightly connected:

> in order for Canada to have access to world councils to present its ideas and be listen to, Canada must demonstrate that it was accepting a military responsibility. Canada's relations with the Unites States would deteriorate and its influence would be reduced if, for example, Canadian land and air forces were pulled out of NATO and only those maritime forces required for sovereignty purposes were provided. Canadian relations with Europe would be similarly affected.[41]

In the April 30th memorandum to Cabinet on the defence review, the Minister of Defence highlighted that substantial reductions to its alliance commitments would damage relations with both the Europeans and the Americans, warning that the US "would be hostile to our withdrawal."[42] He also noted that Canada's multilateral influence in Europe would be weakened as a result of reneging: "Whether or not

[38]This conversation concerns Canada's overall defence expenditures, which were under strain from budgetary cuts to defence, and not reductions to specific defence commitments. However, the worry that Canada could not reduce its defence contribution to NATO any more to NATO without drawing serious questions still applies to Canada's direct contributions to NATO.

[39]DHH, RP, 2101, 22 April 1968.

[40]DHH, RP, 2103, 23 April 1968.

[41]Ibid.

[42]DHH, RP, 2101, 30 April 1968.

our allies would be prepared to have us continue in NATO, we should be effectively excluded from the councils of Europe in the formative period when European settlement, the shape of which is important to us, is being worked out."[43] The importance of NATO for Canada's influence over European policy was reiterated in a similar way in the July 2nd draft of the Defence Review: "Canada has no institutional link with Europe other than the NATO connection, and loses its influence in the councils which are shaping Europe's future."[44] These worries about Canada's loss of reputation within NATO were repeated during the major debate within Cabinet on the Defence Review in March 1969. According to the Leader of the Government in the Senate, Paul Martin, Canada's influence and power on the world stage would suffer if they disengaged from NATO:

> Senator Martin said that Canada's influence in NATO was considerable... Canada's relations with other governments would undeniably suffer in the event of withdrawal; especially our relations with the United States... Legally, within the terms of the treaty, Canada could decide to make no military contribution, but we would not have any influence.[45]

Thus, status quo officials articulated a clear understanding of the potential reputational costs of reneging and withdrawal. They believed that defecting on alliance commitments would not only affect Canada's standing within NATO, but could also affect its relations and influence with allies beyond the military sphere.

6.2.1.2 Material Costs

The status quo officials within the Canadian government worried about the material costs of reneging on their commitments to NATO. Their concerns over material costs can be divided into two main categories: strategic and economic. At the more abstract level, Canadian officials worried that reneging would increase international instability and weaken the Western Alliance relative to the Warsaw Pact. Others had more specific strategic concerns: that substantial Canadian defections would lead to the unravelling of the alliance or would lead to their ejection from NATO. The negative material effects that concerned these officials were not limited to the strategic realm. Many worried that reneging on their commitments to NATO or exiting the alliance would lead to negative repercussions on the trade relationship between Canada and its allies.

[43]Ibid.
[44]DHH, RP, 2101, 2 July 1968.
[45]LAC, CC, 2872, 30 March 1969.

A common theme among those supporting the status quo was the risk of increased instability as a result of substantial Canadian reductions to its military commitments. While NATO primarily defended Europe, it was still the most likely location of conflict and even general war. Weakening NATO vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact therefore carried the risk of increased tensions and insecurity for Canada: "NATO was thus of direct benefit to Canada since trouble in Europe would involve Canada."[46] This point was highlighted by the Secretary of State for External Affairs during the debate in Cabinet at the end of March 1969: "In fact, Europe was the only place where a nuclear confrontation could escalate from a local conflict to destroy Canada," meaning that "[i]t was in Canada's own interest to be there [in Europe] to play a vital role."[47]

The likely effect of increased tensions was especially important to consider since a decision to reduce Canada's contribution would create pressures and knock-on effects for other members of the Alliance. During a Department of National Defence estimates and review committee meeting on April 22nd , Mr. Cadieux, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, drew a stark connection between the importance of Europe for Canada's national security and the likelihood that Canada would incite a chain reaction of military reductions among its allies:

> From a U.S. point of view, withdrawal of Canadian forces in Europe could lead to pressure in the U.S. to run down its forces. This would create difficulties for the U.S. partnership with Western Europe which it was in Canada's security interest to preserve. When talking about Canada's membership in and contribution to NATO one was in fact talking about prospects for peace in Europe and consequently about Canada's security and indirectly Canadian independence and even national unity.[48]

The concern that Canadian actions would inspire further reductions to the Alliance repeated itself throughout the discussions on Canada's role in NATO. In the April 30th memorandum to Cabinet, the Minister of Defence describes the potential damaging consequences to NATO of a unilateral withdrawal or reduction by Canada, implying that this could result in a domino effect of withdrawal:

> unilateral action by Canada without an alliance consensus as to defence reductions might set in motion a chain of reductions by other members of the Alliance, all of whom face severe budgetary pressures which could

[46]DHH, RP, 2101, 22 April 1968.
[47]LAC, CC, 2873, 29 March 1969.
[48]DHH, RP, 2101, 22 April 1968.

> seriously weaken the organization in the year 1969, when legal withdrawal from the Treaty becomes possible.[49]

The Minister went on to detail the severe security implications of such a chain reaction:

> This in turn could:
>
> (a) endanger the security system which has preserved stability in Europe in spite of two crises over Berlin, revolt in Eastern Europe and countless wars on other continents;
>
> (b) jeopardize recent improvements in East-West Relations;
>
> (c) erode the framework which now contains German nationalism and risk a recurrence of German militarism;
>
> (d) influence adversely the German approach to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
>
> (e) weaken the confidence in support being forthcoming from North America, which is still essential to European security; and
>
> (f) undermine Western negotiating position on balanced force reductions in Europe between NATO and Warsaw Pact and thus prejudice the achievement of an orderly drawing down of the massive confrontation of military force in Europe.[50]

In the July 2nd draft of the defence review, this potential chain reaction was noted again. The draft report emphasized that reneging could create pressures for the United States to reduce its own commitments to NATO, which, in turn could encourage Germany to develop an independent nuclear arsenal to make up this shortfall:

> A Canadian decision to withdraw forces could have a disrupting effect in Europe. All NATO governments face budgetary pressures, and a decision to reduce Canadian forces in Europe and in effect to reject the principle of collective defence could have a multiplier effect. The US administration is concerned that such Canadian action, taken on the grounds such as that Canada had the need to economize and that the Europeans were

[49]DHH, RP, 2101, 30 April 1968.
[50]Ibid.

> now wealthy enough to provide for their own defence, might generate irresistible Congressional pressure in favour of substantial US withdrawals from Europe. In this situation, Germany might be left to provide a dangerously large share of Europe's ground forces, and might face strengthened domestic pressure to acquire its own nuclear weapons. The Russians would be less interested in working toward a compromise settlement of the German problem or in agreeing to mutual force reductions.[51]

Essentially, the withdrawal or major reduction of Canadian forces could contribute to the "destruction of the credibility of NATO."[52]

Status quo officials were especially worried that reductions to its bilateral and multilateral commitments would lead to punishment, particularly by the Americans. In a meeting on April 23rd 1968, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff described Canada's dependence on the US for the provision of its own security: it relied on the US not only through defensive alliances, but also for equipment and intelligence.[53] This reliance on the US for the provision "of its own sovereignty defence requirements" meant that "Canada must pay the price for this help or risk the chance of it being denied."[54] The sentiment that Canada would essentially be 'free-riding' if it reduced its forces in NATO was repeated by Senator Paul Martin during Cabinet discussions on the Defence Review: "This government should not take advantage of the NATO security system without discharging responsibility for its maintenance."[55]

The negative economic repercussions that would result from reneging were another key theme in these documents and discussions. The July 2nd draft of the Defence Policy Review specified the negative economic impact for Canada if they adopted neutrality and pulled out of its alliances with the United States:

> Our defence cooperation with the U.S.A. had helped materially in reaching economic arrangements with the U.S. Government which are of great material importance to Canada and which we would forfeit if we adopted a neural policy. Two examples are: the overland exemption for Canadian oil exports to the U.S.A., and the Canada-U.S.A. defence production sharing arrangements. Termination of the latter would have a major impact on

[51]DHH, RP, 2101, 2 July 1968.
[52]LAC, CC, 2872, 30 March 1969. Spoken by the Leader of the Senate, Paul Martin.
[53]DHH, RP, 2103, 23 April 1968.
[54]Ibid.
[55]LAC, CC, 2872, 30 March 1969.

> our defence industries which involve sales of some $600 million. In addition we could not automatically expect the U.S.A. to be disposed to enter new areas of economic cooperation similar to the auto parts agreement; nor could we count on the U.S.A. to be as forthcoming in making special arraignments with Canada in the financial field.[56]

Although this passage relates to the impacts of an extreme scenario - Canada becoming a neutral power, it still reflects the potential economic vulnerabilities that Canada faced if its relationship with the United States deteriorated as a result of Canada reneging on its commitments. Indeed, this document highlights this point: "Canada's position as a major exporter of primary and manufactured products, and its need for large imports of development capital, make it dependent to a considerable degree on the good will of the United States and Western Europe (including Britain.)"[57] By reducing its military role in Europe, Canada risked having a reduced economic relationship with European countries, which in turn could increase its dependence on the United States.

The economic costs of reneging were again brought up during Cabinet discussions on Canada's role in NATO. Sharp highlighted the negative repercussions that could be expected from the United States if Canada tried to withdraw its troops from Europe:

> In this context, Cabinet Ministers should not under-estimate Canada's influence in contributing to [international] stability. If the Canadian government was found to undercut that position, reaction in the United States would be profound. We expect to be treated in a special commercial sense in wheat negotiations, oil transactions, and in the exchange of defence information. The government should not necessarily expect that such special treatment to continue.[58]

While Sharp expected that less extreme reductions would "gain tacit approval" he warned that such action should be "made in consultation with our allies as part of the NATO policy of balanced force reductions."[59] Thus, unilateralist reneging was rejected by status quo officials because of their fears of high material costs.

[56]DHH, RP, 2101, 2 July 1968.
[57]Ibid.
[58]LAC, CC, 2872, 30 March 1969.
[59]Ibid.

6.2.1.3 Domestic Audience Costs

Status quo defenders in the Canadian government seemed less concerned – or at least less vocally concerned – with domestic audience costs compared to the potential international costs that they associated with reneging. Occasionally, officials would mention that they thought that the blowback from defecting on Canada's commitments would have negative consequences for Canadian "national unity."[60] Other members of the government worried that drastic reductions to Canadian forces in Europe would have a negative effect on morale of Canadian troops.[61]

Interestingly, despite the support for NATO within the Liberal caucus and public at large, officials did not vocalize fears that reneging on their commitments would lead to negative electoral consequences. The lack of fear is perhaps related to the fact that Trudeau was just elected to office and therefore unlikely to experience direct electoral consequences for reneging. However, Trudeau still could have experienced domestic audience costs in the form of lowered approval of him and his administration. Indeed, this could have been a concern considering the positive view of NATO within the public at large.[62]

There was also a risk of domestic fallout from alienating the United States. While at this time, anti-American sentiments were on the upswing due to the opposition to the Vietnam war and the United States' Cold War adventurism, this was not necessarily the view of the entirety of the public. According to Bothwell, polling showed that most Canadians had a favourable view of the United States and the current state of Canadian foreign policy:

> Polls taken in the late 1960s and early 1970s showed that a majority of Canadians had positive views of the United States and Americans. Fifty-eight percent told interviewers that the United States was Canada's "best friend."[63]

To avoid domestic audience costs, a nationalist coalition needed to be carefully constructed, especially given the support for the status quo at the elite level.

Trudeau was concerned with the potential negative fallout if he pushed status quo Ministers too far and they resigned from Cabinet.[64] Keeping his government together would inoculate Trudeau from the domestic audience costs associated with reneging

[60]DHH, RP, 2101, 22 April 1968; DHH, RP, 2104, 28 February 1969.
[61]LAC, CC, 2870, 1 April 1969; DHH, RP, 2106, 30 April 1969.
[62]Gallup Canada Inc., October 1968.
[63]Bothwell, 2007, p.285.
[64]Ibid., p.288.

that Diefenbaker had suffered after the collapse of his Cabinet. Co-opting supporters of the status quo within his Cabinet – especially the Ministers of National Defence and External Affairs – was an important element of Trudeau's strategy and will be discussed further below.

In summary, Canadian officials were aware of the potential costs of reneging. Officials that were against drastic and unilateral reductions to NATO commitments justified their stance with extensive references to the reputational and material costs of reneging. While the potential domestic costs of reneging were not emphasized, they were still present in this case.

6.2.2 The United States' Status Quo Position

American officials were aware of and interested in the defence review. They took a specific interest in the review's implications for Canada's role in NATO. These officials hoped to influence Canadian decision-making towards maintaining its commitments. A series of messages sent in early February 1969 from the Department of State and the American embassy in Ottawa discuss a potential meeting between the President and Prime Minister. They reveal that the American ambassador to Canada, Harold Linder, thought that there were "advantages" to remaining ambiguous about the reasons behind a delay to an official meeting between Nixon and Trudeau.[65] Within Canada, there were questions as to whether the lack of American initiative in arranging this meeting indicated discontent over some aspect of Trudeau's policy. Linder specifically highlights NATO as a potential policy area that the Americans would like to influence: "There may be some advantages in permitting Canadians to speculate that absence of arrangement for Canadian-US meeting is attributable to some US dissatisfaction with GOC China policy or questioning of their role in NATO [sic]."[66] Thus, this message demonstrates the Americans' desire to dissuade the Canadians from reducing or questioning their role in NATO.

The timing that was suggested for this meeting also demonstrates that the Americans hoped to influence Canadian policy. While Linder saw benefits to delay, he ultimately recommended that a firm response to the Canadian be drafted due to "the closeness and importance of US-Canadian relations," in order to provide the Canadians with reassurance.[67] An official visit to the US by Prime Minister Trudeau was

[65]RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 7 February 1969.
[66]Ibid.
[67]Ibid.

considered and approved soon after Linder's message.[68] The Department of State wanted the meeting to occur in late March in order to maximize US influence over Canadian decision-making on the soon-to-be-completed defence review. According to a telegram sent from the US Secretary of State William Rogers, "We believe visit should precede completion GOC foreign policy review order provide Canadian officials with opportunity learning first hand US thinking on international issues and permit them consult in advance of final decisions."[69] President Nixon approved March 24-25 as the date for his meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau, in line with the Secretary's recommendation.[70]

A week before the meeting, an advance copy of a research memorandum on the Canadian foreign and defence policy reviews was sent to Secretary Rogers. The memorandum was prepared by Thomas L. Hughes from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and outlined the rationale and expected conclusions of the Canadian defence and foreign policy review.[71] This document reveals that American officials projected that the Canadians would not greatly reduce their forces in Europe and that withdrawal from NATO was an extremely unlikely option. This expectation is clearly laid out in the abstract of the memorandum:

> Few radical policy changes are expected to emerge from the defense review. Private statements by government officials and public announcements by Cabinet ministers suggest that Canada will hold steady to its present course. Ottawa will probably choose to maintain perhaps somewhat reduced but at least minimal forces in Europe and to continue its NORAD membership — just recently renewed for five years.[72]

This memorandum was particularly firm on the notion that Canada would not withdraw from NATO. It argues that while options like neutrality or total withdrawal had been considered by the Canadian government, they were ultimately "rejected as too

[68]Ibid. Linder's message is sent on February 7th, the official visit is under consideration by February 13th, and by February 18th a message is sent to the US Embassy in Ottawa inviting the Prime Minister to Washington for an official visit. See RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 13 February 1969; RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 18 February 1969.

[69]RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 13 February 1969. While the message only refers to the foreign policy review, it is plausible that they meant the defence review. The defence review was set to be completed in late March, while the foreign policy review was not completed for several years after this date. Regardless, it seems likely that the international issues that Secretary Rogers refers to would include matters that were under discussion for the defence review.

[70]RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 18 February 1969.

[71]RN, NSC, Box 670; Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 17 March 1969.

[72]Ibid.

expensive, not feasible, or undesirable."[73] Indeed, the "Trudeau Government seems to be concluding that Canada's membership in NATO and NORAD is a "bargain" because it enables Canada to have its voice heard to an extent far greater than its size and contributions would seem to warrant."[74] This report projected that Canada may still have incentives to reduce its military role in NATO in the future due to the military costs of maintaining forces and replacing obsolete equipment. Even then, withdrawal will still be undesirable, as Canada would want to maintain political influence in NATO's councils. Many of these points reflect those made by status quo officials within the Canadian government.

This optimism about the Canadian position can be related to some 'objective' factors cited in the memorandum, such as the fact that the majority of Canadian officials supported the status quo and that a Gallup poll indicated that "64% [of the Canadian public] favoured Canada's maintaining its forces in Europe".[75] The memorandum's incorrect projection of the course of the defence review may also be related to its sources of information and how they weighed their relative importance. It seems that the writer of this report relied heavily on both Minister Sharp and status quo oriented Canadian officials as being representative of government policy as a whole. It also underestimates Trudeau's alignment with the NATO-skeptics. The report tends to refer to both Trudeau and Sharp together, which creates the impression of alignment over their defence policy. While the report states that Trudeau's public position has been ambiguous – at times supporting the status quo and other times supporting NATO skepticism – the report also tends to highlight his pro-NATO statements and actions.

During the Canadian official visit to Washington in March 1969, American officials tried to influence Canada in favour of maintaining its commitment to NATO. While a transcript of the conversation between the Prime Minister and the President is not available, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Nixon on March 25th in preparation for a meeting with the Prime Minister. This message indicates that Nixon may have tried to dissuade Trudeau from making substantial reductions to NATO in this meeting:

> In your private conversation you may wish to probe Trudeau further on the probable outcome of the Canadian Defense Review.[76] Members of his

[73]Ibid.

[74]Ibid.

[75]Ibid.

[76]On the previous day, Sharp informed Kissinger that the Defence Review would be finalized shortly. According to the transcript of their conversation, while Sharp outlined some aspects of the NATO skeptic position, he did not link this to Trudeau or express this concern, see RN, NSC, Box

> entourage have expressed concern that he is still flirting with reducing Canada's role in NATO; they believe some low key remarks by you in private might be beneficial. In particular you may wish to say that
>
> – your trip convinced you of the continued vitality of NATO;
>
> – your examination of the common threat that still faces us has convinced you of the continued need of the alliance;
>
> – you consider full Canadian participation in NATO one of the alliance's great strengths and mutually reinforcing with our own participation;
>
> —you are convinced that the era of negotiation we are entering requires the maintenance of our joint strength and you envisage NATO as playing a key role through consultation and mutual exchange of information.[77]

Kissinger made similar remarks to Sharp during their meeting on March 24th, which was recorded in memoranda of their conversation. Kissinger emphasised the importance of NATO, especially the importance of cohesion and maintaining force levels after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia:

> [The US] attached great importance to continuity and strength in NATO. There had been obvious changes in attitude among the European members of the alliance after Czechoslovakia. They no longer talked about troop reductions but saw the need for effective NATO forces. At the least, the qualitative performance of the troops could be improved.[78]

When the discussion turned to the Canadian foreign policy and defence reviews, Kissinger again emphasized the importance of NATO and conventional improvements to the alliance in light of Czechoslovakia, arguing that NATO's "conventional forces were not now strong enough to carry out the role assigned to them."[79] Thus, in these meetings, American officials signalled that they would oppose significant reductions to Canada's commitment to NATO.

Despite American predictions about the defence review and their efforts to influence its outcome, the Canadians still opted for substantial reductions to their NATO

670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 24 March 1969b.

[77]FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.92, 25 March 1969.

[78]RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 24 March 1969a.

[79]RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 24 March 1969b.

commitments. Minister Cadieux specified Canada's plans for these cuts to the US Secretary of Defence Laird on May 26 1969. Canada proposed a reduction of forces from 10,000 to 3,500, the complete withdrawal of Canada's mechanized brigade, including the nuclear-armed Honest John, and the removal of all nuclear strike aircraft by 1972.[80] This would amount to Canada reneging on its nuclear role in NATO. According to a telegram from the US mission at NATO to the State Department, which recounted the meeting, Laird reacted extremely negatively to this proposal:

> Secretary Laird expressed surprise that cut was so deep and disappointment that it was described as non-negotiable when there should be NATO consultation; warned that Canadian action might be "disastrous" by contagion within the alliance; and criticized making a security decision for the reasons of domestic popularity... When Cadieux asked SECDEF [Laird] to say frankly what he thought of Canadian plan, Secretary said, "I think it's a mistake."[81]

From this interaction, Americans clearly signalled their opposition to Canada's proposed defection on their commitments. According to the US NATO cable, which "was seen and approved" by Secretary Laird, they advised that the US should "resist Cadieux's natural tendency to put as positive a face on GOC action... and to encourage European allies to be voluble in their protestations."[82] The Americans were therefore initially open to taking a strong stance against the Canadians to pressure them into maintaining their commitments to the greatest extent possible.

The State Department called the for a meeting between the American Ambassador to Canada and Sharp to convey the United States' displeasure and surprise.[83] While it is unclear whether this meeting took place,[84] this State Department telegram reveals both the extent to which and the rationale behind the American opposition to Canadian reductions from NATO:

[80]RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 2 of 2, 26 May 1969.

[81]Ibid.

[82]Ibid. See also RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 2 of 2, 27 May 1969.

[83]RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 26 May 1969. This telegram also recommended calling in the Canadian Ambassador to the United States to object to the reductions, see also RN, NSC, Box 670; Vol.1 2 of 2, 28 May 1969.

[84]Advisor Helmut Sonnenfeldt appealed directly to Henry Kissinger to soften the tone of the message conveyed to the Canadians and to prevent the calling in of the Canadian Ambassador, see RN, NSC, Box 670; Vol.1 2 of 2, 28 May 1969. According to a hand-written note on this document, Kissinger "discussed [this] with [under-Secretary] Richardson on May 29." However, it is unclear whether Sonnenfeldt was successful. I could not locate a record of what action (if any) the Americans took, see also FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.94, 28 May 1969.

Ambassador should seek immediate appointment with Sharp and make a parallel presentation along following lines:

(a) We are deeply concerned[85] at the size of the proposed reductions in Canada's force commitments in Europe and by the speed with which the GOC plans to carry them out. We are also disturbed at the GOC characterization of the proposals as "non-negotiable."

(b) From previous Canadian statements we had been led to believe that the size and timing of the reductions were to be subject to genuine consultation with the other members of the Alliance. We hope that this will still prove to be the case.

(c) GOC needs no reminder of the broader security interests of Canada and the United States in political and military stability in Western Europe. Existing unsettled state of affairs scarcely seems an appropriate time for North American members of the alliance to reduce their forces, hence their influence on events on other side of North Atlantic. Particularly, there has been no change in either political or military situation affecting East-West relations which would warrant significant reductions at this time.

(d) Canadian actions will have an unravelling effect on Alliance as result of sharp and sudden Canadian force reduction. In particular, effect on ability of US and other Allies to maintain level of forces in Europe cannot be ignored.

(e) Moreover, because of US interest and concern with the matter, we feel "non-negotiable" aspect of proposals is not consistent with the "new era of consultation" initiated at the time of Trudeau-Nixon meeting.

(f) In light of foregoing, we would hope GOC will undertake to provide for genuine consultation within the Alliance and that FOC will be prepared to take into account Allied views in light of that consultation.[86]

Thus, the Americans initially reacted in the way that the status quo officials predicted. It was deeply opposed to major reductions from NATO, viewing them as strategically

[85]Initial draft read "shocked."
[86]RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 26 May 1969.

unwarranted and destabilizing, potentially leading to an 'unravelling' of the Alliance. In point c, the connection between alliance commitment and Canada's international influence is emphasized. Lastly, the Americans objected to the unilateral nature of the process of reductions, calling for a more consensus-based approach.

The Nixon administration was also facing domestic pressure to cut their own contributions to NATO.[87] The Canadian reductions would only give more power to these domestic forces and may create an irresistible momentum towards military cuts. At this time, there was mounting Congressional pressure to withdraw forces from Europe in light of the Vietnam war. During a joint-cabinet meeting with the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mitchell Sharp, the American Secretary of State warned that Canadian reductions "might suggest to some in the Congress that the United States ought to pursue a policy along the same lines. The prospects of a snowball were not encouraging here or elsewhere in the alliance."[88] American officials hoped to stave off this pressure by undercutting the Canadian position.

6.2.3 NATO's Status Quo Position

NATO's position was aligned with the United States and was specifically opposed to Canada withdrawing from its nuclear role.[89] NATO command also rejected Canada's initial proposal for its reconfigured and reduced role. Communications between Canadian and NATO officials reveal that NATO command believed that substantial reductions along the lines that Canada was proposing would severely weaken the alliance. Like the Americans, they were also worried about a contagion or an unravelling effect for the alliance.

Representatives from SHAPE consistently advocated for Canada to retain as many commitments as possible. Importantly, they wanted Canada to keep its nuclear strike role for its CF-104s, even if cuts were absolutely necessary. In an assessment of the Canadian proposal sent to Cadieux in July 1969, SACEUR General Goodpaster concluded that Canada should not follow through on its proposed reductions and tried to encourage the Canadians to back down:

[87]FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.95, 25 June 1969.

[88]Ibid.

[89]Individual allied countries also objected to Canada's proposed reductions. According to Granatstein and Bothwell (1990, p.28), after Cadieux revealed the details to its allies at a NATO meeting, "The Belgians and the Dutch were deeply shaken, the Belgian defence minister actually bursting into tears at the news."

> SHAPE strongly recommends that Canadian authorities reconsider their proposal with the objective of maintaining, as nearly as possible, their current military strength, organizational structure and mission assignment in Europe. SHAPE is prepared to participate in this *reconsideration* through consultations with the Canadian authorities.[90] [emphasis added]

More specifically, Goodpaster emphasized the importance of Canada's nuclear role within the larger context in the alliance. He highlighted that there was "no military justification" for the kind of reductions that the Canadians were proposing, particularly in the Central Front, where Canadian forces were based: "SHAPE strongly supports the retention of the present Canadian contribution in Europe. Current forces are very thin in the central region resulting in marginal capability."[91] He emphasised that Canada's air force contribution was "among the most effective in Europe in the [nuclear] strike and reconnaissance role respectively" and that the withdrawal of Canada's strike force would amount to a 11% reduction in the overall nuclear capability of the Allied Forces in Central Europe. [92] A Canadian withdrawal from its nuclear strike role "would have an adverse effect... on the credibility of the deterrent."[93]

SHAPE produced a counterproposal on August 3rd, which tried to minimize the extent of Canada's reductions and reinforce the view that any diminishment of Canada's role was detrimental from a military standpoint.[94] They suggested that Canada retain a substantially higher number of forces within Europe: "If reductions are mandatory because of non-military factors, the SHAPE preferred alternative would be for forces in Europe of a strength of 8300... as a minimum target."[95] However, SHAPE representatives recognized that this figure was unlikely to gain much traction with the Canadians, and noted that they would accept a force of 6500.[96] It also emphasized that Canada should retain its nuclear role: "[f]or the Air Force element a 'meaningful role' should entail participation in the strategy of MC 14/3 i.e., it should have both strike (nuclear) and attack (conventional) capability."[97] SHAPE envisioned that

[90]DHH, RP, 2530, 19 July 1969.

[91]Ibid. This assessment was directly at odds with what many NATO-skeptics in Cabinet were arguing. As will be discussed below, the Prime Minister and other NATO-skeptic Canadian Ministers argued that that there was no military value to the Canadian contribution, that it was a marginal force, and a political token.

[92]Ibid.

[93]Ibid.

[94]DHH, RP, 2530, 3 August 1969. It appears that this proposal was reviewed and endorsed by the United States, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.96, 7 July 1969.

[95]DHH, RP, 2530, 3 August 1969.

[96]Ibid.

[97]Ibid.

Canada would retain two nuclear strike squadrons, according to their proposed force breakdown.[98]

NATO justified their status quo position in a variety of ways, which reflected those articulated by Canadian and American officials. They argued that the current Canadian contribution had military value and any substantial withdrawals would weaken the alliance as a whole. They also highlighted that such unilateral withdrawals were outside of the framework of balanced mutual force reductions, a commitment that had been reaffirmed in NATO on May 29th 1969.[99] The precise timing of Canada's withdrawals from NATO was also particularly bad, as the US and the USSR were "preparing for negotiations over reciprocal reductions in their military forces in Europe."[100] Finally, they worried that the Canadian withdrawal would have a domino effect across the alliance "if other countries with tight budgets followed the Canadian example."[101]

In summary, Trudeau and his government faced considerable international pressure to retain their commitments. There was a sizeable status quo faction within the government that believed reneging would entail large material and reputational costs. The strong opposition emanating from the United States and NATO seemed to support their concerns. How, then, did Trudeau manage to renege, while still managing to keep his Cabinet together and avoid severe domestic audience costs?

6.3 Nationalist Coalitions and Reneging

Trudeau's successful reneging strategy can be summarized as a two-step process, with each step corresponding to each 'level' of the two-level game. First, Trudeau constructed a nationalist coalition at the domestic level. Next, he used this nationalist coalition as leverage at the international level to gain allied acceptance and mitigate the costs of reneging. As demonstrated in the section above, Trudeau faced both domestic and international opposition to reneging. Trudeau took on each locus of resistance sequentially. This strategy was the key to his success: by having Cabinet agree to substantial reductions to its NATO commitments before initiating negotiations with NATO, Trudeau ensured that his fiercest critics were co-opted. Because of the convention of Cabinet solidarity within the Canadian political system, Ministers were required to fall behind the government's policy or resign, regardless of their

[98]Ibid.
[99]DHH, RP, 2530, 19 July 1969.
[100]Fortmann and Larose, 2004, p.538.
[101]DHH, RP, 2530, 28 August 1969.

personal feelings. This strategy allowed Canadian negotiators to present a united front, with a clear set of demands and a credible threat of withdrawal to their NATO counterparts, clearing the path for reneging.

The first section concentrates on how Trudeau secured the support of a nationalist coalition that favoured reneging and co-opted the status quo members of Cabinet. While Trudeau's popularity and status as Prime Minister skewed the balance of power in Cabinet, Trudeau also behaved strategically to empower the nationalist members of Cabinet that were skeptical of NATO. Ultimately, major reductions to Canada's role in NATO became a "compromise" solution between the status quo members of Cabinet and those that wanted to completely withdraw from the Alliance.[102] The next section examines how Canada succeeded in securing these major reductions during its international-level negotiations with NATO. It will show how Canadian negotiators used the backing of this nationalist coalition to gain bargaining power through three mechanisms related to the nature of the support for reductions: a credible threat of withdrawal, a willingness to act unilaterally, and a low vulnerability to restructuring.

6.3.1 Domestic Level: Trudeau's Formulation of a Nationalist Coalition

Trudeau's nationalist domestic coalition did not represent an external force on the Prime Minister that forced him to renege on Canada's NATO commitments.[103] Rather, it was consolidated by Trudeau himself after he became Prime Minister in April 1968. Trudeau was skeptical of Canada's Cold War commitments, particularly its nuclear role within NATO and NORAD.[104] He had opposed nuclear acquisition to the extent that he renounced the Liberal Party during the 1963 election and campaigned for the New Democratic Party in support of their anti-nuclear platform.[105] While he eventually joined the Liberal Party in 1965, Trudeau's stance against nuclear weapons had not abated. During a Cabinet debate on NORAD in 1967, Trudeau, then Minister of Justice, expressed his wish that Canada's nuclear commitments should be re-examined.[106] Trudeau also noted in his memoirs that during the defence review process, he had prioritized the withdrawal of Canada's nuclear role from NATO.[107]

[102]Halloran, 2006, p.125.

[103]However, Trudeau was not necessarily unique - there was a rising tide of skepticism about Canada's commitments, see Bothwell, 2007; Halloran, 2006.

[104]Bothwell, 2007, pp.278-280; Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, pp.7-8.

[105]Bothwell, 2007, pp.280.

[106]LAC, CC, 28674, 1 June 1967.

[107]Head and Trudeau, 1995, p.85.

However, Trudeau's questioning of Canada's alliance commitments went beyond its nuclear role. He argued that Canada's priorities needed to be reoriented. Specifically, they needed to be refocused towards the provision of national security, towards North America and away from Europe. During a Cabinet debate on Canada's role in NATO, the Prime Minister mused,

> [A]n observer would find it strange that Canadian troops were off contributing to the defence of Europe to impress politically our friends while leaving exposed our vast coastline, our territorial seas, and air space... the policy was inverted. We should be protecting our internal security, defending our three seas, and then considering other possible international commitments. It was not logical or rational not to protect that which was ours... Forces in situ, however, should first be in Canada to defend Canadian interests."[108]

Trudeau saw NATO as a primarily one-sided arrangement, where Canada was on the losing end. Trudeau himself can be seen as representing the nationalist view of Canada's defence priorities, calling for widespread reductions to its international commitments, with a particular interest in withdrawing from Canada's nuclear role in NATO.

There were several benefits Trudeau hoped to reap with this policy, aside from a reassertion of Canadian sovereignty. More practically, these defence commitments were expensive, and Canada's budget was coming under increasing strain.[109] Cuts to military spending, while free-riding on the security benefits of the Western Alliance, presented itself as a low-hanging fruit to save money without affecting the life of everyday Canadians. In addition, among certain sectors of Canadian society there was increasing skepticism towards the United States and its military adventurism, especially in Vietnam.[110] According to Fortmann and Larose, Trudeau was embedded within an "emerging strategic counterculture," in which academics questioned many of the fundamental bases of Canadian defence policy, including its role in NATO and close alignment with the United States.[111] However, this was not necessarily the majority view within Canada.[112]

[108]LAC, CC, 2873, 29 March 1969.
[109]DHH, RP, 2109, 18 June 1969a; DHH, RP, 2109, 18 June 1969b.
[110]Halloran, 2006, p.127.
[111]Fortmann and Larose, 2004, p.541.
[112]Bothwell, 2007, p.285.

Soon after taking office, Trudeau ordered a review of Canada's defence policy on May 15th 1968.[113] He also quickly called an election, which resulted in a landslide electoral victory for the Liberals in June 1968. During the election, Trudeau promised to re-examine Canada's foreign and defence policy.[114] The timing of the defence review allowed Trudeau to capitalise on his electoral success and widespread popularity.[115] Cabinet Ministers acknowledged Trudeau's place at the top of the political order, according to Bothwell: "Trudeau was in a strong position vis-à-vis his Cabinet... 'We're here because he's here,' ministers said. Trudeau was not only prime minister: he was party chieftain."[116] Thus, the 1968 election primed the Canadian public for change and gave Trudeau the legitimacy to push for a reassessment of Canada's alliance commitments. However, the outcome of the review was still uncertain.

Although Trudeau's Cabinet was divided on the issue of Canada's commitment to NATO, with a majority of Ministers being in the pro-NATO camp, Trudeau's influence helped shift the balance of power in Cabinet towards those that were skeptical of NATO. [117] This shift paved the way for the Cabinet to adopt a powerful position vis-à-vis Canada's reductions to its commitments to NATO. The newer members of Cabinet, which were brought in by Trudeau, were some of the strongest supporters of widespread reductions to Canada's alliance commitments and even neutrality. Particularly vocal members of the 'new guard' included the Postmaster General Eric Kierans and the President of the Privy Council Office Donald Macdonald, who both advocated for total withdrawal from NATO. Other "known neutralists" included the Minister of Forestry and Rural Development Jean Marchand and the Secretary of State Gérard Pelletier.[118] While these men were members of Cabinet before Trudeau's election, they also represented this 'new guard' of Liberal Ministers, as "Pearson had recruited [them] along with Trudeau in 1965 to bolster federal representation from the province of Quebec" and were considered among Trudeau's closest friends and advisors within Cabinet.[119]

These Ministers emphasized the importance of refocusing the government priorities towards national security or other domestic interests. In the view of these Ministers, NATO did not and could not fulfill these interests. Therefore, the government needed to reassert control over or 'renationalize' its defence and foreign policy by

[113]LAC, CC, 4158, 15 May 1968.
[114]Halloran, 2006, p.126.
[115]Bothwell, 2007, p.281.
[116]Ibid.
[117]Ibid., p.288; Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, p.23; Halloran, 2006.
[118]Bothwell, 2007, pp.287-288.
[119]Ibid., p.287; Halloran, 2006, p.131.

substantially reducing its commitments to NATO or by leaving the alliance outright. As the President of the Privy Council argued, "It was the Canadian interest that this Cabinet should be interested in" rather than the interests of its European allies.[120] Moreover, the Postmaster General highlighted that these commitments came at the expense of domestic priorities:

> In the Pearson years expensive international commitments were entered into by Canada for acceptable reasons but possibly at the expense of prior domestic responsibilities... this country had special economic and social problems which must be faced. The domestic problems of housing, regional disparity, and the position of the unorganized must be solved. Canadian foreign policy was only of value if it was the product of a strong and unified country.[121]

The Minister of Forestry and Rural Development also agreed that national unity and domestic interests should be the main priorities of the government, and this justified reneging on its commitments to NATO:

> Canada was not a big power and was not a country which had been welded together very well. This process should be the government's first preoccupation for if domestic unity could not be maintained, Canadian foreign policy would be of no value. In this context it was his view that Canadian troops should no longer remain in Europe.[122]

All these positions can be seen as elements of a nationalist point of view, as they all believed what was best for Canada was concentrating on its national priorities or forging an independent path from the alliance.

These Ministers also emphasized the reputational and material gains of reneging. The Postmaster General argued that Canada could augment its status by divesting from NATO:

> If, through our initiatives, we could encourage understanding and tolerance then we as a Cabinet could be very powerful. We could indicate [to allies] that we revere independence and respect the need for an increased contribution to the under-developed countries of this world.[123]

[120]LAC, CC, 2873, 29 March 1969.
[121]Ibid.
[122]Ibid.
[123]LAC, CC, 2872, 30 March 1969.

Another argument was that Canada could increase its status and influence in the alliance through reneging, as reducing its forces may bring about a *de-escalation* to the tensions in Europe.[124] Other Ministers, including Trudeau, discounted the ability of Canada to influence Europe through alliance membership. The Minister of National Health and Welfare, remarked that "it was almost pretentious... to assume that we had great influence [in NATO]."[125] Trudeau highlighted that freeing up defence resources could lead to material gains, by reorienting Canada's forces towards less traditional security roles: "Could the forces be used to build highways, to solve problems of pollution, as cadres for social development?"[126] Others discounted the magnitude of the material costs of reneging, arguing that Canada did not rely on NATO for the provision of security.[127]

These NATO-skeptic members of Cabinet also provided strategic justifications for withdrawing from the alliance. They argued that Canada's contribution was basically "marginal," serving political rather than strategic purposes.[128] However, these claims were disputed by other members of Cabinet and officials within the Departments of National Defence and External Affairs. In fact, it does not appear the outcome of the reductions was carefully calibrated.[129] According to Bothwell, after the reductions, "The remaining troops, reduced in size and status, no longer had a clear role to play in NATO defence."[130]

Trudeau not only brought NATO-skeptic members into the Cabinet, but also allowed them influence over the defence review process. Previously, Canada's nuclear and alliance policies were the domain of the Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence, and Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs.[131] Since both Defence Minister Cadieux and Foreign Minister Sharp were among the strongest supporters of NATO in Cabinet, this move was especially important for shifting Canadian policy towards substantial withdrawals. Both the Defence Policy Review and the report of the Special Task Force Europe (STAFEUR), which was tasked with re-examining Canada's military role in Europe, were debated by the entire Cabinet over two days at the end

[124]Ibid.; LAC, CC, 2873, 29 March 1969.
[125]LAC, CC, 2872, 30 March 1969.
[126]Ibid.
[127]Ibid.; LAC, CC, 2873, 29 March 1969.
[128]LAC, CC, 2873, 29 March 1969.
[129]In an interview later in his life, Trudeau noted "It was an arbitrary decision to cut the NATO force in half – the point was that we were still there" (Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.378, interviewed on 30 June 1988).
[130]Bothwell, 2007, p.291.
[131]Ibid., p.281.

of March 1969, where all members were encouraged to give their opinions.[132] During the afternoon of the session on March 29th, the President of the Privy Council Office was given the time to read a prepared statement, "which recommended that Canada should notify its allies of its intention to discontinue membership in the NATO alliance."[133] This steered the debate in the direction of whether Canada should be a member of NATO in the first place, with the extent and type of the commitments to the alliance to be debated only after discussing this more fundamental question.

Trudeau also opened the defence review to the public in a way that amplified critical voices and prevented the Canadian government from tying its hands to any commitments to NATO. Early on in the review process, Trudeau warned Ministers that they should not publicly insinuate that Canada intended to remain in NATO or substantially keep their commitments.[134] However, in January 1969, the Prime Minister "cleared"[135] a speech about the defence review made by Postmaster General Kierans given during a by-election, which was highly critical of NATO and calling for Canada's full withdrawal from the Alliance:

> Given the limitations imposed upon us by membership in NATO, and also the scope for initiative that still remains, is that membership worthwhile, is it the best choice that we can make?
> I believe it is not worthwhile.
> I believe that we can do better.[136]

Trudeau also called on individuals outside of the government to provide their opinions on the future direction of Canadian defence policy. Specifically, the government engaged with academics, many of whom had a dim view of nuclear weapons and Cold War alliances.[137] Having academics participate in the review was another means to allow NATO-skeptic voices to have prominence during the process.

Trudeau persistently involved himself in the review process in order to ensure that it would not flatly negate a neutralist policy or substantial military withdrawals. When the first version of the defence review was submitted to Cabinet in July 1968, supporting the current levels of military contribution to NATO, Trudeau and other members of Cabinet flatly rejected the report and "insisted that the defense review

[132]LAC, CC, 2873, 29 March 1969; LAC, CC, 2872, 30 March 1969.
[133]LAC, CC, 2873, 29 March 1969.
[134]LAC, CC, 4277, 19 July 1968.
[135]Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, p.19.
[136]Kierans in Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, p.18.
[137]Fortmann and Larose, 2004, pp.549-550; Halloran, 2006, pp.135-136.

team start all over again."[138] This version was thrown out because it did not adequately consider policies that would fundamentally change the status quo, such as neutrality or total military withdrawal. According to the co-chairman of STAFEUR, this was part of the Prime Minister's attempt to steer the outcome of the review process towards a policy of reneging: "Trudeau made it perfectly plain that he hoped our recommendation would be for a downgrading of Europe in the Canadian perspective, and a complete withdrawal of Canadian troops in Europe."[139] Indeed, according to Halloran, these efforts were successful making some level of reductions all but inevitable: "The impossibility of maintaining Canada's military contribution to NATO at current levels had been brought home to them [status quo officials] early in the review process."[140]

Despite his persistent efforts to steer the defence review, Trudeau still worried that the Departments of National Defence and External Affairs would not critically examine the status quo or seriously consider the positive implications of complete withdrawal from NATO. Indeed, both the Defence Policy Review and the STAFEUR report would recommend alignment and the maintenance of Canada's alliance commitments.[141] To counter an uncritically status quo position, Trudeau approved the formation of 'the Non-Group' – a group of officials led and selected by Ivan Head, which would prepare an alternate review of Canadian defence policy that could also be considered by Cabinet.[142] Neither Cadieux nor Sharp were aware of the existence of an alternate report, until it arrived on their desks a day before the Cabinet meeting on the Defence Review. Entitled "A Study of Defence Policy," the report called for drastic changes to Canada's military structure, including the halving of Canada's armed forces (from 100,000 to 50,000) over ten years as well as the complete withdrawal of Canada's nuclear role from NATO.[143] Interestingly, the paper did not call for a complete withdrawal from NATO, but did advocate for major reductions to these forces.[144]

Cadieux and Sharp were deeply troubled by Trudeau's secret circumvention of their authority. According to Bothwell, Cadieux threatened to resign, and implied that Sharp would also have grounds to do so if this paper was introduced to Cabi-

[138]Halloran, 2006, p.130; LAC, CC, 4277, 19 July 1968.
[139]Bothwell, 2007, p.285.
[140]Halloran, 2006, p.142.
[141]Ganatstein and Bothwell, 1990, p.19.
[142]Ibid., pp.3-6, 20-21.
[143]Ibid.; DHH, RP 3240, March 1969.
[144]Ibid.

net.[145] Trudeau agreed to withdraw the paper, recognizing that he had perhaps gone too far in trying to steer Cabinet discussion towards reneging and faced potential audience costs: "Cadieux's explosion made Trudeau realise that he might face one and possibly more resignations if he proceeded with the proposals advocated in the mysterious paper."[146] However, the paper had already been circulated to the entire Cabinet, making Trudeau's preferences known, as the withdrawn paper "came directly from the Prime Minister's Office."[147]

Thus, Canada's reneging attempt was the result of a forced "compromise" between officials that wanted to maintain the current level of commitment and those that wanted to leave the alliance outright.[148] By elevating the status of the nationalist and NATO-skeptic voices both in and outside Cabinet, Trudeau made it clear that a simple acceptance of the status quo was off the table, while full withdrawal from the alliance was a credible possibility. For status quo members of Cabinet, the foundations of the debate shifted: instead of trying to maintain a particular level of commitment, status quo officials were now focused on minimizing reductions and not leaving the alliance outright. As will be apparent at the international level of negotiations, it was this credible threat of withdrawal that forced status quo officials to be co-opted into accepting major reductions to Canada's commitment to NATO, including reneging on its nuclear sharing commitment.

In the end, the Cabinet agreed that Canada would remain in NATO, but with substantial reductions to its nuclear and conventional commitments.[149] On April 3rd 1969, Trudeau issued a statement on defence policy that announced, "The [Canadian Government] intends, in consultations with [Canada's] allies, to take early steps to bring about a planned and phased reduction of the size of the [Canadian] forces in Europe."[150] This result represented a compromise between the status quo and neutralist members of Cabinet; however, Canada's role in NATO was clearly to be demoted.[151] On May 20th 1969, Cabinet agreed to a broad array of proposed cuts to Canada's contribution to NATO, including the reduction of Canadian forces from 10100 to 3500 and the elimination of its nuclear role.[152] The proposal for the new and

[145]Bothwell, 2007, p.187.
[146]Ibid.
[147]Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, p.5.
[148]Halloran, 2006, p.125.
[149]LAC, CC, 2844, 3 April 1969.
[150]DHH, RP, 2109, 3 April 1969.
[151]Bothwell, 2007; Halloran 2006; LAC, CC, 2870, 1 April 1969.
[152]LAC, CC, 3034, 20 May 1969.

reduced role for Canada was then communicated to NATO and the United States, which represented the commencement of Level I negotiations.

6.3.2 International Level: Intra-Alliance Bargaining

Trudeau's nationalist coalition at the domestic level translated into leverage at the international level. As I explained in Chapter 3, nationalist coalitions provide negotiators with three sources of bargaining power that facilitate reneging: a credible threat of withdrawal, a willingness to act unilaterally, and a low vulnerability to restructuring. This section will show how these allowed the Canadian government to successfully renege on its nuclear role and reduce its conventional commitments to NATO.

6.3.2.1 A Credible Threat of Withdrawal

The nature of the coalition that backed Trudeau in Cabinet and the co-option of status quo officials had a crucial impact on Canadian bargaining power with NATO. This nationalist coalition provided Canadian negotiators with a credible threat of total withdrawal from the Alliance if allies did not accept major reductions. The Canadian officials presented a united front, a clear set of demands, and a clear threat to walk away if they were not met. Although the Cabinet debates were secret, their allies knew the extent of the NATO-skepticism and tolerance for withdrawal within Cabinet. In a joint Cabinet meeting in June 1969 with the US Secretary of State William Rogers, Sharp noted that complete withdrawal from NATO was discussed within Cabinet, and therefore was within the Canadians' win-set if major reductions were not accepted:

> The Canadians had considered neutrality or an alliance with the United States alone, but had rejected both possibilities... Unless they could contribute constructively to the alliance, they would withdraw. Canada understood the importance of consultation, but its basic position was "non-negotiable." Canada had to have the right to decide on its role. Within that context, it was prepared to discuss the timing of the cuts and, within limits, the extent of the cuts."[153]

The fact that one of the chief supporters of the status quo was the official issuing the threat of withdrawal revealed to the Americans the power of the nationalist coalition and underscored the support for reneging within Cabinet.

[153]FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.95, 25 June 1969.

While the Americans initially bristled under the threat of withdrawal, the fear that the Canadians would simply walk away if their demands were not met ultimately forced NATO and the United States to be more flexible in terms of what it would accept. On July 7th 1969, the American Ambassador to Canada Harold Linder succinctly summarized the dangers of taking a hardline approach in negotiations, as it could further strengthen the nationalists in Trudeau's government:

> Any effort by Allies or by [Secretary General of NATO Manilo] Brosio simply to tell GOC what it proposes to do is "unacceptable" will provoke little more than resentment and could freeze earlier GOC proposal as maximum offer. To do so would also run some risk of engendering sufficient resentment to strengthen hand for long term future of those in Cabinet who wish to remove Canadian military presence from Europe entirely.[154]

He argued that they could push back on certain elements of the Canadian proposal, but ultimately, they would have to accept substantial reductions.[155] Linder recommended that the United States should support SHAPE's counter proposal, but cautioned that it was unlikely to be accepted and they should expect much less. While SHAPE's counter-proposal "assumes continuation Canadian nuclear strike role," he warned that "[r]etention of 104's nuclear capability is probably negotiable for limited and specified period of time."[156] It was more realistic to concentrate on augmenting the number of Canadian troops stationed in Europe and other elements of Canada's conventional commitments to NATO.[157]

The Linder telegram had a substantial effect on American officials in softening their approach to negotiations with the Canadians. Up until this point, Secretary of Defence Laird and Secretary of State Rogers were advocating for a hardline stance in order to dissuade the Canadians from reneging on their commitments. However, on July 10th, in a joint departmental message to the US Mission at NATO, which directly discusses US tactics and response to the Canadian proposal, there is a clear shift. This telegram states that the Ambassador's "careful analysis... has persuaded us of the risks of a 'hard line' as distinguished from a compromise approach to the Canadians"[158] Instead of trying to get the Canadians to reverse course on reneging,

[154]FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.96, 7 July 1969. A similar warning was issued by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, (National Security Council Staff) to Kissinger to "not slam the door" on the Canadians in May 1969 (FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.94, 28 May 1969).
[155]FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.96, 7 July 1969.
[156]Ibid.
[157]Ibid.
[158]RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 10 July 1969.

the Americans now aimed "to limit damage."[159] The Americans supported the NATO counterproposal that envisioned 6,500 troops, a retention of the nuclear role, and other conventional commitments, but they were not very optimistic about the likelihood of Canada's acquiescence.

After receiving the counterproposal from NATO, the Canadians made several concessions, including increasing the total number of military personnel that would remain in Europe from 2,500 to 5,000. However, the new proposal was still a substantial reduction to Canada's conventional commitments and firmly stated that they would withdraw from their nuclear role by 1972. In a meeting on August 15th, the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff General J.V. Allard warned the NATO Chief of Staff General H.M. Wade that this proposal represented the Canadians' final and maximum offer: "If NATO does not consider the Canadian proposal worthwhile the CDS [Chief of Defence Staff] would have no choice but to recommend the complete withdrawal of the European-based forces to Canada."[160] At the end of the meeting, General Allard "concluded his remarks with a further reminder that the Canadian government is not prepared to negotiate the question further."[161] On August 27th, SACEUR sent a response to the Canadian offer that the "revised organization... of approximately 5000 proposed 15 Aug welcome increase provides structure which will allow CF [Canadian Forces] to continue to fulfill a meaningful but reduced role" and found the decision to continue the strike role until 1972 "gratifying."[162] Through coercive threats to leave the alliance outright, Canada was able to achieve allied acceptance of defection on their conventional commitments and reneging on its nuclear role. These threats were credible due to the nationalist nature of the coalition that backed reneging, which had been pushing for further reductions and would accept full withdrawal.

6.3.2.2 Willingness to Act Unilaterally

From the outset, Canadian reductions to NATO were conceived as part of a larger restructuring of Canadian defence priorities towards the national interest, with the defence of Canadian territory and sovereignty as the first priority and the defence of North America as the second priority.[163] These reductions were conceived as part of a review of Canada's national policy, rather than as a part of NATO's collective

[159]Ibid.
[160]DHH, RP, 2530, 28 August 1969.
[161]Ibid.
[162]DHH, RP, 2530, 27 August 1969. In this message, SHAPE requests that Canada reconsider some of its conventional reductions, such as the configuration of the land forces and the number of Canadian staff postings. These were again rejected by the Canadians.
[163]DHH, RP, 2106, 30 April 1969.

strategy. The decision to reduce Canada's commitment to NATO was confirmed before intra-alliance negotiations had even begun. This unilateral approach to nuclear withdrawal and conventional reductions substantially increased the Canadians' bargaining power, leaving allies with very limited time and space to negotiate and roll back the decisions that the government had already made.

By the time Level I negotiations began, Trudeau's government had tied their hands domestically to the reduction of their NATO commitments, making backing down extremely difficult. The decision to reduce Canada's role in NATO had been ratified by Cabinet, announced to the public, and debated within the house by the end April. The public nature of Trudeau's call to reassess Canadian defence policy and the drawn-out process of the defence review "helped to create an expectation of change."[164] This domestic hand-tying effect was recognized by the Americans. Linder had cautioned that Trudeau made this decision with the "full support of most influential members [of] his Cabinet" and that the government was very unlikely to accept the "status quo or something close to it... which Trudeau has publicly ruled out."[165]

The Canadians' unilateral approach and nationalist mindset made them far less concerned with accommodating their allies, which increased their bargaining power. During a Cabinet meeting on April 3rd, on the day of the release of the statement announcing NATO force reductions, there was a discussion about whether the government could do so without first consulting their allies.[166] According to the minutes, "It was pointed out that legally it was not a breach of the articles of the North Atlantic Treaty for a member to announce a change in the assignment of forces before consulting with other parties to the Treaty."[167] This reassurance was enough for Cabinet to go forward.

The text of the April 3rd statement itself also served to strengthen the hand of the Canadians in later negotiations with NATO over the precise nature of their contribution to the Alliance. While promising reductions to domestic audiences, the Canadian government made no firm commitment to gain the approval of its allies for its future force structure. Instead, there was the assurance that allies would be

[164]Halloran, 2006, p.141.
[165]FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.96, 7 July 1969.
[166]LAC, CC, 2844, 3 April 1969.
[167]Ibid. Unfortunately, there is no attribution for this quote, so it is unclear who made this argument in Cabinet. This statement was in response to a point made by Sharp that the Canadian ambassador to NATO had claimed that Canada was legally bound to consult with its Allies before making a public announcement about reductions.

"consulted."[168] This rhetorically softened Canada's unilateral approach somewhat, but at the same time, cemented that the key decision had already been made. In the final draft of a statement to NATO's Central Regional Group of Defence Ministers, Cadieux welcomed "any suggestions you may have... as quickly as possible in order that we can take them into account in coming to our final decisions."[169] Canada would not slow down to ensure that allies would be accommodated. Furthermore, it would not promise that their allies' 'suggestions' would have any impact over the final decisions.

By taking this unilateral approach, the Canadians did not have to rectify the potential negative implications of their reductions on the strategic posture of the Alliance. According to Linder's assessment, the "Canadian position is that any shortfall in Canadian forces or contribution is Alliance problem and that European Allies have greater obligation than GOC to improve defense on what after all is their territory."[170] This position allowed the Canadians to move the negotiations swiftly, concentrating only on the new force posture, but not its overall implications for the Alliance.

Once negotiations had begun, the firmness of Canada's pre-negotiation position created institutional barriers to flexibility, especially regarding Canada's nuclear role. On April 3rd, in order to determine the precise nature of Canada's new force structure for Europe, Cabinet agreed to form an interdepartmental task force to come up with the initial proposal for negotiations with NATO.[171] When this proposal was presented to and approved by Cabinet, Ministers also agreed that certain deviations from this proposal would need to be submitted to Cabinet for reapproval.[172] This was a particularly important source of bargaining power after SHAPE made its counterproposal, which had to be sent to and discussed by Cabinet before any final decision was made.

On August 12th, in anticipation of a meeting between NATO and Canadian military officials, the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff attempted to get Cadieux's approval for two main shifts to the Canadian proposal "as a firm basis for [further] negotiation:" raising the total forces in Europe to 5,000 and the retention of the nuclear strike role for two CF-104 squadrons.[173] The Annex of this memo indicates that the Prime Minister had specifically requested that Cabinet had the final say over Canada's nuclear role: "You will also no doubt recall that when we met the full

[168]DHH, RP, 2109, 3 April 1969.
[169]DHH, RP, 2109, 20 May 1969.
[170]FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.96, 7 July 1969.
[171]LAC, CC, 2844, 3 April 1969.
[172]DHH, RP, 2108, 30 April 1969; LAC, CC, 3005, 15 May 1969.
[173]DHH, RP, 2530, 12 August 1969.

Cabinet the PM indicated to the Minister [of Defence] that if NATO representatives included the retention of the [nuclear] strike role this proposal would have to be returned to Cabinet for decision."[174] In line with this arrangement, on August 13th, the proposed adjustments to the Canadian bargaining position were brought to Cabinet. The Prime Minister commented that the Defence Department's "proposal appeared to be to remain in the strike role," which led to a discussion about the CF-104s.[175] Rejecting the possibility that Canada's nuclear role could be left ambiguous, Trudeau "wanted it made very clear that Canada would be out of the strike role completely by 1972."[176] In the end, Cabinet agreed to increase to 5,000 forces, but remained firm that the strike role would be withdrawn by 1972. Thus, the Canadian government's willingness to act unilaterally augmented their bargaining power and help ensure that they would successfully renege on their nuclear commitments to NATO.

6.3.2.3 Low Vulnerability to Restructuring

The Americans were sensitive to the nationalist nature of Trudeau's coalition, making them reluctant to try to appeal directly to the Canadian population. This limited their ability to restructure the Canadians' win-set. On the 24th of April 1969, shortly before a planned visit by SACEUR General Lemnitzer to Ottawa, the American embassy in Canada sent a telegram to the Department of State that was forwarded to the General.[177] Although there is no clear directive contained within the message, it makes a comparison between the current situation and a previous visit by one of Lemnitzer's predecessors, General Norstad, in 1963. It informed the reader that when Norstad visited, Diefenbaker's nuclear acquisition controversy was at its height, and the General was asked to weigh in on the issue. Norstad affirmed that "Canada was reneging on its commitments to its Allies" by refusing to accept nuclear sharing.[178] According to the Embassy's analysis, these comments intensified the controversy, eventually "culminating in the fall of the Diefenbaker government."[179]

The message highlights the potential danger of nationalist backlash if a similar comment would be made about the current government's plans to renege on its NATO commitments. In particular, the telegram highlights an article written by Trudeau on this affair:

[174]Ibid.
[175]DHH, CC, 3302, 13 August 1969.
[176]Ibid.
[177]FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.93, 24 April 1969.
[178]Ibid
[179]Ibid.

> Department [of State] should also be aware of article written in 1963 about General Norstad's visit by then budding young political writer named Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Following is direct quote: Quote Do you think I dramatize it? How do you think politics work? Do you think General Norstad, former Supreme Commander Allied Forces in Europe, came to Ottawa on January 3 as a tourist to tell the Canadian Government publicly to respect its agreements? Do you think it's by chance that Mr. Pearson was able to rely on the authority of General Norstad in his speech on January 12? Do you think the State Department inadvertently gave newspapers the press release on January 30 which reinforced Mr. Pearson's position and called Mr. Diefenbaker a liar? Do you think it's by accident that this communiqué gave the opposition leader the arguments with which he larded his speech to Parliament on January 31? You think it is coincidental that this led to events which ended in the fall of the government on February 5? Unquote.[180]

This article reveals Trudeau's belief that the 1963 statement was part of an orchestrated effort to undermine the sitting Canadian Prime Minister (Diefenbaker) in favour of a more pliant alternative (Pearson). Although the telegram does not make this point directly, it suggests that General Lemnitzer should be careful not to undermine Trudeau in his visit, as this kind of criticism could lead to similar accusations of interference and conspiracy.[181] This telegram reveals the Americans' concerns about both Trudeau nationalist proclivities and the nature of the coalition backing him. It provides some insight into why the Americans were reluctant to publicly criticize or call out the fact that the Canadians were reneging on their alliance commitments: they were worried about a nationalist backlash that would further weaken their negotiating position and move Canada even farther away from the status quo.

[180]Ibid.

[181]Ibid. In the telegram, it emphasizes that the Trudeau government can be seen as in a somewhat vulnerable domestic position and that General Lemnitzer would be seen as an agent of the US, rather than speaking for the interests of the alliance as a whole: "General Lemnitzer will arrive at time when Trudeau government, while it has comfortable majority unlike Diefenbaker government of 1963, is under opposition attack in Canada as consequence PriMin Trudeau's April 3 announcement of intention to remain in NATO but to reduce Canadian forces in Europe. Government today is in fact in middle of two-day Parliamentary debate about that announcement... In questioning General Lemnitzer Canadian newsmen will, of course, tend to regard him only as American General and not as international servant and may seek to elicit from him statements critical of Trudeau government and at seeming variance with recent public comment by Secretary Rogers."

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter directly addressed the central puzzle of my thesis: How and why do leaders renege on their alliance commitments, despite the costs? I first demonstrated that the Canadian government was aware that it faced considerable costs if they reneged on their nuclear commitments to NATO. Records show that there were many Canadian government officials that justified their status quo position by referring to the likely reputational and material costs Canada would face if it withdrew from NATO or substantially reduced its commitments to the Alliance. The Canadian public supported NATO and prominent Cabinet ministers advocated for the status quo, raising the possibility of domestic audience costs. Finally, both the United States and NATO clearly indicated to the Canadian government that they opposed any substantial reductions, with the United States initially considering pursuing a hardline strategy against Canada to dissuade it from reneging. The first section therefore demonstrated the considerable disincentives to renege at the time.

Trudeau was able to renege because he strategically formulated a nationalist domestic coalition that supported extensive reductions to Canada's NATO commitments. The Prime Minister first strengthened the political power of NATO-skeptic members of Cabinet, who supported Canada's withdrawal from NATO on nationalist grounds. Trudeau's influence over the process of the defence review ensured that reneging could be framed as a compromise solution between the NATO-skeptic members of Cabinet and those that supported the status quo. Trudeau retained the support of his entire Cabinet and was able to provide Canadian negotiators with a firm bargaining position before discussions began at the international level. Ultimately, Canada successfully negotiated out of its nuclear commitments because its allies feared even greater reductions if they did not accept. Trudeau's nationalist coalition allowed the Canadian government to make credible threats of full withdrawal from the alliance. The government's willingness to act unilaterally and set firm policies before negotiation strengthened their bargaining power by tying their hands to reductions and setting institutional barriers to the dilution of their proposal. Finally, the nationalist character of Trudeau's coalition discouraged restructuring attempts by their allies.

These empirical findings support the importance of domestic coalition type for reneging, whereas the realpolitik model does not provide an adequate explanation for reneging success in this case. While officials favoring widespread defections used

strategic justifications as well as nationalist ones, these were not decisive in negotiations with status quo allies. Furthermore, these assessments of the marginal nature of Canada's contribution to NATO were disputed by the government's own Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs. In the end, it was the threat of further withdrawals and reductions, rather than a superior analysis of the level of international threat or the military effectiveness of the weapons systems, that convinced status quo officials within Canada, the United States, and NATO to accept Canada's reneging on its nuclear role and its reductions to its conventional commitment.

7

Case Study 4: Pierre Elliott Trudeau and NORAD

> *"As long as the government still considered that there was a residual bomber threat... there was justification for arming these interceptors with nuclear weapons; conventional armament would be ineffective and arming Canadian interceptors in this way would mean that bomber interception by nuclear means would be performed by United States aircraft stationed south of the border but making their interceptions over Canadian territory... "*[1]
>
> – Paul Martin, Leader of the Government in the Senate, July 15 1971

7.1 Final Withdrawals: Bomarcs and CF-101s

This chapter analyses the final case of reneging: the total withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Canadian soil and the ending of the Canadian nuclear anti-bomber interception role in NORAD in 1984. The Bomarc missile was phased out in 1972, in line with previous estimates of its date of obsolescence and coinciding with the retirement of the Bomarcs on American soil. The Cabinet agreed to upgrade the CF-101 interceptors in 1970. These interceptors retained their nuclear role in NORAD until their retirement in 1984, when they were replaced by a conventional aircraft, the CF-18.

I also examine why nuclear weapons were retained for the CF-101s in the early 1970s, which is important for understanding the timing of reneging. As with NATO, the Cabinet was divided on whether to keep its nuclear role in NORAD. Trudeau and

[1] LAC, CC, 2001, 15 July 1971.

several of the officials that had been critical of Canada's NATO commitments advocated for reneging on its NORAD nuclear commitments as well. The Prime Minister was skeptical about the military value of retaining nuclear weapons for anti-bomber interception. Like with Canada's role in NATO, Trudeau called for a thorough and critical review of the strategic necessity of this role.[2] Despite the fact that Trudeau never wavered in his doubts about the actual benefit of maintaining nuclear interceptors, the Canadian government decided to retain the nuclear role for an indefinite period of time. In fact, the military importance of nuclear-armed interceptors was highlighted in the 1971 White Paper on Defence.[3]

A close examination of this case demonstrates that there are multiple pathways to reneging. There is no evidence nuclear withdrawal in 1984 was related to a nationalist domestic coalition. The Realpolitik model provides the best explanation for nuclear withdrawal in 1984. The bomber threat had greatly diminished by this time and the CF-101s were obsolete by the time that they were replaced; indeed, the Americans had retired their own F-101s in 1982.[4] Furthermore, the Canadian government was able to procure a suitable conventional alternative to replace them.[5]

However, domestic coalition type does help explain why Canada retained its nuclear role in NORAD in the early 1970s. This case will show that nationalist coalitions are not easily 'transportable' to different contexts. Trudeau's nationalist coalition for reneging in NATO was a single-issue coalition for reneging in NORAD. Trudeau and other members of Cabinet were far less skeptical of alliance membership in NORAD and recognized the important benefits of maintaining this security relationship. Their objections were narrowly focused on the nuclear role and its strategic utility. This coalition was therefore more sensitive to the international costs of reneging and more reluctant to pursue a coercive strategy vis-à-vis the United States. Furthermore, because this nuclear role was bound up with Canada's sovereign control of its airspace, reneging was far less attractive to nationalist officials that were sensitive to the sovereignty costs of this move. Thus, the anti-nuclear nature of Trudeau's coalition provides a plausible explanation for why reneging was not attempted in the early 1970s.

The archival data concerning the decision making on Canada's nuclear role in NORAD after 1970 is sparse. Therefore, the analysis of Canada's decision-making is

[2]LAC, CC, 683, 18 June 1970.
[3]DND, 1971, p.30.
[4]Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, pp.259-260; NORAD, 2013, pp.7, 38; Schofield, 2014, p.76.
[5]Ibid; DHH, CP 98/15-18, 22 August 1979.

more limited than previous chapters. However, the documents do provide some insights into the factors that drove the government's decision-making in the early 1970s. Firstly, Trudeau was not able to develop and maintain a robust nationalist coalition that had a credible threat of withdrawal from NORAD. Stepping back from North American defence roles conflicted with the "Canada-first" policy that had justified a reduced role in NATO, which in part was predicated upon a re-prioritization of continental defence.[6] Secondly, it appears that Canada was under pressure from the United States to retain its nuclear role in NORAD. Nevertheless, without more evidence, it is difficult to assess whether this pressure was more considerable than what was applied on the Canadian government to keep its nuclear and conventional commitments to NATO. Finally, the success of the defence review and the general opacity surrounding Canada's nuclear role allowed Trudeau's government considerable space to embrace a straddle strategy. Trudeau was able to retain a nuclear role to placate the Americans, while still touting Canada's special anti-nuclear status for domestic audiences in a way that burnished Canadian nationalism and anti-nuclearism.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I outline the link between strategic factors and reneging in this case. Shifting strategic factors provide a viable explanation for why Canada reneged in 1984 and why the Bomarc was withdrawn before the CF-101s. The next section will explore the role of domestic coalition type. The evidence suggests that despite Trudeau's initial skepticism about maintaining Canada's nuclear commitments to NORAD, he could not easily form a nationalist coalition that would support reneging, as this commitment and alliance were more closely tied to Canadian national security and sovereignty. Therefore, the single-issue nature of the coalition supporting reneging for NORAD contributed to nuclear retention in the 1970s.

7.2 Realpolitik and Reneging

While there is far less archival data about Canada's internal deliberations and interactions with the United States about the ending of its nuclear role, the evidence available supports the Realpolitik model, where leaders optimize alliance commitments to best serve their state's security. After Canada's military contribution to NATO was decided, the government turned to its commitments to NORAD. By July 1971, Cabinet agreed that the CF-101s should be retained in order to defend against the "residual" Soviet bomber threat, while the Bomarcs, considered obsolete, were to be

[6] Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, p.24.

phased out by 1972.[7] The remaining CF-101s were withdrawn in 1984, when suitable conventional aircraft, the F-18, were ready to replace them.[8] Thus, the withdrawal of each nuclear weapons system is primarily related to three strategic factors: The obsolescence of the particular weapons systems, the eclipse of the bomber by ICBMs, and the availability of a suitable conventional aircraft for performing Canada's role in NORAD.

While the withdrawal of the Bomarcs in 1972 did not amount to Canada reneging on its nuclear role, it provides an important point of comparison to the decision to retain the CF-101s. The withdrawal of these nuclear missiles was straightforward and uncontroversial, especially compared to the high drama of 1963. As demonstrated in the chapter on the Diefenbaker era, the strategic utility and accuracy of these interceptor missiles had long been subject to criticism. In addition, by the late 1960s, the threat of manned bombers had diminished considerably.[9] Canada's phase-out coincided with the United States', which was also in the process of dismantling their Bomarcs, indicating that both states saw this weapons system as unnecessary for air defence.[10] Furthermore, withdrawal by 1972 corresponded to previous Canadian estimates of the end of the useful life of the Bomarc.[11]

The CF-101s were also withdrawn in 1984 due to strategic considerations, also without much public discord. The aircraft was reaching the end of its life by the late 1970s and by 1977, the government was seeking its replacement.[12] After three years of deliberation, the F-18 was selected. According to Granatstein and Bothwell, "The air force was satisfied – it had got the best aircraft for the available money."[13] The solely conventional capability of these interceptors was related to the changing role of NORAD, which was now primarily focused on "surveillance and warning of ICBM attack" rather than nuclear interception of Soviet bombers.[14] By the late seventies the interceptor force, along with other aging components of its air defence,

[7]LAC, CC, 1974, 8 July 1971; LAC, CC, 2001, 15 July 1971.

[8]Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, pp.259-260; NORAD, 2013, pp.7, 38.

[9]Schofield, 2014, p.76.

[10]Clearwater, 1998, p.87.

[11]See DHH, RP, 2100, 23 March 1967; DHH, RP, 2100, 21 July 1967 LAC, CC, 3034, 20 May 1969. The Defence Policy Review report projected longer useful life with phase-out by 1973-1975; however, it is possible that the longer projection was related to the Canadian military's worry that withdrawal of Bomarcs would pave the way for the phase-out of the CF-101s, taking Canada completely out of its nuclear sharing role (DHH, RP, 2100, February 1969; LAC, CC, 3034, 20 May 1969).

[12]This paragraph was adapted from my MPhil thesis. While there have been some adjustments to the original text, some of the original wording is maintained. See Majnemer, 2016, pp.75-76.

[13]Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, p.259.

[14]Ibid 260; NORAD, 2013, pp.6-7.

"had become obsolescent and uneconomical to operate."[15] A draft speech for the Minister of Defence in 1979 indicates that improvements in conventional technology were also a factor: "Aircraft and missile systems developed since the CF101 was put into service make it unnecessary to have nuclear tipped-weapons to be effective. We therefore expect the defensive nuclear weapons... will be withdrawn once the CF101s are replaced."[16] Given this evidence, one can conclude that the CF-101s and their warheads were withdrawn in 1984 because an effective conventional alternative was found for the Canadian forces that would not diminish intercontinental security. Much like with the Bomarc, the withdrawal of the CF-101s was closely timed with the Americans retiring the F-101s in 1982.[17]

Strategic factors can also explain why the Bomarcs were withdrawn decades before the CF-101s and why Canada's nuclear role was retained until 1984. Unlike the Bomarc, the CF-101s were upgraded in the early 1970s, extending their useful life. Under the 'Peace Wings' exchange, the Canadians would swap their old CF-101 aircraft for upgraded and modernized American versions.[18] According to Minister of National Defence Cadieux's assessment, accepting these interceptors from the United States would "improve our air defence capabilities and settle the question of interceptor aircraft until 1975 or beyond" in a cost-effective manner.[19]

Initially, Trudeau resisted Cadieux's attempts to push through this aircraft exchange. Cadieux had first recommended approval for this upgrade in July 1969 and tried to get it approved by Cabinet in November 1969.[20] The Prime Minister brushed him off, worried that accepting these aircraft would tie Canada's hands into continuing its nuclear role before a proper review had taken place.

The matter came to a head a few months later, when Cadieux confirmed that the government was considering the exchange to the standing committee on external affairs. This revelation led to a breathless headline in the Globe and Mail: "Voodoos [CF-101s] to be traded-in for U.S. models, Defense Minister tells House committee."[21] Trudeau reacted quickly, chastising his Minister for implying that a decision had been made in a letter to Cadieux:

[15]NORAD, 2013, p.7.
[16]DHH, CP, 98/15-18, 22 August 1979.
[17]NORAD, 2013, p.38.
[18]Clearwater, 1998, 187.
[19]LAC, MG 26 O11, Vol.3, 18, 20 March 1970. "This exchange will be financed, for the most part, by credits which will be established in Canada's favour as the result of a revised cost-sharing agreement covering the operation of the radar systems." Any further payments would fall within the budget for the Department of National Defence. See also LAC, CC, 532, 23 April 1970.
[20]LAC, MG 26 O11, Vol.27, 12, 5 November 1969; LAC, MG 26 O11, Vol.3, 18, 20 March 1970.
[21]LAC, MG 26 O11, Vol.3, 18, 11 March 1970.

> I must advise you that premature public announcements of detailed proposals such as the CF 101 exchange may well embarrass the government and the Minister of National Defence if, in light of our considerations of our future North American defence policy, these detailed proposals are not approved.[22]

Despite Trudeau's reservations, the Cabinet agreed in April 1970 to accept these upgraded aircraft before the completion of the review on North American defence.[23] The Prime Minister was swayed by strategic considerations and his belief that it would not affect the ultimate outcome for the government's decision on its nuclear role in NORAD.[24] As Trudeau stated in a letter to Cadieux:

> I am aware, however, that the [Peace Wings] proposal becomes very much more expensive there is further delay. It is also clear that a number of interceptors are required for the surveillance and protection of Canadian air space even if we had no responsibility for the joint air defence of North America. I, therefore, think we can discuss and decide on the "Peace Wings" proposal at Cabinet in advance of this general review.[25]

One week later, Cabinet discussed and agreed to the interceptor swap, ultimately removing one obstacle for nuclear retention.[26] In Cabinet, Trudeau aired his reservations about taking this action before "the government had come to a final decision on the total North American defence posture," but did not stand in the way of approving the upgrade.[27]

The government justified their decision to retain the nuclear interceptors in the 1971 'White Paper on Defence' with reference to strategic factors.[28] While Soviet reliance on bombers had greatly diminished, they could still be deployed in a nuclear offensive "to strike targets which did not require immediate attack or... the missiles had not successfully attacked."[29] Furthermore, if Canada dispensed with their interceptors completely, the USSR could "be tempted to rebuild their long-range bomber force if they believed there would be absolutely no defences against them."[30] Since

[22]LAC, MG 26 O11, Vol.3, 18, 17 March 1970.
[23]LAC, CC, 532, 23 April 1970.
[24]LAC, MG 26 O11, Vol.27, 12, 16 April 1970.
[25]Ibid.
[26]LAC, CC, 532, 23 April 1970.
[27]Ibid.
[28]This paragraph was adapted from my MPhil thesis. While there have been some adjustments to the original text, some of the original wording is maintained. See Majnemer, 2016, pp.73-74.
[29]DND, 1971, p.29.
[30]Ibid.

the CF-101 needed to be armed with a nuclear rocket to attain maximum effectiveness, there was "no alternative" to housing nuclear weapons on Canadian soil.[31] The government also decided that they would not commit to a specific timeframe for nuclear withdrawal. Rather, this decision would be based on the "strategic situation" rather than a predetermined date.[32] In July 1973, the Prime Minister asserted that he would only contemplate a conventional replacement of the interceptors' nuclear capability if "it did not lessen their effectiveness," indicating that Trudeau viewed decision-making on its nuclear commitments to be driven by strategic, rather than domestic, factors.[33]

This evidence suggests that Canada could only renege on its nuclear commitments to NORAD once international pressures were sufficiently reduced. By 1984, not only had the threat of Soviet long-range bombers been eclipsed by ICBMs, but a conventional alternative aircraft was available for Canada to fulfill its commitments to NORAD without nuclear arms.[34] The last 'shared' nuclear weapons finally left Canadian soil without much fanfare. In their guidance to Canadian officials on how to return the weapons to the US, Sandia National Laboratories suggested that these arms be packed with "crumpled newspaper."[35] Without access to nuclear arms or dual-capable delivery systems, the end of Canada's nuclear sharing agreement was a mere formality, officially "terminated by joint agreement" on March 9th 1987.[36]

7.3 Domestic Coalition Type

Between March 1970, when Canada's NORAD commitments became the focus of Cabinet, and July 1971, when Cabinet agreed to retain its nuclear role, there was a distinct shift in the tone and content of the discussion. Initially, Trudeau was skeptical of the military necessity of Canada's nuclear interception role. Trudeau and his advisors had signalled their support for nuclear withdrawal in the 'Non-Group' report that was presented to and then quickly retracted from Cabinet in March 1969.

[31]Ibid., p.30. "In air combat there is at present no alternative to equipping the CF-101s with nuclear warheads held in Canada by the U.S. under existing storage and custody arrangements... to play an effective role in the defence of North America against the threat of active nuclear attack, they require nuclear-tipped air-to-air weapons. Only with such weapons would they have a reasonable prospect of destroying attacking bombers and their nuclear weapons before the latter were released."

[32]DND, 1971, p.30; LAC, CC, 2001, 15 July 1971.

[33]LAC, CC, 38069, 12 July 1973.

[34]DHH, CP, 98/15-18, 22 August 1979; Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, pp.259-260; NORAD, 2012, p.7.

[35]Clearwater, 1998, p.215.

[36]Ibid., p.54.

While this report had focussed mostly on cutting Canada's contributions to NATO, it also envisioned the replacement of the CF-101s with conventional aircraft and the withdrawal of the BOMARC.[37] In September 1970, Donald Macdonald replaced Leo Cadieux as Minister of Defence. During the previous Cabinet debates on NATO, Macdonald was an important proponent of reneging. Now, he was also skeptical of the necessity of Canada's nuclear role in NORAD. By 1971, not only was the nuclear role retained, but the 1971 White Paper enshrined the enduring military significance of nuclear anti-bomber interception.[38] The upgrade of the CF-101s does not completely explain this shift, as Trudeau and other officials continued to articulate their doubts about nuclear retention even after the government had agreed to upgrade the CF-101s in April 1970. There is not much evidence that Trudeau or other critical officials were truly won over by the claim that nuclear weapons were necessary for anti-bomber defence. What, therefore, explains this shift? Why was Trudeau successful in managing reneging for NATO, but not for NORAD?

While the Realpolitik model presents a plausible causal pathway to reneging, there is evidence that domestic coalition also played a role in the decision to forgo reneging in the early 1970s. Many of the officials that were skeptical of Canada's contribution to NATO also opposed its nuclear commitments to NORAD. However, this group supported reneging because of their skepticism of the necessity of nuclear weapons, rather than the alliance itself. In respect to NORAD's nuclear commitments, Trudeau's cabinet therefore represented a single-issue coalition. Discussion on whether to retain Canada's interceptors centered on the much narrower issue of the viability of the bomber threat and the necessity of an active interceptor role, rather than a broader critique of Canada's role in NORAD. Statements made by Trudeau indicate that he was far more sensitive to the international costs of reneging and alienating the United States in this case. Unlike for NATO, sovereignty costs were a concern, as reneging on its nuclear role in NORAD would mean that the Americans would move in to replace it. This allowed status quo supporting Ministers to use the government's previous nationalist rhetoric and policy priorities to support nuclear *retention*. Moreover, some evidence suggests that Trudeau and other political leaders simply did not sustain the same level of interest in securing nationalist support for Canada's nuclear withdrawal from NORAD as other issues became prioritised.

As with Canada's commitments to NATO, Trudeau was skeptical of arguments and reports that unwaveringly supported the status quo and advocated for a change

[37]DHH, RP, 3240, March 1969.
[38]DND, 1971, p.29-30.

in thinking on Canada's continental defence commitments. On June 18th 1970, after being presented with the Cadieux's recommendations for Canada's future program for North American Defence, Trudeau accused the status quo supporting Minister of not actually conducting a review:

> The Prime Minister suggested that ministers might conclude that no review of North American defence had taken place and that the status-quo was to be maintained, or that a review had taken place and the status quo was to be maintained, but in reality there had been no review of the subject by Cabinet. The Prime Minister indicated that the effectiveness of the military contribution that Canada made to Europe had been fully examined and that a similar examination should take place to establish principles for the effectiveness of military programs for North America.[39]

Trudeau complained that the report was "built on a static set of assumptions" that essentially ceded all decision-making power to the Americans.[40] As long as the Americans thought that the Canadian contribution was sufficient and valuable, then the Canadians should conclude the same. Macdonald echoed Trudeau's call for a more thorough review that went beyond the report that was presented to Cabinet. In particular, Macdonald wanted the necessity of Canada's role against the bomber threat to be further examined.[41] At the end of the meeting, Trudeau "recommended that Cabinet should completely re-examine North American defence policy at a special Cabinet meeting" in July.[42] The Cabinet agreed and specifically called for the provision of a "specific briefing on the bomber threat."[43]

On July 22nd, the Cabinet met again to discuss Canada's North American defence policy. During this meeting, Trudeau's skepticism of the necessity of nuclear retention because of the bomber threat was on full display:

> The Prime Minister question the logic of maintaining an active anti-bomber defence system. . . detection and warning of the approach of U.S.S.R. bombers was necessary but that of the scenario envisaged which attempted to justify the need for an interception and destruction capability against Soviet bombers was marginal.[44]

[39]LAC, CC, 683, 18 June 1970.
[40]Ibid.
[41]Ibid.
[42]Ibid.
[43]Ibid.
[44]LAC, CC, 855, 22 July 1970.

The Prime Minister also emphasized some "Canada first" themes as in the discussion on NATO.[45] He reminded Cabinet that national defence should supersede continental defence according to their strategic hierarchy: "...the first [national] and second [continental] defence priorities which had been established by Cabinet must not be reversed."[46] According to Trudeau, Canada's cooperation with the United State for "the defence of North American did not of itself imply any particular level of military" contribution by Canada.[47]

However, Trudeau's opposition to NORAD was primarily based on anti-nuclear rather than nationalist logics. Canada had announced that it would remain aligned in April 1969. Indeed, it had decided to remain militarily engaged in NATO. Therefore, a full withdrawal from NORAD was off the table. On a more practical level, the defence of the North American continent was more tightly bound with national defence, meaning that the previous emphasis on national priorities would necessarily entail an important role for NORAD. The government had partially justified the cuts to NATO with reference to Canada's commitments to NORAD and continental defence.[48] It had made continental defence the second strategic priority, after national defence.[49] Therefore, the previous nationalist rhetoric, which emphasized the importance of continental defence for national security, undercut Trudeau's ability to formulate a similar coalition that would have supported reneging on Canada's nuclear commitments to NORAD.

Unlike NATO, Trudeau was more willing to recognize the importance of Canada's overall contribution to NORAD, focusing instead on the specific utility of its nuclear role. Reflecting this single-issue approach, the Prime Minister also expressed more hesitance in alienating the United States and advocated for a consensus-based approach if Canada would try to renege: "It was important, however, if Canada decided to co-operate with the U.S. for political reasons that the U.S. government was well satisfied with Canada's contribution."[50] By July 1970, Trudeau was convinced that Canada should retain its surveillance and detection roles in NORAD,

[45]Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, p.24

[46]LAC, CC, 855, 22 July 1970.

[47]Ibid.

[48]DHH, RP, 2530, 3 December 1969.

[49]DHH, RP, 2106, 30 April 1969; LAC, CC, 855, 22 July 1970.

[50]LAC, CC, 855, 22 July 1970. Trudeau also showed more willingness to accept that specific commitments may be retained for political reasons: "The Prime Minister said that it must be made clear that, in the allocation of resources to the defence of North America, when the choice was between the first and second priority, the Canadian government would spend money on the first priority and only spend money on the second priority, primarily, if it assisted the first, and, secondly, if it was necessary for political reasons."

which were deemed "essential."[51] The nuclear interception role was still criticized as "marginal."[52] However, Trudeau highlighted that Canada could show its interest in cooperation with the United States and offset reneging through various other means, such as by "contributing to surveillance and detection systems," or "by agreeing to over-flights" or "providing refueling bases for SAC bombers."[53] In this spirit, Trudeau warned the Cabinet that the White Paper "should not be tough on the U.S.A. because Canada fully intended to co-operate" with the Americans in the defence of North America.[54] Similarly, in a later interview Minister of Defence Macdonald noted that he "recognized the need to co-operate with the United States in defending North America."[55]

Beyond the closer connection between national and continental security, there were sovereignty costs to nuclear withdrawal. The President of the Treasury Board, Mr. Drury, suggested that the CF-101s were essential for Canadian sovereignty, because

> ... if the Canadian government did not contribute squadrons of interceptors to co- operative air defence but rather built icebreakers, then it was possible that the United States would take over that military activity at the expense of control of Canadian air space by Canada.[56]

While Trudeau "noted the attractive aspects of this argument," he also pushed back.[57] In response to Drury's warning, Trudeau mused that he did not necessarily consider the Americans taking over Canadian airspace a "real threat" to Canadian sovereignty if the bomber threat had in fact diminished, in which case:

> ... the government might be willing to allow the United States interceptors to use Canadian bases and air space if the United States continued to believe the bomber threat was still of significance.[58]

However, a priority established during the defence review was that the defence of Canada should be done to the greatest extent possible by Canadian forces.[59] Withdrawing from the nuclear role would ultimately mean ceding a part of Canada's air

[51]Ibid.
[52]Ibid.
[53]Ibid.
[54]Ibid.
[55]Macdonald in Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.165, interviewed on 5 April 1988.
[56]LAC, CC, 683, 18 June 1970.
[57]Ibid.
[58]Ibid.
[59]LAC, MG 26 O11, Vol.27, 12, 1 June 1970.

defence to the United States.[60] This line of argument seems to have been persuasive to Ministers critical of the strategic utility of nuclear interceptors. On July 8th 1971, the Cabinet agreed to retain the CF-101s with their nuclear role. During this discussion at least one member of Cabinet made the point that while there were "certain weaknesses" to the "military argument" for retention, the "sovereignty benefits" of these aircraft, which allowed "the control of Canadian airspace" justified their continued role.[61] This was one of only three points of discussion that were recorded in the cabinet conclusions before the decision was made.

Unlike the reductions to NATO, there is not much archival evidence of extensive negotiations between the United States and Canada over its nuclear commitments to NORAD. It appears that in this case reneging was not attempted and did not reach Level I negotiations. However, there is evidence that the United States tried to pressure Canada into retaining its nuclear role through less formal channels. The aircraft swap can be seen as a positive inducement for nuclear retention: it made maintaining the status quo a cost-effective option for Canada. The Americans may have also applied coercive pressure. According to Gordon Smith, a Defence Department official that was instrumental in the creation of the White Paper, the Americans "strongly pressured" to retain nuclear weapons and even suggested that they could have been "listening in on phone calls."[62] Because of the single-issue nature of Trudeau's coalition and increased concerns about the costs of reneging, the Canadian government may have been more vulnerable to restructuring attempts. This increased susceptibility to American pressure may explain why reneging was not attempted. Because of the limited archival materials available, it is difficult to say whether the American objections to nuclear withdrawal from NORAD were fundamentally different or stronger than its objections to Canada's reneging in NATO. Additionally, it is not possible to construct a direct causal path between American pressure and the outcome of retention.[63]

[60]Ibid.

[61]LAC, CC, 1974, 8 July 1971.

[62]Smith in Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.162, interviewed on 8 October 1987.

[63]Canadian officials later told the Americans that the retention of Canada's nuclear role was in part dependent on American actions. During a meeting between the two countries' representatives in December 1973, American officials noted that the United States was considering fully withdrawing its F-101 interceptors. Canadian officials warned that any withdrawal of American interceptors may be mirrored by a reduction to the Canadian contribution: "[a] phase-out of the F-101s would have an effect on Canada and Canada's views of the US program" (FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.E-15, Pt.2, Doc.108, 6 December 1973). This is similar to the American Embassy in Canada's warning in August 1973 that "any change in level of US support for NORAD is likely to be matched by reduction in level of Canadian support" (FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.E-15, Pt.2, Doc.108, 6 December 1973).

It is also possible that even those that were skeptical of Canada's nuclear commitment did not push harder for nuclear withdrawal because they did not fully appreciate the implications of the White Paper for the longevity of nuclear sharing. In a later interview, Macdonald claimed that there was a "downgrading of the interceptor role" against Soviet bombers, perhaps referring to the withdrawal of the Bomarc.[64] Gordon Smith suggests that he was left with the impression that Canada would withdraw from the nuclear soon, even if it was not directly called for in the White Paper:

> The decision that Canada would get out of the nuclear roles was clear. The idea was to get out of all nuclear roles as soon as possible, and the cabinet (which Smith attended) agreed. He was astonished to learn that that CF-101s in NORAD in Canada retained their nuclear capability into the 1980s. He thought this had simply happened – had the language in the White Paper left a loophole?[65]

There are several interesting aspects to this statement. Firstly, it is unclear what Cabinet decision Smith is referring to – while there is a record of Cabinet categorically deciding to completely withdraw from the nuclear role in NATO, there is no similar statement rejecting this role in NORAD.[66] Secondly, the language of the White Paper is quite explicit that Canada would retain its nuclear weapons and gave no precise timeline for their withdrawal.[67] As no one was calling for a complete readjustment of Canada's relationship and contribution to NORAD, it is possible that this issue may have slipped through the cracks.

In October 1970, only two weeks into Macdonald's tenure as Minister of National Defence, Canada was engulfed in a domestic crisis. The British Trade Commissioner and Quebec's Labour Minister were kidnapped by a radical separatist group, Le Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ). This was not only an internal security crisis, but a direct threat to national unity. The government enacted the War Measures Act, which led to the deployment of "[u]p to 7500 troops... for domestic peacekeeping duties, and to assist in the intelligence side."[68] Beyond absorbing the attention of Trudeau and the Department of National Defence, the crisis had an impact on the White

[64]Macdonald in Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.165, interviewed on 5 April 1988.

[65]Smith in Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.161, interviewed on 8 October 1987.

[66]See LAC, CC, 3247, 31 July 1969, where Cabinet agrees that Canada would be out of the nuclear strike role, referring to its role in NATO, by 1972. Under NORAD, Canada's nuclear forces had an air defence/interception role.

[67]DND, 1971, p.30. It does state that the government will not expend "substantial sums" on new equipment for anti-bomber defence and will only upgrade "to the extent that this is required for the general control of Canadian airspace."

[68]Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, p.236.

Paper on Defence, making "internal security... a high priority."[69] In a later interview, Macdonald also noted that the FLQ crisis improved his view of the importance of the Canadian armed forces.[70] Thus, Macdonald's attention and priorities shifted in 1970. It is also likely that Trudeau's focus shifted as well. In a later interview, Mitchell Sharp, who remained Secretary of State for External Affairs until 1974, implied that Trudeau's interest Canada's alliance commitments had declined by 1971: "When Trudeau had an interest in a subject, as on foreign policy between 1968 and 1970, he had a real interest, but once the issue was settled, he moved away."[71] While there may have been opportunities to construct a nationalist coalition against Canada's commitments to NORAD after 1970, the Prime Minister was not as willing to devote the considerable resources and attention to the issue as he had for NATO in the late 1960s.

As other issues took over, the opacity surrounding Canada's nuclear posture and the vagueness of the withdrawal timeline allowed Trudeau to effectively execute a straddle strategy. As the nuclear issue had become de-politicised since 1963, Trudeau did not face much external pressure to withdraw nuclear weapons from Canadian soil. While the White Paper was quite clear that Canada would retain nuclear weapons on its soil, this assertion did not garner backlash – nationalist, anti-nuclear, or otherwise.[72]

Trudeau capitalized on this opportunity to bolster his anti-nuclear credentials as well as Canada's international standing. In a speech to the UN on May 26th 1978, he boasted that Canada would soon be withdrawing nuclear weapons from its soil, drawing upon anti-nuclear and nationalist rhetoric:

> We have withdrawn from any nuclear role by Canada's armed forces in Europe and are now in the process of replacing with conventional armed aircraft, the nuclear capable planes still assigned to our forces in North America...We are... the first nuclear armed country that has chosen to divest itself of nuclear weapons.[73]

While Trudeau portrayed nuclear withdrawal as imminent, Canada would still have nuclear weapons on its soil for about six years after this statement. However, his

[69]Ibid., p.238.
[70]Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.165.
[71]Sharp in Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.132, interviewed on 8 December 1987.
[72]Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, p.240.
[73]Trudeau, 1978.

claims were still technically true: Canada had begun to consider a replacement for the CF-101 in 1977.[74]

7.4 Conclusion

Overall, the Realpolitik model provides a parsimonious explanation for the timing of reneging and the order of withdrawal of the nuclear weapons systems on Canadian soil. While the bomber threat had been declining for decades, by the late-1970s conventional interceptors were available to replace the CF-101s. Trudeau's decision making, for the most part, was guided by his desire to augment Canadian and North American security in the most cost-effective manner. These nuclear weapon systems were therefore decommissioned in line with their American counterparts: first, the Bomarc; later, the CF-101s. This sequencing suggests that these weapons were indeed obsolete at this point in time.

Because of the sparseness of declassified archives, it is difficult to say with certainty why Trudeau's government position seemed to change so starkly between 1970 and 1971. It is possible that this was merely due to strategic considerations and an authentic belief in the residual Soviet bomber threat. However, evidence suggests that domestic coalition type played a role in explaining why reneging was not attempted at this time. The members of Cabinet that supported reneging on Canada's NORAD nuclear commitments had a more specific agenda than it had in relation to NATO. While Trudeau was skeptical of the military necessity of retaining nuclear interceptors, he saw clear military value in Canada's membership to NORAD and was more reluctant to confront the United States. Furthermore, some of the nationalist rhetoric used to justify reneging on NATO undercut Trudeau's ability to form a nationalist coalition on NORAD. The fear of sovereignty costs associated with reneging may have helped persuade reluctant Ministers to accept retaining Canada's nuclear commitment.

This chapter presents two important limitations for my theory of reneging. Firstly, it demonstrates that nationalist domestic coalitions provide only one of multiple pathways to reneging. Second, it shows that nationalist domestic coalitions that support reneging in one are not necessarily 'portable' to different alliance commitments. The conversion of nationalist sentiment into a coherent coalition that can achieve reneging success requires effort, time, and skill from political leaders.

[74]Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, p.259.

8

Conclusion

8.1 Overview

Why do states renege on their alliance commitments, despite institutional incentives to cooperate? This question turns some of the assumptions of IR on its head. Usually, cooperation is presented as a puzzle in an anarchic world, using Realism as the main foil and thus the standard by which theories can prove themselves. Nevertheless, many studies have shown that the institutionalization of commitments does indeed create a structure of incentives to keep cooperating.[1] However, this linear and self-perpetuating vision of international cooperation is only part of the story.

While this thesis has focused on alliance commitments, this puzzle is relevant to any leader seeking to renegotiate their commitments within institutionalized settings more generally. Considering the recent rise in skepticism of multilateralism, the election of Donald Trump, and the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union, the question of why defection occurs in institutionalized settings and the relationship between nationalism and defection are increasingly pressing for scholars to examine in order to understand international relations. However, while recent developments have brought these questions to the fore, this research has underscored that there have always been instances of reneging, even in highly institutionalized relationships, even among democracies, even by weak or dependent states. Why do some leaders jeopardize long-term gains for short-term payoffs, while most others do not? Why are most leaders constrained by the perceived domestic and international costs of reneging, while others are not? The findings presented here can be applied to other institutionalized contexts, where similar sets of incentives should also apply to bind states and leaders to their international commitments.

[1] Kreps, 2010.

Focusing on alliance commitments provides a useful starting point for examining how and why states defect within institutionalized relationships. Studies of alliance reliability and defection have found that despite being in the 'realist' domain of security, allies are surprisingly reliable and keep their commitments more often than not.[2] The incentive structure that encourages reliability and discourages defection involves three types of costs for defection: material costs, reputational costs, and domestic audience costs. This constellation of costs for reneging can be applied to other institutionalised settings that are similarly designed to facilitate cooperation.

'Reneging' is defined here as a specific type of defection that involves reversing a previously fulfilled commitment, while still maintaining membership in the alliance or the institution more generally. Reneging therefore restructures the distribution of commitments within an institutionalized relationship in favour of the reneging state. Unlike wholesale withdrawal, reneging involves the continuation of alliance membership, meaning that leaders that engage in reneging prefer to maintain the benefits of remaining part of the alliance, albeit at a lower cost. Furthermore, unlike 'softer' forms of defection or reduction of commitment, reneging is more difficult to hide or gloss over. Reneging represents precisely the kind of opportunism that institutional mechanisms are designed to discourage. Therefore, it should be a particularly costly form of defection. Studying reneging provides a useful starting point for understanding how and why the institutional incentive structures that keep allies committed and cooperating can break down.

Withdrawal is a unilateral act, as it terminates a relationship with allies. While political leaders can decide their own states' alliance contribution, they do so while they are still embedded within the alliance. Because reneging leaders want to maintain their standing within the alliance, they will attempt to minimize the costs of reneging and assess allied reaction through bargaining. Because of the interaction of international and domestic incentives involved in defection, I have adapted Putnam's two-level game to represent the dynamics of allied bargaining over reneging.[3] Both allies (Level I) and domestic coalitions (Level II) will need to agree to the renegotiated 'commitment set' that the reneging state will adhere to. Under these circumstances, a no-deal scenario involves a "worsening situation" for the alliance, such as an increase of intra-alliance tensions or even the ejection of the reneging state from the alliance.[4]

[2]For example, Leeds, Long, and Mitchell, 2000.
[3]Putnam, 1988.
[4]Ibid., p.442.

A leader's decision to renege, their choice of bargaining strategy, and their likelihood of success in negotiations is related to the type of domestic coalition that supports reneging. Leaders with the support of nationalist domestic coalitions face fewer audience costs for reneging and have more leverage when bargaining with allies than those with the support or single-issue coalitions. The main difference between these two types of groups is their scope of grievance with the alliance as well as their view of the costs of reneging. Nationalist coalitions, skeptical of a multinational alliance's ability to cater to the national interest, are more likely to see reneging as part of a broader agenda of refocusing security priorities towards more inwardly oriented 'national' concerns. Within the context of nuclear sharing, single-issue coalitions are anti-nuclear coalitions, which only seek to renegotiate their nuclear commitments and do not question the fundamentals of alliance membership. Anti-nuclear coalitions' bargaining power should be constrained by their sensitivities to the material and reputational costs of reneging. Therefore, reneging is likely to be 'double-edged' and invite domestic audience costs. By contrast, nationalist coalitions are less sensitive to these international costs and are in fact likely to reward reneging rather than punish it.

Nationalist coalitions afford reneging leaders with three forms of bargaining power in international negotiations. First, **a credible threat of withdrawal** from the alliance or the negotiations themselves, enabled by the tolerance nationalist coalitions have for no-deal outcomes and their ability to 'punish' allies by supporting more extreme reductions to commitments. Second, **a willingness to act unilaterally** and allow leaders to tie their hands to particular outcomes in the pre-negotiation stage. Third, **a low vulnerability to restructuring**, related to these coalitions' sensitivity to foreign influence. On the other hand, leaders with single-issue coalitions do not have a credible threat of withdrawal, are incentivized to seek an alliance-wide consensus, and are vulnerable to restructuring by status quo allies. Thus, statesmen supported by nationalist coalitions should be more likely to attempt reneging, more likely to adopt coercive strategies, and more likely to succeed in their reneging attempts; conversely, statemen with the support of single-issue coalitions, deterred or constrained by higher costs, should be less likely to attempt to renege, more likely to employ consensus-based strategies, and more likely to fail if reneging is attempted.

Canada's nuclear sharing trajectory in NATO and NORAD was selected as an in-depth case study because it has several characteristics that make it a deviant case for reneging. Canada is a democratic country, a junior alliance member, and the alliances under scrutiny are highly institutionalised: all of these characteristics have

been hypothesized to discourage reneging.[5] Nevertheless, Canada's reliability record for nuclear sharing is varied and uneven. Furthermore, the in-depth examination of Canada's history of nuclear sharing addresses some of the gaps within the alliance reliability literature. First, it allows for analysis of the dynamics of defection on peacetime alliance commitments. This provides further insight into claims that have been tested mostly in reference to commitments that are activated by war. Second, most of the alliance reliability literature relies on quantitative methods or recent case studies without access to declassified material. The large volume of archival material available for most of the of the relevant time period for the Canada case allows for careful and nuanced scrutiny of the mechanisms involved in decisions to renege. Thus, this case is particularly well-suited for theory-generating process tracing.

Each chapter in this thesis has explored a different instance related to reneging. First, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's failed attempt to renege on the nuclear commitments that he made in the 1950s and 1960s. Second, the Leader of the Opposition Lester Pearson's sudden reversal of his support for reneging and his decision to campaign in support of nuclear acquisition in 1963. Third, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's successful effort to withdraw from Canada's nuclear role in NATO by 1972. Finally, the total withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Canadian soil in 1984 and Trudeau's decisions related to the ending of Canada's nuclear role in NORAD.

Diefenbaker's fluctuating stance on nuclear sharing provides a rich case study for examining reneging. This case reaffirms the proposition that leaders who do not keep their commitments will be punished at the ballot box for their perceived incompetence and reputational damage they may inflict on their country.[6] Diefenbaker bound himself to nuclear sharing in NORAD and NATO by tying his hands and sinking costs into this commitment. The perception that he was reneging on these commitments directly led to his electoral defeat. However, Diefenbaker's choices were not due to his indifference to public opinion. This case demonstrates that catering to different types of domestic coalitions will result in different reneging strategies and affects the outcome of negotiations. At first, the Prime Minister attempted to form an anti-nuclear coalition that would appease anti-nuclear constituencies, while also retaining the support of those that were pro-acquisition. Initially, this straddle strategy involved delay and obfuscation. When avoiding the issue became impossible, Diefenbaker found a

[5]For example, Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004; Kreps, 2010; Leeds, 2003.

[6]Fearon, 1994, pp.580-581; Levy, McKoy, Poast, and Wallace, 2015, pp.997-999; Smith, 1998; Tomz, 2007, pp.835-836.

compromise solution: the standby approach, which would allow Canada to technically keep its nuclear commitments and nuclear weapons off its soil. Despite the considerable domestic constraints that Diefenbaker faced, his bargaining power was diminished by his domestic coalition in negotiations with the Americans: he did not have a credible threat of withdrawal, required American and allied consensus, and was vulnerable to restructuring attempts. Indeed, it was the United States' public criticism of Diefenbaker's administration and allied accusations of reneging that precipitated the collapse of the Conservative government. At the same time, a clear-cut case of foreign interference allowed Diefenbaker to reframe reneging as a nationalist cause. While Diefenbaker lost the election, records show that this anti-American and nationalist message resonated with some voters, convincing them that reneging was an act of nationalist defiance. The Americans were concerned enough with the force of a potential nationalist coalition that they stayed out of the election and tried to avoid direct confrontation with Diefenbaker.

While the Diefenbaker case demonstrates how domestic coalition type can affect reneging strategy and outcome, the Pearson chapter shows that leaders with the support of anti-nuclear coalitions might refrain from attempting to renege in the first place. Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, Pearson and the Liberal Party staked their position in opposition to nuclear acquisition on narrowly anti-nuclear grounds. While Pearson and the Liberals supported membership in NATO and NORAD, they argued that nuclear sharing would amount to the spread of nuclear weapons and an expansion of the nuclear club. Despite this position and Pearson's own personal anti-nuclear beliefs, in January 1963, Pearson reversed Liberal policy to support nuclear acquisition. This chapter showed that this reversal can be traced to Pearson's growing awareness of the international and domestic costs of reneging on Canada's nuclear commitments. Ultimately, despite his reservations about nuclear weapons, Pearson believed that maintaining the strength and stability of Canada's alliances and its reputation among allies was more important. Furthermore, he believed that voters would be sensitive to these costs as well. Pearson's gamble paid off: he was able to win the 1963 election, albeit with a minority government. While anti-nuclear activists abandoned the Liberal Party, the Liberals were able to retain their base to a greater extent than the Conservatives. They also attracted voters that were reluctant to support the Conservative Party because of Diefenbaker's nationalist reneging. Crucially, at the elite level, Pearson was able to retain most of the anti-nuclear members of his coalition, who did not abandon Pearson or the Liberals despite their disagreement on the nuclear issue.

The case of Trudeau and the withdrawal from Canada's nuclear commitment to NATO gets to the heart of the puzzle of this thesis. Despite warnings from Canadian officials of the high costs of reneging; despite initial pushback from both American and NATO officials; despite the generally positive view of NATO within Canadian society, Trudeau was able to renege on Canada's nuclear commitments, dramatically reduce its conventional commitments, and avoid domestic audience costs. Trudeau's success was due to the nature of his coalition that supported reneging: It saw conventional reductions and nuclear withdrawal as part of a broader nationalist agenda that would refocus defence priorities closer to home. Trudeau's strategy of coalition-building elevated nationalist and NATO-skeptic officials while sidelining and co-opting status quo officials. This resulted in reneging being framed as a compromise outcome.[7] At the international level, the support of a nationalist coalition provided Canadian negotiators with real bargaining power: they had a credible threat of withdrawal; were able to unilaterally tie their hands to particular outcomes during the pre-negotiation stage; and deterred restructuring attempts by the United States. Archival records show that Trudeau's nationalist coalition, especially the threats of withdrawal, had a major impact on the Americans' approach to negotiations, causing them to drop hard-line opposition to Canadian reductions.

The last chapter examines the final case of reneging: Trudeau's decision to withdraw nuclear weapons from Canadian soil. While the findings of this chapter are constrained by the limited accessed to archival material compared to the other cases, this chapter demonstrates some important limitations to the argument presented in this thesis. Firstly, presents a plausible case for the Realpolitik model, showing that there are multiple potential pathways to reneging. The timing of the withdrawal of the Bomarc and the CF-101 Voodoo corresponded with the relative decline of their military utility, the decline in systemic threat, and the availability of conventional alternatives. Secondly, the inability of Trudeau to easily translate reneging success from one set of nuclear commitments to another – or rather, convert his nationalist coalition against NATO into one against NORAD – demonstrates that formulating and directing a nationalist coalition towards reneging is a difficult and costly task.

8.2 Putnam's Two-Level Game

This research develops Putnam's model in three ways, each related to the three sources of bargaining power that are outlined in the argument: the credible threat of with-

[7] Halloran, 2006.

drawal and the size of the win-set; the willingness to act unilaterally and the pre-negotiation stage; and the vulnerability to restructuring and reverberations. These findings have implications for how this model should be applied to other contexts.

In Putnam's model, leverage is directly related to the win-set size. All else being equal, negotiators with larger win-sets have less bargaining power than those with narrower win-sets: "The larger the perceived win-set of the negotiator, the more he can be "pushed around" by the other Level I negotiators."[8] Those with narrow win-sets are better able to threaten involuntary defection if they do not get their way. According to Putnam, domestic groups with narrow win-sets provide their leaders with a credible threat of withdrawal: "the lower the cost of "no-agreement" to constituents, the smaller the win-set."[9] However, this logic only applies to negotiators that are attempting to *build u*p commitments as opposed to those that attempt to *wind down* commitments. In the case of reneging, the amount of leverage the size of the win-set will afford its negotiators will depend on its content. A tolerance of no deal will not always result in a narrower win-set. After all, single-issue coalitions have a low tolerance for no agreement, but a narrow win-set. Nationalist coalitions have a high tolerance of no agreement, but a wider win-set, as they are seeking more reductions to their alliance commitments. Thus, a wider win-set in this case represent a lower 'floor' for reductions to a state's alliance commitments.

The contrasting examples of Diefenbaker's reneging attempt in 1962 and Trudeau's attempt in 1969 shed light on how the relationship between win-set size, the credible threat of withdrawal, and leverage operates contrary to Putnam's predictions when applied to negotiations on *reducing* commitments. Both leaders relied on domestic constraints as leverage when negotiating with allies about the extent and nature of the reduction to their alliance commitments. Diefenbaker's anti-nuclear coalition would not tolerate the stationing of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil, nor would it tolerate a no-deal scenario. Despite the fact that the Americans believed that the standby proposal or something similar would be the only domestically workable agreement for Diefenbaker's coalition, this did not translate into real bargaining power. On the other hand, Trudeau's reliance on a nationalist coalition resulted in an arguably larger win-set. The Cabinet could have ratified a wide range of conventional reductions, alongside reneging on its nuclear commitment. Nevertheless, the threat of walking away from negotiations and leaving the alliance was far more credible in this case.

[8]Putnam, 1988, p.440.
[9]Ibid., p.443.

This demonstrates how narrow win-sets do not automatically confer a credible threat of withdrawal, nor do larger win-sets preclude it.

The content of the win-set and tolerance of no-deal is important for determining leverage in negotiations related to reneging. In 1969, NATO and the United States were forced to widen their win-sets and accept Canadian reductions that were previously deemed intolerable, rather than risk the collapse of negotiations and Canada's withdrawal from NATO. Thus, the size of status quo allies' initial win-set mattered less in this case than their aversion to a no-deal outcome.

The case studies also demonstrate that the pre-negotiation at the domestic level, the stage before Level I, can have major implications for the bargaining power of a reneging state. While Putnam accounts for this stage, it is not a main element of focus, as he describes it as primarily a stage where negotiators engage in "prior consultations and bargaining... to hammer out an initial position for the Level I negotiations."[10] My research demonstrates that this initial stage can establish not only the opening position, but also the strategies that will be pursued in Level I. Further, this stage is also important for the creation or foreclosure opportunities for restructuring.

Finally, by paying close attention to domestic coalition type, one can make predictions about when restructuring is likely to be attempted and whether it will result in positive or negative reverberations. Putnam hypothesizes that restructuring attempts are more likely to result in positive reverberation in dependent states, internationalist constituencies, and when attempted by allies as opposed to adversaries; furthermore, he argues that leaders should be reluctant to attempt restructuring when they fear that there is a high likelihood of negative reverberation.[11] Despite these claims, Putnam also concludes that "predicting the precise effect of foreign pressure is difficult" even though "reverberation seems to occur frequently in two-level games."[12] My work shows that nationalist constituencies should be more hostile to foreign restructuring, resulting in negative reverberations. Domestic coalition type can be a more powerful predictor than dependence on or the relationship with the foreign 'restructurer.'

The contrasting reactions of Diefenbaker and Pearson to General Norstad's and the State Department's public claims that Canada was reneging on its NATO commitments demonstrates this dynamic neatly. For Diefenbaker, these events created negative reverberations, pushing his position further away from that of his allies.

[10]Ibid., p.436.
[11]Ibid., pp.455-456.
[12]Ibid., p.455

They provided the impetus for the Prime Minister to turn the nuclear issue into a nationalist rallying cry. To a nationalist coalition, these were foreign intrusions that necessitated a leader who would stand up to them and not let Canada be 'pushed around.' For Pearson, these public statements justified the abandoning of his anti-nuclear position. It demonstrated that Canada was losing standing amongst its allies. Thus, these statements created positive reverberations among non-nationalists, putting in stark relief the international costs of reneging.

The Kennedy administration's continuous monitoring of the level of nationalism within Canada and its concerns about exerting too much pressure on the Canadian government demonstrates this dynamic. The State Department justified their press release on the grounds that most of the Canadian population did not have nationalist or anti-American views, making them more amenable to restructuring. When Diefenbaker made a concerted attempt to form a nationalist coalition and appeal to nationalist constituents in the 1963 elections, the Americans backed off. They did so despite their considerable interest in the outcome of the election, because they feared further restructuring attempts would ultimately be counterproductive and reinforce Diefenbaker's nationalist appeals. Learning from this episode, the Nixon administration also avoided public rebuke of Trudeau, fearing that it would strengthen his nationalist coalition and push him towards even more extreme reductions to Canada's alliance commitments.

8.3 The Costs of Reneging

This thesis has found that the costs that scholars have theorised make commitments binding – the material, reputational, and domestic audience costs – are not mere academic constructs, but were articulated by status quo politicians as real constraints on political behaviour. The looming threat of these costs was present in each case, regardless of the outcome. In the cases of attempted reneging, Diefenbaker and Trudeau persisted despite warning of these negative consequences. Indeed, in Diefenbaker's case, he succumbed to domestic audience costs, as his inability to fulfill Canada's nuclear commitments was a key factor in his electoral defeat in 1963. The interviews of Canadian voters that shunned the Conservative Party confirm past findings on the micro-foundations of audience costs: Voters believed that reneging would undermine Canada's reputation among its allies and Diefenbaker's handling of the nuclear issue

demonstrated his incompetence and lack of leadership.[13]

Pearson thought that reneging would be so domestically unpopular and internationally damaging that he reversed the Liberals' long-held opposition to nuclear acquisition and staked his campaign on maintaining Canada's nuclear commitment. In this case, the domestic support for nuclear acquisition had less to do with the value that Canadians ascribed to nuclear weapons themselves. Rather, it was related to their beliefs about the importance of maintaining alliance commitments and the underlying value of the alliances themselves. Likewise, the military necessity of the nuclear weapons systems was not the focus of Pearson's campaign. In fact, he promised to immediately begin the process of negotiating *out* of these commitments once acquisition was secured. Instead, the Liberals' campaign underscored the costs of reneging and the importance of maintaining Canada's reputation within its alliances and on the international stage. Pearson presented himself to voters as someone who was reliable and would keep Canada's commitments to its allies. At the same time, he castigated Diefenbaker as a leader who was recklessly endangering Canada's standing and security.

The presence of the costs related to reneging is an important finding, as most studies on alliance defection have focused on wartime contexts.[14] While the issues at stake may be different for peacetime as opposed to wartime commitments, the threat of material, reputational, and domestic costs resulting from defection provided a consistent incentive to maintain even politically controversial commitments. Indeed, the overall level of threat and the likelihood of the outbreak of war did not have a consistent effect on whether a leader would support reneging or maintaining commitments. While the Cuban Missile Crisis and heightened state of threat were proximate causes of Pearson's reversal, the same international stimuli increased Diefenbaker's reluctance to accept nuclear weapons for Canadian forces.

This qualitative examination of material, reputational, and domestic audience costs allows for more fine-grained conceptual development of them. For example, within the alliance reliability literature reputational costs are often narrowly operationalized as a weakened ability to form an alliance in the future.[15] The in-depth examination of the Canadian case allows for a richer understanding of how leaders

[13]Fearon, 1994, pp.580-581; Levy, McKoy, Poast, and Wallace, 2015, pp.997-999; Smith, 1998; Tomz, 2007, pp.835-836.

[14]For exceptions, see Catalinac, 2010; Duffield, 1992.

[15]Crescenzi, Kathman, Kleinberg, and Wood, 2012; Gibler, 2008; Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, and Cooper, 2016, p.94.

perceive these costs even when they anticipate they will remain a member of the alliance. In this case, leaders are concerned with the reputational effects of unreliability among allies as well as on the international stage more generally. Status quo oriented politicians often made references to the negative effects of reneging on Canada's status and standing within the alliance. For example, during the Defence Review, status quo officials worried that Canada would not be considered a "serious ally" within NATO if it reduced its commitment too greatly. This loss of standing and reputation for unreliability would undercut Canada's ability to influence its allies both in the context of the alliance and other multilateral institutions.

The discussions among status quo officials during the defence review in the late 1960s also underscores how alliances are considered facilitators of both strategic and economic cooperation. Reneging therefore could entail both kinds of material costs. While those that supported the status quo worried about the more immediate security deficit that Canadian withdrawals would entail, they were also concerned about how Canada's actions would affect NATO's credibility and stability more generally. The ubiquity of status quo officials' fears of a 'contagion effect' or 'reneging cascade' are striking and represent a strong incentive towards cooperation. Put in game theory terms, these officials see alliance cooperation as akin to a stag hunt, where cooperation is self-reinforcing as well as defection.[16] Economic concerns also strongly featured in status quo officials objects to reneging, revealing the interplay between security and economic cooperation.[17] When considering reneging on NATO commitments, the writers of the Defence Policy Review worried that a nationalistic defence policy could have negative reverberations on trade relations with allied nations. Thus, the threat of spillover was considered by Canadian officials and offered a powerful incentive to maintain the status quo.

While the Diefenbaker case affirms previous research on the existence and logics of audience costs, it also provides added nuanced insights. First, it shows that some leaders renege on commitments, despite the threat of audience costs. Diefenbaker did not renege because he was unaware of the potential domestic risks of appearing unreliable. He thought that he could avoid audience costs by convincing enough of the public that he had a good reason for opposing nuclear acquisition: because

[16]Nationalists, on the other hand, do not seem to be operating according to this logic. According to the 'stage hunt' metaphor, the nationalist view is essentially that they can hunt rabbits while the rest of the alliance takes care of the stag. This reasoning runs counter to the game theoretic logic that equilibria only exist in the state of mutual defection or mutual cooperation, and that one player's defection will have an unwinding effect on cooperation for the rest.

[17]On the interplay between strategic and economic ties between allies, see, for example, Mastanduno, 1998, 2020; Powers, 2004.

he had not made those commitments in the first place; because the international environment had rendered them obsolete; and because it was not in the national interest of Canada to accept these weapons. This approach lends credence to recent findings that leaders can avoid audience costs if they provide justifications for doing so.[18] At the same time, Diefenbaker's experience shows that not all justifications are viewed as credible by domestic audiences. In fact, not all types of domestic audiences may view the same justification as convincing. Second, the role of political elites in mitigating or amplifying domestic audience costs has been highlighted in several studies.[19] Diefenbaker's experience affirms these findings, as the collapse of his government clearly affected the views of voters on the Prime Minister's confidence and further politicised the nuclear issue. It also demonstrates that elite dissent can be its own form of domestic audience costs: elite-level rebellion against Diefenbaker's approach to nuclear sharing directly led to the fall of his government. This finding challenges a clear-cut separation between elite cohesion and the concept of domestic audience costs.

8.4 The Strength of Nationalist Coalitions

While the costs of reneging were salient to each case, both leaders, elites, and the wider public weighed them differently. This finding challenges Kreps's claim that the systemic incentives should result in elite consensus on the wisdom of avoiding defection and maintaining commitments.[20] Indeed, in each case, there was substantial elite *dissensus* on the prospect of reneging on alliance commitments. Depending on the coalition that supports reneging, leaders will face different sets of constraints and differing views of the reputational and material costs of reneging. Studies that examine the effects of domestic coalitions on audience costs and alliance commitment often focus on the left-right divide or the contrast of hawks and doves.[21] For example, scholars have argued that right-wing coalitions should be more sensitive to sovereignty costs and more skeptical of multilateral institutions than those on the left.[22] This research has demonstrated another salient dimension to commitment and defection: level of nationalism. Nationalism can transcend the traditional right/left divide and can have different implications depending on the context. While Diefenbaker and

[18]Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012.
[19]Ibid.; Saunders, 2015, 2018.
[20]Kreps, 2010.
[21]Kertzer and Brutger, 2016; Rapport and Rathburn, 2020.
[22]Rapport and Rathburn, 2020.

Trudeau stood at opposite sides of the Canadian political spectrum, both leaders drew upon nationalist rhetoric, emphasizing the importance of Canadian sovereignty in the face of multilateral and bilateral pressures.

These nationalist coalitions are important because they do not behave in the way that institutionalists predict. Indeed, nationalist constituencies' evaluations of the material and reputational costs of defection are configured differently. Fundamentally, nationalists will be skeptical of multilateral institutions that can dilute and compromise the pursuit of the national interest. As a result, nationalists should be less likely to punish leaders for reneging on international commitments in pursuit of nationalist causes.

This research suggests that nationalist groups focus on relative rather than absolute material gains and costs, even within institutionalized contexts. For example, while Canada benefited from the existence of NATO, Trudeau was preoccupied by the notion that it did not benefit to the same extent as its European allies. At the core of his nationalist justification for reneging was a focus on relative gains: if Canada did not benefit as much as its European allies, it should contribute less. On the other hand, status quo officials such as Leo Cadieux and Mitchell Sharp focused on the absolute gains of membership: if Canada lessened its contribution to NATO, the alliance as a whole would be weaker and less stable, undermining the benefits it provides to Canada.[23] Furthermore, the Diefenbaker case suggests that nationalist constituencies may be especially sensitive to entrapment concerns.[24] Diefenbaker's campaign rhetoric about Canada being a "decoy" or a "burnt sacrifice" draws on fears of entrapment, highlighting the potential security *costs* of the alliance, rather than the benefits.[25] Under Trudeau, nationalist members of Cabinet also highlighted the material benefits of reneging rather than the costs, such as the redirection of resources towards more 'national' security priorities or even away from the security sphere altogether towards domestic projects.

Nationalist constituencies also conceive of international reputation differently. While both Diefenbaker and Trudeau advocated for reneging, they were not uncon-

[23]This divide between focusing on absolute versus relative gains could extend to leaders' evaluations of specific weapons systems. For example, Trudeau wanted each individual weapons system's value to be rigorously analysed and specifically justified.

[24]Simpson (2001) argues that Canadian leaders can be divided into two categories according to their belief systems regarding NATO: defenders and critics. One of the key categories that distinguishes these two belief systems is their view on entrapment and abandonment (Simpson, 2001, pp.41-49, 72-74).

[25]JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 5 April 1963; JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 4 April 1963a.

cerned with Canada's reputation: specifically, its reputation for not being pushed around or dictated to by outside powers. While Pearson highlighted the importance of Canada's status as a good ally, both Trudeau and, eventually, Diefenbaker emphasized the normative and reputational gains of breaking away from its allies and pursuing a more independent path. Thus, nationalist coalitions tend to focus on and emphasize the reputational gains of reneging and discount the reputational costs.

While this research has highlighted the interaction between domestic coalition type and audience costs, the type of coalition can also mitigate costs at the international level to a degree. In the case of Trudeau's cuts to NATO, the nationalist nature of his coalition deterred the United States from trying to directly punish Canada. Indeed, advisor Helmut Sonnenfeldt's warning that pushing the Canadians too hard to retain commitments could effectively "slam the door" on further negotiations by empowering the NATO-skeptic bloc in Cabinet convinced both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defence to back down for a hard-line strategy.[26] Trudeau's skillful formation of a credible nationalist coalition not only affected the level of domestic audience costs and the outcome of negotiation, but also affected the costs meted out at the international level, at least in the short-term.

8.5 The Role of Political Leadership

While nationalist coalitions provide leaders with powerful leverage in international negotiations, the case study presented here also demonstrates that the production and maintenance of nationalist coalitions is a costly affair. This has several implications. Not all attempts to direct a nationalist movement against a particular institution will succeed. Regardless of whether a nationalist movement is organic or contrived, leaders need to be skillful in order to successfully marshal nationalist coalitions towards a concrete foreign policy goal. Leaders will also need to skillfully balance the will of extreme factions against the more moderate members of their coalition, lest they risk its collapse. Given the amount of effort involved and the potential costs of failure, leaders are likely to be selective in their reneging attempts.

The variation in outcomes between Diefenbaker in 1963 and Trudeau in 1969 points to the importance of leadership in managing a nationalist coalition towards successful reneging. While both relied upon nationalist coalitions and rhetoric in justifying their opposition to Canada's nuclear commitment, Trudeau's message was

[26]FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.94, 28 May 1969.

more coherent, and he was more organized in managing and coopting dissident Ministers within his Cabinet. It is important to highlight that *both* Diefenbaker and Trudeau faced divided Cabinets and publics that were largely supportive of the alliances in question.[27] Thus, the outcomes of reneging success and failure was not necessarily determined from the outset. The role of leadership skill and agency provides an important mitigating factor on the ability of a nationalist coalition to allow for successful reneging. Furthermore, the management of elites is an important aspect for successful reneging and crucial to mitigating audience costs.[28]

Trudeau succeeded in his nationalist campaign, while Diefenbaker failed for several reasons. Firstly, Trudeau was consistent in his messaging. Trudeau presented the reassessment of Canada's defence priorities as an impartial and thorough process, with the outcome not being determined from the outset; however, Trudeau also consistently indicated that change was on the horizon. Once the review was completed, Trudeau did not deviate from his message for a "planned and phased reduction" of Canada's contribution to NATO.[29] Secondly, Trudeau opened the dialogue to allow for more NATO-skeptic voices to participate. This shifted the balance of power within Cabinet, allowing for status quo officials to be co-opted into his nationalist coalition. Thirdly, Trudeau decisively called the consensus within Cabinet, enforcing a policy that all Ministers were bound to abide by. The Prime Minister also prioritized withdrawing from Canada's nuclear role in these discussions and ensured that Canada leave this role by 1972.

On the other hand, Diefenbaker's attempts to maintain an anti-nuclear coalition ultimately undermined his ability to form a nationalist coalition at the elite or mass level. The Conservative's surge later in the election suggested that Diefenbaker's nationalist appeals did resonate with a significant portion of the Canadian electorate. However, while Diefenbaker's electoral fortunes seem to improve as time went on, he ultimately could not shake off his previous mishandling of the nuclear issue. Most crucial in preventing Diefenbaker from forming a nationalist coalition was his inconsistency in both policy and rhetoric. The most obvious example is that in the late 1950s, Diefenbaker made statements that asserted his support for nuclear acquisition and promised that these commitments would be fulfilled within the near future; however,

[27] Arguably, Trudeau faced a more unfavourable balance-of-power within his Cabinet, as both the Secretary of State of External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence were firmly supportive of the status quo. Diefenbaker, on the other hand, had a powerful anti-nuclear ally in his Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green, who was highly skeptical of Canada's nuclear commitments.

[28] Saunders, 2015, 2018.

[29] DHH, RP, 2109, 3 April 1969.

by the early 1960s, Diefenbaker's seemed caught in between the pro- and anti-nuclear factions, adopting a straddle strategy that left his position murky. Indeed, Diefenbaker only formed a coherent nationalist anti-acquisition message during the 1963 campaign. His indecisiveness allowed for these two opposing camps to strengthen within Cabinet. The infighting between these Ministers ultimately spilled out into the public sphere, ending in the resignation of several key Ministers and the collapse of government in 1963. Diefenbaker's refusal to call the consensus within Cabinet further fuelled these divides. This prolonged the crisis by preventing dissident Ministers from being bound by Cabinet solidarity in support of any one position.

Crucially, Trudeau managed to keep most of the dissent within the confines of Cabinet. While Trudeau faced threats of resignation, they never materialised and were issued privately. Status quo Ministers were also bound by Cabinet solidarity to adhere to the decisions made by the government. The strategic maneuvering by the Prime Minister, which elevated the most extreme anti-NATO positions in Cabinet, allowed for substantial withdrawals to be framed as a compromise domestically as well as internationally.[30] Diefenbaker, on the other hand, was unable to manage the dissent amongst his Ministers. The turmoil in Cabinet over the nuclear issue reverberated into the public sphere: not only did it make a relatively esoteric defence issue one of the primary subjects of the 1963 campaign, but the discord among Conservative elites undermined popular confidence in Diefenbaker's leadership. It also undermined his bargaining power with the Americans. While the potential for controversy on nuclear sharing was always present, the issue never reached the same kind of public scrutiny as it did in the early 1960s. Diefenbaker, due to his unwillingness to put out a clear stance, was not able to control the message around nuclear weapons, which led to the issue taking on a life of its own.

These cases demonstrate that reneging is difficult to successfully execute; that the political costs to a botched attempt at withdrawal from an alliance commitment can be extremely high. Trudeau's aborted attempt to renege on Canada's nuclear role in NORAD also reflects the difficulty of reneging. Political leaders need to devote a good deal of energy and political capital towards formulating a nationalist coalition in favour of reneging. In this case, it appears that other issues took precedence for the administration, allowing Canada to retain nuclear weapons on its soil until 1984. It is also possible that the nature of the nationalist coalition and messaging, which prioritised Canadian national security rather than an anti-American brand of nationalism, was a less effective vehicle to leverage withdrawal from a North American

[30]Halloran, 2006.

nuclear defence role. Unlike NATO, NORAD had important implications for Canada's national security. A pullback on Canada's contribution to North American defence would only increase the United States' dominance in this sphere.

8.6 Implications and Future Research

This thesis suggests that an upsurge of nationalism may lead to more political leaders attempting to restructure institutions towards a more favourable distribution of costs and benefits for their state. Thus, a rise in nationalist may not lead to outright exit from various institutions. However, reneging is a risky strategy: if negotiations collapse or allies 'call the bluff' of reneging leaders, it may lead to withdrawal or an increase in tensions between allies. Regardless of the particular outcome, a widespread upsurge in nationalism across the globe will likely have negative implications on the health of international institutions. The case of Canada demonstrates that nationalism can rise and affect the institutional commitments even within states that have entrenched political economies favouring 'outward-looking' or "internationalizing" diplomatic, economic, and security policy.[31]

Two other recent examples demonstrate this dynamic between nationalism, reneging, and the threat of withdrawal: The United Kingdom's exit from the EU and the United States' renegotiation of NAFTA. While both cases technically involved 'exit' from a particular institution, they actually amounted to attempts to restructure institutionalized commitments in the favour of the initiating state. Ultimately, the UK and the EU were able to negotiate a deal that dramatically restructured, but did not completely sever their relationship. In pre-Brexit negotiations, nationalist appeals were used in the hope that the UK could retain the benefits that it enjoyed as a member of the EU, while shedding the commitments that entailed high material or sovereignty costs. Indeed, the threat of 'no-deal' or the complete demise of the institutional relationship and reciprocal commitments between actors was used by both the US and the UK in attempts to extract a better deal from their status quo counterparts at the international level. Thus, in both of these cases, rising nationalism was directed at a particular institution and commitment set, but resulted in reneging rather than complete withdrawal.

Conceptually, more work needs to be done on defining the various facets of defection. This study highlighted the importance of reneging, due to its costliness for actors in institutionalised alliances. Building on the definition presented here, and

[31] Solingen, 2007, p.41.

others such as McInnis's definition of defection, future studies could lay out the various options a state can take when it does not want to retain a commitment. For example, within the realm of alliance commitments: States can renege on a commitment that they are currently fulfilling; they can refuse to renew their commitment or set time limits on commitments; they can stall in bringing a commitment to fulfillment after ratification; they can diminish their commitment without reneging on it. Characterisation of various types of defection leads to theoretical questions: When and why do states engage in particular forms of defection, and when are they most likely to take some kind of compensatory action? Future studies can also explore the relative frequency of different types of defection. This study hypothesizes that reneging should be more rare than other types of defection, as it is more costly.

Future researchers can also test the generalisability of the domestic coalition type argument by applying it to other case studies that encompass other states, institutions, and/or time periods. A comparative approach may also illuminate the underlying causes for domestic coalition type and why certain leaders pursue certain kinds of coalitions. The application of this argument to other cases will also allow for the uncovering of further mechanisms for defection and reneging. While the presence of a nationalist coalition explains Trudeau's withdrawal from Canada's nuclear role in NATO, this finding does not preclude other pathways for reneging and defection.

More research is needed on the interaction between junior alliance membership, nationalism, and reneging. As Catalinac notes, "there has been little research to date that has addressed the questions of when states will become unhappy with their surrender of autonomy, and what they might do about it."[32] While Morrow and Catalinac highlight that changes in power or threat perception can result in increases in demands for autonomy among junior alliance members, my research suggests that there are also purely domestic level causes of demands for autonomy.[33] While junior status has been found to make defection less likely in wartime contexts, domestically-driven reneging may be more likely in junior alliance members, since questions of dependency and sovereignty are more likely to be relevant within their domestic spheres. On the other hand, senior alliance members are unlikely to have such concerns and may therefore choose less controversial reductions over reneging. Senior alliance members may also worry that reneging on their alliance commitments would inflame or be an impetus for these tensions for their junior allies. For example, the American reluctance to withdraw all nuclear weapons from Greece in the 1960s

[32]Catalinac, 2010, p.334.
[33]Ibid., pp.324-325, 332; Morrow, 1990.

and 1970s, despite concerns about the physical security of the weapons, was related to their desire not to "further alienate the Greek government from NATO."[34] More research is needed to determine the extent to which nationalist domestic movements are more likely to be a 'weapon of the weak' for reneging on alliance commitments.

My thesis also suggests further avenues of research for studies on domestic audience costs. Most recent studies on audience costs take the form of experiments, focusing on the audience side. Essentially, they examine under what circumstances do domestic audiences punish international unreliability in their leadership. However, demonstrating the existence of audience costs cannot fully explain how they might affect foreign policy. There is another side of the token to explain how audience costs affect outcomes that deserves equal attention: the role of political leaders. Do political leaders recognize domestic audience costs and act to avoid them? If so, under what circumstances does the threat of audience costs affect foreign policy decision-making? This thesis challenges the often-repeated assertion that audience costs are too difficult to study qualitatively or directly due to selection effects.[35] This argument asserts that if audience costs exist, leaders should be deterred from reneging in the first place, leading to a paucity of case study material to engage with.[36] While well-reasoned, this deductive argument pre-supposes what kind of empirical material is actually available.[37] The frequency of policy reversals in this case suggests that researchers are likely to find cases similar to Diefenbaker's, where leaders make international commitments only to renege. Finally, this thesis shows that political leaders do recognize the impact of audience costs and act accordingly to avoid them. Yet, these strategies can be self-defeating. Thus, merely providing a justification "on the basis of new information" may not be enough to avoid audience costs: domestic audiences need to find them credible.[38] More research is needed to assess how different justifications can interact with different domestic audiences.

[34]Kristensen, 2005, p.25.

[35]Kertzer and Brutger, 2016, p.234; Schultz, 2001; Trager and Vavreck, 2011, p.532.

[36]Ibid.

[37]When audience costs have been studied qualitatively, it has been in relation to threats during international crises, see Snyder and Borghard, 2011; Trachtenberg, 2012.

[38]Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012, p.323.

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